Realpolitik, May 2012 by Leviathan Journal

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Realpolitik

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Essays

Realpolitik: Get Real (about the political world).............................Prof. J. Peterson........p.4 Syria: Peeling Back the Veil...................................................................A. Stolz..................p.6 The Reification of Power Politics................................................................R. Barlas................p.9 Hobbes and the Ethics of Evil........................................................................H. Toope...............p.12 The Nuremberg Trials...................................................................................O. Lamont.............p.14 How Realpolitik Has Made Turkey a Better Democracy.............................M. Alter.................p.16 Qatar’s Riyalpolitik..................................................................................M. Andersen...............p.18 North Korea’s Dark Side.........................................................................J. Scattergood.............p.20 The European Union and the Arab Spring...............................................R. Gebert...................p.21

Illustrations Henry Kissinger.....................................................................................W. Wyndham.............Cover Turkeys for Christmas.....................................................................A. Lindesay-Bethune.........p.16

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Dear Reader,

warm welcome to our readers, new and old. To those who have been involved and interested in our work since our inception in 2010, and to the many for whom this is the first issue of Leviathan that they have come across. Leviathan is a student-run journal which aims to set the standard on thought provoking analysis on the most urgent political debates of the day. We dissect and ponder these topics through the lens of a particular theme, perhaps to allow us to view them from a new perspective. The theme of this issue is Realpolitik. Realpolitik aims to examine the many tensions and contradictions that arise when we try to reconcile politics with some form of morality. Put another way; is realistic, pragmatic politics or realpolitik necessarily evil? Or on the other hand, is an moralistic, perhaps na誰ve idealpolitik desirable or even possible? Or could it be that politics almost always involves a necessary struggle between our ideals and our concrete social reality? Maintaining a dual focus on the theorists of realpolitik as well as the many moral dilemmas in contemporary international politics, the articles in this issue provide fascinating perspectives. To explore how thinkers in the canon of realpolitik might answer our central questions, articles in this issue propose critical interpretations of Hobbes, Machiavelli, and Thucydides. As realpolitik is at its core a set of ideas that aims to respond to immediate and difficult political questions, this issue also explores how these questions play out in cases as far afield as Doha, Damascus and Pyongyang and as close to home as Nuremberg and Brussels. As we conclude, we give our thanks to the Department of Politics and International Relations at Edinburgh who made our many issues possible and in the process have allowed a group of previously inexperienced and relatively wide-eyed students to found and maintain a quarterly journal. This rare opportunity has taught us much about the challenges and rewards of writing and publishing, and we hope that it has provided some novel perspectives for our readers as well. The Politics Society has also consistently supported our work and remains the central avenue for thoughtful and reasoned political discussion in its many events throughout the year. Finally, our editors, production staff, and fundraisers have been prompt, efficient and enthusiastic all term. Their passionate effort and remarkable ability to find time for Leviathan despite their myriad commitments ensured that the end product, this issue, is of the highest quality. As always, we urge you to critically analyse and respond to the articles by sending in your thoughts. Letters to the editor are welcome and should be sent to leviathanjournal@gmail.com. Uday Jain

Staff

Editor-in-chief:

Uday Jain

Senior Editor:

Gabriel Gill Andrews

Assistant chief: Marika Andersen Editorial team: Katerina Kobylka, Hannah Toope, Charles Jamieson, Mitchell Hargreaves, Jana Bischler, Joel Sharples Production chief: Hannah Toope Production team: Mitchell Hargreaves, Marika Andersen, Joakim Bjornestad, Charlotte Mohn, Mike Yeomans Publishing chief: Marie Alter Publishing team: Mary Helen McDougall, Andrew Merry, Milena Aksentijevich, Sanah Saeed Zuberi Sianan Irvine, Charles Jamieson

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Realpolitik: C’mon, get real Professor John Peterson sheds light

ealpolitik was first conceived by an obscure 19th century German philosopher named Ludwig von Rochau. Ever heard of him? Didn’t think so. He was apparently the first to argue that ‘the law of the strong over political life performs a function similar to the law of gravity over the material world’. In other words, in the political world, the strong always do what they can and the weak do what they must. Those who believe in realpolitik – literally, in German, ‘realistic politics’ – are often accused of taking a cynical, simplistic and amoral view of the political world. They stand accused of not even hoping for peace or international cooperation because the foundations of both are built on sand. Those who do hope for – let alone expect – either are naïve. They are not serious. They should ‘get real’.

In some ways, realpolitik’s pejorative reputation is undeserved. Realpolitik emerged after decades of inter-state conflict in Europe, which obviously did not end in the 19th century. Its proponents often reflected thoughtfully and carefully on how to maintain a balance of power between Great Powers in order to keep the peace. An illustrative

“In some ways, realpolitik’s prejorative reputation is undeserved.” 20th century exemplar is Reinhold Niebuhr, an American theologian whose influential 1944 essay – The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness – is a classic and influential statement of realpolitik. In it, Niebuhr famously argued that ‘man’s capacity for justice makes democracy possible, but man’s inclination to injustice makes democracy necessary’. Among those who have

acknowledged Niebuhr’s influence on their thinking about international relations are Hilary Rodham Clinton, John McCain and Barack Obama. Sometimes, however, ideology can give rise to theory in ways that com-

“Those who believe in realpolitik - literally, in German, ‘realistic politics’ - are often accused of taking a cynical, simplistic and amoral view of the world.” promise the goal of seeking to study politics in an objective, value-free way. Realpolitik as a set of principles has given rise to realist theories of international relations, which tend to assume that three basic ‘laws’ govern the international political world. First, all states are selfish and have an insatiable desire for power. Second, the international world is anarchic in that there is no ‘government’ or authority higher than states. Third, all alliances between states are expedient and temporary: states are (literally, in some realist theories) ‘billiard balls’ that do not align with one another permanently. In figurative terms, they all bang against one another and have hard, impenetrable shells. Obviously, both realism and realpolitik are open to serious question. Both take a very dim view of human nature: we – just like states - are all selfish, out for ourselves, and always want more of everything, especially power. But human beings are demonstrably capable of sacrifice for their fellow human be-

ings and even capable of altruism. The firefighters who climbed the stairs of the World Trade Centre on 9/11, and never climbed down, are a case in point. Perhaps states are sometimes capable of the same? Realists also assume that states – just like human beings – always choose ‘relative gains’ over ‘absolute gains’: that is: they always choose options that get them more money or stuff or power than other states over options that yield ‘absolute gains’, or which end up benefitting everybody (if hardly ever to an absolutely equal extent). Yet, there is plenty of evidence to suggest that states – just like individuals – cannot, and thus do not bother, to calculate precisely who gains how much when they strike international bargains. They sign up to whatever serves their interests.

“There is plenty of evidence to suggest that states – just like individuals – cannot, and thus do not bother, to calculate precisely who gains how much when they strike international bargains.” The question of whether any bargain serves the interests of other states is, at most, only a secondary consideration. Maybe above all, realists and believers in realpolitik seem to think that states – and individuals – are incapable of calculating that their actions today might have consequences tomorrow. We all act to maximise our advantages over others, whether we are states or individuals, and never worry about how it

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(about the political world) on the different understandings of realpolitik might motivate others to treat us in the future. But one need not be a person of faith to conclude, logically, that others tend to treat you as you treat them. To get a different slant on realpolitik, an interesting thought exercise is to consider the difference between the pursuit of interests and the furtherance of values. When states pursue their interests, they are seeking to maximise their power. When they act to further their values, they are seeking to propagate that in which they believe, and think others should believe in. States often find the two in conflict when they must make foreign policy choices. Some real-world examples, in the form of recent foreign policy choices faced by the US Obama administration, can help us illustrate. The Arab Spring spread to Bahrain in March 2011. The Gulf Cooperation Council – a regional organisation dominated by Saudi Arabia – sent troops to help the Bahraini authorities suppress street protests. The response from the Obama administration, no doubt conscious of Bahrain’s hosting of a major US naval base and its close alliance with the Saudis, was silence. It was, in the eyes of Washington, not in the American interest to do anything else. Earlier in 2011, Washington and much of the rest of world were gripped by mass street protests against the regime of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt. For years previous, Egypt had been a staunch American ally: a major aid and arms client, a bulwark against Islamic fundamentalism, keeper of a fragile peace with Israel, and an island of stability (if certainly not democracy or respect for human rights) in a turbulent region. After much dithering and swithering by the Obama administration as well as the wider US foreign policy commu-

nity, the US policy choice was to urge Mubarak to step down. Obama celebrated the ‘entrepreneurial spirit that young people ha[d] shown’ in bringing down Mubarak. His choice was by no means universally welcomed in Washington, as realists deplored a move that sacrificed US interests at the altar of furthering American values. But it certainly furthered American values. And then there was Libya. The Obama administration took genuine political risks – given that America was already fighting two ‘hot wars’ in Iraq and

