Journal of Political Affairs 2016

Journal of Political Affairs

2016 Edition

Concordia University's Undergraduate Political Review

Journal of Political Affairs is a collection of undergraduate papers relating to scholarship in political science. The Journal encompasses essays in public policy, political theory and philosophy, international politics, comparative politics, Canadian politics, and international political economy. It also includes papers from other disciplines that address issues of political importance.

Copyright Š Journal of Political Affairs 2017 The Journal of Political Affairs retains First North American Serial Rights The JPA is a yearly publication produced by the Political Science Department at Concordia University, Montreal.

Except for brief passages quoted in newspaper, magazine, radio or television reviews, no part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying or recording, or by an information storage and retrieval system, without written permission from the author of the essays.

ISSN 2371-2686 (Print) ISSN 2371-2694 (Online) ISBN 978-1-5251-0272-1 (Print) Typset in Times New Roman & Crimson Text Design, layout, and cover art by LĂŠandre Larouche Journal of Political Affairs Concordia University 1455 De Maisonneuve Blvd. W., Montreal Quebec, Canada, H3G 1M8 https://www.facebook.com/pajournal/ http://journalofpoliticalaffairs.com/

2016 Edition

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__________ JPA Team __________

GENERAL MANAGER

Léandre Larouche

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

Heloise Martorell

ASSOCIATE EDITORS

George Stoyanov Seeba Chaachouh

COPY EDITORS

Kayla Fanning Jessica Coe

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__________ Table of Content __________

Acknowledgements

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General Manager's Letter Léandre Larouche

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Editor-In-Chief's Letter Heloise Martorell

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Neoconservatism: Past, Present, and Future Alexandre Viger-Collins 5 The Personal is Not Political: Tocqueville’s Gender Equality in 1850s America Sarah Smith 21

Keynesian Economics: Shift in American Political Culture post 2008 Economic Recession Elsa Rathgeber

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Costly Signals and Revealing Intentions: The SinoAmerican Rapprochement Jason Poirier Lavoie

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The Impacts of Religion and Democracy on the Political Development of the State of Israel Sonia Ahimana 77 “Multiculturalism Has Failed”: Which Factors are really to Blame?

Felicia Leone Editing Team

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__________ Foreword __________

Acknowledgements The Journal of Political Affairs would like to express its sincere gratitude to the people that allowed its publication. We thank the executive members of the Political Science Student Association for their help and support. Specifically, President Nora Molina and Academic Vice President Alex Decarie; without them, the 2016 issue would not have seen the light of day. We thank Jason Poirier Lavoie and Ian Pelekis from the Canadian Centre for Strategic Studies for showing us the ins and outs of publishing an undergraduate journal.

We thank the authors, editors, and copy editors for complying with the multiple rounds of editing.

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General Manager's Letter One of the things I've learned from working with the JPA is that you never know what you signed up for until the end. One morning, during my first semester at Concordia, somebody made an announcement saying that the JPA was looking for associate editors. I was fresh out of Cégep, new to Montréal, and eager to get involved in the university community. I assumed I could do that, although my field of studies is not Political Science but English Literature and Professional Writing. It turned out that I got the job, which surprised me somewhat.

However, as we started working on the project, organizational problems forced us to delay the publication of the 2016 issue. This very delay finally led me to take on the role of General Manager.

Once you start getting involved, whatever project it may be, so many opportunities begin to emerge; and the beauty of it is that things often get most exciting when they go wrong. A university is like a maze: although it gets confusing at times, you find your way by opening door after door and finding unexpected things. This is how you get to know yourself, your strength, and your weaknesses; and this how you get to know what you want to do – or not do – with your life.

At the time I am writing this, I am still somewhat in disbelief. I consider myself very lucky to have been given this opportunity, and I realize how far we've come from to finally deliver this academic journal.

I hope you will appreciate reading these papers as much as we did, and I hope they will make you think as hard as we worked. I would like to thank personally Heloise, George, Seeba, Jessica, and Kayla for being such an amazing team to work with. I am also indebted to the PSSA team for bringing me in. I was an outsider, and yet they gave me their full trust to undertake this beautiful project.

Léandre Larouche April 1, 2017 Montreal, QC

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Editor-in-Chief's Letter After four years of undergraduate studies with two courses to go, I find myself at the library, once again, trying to find the words as I so often did when I wrote dozens of research papers. Listening to Ludovico Einaudi’s Una Mattina, I am trying my best to reflect on my last year of university and my role in the undergraduate academic community.

My interest in editing dates back to my second year of university, after I had successfully completed a peer-review for a fellow student’s paper. Editing gave me the tools to share my opinion, to give constructive criticism, and to learn new dimensions of political science. As much as I enjoyed writing my own research papers, I welcomed the opportunity to be able to help others complete the same project. The Journal of Political Affairs gave me the platform to pursue this passion.

I started as an associate editor, along with Léandre, George, and Seeba. Due to some delays of the 2016 publication, the four of us became the sole members and I volunteered to take on the role of editor-in-chief. Fortunately, I knew I was not alone as Léandre and I were to work collaboratively.

Each paper is the product of tireless authors and editors. I want to thank George, Seeba, Jessica, and Kayla; their hard work produced a timeless piece of academic achievement. I want to thank Sarah for leaving us her legacy; I hope that we did this journal justice. I also want to thank Nora, Alex, and Ian, whose help was vital for this issue to see the light of day. Finally, I want to thank Léandre for all of his work and support thoughout this process.

Heloise Martorell April 10, 2017 Montreal, QC

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__________ Alexandre Viger-Collins __________

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Neoconservatism: Past, Present, and Future Born and raised in Montreal, Alexandre Viger-Collins completed his BA at Concordia University in 2016, majoring in Political Science with a Minor in Psychology. He was named a Faculty of Arts and Science Scholar for 2015-2016. In 2017, he began a MA in Political Science at the Université de Montréal. Alexandre’s academic interests revolve primarily around Quebec, particularly the issue of sovereignty and the province’s identity politics. However, his academic interests also include Canadian politics more generally, U.S. politics, and the left-right divide.

Abstract Neoconservatism is an ideology that is either on the decline or is permanently embedded in our politics, depending on who you ask.

Alexandre Viger-Collins examines what neoconservatism is in Canada today and how it originally gained sway in Canadian political discourse.

In this paper, one can trace neoconservatism’s Canadian roots, beginning in the mid-to-late 1970’s with the decline of Keynesianism and the implementation of monetarist policies by the federal government, as well as the election of the first neoconservative provincial government; that of Sterling Lyon’s Progressive Conservatives in Manitoba.

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Introduction Neoconservatism is an ideology that has been seemingly omnipresent for the past thirty-five years. What was once a fringe movement became influential not only on the policies of right-leaning parties, but also on those on the left of the political spectrum. This paper is not an exhaustive account of the history of neoconservatism; it will instead focus on three specific topics. First, the neoconservative ideology and its influences will be discussed. Second, the political roots of neoconservatism in Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom will be explored. Finally, the paper will examine whether or not, in the wake of recent events, neoconservatism has a future as an ideology which will enjoy continued support amongst parts of the electorate and with those politicians who seek to implement its core beliefs, despite the negative effects on the welfare state. Globalization may prove to be a major hurdle for opponents of the neoconservative agenda, given both the ability and the willingness of major corporations to relocate whenever they perceive that government policies may be detrimental to their ability to maximize value for their shareholders.

The Neoconservative Ideology One definition of neoconservatism states that it “involves a core set of set of beliefs which include a preference for down-sizing government, a belief in the efficacy of private enterprise and hence a preference for deregulating the economy” (Nevitte & Gibbins 1984, 385). However, if one wants to further understand neoconservatism, it is important to consider how it is at odds with the welfare state and its outcomes. There are parts of the welfare state that are tolerated, such as unemployment insurance, but what neoconservatives dislike the most about the welfare state is the large bureaucratic apparatus created by it and its determination to solve social issues (Kristol 2011, 9).

Neoconservatives understand that the welfare state does not stop at formal equality as provided by the law, but goes further in ensuring equality by utilizing redistribution of economic resources (Laycock 2002, 41). In Canada, many of the top neoconservative thinkers “follow the American new right in accepting Hayek’s and Friedman’s insistence 6

that the pluralist political competition of liberal society should not recognize claims to political influence that do not prove their worth through the success in the economic marketplace� (Laycock 2002, 47).

Another way to put the motives of neoconservatives is that they reject the social-democratic minimum, which includes three key features: first, government emphasis on social, not market, priorities, in our capitalist society; second, the continuation of the welfare state in order to compensate for market failures; third, economic policies that prioritize full employment rather than focussing on inflation (Chorney & Hansen 1985, 18). Until the rise of neoconservatism at the end of the 1970s, the social democratic minimum was a given, and what parties on the right and center made sure to do was avoid a social democratic surplus, in which the state may become so activist as to be seen as negative (Chorney & Hansen 1985, 18). However, neoconservatives reject the concept of the social democratic minimum in its entirety, as is first demonstrated by Sterling Lyon's Progressive Conservative government of Manitoba's commitment to ‘rolling back the state’ when it came to power in 1977 (Chorney & Hansen 1985, 18). Essentially, neoconservatives reject the social democratic minimum, since the free market is hampered by the state playing a role in economic activities.

The issue here is that neoconservatives have a problem defining the absolute minimum that the government can do; even centre parties believe the state should not overextend its reach. Instead, neoconservatives wish to see not one iota of interference by the state in the market, and they contend that the state should not be playing any role that the free market could provide. This is why neoconservatives have such a polarizing image; there is no exception to their belief that the state must be diminished at all costs.

Neoconservatism & the Welfare State When it comes to the welfare state, neoconservatives have issues with two groups that they see as benefiting from the welfare state at the expense of the larger public interest: the bureaucracy and the special interests. The views that neoconservatives hold of the bureaucracy deri7

rive from public choice theory, which sees civil servants as similar to anybody else in that they make decisions based on self-interest; in neoclassical terms, utility maximization, rather than the ideal of the collective good (Thompson 2008, 361). The problem, according to neoconservatives, is that this means that civil servants are motivated to constantly expand the bureaucratic apparatus of the welfare state in order to serve their own financial benefit, even if this is not in the public interest (Thompson 2008, 362). This loathing of bureaucracy fits the neoconservative ideology, considering that it is one that is against large government, thus preferring small government. Even economic theorists such as Joseph Schumpeter (1976, 206), who believe that the bureaucracy is not an inherently negative conception, acknowledge that it is naive to expect that civil servants serve only in the public’s interest without any sense of self-interest.

This self-interest of civil servants ties into the other group neoconservatives are at odds with, the so-called ‘special interests.’

Neoconservatives define this group as “any group that asks for or benefits from government agencies’ efforts to offset the market’s distribution of benefits and opportunities” (Laycock 2002, 57). Among those included in this category are “feminist lobby groups, Native organizations, ethnic and cultural minority groups, state-aided arts and cultural organizations, providers of state-subsidized legal assistance to the poor or traditionally disadvantaged.” (Laycock 2002, 57).

Neoconservatives view the relationship between the bureaucracy and special interests as strong because special interests advocate for an expanded government that civil servants are all too willing to provide in order to serve their self-interest (Thompson 2008, 365).

Neoconservatives see the mutually beneficial relationship between the bureaucracy and special interests share as conducive to negative impacts far greater than simply wasteful government. What neoconservatives believe is that this relationship is detrimental to our political system, since they are a burdensome influence on politicians (Thompson 2008, 365). Elected officials, instead of serving in the interests of the public, cater to the ever growing bureaucracy and special interest groups in ord8

er to win elections, and “accommodate an inflation that passed the costs of this expansion on to future generations but allowed the building of power-winning coalitions in the here and now” (Thompson 2008, 368).

Neoconservative Influences Neoconservatism is not a brand new set of ideas; instead it harks back to the concept of laissez-faire economics as a part of classical liberalism, which is, in this case, anti-government in nature and against the philosophies behind the advent of the welfare state (Nevitte & Gibbins 1984, 391). This is not the only way in which neoconservatism resembles classical liberalism rather than traditional conservatism. The hallmark of individualism in liberalism is key to neoconservatism as well, though in the neoconservative ideology this "translates into a weaker commitment to the use of government to promote or protect disadvantaged groups, such as racial minorites [sic] or women" (Nevitte & Gibbins 1984, 392). However, while neoconservatives do support the classical liberal idea of equality of opportunity, they are against the idea of equality of outcome (Nevitte & Gibbins 1984, 392). Similarly, neoconservatives use the strict classical liberalist definition of egalitarianism. They stand against the more current form of egalitarianism which would “require a deliberate manipulation of the environment ... [and] ... would be wholly irreconcilable with the ideal of a freedom in which individuals can use their own knowledge and skill to shape [the] environment” (Steele 2007, 70). Therefore, individual responsibility and small government are seen, by neoconservatives, as the cure to solve any larger societal issues, not the welfare state.

Friedrich Hayek, one of the primary influences on public choice theory, wrote about the overbearing power of the bureaucracy and special interests. He argues that “a political party hoping to achieve and maintain power will have little choice but to use its powers to buy the support of particular groups by the promise of special privileges” (Thompson 2008, 366). Hayek’s work in public choice theory is not his only contribution to the neoconservative movement. Hayek also states 9

that government has reached a point where its influence on society was too vast and unwieldy, and that without limits being placed on government, liberty would be threatened by special interests trying to bend government to their will (Laycock 2002, 57). These limits include reducing the amount of taxes government could collect from citizens, thereby weakening their ability to construct the redistributive policies of the welfare state (Laycock 2002, 65). The views of Hayek influenced British Prime Minister and noted neoconservative Margaret Thatcher, who read much of Hayek’s works (Jeffrey 1999, 11) and influenced the predecessors of the Conservative Party of Canada, the Reform Party and the Canadian-Alliance Party (Laycock 2002, 59). To these parties, in order for us “to recover the individual initiative and responsibility that Canada has lost, while simultaneously lifting a massive burden from government budgets, we must do away with much of the ‘compulsory’ state-supported social safety net” (Laycock 2002, 60).

Milton Friedman is another primary influence on the neoconservative movement. Friedman shares many of the same beliefs that Hayek holds about the welfare state and how it was inefficient, mainly beneficial to the bureaucracy and special interests, and eliminated individual responsibility (Butler 1985, 204). However, Friedman’s main contribution to neoconservatism is monetarism. His economic theories of monetarism provide ample ammunition for neoconservatives against the Keynesian policies of the welfare state.

While Keynesian economics focus on employment by way of government investment through deficits and taxation, monetarism focuses on regulating the money supply in order to prevent inflation (Butler 1985, 18). When the inflation crisis of the 1970s could not be adequately solved by Keynesian economics, Friedman and monetarism provide what seemed like a solution to the problem (Springer 2015, 8).

To Friedman, government still has a role to play in the economy, but this would be through its control of the money supply instead of taxation and investment (Drucker 1981, 7). Government also did not need to spend money to ensure full employment because monetarists, like Friedman, believe that at least in the long run, there would be no such thing as 10

unemployment (Davidson 1981, 169). Therefore, they saw no need for government to invest in the economy to ensure full employment. Thus, while monetarism is not going to lead to the end of government, it would very much reduce its overall role in the economy, which appeased neoconservatives who wanted small government.

The Political Roots of Neoconservatism Before examining neoconservatism in the Canadian context, the influence of neoconservatism from both the U.K. and the U.S. must be examined, since they are “the two countries which are usually considered the most relevant reference points for appreciating, even anticipating, the direction of Canadian public policy” (Nevitte & Gibbins 1984, 384). Margaret Thatcher’s and Ronald Reagan’s policies, as well as the theories behind them, influenced Canada’s neoconservative movement. In the U.K., Thatcher’s rise to power in 1979 was not seen as an endorsement of her neoconservative agenda as much as the electorate being dissatisfied with the Labour government at the time (Jeffrey 1999, 12). However, once Thatcher became Prime Minister, she wasted no time implementing her neoconservative agenda.

This entailed breaking the liberal consensus of an activist state that would ensure equality of opportunity for all (Jeffrey 1999, 11). In its place, Thatcher proposes a commitment to “personal responsibility, selfreliance and initiative” (Jeffrey 1999, 11), as well as “a significant ‘reduction in the powers of the state,’ whose intervention must be strictly limited to defined purposes, and justified by particular circumstances rather than doctrinaire theories’” (Jeffrey 1999, 11).

Regardless of the fact that Thatcher wanted to mold government according to her own doctrinaire theories of small government, her vision influenced another neoconservative running for the highest office.

Much like Margaret Thatcher in the U.K., it was surprising to some that Ronald Reagan would win the presidency with such a neoconservative agenda. In 1964, Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona lost to Lyndon B. Johnson by a huge landslide, primarily because he could not successfully convince America to accept his right-wing ideals 11

(Jeffrey 1999, 14). However, by 1980, Reagan was seen as the man for the job, greatly appealing to two different groups of Americans. First, he appealed to the disgruntled middle class with his ‘trickle-down theory’ that he claimed would benefit them, resulting in lower taxes for the rich, even though capitalist elites were the only ones who stood to gain from the policy (Jeffrey 1999, 14). Populist right-wing groups were also attracted to Reagan’s contempt for the welfare state and government in general (Jeffrey 1999, 14). Canadian neoconservatives included rightwing populists, such as the founders of the Reform Party, who also connected with voters who became alienated from a strong and intrusive federal government. The way in which Reagan won the 1980 election is also quite similar to the electoral successes of the Reform Party in the 1990s. Instead of focusing on a broad base of the electorate, Reagan concentrated on certain segments of voters that were guaranteed to vote for him (Jeffrey 1999, 19). The closest comparison to Canada is how Reagan won the votes of the South and Southwest by addressing “regional alienation, similar in many respects to the pattern of the Canadian West” (Jeffrey 1999, 23). While Reagan was successful in winning in 1980 and again in 1984, his economic policies failed to work.

In fact, for somebody who detested government spending, his administration “drove the deficit and the debt to soaring new heights in order to make good on his promises of tax cuts and increased defense spending” (Jeffrey 1999, 24). However, that did not stop the ideals of ‘Reaganomics’ from influencing Canadian neoconservatives.

