china and confucianism

Kang Xiaoguang Confucianization: A Future in the Tradition WHITHER CHINA?

This question has engaged the attention of China and the world in modem times, and it is all the more urgent and pressing today. Two dominating opinions have taken shape around this question. One holds that the status quo cannot possibly go on for long; the other that China should and certainly will be further "Westernized." But there has appeared a third voice in China in the twenty-first century— "Confucianization," which declares that China's future should emerge from its tradition and should be constructed in accordance with the spirit of Confucianism.

Why should China be "Confucianized" ratherthan "Westernized"?

An answer to this question must address four issues. First, it needs to make clear why the status quo cannot and should not continue. Second, it must show that the competing solution, liberal democracy, has nothing to recommend it. Third, it must put forward its own solution.

Fourth, it must demonstrate that its own solution is feasible—that, in other words, benevolent government is not merely Utopian.

This article is an attempt to answer this central question.

I. JUDGMENT OF THE STATUS QUO The study of history is the best way to understand of the status quo, but there is no need to go back too far. For our purposes, it will be enough to go back to 1978. Here, I wish to give a brief summary of China's reform process over the past nearly three decades.

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Vol 73 : No 1 : Spring 2006

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Institutional Changes

Deng Xiaoping conceived many of his ideas on reform in the 1960s and the 1970s. These ideas refiected Weber's rational logic, instead of liberal democracy. It should be borne in mind that Deng Xiaoping was a pragmatist who put his ideas into practice once he was in power. In a word, Deng was a communist, in pursuit of the "self-improvement of socialism." He did not vdsh to totally deviate from the tradition of the Chinese Communist Party. But, of course, his reform went much further than he had expected.

In China's reform, the greatest pressure comes from the economic sector.With Western examples setting a baseline, those in power need to demonstrate their achievements in economic growth to the governed so as to legitimize their rule. After more than 30 years of cold war, a "common understanding" has been gradually acknowledged that a market economy is better able to promote economic growth than a planned economy. Thus, Deng Xiaoping's reform was directed mainly at the economic sector. Of course, he also launched a series of reforms in the political and social sectors. The market economy reform has indeed led to economic growth in China. In turn, this surprisingly high growth rate over 20 successive years has truly supplied the Communist Party with "legitimacy based on economic achievements." This is also a decisive contribution to the political stabihty of China.

But the impact of market-oriented reform is by no means restricted to the economic field! The Chinese political system has also undergone significant changes with the market economy gradually replacing the planned economy. The first indication of this political change is that China has turned from a totalitarian state to an authoritarian or a posttotalitarian state. One of the substantial changes is that the government is no longer controUing all economic activities—that is, society's most important activities (economics) and most important resources (wealth) have gradually escaped government control. This is extremely important, and one can never stress it too much. Separation of the state from society begins to emerge with the separation of economic activities from the government. Furthermore, China's social formation has

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also changed significantly. Now family life and the personal activities of individuals are no longer under the complete control of the government as was the case in the Mao Zedong era. Nowadays, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) vwU generally leave you alone if you do not challenge its authority. Even if you do, it will still leave you alone unless you openly challenge it in the public sphere. The CCP has turned to passive defence from its previous active aggression. It may be said that market orientation has not only changed China's economic structure, but also its political and social structure, and even its culture and ideology.

Division of Classes and Adjustment of Aliiance Strategy

Along with these institutional changes, the class formation in Chinese society has also become different. There was only one elite group in the Mao Zedong era: the party and political officials. The working class was in the middle, the peasants still lower, and the intelligentsia at the bottom, while the class of capitalists and landlords was to be wiped out altogether. However, with the progress of the market economy, all this has drastically changed. The class of capitalists and landlords, rather than being wiped out, has risen once again to become the new elite group and is vwelding extraordinary influence by means of its wealth. The intelligentsia, which had been driven to the bottom of society, has come up again to become the salt of the earth in Chinese society. And the former "leading class" (the working class) and its "allies" (the peasant class) have become the new lower class in the society. That peasants and workers are at the bottom of Chinese society is an indisputable fact.

The biggest threat to political stability does not come from institutional changes, but from changes in the class structure, particularly when such changes are transformational and revolutionary. The group that the ruling class had relied on has been downgraded to the bottom of society in a matter of merely 15 or 16 years, while the former enemy class has become the core force of society. This is a serious challenge for an administration that wishes to remain in power. Mao said, "Who is our friend and who is our enem)^ This is the very first question of our revolution." Actually, this is the very first question of political rule.

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Therefore, in the face of a total restructuring of the classes, the rulers needed to answer the question again: Whom to rely on, whom to unite, whom to attack and whom to suppress. The "class alliance strategy" needed readjustment. And this readjustment was completed in the late 1990s. The government wisely gave up the working class and the peasant class, and entered into an alliance with the capitalists and the intelligentsia. I call this alliance an "alliance of the elite." It is precisely this ruling alhance of the old and new elites that has maintained the political stability and economic prosperity in China.

The Mechanism and Function of the Ailiance of the Eiites

The "alliance of the elites" is very important. There is necessity and rationality behind its formation and existence. And such an alliance also has a strong hfe force. It is closely connected to both the achievements and evils of China in the last 20 years. This alliance is the starting point for both understanding the status quo and designing the future.

The relationship between the CCP and the economic elite has been harmonious ever since the beginning of the reform. This has not occurred by accident. The CCP needs to maintain political stability through economic growth, since political stability is the party's fundamental interest. A market economy is necessary to promote economic growth, and capitalists and managers are necessary in a market economy. What the capitalists and managers are after is wealth. Thus the market-oriented reform and the economic growth that comes with it bring stability to the political elite and profit to the economic elite. So the political elite and the economic elite share a common interest in market economy and economic growth. And it may well be said that focusing on economic construction refiects the shared pursuit of both the pohtical elite and the economic elite. That is why there has been no trouble between the capitalists and the CCP ever since the beginning of reform. On the contrary, they have been living in harmony, even in collusion with each other.

However, the relationship between the intellectual elite and the CCP has gone through twists and turns. There were constant confiicts

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between the two in the 1980s, which gradually died out after the 1990s.

Why did the intellectuals stop making noise? Some say it is due to heavy-handed suppression while others say that the intellectuals have been bought off. Indeed, suppression has never stopped, and has been dreadful, too. In the mid-1990s, the government started a policy of massive buy-off. For instance, there has been a marked increase in the outlay for education and research, and much better working and living conditions for teaching and research staff. However, suppression and buy-off cannot fully explain the change in the intelligentsia. Otherwise the intelligentsia would not be the intelligentsia any more. No, there are deeper reasons for this change of attitude. First, the Chinese govemment continued the reform and opening-up policy in and after 1992, which was what the intelligentsia wanted. Second, the CCP had won "achievement legitimacy" through continued high-speed economic growth, marked improvement in the living standard, relaxed sociocultural control, and rising intemational status. Third, the reform in the former Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe had taught the intelligentsia that reform would not necessarily end with everyone would being happy and satisfied; reform might also mean division, economic recession, a rampant underground, degraded international status, poverty, and even war. Seeing that there could be such uncertainty and complexity in reform, the intellectuals turned conservative. Fourth, further understanding and awareness of democracy, especially the democracy in Latin America, Southeast Asia, and Africa, has brought home to people the awareness that democracy is not a panacea; it cannot solve all the problems of China. On the other hand democracy has its own share of problems that have yet to be solved. Finally, some liberals have also realized that it is a long and arduous process to achieve democracy; it cannot be done once and for all at one go. All this is the root cause of the change that has occurred among the intellectuals, who have turned conservative and accepted the reality.

It needs to be pointed out that the so-called alliance of the ehtes does not mean that the three elite groups sat around a table and negotiated an agreement of united rule, but rather that the economic and

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intellectual elite groups have accepted or given tacit consent to the existing order. This acceptance or tacit consent, not marked by any open or heated confrontation, may or may have not been voluntary acceptance.

In any case, such an alliance is very useful. On the one hand, it can maintain essential political stability, and on the other hand, it can promote continued economic grov^rth. In fact, society vdll be stable when the advantaged groups are united. The rank and file have little resources at hand; they have no ideology, no money, no organization, and no guns either. So even if they are numerous, for example 900 million or 1 billion, they are no match to the few dozen million members of the elite. That is why a society can be stable when the advantaged groups are united. The stability of a government does not rely on the number of its supporters, but on the support of the strong and powerful. So what the government wishes to rally is not "the majority" but "the powerful." That is the secret of government!

Morai Evaiuation

This kind of alliance also produces serious consequences, such as political corruption, social inequality, financial risks, rampant evil forces, and moral degeneration. In fact, the "alliance of the elites" is an "alliance to plunder" or a "booty-sharing alliance." In plain words, it is an alliance whereby the elites collude to pillage the masses.

Now, the elite are plundering the masses to an extreme degree.