“Maybe above all, realists and believers in realpolitik seem to think that states - and individuals - are incapable of calculating that their actions today might have consequences tomorrow.” Afghanistan – in deciding to participate in the NATO action that saved Libyan civilian lives and led to the downfall of Mohammar Qhadafi. In this case, the US made a foreign policy choice that, in the end, served both American interests and furthered US values. Even though the United States ‘led from behind’ – in the unfortunate words chosen by one official in the Obama administration – it was instrumental to an outcome that both served US interests and furthered American values. Specifically: a ‘rogue’ regime was toppled in the Middle East, which served American interests, and the Obama administration was able to claim, plausibly, that it supported a civilian uprising that would

lead to a democratic Libya. Not often can major powers make a foreign policy choice that serves both its interests and furthers its values. Arguably, when the chips are down, most states are motivated by realpolitik when they make foreign policy decisions. But we can show, empirically, that this logic does not determine the outcome of all foreign policy decisions. States have mixed motives when they make foreign policy decisions. Maybe pursuing their interests is paramount. But all want to further their values as well. When they face foreign policy choices that translate to choices between interests and values, we can expect them to be conflicted. Those who have bought into realpolitik – Niebuhr, E. H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, Stanley Hoffmann, Kenneth Waltz – have taught us quite a lot about international politics. But there are alternative perspectives that reject realpolitik’s assumptions and also tell us a lot about our international political world. There is quite a lot of detail – which is important – about the international political world about which it is possible for reasonable people to disagree. And for good reason. But those who believe in the possibility of international peace or cooperation are wise to understand the arguments of those who believe in Realpolitik, enough so that they can refute them.

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Syria: Peeling

he Arab spring has opened up a Pandora’s Box of uncertainties. The suppressed energy and sheer momentum of the uprisings will shape the Middle Eastern geopolitical landscape for generations to come. While this is an unparalleled period of freedom and opportunity for generations oppressed under brutal dictatorship, the world powers should avoid complacency and keep a cynical eye towards events happening in the Middle East. The region is the centre of global power politics. It serves as the turntable and fault line between the East and the West. This has been both its greatest asset and its greatest liability, benefiting from the cross-fertilisation of trade and ideas, yet at the same time, being the stage of numerous proxy wars. Syria has always been at the crossroads of all the major powers in the world, from the Romans and Ottomans, to the French and Soviets more recently. The events unfolding now in Syria have the potential to ignite deepseated regional tensions and to ensnare world players into a situation that none desires, but which might force them into destructive brinkmanship. It is absolutely imperative that a new and critical view is cast upon Syria and its ongoing uprising, for not to do so could lead to dire consequences for all embroiled in this conflict.

Alex Stolz examines how a mosaic society is Syria is made up of many different, often mutually hostile groups whose animosities date back several centuries. Like many countries in the Middle East, Syria was concocted out of the precipitated dismantling of the Ottoman Empire and the subsequent botched handover to a Western power. The French Mandate in Syria after the First World War created a power system based on ethnicity and religion, whose legacy still shapes Levant politics.1 After Syria gained independence in 1946 and the French hastily left, Syria went through two decades of turbulent political upheaval: characterised by foreign-backed coups, war and poverty. Syria was in a permanent state of either war or unrest throughout of this period. Its humiliating failures in the Arab-Israeli war in 1948, 1967 and 1973 had a lasting impact on both its power structure and its geopolitical outlook. This led it to be an ever more vocal supporter of Pan-Arabism, and continuing hostility towards its existential enemy: Israel. During the 1950s, a group of military officers formed the Ba’ath party, a party devoted to Pan-Arab Socialism in Syria, Iraq and Egypt. The Ba’ath party’s successful coup d’états in Iraq and Syria in 1963 and again in Syria in 1966 laid the

Hafez and Bassel al-Assad, father and brother to the current president Bashar al-Assad. ‘AudreyH’, 14 Sept. 2009, Creative Commons.

groundwork for the modern Assad regime’s rise to power. Hafez al-Assad, a high ranking member of the Ba’ath party and father of the current ruler Bashar, seized control in 1970 during the Corrective Revolution aimed at purging Syria of extreme leftist factions. These were perceived to be too adventurous in their foreign policy following Syria’s military defeat during the Palestinian Black September uprising in Jordan. The stage was set for Hafez to create the modern security state we now see. The Assad family belong to the minority Alawite group. The Alawites are a branch of Shia Islam, and have traditionally been agrarian peasants in the North-

“Over the past 40 years, the Assad family has consolidated power by exacerbating internal communal tensions and by filling the top security and military posts with Alawite loyalists.” West of Syria and Lebanon. They make up only around 10 percent of Syria’s population yet are nevertheless the ruling group – Hafez al-Assad’s Faustian Pact ensured the survival of the regime and the shortterm dominance of the Alawites. The vast majority of Syria’s 22 million people are Sunni, although within the Sunni community there are numerous divisions along ideological, economic and regional lines. The remaining 20 percent of the population is divided between Kurds (9 percent), Christians (6 percent) and another Shia branch, the Druze (3 percent). Over the past 40 years, the Assad family has consolidated power by exacerbating internal communal tensions and by filling the top security and military posts with Alawite loyalists. Historically, the Alawites have been very poor farmers and were oppressed by the more urban, trade

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Back the Veil

at the cross-roads of global power politics oriented Sunnis, so the socialist rhetoric of the Ba’ath party resonated well with the agricultural Alawites and many were eagerly recruited by the regime. The tables now turned, and the ruling Alawites were far from clement on the Sunni backed Muslim Brotherhood rebellions during the 1970s and 1980s, which culminated in the Hama massacre in 1982. The other minority groups in Syria have perhaps had to hedge their bets. The Christians are for the most part wary of a zealous Sunni state, and have tended to give tacit support to the regime. Indeed, the experiences of their immediate neighbours have given them cause for concern. After all, the Christian population in Iraq was reduced by almost two-thirds following Saddam’s ouster, as many were killed or fled fearing death. Once the dominant group in Lebanon, both financially and numerically, the Christians now tend to be overshadowed by Hezbollah and its allies. In Egypt, the fate of the Copts has not yet been sealed, and many remain sceptical that the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafists will treat them well. The Kurds have proved more problematic. They span four countries in the Middle East, each with its unique set of issues and objectives. Many Kurds would like to see a separate Kurdistan and have been fighting for independence for decades. The Syrian regime has, in the past, sponsored the PKK in Turkey in order to keep its own Kurdish separatists at bay, and in 2004 the Kurds in Syria launched a rebellion and were brutally suppressed. During the Syrian uprising the Kurds have stayed out, waiting for the storm to pass. They have little love for the Sunnis who did not come to their aid in 2004, and Assad has rekindled ties and support to the PKK in order appease domestic Kurdish concerns and gave citizenship to the Kurds in Syria. This is a palliative solution and will only buy the regime time and no real solution to the Kurdish question. The Druze are the last piece in the puz-

A memorial to the assassinated Rafic Hariri in a square which became the focal point for Lebanese demonstrations against Syrian occupation in 2005. ‘Upyernoz’, 27 Sept 2005, Creative Commons.

zle. Though numerically weak they are crucial for the Assad regime: as a fellow Shia branch to the Alawites, they too fear the Sunni majority. However, their geographic position, if not their numbers, underwrites their strength nevertheless. They straddle the Syrian-Lebanese border and inhabit the crucial, yet contested, Golan Heights. The Druze’s geographic position and the regime’s support is revealing of its regional power structure and support base. Syria has friends in high places. It is one of Iran’s staunch allies, and Iran provides Syria with large amounts of economic and military assistance. For example, it has sent in its most elite military unit, the Revolutionary Guard, to train and assist Assad’s troops during the ongoing uprising. Iran and the Gulf states are vying for dominance in the Middle East, embroiled in a Cold War-like scenario. A particularly sobering fact is that 25 percent of the world’s arms purchases are shared between the Saudis and Emiratis, all of which are terrified of Iran and of its influence. Whereas the Saudis see themselves as the bastion of Sunni Wahhabism, and lavish petrodollars on those who embrace the most puritanical interpretation

of Islam, the Iranians back their Shia allies throughout the world, eager not to be outdone by the Saudis. Sectarian religious belief is, in this sense, used as a pretext for geopolitical dominance. Syria and Iran support Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in the Gaza strip, both of whom have continually been hostile towards Israel, they offer channels of influence for either sponsor country. Many diehard Palestinians view Syria as the only Arab state not obsequious to Israel and capable of defending “their” cause. Elsewhere, Iraq’s dominant Shia majority wants to check Sunni advances in Syria so as not to embolden subsequent advances in Iraq. The Lebanese find themselves in an equally precarious state, as civil war has permanently scarred their psyche and has shaped bad governance. Lebanon is also wrought with sectarian divides and wants to avoid being dragged into Syria’s crisis. Syria occupied Lebanon until 2005 and maintains a shadowy role in Lebanese politics, accused, for instance, of playing a role in Prime Minister Rafic Hariri’s assassination in 2005. Within the Arab world, the Syrians also have other