While Thatcher and Reagan’s economic policies influenced the Canadian neoconservative movement, Canada had a head start in terms of neoconservatism influencing its politics. The genesis of this can be seen in the actions of the Bank of Canada, in 1975, when it converted to a monetarist policy of focusing on inflation, which was becoming an issue in Canada and other countries, instead of full employment (The Gazette 1988). Monetarists argue that, in order to control the effects of inflation, the money supply needs to be tightly controlled and monitored (The Gazette 1988). This can be seen as the first crack in the liberal

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consensus because Keynesian economic policies of emphasizing full employment by government investment in the economy were beginning to be abandoned in favor of the more traditional and conservative consensus because Keynesian economic policies of emphasizing full concerns over inflation. This bodes well for neoconservatives who had always refuted the ideals behind Keynesian economic policies practiced since the end of World War II. Also, the province of Manitoba was home to the world’s first elected neoconservative government in 1977, that of Sterling Lyon’s Progressive Conservatives. While Lyon’s aspirations for less state intervention and more private enterprise were not a new kind of Conservative philosophy, what was different was its prime target: the welfare state (Chorney & Hansen 1985, 4). Lyon’s government was a harbinger of the future neoconservative governments of Ralph Klein of Alberta and Mike Harris of Ontario. This is because in Lyon’s government, business interests were given a prime seat at the table of economic policy creation (Chorney & Hansen 1985, 5), which would later be emulated by the Harris and Klein governments. In this sense, Lyon’s government, with its ambitions of small and fiscally prudent government at all costs, was “the major testing ground for [...] neo-conservatism: the ‘conviction that the people of Canada are better served by a greater reliance on markets rather than on politicians to solve economic and social problems’” (Chorney & Hansen 1985, 10).

While the Lyon government would only last four years before being defeated, it would not be the last Canadian government to have a neoconservative ideology.

Does Neoconservatism Have a Future?

There has been questioning among world leaders and intellectuals alike as to whether neoconservatism is viable after its economic strategies contributed to the 2008 financial crisis (Springer 2015, 6). One indicator of this is that a return to Keynesian economics is postulated as a remedy for the economic failures of neoconservatism (Springer 2015, 6). This is certainly true in Canada, where the Liberal Party won the 2015 federal election campaigning on a promise to utilize 13

deficit financing in order to stimulate the economy (Hébert 2015). Now, while there is still a commitment on the part of the Liberals to balance the budget by 2019 (Hébert 2015), there are signs that the state will once again be playing a major role in the economy. In this sense, neoconservatives have, for the time being, lost the battle to persuade the public to reduce the role of government. Even the Conservative Party, after almost ten years in power, was not able to accomplish that goal in the economic sphere. The Conservatives used deficit financing, albeit in limited form, in order to keep Canada’s economy from collapsing after the effects of the 2008 financial crisis.

Ironically, right-leaning parties like the Conservatives and their predecessors, the Progressive Conservative Party, have been more likely, in the post-war era, to run deficits than left-leaning parties like the Liberals (Frendreis & Tatalovich 2013, 121). While deficits are not inherently negative, the neoconservative approach is opposed to it. The mix of deficits and large tax cuts means government is at once spending money, yet making insufficient revenue to pay for it. However, while the Conservatives may not be the prudent economic managers they believe themselves to be, neoconservatism can still be considered successful because the ideology influenced Finance Minister Paul Martin and the Liberal governments of Jean Chrétien. Their commitment to balancing the budget led to the Liberals “end[ing] the last vestiges of Keynesianism and embrac[ing] […] deficit reduction” (Frendreis & Tatalovich 2013, 131). The irony is that perhaps neoconservative economic principles ought not to be practiced by the Conservatives and their ilk. In any event, the victory belongs to neoconservatism because its principles have spread beyond right-wing parties to those supposedly in the centre and the left. In the end, it put the final nail in the coffin of Keynesianism. Although, as previously stated, it may be making a comeback.

Another way to examine the success of the neoconservative ideology in the Canadian context, or the lack thereof, is by looking at how the federal NDP performed in the 2015 election. The NDP underperformed compared to the expectations at the beginning of the 14

election. One potential explanation for this is that their commitment to ensuring balanced budgets, in order to convince skeptical voters that they were not ‘tax-and-spend’ socialists (CBC News 2015), backfires on them. A lack of faith in balanced budgets is not, however, the only way to explain the NDP’s election failures. Going back to the concept of the social democratic minimum, Chorney & Hansen (1985, 18) suggest that while center and center-right parties can stay at the minimum, social democratic parties like the federal NDP have to ensure more than just the minimum and must move to the potentially controversial social democratic surplus. In this regard, the authors are prescient, since they argue that social democratic parties, like the federal NDP, that only try to ensure the social democratic minimum are “doomed to become conservatized through the exercise of power and, ultimately, to suffer electoral defeat” (Chorney & Hansen 1985, 19). While Chorney & Hansen refer to the provincial provincial NDP of Manitoba, it also applies to the federal NDP. In the 1990s, the federal Liberals, as a centre party, were able to skirt the social democratic minimum by aggressively pursuing balanced budgets. However, a centre-left party such as the federal NDP cannot be successful in the same manner. In 2015, the NDP was seen as being “out-flanked” by the Liberals on the left, and they left the NDP looking ‘conservative’ in terms of solutions to economic problems.

Neoconservatism could continue to have a future in Canada, especially if the Liberals are unsuccessful in rejuvenating the economy through deficit financing. It will certainly be difficult to excise neoconservative ideas from the collective consciousness. The public is now, more than ever, hostile to possible increases in taxation in order to fund potential government investment because they increasingly see their taxes used to prevent the bankruptcy of the same wealthy corporate interests that are in favor of a reduced state (Springer 2015, 8). Instead of seeing taxes pay for better roads, schools, hospitals, and such, citizens have seen their taxes go to protect those who are already financially secure. Neoconservatism will continue to have a future if governments cannot convince the public that state investment in the economy will res15

ult in improved economic and social standards.

Conclusion Globalization has been a key factor in the entrenchment of neoconservative values. McBride & Shields (1997) argue that the neoconservative agenda has benefited from globalization because it resulted in the market’s increased role in economic decision-making, particularly because the market “has been strengthened by threats to relocate if its demands for enhanced flexibility with regard to taxes, state regulation, and labour-market policies are not met by policy-makers” (McBride and Shields 1997, 13). Since there appears to be no turning back from our more globalized society, the argument that globalization benefits neoconservatism certainly means there is a future for the ideology. Shields & Evans (2002) point out that neoconservative ideals promote the idea that there is only “survival of the fittest: globalization politics, which is the politics of “a diminished sense of mutual obligation and responsibility in which the commitment to a sharing community is undermined” (Shields & Evans 2002, 42).

Neoconservatism is an ideology that, while following in the tradition of previous ideologies against big government, is specifically a reaction to the advent of the welfare state at the end of the Second World War. Although Canada’s neoconservative movement was influenced by the ones in the United States and the United Kingdom, it was already moving in that direction with the Bank of Canada utilizing monetarist policies and the election of the first neoconservative government, that of Sterling Lyon’s Progressive Conservatives in Manitoba. The future of neoconservatism is debatable, with some events signalling its decline, such as the 2015 election of the Keynesian-favouring Liberal Party; and others signalling its continued relevance, such as globalization and a distrusting and disengaged electorate. As long as citizens continue to either distrust their elected officials, or simply to disengage with politics and government, neoconservatism can survive well into the future. As long as politicians, the media, and the electorate remain ill-informed on the difference between those economic policies which create a strong 16

middle-class—for instance Keynesianism—and those which result in the ever-widening gap between the wealthy and the general public—ergo neoconservatism—the latter will remain at the forefront of political and policy discussions.

References Butler, Eamonn. 1985. Milton Friedman: A Guide to His Economic Thought. New York: Universe Books.

CBC News. 2015. “NDP promises 4 years of ‘modest surpluses’ in fiscal plan.” CBC news. September 16, 2015. Accessed April 03, 2017. http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-election-2015ndp-fiscal-plan-1.3230097.

Chorney, Harold, and Philip Hansen. 1985. “Neo-Conservatism, Social Democracy and ‘Province Building’: The Experience of Manitoba.” Canadian Review of Sociology 22:1-29.

Davidson, Paul. 1981. “Post Keynesian Economic: Solving the Crisis in Economic Theory.” The Crisis in Economic Theory. edited by Daniel Bell and Irving Kristol 151-173. New York: Basic Books.

Drucker, Peter F. 1981. “Towards the Next Economics.” The Crisis in Economic Theory, edited by Daniel Bell and Irving Kristol 4-18.

New York: Basic Books.

Frendreis, John, and Tatalovich, Raymond. 2013. “Fiscal Frugality and Party Politics.” Conservatism in Canada. edited by James Farney and David Rayside 120-138. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Jeffrey, Brooke. 1999. Hard Right Turn: The New Face of NeoConservatism in Canada. Toronto: Harper Collins.

Kristol, Irving. 2011. The Neoconservative Persuasion: Selected Essays, 1942-2009. New York: Basic Books.

Laycock, David. 2002. The New Right and Democracy in Canada: Understanding Reform and the Canadian Alliance. Don Mills:

Oxford University Press.

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McBride, Stephen, and John Shields. 1997. Dismantling a Nation: The Transition to Corporate Rule in Canada. Winnipeg: Fernwood Publishing.

Nevitte, Neil, and Roger Gibbins. 1984. “Neoconservativism: Canadian Variations on an Ideological Theme?” Canadian Public Policy 10: 384-94.

Schumpeter, Joseph A. 1976. Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, 5th ed. London: Taylor & Francis.

Shields, John, & B. Mitchell Evans. 2002. Shrinking the State: Globalization and Public Administration “Reform.” Winnipeg: Fernwood Publishing.

Springer, Simon. 2015. “Postneoliberalism?” Review of Radical Political Economics 47: 5-17.

Steele, G.R. 2007. The Economics of Friedrich Hayek (2nd ed.).

Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.

The Gazette. 1988. “Central bank puts growing importance on money supply.” The Gazette. January 23, 1988. Accessed April 03, 2017. https://0-search.proquest.com.mercury.concordia.ca/ docview/431578181?accountid=10246.

Thompson, Noel. 2008. “Hollowing Out the State: Public Choice Theory and the Critique of Keynesian Social Democracy.”

Contemporary British History 22: 355-382.

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__________ Sarah Smith __________

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The Personal is Not Political: Tocqueville’s Gender Equality in 1850s America Sarah graduated with honours from Concordia University in the spring of 2016. She has since begun her masters degree in Political Science and Gender Studies at the University of Ottawa. Her current research seeks to map the discourse present in Canadian mental health policies, specifically as it applies to transgender and gender non-conforming adults. She has a special interest for feminism, social movements, and health policy. Sarah hopes to pursue a career in public policy or academia.

Abstract Is Alexis de Tocqueville a misogynist? This paper responds to contemporary feminist critiques of Tocqueville’s work, largely his writings on women and girls in Democracy in America. By reading Tocqueville’s work through the lens of historicism and alongside his feminist contemporaries, this paper demonstrates how his perspectives on women were significantly progressive within the context of the 19th century. Nevertheless, the author critiques Tocqueville, not in comparison to contemporary feminism, but in comparison to Tocqueville himself. This paper argues that Tocqueville lacks critical insight in his discussion of women and girls in comparison to his discussion of other minorities, particularly racial minorities in America.

This should be the grounds of comparison – not contemporary feminism – when critiquing Tocqueville’s feminism.

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Introduction Is Alexis de Tocqueville a misogynist, or is he simply a victim of historicism? In his discussion of the status of American women in Democracy in America, Tocqueville provides contemporary feminist scholars with a significant amount of fodder for relentless critique. Such scholars include Delba Winthrop and Kathleen S. Sullivan, who have responded with undue haste to Tocqueville’s dichotomous distinctions between men and women, particularly his assertion that a woman’s place is in the private sphere (Tocqueville 2000, 374). Similarly, Janara articulates that Tocqueville is “no mere sexist”, and that his understanding of natural laws is incomplete and incorrect (Janara 2009, 48). These statements are far from profound. When reading Tocqueville from a contemporary feminist perspective, his comments are undeniably problematic. This is because Tocqueville observed American behaviour and politics before the American feminist movement is a fully formed, public social movement, at a time when conceptions of sex and gender are not yet distinguished. In order to justly interpret Tocqueville’s works, comparative studies must be executed with a consideration of the historical context in which he was writing. It is both unfair and imprudent to make harsh claims against Tocqueville in comparison to contemporary feminist political science, as American society’s understanding of sex and gender relations has ratified dramatically.

While we have had over a century of feminist activism to reflect upon, Tocqueville’s sources of comparison, analysis, and reflection could only derive from his observations of the status of women in aristocratic France versus the status of 19th century feminists in America and other parts of Europe.

This paper seeks to remedy the flawed analytical methodology of Delba Winthrop while being vigilant of my own contemporary feminist bias. It is in favour of performing a historically contextual comparison of three of Tocqueville’s major works and notes from some of his private correspondence. This paper will analyse late 19th- and early 20th-century feminist texts to understand the relevant social norms

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surrounding sex and gender, particularly the writings of early feminists Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony.

Employing this more appropriate perspective overrides contemporary feminist arguments, including Winthrop’s statement that Tocqueville has “a devastating critique of American, or modern democracy, as a whole” (Winthrop 2009, 178) as it allows us to analyse Tocqueville’s America from the perspective of Tocqueville’s America.

Winthrop’s poignant attack at Tocqueville’s understanding of modern American is irrelevant, as Tocqueville was not trying to predict the future, but rather, to analyse history as a means of informing the America he journeyed to.

While Democracy in America is the focus of Winthrop’s critique, this paper will draw upon several works by Tocqueville. Through drawing on content from his other works, including The Old Regime and the Revolution, Recollections: The French Revolution of 1848; Selected Letters of Politics and Society; and Journey to America, this paper takes into consideration a more complete picture of Tocqueville’s experiences and the events that shaped his opinions of American women in contrast to France and the rest of Europe. Focusing solely on Tocqueville’s perception of women and girls, this paper argues that feminist critiques of Tocqueville’s work are ignorant of the historical context in which Tocqueville was writing. However, after a thorough analysis of the aforementioned texts, I have found myself to be critical of Tocqueville, not for his apparent sexism, but for his lack of optimism and foresight in comparison to his perspectives on other minority groups, namely racial minorities, in 19th-century America. Based upon a desire to derive authentic relevance to modern feminism, this paper argues that we cannot meaningfully apply Tocqueville’s account of women to modern understandings of women, society, and politics, as Tocqueville was writing from a perspective bound by the following contextually dependent variables: his French heritage, his experiences with revolution, as well as 19th-century feminism and the unstable nature of democracy and revolution. This paper will be divided into three main 23

arguments, which serve to contextualize and coordinate Tocqueville’s arguments against the factual situation of American women in the 1850s. Meanwhile, it simultaneously supports my argument that while Tocqueville is committed to gender equality, he is less critical of the status quo and fails in comparison only to himself. First, this paper presents Tocqueville’s perceptions of the status of women from several of his texts, including private correspondence. Second, his arguments are compared to those of prominent 19th-century feminists including Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony. Finally, this paper utilizes Tocqueville’s perceptions of gender equality, revolution, and democracy as a means of predicting how Tocqueville may have reacted to the eventual shift of women from the public to private realms, as a means of showing his failure to treat women as considerably as other minority groups.

Tocqueville’s American Woman For Tocqueville, women and men are equal but different. He states this early on in his critique of European conceptions of equality, scorning the desire to make men and women “not only equal, but alike” (Tocqueville 2000, 573). Tocqueville considers this desire as degrading (Tocqueville 2000, 574) as it wrongfully ignores the inherent differences between the physical and moral constitutions of men and women that characterise both French and American understandings of gender[1] at this time. In contrast, Tocqueville argues that the differences between men and women should be enhanced so that they can each perform the duties to which their individual and biological[2] natures are best suited (Tocqueville 2000, 574). Therefore, for Tocqueville, both men and women are able to be successful, something he would not have seen in _________________________ [1] Sex and gender will be used interchangeable throughout this paper, as the two

concepts were synonymous during the time that Tocqueville was writing his major works. However, the author recognizes that sex and gender constitute two different aspects of an individual’s identity, as is understood in the context of the more liberal members of modern day democratic societies.

[2] Speaking in relation to Tocqueville’s understanding of gender differences.

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his life in the French aristocracy. Already, American gender dynamics appear extremely progressive for Tocqueville, and his writing shows that he approves of this continental difference (Tocqueville 2000, 574).

Where contemporary feminists have trouble with Tocqueville is in this assertion that men and women are equal, but different. For Tocqueville, men are successful when they run for office or own property; women are successful when they run a proper household. In these beliefs, Tocqueville appears to support the distinction between the public realm, which deals with economics and government, versus the private sphere, which concerns matters related to the home and domesticity. This is a dichotomy that has motivated much of second wave feminist activism. Yet, Tocqueville’s distinction does not appear to dampen his perception of American women. In fact, he holds women and their intellect in quite high regard. While Winthrop would head us to believe that Tocqueville prefers his women “barefoot and pregnant in the kitchen” (Locke and Botting 2009, 11), there exists evidence which serves to counteract this judgement. In fact, not once does he mention the role of women as mothers, which Winthrop does recognize in her critique of Democracy in America. Tocqueville is more concerned with women as makers of mores, which he considers to be important in a democratic society. In this way, Tocqueville’s account of the role of women is a form of political inclusion, although it is ultimately performed from the private realm.

In reference to the intellect of women, Tocqueville states that “a philosopher would have stumbled a hundred times on the narrow path that they traveled without incident and without trouble” (Tocqueville 2000, 564). Tocqueville’s admiration of female intellect is further supported in a passage from his private correspondence in which he criticizes French women for not being more adamant about entering political life. He writes that “they do not seem to have the least idea” of what goes on in public life, and “do not seem even to have any thought” of considering such an important change (Tocqueville 1985, 338).

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The Public Versus the Private and the American Girl To gain a more comprehensive understanding of Tocqueville’s perception of gender dynamics, the public/private dichotomy needs to be analysed in further detail. Tocqueville adamantly advocated for a division of labour in democratic society, a concept troubling to modern feminism, but arguably understandable in a Tocquevillean context.

Tocqueville strongly believed in the division of labour because he wanted to maximize women’s freedom and equality. This, due to his past experiences in France, means that women must be separate from men and able to flourish in comparison to each other within the private sphere. Upon first read, his tone suggests that he would prefer women to be confined to the home, but through a careful analysis of his discussion of the American girl, we learn that Tocqueville ultimately laments the loss of freedom that came with the transition from adolescence to womanhood. The American girl is allowed a great deal of freedom when she is young and unmarried. She is described by Tocqueville as someone who “thinks for herself, speaks freely, and acts alone” (Tocqueville 2000, 563). While this statement is not overly evaluative, it is not hard to infer from the text that Tocqueville views this as a positive improvement in contrast to the life of girls in France. We know this because he associates these qualities of freedom with the democracy he so greatly cherishes. Therefore, in the most moderate way, Tocqueville’s writing suggests to us that he deplores the inevitable subordination and loss of intellectual freedom that became “lost within the bonds of marriage” (Tocqueville 2000, 565).

Historicism This paper rests on the assertion that Tocqueville is a victim of historicism, or “the claim that all human beings always have been, and will be, imprisoned in a point of view particular to their time” (West 1997, 72). This concept helps us to understand how Tocqueville’s assertion between the public and private realms is not sexist, but rather the result of contextually dependent circumstances and historical understandings of equality. In his assertion that women can only be 26

equal within the private sphere, Tocqueville does sacrifice a sense of true freedom in which men and women could succeed in either sphere.

