ICAC
Commissioner Lander reflects on seven years of investigating corruption, misconduct & maladministration MICHAEL ESPOSITO
B
ruce Lander ended his seven-year tenure as South Australia’s Independent Commissioner Against Corruption on 1 September. His final public report, “Looking Back”, reflects on the past seven years as the State’s chief public integrity watchdog and makes a number of recommendations for reform of ICAC legislation.
MEASURE OF SUCCESS Mr Lander said he was proud of what his office had achieved over the past seven years, and expressed the view that the impact and value of the office was not as well understood as it could be. He made the point that the success of the office should not be measured by way of the number of successful prosecutions that have arisen from an ICAC investigation, but instead should be evaluated by considering he broader impact of the ICAC in terms of enhancing and promoting integrity within public agencies. “Corruption investigations that do not lead to a prosecution nevertheless result in a detailed review to identify weaknesses in an agency’s practices, policies, procedures and those findings are routinely communicated to agency heads,” Mr Lander said in his report. Mr Lander cited several examples of investigations leading to significant reforms, including: • Changes to the manner in which Government assesses unsolicited bids (resulting from the Gillman investigation) • Reforms to the operation of mental health facilities (resulting from the Oakden investigation) • Significant improvements in administration and governance practices in the Public Trustee, Safework SA and City of Playford Council, following investigations into those organisations. The ICAC office has developed training programs to improve governance and promote integrity in pubic bodies, and has published numerous reports based on state-wide integrity surveys, that address integrity issues.
30 THE BULLETIN October 2020
RESOURCES While all agencies would welcome additional resources, Mr Lander by and large has been satisfied with the level of funding allocated to his office. However, Mr Lander reported that his request for funding to conduct an evaluation of SA Health was rejected by the State Government, who argued that the ICAC office had discretion with regards to the use the funds in its existing budget to conduct investigations. Mr Lander said that he sought an additional $2 million in funding to evaluate SA Health because “an evaluation of SA Health could not be undertaken at the same cost as previous and current evaluations for the simple reasons that SA Health is so big and so specialised”.
ASSESSING SERIOUSNESS OF CORRUPTION & MALADMINISTRATION Mr Lander observed in his report that his office had progressively become better at assessing evidence and discerning whether the conduct that is the subject of an assessment was likely to amount to corruption. “We have become better at focusing our investigation resources on the most serious and complex corruption matters
and we have advanced our capacity and expertise to investigate them,” he said. Mr Lander supported the existing jurisdiction of ICAC, which includes misconduct and maladministration in addition to corruption, observing that the line between misconduct, maladministration and corruption is often unclear, and the evidence the office evaluates in order to discern the gravity of the conduct is often incomplete. “The benefit of having a single agency capable of dealing with all three forms of impropriety is that it can continue to address a matter even when information changes the way in which the impugned conduct is assessed.”
TRUST V OVERSIGHT: A BALACING ACT The “Looking Back” report reflected on the delicate balance between trust and oversight in public institutions. Mr Lander acknowledged that too much oversight could be oppressive and degrade trust, but noted that there has been a number of occasions where, during the course of the ICAC office’s work, institutions have been found to have had insufficient oversight mechanisms. He noted the heightened risk of corruption, misconduct and administration when public officers who gain the trust of employers operate with minimal oversight.