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p. 8 allies: the Algerians, themselves reeling from the effects of civil war, are wary of a potential Islamist uprising. The only Arabs who openly support and have called for arming the Syrian “opposition”, of which we know very little, are the Saudis and Qataris. One can be assured that this is not because of altruism: they, like all others embroiled in the conflict, want to propagate their sphere of influence and power. Given Saudi Arabia’s track record, this is not the ideal situation for reformers that seek to embrace the 21st century. The West also is not without its own constraints and adversaries, complicating matters to say the least and making the West a biased arbiter. The United States, in particular, needs to tread carefully. Its security arrangements with the Gulf monarchies make it difficult to balance

“The United States, in particular, needs to tread carefully. Its security arrangements with the Gulf monarchies make it difficult to balance its support of the democratic aspirations of the people of the region with its own vital energy needs.” its support of the democratic aspirations of the people of the region with its own vital energy needs. Iran has threatened to close the Straits of Hormuz, the shipping lane through which flows 20 percent of the world’s oil supply, yet, on the other hand, the Saudis have raised the possibility of an “oil war” with the Iranians in order to reduce the latter’s financial clout. US sanctions against Iran are biting hard, and the Iranian Rial has depreciated by more than 12 percent against the dollar in recent months. The Saudis even went so far as to say that they would seek nuclear weapons if Iran continued its nuclear weapons programme. The United States does not want war, but might be forced into conflict if any number of factors sets off a chain of events beyond its control. It

does not have the luxury of distance and time, since its troops and fleet are half an hour away from an increasingly desperate, and perhaps reckless, Iran – the US will, when the chips are down, be forced to defend its interests. Yet they are not alone. Russia, seeing their sphere of influence rapidly withering away, is determined maintain relations with Syria and provide Iran with diplomatic cover. The Kremlin’s myopic view of power will ensure that they will endure the wrath of generations of future Syrians once Bashar is removed, and if Russia wants to maintain its influence, it should appear to at least tacitly support the democratic aspirations of the people. Putin has campaigned increasingly on nationalistic rhetoric and anti-Western sentiment. His talk of a ‘Eurasian Union’ and the regretful breakup of the USSR underlie his desires and the direction he seeks to take, or perhaps return to, for Russia. Syria is Russia’s last ally in the region and a base for its Mediterranean fleet, so the loss of Syria would be a symbolic burial of Russia’s Middle Eastern power, and would relegate Russia to the rank of a secondary or even tertiary player. The West, however, must not isolate Putin; a wounded beast is all the more dangerous and may lash out in desperation. Russia has everything to lose and the West must not deplete its diplomatic reserves over an ideological battle, as it will need Russia soon in the Afghanistan considering the spill over effects it has caused in Central Asia. All of the world players are in a vulnerable position: the Syrian uprising is taking place amid a global power reshuffle, and the unfortunate reality for the Syrians is that this means that world powers will remain indecisive with regard to Syria while international uncertainty prevails. The US presidential elections take place in November, and Obama is unlikely to do anything radical until then and will probably simply seek to defuse the situation, restraining his more pugnacious ally Israel. In China, the top tier of the Communist party is being reshuffled for the 2013 government, and the mammoth state apparatus does not want its first

term marked by conflict. Sarkozy, the initiator of the Friends of Syria group, is facing an uphill battle for re-election in April and May, yet his Socialist rival lacks his military shrewdness and diplomatic perspicacity – if elected, he will do nothing awe-inspiring. France, the most bellicose member of the EU over Syria, is unlikely to intervene in any form. Its foreign minister adamantly ruled out arming the rebels, and if the West arms the rebels then it bears direct moral responsibility for the ensuing chaos. The Spanish Civil War was no less bloody for those caught in the crossfire because of outside intervention, it only prolonged their suffering – we must not repeat the mistakes of history. Russia, for reasons already mentioned, will cling on to the Assad regime, in sickness and in health, ‘til death does them part. The Assad regime still has enough momentum to carry it forward; its allies in the region, though weakened and isolated, will continue to support it. Is the West’s intention to do good more important than the outcome of its actions? This mind-set is dangerous and counterproductive; we must work with a situation that was inherited, the problems of which date back centuries. Until a viable, stable government can be set up in Syria, the precipitated removal of the Assad regime will likely result in civil war and regional, if not global, conflict. At the time of writing it appears that the Assad regime has regained control, so for now it is

“Until a viable, stable government can be set up in Syria, the precipitated removal of the Assad regime will likely result in civil war and regional, if not global, conflict.” an evil that we will have to contend with. The stakes are too high for all ensnared in this conflict to be guided by passion. 1

White, Benjamin T. (2011) The Emergence of Minorities in the Middle East: the Politics of Community in French Mandate Syria. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, p.45.

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The Reification of Power Politics Raphae Barlas puts into question contemporary views on what we now call “classical realism”

t is almost a truism that Realism represents “a tradition that stretches back through Thomas Hobbes and Niccolò Machiavelli, to Thucydides”.1 Indeed, such sentiments can be found amongst many prominent, contemporary realists; for example, Robert Gilpin claims that there have been “three great realist writers” and that it would be facile to “deny them inclusion in the tradition”2 or Stephen Walt, who claims that “the realist tradition has a distinguished lineage and it includes that works of Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes”.3 Moreover, the significance of the aforementioned thinkers is frequently associated with “terms like power, state and national interest...interspersed with claims about human nature or political necessity, structural determinism or the tragic condition of human existence in general”.4 Quite simply, Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes are appropriated in order to justify the ontological claim that the international is, and will always be, pure power politics. Yet, we can question to what extent these thinkers can be unambiguously interpreted as being part of such a Realist tradition – it is not clear that they can be coherently described as being part of a body of political thought that advocates amorality in international affairs. While this article will outline some reinterpretations of Hobbes, Machiavelli and Thucydides, it should be made clear that in doing so, the purpose of the paragraphs below is not to make claims about what these thinkers ‘really said’, rather it is to indicate how the discursive practices of realist scholars “have turned historical problematics into apologies for the violence of the present”.5 This has principally been achieved by selectively appropriating the writings of the thinkers concerned, and simply eliding the nuance, complexity and richness of their thought – in sum, by reducing and equating the inherently ambiguous nature of realpolitik, with pure power politics.

While Thomas Hobbes has said next to nothing about international affairs explicitly, the typical rendition of a ‘Hobbesian’ account of international politics makes much of his bleak account of our natural condition, and infers from this that Hobbes describes the international as an anarchic system where strength rules – IR is a struggle of power between sovereign states, the realm of power politics.6 However, Michael Williams presents a fascinating reinterpretation of the applicability of Hobbes’ work to international thought. Contra the Realist view that Hobbes described political reality ‘as it really is’, Williams highlights the influence of Pyrrhonian Scepticism on Hobbes – he was in fact a nominalist

“Contra the Realist view that Hobbes described political reality ‘as it really is’, Williams highlights the influence of Pyrrhonian Scepticism on Hobbes – he was in fact a nominalist who rejected essentialist claims to objective knowledge.” who rejected essentialist claims to objective knowledge.7 This created a ‘deeper’ sense of anarchy, namely “epistemic and ethical anarchy”8 – the problem is not that man’s natural condition is essentially one of conflict and power politics, but rather that the potential for conflict always exists in the encounter with the other. According to Hobbes, anarchy between states may exist however “not in actual fighting; but in the known disposition thereto”.9 As such, it appears that Hobbes is not describing the actual relations between sovereigns, he is making a prescription; their function is to fix meanings in order to promote peace by providing epistemic certainty.10 Rather than justi-

Celebrated frontispiece to the 1651 edition of Hobbes’s Leviathan, designed by Abraham Bosse, with input from the author. Public domain.

fying untrammelled power politics – as the Realist tradition would argue – it can be argued that Hobbes’ writing was profoundly normative in character. Of course, while his work may not provide a definitive solution to the problem of difference – the existence of multiple value systems between states, which is of course the product of Hobbes’ prescription - there is no reason to assume that Hobbes is making the ontological claim that sovereigns must necessarily exist in a violently antagonistic relationship with one another. As Inayatullah and Blaney note, “cultural interactions can admit of growth - the creation of new structures of self-other relations”.11 Machiavelli as well is often portrayed as the theorist of cynical and pragmatic power politics par excellence. His codification of the maxims of realpolitik in The Prince is often seen as being wholly antithetical to an ethical approach to politics.12 However, as with Hobbes, it can be argued that typical renditions of

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p. 10 just limited to the increasingly fashionable portrayal of Machiavelli as republican. Joseph Femia suggests that his thought is best thought of as a form of “sceptical liberalism” that “anticipated later utilitarianism by suggesting – though not developing – a consequentialist understanding of morality”, and in doing so, Machiavelli’s thought greatly contrasted with the orthodoxy of his time.16 Following from this theme of Machiavelli as breaking with transcendence-centred ethics of his age, Walker engages in a particularly interesting reinterpretation of Chapter 12 of the The Prince, and argues that Machiavelli’s objection to the use of ‘fortresses’ is that they are “fixed...and inhibit the capacity to respond to changing conditions”. Moreover, when we note that in Machiavelli’s view “the virtu of a prince is understood as a capacity to respond to fortuna” it becomes clear that “Machiavelli’s understanding of time involves contingencies and uncertainties”.17 As such, it seems that contrary to the claims that Machiavelli’s political ethics represents the essentializing of power politics as the nature of the political, it is worth considering that he was in fact “struggling to articulate a politics of time against a dominant discourse of universalisms”18 – that of the Catholic Church (Ibid: 41). Posthumous detail of Niccolo Machiavelli, by Santi di Tito (1536-1603). Public domain.