Yet, in remaining fair to Tocqueville’s historical context and perspective, we learn that this distinction is necessary for the protection of a woman’s ability to be successful on par with man. This is due to the loss of tremendous freedoms in the transition from girl to wife, as she is constrained by paternalism through the bonds of marriage (Tocqueville 2000, 565). In seeing this as inevitable, Tocqueville created a new, contextually dependent understanding of equality in an attempt to reconcile this struggle with the desire to see women as equals to men, albeit in a different capacity.

The nature of American democracy in the 1840s also comes into play in Tocqueville’s understanding of the public and the private.

During this time, America is a new, expanding and changing society, which is fuelled by a hatred for aristocracy and despotism. This dynamic makes American society quite fragile, and, recognizing this, Tocqueville ponders the future stability of this new successful democracy, warning that “a single revolution, a change in public opinion, can break it apart forever” (Tocqueville 2000, 379). Therefore, it makes sense that Tocqueville approved of America’s division of labour, as he observed that it is a stark separation that facilitates and preserves the tenuous democracy he covets. As Laura Janara acknowledges, “Tocqueville was acutely aware of the consequences that a change in ‘social state’ means for family as well as for politics, society, and culture” (Janara 2009, 47), making it easier to understand why Tocqueville advocates for a way of life that we now consider to be confining and sexist.

This unfortunate destiny is not met with ambivalence from Tocqueville. It is unfair to assume that Tocqueville’s beliefs are in alignment with his observations in Democracy in America, as this book is written in a purely descriptive and empirical manner. For example, Vetter recognizes Tocqueville’s grief surrounding the inevitability of the relegation of women to the private sphere in her analysis of one of his lesser-studied texts, Journey to America. In his account of Lake Oneida, Tocqueville recognizes that there is a tension between the potential for 27

female liberty and the need for female confinement to preserve democratic stability (Vetter 2009, 160), as aristocracy can issue from industry (Tocqueville 2000, 530). Tocqueville is also quite blatant in addressing how women in America felt about their subordinate status, stating that he is not suggesting that “American women considered conjugal authority a happy usurpation of their rights” (Tocqueville 2000, 575). Whereas Winthrop critiques Tocqueville for wanting women to be “barefoot, pregnant, and in the kitchen” (Locke and Botting 2009, 11), my analysis of Tocqueville’s sentiments on education and his critique of conjugal authority prove otherwise.

Tocqueville vs. The Founding Fathers If it is necessary to perform an analysis of Tocqueville in relation to his feminist contemporaries, a comparison to some of his nonfeminist fellows, namely, America’s founding fathers, must also be conducted. While it is true that the era of the Founding Fathers is nearly 60 years prior to the publication of Democracy in America, the significance of their words would not have been so far removed from Tocqueville’s thinking. In fact, the Founding Fathers have found themselves the subject of criticisms similar to those that have been performed upon Tocqueville’s work by contemporary feminists. The Founding Fathers, like Tocqueville, believed that the role of women in a democratic society is best performed within the private realm. They asserted this by excluding women and other minorities from possessing the constitutional right to vote, among other civil liberties. While this issue was perhaps the largest and most contentious grievance of the first wave feminist movement, the Founding Fathers, like Tocqueville, can be historically defended.

Thomas G. West performs such a defense in his critical assessment of the Founding Fathers concerning their opinions on race, sex, and class. West states that critics of the Founding Fathers have been too quick to assume that they are not in favour of gender equality, purely based on the fact that they withheld civil liberties from women. West argues in response for a more generous interpretation of the Founding 28

Fathers’ view on gender equality, much as I am advocating in reference to Tocqueville. Like Tocqueville, the Founding Fathers were committed to the protection of women. They saw society as a particularly hostile environment that forced women to compete with men. This was seen as unfair by the Fathers due to their belief in the inherent differences between the sexes (West 1997, 73). Unsure how to sufficiently address this problem in a time of revolution and rebellion, they preferred to protect women from male competition by relegating them to the private sphere, where they reigned above men and only needed to compete with other women. Of course, this solution demonstrates a lack of critical thinking. However, in comparison to European conceptions of gender equality at the same time, the understanding put forth by the Founding Fathers and Tocqueville are quite progressive.

Tocqueville’s experience with and understanding of revolution also played a role in his conception of 19th-century gender relations.

During the time when American constitution is written, men and women are united around the same strong cause; independence from Britain (West 1997, 72). In fact, West argues that the American Revolution actually served to create the conditions that enable the abolition of slavery and women’s suffrage when it came to political discourse. Yet, as Tocqueville shows us in his retelling of the French Revolution, revolutions develop over time. Therefore, while it is unfortunate that American women received civil rights so far into the timeline of American history, such is the nature of social justice. If authors like Winthrop would like to lament over injustices, they would perhaps be more suited discussing the perils of the modern world, rather than wasting their words on trying to reshape history.

Nineteenth Century American Feminism: The Suffragettes Now that the tone of democratic writing similar to Tocqueville’s has been established, it is important to turn to a comparison between Tocqueville and some of his feminist contemporaries, particularly the the ones that pertain to the public and private spheres. When the Declaration of Rights and Sentiments was signed in 1848 at the Seneca 29

Falls Convention in New York, American society was publicly presented with a manifesto that challenged traditional gender roles and poked holes in the public/private divide. Famous American feminists, including Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony, were major players in the drafting of this document. While many of Tocqueville’s opinions differed from that of American feminists, there are a number of striking similarities that are cause for mention. For West, both men’s and women’s views of gender equality in the early to mid-1800s diverge significantly from modern feminism (West 1997, 73). Knowing this, it becomes important to remember that both Tocqueville and 19th century feminists are victims of historicism, and that the following similarities between Tocqueville and 19th century feminists are contextually dependent. As previously mentioned, Tocqueville was critical of the loss of freedom women experience as a result of marriage. There is a criticism echoed by Stanton et al. that states that women were “if married, in the eye of the law, civilly dead” (Tocqueville 1889, 70).

Second, one of Tocqueville’s earliest statements about women in Democracy in America is “It is woman who makes mores” (Tocqueville 2000, 563). On this subject, 19th century feminists concur. The suffragettes asserted that men, in claiming intellectual superiority, granted women moral superiority (Stanton et al. 1889, 72). In this way, the suffragettes also supported dichotomous understandings of gender equality, as Tocqueville did with his support of the public/private dichotomy. Yet, the suffragettes also lamented this division, which was seen in a direct quotation from the Declaration of Rights and Sentiments.

It bears striking resemblance to Tocqueville’s assertion that the loss of the American girl’s freedom upon marriage was to be lamented. The suffragettes stated, “After depriving her of all her rights as a married woman, if single and the owner of property, he has taxed her to support a government which recognizes her only when her property can be made profitable to it” (Stanton et al. 1889, 71).

Keeping in mind that Tocqueville wrote before American feminists began to formally organize[1], it is interesting that there are the above similarities between Tocqueville and early American feminists. Both Tocqueville and American feminists agree that women 30

are equal but different, although both lament this fact. The only difference is that feminists demand that action be taken to remedy this discrepancy. Additionally, feminists overtly argue that equality in all realms should be necessitated regardless of the inherent biological differences between men and women and their associated qualities, thus making a distinction on par with Tocqueville’s assertion that such biological differences are socio-politically significant. In the Declaration, feminists argue that it is a woman’s right to be a part of “the enlarged sphere which her Creator has assigned her” (Stanton et al.

1889, 72). The importance of this right is not simply based on the feminist assertion that all basic rights and freedoms, as outlined by the Declaration of Independence, are held by both men and women. Rather, it is also an attempt to argue that both the public and private realms require the benefits of both males and females, as the qualities that each respectively possess cannot be substituted by the other in their absence.

However, Tocqueville’s understanding of gender differences is not without its inherent problems. Tocqueville wrote,

Thus Americans do not believe that man and woman have the duty or the right to do the same things, but they show the same esteem for the role of each of them, and they consider them as beings whose value is equal although their identity differs (Tocqueville 2000, 576).

In contrast to this sentiment is what Tocqueville would have learned from his experiences in Europe and the study of European politics.

However, his views seem to be less abrasive. Tocqueville held in disdain the European treatment of women as weak or inferior. As he wrote in Democracy in America, American countries exhibit “public ill will” which is “constantly exercised over the weaknesses of women” (Tocqueville 2000, 568). Again, this reference tunnels the comparison of the condition of American women to that of their European counter___________________________ [1] Volume II of Democracy in America was published in 1840, while the American women’s suffrage movement would not officially come together until 1848.

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part. However, he should not be faulted for his experiences and empirical observations simply because they do not meet the contemporary status quo. Any discrepancies between Tocqueville and 19th century American feminists are the result of contextual dependence yet again. Tocqueville, as a European coming to America for his first time, could not possibly have understood the true plight of the American woman in the same way as Stanton and Anthony. Perhaps if Tocqueville had taken the time to interview women with personal experiences, rather than assume the particulars of their status based on observation alone, his conclusions may have been more feminist in nature. This is where the rest of this historically contextual critique of Tocqueville occurs, as it is his method, rather than his arguments, which I argue to be problematic.

The previous sections provide a segue into the final portion of my argument. While the discussion of Tocqueville and the Founding Fathers relate to Tocqueville’s conception of women, the discussion of Tocqueville and 19th century feminists transitions into a hypothetical analysis of Tocqueville’s position of the women’s suffrage movement, in particular, its society-melding outcomes. Would Tocqueville have been able to foresee the women’s suffrage movement, and if so, would he have seen it as praiseworthy or lamentable? The answer to the first part of this question has already been made clear in the discussion of Tocqueville’s American woman. Tocqueville adamantly advocated for the public versus private dichotomy because he knew such social change was inevitable, but dangerous. Therefore, I am now concerned with the second half of the question, on whether or not Tocqueville would have deemed women’s suffrage as praiseworthy or lamentable, which I explore in the following section.

The American Women’s Suffrage Movement The women’s suffrage movement in America achieved the opposite of what Tocqueville so strongly felt was right, as it involved the unprecedented entrance of women into the public sphere. Yet, it did 32

not challenge the traditional characteristics ascribed to men and women, nor can the movement be count as a revolutionary success in Tocquevillean terms. However, I do argue that should Tocqueville have lived to see this unprecedented social change that he could have never predicted, he may have changed his perceptions of the place of women within society to adapt to the times. In summary, Tocqueville appears sexist to us because he could not tell the future, but there is evidence in many of his texts that, in a modern context, Tocqueville would not be unsupportive of new gender dynamics.

There are two potential ways to interpret Tocqueville in order to deduce what his reaction might have been to the women’s suffrage movement in America, should he have lived to see it through. First, Tocqueville would not have been able to foresee the advent of a very helpful policy window: World War One. As tragic as the war was, it presented American women with an unprecedented release from the private and into the public sphere. Women supported the war efforts by working factory jobs, taking over their husband’s businesses to stimulate the economy, and even worked on the construction of fighter jets. For Tocqueville, this would have been unimaginable, not because he is sexist, but because he could not have predicted the future. Yet, if he could have seen how much women in the public realm contributed to society, and therefore, democracy, I do not believe that he would have met this migration with malcontent. Also, Tocqueville would have realized that the movement of women from the private to the public realm did not lead to the destruction of American democracy. Rather, it served to strengthen it. Not only did it strengthen the economy, but the added involvement of half of the American population served to enhance one of the main tenets of democracy: accountability. It is for this reason I argue that Tocqueville would have been accepting of women as public citizens, as they protected and safeguarded the democracy of his coveted America.

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On Revolutionary Success My assertion that Tocqueville would have been accepting of first wave feminism is further evidenced through analysing and applying his experience with revolution, or the failure thereof. Having experienced the French Revolution, one of the most chaotic social upheavals in recent history, Alexis de Tocqueville was no stranger to the nature of change. In Old Regime and the Revolution, Tocqueville is concerned with accurately recounting the factors that contributed to the French Revolution, yet I believe this piece of writing also serves as a way to understand Tocqueville’s attitude toward the concept of revolution and social change more broadly. As previously mentioned, Tocqueville is quite cynical of revolution. Seeing that the French Revolution served to strengthen, rather than abolish the harmful institutions it so opposed (Tocqueville 1998, 106), it is not hard to deduce that he may be wary of rocking the political boat. For example, Tocqueville remarks “the regime that a revolution destroys is almost always better than the one that immediately preceded it� (Tocqueville 1998, 222). This feeling is exemplified in his discussion of America, through his careful contemplation of the majority of his[1] topics. I argue that part of this sentiment comes from seeing the successful manifestation of democracy, something that European nations had yet to achieve.

Yet, would he have seen this change as acceptable? Without knowing the particulars of the circumstances in which women would receive political, public rights, I would argue that he would have seen it as lamentable, particularly as it relates to his perception of revolution and regime stability. Unlike France, America did not experience an initial revolution. When the Europeans first arrived, America was essentially a blank slate, while noting the tragic treatment of the American indigenous peoples. There was no aristocracy to challenge, nor centuries-old regimes to overthrow. Institutions were created from the ground up based on shared values and a passion for liberal democracy. Should America have been founded on a revolution similar ___________________________ [1] The topic of women being one of them.

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to that of France, Tocqueville might have been less wary of introducing or advocating for social change as it concerned the status of women.

Therefore, his experiences with revolution in his home country should be taken into account along with the historical context in which he was writing before evaluating his approaches to women and feminism.

Where Tocqueville Went Wrong While Tocqueville may have been undeserving of criticism by Winthrop and Sullivan, he is not immune to other forms of criticism.

Tocqueville’s discussion of men, women, and the roles each respectively play is quite sparse in comparison to the rest of the topics discussed in Democracy in America. Additionally, I find his tone to change significantly in his writing on women, a shift which does not fare him well in the eyes of the critical observer. His descriptions are minimal and his evaluation are either short-sighted or non-existent. This behaviour is particularly condemning, as Tocqueville demonstrated in previous sections of Democracy in America that he was able to write both critically and sympathetically concerning minority issues. This is most apparent in his discussion of, and disagreement surrounding, the treatment of what he referred to as the “three races” of America in the 1800s. His sentiments surrounding the mistreatment of racial minorities are full of emotion, which is starkly nonexistent from the rest of his discussion in Democracy in America. For example, he states that the bringing of Africans to America for slavery was a “frightful evil” (Tocqueville 2003, 310). He recognizes his own emotion in these words, as he urges his readers in the same passage that they should not believe that his depiction and opinions of these events have been “overcharged” (Tocqueville 2003, 310), for he has witnessed such evils of which he believes no other evil could surpass (Tocqueville 2003, 310).

Criticism aside, racial tensions and the murmur of social change were prominent vocal issues at the time, compared to the lack of discussion of women's suffrage. This statement does not serve to dismiss the assertion that Tocqueville should have been more critical and selfreflective in his section on women. Nor does it suggest that because 35

Tocqueville did not include such an analysis of women in Democracy in America that he should be automatically labelled a misogynist. Rather, Tocqueville’s inaction provides an example of a larger problem that plagues even modern democratic society. This issue falls within the realm of what we could now call identity politics, which recognizes the importance of standpoint in policy making. Standpoint requires a heightened consciousness of the self and others, based on the socially constructed aspects of human identity[1], concepts that would not have been familiar to Tocqueville. There are an increasing number of incidents, even in today’s most liberal democratic societies, where men are wrongfully speaking on behalf of women, legislating their bodies without their equal involvement in the political process. The female body has been politicized and patriarchal democracy has taken its hold on this issue, a problem which is exemplified by Tocqueville and Winthrop’s reaction to him, but which now have been identifiable as a problem in 1840.

Part of Winthrop’s argument is that Tocqueville’s impression of women is “incomplete” (Janara 2009, 48), part of which she argues is due to his failure to mention the role of women as child bearers (Winthrop 2009, 193). Within the context of a public versus private dichotomy, it is inferred that childbearing and child rearing would have been one of the main duties of the type of American woman Tocqueville described, even though no reference to child rearing is mentioned in Democracy in America.

Conclusion Evidently, current feminist analyses of Alexis de Tocqueville’s writing on American women have been the source of contention among contemporary feminists. Whether he is described as “no mere sexist” (Janara 2009, 48), or a downright misogynist, makes no difference.

These sentiments may very well be true. Alas, we will never know for certain. This paper does not claim absolution in its argument that Tocqu________________________________ [1] Gender, sex, race, ethnicity, and sexual orientation, to name a few.

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eville is not a sexist or a misogynist, as to make such a claim would be impossible. However, this paper does advocate for a new approach to the analysis of Tocqueville’s major works, largely in comparison to himself. This new form of critical thinking leads us to more generous considerations of such harsh labelling, given the variables associated with contextually dependent situations. The concept of historicism rightly applies to this study, as it does, or should, many others. In summary, such an analysis has served to support the assertion that Tocqueville needs to be critiqued within the context of his time, and that any criticisms should come from discrepancies in his own methodology.

Ultimately, to say that Tocqueville is sexist is superficial and likely incorrect. Naturally, Tocqueville would appear sexist when compared to modern understandings of gender equality, but ultimately, this paper has proved that he was relatively progressive within the context of 19th century America. Tocqueville noticed that the American woman was a type of private servant, biologically designed to guard the home and support her husband. At first glance, it is inconclusive whether or not this is a reflection of his true feelings. However, based on the evidence presented in this essay, I argue that Tocqueville should be seen as a relatively progressive thinker, when analysed in the context of his time, as he should be. In his private correspondence, he is much more opinionated. One cannot dismiss these methodological misconducts, nor can one label Tocqueville as possessing any sort of proclivity for understanding the plight of women. We know that studying the female world and the issues within it from the male perspective, a practice which is unfortunately still characteristic of modern democracies, has, and still does, contribute to the perception of patriarchal democracy. It is therefore important to note that this paper is not an endorsement of Tocqueville’s views. Rather, it is a response to the plethora of superficial and undue criticisms to Tocqueville’s major works. This paper has also been inspired by the desire to contribute to the history of feminist political science, as it accurately provides a unit of comparison between 19th century feminism and contemporary feminist political science.

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However, that is not to say that Tocqueville is exempt from criticism. In a historically and contextually fair assessment of his writing, there are problems with his discussion of American women, although unfamiliar to more modern critiques. Rather than finding Tocqueville to be sexist, as such an assertion would breach the consideration of potential alternatives that would have been able to preserve the integrity of American democracy without limiting the freedom of women. This is what caused his argument to suffer, to the content of his statements. Tocqueville’s lack of reflection on the matter of women in Democracy in America should be the only legitimate source of critique within a historically relative analysis of his work.

Furthermore, any other type of analysis is both unnecessary and unhelpful, although this may seem counterintuitive when the desire is to apply Tocqueville’s works to modern political science. This paper asserts that Tocqueville remains relevant in the context of today’s society, as his sentiments certainly ring true to the issues of the exclusion of women and unfair treatment of women within today’s public realm. Yet, this paper does not agree with Tocqueville. In the context of modern society, it would be impossible to do so.