Sweatshops no longer satisfy their possessiveness. The elite even leave the sweat and toil wages of the migrant workers in arrears and repudiate the payment. This is no longer a question of sweatshops, but a matter of open robbery and fraud. Such violence includes both nongovernment violence bought off by the capitalists, the underworld, and governmental violence—the police and the armed police. In addition, not only the capitalists are engaged in this tj^je of fraud and robbery, but also the government at all levels. More often, it is done by the government and private business people in collusion. Therefore, what we are faced with is not only "the heartless rich" but also "the heartless government." I have often said that equity is a wild wish in China today, and what we

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can expect is only "sustainable pillage and controlled extortion." This is the highest ideal that I can dream of! In the past, the rational slave ovmer let his slaves live so that they could work for him the next day. A better slave owner would let his slaves have offspring so that his would themselves have slaves to exploit. But the contemporary Chinese elites do not even possess this selfish rationality. They oblige migrant workers to work without paying them so that the workers go back home in debt. Such exploitation is of the most frenzied and perverse kind.

And, what is more terrible, we are developing a kind of gangster public opinion and gangster morality that is doing its utmost to beautify and justify this gangster society. The strong and powerful are praised to the sky in the mainstream media, while the weak get nothing in terms of sympathy. "It serves you right" is what is left for the unfortunate.

"You have only yourself to blame, society bears no responsibility whatsoever for you, and you must think of ways to help yourself." This is what our media is advocating day after day! This world of ours is devoid of any sympathy, any morality, and any justice; there is only the naked jungle law. It is by no means unjust to describe today's China as a place where "Behind the vermilion gates of the rich meat and wine are left to rot. While out on the road lie the bones of the poor who have frozen to death," and where "the strong and the powerful cut off the flesh from the poor and the weak until only white bones are left."

In conclusion, my comment on the current order is that "it is unfair or very unfair." For this unfairness, we should refuse to accept it.

The Legitimacy issue

Besides being unfair, this order has another fatal weakness: it is devoid of legitimacy.

In the Mao Zedong era, the CCP had its own theory of legitimation. Historical materialism furnished its legitimation. The core of Communist ideology is public ownership, a planned economy, and dictatorship of the proletariat. Historical materialism would be weakened and gradually lose its convincing power once the CCP gave up public ownership and the planned economy. Currently, the legitimacy

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afforded by historical materialism is very weak. It is even a question whether or not party officials themselves believe in it, let alone require the people to. The legitimacy of liberal democracy is rejected by the govemment, and there are no theocratic politics in China today. And the CCP rejects the traditional Chinese political philosophies, too, including Confucianism.

A regime without legitimacy can be sustained only by effectiveness. In plain language, political stability is sustained by economic growth—which is very fragile, since economic growth is not up to the government alone. It has ups and downs and inherent risks, too.

In particular, government control over the economy will decrease with China's further integration into the global economy in an era characterized by "globalization." All this means the government is likely to gradually lose the power to control its own fate. It is both extremely dangerous and irresponsible for a country to place its stability, and for nation to place its future, on these external and accidental factors.

The CCP has become aware of the question of legitimacy. In repsonse, the party has made a substantial and meaningful effort to legitimate its rule by attempting to revive Chinese traditional culture.

And this is a good sign.

In fact, what the CCP has done is total Westemization. Marxism is not Chinese, is it? It is 100 percent Western. The CCP continues to say that it is against total Westemization, but this is because it wishes to use its own total Westernization to fight others' Westernization.

Once it has proceeded to Westernization, it no longer allows others to Westernize China. Can we find another case in which one's own traditional culture is systematically destroyed vidth the government leading the way and mobilizing the whole nation in a wholehearted campaign of destmction? Nearly a century of total Westemization and digging the graves of our ancestors culminated in the Mao Zedong era.

Things developed in the opposite direction once they reached a peak, and began to take yet another direction in the Deng Xiaoping era. But another kind of total Westemization came in. The return to Chinese

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tradition in the real sense started in the Jiang Zemin era. We may see this change in the slogans of the CCP. The slogans were about revolution and communism under Mao, and modernization under Deng. It was quite different under Jiang Zemin, when the goal was clearly to build a well-off society. "Well-off society" is a completely indigenous Chinese politico-philosophical concept. To be precise, it is a Confucian concept. Hu Jintao seems to be introducing populism into the political philosophy of the CCP. So from Mao Zedong to Deng Xiaoping and from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao, the Chinese Communist Party has been heading back to traditional Chinese culture. Jiang Zemin put forward "the great renaissance of the Chinese nation." Please remember that it was "rejuvenate China" in the Deng Xiaoping era. "Rejuvenate" gives the feeling of starting all over again, suggesting that we were no good in the past, and that we are starting to strive for briUiance and glory today.

But "renaissance" is completely different. It is in itself a positive evaluation of history, meaning that one recognizes a great past and acknowledges a decline. But it also means more a return to prominence, a rising once again to renewed greatness. It is a great change from "rejuvenate" to "renaissance," and by no means useless wordplay. In fact, the different wording refiects a revolutionary change in the attitude of the CCP toward traditional Chinese culture.

A Brief Summary

The present situation is characterized by efficiency, injustice, and the absence of legitimacy. By efficiency, I mean that it can sustain economic growth, maintain political stability, and guarantee national unity. By injustice, I mean that the rights of the masses have been badly infi-inged upon; the elite are plundering with impunity; there is political corruption and power-money collusion; the rich are heartless and the government is heartless. By absence of legitimacy, I mean that the rulers have failed so far to put forward a theory that can justify the current order. That is why the status quo cannot and should not go on as it is. However, this does not mean that there is nothing good in the status quo, or that it should be rejected wholly. Our mission is to keep

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what is good and overcome what is bad. This is the starting point for considering future development.

II. CRITIQUE OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY Since the status quo cannot and should not continue, then let's choose hberal democracy! Hasn't it become the global trend alread}^ Isn't it true that those who submit to it will prosper and those that resist it shall perish? Indeed, democracy has now become a sort of "superstition," a holy and inviolable creed. The Chinese do not need to develop new ideas on political reform. They only need to kick up a row and follow suit. At present, as soon as one talks of political reform, democracy comes in, and it is the same from the top to the bottom of the whole country. Today I am going to svwm against the current. I will now explain why I reject liberal democracy.

Critique of Effectiveness

Can Western democracy—specifically, "multiparty systems" and "general elections"—resolve all ofChina's problems today? The answer is no. And therefore, China has a reason to reject it.

There is a popular "logic of reverse thinking" or "Utopian logic."

For instance, when criticizing capitalism, Marx saw that considerable eviles existed in capitalist society, and he further found that these evils had much to do with private ownership and the system of market economy. He therefore put forward a solution to get rid of the evils: to replace private ownership vdth public ownership and a market economy v^dth a planned economy. However, decades of Marxist practice in the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and China have demonstrated that the logic in reality is different from that in theory. Those evils still exist, but they express themselves in different forms and mechanisms. Nowadays, this kind of "logic of reverse thinking" is still popular in China. Many see that myriad evils exist in China, and they find that these evils are associated with the totalitarian system. Thus, they firmly believe that as soon as democracy replaces totalitarianism, we will say goodbye to misery and usher in happiness, a sunny day will

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dawn on China and drive away the darkness. This simplified logic of reverse thinking dominates the mind of almost each and every individual. From the small vendors of cabbages to state leaders there is no exception. What I wish to say today is that such a simplistic logic does not work. Even if democracy is practiced in China, the problems that we are faced vwth, such as political corruption, economic risks, serious social injustice, will not necessarily be wiped out or alleviated. On the contrary, we might well lose the achievements that we have already obtained, such as economic prosperity, political stability, state integrity and national unity. It is absurd to think that China's problems vdll be solved once democracy is realized in China. This logic of reverse thinking does not hold water in terms of academic reasoning, nor will it obtain any support in practice.

My opponents will say that I have only pointed out the bad possibility. How do I know without experimenting that democracy will not bring good results? Well, that is exactly the problem! We cannot experiment vdth the fate of our nation. Who has the right to do so? Then, how to emerge from the plight where each says he is right? The only way out is to look at the experiments done by others. How do we do this?

By international comparison. We compare data from other countries to have an idea of the situation there: the degree of democracy in these countries; their achievements in economic development; their degree of political corruption and economic inequality; and finally, whether a higher degree of democracy or democratization will resolve these problems.