Machiavelli’s work grossly mischaracterize his thought; “Machiavelli can be read in many ways that problematize the most basic assumptions on which claims about the tradition are based”.13 Much of the recent literature – particularly that associated with the ‘Cambridge School’ of political theory – illustrates that a more careful analysis of Machiavelli’s work unearths a number of tensions within his thought. Most obviously, the moralistic tone of Machiavelli’s other work; The Discourse on Livy, and secondly; the deep ambiguities surrounding his concept of virtu (which is a concept that is central to The Prince). As well as recasting Machiavelli’s thought

within the intellectual context of his time (that of Renaissance Humanism), Quentin Skinner has exploited these tensions to argue that “Machiavelli not only presents a wholehearted defence of traditional republican values; he also presents his defence in a wholeheartedly traditional way”.14 Using a similar approach, John Pocock argues that Machiavelli was a freedom-loving republican who thought the primary aim of politics was not duplicitous self-interest but “the preservation of a community of men grounded upon justice and the common good”.15 Moreover, reinterpretations are not

Finally, regarding Thucydides, a typical move of the proponents of the Realist ‘tradition’ is to refer to particular sections of his History of the Peleopenessian War - typically, the ‘Melian Dialogue’ – to argue that he “appeals to law-like regularities [of human nature] that make international politics a domain of power and necessity”.19 However, as noted by David Welch, there are several problems with this view. Firstly, elsewhere in his work, Thucydidies provides an account of how the Corinthian delegation at Sparta provided a cultural explanation for the war between them and Athens. Secondly, in the Mytilenian debate, Thucydides description of Diodotus’ claims sound very modern – he seems to be arguing that class interests

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p. 11 within a state can contour its foreign policy.20 As such, contrary to the claim of the proponents of a tradition, “part of Thucydides’ achievement....is showing us human nature in all its complexity and variety.”21 Paul Rahe’s interpretation is also worth considering; he considers Thucydides’ work to be not just a criticism of pure power politics but even a “critique of realpolitik”. Simplifying somewhat, the reasoning behind this is that, according to Rahe, Thucydidies views a ‘realist’ approach to political action as the path to hubris and therefore destruction; and this is amply illustrated by the catastrophic Athenian expedition to Syracuse.22 While it can hardly be denied that power politics is an important object of analysis within the work of the aforementioned thinkers, it is far from clear that it is purported to be the essential condition of international politics – quite simply, Realism’s account of the tradition seems dubious at best. However, it is worth reiterating; the purpose here is not to illustrate in a Straussian fashion, what the definitively ‘correct’ interpretation of Hobbes, Machiavelli and Thucydides is. Rather, it is to indicate that many plausible alternatives to the typical interpretations do in fact

exist. Moreover, it is to reveal the manner in which crude and selective renditions of these thinkers have been cynically constructed, in order to provide a defence of current trends within Realist scholarship. By way of concluding, it is perhaps worth noting John Gunnell’s point; that when creating traditions within political thought, texts are often interpreted according to the meaning ascribed to the tradition rather than texts as independent entities – hence accounts of a tradition are often a ‘myth’.23

affairs, and beginning with this assumption, have unquestioningly appropriated selective representations of past thinkers to validate their pre-conceived notions. In doing so, they have not unearthed a ‘tradition of timeless wisdom’ as much as they have invented their own mythology. 1

William Wohlforth (2008), ‘Realism’ in The Oxford Handbook of IR, C.Reus-Smit and D. Snidal (eds), Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 131.

Robert Gilpin (1986), ‘The Richness of the Tradition of Realism’ in Neorealism and its Critics, New York: Columbia University Press, p. 306.

“It seems that contemporary Realist scholars have reified power politics as the essential feature of international affairs, and beginning with this assumption, have unquestioningly appropriated selective representations of past thinkers to validate their pre-conceived notions.” Indeed, it seems that contemporary Realist scholars have reified power politics as the essential feature of international

Stephen Walt (2002), ‘The Enduring Relevance of the Realist Tradition’ in Political Science: State of the Discipline 3rd Edition, New York: Norton, p.138. 4 Robert Walker (1993), Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 32.

Ibid, p. 31.

Jack Donnelly (2004), Realism and International Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Williams, M. (1996), ‘Hobbes and International Relations: A Reconsideration’, International Organization, Vol. 50, p. 217.

Ibid, p. 219.

Thomas Hobbes (1996) Leviathan, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 89.

Williams, p. 232.

Naem Inayatullah & David Blaney (2004), International Relations and the Problem of Difference, London: Routledge, p. 80.

12 13

Donnelly Walker, p. 31

Quentin Skinner (1991), ‘Machiavelli’s Disocorsi and the PreHumanist Origins of Republican Ideas’ in Machiavelli and Republicanism, Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, p. 141.

Maurizio Viroli (1991), ‘Machiavelli and the republican idea of politics’ in Machiavelli and Republicanism, Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, p. 144.

Joseph Femia (2004), Machiavelli Revisited, Cardiff: University of Wales Press, p. 15.

17 18 19

Walker, p. 39. Ibid, p. 41. Donnelly, p. 24.

David Welch (2003), ‘Why IR Theorists Should stop reading Thucydides’, Review of International Studies, Vol. 29, p. 314.

Ibid, p. 316.

Paul Rahe (1996), ‘Thucydides’ Critique of Realpolitik’ in Roots of Realism, London; Frank Cass, p. 105 - 141.

John Gunnell (1978), ‘The Myth of the Tradition’, American Political Science Review, Vol. 72, No. 1, p. 249.

The Parthenon in Athens, completed at the height of the Athenian Empire in 432BC, directly following the first phase of the Peloponnesian War. Kyri Sarantakos, 25 April 2008. Creative Commons.

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Hobbes and Hannah Toope gives an overview of

t is true that Hobbes has been misappropriated by Realists in the specific field of International Relations. Domestic anarchy (which theoretically existed before the imposition of sovereigns and of social contracts beneath them) and international anarchy (the persistent

“The state of nature is [...] one of epistemic uncertainty, in which men live in ‘continual fear, and danger of violent death’[...] Anarchy abounds.” condition of the international system) are not directly analogous, and modern realism has been wrong to equate them and to draw the same ethical conclusions for each. Indeed, Heller warns in strong terms that Hobbes’s opening comparison of the Leviathan to a man is to illustrate a specific point, and that it should not be assumed that all Leviathans internationally are like individuals in a state of nature.1 “Logically,” says Forsyth, “it [would be] impossible for [states] to be in the same position as that which they transformed”.2 Thus he believes Hobbes to have viewed states in the international system to have been no less (and never more) than in the intermediate state of nature modified by the laws of nature which are heeded to varying extents, but without the oversight of a prince.3 Not, in other words, raw anarchy, but equally not the constructive and institutionalised cooperation characteristic of states. It is also true that in the domestic sphere, with which Hobbes was most preoccupied, the sovereign’s chief end is to provide a sort of epistemic determinacy requisite to the functioning of a peaceful and flourishing society in a world of fundamental uncertainty – a normative and ethical end.

However, the means pursued in the name of this objective are by definition unrestrained. Ultimately Hobbes’s deep sensitivity to the potential indeterminacy of knowledge and morality, leads to an operationalization of an arguably constructivist-style premise which takes on an unabashedly pragmatic – Realpolitik – hue. This article will begin by looking at the Hobbesian trajectory from anarchy to a government which at the domestic level fulfils its ethical obligations by its very existence and pre-eminence, with amoral or immoral tools thereafter at its disposal. It will provide an overview of this position, and that of Hans Morganthau after it, which both varyingly hold politics to be “the ethics of doing evil”.4 The article will furnish a tacit critique throughout, but ultimately will leave the verdict to the reader. Thinking caps on! What is right and wrong I know, for Leviathan tells me so Hobbes saw mankind as by nature suffering from an “indeterminate and objectless fear” emerging from the lack of ability of the senses to capture the essence of their surroundings.5 The world is dimly perceived and always varyingly interpreted. Though language improves things somewhat by serving as building blocks for reason, just as in calculating lengthy sums even the most rational thinker can at any minor point turn astray. The state of nature is therefore fundamentally one of epistemic uncertainty,6 in which men live in “continual fear, and danger of violent death”.7 Truth and communication and morality are all made fallible in imperfect man. Anarchy abounds. One sees in Hobbes’s premise a foreshadowing of much later constructivist, critical, and post-structural paradigms of thought. In challenging notions of settled truth, values and received wisdom,