References Janara, Laura. 2009. “Democracy’s Family Values.” In Feminist Interpretations of Alexis de Tocqueville, edited by Jill Locke, Eileen Hunt Botting, 47-70. State College: Penn State Press.

Locke, Jill, and Eileen Hunt Botting. 2009. “Introduction: To Tocqueville and Beyond.” In Feminist Interpretations of Alexis de Tocqueville, edited by Jill Locke, Eileen unt Botting, 1-18. Hunt Botting, 1-18. State College: Penn State Press.

Tocqueville, Alexis de. 1998. The Old Regime and the Revolution, edited by François Furet and Françoise Mélonio, translated by Alan S. Kahan. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

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Tocqueville, Alexis de. 2000. Democracy in America, translated and edited by Harvey C.Mansfield and Delba Winthrop. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Vetter, Lisa Pace. 2009. “Sympathy, Equality, and Consent: Tocqueville and Harriet Martineau on Women and Democracy in America.”

In Feminist Interpretations of Alexis de Tocqueville, edited by Jill Locke, Eileen Hunt Botting, 151-176. State College: Penn State Press.

West, Thomas G. 1997. Vindicating the Founders: Race, Sex, Class and Justice in the Origins of America. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

Winthrop, Delba. 2009. “Tocqueville’s American Woman and the ‘True Conception of Democratic Progress’.” In Feminist Interpretations of Alexis de Tocqueville, edited by Jill Locke and Eileen Hunt Botting, 177-198. State College: Penn State Press.

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__________ Elsa Rathgeber __________

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Keynesian Economics: Shift in American Political Culture post 2008 Economic Recession Elsa has recently graduated from Concordia University in Political Science. Her interests are focused on understanding globalization and issues related to women’s challenges to achieve social, political, and economic parity. Elsa believes that developing critical thinking skills is indispensable in analyzing events in a world increasingly dominated by post-factual politics. It is with this interest that she participated in four simulations at the provincial and municipal level, where she debated different bills and motions. Elsa's goal is to encourage women to take on a leadership position whatever the field may be.

Abstract

How did the 2008 financial crisis affect American political and economic culture? By looking at scholars such as Thomas Piketty, Joseph Stiglitz, and Frank Stilwell, this paper gives a thorough examination of the history of the subprime crisis and its effects on economic policies. The year of 2008 marked a turning point in economic history as popular laissez-faire, neo-classical, and noninterventionist policies were replaced by the adoption of government intervention in the economic process. The author looks at the social and political uprising to demonstrate the change in American economic culture following the economic crisis.

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Introduction The 2008 collapse of the American housing market led to what has been considered the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression (Economic Policy Institute 2016). In fact, as America has been recognized as the political and economic hegemon, its financial downturn impacted many countries (Squibb 2015, 43). However, for the purpose of this paper, I focus solely on the effects of the United States economy and political system. The American Dream has encouraged values of a laissez-faire state, in which citizens are responsible for their own success. The U.S. economy is based on a neoclassical framework encouraging limited state intervention and a laissez-faire state. This economic philosophy is the root of the American Dream philosophy in which every citizen is responsible for their own success (Stilwell 2012, 7).

As inequality increases, many critics have pointed out that the system favours the hegemonic dominance of the rich 1%, responsible for the economic downturn. After the crisis, public policies aimed at stripping the top 1% of their influence on the national economy was illustrated in the development of policies adopted after the recession (Squibb 2015, 40). How does the failure of the 2008 economic market affect the American political and economic culture? This paper argues that following the 2008 economic crisis, the historical and political Occupy Wall Street movement educated people about the necessity of developing policies based on social-democratic and Keynesian values (Schneider 2012, 15). Taking the latter into consideration helps put a theoretical perspective around the root causes of the revolutionary movement. Occupy Wall Street focused on educating people about the political and economic inequality between the rich 1% and the poor 99% in American society (Gibson 2013, 338). While its effects may not be measurable, it can be argued that it has helped foster political consciousness in the United States. In fact, Americans have become more inclined in adopting a more Keynesian and interventionist economy.

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This may in fact be represented in the current political campaign as Democrat candidate, Bernie Sanders, is proposing different policies that are a direct reflection of what people were protesting in the Occupy Wall Street movement (Benson, 2015). Thus, the latter has created a new wave of political consciousness in American society that could help overthrow the hegemonic dominance of the rich 1% elite in the United States (Schneider 2012, 15).

The paper is divided into two parts in order to deepen our understanding of the causes and consequences of the Occupy Wall Street movement. The first part describes the main economic and political concepts that pertain to the subject and provides an overview of the American economic system. Secondly, it analyses the Keynesian theory for the hegemonic dominance of the rich 1% and the shift in American political culture.

Definition of Concepts Hegemony Antonio Gramsci, a political theorist and activist, was the first to develop the concept of hegemony (Katz 2006, 334). He believes that in order for world society to evolve and progress there must be one leader.

For example, one country influencing the wider community with its political, economic and ideological dominance (Scheidel 2006, 5). The “hegemon’s supremacy in military and cultural terms” makes it likely that the country will have an international impact (Scheidel 2006, 5).

Countries are inclined to adopt the hegemon’s political system and ideology, as they want to maintain a good relationship in case of the occurrence of a war (Scheidel 2006, 5). In other words, states choose to ally with the hegemon as they represent military intelligence and help to foster a system of balance of power (Scheidel 2006, 5). The hegemon therefore represents the concept of stability for the international community.

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By adopting the hegemon’s ideas and values for strategic security reasons, the international community begins to adopt its culture (Katz 2006, 334). The dominant values are spread internationally on the basis that it is the best alternative (Katz 2006, 334). For the purpose of this paper, the hegemonic concept is seen in terms of the dominant political and cultural idea in the United States. Americans adopt the values of the most powerful political group as it is considered in the best interest of the whole country. The hegemonic ideology can be represented within the development of certain policies and laws (Katz 2006, 334).

For instance, prior to the 2008 economic recession, the United States based its economic policies on the neo-classical theory: if its people work hard for their money in a non-interventionist economy, they can achieve the American Dream (Foster and Yates, 2014). The neoclassical theory had been the hegemonic ideology in American politics for years because it proved to be successful in many respects (Foster and Yates, 2014). However, as it is argued in this paper, since the 2008 recession, the hegemon of economic theory has shifted since the neo-classical thinking does not respond to the issues of inequality.

As such, the hegemonic power is susceptible to change with the disturbance of impactful events.

Occupy Movement Occupy Wall Street is a political-economic movement that “began in New York City on September 17th, 2011” (Squibb 2015, 39).

Having been influenced by the Arab Springs, this grassroots political movement used social media to raise awareness about inequality. It gained widespread support as many Americans were unsatisfied with the government’s economic politicise following the 2008 recession, including George Bush’s $700 billion financial bailout bill. Protesters physically occupied the Zuccotti Park, which is located one block away from the Wall Street banks (Akbaba 2013, 32). The bankers of Wall Street represented the rich 1% that were bailed out post-recesssion, while the protesters who slept in the park represented the people who lost their homes and remained unemployed years after the economic 44

crash (Gibson 2013, 338). The movement helped raise awareness about the inequality between the poor 99% and the rich 1% in the world (Schneider 2012, 15). It changed the American political culture as people began to realize that the initial neo-classical theory was failing them in many respects (Schneider 2012, 15). Thus, the consequences associated with a laissez-faire state led people to adopt more socialdemocratic values (Macpherson and Smith 2013, 371).

Keynesian Economic Theory John Maynard Keynes founded the Keynesian economic theory in the 1930s, following the Great Depression (Jahan et al. 2014, 53). He criticizes the capitalist and free-market system, as he believes that it “is conflict ridden and crisis prone – quest for perfect is not possible” (Stilwell 2012, 264). More precisely, Keynes argues that unemployment and inequality is deemed to occur through a capitalist system under a neoclassical economy. The consequences of such issues will affect the aggregate demand, as the unemployed will not have the liquidity to purchase goods and services. Consequently, the result of the imbalance between the supply and demand lead Keynes to believe that it will further lengthen periods of unemployment, as employers will cut jobs on the basis that profits have decreased (Jahan et al. 2014, 54). Thus, Keynes argues that the key lies in “government intervention through public policies that aim to achieve full employment and price stability” (Jahan et al. 2014, 53). This proposal helps stimulate the aggregate demand through four different ways: “consumption, investment, government purchases, and net exports” (Jahan et al. 2014, 53). The end result is based on the notion that the government is able to offer services to citizens through tax policies, raising the need for high employment rates. It therefore offers the opportunity to tax people, which can only be achieved through those who are employed (Stilwell 2012, 266). It is through these taxes that the government is able to offer services to citizens. High unemployment decreases the allocation of various services as people who do not work, thus reducing their contribution towards the taxation system (Stilwell 2012, 266).

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Keynesian economics offers a perspective about the complexity of the effects of unemployment and aggregate demand. The government can stabilize the economy by working against the business cycle (Jahan et al. 2014, 54). Policies should be developed on the basis that there might be periods where the economy might not be as profitable as it should be (Jahan et al. 2014, 54). In other words, it is the ability to foresee the occurrence of an imbalance between the aggregate demand and supply. For instance, reducing interest rates to encourage investment (Jahan et al. 2014, 54). The benefit of such intervention helps reduce the impact of an economic recession on society.

A lack of consideration results in the eventuality of a natural and international economic crisis such as the Subprime Crisis, in which the government is not prepared to act. As it is argued throughout this paper, Keynes’ theory provides a hopeful alternative to the neoclassical perspective which fails to offer solutions at times of economic downturn and increased income inequality.

Neoclassical Economic Theory David Ricardo and Adam Smith contributed to the development of the neoclassical economic theory. It was founded on the basis of the “rejection of the Marxian notion of exploitation and the promotion of the idea that the distribution of social resources produced by market exchanges is innately fair and just” (Gabriel, 2004). Throughout the years, neoclassical theory was the dominant school of thought in the Western world as it promoted the power of free markets to achieve a competitive equilibrium between aggregate demand and aggregate supply (Stilwell 2012, 62). For instance, a low demand was due to society’s disinterest in the commodity or service during that particular period.

That being said, neoclassical theorists did not believe in government intervention as they encouraged the power of individuals to acquire the wealth they desire (Stilwell 2012, 62). In other words, the difference between those who are members of the upper economic class and those of the lower economic class was based on their hard work.

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Thus, neoclassical theorists argued that people who are wealthy work harder than the poor and do not consider inherent advantages as a factor in someone’s success.

This economic theory is different than the Keynesian economy since it encourages the government to observe the business cycle as an indicator of the reality of the market. The 2008 recession is based on the neoclassical theory in which the government does not intervene in the economy since it appears to be developing well. However, the government’s laissez-faire attitude left the Americans stranded as many of them lost their homes to foreclosure and banks became bankrupt. As such, the neo-classical philosophy is criticized for being unable to predict and prevent the recession.

Political Culture Political culture is the most popular ideology within a country.

More precisely, it is the “widely shared beliefs, values, and norms that define the relationship between citizens and government, and citizens to one another” (Independence Hall Association, 2014). The political culture of the country is based on historical facts and events that help to foster the development of certain values. For instance, the American political culture of neoclassical economic theory and laissez-faire dates back to the Cold War era when the U.S fought communism (Independence Hall Association, 2014). The American constitution was based on the notion of liberty and freedom; thus its political and economic ideology are inclined to favour these values (Independence Hall Association, 2014).

However, I argue that the political culture can shift with the occurrence of certain events with high socio-economic impact in which people may come to question their values. This is the case after the 2008 economic recession where those who lose their jobs and homes begin to reconsider the dominant ideology of a laissez faire state (Schneider 2012, 15). The political culture therefore shifts from discouraging government intervention to encouraging it (Ohmann 2015, 5).

Consequently, Americans have been seen adopting more social-demo47

cratic values to help with the growing issue of socio-economic inequality.

Democratic Socialism Democratic socialism has often been mistaken for communism (Dreier, 2016). The main idea behind this ideology is based on the notion of “giving ordinary people a greater voice in both politics and the workplace” (Dreier, 2016). It puts forward capitalism but considers developing policies for the consequences that may occur from this type of economy. Democratic socialists acknowledge the struggles of visible minorities in societies’ various jurisdictions and make an effort to cater to their unfilled needs (Dreier, 2016).

Following this train of thought, this political ideology considers the distribution of wealth in society and develops a strategic plan to have “companies pay decent wages and provide safe workplaces” (Dreier, 2016). Democratic socialism believes in government intervention to avoid an imbalance between the rich and the poor (Dreier, 2016). They advocate the following values: “reducing the political influence of the super rich and big corporations, increasing taxes of the wealthy to help pay for expanded public services like child care, public transit, and higher education, reducing barriers to voting, and strengthening regulations of business to require them to be more socially responsible in terms of their employees, consumers and the environment” (Dreier, 2016). Democratic socialism considers the needs of every member of society, regardless of class, race, or gender, when developing its policies.

Democratic socialism was once considered the enemy of the Western world. However, as inequality becomes the focus of political debates, more people are beginning to adopt this ideology. This is particularly relevant in the American context in which the shift from a laissez-faire state to a more interventionist state is occurring in the current political campaign for president (William, 2016). Democratic candidate Bernie Sanders is challenging the political parties ideology by promising to develop policies that reflect democratic-socialist values 48

(William, 2016). In other words, the political culture is changing in the United States as people demand for more social equality in the political and economic spheres (William, 2016).

Overview of the 2008 Economic Recession in the United States The United States economy experienced high economic growth in 2005 (Coughlin, 2005). “The government had successfully created two million jobs across the country, which was beneficial for the country’s Gross Domestic Product (The Economist, 2013). America’s low interest rates contributed to encouraging risk-taking investments (The Economist, 2013). Lawrence H. White, author of the article, “How Did We Get into This Financial Mess?”, mentions that the governmentsponsored enterprise, Fannie and Freddie, funded “hundreds of billions of dollars worth of loans, many of them sub-prime and adjustable-rate loans and made to borrowers who bought houses with less than 10% down” (2008, 6). As such, Americans sought the opportunity to purchase expensive homes, which in many cases were above their financial means. During this period of high economic growth and prosperity, no one doubted that the real-estate market would collapse (White 2008, 6).

However, in 2008, the United States encounters the real estate crash, also known as the Great Recession (Angelastro, 2013). From a theoretical perspective, the financial crisis can be attributed to the neoclassical economic thinking (Stillwell 2012, 62). The lack of government intervention could qualify the economy as a laissez-faire state that favoured the empowerment of private firms (Stillwell 2012, 62). The latters made irresponsible decisions not only in allocating high mortgages to people who could not afford them, but also in creating risky financial products (The Economist, 2013). For example, the popular development of CDOs (Collateralized Debt Obligation) along with CDS (Credit Default Swap) encouraged investors to trust the real estate market since the profit was appealing (The Economist, 2013).

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The government also had its share of responsibility in the financial crisis because of its faulty rating agencies (Shah, 2013).

Indeed, the government rating agencies such as, “Standards and Poor” failed in evaluating the actual CDOs value (The Economist, 2013). For instance, some of the latters were quoted as being a low-risk investment (AAA investment); but in reality, they were highly risky (B investment) (Shah, 2013). Americans never questioned the risk assessment provided by national rating agencies, as they trusted the government’s assessment and expertise (Hurd and Rohwedder, 2010). Consequently, the lack of proper ratings of financial products led many people to be affected in the case of a devaluation of the market (Hurd and Rohwedder, 2010).

This scenario occured in 2008 and impacts millions of families. More precisely, unemployment and debt rate increased, along with many foreclosures (Shah, 2013).

Thus, it is arguable that the lack of government regulation contributed to the “financial explosion” in 2008 (Macpherson and Smith 2013, 367). Following the latter, it resulted in an increase in the unemployment rate, foreclosure of houses across the United States, and poverty rate. The need for additional government intervention led many to encourage a Keynesian perspective to stimulate the economy (Jahan 2014).

Keynesian Perspective on the 2008 Recession As mentioned previously, the recession was due to low interest bank loans and the wrongful evaluations of the real estate market (White 2008, 6). However, the Keynesian theoretical framework would argue that the gravity of the recession could be attributed to a lack of government intervention to regulate the financial market. Keynes argues that the economy was bound to experience certain moments of growth and depression and thus, the degree of the state’s input in this sector would help to regulate the length of these periods (Mankiw 1989, 80). In other words it would allow for the possibility to maintain a more stable economy since the effects of the business cycle would be less apparent.

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That being said, the Keynesian theory puts forward that the neoclassical laissez-faire state is the major problem. The American government did not believe in intervening in the economy when it was in high growth (The Economist 2013). The Keynesian theory criticizes this perspective, as it believes that there is high risk involved in letting the economy regulate itself. More precisely, a laissez-faire state created high inequality, since few people were able to profit from this type of economy (Stiglitz 2013, 158). Meanwhile, the rich 1% was considered the hegemon of the national economy (Stiglitz 2013, 158). Since it was primarily composed of bankers from Wall Street, they had a great influence of the greater community (Stiglitz 2013, 158).

Thus, the Great Recession may be attributed to the fact that the state allowed the hegemonic upper class to influence policies that discouraged the state to intervene in the economy (Stiglitz 2013, 159).

Their political influence on public and economic policy is directly related to their contributions to political campaigns (Stiglitz 2013, 167).

Following the 2008 recession, critics argue that the “government has entrusted the responsibility for a matter of vital concern to ordinary citizens – monetary policy, which affects the level of unemployment and economic activity – to a group that consists in significant measure to those elected by banks and the business community themselves, with insufficient democratic accountability” (Stiglitz 2013, 167). Joseph Stiglitz author of the book, The Price of Inequality, mentions that democracy is impacted by the fact that “America’s economic system is, in a fundamental sense, no longer fair” (Stiglitz 2013, 167). Keynesian economic theory would argue that the idea that every American citizen has an opportunity to strive and succeed in a neo-classical economy has been dismantled after the Great Recession, as only a small portion of the population is able to profit from this type of economy.

That being said, the Keynesian perspective believes that the government needs to intervene in all the various periods of the economy in order to balance economic opportunities (Stilwell 2012, 7). The state should regulate the economy in times of growth as well as during

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periods of recession. By constantly regulating the economy, it allows the opportunity to reduce the amplitude and the length of an economic downturn (Stilwell 2012, 7). For instance, in the case of a recession, the state intervenes by stimulating the economy by creating employment (Stiglitz 2013, 349). In doing so, consumers have the capital to invest purchase goods and services, which in turn stimulates the markets supply.