I will answer these questions on the basis of an international comparison of the experiential data. I have selected the data issued by the World Bank in its World Governance Report. This report is the result of an investigation into the level of democracy and pohtical corruption in various countries. The annual report of the World Bank also gives the economic growth rate, the absolute level of econoniic development, the Gini coefficient, and the ratio of the poor to the total population. I have also cited the corruption estimates for various countries published by Transparency Intemational. Why cite the indicators of the World Bank

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EXPERIENTIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEMOCRACY, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, POLITICAL CORRUPTION, AND SOCIAL INJUSTICE Democracy

Economic

Annual GDP

Corruption

Poverty

Gini

Level Index'

Development Index^

Growth

Index^

Index (%)5

Coefficient*

China

-1.38

$4,260

10.0

3.4

18.8

40.3

India

0.38

2,450

5.9

2,8

44.2

378

Pai<istan

-1.10

1,920

3.7

2.5

31.0

31.2

Bangladesh

-0.57

1,680

4.9

1.3

29.1

33.6

Indonesia

-0.49

2,940

3.8

1.9

12.9

Malaysia

-0.27

8,340

6.5

5.2

49.2

Philippines

0.17

4,360

3.3

2.5

46.2

8,660

-3.7

2.7

0.7

2.3

Rate'

Russia

-0.52

Yugoslavia

-0.20

Egypt

-0,87

3,790

Argentina

0.12

11,690

3.7

2,5

Brazil

0.28

7,450

2.8

Mexico

0.33

8,770

3.1

Peru

0.22

4,680

Hong Kong

0.15

26,050

Taiwan

0.89

31.7

7.1

48.7

3.9

11,6

60.7

3.6

15.9

53.1

4.3

3.7

15.5

46.2

3.9

8.0

52.2

5.7

Singapore

0.51

24,910

7.8

9.4

Japan

0.99

27,430

1.3

7.0

24.9

NOTES 1. Freedom of speech and accountability. "Giobai Governance Evaluation Report (index), 19962002." World Development Report, 2003:83-86. Data for 2002.

2. World Development Report, 2003:240-241, Data for 2001. In dollars, PPR 3. World Development Report, 2003: 244-245. Data for 1990-2000.

4. Transparency Internationai. Data for 2003.

5. World Development Report, 2003. The data are the international poverty line, the percentage of those who iive on less than one dollar per person per day, of which the maximum value is to be taken when the figure is smaller than a certain percentage, 6. World Development Report, 2003: 242-243,

and Transparency Intemational? Because these two organizations stand a little to the right and enjoy good reputations, with academic authority backing the use of their data. At the same time, the liberals will have nothing to say against using these two sources.

In my comparison, I divided the countries into two groups. One is the low- and medium-income group; the other is of all the compared

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countries. Let's first take a look at the low- and medium-income group of countries. We can see that there is no statistical correlation between the level of democracy and their annual average GDP growth rate in the last 10 years. That is to say. there is no statistical basis for the claim that "democracy can promote economic growth." Then let's have a look at cormption. The result is the same; there is no statistical correlation between the level of democracy and the index of corruption. This means that there is no statistical basis for the claim that "democracy can check corruption." Neither does the Gini coefficient, which directly shows the degree of economic inequality, have any correlation with democratization. The poverty incidence rate, that is. the proportion of the poor in the total population, which is estimated by the World Bank at one dollar a day per person, also has no statistical correlation with the level of democracy. Then if we made a comparison among all the countries under study, we arrive at the same conclusion.

But. there are great differences in the levels of poverty and corruption of the various countries. How to account for the difference?

What is the decisive factor? Analysis of the statistics shows that the decisive factor is not the level of democracy, but the absolute level of economic development. There is a very high correlation between the absolute level of economic development and the index of corruption, with the r square value reaching 0.79. which is very high. It is the variable of the absolute level of economic development that underlies the degree of political corruption. In the same way. it is the variable of the absolute level of economic development that underlies the poverty incidence rate.

I have listed here the data of the countries that are comparable with China. You may make your own comparison. The countries that I have selected are those that have a similar level of economic development, a large population, and also a comparatively large size. Countries selected from Asia include India. Pakistan. Bangladesh. Indonesia.

Malaysia, and the Philippines. Those selected from Europe include Russia and the former Yugoslavia. We have Egypt from Africa, and Argentina. Brazil. Mexico, and Peru from South America. I have also

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added several regions or countries that are very similar to China in culture, including Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, and Japan.

Today, China is essentially an empire, not a nation-state in the typical sense. We have not experienced the democratization process that goes together with the development of capitalism. For countries like China, democracy sometimes goes with national division. Let's take a look at some recent examples. Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, and Czechoslovakia are now divided. A little further away, in the process of India breaking away from British colonial rule, there was first the partition of India and Pakistan, then Pakistan became independent, and then Bangladesh. India and Pakistan have been in constant disputes and conflicts since then. Neither is it peaceful in Yugoslavia, and Chechnya and Russia are in furious conflict. No one will deny that these are the consequences of democratization. China would be similarly doomed if it were to practice democracy. Tibet, Xinjiang, and Hong Kong would all join the fray, not to mention Taiwan. In matters like this, no one is entitled to put the fate of a nation at stake just for the sake of his partial preference.

Compared with the countries that have already realized democracy and with those that have just had an experience of democratization, China's performance is not at all worse than any of them in terms of the three major indexes: economic growth, political integrity (honesty), and social justice. In addition, problems found in China are also found in the democracies. But none of them could hope to have what China has achieved. If such is the case, why should China turn into another direction? Why should China go the same way that others have done and failed?

Critique of Legitimacy

It is not very difficult to let the ordinary people give up democracy; it will suffice to convince them that democracy will not help solving the problems. But to make the proponents of liberalism change their minds, it is far from enough to argue that democracy is useless. The reason they prefer democracy is just that it is a value they cherish. It

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is better if democracy is useful, but it does not matter if it is useless.

Therefore, in order to smash the superstition of democracy, it is necessary not only to criticize it in the field of efficiency, but also in the field of legitimacy.

I shall refiite the legitimacy of liberal democracy on three levels.

First. I think that some of the values that liberal democracy advocates are bad. For instance, liberal democracy advocates individualism. I do not approve of individualism; I do approve of values based on the world, on society. If I have to make a choice among imports fTom the West. I shall choose communitarianism. Another example is that liberal democracy holds that morals are a private matter, belonging to the category of privacy, so that no person or organization, including the govemment. has the right to declare that one moral is higher than the others. It alleges that the society and government should remain neutral in the judgement of values, which I am against. I believe that a stable and effective society has to have a set of mainstream values, and that society has the responsibility to propagate these values and let them take root deep in the hearts of the people through enlightenment and socialization.

Second, the logical premise on which liberal democracy relies does not have any factual foundation. For example, it presupposes that the human individual is a self-sufficient entity. But. in fact, the human being is a social animal that will not survive away from the group or society. Further, it believes in the original sin. Actually, man has both the instinct to commit sin and the potential to do good. The good and the bad coexist in human nature. In addition, the social contract theory, which was based on the state of nature, the presupposition of human nature, individualism, equality, etc.. does not have any historic fact to support it. It is totally and completely an artificial theory. And some of the major inferences are erroneous. For instance, it holds that govemment is a necessary evil. The so-called necessary evil means that government is something intrinsically bad. but humankind cannot manage without it. Government exists just because there is "market failure."

If the market were perfect, there would not be any need for govern-

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ment. In short, government is a complement to the market. As a matter of fact, a government is capable of both evil and virtue. There is one thing that is certain, that is, there would not be a stable society vwthout government. Therefore, government is a necessary virtue. Hegel had made this point clear long before.

Third, even if the values that liberal democracy advocates are good, even if those logical premises are true, and even if its inferences are correct, liberal democracy has proved to be a set of lies in practice; it has never made good its promises. Liberal democracy is Utopian, just like communism.

In Rousseau's imagination, if obedience, usually an embarrassing concept, is given to people we have elected, it becomes a beautiful one.

Though I still have to obey, this obedience is based on my "consent," which is of course a more pleasant arrangement. Thus, rule based on consent is very good indeed. When there is a conflict of interests, the solution of the liberal democrats is for the minority to obey the majorityâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;that is, the rule of the majority. All this is realized by one vote for one person in political elections. The political legitimacy of an elected government is thus established. It may be said that in human history, of all theories of governmental legitimacy, the one put forward by liberal democrats is the most competitive and the most convincing. However, this theory has never worked, nor has it ever been truly realized.

Equality is the precondition of effective democracy. But in a market society, economic inequality is a matter of course and is necessary, and economic inequality will certainly lead to all other inequalities: political inequality, social inequality, and cultural inequality. Some will claim this is wrong, that in elections a vote is a vote, whether it comes from a street rowdy, or Bill Gates, or Bush. True, this is a fact. But it must be remembered that is the extent of equality that liberal democracy can give. There is no equality at all except this.

When the bourgeoisie was struggling for power against the kings and aristocrats, it was the staunchest advocate of equality and democracy. After it got into power, it became the staunchest opponent of equality and democracy. One needs only to look at the poor, the women, and

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people of color's stmggle for voting rights to understand that. Bloodshed, sacrifice, and brutal repression have always accompanied such processes.