Hobbes can be said to be far before his time. The problem, as ever, is one of operationalization of such a philosophical understanding. Where today’s writers propose discourse and dialog and emancipation, Hobbes opted rather for repression, in the form of an absolute monarch. This sovereign’s role is to be the ultimate arbiter of any epistemic disagreement, and to promulgate and coercively enforce laws guaranteeing state stability and welfare.8 The sovereign determines a functional truth and order by which society can operate. Men agree to fully submit to it (with select exceptions)9 , knowing that they are exchanging their natural liberty for survival and a better quality of life, one in which there can be art and industry.10 The sovereign is thus the result of a “rational choice made by individual agents”, but additionally has a “certain mysterious force” which inspires people to fittingly behold it “with a certain awe”.11 The sovereign becomes, in other words, “that mortal god to which we owe under the immortal God our peace and defence”.12

“...whereas by entering into the social contract, man alienates his individual sovereignty in favour of survival, the state’s lifeblood is sovereignty. ” For Hobbes, the sovereign is an ethical end in himself. He embodies stability, and his enduring mandate is to uphold stability at any cost short of exasperating his people to the point of (unstable) rebellion – his only potential limitation. By necessity, all power belongs to or stems from the sovereign, for two reasons: firstly, the sovereign must be able to act in any necessary way for the preservation of the state, lest society fall back into the

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the Ethics of Evil

two influential views of amoral politics insufferable state of nature.13 He must be able to legislate, to enforce and to judge unhindered by competing seats of power,14 and all resources, though protected between subjects, must be available to him should he need them.15 Secondly, whereas by entering into the social contract, man alienates his individual sover-

“Though Morgenthau’s state [...] is an expression of rationality[...], rationality is not always coextensive with morality.” eignty in favour of survival, the state’s lifeblood is sovereignty. Individuals have contracted to yield their power to the state to preserve their lives. Should the state yield the power back, it would itself perish.16 There can be no limited government, no separation of powers, no democracy. The only way to overcome uncertainty and violence, according to Hobbes, is to have an absolute monarch whose every decree is law backed by strong sanctions – the fearsome and invincible beast of Job 41, the Leviathan. Morgenthau: less prescriptive of government make-up, no more assured of favourable outcomes Morgenthau, a more contemporary writer no less known for his discussion of the ethics of the state, takes if anything a more pessimistic view. While he criticises Hobbes’s conception of the absolutist state being necessary for the preservation of an (ethical) order, accusing Hobbes of using “totalitarian philosophy [to reformulate] ethical principles to fit the political reality”,17 for him the state can never be more than a necessary evil. He sees government as the principle outlet for man’s natural lust for power, albeit a deeply unsatisfying one.18 From being

a “mortal god” for Hobbes, the state in modern secular societies is now perhaps for many “the only God there is”.19 It would be wrong to assume, however, that this status gives the state any greater ethical standing. Though Morgenthau’s state can be limited and democratic, and is an expression of rationality (it is used by individuals to rationalise and legitimise their natural thirst for domination), rationality is not always coextensive with morality. Himmler’s gas chambers, he writes, were arguably nothing if not rational.20 For Morgenthau, there thus remains in rationality-oriented politics a profound “chasm” between “political action and ethical standards”.21 Ethical principles are still worse served by man’s intellectual inability to foresee all of the consequences of actions performed even in good faith, the reality of irreconcilably conflicting interests across society,22 and the heightening

“the very act of acting destroys our moral integrity” and corrupting effect of political power on man’s animus dominandi.23 Indeed, “the very act of acting destroys our moral integrity”,24 as every action bears an opportunity cost. Thus “political ethics is… the ethics of doing evil”.25 This holds true if politics is viewed either as the rational outlet for man’s natural passions and ambitions, but is found to be too complicated a matrix of interests for man to really manipulate in a satisfactory manor; or, if politics is viewed as the prerogative of a single ruler whose chief end is to preserve stability among the rabble at any cost. But ought politics to be viewed in these lights? Does politics have to be exclusionary and self-serving and morally pragmatic (if moral at all), bearing all the marks of raw Realpolitik?

Mark Heller, ‘The Use and Abuse of Hobbes: The State of Nature in International Relations’, Polity, vol. 13, no.1, 1980, p. 22. 1

Murray Forsyth, ‘Thomas Hobbes and the external relations of states’, British Journal of International Studies, vol. 5, 1979, p. 208. 2

Forsyth, p. 209.

Hans Morgenthau, ‘The Evil of Politics and the Ethics of Evil’, Ethics, vol. 56, no.1, 1945 (hereafter: Ethics of Evil), p. 18. 4

Jan Blits, ‘Hobbesian Fear’, Political Theory, vol. 17, no. 3, 1989, p. 424. 5

Michael C. Williams, ‘Sceptical States: Hobbes’, in Michael C. Williams, The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 40. 6

Thomas Hobbes, ‘Leviathan’, in Richard Tuck (ed.), Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, (hereafter: Leviathan), ch. XVII. 7

Leviathan, ch. XVII.

Leviathan, ch. XXI.

Leviathan, ch. XIII.

Quentin Skinner, Visions of Politics, vol III: Hobbes and Civil Science, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 204. 11

Leviathan, ch. XVII.

Leviathan, ch. XXIX.

Leviathan, ch. XXIV.

Heller, p. 28.

Ethics of Evil, p. 4.

Ethics of Evil, p. 15.

Hans Morgenthau, ‘The Dilemma of Scientific Man’, in Hans Morgenthau, Scientific Man Versus Power Politics, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974, p. 6. 20

Ethics of Evil, p. 4.

Ethics of Evil, p. 11.

Ethics of Evil, p. 16.

Ethics of Evil, p. 11.

Ethics of Evil, p. 18.

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The Nuremburg

Oscar Lamont on how realpolitik and lofty ideals came together

etween November 1945 and October 1946, the eyes of the world were fixed on Nuremberg as twenty-four major Nazi war criminals were tried before the International Military Tribunal: the legacy of which is still debated today. There were clear problems. The Allies, victors of a devastating and costly war, perhaps employed some legally dubious realpolitik to condemn Germany. Nevertheless, it was a strong will for justice that made trials possible at all. Ultimately, as this article demonstrates, it is clear that, whatever Nuremberg’s shortcomings, its legacy has been positive. The key legacy of the Nuremberg Trials with regard to post-conflict justice was that they happened at all. The idea of trials for those who have committed war crimes may seem natural, but the path to Nuremberg’s justice was anything but inevitable. As Robert Jackson, the American chief prosecutor at Nuremberg, asserted at the opening of the trial: the decision of the Allied nations to “stay the hand of venge-

ance” and submit the defeated enemies to trial was “one of the most significant tributes that Power has ever paid to Reason”.1 This was because the plan to spare the Nazi leaders immediate retribution and put them on trial emerged relatively late, with little initial support from Allied leaders and their constituents. Indeed, the Morgenthau Plan, signed by Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill in 1944, which called for summary executions of the Nazi leadership, saw overwhelming support from the public in Britain and the US. Stalin’s now infamous toast at a meeting of Allied leaders - to “shooting at least 50 or 100 thousand Germans” clearly exemplifies the pervasive view that “the justice of the firing squad” would suffice.2 The Morgenthau Plan went further than summary executions, however. It also proposed ‘pastoralising’ Germany and destroying its industrial capabilities so that it would never be a threat to peace again. Fortunately, the document laying out these plans was leaked, and the idea of pastoralisation was, in fact, not at all

Hitler’s personal physician, Karl Brandt, also notorious for having used concentration camp inmates as medical guinea pigs, as he is sentenced to death by hanging, Nuremberg, 20 August, 1947. Public domain.

well received by the American public. Instead, the “legalist” plans of the US War Department prevailed (Britain and the USSR were forced to follow the US’s lead). Thus, “even amidst the vengeful passions so understandable in 1945-46, [the Allies] endeavoured to subject the Nazi tyranny to the cooler analysis of reason and of law”.3 This was a moral triumph. The main criticism levelled against

“Only crimes commited by Nazis were tried: either Allied crimes were ignored, or the categories of their crimes were conveniently overlooked.” the Trials, which might perhaps mitigate their positive foundation, is that they represented “victors’ justice”: that the Allies pursued self-interested political considerations – realpolitik – rather than disinterested legalism. Gary Bass writes “Nuremberg was self-serving in ways that are usually forgotten today”.4 He refers to principal quarrel of the Allied nations: the crimes against their own citizens. Indeed, war crimes and crimes against peace were so much more central to the motivation behind the Trials than the Holocaust. The Allies’ primary agenda was to punish the Nazis for their destruction of Allied lives - the suffering of the Jews was far from the primary concern of the planners of Nuremberg because, on the whole, the Jews killed were not Allied citizens. From a realist perspective, however, this selfinterest is merely indicative of an inevitable status quo; it is invariably the case in international relations that, as Hermann Goring scribbled on his copy of his indictment at Nuremberg, “the victor will always be the judge and the vanquished the accused”.5 The taint of victors’ justice is arguably also evident in some of the