However, at the beginning of the recession, the United States was still running under the Bush Administration, which was influenced by neo-classical thought (Gibson 2013, 338). Top officials of the administration believed that the state should focus on saving the banks rather than helping the taxpayers (The Regents of the University of California, 2011). The government, therefore, intervened in 2008 with the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, leading to the creation of the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) (The Regents of the University of California, 2011). The latter played a major role after the recession by allowing the “United States Treasury to spend up to $700 billion to purchase trouble assets both domestically and internationally” (The Regents of the University of California, 2011). TARP was justified on the basis that it would give banks the liquidity they needed to provide loans for struggling Americans (The Regents of the University of California, 2011). Piketty, a Keynesian economist, argues that banks play a critical role in helping to stimulate the economy in times of recession. More precisely, people tend to depend on the banks for financial support, as it is “the only public institution capable of averting a total collapse of the economy and society in an emergency” (Piketty 2014, 473). However, Piketty criticizes post-recession policies for helping the central banks as it did not resolve the “structural problems that made the crisis possible, including the lack of financial transparency and the rise of inequality” (Piketty 2014, 473). In this sense, Piketty’s vision of Keynesian economics aims at creating an economy that is inclusive by taking into consideration political and economic factors, education and the environment.

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Joseph Stiglitz, a Keynesian economist, is critical of this perspective as he considers the failure of the 2008 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act to help the struggling American middle class (Shah, 2013). The 2008 Act is mainly focused on bailing out the institutions considered by many scholars, responsible for the Great Recession (Shah, 2013). Paul Craig Roberts supports Stiglitz argument by stating, “despite the large $700 billion US plan, banks [were] still […] reluctant to lend” (Shah, 2013). In this case, Piketty’s argument about the importance of banks is undermined as the conditions to obtain a loan after the Great Recession made it difficult to rely on these public institutions for financial support.

That being said, following the Keynesian theoretical framework, we could argue that the state needs to intervene in a way that will help all the various spheres of society in order to avoid socio-economic exclusion.

Keynesian Perspective: Occupy Movement and Political Culture As mentioned previously, Keynesian theoretical framework has been very critical of the policies that have been put in place following the recession. This is mainly due to the fact that the “1% lost a lot of their wealth before the turnaround in 2009, but bounced back quickly, while poor and working class people and most of those referred to as ‘middle class’ lost ground at an even faster pace than they had during the previous three or four decades, and almost of all the wealth that was recovered or newly created in the next five years went to the richest few per cent of Americans” (Ohmann 2015, 4).

The hegemonic priority of the upper class can be seen in policies such as the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, which led the poor 99% resentful toward the government’s politics (Ohmann 2015, 5).

These types of policies left out the needs and demands of “left-leaning syndicates like the unions of teachers, construction trades, health care, and service employees, whose own advocacy was in no way reflected at the national level” (Squibb 2015, 40). Thus, the state’s lack of consideration for the wider community encouraged many to form a political movement that would raise awareness about the rising socio53

economic inequalities across the country (Mukherjee 2015, 70).

The development of Occupy Wall Street was further encouraged by the Democratic Party’s hold of the legislative and executive branches (Welty 2014, 39). Democrats’ belief in the necessity of redistributing the surplus to the middle-class contradicts itself. By “redistributing resources to the 1%, either by weakness or inclination […] revealed by the ‘Grand Bargain’ proposed by Barack Obama and John Boehner” (Squibb 2015, 40). In this sense, the American government initiated the Occupy movement as citizens felt the need to mobilize to raise awareness about the promises that had failed to be provided (Welty 2014, 39).

Following this train of thought, Mark Chou, author of From Crisis to: Democracy, Crisis and the Occupy Movement, argues that the Occupy movement is triggered by the lack of democratic representation as the policies mainly reflect the interest of the hegemonic upper class and therefore contradict the essence of democracy (Chou 2014, 54). The movement was shaped around giving a political voice to those who feel ignored. Occupy Wall Street used social media as a way to democratize the shared information. It was considered an ideal and equal platform for political exchange as it prevented the development of hierarchical structures since it was free, targeted the youth, and attracted a wide audience.

Taking these factors into consideration, it is fair to say that Occupy Wall Street encouraged Americans to mobilize against socioeconomic inequality. A 2011 research poll demonstrates that 49% of people between 18-29 show their support for socialism while 43% of them encourage capitalist values (Ohmann 2015, 5). This slight change goes to show that the political culture has begun to shift from being neoliberal to being more social-democratic. The Occupy Wall Street movement was considered by many scholars as the “millennial generation’s first public response to the particular social, political, and economic climate around them” (Welty 2014, 39). This may be attributed to high rates of unemployment for recent graduates in 2008.

In this sense, America’s youth has exposed the hegemonic dominance 54

of the 1% over the 99% in the political and economic sphere (Welty 2014, 39).

While the impact of Occupy Wall Street cannot be measured quantitatively, it may be interpreted qualitatively. More precisely, the inclination towards democratic socialism is seen in the 2016 political campaign as Bernie Sanders challenges American politics and the Democratic Party with his policies that reflect democratic-socialist values (Benson 2015). For instance, he considered access to healthcare, childcare, and affordable education to be a ‘right of citizenship’ (Benson 2015).

To the astonishment of many Americans who fought against communism and socialism, he was gaining great support of America’s youth (Williams 2016). “Young voters are flocking to Bernie Sanders […] and the results in Iowa back this up: Sanders won caucus voters under 30 by an astounding 70-point margin, while Hillary Clinton won those over 65 by 43 point […]. Many young voters [saw] Clinton as a corrupt or untrustworthy insider, whereas Sanders “seem[ed] sincere” (William 2016). It was not a coincidence that the millennial generation, who mainly organized and participated in Occupy Wall Street, were also the ones who supported Sanders campaign. The latter is in some ways a direct reflection of what they were campaigning in New York City’s Zuccotti Park in 2011.

While Bernie Sander’ campaign is a source of hope for change and equality, the 2016 election results prove the youth need to continue to mobilise and participate in politics. Although President Donald Trump’s message spoke to the average American, his cabinet and latest policy changes will hurt the 99% as their interest are not properly represented in Washington. The Women’s March on Washington on January 21st, 2017, was a day where women and men in different international cities rallied together and marched for equal rights following Donald Trump’s inauguration at the White House (Women’s March on Washington, 2017). It was not only a way to demonstrate the necessity to acknowledge the economic and political challenges that continue to persist for women, but also an opportunity to educate people 55

about the effects of Trump’s policy cuts will have on women and the marginalized population. For instance, Trump’s administration claimed to cut on affordable childcare services, which, in turn, will affect the ability for women to hold a full-time job as they will need to stay at home with their children (Damaske, 2016). This is only one example in which the American President will affect women’s economic and political standards in a degrading manner (Damaske, 2016). The Women’s March on Washington event may be the beginning of a new social movement that could mark the starting point of a new era for America and the international community (Women’s March on Washington, 2017).

Conclusion The 2008 Great Recession questions the limitations of a neoclassical economy. American values shifted as citizens were losing their jobs and houses during the economic downturn. Occupy Wall Street movement exposed the possibility of reconsidering the American Dream. The 2008 historical recession revealed the need to mobilize the 99% to overthrow the hegemonic power of the rich 1% who controlled and manipulated the political and economic spheres of American society through excessive campaign donations. The economic crisis created a new political culture where people are more politically conscious about the inequality in opportunity in a neo-classical economy.

The high rate of support in America’s youth towards Bernie Sanders’ campaign was a testimony that the United States future may involve a government that reflects the values of democratic-socialism. It is arguable that Occupy Wall Street movement may have helped rally this support as it educated people about the importance of inequality in American society and the need for a Keynesian economy favouring state intervention.

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Women’s March on Washington. 2017. “Washington State Mission Statement.” Women’s March on Washington. www.womensmarchwstate.org.

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__________ Jason PoirierLavoie __________

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Costly Signals and Revealing Intentions: The Sino-American Rapprochement Jason Poirier-Lavoie is an undergraduate at Concordia University, finishing his Honours’ thesis in Political Science on the topic of the French national reaction to the Algerian War of Independence. Through his course selection and extra-curricular activities, he has placed a heavy focus on international conflicts, causes of war, and strategic studies.

Jason works full time as Manager of Corporate of Services at a civil aviation firm, Aviation Strategies International, while concurrently serving as an Engineer in the Canadian Armed Forces.

Abstract Does certainty, when regarding the intentions of states, decrease the likelihood of war? This theoretical question is significant when taking into account the considerable efforts that states make to signal their intentions to one another and to communicate foreign policy objectives.

Using defensive realism’s theories concerning signaling and trustbuilding, this paper will study the Chinese and American rapprochement during the cold war period, particularly in the 1970s.

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Introduction Does certainty, when regarding the intentions of states, decrease the likelihood of war? This theoretical question is significant when taking into account the considerable efforts that states make in order to signal their intentions to one another, and to communicate foreign policy objectives.

This proposed research paper tests defensive realism’s theories concerning signaling. These theories assert that status quo states caught in a security dilemma may participate in costly signaling as a way to reduce the expected cost of cooperation. Firstly, when a state is faced with security competition and believes both parties are security seeking,

it may try to signal its intentions to reassure a target state. Secondly, knowing countries experience asymmetrical information, a target state may reciprocate costly signaling to alleviate the fear of other states and build trust. If successful, both states may emerge from the spiral of the security dilemma.

In order to test this theory, I require a case of two states that were caught in security competition. To investigate correlation with the theory's arguments, this paper asks the following questions. Firstly, did the target of a signaling attempt understand and recognize the benign intent of the other? Secondly, did they reciprocate the signaling?

Thirdly, was there a reduction in the security competition by the target of the signaling? Finally, did all of this occur within a certain time frame? If the theoretical argument is confirmed/validated, this paper will establish causation. Through a review of primary sources – reports and meeting records of the foreign policy apparatus of the signaling state – this paper determines if there is evidence of deliberate attempts at reassuring with the expectation to avoid war by the signaling state.

It is important to evaluate alternative explanations of the outcomes such as potential external threats or domestic influences to the bilateral relation, which are driving one of the two states to act differently. This could possibly provide a better explanation of the results.

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My case study focuses on the Chinese and American relations during the cold war period, in particular the 1970s. This case is an appropriate test for the theory because both countries were being driven by security competition, and the United States began a policy of rapprochement with China who in turn opened up to normalized relations; hailing a new era of relations.

I will conclude this research paper with the finding that signaling intentions can help decrease the likelihood of war and although it played an important role in the Sino-American rapprochement, it did not conclusively yield a reduction in tensions. China understood and reciprocated the Americans’ attempts at signaling benign intentions towards them. However, it was the domestic pressures on both sides that, ultimately, prevented the rapprochement from yielding significant results.

Definition of Key Terms For the purpose of this research paper, it is necessary to define intentions and signals. Firstly, I use Sebastien Rosato’s definition of intentions. Intentions are courses of actions that states plan on taking to achieve their goals. They are preferences for how to act in specific situations based on information available to them at that time (Rosato 2014, 53). Secondly, signals are actions taken by a state to send a persuasive message to another state in an attempt to convince it regarding one’s intentions. For example, the signal may attempt to demonstrate the resolve a state has over a certain issue, or the benign nature of its foreign policy. A further distinction that is necessary to make is that of costly signaling. To be considered costly, signals will have to impose a significant burden on the signaler (Kydd 2000, 326).

Theoretical Overview In the theoretical overview, I explore the literature on signaling and reassurance; which argues that inherent uncertainty is the result of systemic anarchy and that signaling may promote trust, alleviate fear and potentially lead to cooperation. The debate is still lively as the 63

degree at which states can ascertain the intentions of others is still unsettled (Glaser and al. 2015, 197-215).

Through the perspective of the realist paradigm, states find themselves in an environment of international anarchy. They are driven to ensure their own security since no over-arching power exists to prevent hostilities. Without a central power to hold all in check, states find themselves in a Hobbesian world of all against all (Kydd 2005, 12; Kupchan 2010, 16). In this kind of environment, fear permeates the relations between nations. Since all states are on their own, and they do not know the intentions of others, they necessarily come to fear their potential actions (Tang 2008, 452). If their goal is to ensure survival, states must acquire more security to protect themselves from any potential aggressor. As all states in the system witness this increase in security, and are driven by fear, question the intention of the rising power. Even if its only goal is benign self-protection, others may not be certain of its intention (Rosato 2014, 49). Robert Jervis introduces the concept of the “security dilemma� to capture this theoretical dynamic at work. By the very pursuit of power for security purposes, a state will provoke in others a loss of security. In response, they gather more power, in turn reducing the security of the first state. In an environment of security-seeking states with benign intents, all may be driven to war through this logic (Jervis 1978, 186-214; Kydd 2005, 13). The reason for this spiral is that a state may never know the true intentions of others with complete certainty. Incomplete information reinforces fear, as states take actions based on their perception of probability, which is based on beliefs and power position (Walsh 2008, 443).

This approach can be broken down into the two schools of offensive and defensive realism. Offensive realists argue that there is no place in international relations for trust or reassurance since the intentions of other states are truly inscrutable and, as a result, pointless to attempt to discern. States must make worst-case scenario assumptions of the intentions of other states. This leads to the assumption that the only way to secure oneself is to aggressively obtain more power and to prevent others from doing so. By assuming relative gains matter, and 64

that the actions of the aggressors do not distinguish themselves from the benign actors, states are perpetually in fear (Edelstein 2002, 6; Tang 2008, 453; Montgomery 2006, 155).

Defensive realists share some of the assumptions of offensive realists but depart particularly where it concerns the distinguishability of intentions and strategies. They argue that states are not powermaximizing and may have been able to ensure their own security without provoking others into a spiral. By demonstrating a benign intent and selecting defensive strategies over offensive ones, states may credibly demonstrate to one another that they are security seeking.

Without the offensive advantage, only aggressive states would be pursuing unbridled power (Edelstein 2002, 6-7; Tang 2008, 453; Montgomery 2006, 155-156). The implications of defensive realism are that states may be able to cooperate and limit their mutual fear by signaling their peaceful intent to one another (Glaser 1997, 178).

For Andrew H. Kydd, in Trust and Mistrust in International Relations, trust plays a central role in encouraging states to cooperate.

Trust, according to his theory, is the view that a state will not exploit one’s vulnerability and prefer mutual cooperation (Kydd 2005, 6). In this sense, it is the ability to trust the intentions of another with a relative degree of certainty and to expect the other to reciprocate your actions rather than exploit them. Kydd offers a theory of trust-building where progressive steps are taken and greater degrees of risk are accepted. This progressive process leads to the development of a history of cooperation. This is where trust is built and both actors may use it as a reference for future cooperation.

Kupchan further elaborates on trust building as a criterion for peace. He identifies four phases where a state may act to develop a solid foundation for cooperation through trust: firstly, unilateral accommodations are to be taken by one state; secondly, reciprocal restraint is witness by the other. These two phases repeat until a degree has been achieved for an outbreak of peace. Then, thirdly, societal integration can take place between both populations. Finally, the fourth phase is the generation of new narratives and identities through 65

exchanges. Kupchan argues that the moment of success or failure is determined in the interplay between phases one and two. For the outbreak to occur, there are necessary causal conditions, such as Institutionalized restraint on behalf of both states, compatible social orders within both nations, cultural commonality by the people attempting to build trust. Rapprochement is therefore an indicator of a successful peace process. (Kupchan 2010, 12-20).

On the pessimistic side of the theoretical divide, Montgomery argues that the only kinds of signals that would not be imitated by aggressive states would have to be military reassurances. These signals would require a certain degree of distinguishability between offense and defense, and would likely lead to an increase in the vulnerability of the signaler. Rosato would go even further and argue that no signal irrespective of cost could provide certainty with regards to the intentions of states and their foreign policy objectives. This is due to that fact that at any point in the future, they may change intentions, and are not restricted to past commitments (Montgomery 2006, 154-157).

Methodology To test this theory, I need a case of two states that find themselves in a security competition, where one state received a series of signals with the intention to de-escalate the conflict. To qualify as a security competition, the case requires a proximity of military assets between both states and the implication of a potential conflict over territory or policy. The conditions for signaling and de-escalation will be covered below.

The first step to investigation is to evaluate the presence of the theory’s variables in the case. In this way, I confirm the correlation of the case to the theory of signaling. Following this step, an investigation of causation is necessary to see the relevance of the theory in building peace between the signaling states. Pulling from the literature, the variables that I am looking for shall be: 1) signaling through unilateral accommodations (IV), 2) reciprocal restraint (IIV), 3) political integration (IIV), and finally 4) a reduction in conflict (DV).

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Firstly, the independent variable (IV) is the signaling through unilateral accommodations to another specific state. By taking action through costly signals, a state may demonstrate its intentions in an attempt to display trustworthiness and reassure the target state. The indicators for this are any policy that results in a signal by the state that cannot be easily reversed or changed. This can take the form of troop displacements, change in foreign or trade policies, and public declarations or commitments in a democratic state. The signals must be non-negotiated, with the expectation that it might not be reciprocated. It is considered costly and significant only if the result of the action cannot be easily undone and give the opportunity to be exploited to the other state.

Secondly, an intervening variable (IIV) in this theory is the reciprocation of restraint by the target state. By also taking action through costly signals, the target state acknowledges the initial signal and demonstrates its own trustworthiness and reassurance. The indicators for this is any policy that results in an action that deviates from the status quo and cannot be easily reversed or changed. This can take the same form as any indicator of unilateral signaling, except that it must be of relevant scope and to a certain degree proportionally significant as the signal that prompted it.

Thirdly, another intervening variable (IIV) shall be political integration by both signaling states. This is the by-product of mutual restraint by both states since greater coordination and negotiation will be required once the actions become significant enough in scale. The indicator for political integration is the frequency of high-level meetings, diplomatic relations, and agreements of exchanges and trade.

The frequency and scope of these actions must be broad and repetitive over a small period.

Finally, the dependent variable (DV) is the presence and degree of reduction in conflict by both signaling states. It is the result of political integration and mutual restraint. The primary indicator of a reduction in conflict is the geographic displacement (redeployment) of forces into a defensive or non-aggressive posture. Secondary indicators 67

include collaborative discussion concerning military affairs, credible public commitments to withdraw troops, and the adoption of foreign policies that are notably less confrontational and more conciliatory.

Case Study: Sino-American Rapprochement Background: Sino-Soviet Split The case that I use to test the theory is the Sino-American rapprochement that occurred in the late 1960s onwards. Following the strained relations with Soviets after the failed Sino-Soviet rapprochement, China found itself facing enemies on two fronts. These hostilities were intensified after the Czechoslovakia invasion and the introduction of the Brezhnev doctrine. The hostilities reached their peak in the Sino-Soviet border conflict of 1969 (Qingguo 2002, 109-132).

Combined with the Soviet threat of a nuclear strike on Chinese strategic assets, the leadership was forced to disconnect the domestic far-left politics from foreign policy. It was necessary to adapt the more ideological aspects of Chinese diplomacy in the interest of national security; hence the emergence of a more pragmatic China on the international scene (Zhang 2002, 39; Copper 1992, 4).