Actually, the bourgeoisie is the deadliest enemy of democracy by nature, because democracy means that the poor majority can take advantage of its democratic rights to expropriate the rich minority in a legal manner.

So the bourgeoisie is faced with a strong contradiction: on the one hand it has to justify its rule by advocating democracy, and on the other hand it wishes to deprive the majority of its democratic rights. To overcome this contradiction, the academic spokesmen of the bourgeoisie invented "constitutionalism." The function of "constitutionahsm" is to allow the bourgeoisie to use democracy to whitewash oligarchy politics, while at the same time depriving the broad masses of their democratic rights so that the it can stay at the top of the pyramid of wealth. "General elections" have not changed the fact of bourgeois dictatorship. The elections are controlled by money. The parliament is controlled by money. The media, the educational institutions, and the research institutions are all controlled by money. The hegemony of the bourgeoisie not only has found expression in the economic and political sectors, but the bourgeoisie have also established a cultural hegemony of its own in civil society. The mle of the bourgeoisie has permeated the whole of the society and it is very effective, too. Politics has always been the business of the elite. This is an indisputable, ironclad law! There has never been such a thing as the people being the masters of their own country, neither in the past, nor now; neither in the United States nor in Ghina. Who is dominating politics in the United States? Neither the so<alled majority nor public opinion, but the powerful moneyed groups. It is the same in the United States as in China: the powerful and advantaged groups control ever3thing.

For China. Western democracy is useless as a tool, and is not helpful as a value. It is useless because it will not necessarily resolve the problem of political cormption. nor break the collusion between the officials and private businessmen, nor protect the interests of the masses, nor prevent the elite from plundering. On the contrary, it is likely to bring economic recession, political instability, and division

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of the country. That it is helpless does not mean that the legitimacy theory of liberal democracy cannot justify itself, but that it cannot by any means make good its promises, and in the end it turns out to be a set of hes. So China should reject it. At least, China should not accept it without question.

III. BLUEPRINT OF BENEVOLENT GOVERNMENT The status quo cannot go on and liberal democracy is rejected. Does it mean that China has nowhere to go? There is always a way out. There is a better substitute plan, and that is "benevolent government."

Benevoience and Benevoient Government

The status quo is not perfect; it needs improvement and should not go on. Where does its imperfection lie? What improvement does it need? The answer is that there is no "benevolence." The government is not benevolent, the rich are not benevolent. Not only the elite are not benevolent, the masses are not benevolent either. We cannot expect that "there are no meat and wine left to rot behind the vermilion gates of the rich." What we can expect is only that "out on the roads there lie no bones of the poor who have frozen to death." You have your own particular interests, and you can even plunder in cold blood, but you should leave the people something. The most essential rights of the people must be assured. So it is in this sense that I particularly stress the need to reject the gangster society and usher in a humane society.

It is on the basis of these considerations that I have put forward the idea of "benevolent government." What is "benevolence"? Confucius says, "Benevolence is to love all people." "Benevolence" means a loving heart. What is "benevolent government"? In plain language, it is to let the benevolent govern. Mencius puts it in a most simple and most penetrating way: "Practice commiserating government vsdth a commiserating mind."^ The government or those who practice government should have a feeling of commiseration.

"Benevolent government" is not put forward here for the purpose of giving expression to one's nostalgic musings over the past, nor is it

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the vdld imaginings of Utopia, and much less a defense of a despotic system. It is a rational response to a complex reality, a serious conclusion from repeated deliberation. As far as Ghina is concerned, it can both keep the advantages of reality and overcome the shortcomings of reality. There is no other way out but "benevolent govemment."

On Confucian Orthodoxy

What kind of politics does Ghina need? Or what is "good politics" for Ghina? My answer is: Ghina needs benevolent govemment. and benevolent govemment is good politics for Ghina.

All political philosophies have their own theories of human nature. Gonfucianism's essential judgement of man is that man is capable of empathy. Mencius says. "That whereby man diflfers from the lower animals is but small"; there is little difference between man and the lower animals. What is this small or little difference? It is the feeling of empathy. You v^dll suffer when you see others suffer. You cannot bear to see the sufferings of others. Mencius regards this feeling of empathy as something that you are born vdth. He gives a very convincing example to demonstrate this point. He says that if men suddenly see a child about to fall into a well, they will without exception experience a feeling of alarm and distress. They will feel so. not as a ground on which they may gain the favor of the child's parents, nor as a ground on which they may seek the praise of their neighbors and friends, nor because they fear that they will get a reputation for having been unmoved by such a thing. They will feel so just because of their feeling of empathy, which is the root of benevolence.

Politics is a noble undertaking, of which the mission is to make a man a man. Man is capable of both virtue and evil. If you wish to make a man a man rather than a lower animal, you must promote those things whereby man differs from the lower animalsâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;that is. you must promote the human capacity for virtue or benevolence. Benevolent government is such politics! So if we acknowledge that politics is a noble undertaking and admit that the mission of politics is to make man a man. we must also recognize that the mission of politics is to

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promote benevolence, which means we must acknowledge and accept benevolent government. This in turn requires the establishment of the orthodox position of Confucianismâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;to base the legitimacy of Chinese politics on the political philosophy of Confucianism.

On Political Rule

Then who should have political power in a benevolent government? My answer is: a community of Confucian scholars.

It is a Confucian precept that "the virtuous rule the state." Nobody challenges this. You can never say that bad guys or mediocrities should rule the state. But who are the virtuous? What is the standard against which to measure them? The virtuous are those who embrace and practice Confucianism. The standard for them to be measured against is whether they embrace and practice Confucianism. This is because benevolent government is the best politics and Confucian scholars are those who practice benevolent government. In plain words, benevolent government is a dictatorship by the community of Confucian scholars. There is no denying the fact that benevolent government belongs to the scope of authoritarianism. But it is diflFerent from ordinary authoritarianism. The difference lies in the fact that it is benevolent authoritarianism.

Why can't Western democracy be benevolent government?

Why can't Confucianism adopt the elements of Western democracy, such as "popular sovereignty," "the multiparty system," "general elections"? First, while Confucianism may acknowledge that "sovereignty" belongs to the people, it insists that "ruling power" remains only in the hands of the community of Confucian scholars. This is because the Way of Heaven is higher than public opinion, and only the community of Confucian scholars can understand the Way of Heaven. Thus, it may be said that Confucianism does not completely reject the principle of "popular sovereignty." Second, if benevolent government is the best politics, then no party that does not believe in Confucianism is entitled to come into power, not to mention stay in power. That is why Confucianism is against the "multiparty system." Third, Confucianism is against "general elections." This is not because Confucianism does

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not acknowledge the abstract principle of equality, but rather because it recognizes actual inequality. Gonfucianism acknowledges the principle of equality as an ideal: everybody is equal in the sense that "all men may be saints." However, it also holds that people are not equal in that some are virtuous and others are not. Gonfucianism holds that greater virtue should mle over smaller virtue. That is to say. only those who are virtuous are qualified to hold the right to mle or to govern. Mencius said. "Only the benevolent ought to be in high position." Gonfucian scholars are those who are virtuous and benevolent, and so the mlers can be elected only from the community of Gonfucian scholars. General elections are not needed in this sense. In fact. Gonfucianism advocates political equality, too. Only it does not advocate equality between each and every human, which is illusory and unreal. Though Gonfucianism does not believe that those other than Gonfucian scholars have any right to practice political mle. it does believe that they have the right to be well mled. Which means that the mled have the right to demand the rulers to deliver benevolent government. This is an inalienable right of the ruled.

The Relationship between Confucian Orthodoxy, the Educational System, and Political Rule

So what kind of relationship is there between Gonfucian political philosophy, the community of Gonfucian scholars, and government?

The principles are all there, in the wisdom of the ancients. The axis of ancient Ghinese politics lies in the "Trinity" of Gonfucian orthodoxy, the system of education, and political mle. It is also the essence of ancient Ghinese political philosophy.

Gonfucian orthodoxy is a political philosophy that elaborates a set of basic principles for political practice. Gonfucianism established a mling order that was consciously obeyed by the majority of the people.

The "Gonfucian orthodoxy" of Ghina is benevolent govemment. or the "kingly way of politics."

The education system consists in inheriting and passing on the Gonfucian orthodoxy, and in incubating and developing an organiza-

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tional system of practitioners of Confucian orthodoxy. In ancient China, Confucian orthodoxy was inherited, passed on, and promoted through official, nonofficial, and private institutions of education, which at the same time turned out a large number of Confucian orthodoxy practitioners who exerted an infiuence all over the government and society.

The "political rule," in simple terms, is government. Confucian scholars were the major source of government officials in ancient China. A systematic institutionalized relationship was established between the educational system and political rule in all the dynasties by the development of various means of selecting officials. A typical example is the imperial examination.

