The new Dreadnoughts

combine were stalled and delayed until the outbreak of war in August 1914 pushed it from the agenda. The Deutsche Bank plan was to have the Baghdad rail link transport Mesopotamian oil over land, free from possible naval blockade by the British, thereby making Germany independent in its petroleum requirements.

THE NEW DREADNOUGHTS

It was not until 1909 that Admiral Fisher’s plans for Britain’s oil-fi red navy began to be implemented. Germany had just launched the fi rst of its advanced improvement on the British Dreadnought series. The German Von der Tann carried 80,000 horsepower engines, which, while still coal-fi red, were capable of a then-astounding 28 knots. Only two British ships could meet that speed. Britain’s coal-fi red fl eet was at its technological limit and British naval supremacy was decisively threatened by the rapidly expanding German economic marvel.

By 1911, a young Winston Churchill had succeeded Lord Fisher as First Lord of the Admiralty. Churchill immediately began a campaign to implement Fisher’s demand for an oil-fi red navy. Using Fisher’s arguments, Churchill pointed out that with ships of equal size, oil gives far greater speed, and per equal weight gives a decisive advantage in the domain of action without refueling.

In 1912, the United States produced more than 63 per cent of the world’s petroleum, Russia’s Baku 19 per cent and Mexico about 5 per cent. Britain’s Anglo-Persian Exploration Co. was not yet producing major supplies of petroleum, but British government strategy had determined even then that a British presence in the Persian Gulf was essential to the national interest. As we have seen, Germany’s relentless extension of the Berlin–Baghdad railway line played a signifi cant role in this determination.

By July 1912, Prime Minister Asquith’s government, on Churchill’s urging, appointed a Royal Commission on Oil and the Oil Engine, chaired by the retired Lord Fisher. By early 1913, acting secretly, again at Churchill’s urging, the British government bought up majority share ownership of Anglo-Persian Oil (today British Petroleum). From this point, oil was at the core of British strategic interest.7

If Britain could not only secure her own direct petroleum needs for the transport and energy technology of the future, but perhaps more decisive, if she could deny economic rivals their access to secure petroleum reserves in the world, her dominant role might be maintained into the next decades. In short, if Britain’s stagnating