Presence of Sino-American Tensions Ever since the outbreak of the Korean War, the risk of a conflict between America and China was seen as on the rise as well. In 1950, Truman declared that an attack on Taiwan would be a threat to American security. He ordered the 7th fleet into the Taiwan Strait and attempted to reopen the legal status of the island. A China policy of containment was pursued with several alliances formed with most of the East-Asian states from 1951 to 1954: ANZUS with Australia and New Zealand, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, and the Japanese, Philippine and ROC bilateral defense treaties. Combined with 1958 congressional approval for the President to use force in the region and the escalation of the conflict in Vietnam, the tensions reached a high point. This all culminated with the Gulf of Tonkin incident and the 68

Chinese nuclear tests during 1964 (Copper 1992, 1-4). These events clearly indicate the presence of a potential conflict: both these states clashed multiple times (and increasingly so) over issues they perceived as vital to their security interests, indicating a worsening security dilemma.

In exploring the causation of the theory, I attribute the foreign policy formulation and general strategic direction of the People’s Republic of China between 1969 and 1972 to Chairman of the Central Committee Mao Zedong and Premier Zhou En-Lai. In a highly centralized decision-making system, they were the ones with the support of the state’s intelligence apparatus, which interpreted the signals from the United States and instructed diplomatic cadres to act in consequence.

Other political groups domestically were not significant or influential in policy formulation (Zhang 2002, 39-41).

American Signaling by Unilateral Accommodations Fear on the American side of an actual direct engagement with China raised the concern of being chain-ganged by any one of the multiple alliance members in the region that it had signed onto bilaterally. This concern inevitably led to a review of the China policy in congress as well as in the White House (Copper 1992, 3-4).

Therefore, an unexpected opportunity for China emerged in the late 1960s when America began its unilateral revision of its China policy.

This was complemented by the election of President Nixon who campaigned on an honorable withdrawal from Vietnam and renewed relations for a war-weary America (Zhang 2002, 39).

It was at this point that the United States began signaling a desire to hold high-level discussions with the aim to resume normalized relations. To demonstrate the resolve that Washington had, they lifted travel and trade curbs (Office of the Historian 2016; Fenby 2013, 499).

This move did not greatly improve the level of trust between them and did not lead to a reciprocation. In another signal attempt, this time far more costly, in 1970, the 7th fleet was ordered by the President to with-

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draw from the Taiwan Strait, an issue they knew was seen as vital by the Chinese (Office of the Historian 2016; Ross 1995, 4). The PRC recognized the costly nature of this move, and acknowledged them via the Polish communication channels (Ross 1995, 33; Copper 1992, 29-33).

These events serve to indicate that a costly signal by unilateral accommodation took place and it is noteworthy in that it could have been exploited by the PRC both militarily and diplomatically. From the Chinese perspective, the United States ordered for a troop displacement that was not negotiated for, and made without any concession demanded by the signaler (The US). The intention of the America leadership was to reassure and build trust.

Chinese Signaling of Reciprocation of Restraint It is in this context that the Chinese leadership opened up to further and higher level talks. There occurred a heavy period of signaling between 1969 and 1971 prior to Nixon’s visit (Ross 1995, 29-33). The gradual and escalating signals from America were reciprocated by China. These reciprocated signals were small in nature, and were not very costly. There was the invitation of the America pingpong team in what was dubbed the ping-pong diplomacy by Mao in the spring of 1971 (Zhang 2002, 39; Fenby 2013, 499). Additionally, Beijing released two American sailors who were held captive following an accidental border crossing (Office of the Historian 2016; Fenby 2013, 499; Ross 1995, 33). Both countries understood the significance of these signals and noticed their escalation.

All things considered, several private concessions were being made in the meetings and discussion between the powers at this point; all meetings were still being done in private. This was not done to avoid public commitments, but in fact to avoid raising domestic attention and, in turn, pressure for both sides. To keep the dialogue open to solutions, both sides avoided the issue of Taiwan (Kirby, Ross, and Li 2005, 11).

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These events serve to indicate that China received the signals, and reciprocated them, to a certain degree. The time between the unilateral accommodation and reciprocation indicates a direct relation, but the lack of internal documentation noting the reason for the reciprocation by the PRC reduces the degree of confidence we may have in the causation of the variables. Additionally, the low cost of the signals by China, and the American’s persistence in continuing costly signals, indicated a large degree of willpower by one party to overcome the uncertainty of the other. This was not a mutual building of trust, but an attempt at persuasion.

Sino-American Political Integration Following this constant exchange of signals, both sides agreed for high level talks and eventual public acknowledgement of relations.

Kissinger visited China twice in 1971 to determine points of agreement and disagreement. These preliminary visits were meant to establish the agenda of the all-important trip: Nixon’s visit to Mao in 1972 (Zhang 2002, 39-41). These discussions culminated in the climax that was the “Shanghai Communique” (Myers, Domes, and Yeh 1989, 247). This published document announced their disagreements, and their commitments to one another for a cooperative future. A commitment to normalization, frequent talks, progressive development of trade between their two countries, and all importantly, a commitment to let the Taiwan issue be resolved domestically by the Chinese.

In an attempt to improve diplomatic relations and reduce the hostility in the party’s narrative concerning America, the party leadership informed the diplomatic cadres that the China-US negotiations were not a betrayal of communist principles (Myers, Domes, and Yeh 1989, 251). Likewise, the State Department on the American side reconsidered its approach to its public discourse on China (Goh 2005, 155). The rapprochement also yielded a significant milestone in the political integration of China that was the United Nations recognition of the People’s Republic of China in October 1971 (Copper 1992, 4; Myers, Domes, and Yeh 1989, 261).

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These indicators serve to demonstrate the progress that the political integration of China and America had. Frequent high-level discussions, the resumption of diplomatic relations and several agreements to begin trade and exchanges.

Mutual Reduction in Conflict Despite this progress, China frequently questioned the intentions of the United States and saw them as exploiting the Sino-Soviet split (Goh 2005, 227). The State Department was aware of the possibility of exploitation on behalf of the Chinese; that they were attempting to solidify the regime and benefit in terms of prestige from the visits (Goh, 2005, 165).

The “Shanghai Communique” called for “the ultimate withdrawal of all U.S. forces from the region consistent with the aim of self-determination for each country of Indochina. […] there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves” (Myers, Domes, and Yeh 1989, 247). Despite the lofty words, the immediate fallout was not impressive (Fenby 2013, 505). The withdrawal of troops would not occur, and the military posture nonetheless remained the same.

Although there was a clear reduction in the hostile rhetoric between the countries and increase in cultural exchanges and trade, there is little to indicate a reduction in conflict. Following Korea and Vietnam, there was less likelihood of a confrontation, but it is difficult to measure this variable since the rapprochement did not yield immediate cooperation.

Conclusion Does certainty, when regarding the intentions of states, decrease the likelihood of war? How does signaling help to reduce this uncertainty regarding the intentions of other states? The theory suggests that strategies of signaling play a notable role in the decision of states to 72

reassure to one another, in the hope of reducing uncertainty about their intentions.

If offensive strategies can be distinguished from defensive ones, then leaders may demonstrate good will and pursue security in a fashion that escapes the security dilemma. Defensive realists are convinced that benign states can make themselves known and discover one another, without risking their position and security in the international system.

When considering the findings of the case, I believe it would be safe to assume, to a certain degree of confidence, that states can signal their intentions to other states and reassure them of their benign foreign policy. Without additional strategies for cooperation, this certainty may not yield the degree of cooperation that the literature suggests.

Moreover, an alternative explanation that weighed heavily during the Sino-American rapprochement was the looming threat of Soviet Russia and its potential to harm Chinese interests. Following the rapid deterioration of the Sino-Soviet rapprochement and its eventual border clash, the American reassurance was against a backdrop of hostility on two fronts for China. The presence of a hostile third party, particularly in a cold war scenario, underpinned all negotiations between the superpowers. To make matters worse, following the normalization, incredible domestic turmoil for both China and America prevented them further pursuing improved relations according to the “Shanghai Communique.� The inability to overcome domestic ideological and political crises made the continuation of cooperation too onerous.

The implications of the research for theory and policy are that conflicts may be avoided by signaling but must be complemented by other strategies of reassurance and cooperation. The required degree of cost for a signal to be effective may be too great for states to pursue and leave them vulnerable to an aggressive state. No matter sunk costs of cooperation, the adversarial state may change direction and end the rapprochement. Despite the results of the case, I do believe that a sound theory of reassurance may be developed for effective signaling. By learning from the failures of the past, we may amend our approach and improve the toolkit available to statesmen during periods of insecurity 73

and tension. I would consider this an important possible alternative to the prescriptions of deterrence theory in which a hostile posture is assumed with the hopes of avoiding conflict.

References Copper, John F. 1992. China Diplomacy: The Washington-TaipeiBeijing Triangle. Oxford: Westview Press. Edelstein, David M. 2002. “Managing Uncertainty: Beliefs about Intentions and the Rise of Great Powers.” Security Studies 12(1):1-40.

Fenby, Jonathan. 2013. The Penguin History of Modern China: Fall and Rise of a Great Power 1950 to the Present. London: Penguin Books. Glaser, Charles L. 1997. “The Security Dilemma Revisited.” World Politics 50(1):171-201.

Glaser, Charles L., Andrew Kydd, Mark L. Haas, John M. Owen and Sebastien Rosato. 2015. “Correspondence: Can Great Powers Discern Intentions?” International Security 40(3):197-215.

Goh, Evelyn. 2005. Constructing the U.S. Rapprochement with China, 1961–1974: From “Red Menace” to “Tacit Ally.”

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Jervis, Robert. 1978. "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma." World Politics 30(2):186-214.

Kirby, William C., Robert S. Ross, Gong Li. 2005. Normalization of U.S.-China Relations: An International History. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Kydd, Andrew H. 2005. Trust and Mistrust in International Relations.

Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Kydd, Andrew H. 2000. “Trust, Reassurance, and Cooperation.”

International Organizations, 54(2):325-357 Kupchan, Charles A. 2010. How Enemies Become Friends: The Sources of Stable Peace. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Montgomery, Evan Braden. 2006. “Breaking Out of the Security Dilemma: Realism, Reassurance, and the Problem of Uncertainty.” International Security 31(2):151-185 74

Myers, James T., Jurgen Domes, and Milton D. Yeh. 1989. Chinese Politics: Documents and Analysis Volume 2: Ninth Party Congress (1969) to the Death of Mao (1976). Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.

Office of the Historian. 2016. “Memorandum from the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon: December 23, 1969.” Accessed April 15. https:// history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d54 Office of the Historian. 2016. “Memorandum from Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon: December 2, 1969.” Accessed April 15. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/ frus1969-76v17/d49 Office of the Historian. 2016. “Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China and Commander, U.S. Taiwan Defense Command: September 23, 1969.” Accessed April 15. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus196976v17/d34) Qingguo, Jia. 2002. “Chinese Relations with the United States.” In The Golden Age of the U.S.-China-Japan Triangle 1972-1989, edited by Ezra F. Vogel, Yuan Ming, and Tanaka Akihiko, 109- 132. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Rosato, Sebastian. 2014. “The Inscrutable Intentions of Great Powers.”

International Security 39(3):48-88.

Ross, Robert S. 1995. Negotiation Cooperation: The United States and China, 1969-1989. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press.

Tang, Shiping. 2008. “Fear in International Politics: Two Positions.”

International Studies Review 10(3):451-471.

Walsh, James Igoe. 2008. “Do States Play Signaling Games?”

Cooperation and Conflict 42(4):441-459.

Zhang, Baijia. 2002. “Chinese Politics and Asia-Pacific Policy.” In The Golden Age of the U.S.-China-Japan Triangle 1972-1989, edited

by Ezra F. Vogel, Yuan Ming, and Tanaka Akihiko, 38-51.

Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

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__________ Sonia Ahimana __________

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The Impacts of Religion and Democracy on the Political Development of the State of Israel Sonia was born in Rwanda and moved to Canada with her family in 2001. Primarily francophone, it was after CEGEP that she decided to undertake her undergraduate education in English. She is currently completing her last semester at Concordia with a major in Political Science, and she will start law school in Fall 2017. During her undergrad, she developed a keen interest for international relations, human rights, and she particularly enjoyed a few law-related classes such as business law and international public law.

Abstract In her analysis, Sonia evaluates the impact of Israel’s self-definition as “Jewish” and “Democratic” and that of the negotiations surrounding the peace process from the 1979 Peace Treaty with Egypt to the current negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority on the political and religious development of Israel. Sonia examines how religious parties such as the National Religious Party (NRP) seeks to promote and protect Judaism’s relevance within the Jewish community. To counter secularist tendencies, religious parties emphasize the fact that the Torah is not only restricted to aspects of religion. Rather, it is also linked to everything else pertaining to public and private life, society, and the national and individual. Sonia goes on to explore the debate over ceding the land to Arabs in exchange for peace, something that religious Jews are reluctant to do, given their attachment to the Land of Israel.

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Democratic Nature The establishment of the State of Israel, in 1948, is a landmark in the Jewish people’s quest to escape the harsh realities of anti-Semitism in Europe and to exercise their right to self-determination in their ancient homeland (Kasher 2005, 178). Since its foundation, the state adopts democratic and Jewish characters. The safeguard of the Jewish character mainly rests on avoiding the distortion of the Jewish heritage and the traditions shared by a vast majority of Israeli Jews. On the other hand, the democratic nature of the State of Israel, as mentioned in the Declaration of Independence, calls upon the state’s engagement to “ensure complete equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race or gender; it will guarantee freedom of religion, conscience, language, education, and culture ... and it will be faithful to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations” (Elior 2002, 136). The Declaration is the guiding principle of the Supreme Court and other state institutions that bear the duty to protect and advocate core democratic principles in order to “maintain an arena of free expression, in which different beliefs and lifestyles can compete in a marketplace of ideas on a basis of freedom of expression and freedom of identification, and freedom of choice without coercion and without predetermined preference” (Elior 2002, 137).

With the founding of the State of Israel, discussions about framing a constitution forced themselves to the foreground. Opposing sides hold diverging views on the fundamental character of the constitution as well as on the clauses that it contains, and each side wants to secure its preferred outcomes. Determined to deter liberal groups from adopting a liberal constitution that emulates the principles of Western democracies, the religious parties, despite their political minority, tirelessly fight against such a framing because it would significantly, if not completely, undermine the Jewish character of Israel (Goldberg 1998, 226-227). Religious political parties are not always opposed to the idea of a constitution for the State of Israel, but their resistance is triggered by the inclination of liberal political leaders to disregard the status quo agreement (Goldberg 1998, 212). According to 78

them, a proper constitution is to “secure the existence of the highest religious institution—the Chief Rabbinate—the superiority of the Torah Law in marriage and divorce issues, Kosher food in state-funded institutions, recognition of the state of the Sabbath and the religious holidays, and education in Jewish schools based on Jewish religion and tradition” (Goldberg 1998, 213). In the years following the declaration of independence, the religious political parties realize that opposing the establishment of a constitution is of little avail given their minority political status. They thus choose to be part of the process of drafting a set of Basic Laws that serve as a constitutional document (Goldberg 1998, 212-214). In the years following 1977, religious groups gain significant bargaining power and influence in the political arena to successfully undermine the enactment of a liberal constitution that ignore core precepts outlined in the Torah (Goldberg 1998, 212-213). A key actor in the constitutional debate is the first Prime Minister of Israel, Ben-Gurion. He apprehends the emulation of the United States’ constitution, which gives the power of judicial review to the Supreme Court as this strongly weakens the majority government’s decision making power (Shapira 2012, 182). On the other hand, minority parties want a constitution that effectively protects them against the majoritarian rule of the Mapai party (Shapira 2012, 182). Although BenGurion recognizes the central role of a constitution in the consolidation of democracy, he reasons that citizens’ allegiance to the rule of law and the principle of equality stems from a “general civic ethos” (Shapira 2012, 182). Furthermore, he believes that it is democratically counterproductive to enact a constitution agreed upon only by a few given that there are still more Jewish generations awaiting to come to Israel (Shapira 2012, 182). Ultimately, Ben-Gurion’s resistance to the framing of a constitution reflects his desire to sidestep tensions between his governing party and religious parties as well as their demands for “Halakha to be the source of law in Israel, or at least a demand to base the constitution on Jewish law, which the system totally rejected” (Shapira 2012, 182). Nevertheless, to appease internal tensions between secular and religious parties and work toward a national unity, Ben79

Gurion accedes to maintain the status quo – “Sabbath would be the public day of rest, public kitchens would be kosher, efforts would be made to maintain the halakhic laws of personal status, and the autonomy of religious education would be preserved but would include the core studies of the general education system” (Shapira 2012, 182-183). Such accommodations are very difficult to incorporate in a constitution as they limit citizens’ way of life. The status quo agreement is struck prior to Israeli statehood between the Jewish Agency and the leader of Agudat Yisrael, the non-Zionist religious party (Shapira 2012, 182-183). BenGurion also agrees to excuse yeshiva students and orthodox girls from military service, since enrolment in the army is contrary to the UltraOrthodox values and way of life (Shapira 2012, 182-183; Cohen and Susser 1996, 822). Thus, the status quo agreement plays a major role in reconciling religion and state whenever the two are in conflict.

However, it by no means rules out the potential for future disagreements on a number of issues between religious and non-religious groups within Israeli society.

Jewish Character of the State The power bestowed upon Israeli religious entities in the early years of nation building enables them to exert a tremendous influence on the manner in which Jewish national identity is defined. To begin, the right of all Jewish people to immigrate to Israel is first outlined in the Declaration of Independence, and it is later codified into the Law of Return enacted in July 1950 (Shapira 2012, 184). This law grants Israeli citizenship to all Jewish newcomers in the State of Israel. Typically, Israeli citizenship “includes the right to vote and to be elected to office” (Shapira 2012, 185). However, the Declaration fails to mention who is a Jew or the manner in which Jewishness is to be defined. In an attempt to shed light on this ambiguous and controversial question, the Minister of the Interior Yisrael Bar-Yehuda declares that a jew is “any person declaring in good faith that he or she was a Jew, with no additional proof required” (Shapira 2012, 185). Far from solving the mystery, Yisrael only adds fuel to the fire. In 1958, the Knesset hold discussions 80

about the matter and uphold Bar-Yehuda’s instructions, thereby suggesting that individuals are to be considered “Jewish from the standpoint of belonging to the Jewish people, even if not considered so according to Jewish law” (Shapira 2012, 185). Later, the National Religious Party, establishes that Jewish people are those “born to a Jewish mother or who had converted in accordance with the Halakha” (Shapira 2012, 185). These new religious guidelines are not codified in law and they generate much objection and controversy until the early 1990s. With enough pressure from religious parties, the Law of Return is amended to recognize Jews as those “who have a Jewish mother or who have converted, and who is not a member of another faith” (Shapira 2012, 187). The issue becomes highly contentious when Jews from the former Soviet Union immigrate in great numbers to Israel (Shapira 2012, 187). Furthermore, the manner in which Jewishness is defined and enforced in Israel by the orthodox religious authorities matters greatly to American Jews who are discriminated against on the basis of their Western “liberal and universalistic” values (Goldscheider 2002, 244; Don-Yehiya 2012, 847). In addition to defining the standards used to grant citizenship, Orthodox rabbinical courts have a monopoly control over “life-course transactions,” such as marriage, death, divorce, birth, and induction into military service (Goldscheider 2002, 244). In fact, Halachic laws surrounding the institution of marriage in Israel do not recognize some immigrants as Jews and they are therefore prohibited to marry in Israel (Cohen 2005, 731). An alternative solution adopted by many is to marry abroad rather than undergo an elaborate conversion process (Ben-Porat 2013, 67). Moreover, same-sex marriage, civil marriage, abortion, and children out of wedlock are not allowed by the state as they are contrary to Jewish religious law (Ben-Porat 2013, 63). In addition, unions between Jews and non-Jews are not allowed, and civil or non-orthodox marriages performed outside Israel are not seen as valid (Fox and Rynhold 2008, 512). Also, in Israel, Reform and Conservative converts are not considered Jewish nor are unions performed by those non-orthodox entities valid (Fox and Rynhold 2008, 512).