Confucianism set forth the Confucian orthodoxy, its education system turned out Confucian scholars, and Confucian scholars became officials in the government system of the dynasties and controlled political rule. This is how the communion and integration of Confucian orthodoxy, the education system, and political rule are realized. This is a very, very important political set-up. Have a look at the history of China and you will see political stability whenever political rule was in accordance vdth Confucian orthodoxy. As long as the rulers practiced benevolent government, there would be peace; once they practiced despotic government, there would be turmoil and chaos.

There were two capacities in which Confucian scholars could serve: as supporter of the government when the political rule was in conformity with Confucian orthodoxy, and as critic of the government or even a rebel against the government when political rule deviated fi:om Confucian orthodoxy. Therefore, Confucian scholars were both a stabilizing force and a revolutionary force for dynastic change. Of course, they were also a core force for reviving and reconstructing Confucian orthodoxy. I do not think that these ideas and principles have become outdated or obsolete. They are still relevant to today's and tomorrow's political practice. So long as we are to practice benevolent government, we need to reestablish Confucian orthodoxy, educational system, and political rule, and the systematic relationship between them. This is the moral that we can learn from history.

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The Transfer of Supreme Power

How does benevolent government resolve the question of transferring supreme power? It is said that in ancient Ghina. the dominating thought since Yu. mler of the Xia dynasty, was the concept that regarded the whole country as one's family or property. The overwhelming law of the transfer of supreme power was the hereditary system, palace coup, and violent revolution. Mencius was full of praise for the practice of abdicating and handing over the throne to another person, but he was not against revolution.

Today, when discussing the transfer of supreme power, the first of all major mles of the replacement of supreme mlers should be the election by the conununity of Gonfucian scholars, followed by abdication; revolution should come only last. Election by the community of Gonfucian scholars is a type of elite democracy. Abdication is to yield one's position to a person of virtue and talent or to a better-qualified person. Revolution is the worst of all choices, but we cannot deny the legitimacy and justifiability of its existence. We have to admit and acknowledge that ordinary people have the right to overthrow t3^anny.

Gurrently. Ghina practices abdication. Of Mao Zedong's offspring, some died and others are mentally retarded, which means there was no possibility of the hereditary transfer of supreme power. So he could only choose abdication. Maybe this is the will of Heaven or God's will.

But Mao's abdication was not successful, because Hua Guofeng was overthrown not long after he succeeded Mao. Deng Xiaoping's abdication was successful even though it went through twists and turns, v^dth Jiang Zemin eventually succeeding to him after Zhao Ziyang and Hu Yaobang had been ousted. The transfer of power from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao was a very successful case of abdication. Obviously, the change of supreme mlers in Ghina cannot be explained by the election theory of liberalism, nor by the democratic centralism of the GGP or the theory of palace conspiracy. Only the abdication theory of Gonfucianism is able to offer an effective explanation.

Mencius pointed out that there were three conditions for abdication. The first was the recommendation by the Son of Heaven, the

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second was that the successor had to be a person of virtue and talent, and the third was that there be a probation and afterward confirmation of the successor. Under the abdication system, the Son of Heaven did not have the right to decide who his own successor was to be. He could only recommend a candidate successor, who had to be both virtuous and talented. The candidate had to be tried during a probation period.

After probation, he needed further confirmation to see whether he had won the recognition of the Son of Heaven and the people, without which he could not succeed to the position ofificially.

Mencius told the story of the abdication of Yao to Shun. Yao, finding Shun to be a good candidate, decided to hand his position over to Shun. He therefore entrusted some important duties to Shun, with the dual intention of letting Shun get some experience and getting to see how able Shun was. Shun was in this probation period for 28 years, during which time he did quite a good job, was held in high esteem, and so was not replaced in the middle. However, it was farfi-omenough only to have Yao satisfied. Shun's position also depended on the will of Heaven and on public opinion. How to know the will of Heaven and public opinion? After the death of Yao, Shun moved out of the capital.

The capital was thus left to the son of Yao. Shun had to find himself another oftice. The result was two centers of power in one country.

It remained like this for three years, during which time it would be observed to whom the chieftains of the tribes and the common people would go. They all went to Shun to offer their obeisance and to ask for directions and instructions. No one paid any attention to the son of Yao. This meant that both the vdll of Heaven and public opinion favored Shun. Thus, three years later Shun moved back again to the capital and officially ascended the throne while Yao's son lost his position and went back home. This was abdication! Nowadays, China's handover and takeover of power is realized in this way. You cannot say that this is palace struggle, nor is it completely private give-and-take or an under-the-table operation. It has its procedures, carried out on the basis of quite a solid foundation of public opinion with a certain degree of transparency. In fact, this is a very civilized form of power transfer.

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Mechanism of Expression of Pubiic Opinion

Confucianism believes that politics must reflect both the will of Heaven and public opinion. The two are different, yet interrelated. The vdll of Heaven is higher than public opinion and represents public opinion. The Book ofShang says, "What Heaven sees is what we the people see; what Heaven hears is what we the people hear." (This is known in the West as "The voice of the people is the voice of God.") In a word, Confucianism believes that the will of Heaven and the vwU of the people can both be communicated and practiced by the saints and the virtuous. Such elitist political solutions worked in ancient society, but it will not work to respond to the requirements of a changing and complex modem society. How do politics reflect the will of the people? This is a challenge for modem Confucianism to face. The problem is that Confucianism does not have much expertise vdth regard to this question. We must learn from modem political theories and practice.

How to implement populism in practice? How to hear the voice of the ordinary people? How to reflect their interests in administrative decision making? We need to explore, set up, and improve three types of mechanisms to answer these questions.

First, the mechanism of open mass media. The function of the media is well knovra, and it is not necessary for me to repeat it here.

Second, the mechanism of consultation in administrative decision making. The CCP has applied this mechanism quite successfully the past nearly 30 years. I have written an article, entitled "Second Treatise on 'the administrative absorption of polities'" that discusses this question in particular.

In the 1970s, the concept of the administrative absorption of politics was put forward by Ambrose King in his studies of the politics of Hong Kong. In terms of the theory of modemization, with the deepening of market, economic growth, pluralization, better education, and v^dder opening-up, the public will have a greater demand for democracy, which necessarily leads to the rise of democratic politics. However, this prophecy of the theory of modernization has failed in Hong Kong, which is a society that has only administration but no politics. Why? Ambrose

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King found that Hong Kong actually has resolved by means of administration the questions that some countries have resolved by means of politics. He called this practice the "administrative absorption of politics" or "administrative politics." There are two key elements to administrative politics: "decision making through consultation" and "elite co-optation."

"Decision making through consultation" means that the government lets the decision making refiect the interests of all parties through the wide apphcation of consultation. "Elite co-optation" means the absorption of all societal elites directly into the administrative system.

I have found that Ambrose King's concept is also very helpftil in analyzing mainland China in the 1990s, when mainland China was a highly plurahzed society with serious confiicts of interest. But we did not have a multiparty system, nor did we have elections, a parliament, or lobbies. We did not even have freedom of the press, or freedom of association. However, China did not collapse for lack of these mechanisms of democracy. On the contrary, it had a quite remarkable overall performance. The secret behind this lies in the administrative absorption of politics! China has a government of "legislative and executive powers combined into one," which will actively watch and observe and learn about the various needs, pressures, and conflicts during the process of legislation and execution and then respond accordingly. For example, it will hear different opinions and hold various meetings in the process of making pohcies and laws. It also ofFers mayor's hotlines and receives letters of complaint from the people, and ofFers offices where ordinary citizens can to lodge complaints. And,the people's congresses and pohtical consultative conferences at all levels are even more important. At the same time the CCP pays great attention to coopting the elite. For instance, the government goes out of its way to arrange for those who have money, reputation, and prestige, those who have historic positionsâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;in a word, the modern aristocratsâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;to enter the govemment, the people's congress, the pohtical consultative conference, the association of industry and commerce, the association for science and technology, and other organizations.

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Speaking generally, vÂŤth on-going polarization and pluralization and aggravating conflicts among different interest groups, how can a nation resolve the problem of expression of interests and interests integration in public decision making? Two drastically different mechanisms have been invented for this purpose by modem society. One is democratic politics, including such major means as a multiparty system, elections, parliaments, and pressure groups. The second is administrative politics, including such major tools as decision making consultation and elite cooptation. Administrative politics in Chinaâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;^which is a party state that exercises both legislative and executive powersâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;is an effective means of public opinion expression.

The third system is corporatism. When I talked about administrative absorption of politics," I mentioned two key elements. But when talking about "the second mechanism," I only talked about the "public decision-making consultation mechanism." Why did I not mention "elite co-optation"? It is not a careless omission, but a careful one.

Elite co-optation sets up an alliance of the elites on the one hand and excludes the masses on the other. It assures the political participation of the elite, but it intentionally or unintentionally deprives the masses of their right to political participation. It may be said that this is one of the systematic causes of the current injustice in Chinese reality. Therefore I am directly opposed to it. I wish to emphasize that I am not against the "political participation of the elite." What I am against is the fact that only the elite are allowed to participate but the masses are not. As far as mass participation is concerned, corporatism is what I prefer.

