optimization paradigm

1.4. Procedural and ecological rationality as the alternative to the optimization paradigm

Gigerenzer et al. (1999) understand ecological rationality as the feature of heuristic strategy, asserting that the degree of ecological rationality depends on the degree to which the subject is adapted to the structure of the external environment. Less formally, the ecological rationality criterion addresses the agents’ ability to design, transform, and adjust their behavioural strategies constrained to their habitat. Under the aforementioned theory, substantive rationality does not operate as the normative principle of rational human behaviour anymore. Ecological rationality is a descendant of the procedural rationality concept developed by Simon (1968), who emphasized that operating in the conditions of uncertainty requires human beings to rely both on conscious analysis and feedback from the external environment (Simon, 1990). Under the neoclassical framework, the necessary condition of rationality is achieving the best possible outcome (a utility-maximizing consumption bundle, a cost-minimizing combination of inputs, a social welfare-maximizing public policy, etc.).

In contrast, under the procedural rationality framework, human rationality is revealed in the process of designing an intelligent strategy of interaction with the external environment and the ability to interpret the signals coming from the external environment. The ecological rationality framework might be treated as Simon’s (1968) abstract concept of procedural rationality utilized in applied decision-making science. Due to the complexity of the external environment and the lack of certainty (Gigerenzer, 2000; 2007; 2008a; 2015), agents pursuing the appropriate principles of communication and interaction have better chances for survival than agents rational in the substantive sense.

The ecological rationality paradigm is argued to serve as the appropriate theoretical foundation for both the individual patterns of conduct and decision-making (Gigerenzer, 2000; 2007; 2008a; 2008b; 2015) and social interaction (V. Smith, 2003; 2010) analysis. Such uniformity might be mistaken for heterogeneousness: for instance, Dekker and Remic (2008) assert that “there are two different conceptions of ecological rationality, which represent different ways of integrating psychology and economics” (p. 303), represented by G. Gigerenzer and V. Smith, respectively. This claim can be, to some extent, justified by the fact that, for Gigerenzer (2000; 2007; 2008a; 2008b; 2015), the central area of interest is the process of selecting, transforming, and adjusting the strategies by individuals, while V. Smith (2003; 2010) concentrates on the nature and role of “spontaneously developed social structures” (“collective intelligence”). However, following social norms represents a particular type of heuristic strategy (see Blythe