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Judicial activism brings about new considerable implications for religion and politics (Cohen and Susser 1996, 827-829). With the enactment of two Basic Laws with constitutional status in 1992 (protecting human dignity and freedom and freedom of occupation), the Supreme Court has a new set of basic rights to protect. Practically, this means that the government’s authority would now be limited in certain respects by the provisions outlined in the Basic Laws. If it wishes to amend or remove such limitations, it needs majority support and must justify why a specific law, though it conflicts with a Basic Law, is nonetheless legitimate (Cohen and Susser 1996, 829). The court declares that it has the duty to ensure “the proper balance between two principles: the Knesset’s sovereignty on the one hand, and safeguarding the rule of law in the legislature itself on there other” (Cohen and Susser 1996, 824). The Court also asserts that it would not hesitate to declare invalid laws or decisions passed by the Knesset, which violate the rule of law and citizens’ interests (Cohen and Susser 1996, 824). For instance, in 2002, the law becomes more lenient with regards to conversions carried out by the non-orthodox Reform and Conservative movements abroad, allowing the individuals to be registered as Jews.

Moreover, there is no doubt that as religious institutions such as the Chief Rabbinate, religious councils, and courts in Israel, at times, seek to protect and promote the preservation of the Jewish character of the state. They are by the same token jeopardizing the democratic character of the state by limiting to a certain extent the liberty of citizens to make choices in accordance to their values and lifestyles. However, as Fox and Rynhold point out, in the modern State of Israel, orthodox groups do not seek to forcefully impose religious practices upon nonreligious individuals per se; rather, they want Judaism to influence certain aspects of society through a widespread public approval (2008, 517). It may be tempting to believe that although citizens have freedom of religion, Israeli society overall lacks freedom of religion and that the Jewish nature of the state is in contradiction to the democratic nature.

However, recent developments show that the reconciliation of the two is not impossible. Of course, this does not mean that tensions no longer 82

exist between religious and secular entities. Rather it shows that

improvements are made largely due to the Supreme Court’s commitment to take seriously its role to protect core democratic principles. Thus, a shift from rigid religious legislation to fairer practices and compromises transpires, through several amendments, to previously established laws. For instance, in relation to the prohibition of public transportation and any form of work on the Sabbath, there is currently an increasing number of shops, restaurants, cinemas, and discotheques that open their doors on Sabbath due to a court decision in 1987 (Liebman and Yehiya 1983, 39; Fox and Rynhold 2008, 517; Sharkansky 1999, 66). Also, in 1999, the Supreme Court finds a deficiency in the provision that gives monopoly control to orthodox rabbis over conversions to Judaism in Israel and orders that it should be amended by parliament (Fox and Rynhold 2008, 517-518; Sharkansky 1999, 66). Another major development is the acceptance of foreign legislations pertaining to marriages or divorces conducted overseas by the Israeli Interior Minister (Sharkansky 1999, 66). In the same spirit, the propensity to sell non-kosher food increases following the large immigration of Jews from the USSR (Sharkansky 1999, 66). Also, since the Post-Soviet aliya comprises a significant number of “Halachically non-Jewish immigrants” aged 65 years and older, alternatives to religious burial are sought, and eventually nonreligious cemeteries are built (Cohen and Susser 1996, 836).

All things considered, it can be said that the growing liberal political culture within Israeli society, along with judicial activism, holds a check on religious authorities by delineating boundaries necessary to protect citizens’ right to equal treatment and freedom of choice. This analysis shows that religion plays a major role in Israeli politics through its relentless advocacy for the preservation of the Jewish character of the state amidst a democratization era. However, one ought to keep in mind that Mapai's dominant governmental rule is not contingent upon the approval from weak minority political parties; rather, it accommodates them for strategic reasons. Thus, as previously mentioned, Ben-Gurion’s assent to maintain the status quo is merely a 83

mean to preserve internal cohesion and avoid potential political cleavages. All in all, this analysis lends itself easily to the following conclusion: as long as the state keeps its dual nature, namely, its “Jewish and democratic” nature, both sides are bound to intertwine in the public and private spheres with mutual accommodation as the main ethos.

The Peace Process and Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations The Israeli-Arab and particularly the Israeli-Palestinian conflict ultimately rests upon each side’s refusal to recognize the legitimate right of the other to exist (Kamrava 2005, 233). Following several years of violence and bloodshed, each side of the divide suffer inevitable losses, although it is thought that Palestinians probably lost more than Israelis, such as loss of land and identity and human fatality. After nearly a century of conflict, a long-awaited realization transpires on each side of the divide: denial of the other’s existence is of little avail, no matter the weapons they use and the pain they afflict on each other (Kamrava 2005, 239). The most troubling result of the conflict is the growing human cruelty: not only the opponent’s cruelty but also their own (Kamrava 2005, 239). Admittedly, some contend that it is time to accommodate the other side and recognize its right to exist. This is the position of idealists on both sides whose voices have long been ignored by a majority in favour of a complete annihilation of the enemy (Kamrava 2005, 239). The intifadas make many people come to terms with the fact that “the violence also deeply affected Israel itself” and “many Israelis perceived their country’s occupation as morally indefensible, socially deleterious, economically ruinous, and politically and militarily harmful” (Kamrava 2005, 240). By 1992, the leaders of the State of Israel, Foreign Minister Shimon Peres and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, see peace as the only viable option, and so do officials in the Palestinian Liberation Organization (Kamrava 2005, 240). However, Palestinian and Israeli “accommodationists” are opposed by fervent “rejectionists” who see them as “sellouts and traitors”, and for whom “the wounds are too deep to let go, the stakes are too high to

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compromise, and the enemy is too untrustworthy to negotiate with” (Kamrava 2005, 239). After the assassination of Rabin by a yeshiva student in 1995, accommodationists on both sides start to ponder how the interests and concerns of the people on each side could best be served. These discussions amount to the Oslo Accords. To a certain extent, the Oslo Accords are a by- product of earlier Arab-Israeli peace treaties such as the 1979 Camp David Accords with Egypt (Kamrava 2005, 239). As it will be further discussed in this essay, the peace process has, over the years, been a highly contentious issue with a number of disagreements, which contribute to exacerbating the divide between religious and secular groups within the Israeli society (Cohen and Susser 1996, 837).

The contemporary political issue related to war and peace among Israelis and Arabs give rise to diverging ideological viewpoints within different streams of Judaism and pose various challenges in Israeli political life. Overall, the riddle revolve around whether or not it was allowed to return the annexed territories in order to save lives, hence the widespread phrase “land for peace” (Rynhold 2005, 373). The stance of religious and non-religious groups on the peace process is contingent upon their position on the political spectrum. The right wing is composed of opponents to the peace treaty because they perceive Arabs or more precisely Palestinians as ill-intentioned and attach a messianic significance to the Land of Israel (Liebman 1997, 106). Almost all religious Jews belong to the right wing (Liebman 1997, 106). In contrast, the left wing comprises individuals with opposite beliefs, including “accommodationists" (Liebman 1997, 106). For instance, ultra-orthodox Jews adopt a rather pragmatic approach to the issue.

Indeed, the most prominent ultra-Orthodox rabbi, Eliezer Menachem Shach affirms that giving up control over holy lands is permissible because “the study of religion, and not control over territory, is the key to the survival of the Jewish people” (Liebman 1997, 106). In the same spirit, the traditional quietist political culture of ultra-Orthodoxy maintains that surrendering the land to Palestinians is a reasonable comprise to ensure the preservation of Israelis’ security (Liebman 1997, 85

106). Overall, the ultra-orthodox positions on the peace process are primarily based on its rejection of the Zionist idea: the establishment of the State of Israel is not part of the Jewish messianic idea and it thus has no significant religious value for them (Rynhold 2005, 373). On the other hand, the hawkish wing of ultra-orthodoxy ascribes a messianic significance to the 1967 Six Day War as Israel acquires many Holy lands, lands they were afterwards reluctant to return (Rynhold 2005, 373). In fact, in line with the hawkish viewpoint, the Lubavitcher Rebbe Menachem Mendel Schneerson announces that Jews would not freely give up their lands (Rynhold 2005, 373). In contrast to the ultraorthodox view, the leader of the Sephardi Jewry, Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, asserts that trading territory for peace and security is more valuable than the coming of the Messiah and the sacred lands (Rynhold 2005, 373).

Additionally, the Ashkenazi rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook, a fervent believer in the Jewish messianic idea and religious Zionism, sees the annexation of conquered territories as an integral part of the messianic endeavour and asserts that transferring those lands to non-Jews might have reverse repercussions on the process and as a result, it is prohibited (Rynhold 2005, 374; Inbari 2009, 305). Mercaz Harav followers also embrace the idea that the land could not be given by one group as it did not belong to one particular group, it is meant to represent the unity of the Jewish people, and the victory of Israel in the war as a “manifestation of the Divine will� (Inbari 2009, 305). In this light, it is not surprising that rabbi Kook encourages the establishment of Jewish settlements in the acquired territories, as it is part of the Zionist goal. It is worth mentioning that among proponents of religious Zionism, a minority of adherents are in favour of the peace process for reasons similar to that of rabbi Ovadia Yosef. That minority is opposed to Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza (Rynhold 2005, 374). In general, while hawkish religious approaches to the peace process are against the exchange of territory for peace because of their messianic beliefs, religious doves, on the other hand, regard things differently as they do not give the messianic idea of Zionism great significance (Rynhold 2005, 376). Equally important are differences between religious and 86

nonreligious dialogues (Rynhold 2005, 375). Secular leftist Jews often tend to side with Palestinian accommodationists because of their belief in liberal democratic principles, such as, equality of rights for all regardless of ethnicity or religion, and the right of all nations to sovereignty (Rynhold 2005, 375). Indeed, for them, Jews and non-Jews should have equal treatment and Jewish settlements should be demolished (Rynhold 2005, 375). Contrastingly, the dovish religious left converge with the religious right on the view that Jews have a basic right to the Land of Israel unlike the Palestinians; however, they differ in that they believe compromise should be reached because “the lives of the people of Israel are more important than the Land of Israel, or in order to preserve Jewish unity and prevent the moral deterioration of the Jewish people” (Rynhold 2005, 375). This is the position held by two dovish rabbis, namely, Yehuda Amital and Aaron Lichtenstein (Rynhold 2005, 375). On another note, among right-wing Israeli Jews, there are some who mobilize to show their dissatisfaction with the Oslo Accords (Liebman 1997, 106). There are also religious movements such as Gush Emunim which actively sought the occupation of conquered territories

by Jewish people (Rhynhold 2005, 378). Sometimes these demonstrations take on a violent character: right-wing extremists go as far as to attack Arab officials and conspire to blow up the al-Aqsa Mosque on the Temple Mount (Rhynhold 2005, 378). In 1995, a yeshiva student, Yigal Amir, assassinates Prime Minister Rabin. The student claims that Rabin “failed the Jewish people and therefore deserved to die” (Kamrava 2005, 240). Some claim that he is assigned this atrocious task by extreme rabbis (Rhynhold 2005, 378). It should be noted that left wing religious movements, like “Peace Now,” do not undertake such determined actions (Rynhold 2005, 378).

Additionally, starting with the 1996 elections, these ideological differences among secular and religious groups have far-reaching repercussions within the political sphere as they shape the main actors’ political behaviour on matters pertaining to the peace process. Thus, the political dynamics are primarily “based on orientations toward security and territory” (Liebman 1997, 106). As Rynhold contends, because none 87

of the religious parties in government ever has to deal with foreign policy, they could easily tip the scale in one direction or another based upon deeply held principles and values or “ulterior motives” (2005, 377). In the 1996 elections, the vote for the prime minister was for the first time held separately from the vote for political parties or, in other words, the election operated on the basis of a single ballot (Rhynhold 2005, 379). It should come as no surprise to learn that all the religious parties, and a large majority of the public, voted in favour of the rightwing candidate, Netanyahu (Rynhold 2005, 379). Data from the election shows that the race was very close, with religion being the “single most significant variable in differentiating Netanyahu from Peres supporters” (Rynhold 2005, 379). Peres, along with the late Prime Minister Rabin, advocated the imminent necessity to strike a peace agreement with Palestinians. On another note, since Israeli elections tend to produce coalition governments, the governing party always needs to ally with smaller parties to form cabinet (Rhynhold 2005, 379). For instance, given this fact, ultra-orthodox religious parties could offer their support to bigger political parties in exchange for financial support for their institutions (Rynhold 2005, 379). It is in this manner that the bargaining power of religious parties increased over the course of years. However, religious parties do not always seek to oppose peace process initiatives (Rhynhold 2005, 380). They gave their support for the Camp David Accords and the peace agreement with Egypt in 1979. A number of religious parties are also in favour of the peace agreement with Jordan and the 1998 Wye agreement, introduced by the Netanyahu government (Rynhold 2005, 380). It is only in one instance that a religious party’s final decision tipped the scale in favour of the peace process; in 1993, Shas’s decline to vote for or against the Oslo Accords permitted the measure to get a majority support in parliament (Rynhold 2005, 380). A final point to consider in this analysis is the shift in Israeli political culture since the 1967 Six Day War. Israeli political culture revolved around liberalism, republicanism, and ethno-nationalism (Rynhold 2005, 380). The liberal stance associated with the dovish orientation to the peace process concerns itself with individual and universal human 88

rights, while ethno-nationalism focuses on collective Jewish ethnonational rights and is associated to the hawkish stance on the peace treaty (Rhynhold 2005, 380). After the 1967 war, liberalism grows among secular Jews to the detriment of republicanism and ethnonationalism, and the reverse takes place in religious societies (Rynhold 2005, 384). All in all, the foregoing analysis raises an important question: is a lasting peace agreement between Israeli Jews, the Muslim, and Christian population possible or has it become a far-fetched ideal?

References Ben-Porat, Guy. 2013. “The State of Marriage.” In Between State and Synagogue: the Secularization of Contemporary Israel, 60-101. United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.

Cohen, Asher, and Bernard Susser. 1996. “From Accommodation to Decision: Transformation in Israel’s Religio-Political Life.” Journal of Church and State 38: 817-839.

Cohen, Asher, and Jonathan Rynhold. 2005. “Social Covenants: the Solution to the Crisis of Religion and State in Israel?”

Journal of Church and State 47(4): 725-745. Don-Yehiya, Eliezer. 2012. “Orthodox and Other American Jews and T heir Attitude Toward the State of Israel.” Israel Studies 17(2): 120-128.

Elior, Rachel. 2002. “Judaism and Democracy—the Private Domain and Public Responsibility.” In Jewish Identity in Modern Israel: Proceedings on Secular Judaism and Democracy, edited by Naftali Rothenberg and Eliezer Schweid, 123-139. Jerusalem: Urim Publications.

Fox, Jonathan, and Jonathan Rynhold. 2008. “A Jewish and Democratic State?: Comparing Government Involvement in Religion in Israel With Other Democracies.” Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions 9(4):507-531.

Goldberg, Giora. 1998. “Religious Zionism and the Framing of a Constitution for Israel.” Israel Studies 3(1): 211-229.

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Goldscheider, Calvin. 2002. “The Jewish Diaspora and Palestine: Ethnicity and Nation-Building in the State of Israel.” In srael’s Changing Society: Population, Ethnicity, and Development, 241-250. Boulder, Colo: Westview Press.

Inbari, Motti. 2009. “When Prophecy Fails?: the Theology of the Oslo Process—Rabbinical Responses to a Crisis of Faith.”

Modern Judaism 29(3): 303-325.

Kasher, Asa. 2005. “A Jewish and Democratic State: Present Navigation in the Map of Interpretations.” In Israeli Democracy at the Crossroads, edited by Raphael Cohen- Almagor, 165-182. London: Routledge.

Kamrava, Mehran. 2005. “The Palestinian-Israeli Conflict.” In The Modern Middle East, 215-256. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Liebman, Charles, and Eliezer Don Yehiya. 1984. “Religion and Politics in Israel.” In Jewish Political and Social Studies, edited by Steven M. Cohen and Daniel J. Elazar, 31-40.

Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Liebman, Charles. 1997. “Religion, Modernization and the Peace Process in Israel.” In Religion, Democracy, and Israeli Society, 95-108. Netherlands: Harwood Academic Publishers.

Rynhold, Jonathan. 2005. “Religion, Postmodernization, and Israeli Approaches to the Conflict With the Palestinians.”

Terrorism and Political Violence 17(3): 371-389.

Shapira, Anita. 2012. Israel: A History. Waltham, Massachusetts: Brandeis University Press.

Sharkansky, Ira. 1999. “Ambiguity in Religion as Well as Politics.” In Ambiguity, Coping and Governance: Israeli Experiences in Politics, Religion, and Policymaking, 53-70.

Westport: Praeger.

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__________ Felicia Leone __________

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“Multiculturalism Has Failed”: Which Factors are really to Blame?

Felicia Leone is a Montreal native and a fourth-year student in Political Science at Concordia University. Her interests include postcolonial political development, international relations, foreign policy, and most importantly conflicts in the Middle East. She will be pursuing an MA with a specialization in Conflict Resolution at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs in the Fall. Her mission with this contribution is to rebuke negative perceptions and stereotypes where Islam is concerned, and to counter the faulty yet widespread narrative of “the West” vs. “the Rest.”

Abstract This research paper seeks to examine why the governments of Britain and France proclaimed, in 2011, that multiculturalism was a failed policy, specifically referring to failed Muslim immigrant integration.

While Islamic culture is targeted for being incompatible with the values of European society, this paper highlights the socio-economic barriers that are most detrimental to Muslim integration. Generational difference in Muslim immigrant families shows that each subsequent generation displays higher levels of integration than the last. Islamophobia has generated feelings of dislike or distrust towards Muslims, causing them alienation and hindering their sense of belonging. Economic marginalization appears to be a direct result of Islamophobia, with the majority of Muslims living in lower-income areas and experiencing lower-quality education as well as prejudice in the job market regardless of their qualification level. These barriers make clear that Islamic culture is the least likely reason for failed integration.