How can the masses participate in politics in an organized way?

When we speak of political participation, we Chinese will think of the West, and generally we will think of the United States in this regard.

Actually, democracy takes on different forms. The United States is tj^ical of plurahsm, while Austria is typical of corporatism. In the pluralist model, political parties, the parliament, and pressure groups play an important role. Major public decisions are made in the parliament.

The chief function for the government is to execute these decisions.

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Elections, parliament legislative power, and government executive power constitute the core hnks of plurahst pohtics. But corporatism is not like this. It holds that every person has a number of identities, the most important of which is that of his occupation. The most important income for a proletarian comes from his occupation. And thus his most important interest is linked to his occupation. So corporatism advocates organizing the people according to their occupation: for instance, the iron and steel workers union, the transportation workers union, public servants union, etc. When confiict arises between labor and capital, or between different occupations, the govemment will intervene and let the parties in conflict sit down for negotiations. When an agreement is arrived at all the parties concerned will abide by it. Attention here, please. The true participants are the government and the functional organizations, not the parliament. "The legislative process" takes place outside of the parliament. Of course, the agreement arrived at by the government and the functional organizations will generally be supported by the parliament, since the government is dominated by the majority in parliament.

In the model of corporatism, how are the rights of participation or negotiation allotted? Take the iron and steel workers union, for example. There might be dozens of such unions or ten thousand of them. It is impracticable to let all of them participate in the negotiations. Under general circumstances, the govemment allows only a few or one or two of them to participate in the negotiations. Often, the govemment would like the large ones, or those that are willing to cooperate, to participate in the negotiations. There are some countries that even provide financial support to the selected unions. The unions so privileged must bear the responsibihty of implementing the negotiated agreement. A carrot is the government's means of control: "Cooperate with me and you will have the right to take part in negotiations and I will give you financial appropriation." China is still using the stick to control: "If you do not submit, I shall kill you." There will definitely be no carrot, not even for the cooperative ones. Cooperate and you shall

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not be killed. If you don't cooperate, you shall be killed. Now it is still a strong imposing govemment that has the capability to do so. It will have to sit down to negotiations when it gradually loses this capability.

What needs to be stressed is that corporatism is not against freedom of association; we would not have effective corporations without the freedom of association. In this system, the negotiated agreement must be carried out jointly by all the negotiating parties. Both the workers' unions and the chambers of commerce of the capitalists need to have authority. Where does the authority come from? Not from violence, nor buying off, but only from "serving the members heart and soul."

Therefore, these functional organizations generally set up the structure of their internal governance according to democratic principles.

In comparison with pluralism, corporatism can better safeguard the political participation rights of the masses. This is very very important. Let us not take it for granted that freedom of association will enhance justice, or improve the conditions of the disadvantaged groups. Don't forget that capitahsts can use their right of association to promote their interests as well as the workers do theirs, and the capitalists are often better organized and more efficient than workers in this regard. Some interested groups are able to use more effectively the right of association to safeguard their own interests, so that they themselves get an interest that is not at all in proportion to that of the other groups; this has become conventional vdsdom in modem political science. For example, in the United States, although the National Rifle Association and farmers' organizations have a small number of members, they are very powerful, so that they can pressure Congress ot pass bills that are in favor of the minority (that is, in favor of themselves) at the expense of the majority. So when the freld of free association is gradually open, we may see improvement in the condition of some on the one hand and an increased gap between different groups on the other. Freedom of association is both a tool to protect the rights and a tool to enlarge inequality. It is in this sense that the corporative model furnishes an equal opportunity both for the various corporations to associate and

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for them to participate in politics on an equal basis. In this system the strong and the weak both have a roughly equal opportunity to associate and to assert their ovwi interest.

Not only do the various groups have different capabilities to use the right to associate, but the right to associate that they enjoy is also different. If you have a look at the right of the Chinese to associate, you will not have to stretch your mind to understand that the Chinese right to associate is highly imbalanced. The strong realize their right to associate to a greater extent than the weak. For example, the party's right to associate is guaranteed to be the best in the world. It can support itself with state finance. There is no other group of people that enjoys as full a right to associate as the CCP. The capitahsts also have a very good right to associate, with chambers of commerce, trade associations and clubs, all very active. And the government is strongly promoting this. Also active are the various associations of the intelligentsia, but not the unions of the workers. Look at the unions, both the unions of state-ovmed and foreign-ovraed enterprises. They all "hang up a sheep's head but they all sell dog meat." In the past, only the government suppressed the unions. Now the government and the capitalists have united in doing this. Power and money have become united in suppressing the workers. The unions are just a tool for the bosses to mobilize the workers to work harder and better.

Safeguard the rights of the workers? No way! The workers are in a very bad condition. Then what about the farmers? Don't even mention it.

The farmers do not even have any farmers' organizations as in the United States, not even in name. So one should not talk in general terms about the fact that there is no right to associate in China. But we should discuss who does not have the right to associate and who has what right to associate.

China should establish corporatism, organizing the masses according to their occupation and also organizing the capitalists in the same way, so that the government provides the platform and calls them together to sit down to negotiate and arrive at agreements for all to

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abide by. This is the most fair model that best suits China's particular circumstances.

The Baianced System: Autonomy, Cooperation, Checks and Baiances, Sharing

In terms ofWestem political science, benevolent govemment is a "mixed political system" that combines elements of monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy. In a mixed political system, every class has systemic facilities to express it own interest. An appropriate expression can be found for the interest of all classes through these facilities. This is a stmcture of power division by class, not a structure of class dictatorship. So a mixed political system is also called a "balanced political system." Up to now, nearly all societies have single-class dictatorships. Those in power are either those who possess wealth or those who control violence, or those who possess the divine will. It is up to benevolent govemment to break up this situation.

In "Benevolent Government" and "On The Corporatist State," I described the framework of China's political system in the future.

It includes the following elements: benevolent authoritarianism, a market economy, corporatism, a welfare state, and Confucianism.

What roles do they play in a mixed political system? A market society is a class society. A permanent feature of such a society is class division and class conflict. The aim of benevolent government is autonomy, cooperation, checks and balances, and sharing among the classes.

Now there is a mling class that possesses power, a bourgeois class that possesses wealth, an intelligentsia that possesses knowledge, and a working class that possesses labor. A good social order should let each class achieve autonomy or self-government; let the classes cooperate on the basis of autonomy; let there be checks and balances in their cooperation; and let there be sharing of the fruit of cooperation through checks and balances, which vdll avoid the situation where the winner takes all. To be concrete, authoritarianism and a market economy ensure the autonomy of power and capital, while the corpo-

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ratist system provides the framework of labor autonomy. The market economy and the consultation mechanism of the corporatist system provide a platform of class cooperation. The corporatist system is also a mechanism of checks and balances between classes. Remember that the market is also a mechanism of checks and balances. The market is the most powerful weapon by which society can check the government. And the welfare state is an effective mechanism for all classes to share the wealth of society.

It is said that only democracy can guarantee the interests of the masses. This is erroneous. Authoritarianism also can. The first welfare state in history was set up by Bismarck in Pmssia. Then Prussia was a typical authoritarian state. To resist the double attack from both the bourgeoisie and the proletariat and to protect the vested interest of the king and the bureaucracy, Bismarck was the first to set up the welfare state system. This move tranquillized the workers, created a stable environment for the capitalists to make money and preserved the power of the king and the bureaucrats, which was why everybody liked it. Britain's Poor Law has been taken by some as a mark of welfare state. This is totally mistaken. The Poor Law in Britain was something like China's practice of housing and sending back the poor and homeless. The law prescribes that the homeless will either go to sweatshops or be arrested to do forced labour. It is a punishment of the poor and therefore is a far cry from a welfare state.

Transcending the Periodic Law of Cycles

There is a widely known story. It is said that when the Kuomintang (KMT) and the CCP were fighting and the CCP was about to win, Huang Yanpei went to Shaanbei, the northern part of Shaanxi province, and had a talk with Mao Zedong. Huang asked Mao how the CCP could transcend the periodic law of cycles. By relying on democracy was the answer that Mao gave with self-confidence. Of course, Mao Zedong did not take this event very seriously. After he died, however, particularly with rampant cormption everywhere, people

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thought of this event again and talk about it in an increasingly positive light.

I am faced with the same problem today. Ever since the publication of "An Outline on Cultural Nationalism" and "Benevolent Government," I have heard of a number of challenges. The most frequent is: "Benevolent government has been practiced for more than 2,000 years, ending nowhere except in a heap of problems. Can it be practiced successfully today?" Monopoly of power by individuals, political corruption, and dynastic cycles, these phenomena recurred again and again in ancient politics. Why? Because there were no forces and mechanisms of checks and balances in ancient society. Now it is different. Democracy is one mechanism to restrict the government.