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Trials

to establish a positive foundation for post-conflict justice. more legally dubious aspects of the Trials. For example, only crimes committed by Nazis were tried: either Allied crimes were ignored, or the categories of their crimes were conveniently overlooked. The USSR posed the most serious problems on this front, as it was guilty on three of the four counts against the Nazis for acts it had committed during the previous decade. The Soviet legal team was adamant, for example, that “crimes against peace” should refer only to specific instances, committed by Axis states, because it was clear that the USSR was guilty of aggressive war, having attacked Poland and Finland in 1939. Similarly, the Allies avoided charging the Nazis for indiscriminate bombing campaigns, since, of course, they had conducted such campaigns themselves, most infamously at Dresden in 1945. Another legally dubious aspect of the Nuremberg Trials, which one might also consider victors’ justice, is the ex post facto (read: retroactive) implementation of the laws that were used to condemn Nazi leaders. Three of the four counts – conspiracy against peace, aggressive war and crimes against humanity – had little or no precedent in international law. The legitimacy of count two – aggressive war – was perhaps the most dubious. Planning, initiating, and waging wars of aggression was the main charge levelled at Nuremberg, despite never having been defined as a crime in international law up to that point. Indeed, war had previously been legally neutral, so prosecuting Nazi warmongering meant that international law had to be written backwards, rewritten even. Notwithstanding that this contravened the fundamental legal principle of nullum crimen sine lege (“no crime without law”), there were two further problems. Firstly, the Allies’ case rested on the claim that Germany had contravened the principles of the League of Nations, which, though true, represented a hypocritical, weak argument: the US had never joined it and the USSR had been expelled for aggression against Finland in

1939. Secondly, the count covered Nazi aggression before war began in September 1939, which, ironically, the Allies had at that time essentially condoned through appeasement. Returning to the positive legacy of the Trials: Bass makes the crucial point that “the Allies were interested parties... to many lawyers this looks like a flaw; but it was also a strength6.” The political interest and motivation of the Allies in their approach to the Trials, as discussed above, is often seen as a negative; yet it was this unswerving political will and commitment that allowed the Trials to happened at all. As a result of the Allies’ commitment, the process was not plagued by the problems that are rife in contemporary international tribunals – it was well funded and managed by highprofile staff, and there were no qualms about making arrests. Though, of course, the fact that the Allies were out-and-out victors and Germany had surrendered unconditionally facilitated this process. One major difficulty that the Allies overcame – testament to their political will – was the profound disagreement between them at almost every stage of the process. Justice Jackson noted in his report on the negotiations prior to the Trials that the views of the four nations “represented the maximum divergence in legal concepts and traditions.7” Considering this, the fact that these countries managed to come together to create the Nuremberg Trials at all is testament to their positive will for justice. Furthermore, as discussed above, while political considerations were not removed completely, they were never dominant, and, according to realist theory at least, this is to be expected. Returning to the criticism of the Allies, they were deemed to have slyly, or even illegally, sought ways to punish Germany. While this assessment is not entirely untrue, it ignores the fact that through they were consciously legislating within a unique, horrific situation8. As Jackson declared, the plan for Nuremberg “ushers

international law into a new era,” 9 where it aligns with common sense in condemning warmongering. Jackson did not mention, however, another positive legal innovation which the Trials implemented – the recognition of crimes against humanity: certainly a positive contribution. Indeed, as Overy posits, what is most striking about the trials is not that they were in some way flawed, but “that so much was achieved in the chaos of postwar Europe in building the foundation for contemporary international law...and human rights.”10 ‘Justice Jackson’s Opening Address for the United States of America’ (http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/imt/nca/nca-01/nca-01-05-openingaddress-usa.html) The Nizkor Project. 1

Michael Biddiss (1995) ‘Victors’ Justice? The Nuremberg Tribunal’, History Today, Vol. 45, Issue 5 pp. 40-46. 2

Michael Biddiss (1995) ‘Victors’ Justice? The Nuremberg Tribunal’, History Today, Vol. 45, Issue 5 pp. 40-46. 3

Gary Bass (2002) Stay the hand of vengeance: the politics of war crimes tribunals. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 4

Richard Overy (2011) Making Justice At Nuremberg, 1945-1946. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/war_ crimes_trials_01.shtml 5

Gary Bass (2002) Stay the hand of vengeance: the politics of war crimes tribunals. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 6

Gary Bass (2002) Stay the hand of vengeance: the politics of war crimes tribunals. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 7

Richard Overy (2011) Making Justice At Nuremberg, 1945-1946. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/war_ crimes_trials_01.shtml 8

Gary Bass (2002) Stay the hand of vengeance: the politics of war crimes tribunals. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 9

Richard Overy (2011) Making Justice At Nuremberg, 1945-1946. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/war_ crimes_trials_01.shtml 10

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Positive Realpolitik: How Choosing Power Interests

ealpolitik is generally perceived as an amoral, unjust, or even fraudulent approach to politics. Idealists believe that political decisions should be made in the name of greater ideals, that they should be guided by ethical considerations. They condemn the idea that power, pragmatism and self-interest drive politics, and attempt to minimize their role. The case of Turkey reveals that realpolitik is not necessarily negative. Since the coming to power of the Islamist AKP (Justice and Development party) in 2002, Turkey has surprised many by becoming a more modern, more just, and more democratic society. In the aftermath of the Arab Spring it has even been cited as a political model for the region. How did this happen? This article argues that this has been achieved through a more pragmatic, materialistic approach to politics. Ideals, especially Islamic ones, have been abandoned in the name of rational thinking and selfinterest, and this choice has proven to be more positive than negative for Turkey. The AKP came to power in 2002 as a metamorphosed Islamist party. Led by current Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, it aimed at clearly differentiating itself from the previous

“A market-oriented economy (...) has turned Turkey into the fastest growing economy in the world.”

Turkish Islamist parties which had all been banned for violating the sacred principle of a secular state set up by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of the Turkish Republic. It even went so far as to describe itself as a “conservative democratic” party instead of an Islamist one, and avoided the slightest reference to religion in its political discourse. It vowed to render the country more democratic, improve its economy, and initiate the process of accession to the EU. It would be unfair to deny its success in

Marie Alter argues that realpolitik is the

Illustration by Alexandra Lindesay-Bethune

delivering on most of these promises. But how has it managed to achieve these transformations? This is when the concept of realpolitik comes into the equation. Despite its Islamist roots and the fact that most of its members stem from the previous Islamist parties, the AKP seems to have followed a very pragmatic stance to politics, where most of its decisions are calculated according to the strategic and material benefit they will bring, rather than in line with Islamist values and ideals. Foreign policy is maybe the most important element of this approach. Islamist parties have traditionally sided with the other Arab-Islamic countries, and especially in the post 9/11 era, they have often declared the ‘West’ as their archenemy. Unlike the previous Turkish Islamist parties, Turkey’s AKP has not followed this mould. It thought it more strategic to ally with the world’s leading power, the US, and has boldly requested to join the EU’s Christian club. Until recently, it was even on friendly terms with the Zionist state of Israel. If this upset the principle of Muslim brotherly solidarity, siding with the rich and

powerful certainly brought many more advantages than what idealistic solidarity could have achieved. In fact, Turkey has become the favourite ally of the US in the Middle East, and their relationship has been described as a ‘model partnership’.1 It has become a trustworthy member of, and has a stronger voice in the international community. Whether this was intentional or not, siding with the world’s leading democracies has had the beneficial effect of improving Turkey’s democratic credentials. If compliance with the EU Copenhagen criteria (an ensemble of rules potential member states have to comply with in order to be admitted in the EU) required the AKP to democratize in targeted areas, respect from the international community has been an has been an indirect incentive for further voluntary for further voluntary democratization. Encouraged by the international community and in contrast to previous Islamist parties, the AKP has embraced a pro-globalization market economy. It has thus turned its back on the Muslim caritative ideal according to which the economy should be interest-free. It has

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Over Ideals has Made Turkey a Better Democracy reason for the AKP’s success in Turkey realized that the material benefits of a market-oriented economy as a member of the international community are considerably greater, and this has indeed proven more beneficial for economic growth. In fact it has attracted significant foreign investment, exports have tripled since 2002 and it has turned Turkey into the fastest growing economy in the world.2 This new economic orientation has also allowed the new devout Anatolian bourgeoisie, the main financiers of the AKP campaigns, to take a significant foothold in the economy and thus bring much needed economic modernization to the rural mainland. In terms of social policy as well, it has calculated its policies in realpolitik terms. It has embraced a much more moderate and pragmatic version of political Islam

“The AKP has not given up its Islamist ideals in the name of power, pragmatism and self-interest, but in the name of a milder version of political Islam compatible with democracy and economic liberalism.” with the aim of casting its net on a much wider circle of voters and becoming a successful mass party. Although many still doubt the sincerity of this mildly Islamist stance, fearing the existence of a hidden radical Islamist agenda.3 But there is little in the party’s policies that indicate the presence of suspicious agendas and it would be hard to believe that the AKP would be willing to give up its firmly entrenched 48.9 percent share of votes4 to impose radical Islamist policies on the masses.

in the name of power, pragmatism and self-interest, but in the name of a milder version of political Islam compatible with democracy and economic liberalism. It is certainly true that Erdoğan has real democratic ambitions, but often realpolitik seems to prevail over ideological considerations, whether Islamic or democratic. How else could they justify Erdoğan’s recent authoritarian impulses to violate freedom of expression by jailing journalists and reprimanding peaceful demonstrations, if democratic ideals were more important? How could they defend his neutral stance towards Gaddafi’s Libya if he were so keen to promote human rights?5 Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Cologny, Switzerland in 2006. World Economic Forum, Creative Commons.