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Introduction British Prime Minister David Cameron made headlines in 2011 when he proclaimed that multiculturalism was a policy that failed in his country. He referred specifically to the failure of Muslim immigrants’ integration into mainstream British society. French President Nicolas Sarkozy followed his lead, stating that immigrants had to melt into the wider national community, which is according to him a community threatened by the growing prevalence of Muslims in Europe, or settle elsewhere (The Telegraph 2011). Interestingly, Britain and France have employed opposite modes of immigrant integration. Yet both policies are deemed unsuccessful. Britain has used a multicultural policy which seeks to equally recognize and accommodate cultural and religious difference in the public sphere. However, the French model is secular and assimilationist; thus, it emphasizes equality through sameness and does not recognize religious symbols or cultural difference in the public sphere (Langellier 2005). This paper seeks to invalidate cultural difference as a main cause of failed immigrant integration; it rather examines the socio-economic barriers that, despite Muslims’ willingness to integrate, prevent them from becoming fully integrated members of society. Firstly, second- and third- generation children of immigrants are expected to display a higher level of integration than their parents and grandparents, being born and raised in their respective societies, thus being more comfortable with the British or French aspect of their identities. Secondly, Islamophobia, which has become increasingly prevalent in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, has manifested into ethno-racial prejudice against Muslims. The majority of those native to Britain and France, reported in a 2009 Gallup study to feel uneasy regarding Muslim communities in their country. This is expected to impede Muslims’ ability to identify as British or French citizens and emphasize their self-perception as outsiders. Thirdly, prejudice against Muslims is expected to translate into economic marginalization, as immigrant families who typically settle in lowerincome areas will have less access to quality education and employment ; giving Muslims less opportunities to advance economically.

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Generational Difference Although the religious norms of Islam are labeled as incompatible with the values of European society, a closer examination of the social reality of Muslim immigrants and their subsequent generations of children paints a different picture. It is not religiosity, but the indicators of integration; which can be identified as time spent in the host country or birth in the host country, host-language fluency, and the development of friendship networks. These are the aspects that have the biggest impact on the integration of Muslims into French society and affect their level identification with France (Maxwell and Bleich 2014, 155). In a survey of Muslims born in metropolitan France, 98% of them hold French citizenship, and 100% of them claim to be fluent in French and that they identify strongly with France (Maxwell and Bleich 2014, 155). Maxwell and Bleich found in their study of French Muslims that while first-generation immigrants do develop strong attachments to their adopted homes as they become more established, their identity is always split between the native and host country; and their children do not face the same divide (Maxwell and Bleich 2014, 156).

The same trend is obvious in the testimonials of immigrants and their children obtained from research conducted by Alam and Husband in Bradford, a Britain suburb with a highly concentrated Muslim community. Bradford is a city that has seen at least three generations of people of Pakistani heritage make a life for themselves, and it is clear to see how their British socialization contributes to their identity. However, this occurs more strongly in second- and third- generations of children, who negotiate between the Muslim and British aspects of their identities. Several respondents’ testimonials follow with special emphasis placed on particularly revealing parts of these passages: My dad sends money back to the family in Pakistan and we just have this sort of big family pot…As long as my dad’s alive we don’t really have a choice. I wouldn’t send it back if it was up to me because they’re not worth it. If something happened to

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one of my friends, I’d feel more hurt than if my cousin died in Pakistan. We don’t know them. You don’t knowthem by saying, ‘He’s my cousin.’ (Alam and Husband 2006, 30) Kids don’t have a language problem anymore. They’re born speaking English…take my kids. All three of them speak perfect English, better than I speak it and better than they know their own language. (Alam and Husband 2006, 37) If I go out I don’t have that Pakistani culture. I have the whole ‘do what I want’ but at home… I speak Pakistani to my parents. (Frankenstein and O’Brien 2015, 706) A lot of the older generation worked hard: seven days a week. It was just work and save. The younger generation is probably spending the money on the houses. Before, it used to be just any ordinary car…now, more than whites, the most prestigious cars would be Asians.’ (Alam and Husband 2006, 39) The desire to discontinue the cultural practice of arranged marriage is mentioned as well, with one respondent stating, “It’s not right. Even my dad [is] on my side” (Alam and Husband 2006, 26). What is clear is that the respondents above are conditioned by their surroundings, and they develop a distinct British identity by the experience of being raised and socialized in Britain. However, this is combined with the heritage they are exposed to in their home life. While one of the testimonials above creates a divide between family and social life, others reject the ethnic values of the older generations, such as arranged marriage, as these values are rooted in a homeland that is distant from themselves.

Changes in in lifestyle are also evident, as spending on housing and luxury cars becomes a priority for younger generations of Muslims, pointing to their further establishment and integration into the British mainstream. It is evident that their deeper immersion in British culture and society forms a large part of their worldview (Alam and Husband 96

2006, 10). Subsequent generations will most likely develop a more seamless and comfortable identity with the passing of time. Therefore, apprehensions about the perceived lack of identification by Muslims with their host countries should decrease as future generations develop stronger indicators of integration than their predecessors. As a result, they will find themselves more attached to mainstream European society, an already current trend.

Islamophobia Islamophobia, or the dislike and prejudice against Muslims, represents a significant barrier to their successful social integration in Britain and France. The uneasiness surrounding Muslims has increased after the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent increase in terrorist group activity; which has resulted in a substantial amount of the global population positing a link between Islam and terrorism. This has contributed to claims about the “inassimilable” (Freedman 2004, 6) nature of Muslims. In France, some fear that adherence to Islam connects Muslims to an international religious community, preventing their allegiance to European national communities (Maxwell and Bleich 2014, 157). A Gallup study conducted in 2009 found that the majority of France and Britain’s native populations do not think the Muslims in their respective countries are “loyal to their countries of residence,” or are “unsure” of where their loyalties lie (Gallup 2009).

Further cementing this thinking were the short but intense riots in Bradford, England in July 2001, which involved about one thousand Pakistani youths. Completely disregarding the socio-economic factors that could have contributed to the outbreak of the riots, officials asserted that the Muslim culture is to blame and is inhibiting the realization of integrated, cohesive communities. The policy of “Community Cohesion” is developed and prescribes that Muslims and their culture are to be somewhat suppressed in order for their integration to be successful (Samad 2013, 269). Yunas Samad notes that the British government’s subsequent counter-terrorism strategy, “PREVENT”, 97

complicated matters, as it is directed towards the same communities that the Community Cohesion policy targets (Samad 2013, 276). This sent a confusing and generalizing message to British Muslims, in which they are required to fully integrate, most importantly for the purpose of avoiding their potential radicalization. An obvious and unfortunate consequence has been to view the entirety of Muslim communities as a threat to national security (Jacobson and Deckard 2014, 155). In France, although the Muslim population is far from homogeneous, their internal variations and distinctions go unnoticed; Islam as a whole is the problem, and thus integration “failed” (Freedman 2004, 7). In Britain, the trend is the same, as other testimonials of young British-Pakistani Muslims allude to these themes: All this 9/11 has really put pressure on us, not because we’re Pakistani, but as Muslims… It’s like us, as Muslims, we’re Public Enemy Number One. (Alam and Husband 2006, 31) There was this proper clown…he walks past me wearing one of those bandanas around his face like a mask, shouting ‘Jihad!

Jihad!’ I just looked at him and thought… I bet you don’t even know what that means. Why are you calling us Jihadis? (Alam and Husband 2006, 33) You hear government people on the telly after some terrorist stuff has taken place, they’re saying that we need the most help, so as not to be persuaded to go off to Afghanistan and train to become a terrorist. The main stereotype of us is that we are terrorists. (Ghaill and Haywood 2014, 99) It’s like for these people, religion for them is like a big cage that they try and lock us up in. (Ghaill and Haywood 2014, 102)

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Such overarching generalizations affect a younger generation that is, by all indicators of socio-economic integration, better poised for success in European society than their parents or grandparents before them. Discrimination is one factor that they cannot control; it is not in their own hands but in those of the society around them, with conditions created by people of which they have no affiliation. This challenges their self-perception as British citizens, as they are targeted and singled out as ‘others’, and is treated as potential enemies. This only complicates their integration into mainstream society and constitutes one of the largest barriers, as it is one that they themselves cannot control.

Economic Detriments Islamophobia has detrimental economic implications as well; it has created several barriers that prevent Muslims’ economic integration, and it hinders their access to certain resources that are more easily available to others. Although a Gallup Index poll from 2009 found that French and British Muslims do have a “great” sense of purpose, there are several barriers that prevent the realization of their full potential (Gallup 2009). In the poll, they are less likely than the native populations of France and Britain to say they have a job, and are less likely to report satisfaction with their standards of living (Gallup 2009).

In France, it was discovered that second-generation Muslim households have lower income compared to matched Christian households (Adida, Laitin, and Valfort 2010, 22384). Claire Adida, David Laitin, and Marie-Anne Valfort investigate whether discrimination against Muslims truly exists in the French labor market by conducting a correspondence test. They use three Curriculum Vitae’s – one with a well-known Muslim surname (Khadija), another with a well-known Catholic surname (Marie), and introduce two indicators of religious identity by giving Khadija a past position with “Secours Islamique” and the “Scouts Musulmans de France”, and giving Marie a past position with “Secours Catholique” and “Scouts et Guides de France”; the third Curriculum Vitae has a common French surname (Aurélie) and contains solely secu99

lar firms in the candidate’s work experience (Adida, Laitin, and Valfort 2010, 22387). Although work and educational qualifications were identical, they received strikingly different response rates. While Marie received a positive response rate of 21%, Khadija received a positive response rate of only 8%; meaning that for every 100 positive responses Marie receives, Khadija only receives 38. She is thus 2.5 times less likely to be called for a job interview (Adida, Laitin, and Valfort 2010, 22387). Aurélie received the highest response rate of 27%, a result that confirms the privileging of secularism in France (Adida, Laitin, and Valfort 2010, 22387). Evidently, the physical absence of religious symbols in France does not entail the end of ethnic bias and discrimination.

French Muslims also encounter disadvantages in the education system. Jane Freedman states that such a system has “massively failed” children from poorer areas. She also argues that these social and economic inequalities are the real barriers to integration (Freedman 2004, 22). Many second generation Muslims have ended up in technical educations, which are unlikely to lead to a particularly promising career path in France. Dominique Maillard found in her study of the French

integration model that only 4% of second-generation Muslims reach

university level, compared to 25% of their native French counterparts (Maillard 2005, 73). Regardless of university attendance, a French born and educated Muslim may not get the same career opportunities as a native French applicant. While the French Muslim population is willing to become part of mainstream society, they end up competing for jobs in poor and marginalized suburbs (Maillard 2005, 62). In Britain, the outlook is similar: educational achievement levels of Muslim children are lower than those of white and even other ethnic group children, such as British East Asians (Anwar 2008, 128). In higher education, the acceptance rate for Muslims is 40% compared to that of native British students at 54%, despite having the same qualifications (Anwar 2008, 128). State funding for Muslim schools is also lacking in Britain. There are about 100 Muslim schools in Britain of which only seven receive state funding, as opposed to approximately 7000 Catholic and Jewish 100

schools that receive it (Anwar 2008, 131).

Since first-generation immigrants have generally lower levels of education than the native population, they are mainly employed in menial, manufacturing industries, receiving lower incomes. This is reflected in the quality of housing in which they live. 43% of Pakistani and Bangladeshi houses are overcrowded, compared with only 2% of white households. Almost 60% of Pakistani and Bangladeshi households are without central heating, compared with 37% of white households (Anwar 2008, 132). One young British Pakistani states, In poor areas like around here, why don’t they give us jobs and good education? If you’re from this area and you go for a job, they’ll tell you to get lost. There’s a lot of poverty, unemployment, and nothing for the kids to do, they’re just bored.

They’ve nothing to do with the racist stereotypes about being radicals and all that. But like all the kids who came out from our year. How many of them got jobs, went to college or anything?” (Ghaill and Haywood 2014, 110) Naturally, active participation in the economy is a crucial factor for successful integration. The findings above elude to the fact that marginalization produces alienation from mainstream society, and this is a marginalization inflicted by French and British populations with ethnic biases and discrimination. Educational and professional success could certainly contribute to a stronger identification with the national community, beyond the more basic provisions of language fluency and friendship networks. However, Islamophobia only contributes to the disadvantages Muslims face socio-economically, which inhibits their integration.

Conclusion Stating that multiculturalism has failed on the basis of the fundamentally inassimilable nature of Islam is clearly a mistake. The 101

failure of the integration of Muslims in Britain and France is not because Islam represents a threat to national unity and is an antithesis to European values. Although religion is the focus and receives the blame for its supposedly cataclysmic nature, the research above suggests that religion is marginal to the real issues facing Muslims in Britain and France.

One important fact that has been overlooked is the substantial level of integration that second- and third- generation Muslims achieve in their respective societies. This discredits the statement that Islamic norms are incompatible with those of Europe. As French Muslims become fluent in the language and more comfortable navigating social networks, their identification with France becomes stronger. As the testimonials of the young British Muslims in Bradford convey, most of them have found ways to balance their Muslim identity with their British identity. Each have done so in their unique way. What is clear is that the relationship their parents or grandparents have with their home countries is not the one the young Muslims in the study have—they feel at home in Britain. Both the French and British cases attest that with the passage of time, integration generally deepens.

Another oversight has been to discount the socio-economic barriers that Muslims face in Britain and France that hinder the process of their integration. Islamophobia and the increase in terror attacks following those of September 11, 2001 have led to an increase in distrust and discrimination towards Muslims.

These tensions have very real economic consequences for Muslims. They receive lower-quality education and less access to jobs than their native counterparts both in Britain and France. Being in a position of socio-economic disadvantage, Muslims are less empowered to engage with mainstream society.

It is clear to see where the failure of integration lies, but religion does not appear to be the crux of the problem. However, the social and economic conditions of many Muslims overarching in Britain and France do present a cause for concern. While they express their desire to participate in mainstream society, such barriers to their socioeconomic 102

integration do not allow for it. Before multiculturalism is put to rest, effort must be devoted to reducing these barriers to Muslim integration.

References Adida, Claire L., David D. Laitin, and Marie-Anne Valfort. 2010.

"Identifying Barriers to Muslim Integration in France."

Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 107(52): 22384-2390.

Alam, M. Y., and Charles Husband. 2006. British-Pakistani men from Bradford: linking narratives to policy. York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation.

Anwar, Muhammad. 2008. "Muslims in Western States: The British Experience and the Way Forward." Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 28(1):125-37.

Franceschelli, Michela and Margaret O'Brien. 2015. "'Being Modern and Modest': South Asian Young British Muslims Negotiating Multiple Influences on Their Identity."

Ethnicities 15(5):696-714.

Freedman, Jane. 2004. "Secularism as a Barrier to Integration?

The French Dilemma." International Migration 42(3):5-27.

Gallup. 2009. “The Gallup Coexist Index 2009: A Global Study of Interfaith Relations.” Last modified May 7. http:// www.gallup.com/poll/118273/canada-show-interfaithcohesion-europe.aspx.

Ghaill, M. Mac An, and Chris Haywood. 2014. "British-Born Pakistani and Bangladeshi Young Men: Exploring Unstable Concepts of Muslim, Islamophobia and Racialization."

Critical Sociology 41(1):97-114.

Heneghan, Tom. 2011.“Sarkozy Joins Allies Burying Multiculturalism.”

Reuters, February 11. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-francesarkozy-multiculturalism-idUSTRE71A4UP20110211.

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Langellier, Jean-Pierre. 2005. “Les Français pourraient emprunter un peu de notre pragmatisme." Le Monde, November 11.http:// www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2005/11/11/violences-urbainesle-royaume-uni-et-l-espagne-s-interrogent-sur-leurs modeles_709200_3224.html Maillard, Dominique. 2005. "The Muslims in France and the French Model of Integration." Mediterranean Quarterly 16(1):62-78.

Maxwell, Rahsaan and Erik Bleich. 2014. "What Makes Muslims Feel French?" Social Forces 93(1):155-79.

Samad, Yunas. 2013. "Community Cohesion without Parallel Lives in Bradford." Patterns of Prejudice 47(3):269-87.

“Nicolas Sarkozy Declares Multiculturalism Had Failed.” The Telegraph. February 11, 2011. Accessed November 21, 2015. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/ 8317497/Nicolas-Sarkozy-declares-multiculturalism-hadfailed.html.

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__________ Editing Team __________

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LĂŠandre Larouche General Manager LĂŠandre is a second-year student in English Literature and Professional Writing. His area of interest is the intersection between literature and politics, and he has given two academic conferences on that topic.

LĂŠandre found interest in publication when he volunteered as a copy editor for the Literature Undergraduate Colloquium at Concordia during his first semester. He hopes to attend Nottingham University, England, as an exchange student next year.

Heloise Martorell Editor-in-Chief Heloise is in her last semester at Concordia, studying in Political Science and Human Rights. She is interested in American domestic and foreign policy, comparative politics, and international relations. She uncovered her passion for editing through in-class peer reviews and enjoyed the opportunity to give constructive criticism. Editing is a medium that allowed her to improve her writing and expand her knowledge on the different dimensions of political studies. By next year, Heloise hopes to be pursuing an MA in American politics in the United Kingdom.

Seeba Chaachouh Associate Editor Seeba is in her third and last year at Concordia, studying Journalism and Political Science. Her interest in editing began when she started her studies in university. She specializes in international relations and comparative politics, as well as in print and broadcast journalism. Seeba also focuses on developing her photography and design skills. She will be attending McGill Unisity in Fall 2017 to pursue a Law degree.

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George Stoyanov Associate Editor George is a third-year Honours Political Science student who grew up in the South Shore of Montreal. His interests include international relations, comparative studies, economic development, and questions regarding technology in the 21st century. After his degree, he plans to pursue graduate studies and explore questions relating to economic inequality and the increasing displacement in the workforce. His goal with the JPA is to showcase the enormous amount of talent Concordia's Political Science department has to offer.

Kayla Fanning Copy Editor Kayla is an Irish Studies and English Literature Major at Concordia University. Much of her research focuses on the relationship between gender performance, sexuality, and memory. Her essay on memory and silenced women’s history is published in the LUCC 6th edition. She intends to conduct field research this summer on the status of consent in Ireland in relation to the novel Asking For It by Louise O’Neill.

Jessica Coe Copy Editor Jessica is studying English Literature and Professional Writing at Concordia. She fell in love with reading when she was very young and stumbled upon Harry Potter. She has travelled to numerous fictional worlds since then. As she grew older, she found herself drawn to words and found it much easier to communicate on paper than verbally. She has created many fictional worlds since then.

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2016 Edition

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