But there are many other forces and mechanisms besides democracy. First of all there is the market. A market economy means that wealth has shaken off the control of power. Independent wealth itself is a strong force in a system of checks and balances. Second comes the organized masses. If corporatism is established, the masses will be an organized force that can safeguard their own interests. Third comes the independent media. Finally comes the pressure of overseas examples. Benevolent government will have to face the challenges from democracy. This kind of pressure will make it impossible for the authoritarians to have it their own way. Therefore, it does not mean there are no checks and balances without democracy. As long as we have the market, the corporation system, freedom of the press, and opening-up to the world, benevolent government will be able to escape the law of cycles of Huang Yanpei.

I wish to emphasize again that to practice benevolent government today does not mean to simply repeat the ancient politics of 2,000 years ago. The Chinese know better. Carry forward the cause and forge ahead into the future, weed through the old and bring forth the new, make the past serve the present and foreign things serve China are frequently heard principles that do not need any elaboration from me here.

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Inherit and Improve

To design and create the future is to overcome the shortcomings in the current order while preserving the strong points at the same time.

What are the strong points of the existing order? Efficiency! The expression of this efficiency is found in its ahility to effectively maintain economic growth, political stahility, national unity, and state integrity.

What are the shortcomings of the existing order? The first is injustice and unfairness, in that the rights of the masses cannot have even the least protection. The second is the lack of legitimacy, in that the rulers have failed to provide a convincing justification for the existing order.

Then, can benevolent government preserve these virtues and overcome these shortcomings? The answer is affirmative.

First, it is possible for benevolent government to preserve these virtues in the existing order. The efficiency of the existing order comes fi-om authoritarian politics and the market economy. Benevolent government is in itself a kind of authoritarianism; it is only more benevolent than common authoritarianism. Confucianism has never been against the market, but rather exists in harmony with it. "The theory of Confucian capitalism," which is all the rage at the time, supports this statement.

The experience of Taiwan, Singapore, the Republic of Korea, and Japan has demonstrated this. As benevolent government has "causes" similar to those of the existing order (authoritarianism and market economy), it is very likely that there will be similar "results" (economic growth, political stability, national unity, and state integrity).

Second, benevolent government can effectively promote social justice. Benevolent government, first of all, firmly disavows "being rich and heartless" and "being government officials and heartless." This negates the current gangster society. Besides, benevolent government contains this kind of "being heartless." Confucian orthodoxy, corporatism, and the welfare state are all systemic mechanisms for benevolent government to control "heartlessness." Furthermore, benevolent government is not the authoritarianism of a dictatorship by violent cliques, nor the authoritarianism of a dictatorship by blocs of capital.

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but the authoritarianism of a dictatorship by particular cultural groups.

Compared with warlords, party bosses, and nouveaux riches, intellectuals are more benevolent after all. This is a global law. So I am certain that benevolent govemment will bring us a more humane society.

Third, benevolent govemment has a good theory of legitimation, which is provided by the theories of "Confucian orthodoxy," "political rule," and the "trinity." What is more important, this political philosophy has deep cultural roots as its foundation. It is an organic part of the rich and long-standing Confucian culture. Some say: As both are authoritarian, what is the significance in replacing Marxism with benevolent govemment? Of course it is significant, and very significant, too! What is our reality? It is private ownership, a market economy, and dictatorship by an alliance of the elites over the proletariat. Can Marxism remain in harmony with this reality for long? For its part, Confucianism can accommodate private ovmership, market economy, and eUte politics. The political philosophy of benevolent govemment accommodates the major elements of the current system without getting into confiict with it. Besides, Confucianism gives a rich glow of idealism, vÂŤth a hugely inspiring power of moral justice. It should be remembered that all these are integral factors for any political ideal or ideology. Thus, benevolent government as a legitimation theory is more convincing than Marxism.

IV. CONFUCIANIZATION: POLITICS AND CULTURE My design for the future is not divorced from reahty. In the blueprint for the future that I have dravm up are preserved many of the current things, including authoritarian politics and the market economy system. I have not even discarded the alliance of the ehtes altogether.

However, the most outstanding feature of this blueprint is that it transcends reahty. There are many new things in this blueprint, including benevolent govemment, Confucianism, corporatism, welfare state plus freedom of the press, and freedom of association. Some of the new elements are indigenous to China, such as benevolent govemment and

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Confucianism. Others are imported from the West, such as corporatism and the welfare state;fireedomof the press and freedom of association may also be counted as Western. Therefore, in the construction of the future, the past must be made to serve the present and the foreign must be made to serve China, but we must stick to "Chinese learning as essence. Western learning as technique," because the very soul of the new blueprint is traditional Chinese Confucianism rather than Western Marxism or liberal democracy. Therefore, I call this overall future design a "Confiician state." And the establishment of such a Confucian state is the process of implementation of Confucianism. I shall discuss this process fiom the perspectives of "politics" and "culture."

A Great Trend: Re-sinization and Re-Westernization

Though quite efficient, the current order will not be able to last but because it is very unfair and lacks legitimacy. Thus, where is China going? The previous analysis shows that there are but two outcomes in the future for China, either "re-Westernization" or "re-sinization." Attention here. I have used "re-" twice. We were Chinese originally, but during the last hundred years we have undergone complete Westernization, or rather complete Westernization according to the model set by Marxism. In the last 20 years, liberalists have advocated another complete Westernization according to the model of capitalism. In recent years, a handful of peopleâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;I for oneâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;have stood up to demand the renaissance of Confucian culture. This demand may be exactly called a "re-sinization." "Re-Westernization" and "re-sinization" may be the two destinies for China.

In the next 20 to 50 years, the struggle between the two destinies will go on in both the political and cultural fields at the same time.

What is more important, the outcome of the political struggle is closely associated with that of the cultural struggle. If Western culture wins the struggle. China's politics will become democratic. On the other hand, if Confucianism is revived, China's politics v^dll move to benevolent government. So in the next 20 to 50 years, Confucianism will fight

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a decisive battle with Western culture. This will be a life-and-death stmggle since it concerns the future of the Chinese nation. And I firmly believe that democracy will doom China's future while Confucianism or Confucianization best suits the interest of the Chinese nation. This is a basic view of mine.

Why is politics so closely related to culture? On the one hand, politics may infiuence culture. The history of the CCP is an example. On the other hand, culture also infiuences politics. In the long mn, legitimacy determines the survival of pohtics, but culture prescribes the content of legitimacy. Antonio Gramsci told us that the theory of legitimacy is typically a question of ideology, and that an effective ideology has to command cultural hegemony. Jurgen Habermas pointed out that the awareness of legitimacy comes into being in civil society or the public sphere through extensive and deep discussions. This concept of legitimacy has already become an organic part of the culture. All this tells us two important messages: first, the theory of legitimacy is inseparable from culture; second, only a theory of legitimacy deeply rooted in culture can stand. So, to establish the legitimacy of benevolent government, the hegemony of Confucian culture must first be established. In the same way, to establish the legitimacy of democracy, the hegemony of Western culture must first be established. Pay attention that the concept of "hegemony" that I have used here is the Gramsci's concept.

A Sense of Urgency and a Sense of Crisis

The whole of modern and contemporary history is the history of the decline of Chinese culture. By the time of the May Fourth movement, the cultural confidence of the Chinese people had been utterly shattered, with the whole country crying out for Westernization, which ascended to a stage of insanity during the Cultural Revolution, a thorough destmction both of the form and the content of traditional Chinese culture. Even today, the Temple of Confucius is but a tourist attraction in the eyes of the government. As to today's university students, they have absolutely no sense of shame if you tell them that

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they have forgotten their own ancestors and that they are ignorant of the history of their own country. But if you tell them that their English pronunciation is poor, they will feel too ashamed to face anyone. Now in mainland China some people are engaged in Confucian studies, but basically speaking, they live ofF Confucianism, taking it as a means to make a living. They neither believe in it nor sympathize vdth it. What is more, many of them know nothing of Confucianism. But no sooner do you start talking about Confucianism with them and they will say that this old stuff does not work. Nowadays when you ask those who are opposed to Confucianism what is Confucianism, 9,999 out of 10.000 will not be able to give any meaningful answer; they have not even any superficial knowledge about Confucianism. Nevertheless, they dare to say that it does not work. What is it that makes the Chinese Chinese?

Not the yellow skin, nor the black hair, nor this land of 9.600,000 square kilometers, but Chinese culture. Suppose the country is lost or conquered; the Chinese will remain Chinese as long as their culture is there. But suppose the culture is lost; the Chinese will not exist even if the country is still there. So the loss of culture is much more terrible than the loss of the country. China today is on the verge of losing its culture. We should have a sense of urgency!