The controversial headscarf ban in public institutions is an example of the way in which the AKP has opted for the more politically strategic option rather than staying loyal to its Islamist ideals. Although the traditional Islamic voter base believed that, once in power, the AKP would reverse this ban to enhance the expression of Muslim identity in the public sphere, the party realized that this would probably alienate a large part of the secular electorate for whom the headscarf is an embodiment of an aggressive political Islam, and more importantly raise international suspicion as to its secular credentials, and therefore chose not to. Also the decision to curb the influence of the armed forces in the political arena by stripping them of key constitutional rights was clearly motivated by the desire to diminish their traditionally strong hold on power, but denying the army a role in politics is a significant democratic improvement in itself. Thus overall, policies which have mostly been calculated to increase the AKP’s political success have had the beneficial effect of turning Turkey into a more democratic society. Idealists could now argue that the AKP has not given up its Islamist ideals

Either way, whether the AKP’s political, economic and social policy choices over the last ten years have been purely motivated by pragmatic and materialistic calculations or whether its ideological perceptions have changed, they have nonetheless stimulated Turkish economic growth and made for a better democracy. In some cases realpolitik can come as a blessing to overtly ethically oriented politics and ahistorical ideals that fail to take into consideration political realities. Han, A.K., (2010) ‘From strategic partnership to model partnership: AKP, Turkish – Us relations and the Prospects under Obama.’ UNISCI Discussion Papers (23) 1

AK Parti, (2012) ‘Actions’, http://www.akparti.org.tr/, accessed 30 March 2012 2

Tibi, B., (2008) ‘Why they can’t be democratic”, Journal of Democracy 19(3), accessed 30 March 2012 3

Result of the 2011 parliamentary elections.

Walker, J. W., 2012, “Turkey’s Regional Leadership in the Middle East: Principle or Realpolitik?”, Turkey Analyst, http://belfercenter. ksg.harvard.edu/publication/20882/turkeys_regional_leadership_in_ the_middle_east.html, accessed 30 March 2012 5

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Qatar’s

Marika Andersen on how Qatar as a small

atar draws attention for its ambitious foreign policy endeavours. It promoted intervention in Libya and has a large role in sustaining amicable relations between the West and Iran. At the same time, Qatar has controversial diplomatic ties with Israel and hosts an extensive US military base. For a small state surrounded by powerful interests, this is some achievement, and it is made possible for two reasons. First, Qatar is wealthy - a luxury which allows it to pursue a number of different means of achieving its goals. Second, Qatar does not allow ethical considerations to cloud its evaluation of what is in Qatar’s national interests. This does not mean that Qatar never behaves in ethical ways, but it does so only when such ethical behaviour is aligned with reasoned calculations about what will benefit the country. By every common measure bar one, Qatar is a small state. Geographically, it is about the size of Connecticut and its population is less than two million, of which only 300, 000 are Qatari citizens. Qatar is, however, blessed with the world’s third largest gas reserves and generous oil deposits. As the world’s largest exporter of Liquefied Natural Gas, Qatar ranks as one of the globe’s greatest energy giants. Oil

“This does not mean Qatar never behaves in ethical ways, but it only does so when such ethical behaviour is aligned with reasoned calculations about what will benefit the country.” and gas exports account for roughly 70 percent of government revenue and mean that Qatar can, without levying any taxes, provide its citizens with universal health care, education, energy, housing allowances and even a lump sum with which to furnish newly built homes1. At first glance therefore, Qatar appears as a typical example of one of the Persian Gulf’s

Seat of the Qatari government. Photo: Omar Chatriwala, Creative Commons.

many rentier states. It does, however, have a number of features that distinguish Qatar from its neighbours in notable ways. One of these features is that, since coming to power in 1995, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani has enacted a number of reforms which are arguably moving Qatar toward liberal-democracy. A new constitution has been ratified, introducing universal suffrage and a partially elected national council. Although these changes are piecemeal and elections are yet to be held, they have drawn international praise. Qatar does not shy away from this attention. The date for its first elections with universal suffrage was set for March 8th, International Women’s Day, a demonstration not only of Qatar’s desire to reform but also of an eagerness to flaunt its reforming credentials2. Because it has been seen as a liberalizing force in a region reputed for its conservatism, Qatar’s international stature has grown and it is able to project a unique voice in international affairs – one that frequently carries more clout than its neighbours. Qatar employs this power in a multitude of ways, perhaps most recognisably through the satellite news network Al Jazeera. Whilst there is no official link between the Qatari government and Al Ja-

zeera’s reporting, Al Jazeera’s mere existence helps Qatar further its foreign policy goals. In a region starved of critical and independent reporting, the fact that Qatar hosts a network praised for its contribution to the free exchange of information helps

“As a small Gulf state surrounded by powerful neighbours Qatar needs leverage, and it needs to be smart about how it uses it. Qatar has distinguished itself by its ability to use its wealth to carve out its own niche.” the country buttress its reforming image. Al Jazeera played a significant role in spreading the news of the Arab Spring and Qatar was the first Arab state to endorse military intervention in Libya. This paved the way for Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and Arab League support for NATO’s ensuing operations in the country3. For its role in the Arab Spring, both Al Jazeera and

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Riyalpolitik

state asserts itself in the realm of realpolitik “winning strategy” that is smart power9.

Al Jazeera. Photo: SpecialKRB, Creative Commons

the Qatari leadership have been targeted. Journalists and even diplomats have been recalled and expelled4. Similar reporting from the BBC or CNN rarely provokes such a reaction and it is clear that, despite the official separation of the network from the government, Al Jazeera is widely perceived to serve the interests of the Qatari state as a “PR tool for the outside world”5 As a small Gulf state surrounded by powerful neighbours like Iran and Saudi Arabia, Qatar needs leverage, and it needs to be smart about how it uses it. Qatar is wealthy, but so are its neighbours. Qatar has, however, distinguished itself by its ability to use its wealth to carve out its own niche6. In the same way that Switzerland is known for its neutrality and banking, Qatar is recognized as a go-to destination for international conferences, such as the ongoing Doha Rounds of WTO negotiations7. Qatar’s high profile efforts to project a reforming and liberal image are therefore allowing it to defy the limitations of its small size. They are successful largely because they are shored up by a strategic partnership with the United States. Qatar has arguably replaced Saudi Arabia as the US’s favoured ally in the Middle East. In the wake of US-Saudi tensions that grew up after 9/11, the US military presence in Saudi Arabia has been drawn down

and effectively transferred to Qatar with the establishment of US Central Command headquarters at Al Udeid Air Base8. An alliance between the world’s superpower and what is quickly becoming one of the Middle East’s most influential players is one that is in the interests of both parties. The US secured the base it required to execute

“Qatar may be a small state, but it is a smart one, and it is applying its resources in a way that combines hard and soft power into the ‘winning strategy’ that is smart power.” missions in Afghanistan and Iraq and was also able to enhance its regional presence in a way that allows it to exert pressure on Iran. In return, Qatar received the material assurance it needs to continue its outspoken efforts to shape the affairs of the Middle East without fear of military retribution. Qatar may be a small state, but it is a smart one, and it is applying its resources in a way that combines hard and soft power into the

The way in which Qatar combines the soft power in gains through Al-Jazeera and the hard power that it gains through US support is one example of how ethical considerations combine with hard-headed calculation in the realpolitik of contemporary international relations. Qatar does not do something for nothing. Whilst it actively aided the cause of the Libyan National Transitional Council, it simultaneously engaged in talks on a potential Qatari-Libyan partnership aimed at exploring and extracting Libyan gas resources10. When Saudi Arabia obstructed a gas pipeline from Qatar to the UAE and Oman, it coincided with Al Jazeera’s hosting of Saudi dissidents, up until the point where an arrangement between the two states was met11. Qatar pursues many ways of achieving its goals, skilfully balancing the interests and good will of disparate states such as Iran and the US. Al Jazeera is but one tool in its repertoire. If successful realpolitik amounts to the ensuring self-interested policies are realised, then Qatar is useful as one example of how realpolitik can be pursued by a even a small, albeit rich, state. Dargin, J., (2007). “Qatar’s Natural Gas: The Foreign Policy Driver” in Middle East Policy, 14(3), pp. 136-142. 1

Lambert, J., (2011). “Political Reform in Qatar: Legitimacy and Security” in Middle East Policy, 18(1), pp. 89-101. 2

O’Sullivan, M., (2011). Tiny Qatar’s Big Plans May Change Mideast. Bloomberg (online) October 3rd. Available at: http://www. bloomberg.com/news/2011-10-04/tiny-qatar-s-big-plans-maychange-u-s-mideast-policy-meghan-o-sullivan.html. 3

Bahry, L., Y. (2001). “The New Arab media Phenomenon: Qatar’s Al-Jazeera”, Middle East Policy, 8(2), pp. 88-99. 4

El-Nawawy, M., and Iskandar, A., (2003). Al-Jazeera. The Story of the Network That Is Rattling Governments and Redefining Modern Journalism. Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA: Westview Press. 5

Peterson, J., (2006). “Qatar and the World: Branding for a MicroState”, Middle East Journal, 60(4), pp. 732-748. 6

ibid.