Now Confucianism has been absolutely demonized. so much so that those who know nothing about it dare to reprobate it.

Democracy, however, has been so deified that it is hailed by those who know nothing of democracy. Those who reprobate and those who hail are both assured and emboldened with justice as they do so. In general, in the field of ideology, liberal democracy is the mainstream while Confucianism has been marginalized. Although in recent years liberal democracy has been on the decline and cultural nationalism has been on the rise, this is still the case. In addition, the international environment is generally favorable to liberal democracy. And thus Confucians should have a sense of crisis! One needs to realize that it will take long and arduous efforts for Confucianism to defeat the West.

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The Principie and Strategy for Confucianization

How to go toward benevolent govemment? Or, what are the principle and strategy for Confucianization? The principle is "peaceful evolution." And the strategy consists in working at both the top and the lower levels: to Confucianize the CCP at the top and society at the lower level.

First, the CCP must be Confucianized; Marxism is to be replaced with the doctrines of Confucius and Mencius. We should keep the party schools, but their syllabi should be changed, listing the Four Books and Five Classics as required courses. There will be examinations for each promotion and only those who pass the exams shall be promoted. An examination on Confucianism should be added to the civil servants examinations. An institutionalized link should be conscientiously established between the Confucian educational system and Confucian political rule and this link must exclude any other ideology. Benevolent government will be realized the day the CCP is turned into a community of Confucian scholars and Confucianism replaces Marxism.

In this respect, the Kuomintang has done better than the CCP. Sun Yat-sen consciously integrated Western culture with Chinese tradition in his blueprint for a modern China. Sun's constitution, which provides for a five-branch govemment (the legislative, executive, judicial, supervisory, and civil examination branches), his attitude toward capital, and his understanding of civil rights all refiected the wisdom of Confucianism. And the theorists of the KMT spared no efforts in identifying the legitimacy of KMT mle with China's history and culture. The New Life Movement staged in the 1930s by Chiang Kai-shek was actually an attempt at reviving Confucian culture.

Second, Confucianize the society. In the short term, the key is to introduce Confucianism into the national education system, adding courses of Chinese culture to the curricula from primary school to university. Courses of Chinese culture do not mean the course of Chinese language currently taught in the schools and universities. Courses of

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Chinese culture impart a value system, a faith and the soul of a culture, not just selections from old poetry or the recitation of a few pieces of ancient prose, nor just for the purpose of writing good compositions, nor merely for mingling with men of letters and posing as a lover of culture. In the long term, the key is to establish Confucianism as the state religion. There has to be a vehicle to transmit Confucianism in the society. Thinking it over. I believe that it can only be religion. All religions have their own organizational systems. But Confucianism does not. Why? Confucianism was the most successful religion in history.

The emperor was its pope, the whole of the government was its church, and all the officials were its believers. Besides officialdom, the gentry that ruled society were also believers of Confucianism. And the masses were also to receive an education in Confucianism. This was a very successful system of integrating the church and the state, of the church and education. However, once the traditional political system fell apart.

Confucianism also lost its vehicle and was left in a situation of separation of the soul from the body. Today Confucianism needs to reconstruct its vehicle, which is best in the form of state religion. Talking of state religion, some vdll ask: Will Confucianism be forced upon everybody? No. The establishment of a state religion is not in confiict with the fi-eedom of belief. And Kang Youwei had already made this point very clear long ago.^ The state will persist in the policy of fireedom of religious belief but offer some favor to Confucianism. Only when Confucianism has revived, can we say that the Confucianization of the society is successful.

I think that there does not exist a fundamental confiict between the CCP and the Chinese nation on the question of Confucianization. It will be difficult for the CCP to go on with the current situation in any case. Compared with Confucianization, the CCP will have less difficulty accepting Confucianism than democracy. This is why I am optimistic about the possibility of achieving this peaceful evolution. If it can be enforced, it will be a great opportunity for the Communist Party and for the Chinese nation.

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Confucianism is in for an Era of Revivai

To be confident in the success of Confucianism, we need to have a clear understanding of the great trend of history. We need to have a great vision in order to see clearly the future trend. The so-called great vision means a vision of history on the one hand and a global vision on the other. After observation, I think that Samuel P. Huntington is a man of great vision. So far I have not found a second man of such great vision.

Here I wish to give a brief account of Huntington's point of view. He suggests that Confucianism is not out of date. On the contrary, it is ascending into a great era of revival.

The Westernization of Consummatory Culture The Modernization of Instmmental Culture Painful Process Refusal Reformism Kemalism Huntington separates culture into two parts. One is called "instmmental culture." His instmmental culture not only includes science and technology but also the economic system and the political system.

The other is called "consummatory culture," which is related to the basic values of a civilization. These basic values are coagulated in the great religions. Huntington categorizes the "modernization" of nonWestern countries under two processes. One is the modernization of the instmmental culture, and the other is the Westernization of the consummatory culture. He has discovered four basic patterns. The first pattem is "refusal." Such countries stay where they are, rejecting both the modernization of their instmments and the Westemization of their values. They go round and round in a circle. That is the pattem selected by the American Indians. The second pattern is a "painful process." These nations achieve nothing in terms of modernization of their instrumental culture while their consummatory culture has been

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totally Westernized, which Huntington regards as most unfortunate.

The third pattern is Kemalism. Turkey is an Islamic country, which has realized complete Westernization in the true sense. Its instrumental culture has been modernized and its consummatory culture has been Westernized, too. The West likes Turkey the best and has set it up as a typical model of Westernization, calling on the Third World to follow Turkey. The West has even named this pattern afier its initiatorâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;Kemal. But Huntington does not regard this pattem of Kemalism as the most typical pattem. He regards reformism as the most typical pattem. And that is the fourth pattem. Countries of this pattem are very successful in the modemization of their instrumental culture and this success is total and complete, but they go the way of an inverted "U" in the Westemization of their consunmiatoiy culture. In the initial stage, their consummatory culture will undergo fast Westemization together viath the modemization of their instrumental culture, until at a certain stage, the process of Westemization reverses and the native national culture begins to retum. Meanwhile, there will appear a trend to reject Western values. That is to say. the cultural confidence of a nation will certainly return with the success in the economy and in politics and military affairs. Cultural nationalism will also rise as a result. Huntington thinks that China is on the way of reformism. He also believes that China will definitely succeed and will come to blows with the United States as a consequence of its success.

The Basic Attitude in Thinking of the Future

Culture is not like a piece of clothing that may be discarded or put on as one likes. Culture will always govern you. It will govern you even when you are not aware of its existence, just like water for a fish. The fish may never know the existence of water nor does it understand the nature of water, but there is one thing that is certain: the fish cannot live out of the water. Mao Zedong applied himself to the destruction of traditional Chinese culture to the extreme. However. Mao himself was unable to escape the infiuence of Chinese culture. Lin Biao has a very accurate

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judgement of Mao Zedong in the "Summary of Project 571," saying that "Mao is wearing the skin of Marxism, practicing the doctrines of Confucianism, and applying the methods of Qin Shi Huang." Mao Zedong may have talked about Marxism, but in reality he was pursuing the doctrines of Confucianism and using the means that Qin Shi Huang had used. This is the power of culture, a magic spell. Though Mao Zedong was engrossed in the destmction of the "Confucian shop," eventually the monkey king could not jump out of Buddha's palmâ&#x20AC;&#x201D; meaning that Mao was unable to extricate himself from the control of traditional Chinese culture. The most outstanding characteristic of China is not its vast size, nor its huge population, but a long and enduring culture, which has evolved over thousands of years. Though there have been repeated setbacks, this culture has never been wiped out and has always been able to rise up again in the end. This does not happen by chance. It is because this culture has a very deep and firm foundation, very steadfast and indomitable. Our future development can never do without this foundation. Putting emphasis on being realistic, emphasizing the continuity of history, and respecting one's ovm cultural tradition: these form the basis for the conservative attitude in thinking of the future. This attitude is what China needs at present!

In the last analysis, pohtics cannot be disengaged from culture.

And pohtics vdll have a long-lasting hfe only when it is deeply ingrained in the rich and thick soil of culture. Politics like this in China is benevolent government. Reconstructing benevolent government can not only safeguard the people and reign over the entire country, but also promote and carry forward what makes the Chinese Chinese. And this is the mission of our generation!

Translated from the Chinese by Huiqing Liu. NOTES

1. One of the most infiuential Confucian philosophers, he hved in the fourth century BC and defended the Master's teachings against other schools of thought, especially Mozi.

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2. Kang Youwei was one of the main exponents of the modemization of Confucianism at the end of the nineteenth century. His petition to the throne in 1898 was accepted by the emperor in 1898. end resulted in the 100 days reform, an attempt to install a constitutional monarchy in China. However, after 100 days, the Emperor Kang Xu was deposed by the Empress Dowager Ci Xi. and then executed. Kang Youwei had to go into exile in Japan.

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