Gause, G., (2005). “The International Politics of the Gulf” in Louise Fawcett (ed.) International Relations of the Middle East. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, pp: 263-282. 8

Nye, J., (2006). “In Mideast, the goal is ‘smart power’” in The Boston Globe, August 19. Available at: http://www.boston.com/ news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2006/08/19/in_mideast_the_goal_is_smart_power/. 9

See 3

Al Qassemi, S., (2011). How Saudi Arabia and Qatar Became Friends Again. Foreign Policy (online) July 21st. Available at: http:// www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/07/21/how_saudi_arabia_and_ qatar_became_friends_again. 11

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North Korea’s Dark Side

Jamie Scattergood criticises not only the regime, but the lack of the West’s response

orth Korea is one of the most secretive, and therefore one of the most intriguing, states on Earth. Despite its furtiveness, the human rights abuses that its de facto totalitarian regime routinely commits are no secret to Western governments, and North Korea has become somewhat of a pariah state. North Korea is profoundly insecure, and its secretiveness is both contingent on this insecurity and constitutive of its precarious international standing. Nevertheless, foreign officials, notably Hillary Clinton, constantly seek to mitigate this sense of insecurity, which also, incidentally, clearly stems from the belief that improving relations with the outside world would be detrimental to the continued ability of the ruling party to govern without dissent. Tellingly, at the time of writing North Korea’s government has stated that it intends to “mercilessly destroy”1 any state which interferes with its controversial missile operation. Evident in the recent celebration of the one-hundredth birthday of North Korea’s founding president, the late Kim Il-Sung, vast displays of military power and manufactured emotion continue to dominate TV coverage, just as was the case with the

death of the late Kim Jong-Il. After the recent passing of the ‘supreme leader’, its is perhaps surprising that there has not been more pressure from the global media for the world’s governments to provide further aid for a population in such desperate need. The death of Kim Jong-Il cast a spotlight on the North Korean establishment, past and present, overshadowing the thousands of Koreans that remain subjected to abhorrent treatment and grotesque living conditions in the state’s prison camps. Recently, the power of social media has perhaps been epitomised by the ‘Kony 2012’ movement, which has sought to bring attention to injustice and human rights violations in Uganda. Undoubtedly, the movement’s cause is a noble one, but – notwithstanding its founder’s recent fall from grace – its “bandwagon” modus operandi does not appear to have truly resonated. One cannot help but feel that some political movements are destined to their “15 minutes” and nothing more. While they may twinkle in vogue in their infancy, the globalisation of communication is a double-edged sword. That which facilitated a movement’s ubiquity can equally facilitate the dissemination of both its critics’ retorts and, equally, the next viral craze. All the while, important issues that lack the same agency for mass publicity are rendered obsolete. Coverage of North Korea is meagre, the state’s surreptitiousness renders the outflow of information a mere trickle – and an intermittent one at that.

Torture Room: North Korea Gulag by Gregory Gilbert-Lodge, 2003, Das Magazin, Tages Anzeiger, newspaper supplement Zurich.available at: http://gilbert-lodge.com

Given the media’s obsession with the North Korean leadership and restrictions imposed on foreign news corporations like the BBC, the ignorance of the global body politic to the plight of many North Koreans can perhaps be forgiven. This is, however, perhaps subject to change. While details of the prison camps (which hold around 200,000 political prisoners)2 remain sparse, personal accounts are slowly entering the public domain, in no small

part due to the roughly 20,000 defectors that have now fled south of the 38th parallel, many of which now live in Seoul.3 Significantly, Western human rights activists are now for the first time collaborating with dissenters to shed light on the prison camps, yet they have not, perhaps expediently, yet turned to social media. Blaine Harden recently published the book Escape from Camp 14, which gives the account of Shin Dong-Hyuk, a human rights activist who himself experienced many years of excruciating torture, as many

“Western governments [...] keep the North Korean human rights issues off the international diplomatic agenda.” thousands of North Koreans do on a daily basis. One would hope that an increase information-flow continues, and might lead to a Western reaction of a magnitude even on the same scale as that of the Kony movement. However, the likelihood of this is bleak. Furthermore, Western governments allegedly pursue courses of action that are calculated to keep the North Korean human rights issues off the international diplomatic agenda. While the Korean peninsula remains a critical flash point of security issues, domestic human rights violations will remain relegated.4 The Kim dynasty is often portrayed humorously in social media, thus, similarly to mainstream coverage, its North Korean focus remains largely on the regime, which leads it often to overlook the perhaps more important issues. Taking the time to read Shin’s account might give well-needed pause for thought – from Kim Jong-Il dropping the bass – for many of us that remain blinded. CBSNews, ‘North Korea Makes Fresh Threat of Attack’, 25.02.2010, available at: http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-202_162-6241317.html. 1

Amnesty UK, ‘North Korea: New images reveal true scale of political prison camps’, 03.05.2011, available at: http://www.amnesty.org. uk/news_details.asp?NewsID=19434. 2

NPR Staff, ‘Escape from Camp 14: Inside North Korea’s Gulag’, 29.03.2012, available at: http://www.npr.org/2012/03/29/149061951/ escape-from-camp-14-inside-north-koreas-gulag. 3,4

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The European Union and the Arab Spring Randi Gebert identifies double standards in the EU’s human rights policies in response to the Arab Spring, and lays out their implications

s the Arab Spring gained momentum, Western states keenly echoed the protesters’ calls for reforms, democratic transition and respect for human rights. While the European Union (EU) also jumped on the bandwagon, the unexpected uprisings put to test the Union’s ability to coordinate its internal and external policies and act as an effective norms promoter, posing an immense challenge to its foreign policy dimension. The EU’s foreign policy seems to be as sui generis as the Union itself and has puzzled politicians and academics alike. Henry Kissinger, in the 1970s, allegedly asked whom to call if he wanted to speak to Europe; scholars, in an attempt to conceptualise the problem, have invented a host of labels that seek to grasp the role of the EU in the international system. Ian Manners famously termed the EU a normative power. Accordingly, the Union is based on a variety of norms, including democracy, human rights and the rule of law. These norms, however, are not merely constitutive aspects of the EU; they render the Union a powerful international player as it diffuses these norms through a variety of channels to other actors, defining what is considered normal in global politics.1 Indeed, norms in general and human rights in particular play a fundamental role in EU foreign policy. The Lisbon Treaty clearly and repeatedly links human rights to external policies, stipulating for example that EU external action “shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, ...”.2 Such wording clearly feeds into the idea of Europe as a normative power: not only are the EU’s policies to be guided by a list of values, but the Union is also to actively promote these principles in the world. Preferential trade agreements and development aid are often tied to conditionality, with human rights featuring prominently in those arrangements, exemplifying how the Union actually attempts to spread this set of norms. As the Arab Spring swept over the Mid-

Catherine Ashton addressing the European Parliament. European Parliament, 1 February 2012, Creative Commons.

dle East and North Africa, the EU was again quick to emphasise human rights protection and democratic consolidation. In February 2011, the High Representative Catherine Ashton remarked that the “violation of human rights [in Libya] must stop now”.3 The Union’s first strategic reaction to the uprisings, a joint communication by major EU institutions in early March last year, emphasised the need for a review of the current European Neighbourhood Policy and for a new approach towards the Mediterranean countries to foster the trends towards democratic reform. Very much in line with Manner’s conception of the EU as a normative power, the document’s introduction makes clear that a “new approach should be rooted unambiguously in a joint commitment to common values” and affirms support for democracy, human rights and the rule of law.4 Proposing a ‘Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity’, the EU endeavoured to water the seeds of democratic reform through aid, economic incentives (i.e. market access), and prospects for visa facilitation. To induce change the communication introduced conditionality, offering ‘more for more’ if governance and human rights standards improve.5 A European Council Declaration in the same

month likewise referred to the opportunities for democracy and human rights6 and in August 2011, Ashton reiterated that Libya’s “historic transition process should be based upon the respect for democratic values and human rights”.7 While evidence for human rights rhetoric is abundant, the EU’s words and deeds diverge considerably. In fact, the first practical answer since the Arab uprisings began has been to mobilise and step up FRONTEX, the EU’s external border protection agency.8 Since its foundation in 2005, human rights NGOs and other civil society groups have had an eye on FRONTEX. In particular, its strict, undiscriminating operations have been said to infringe the Refugee Convention and Human Rights Declaration by interfering with the right to seek asylum. People who are in need of protection because they are persecuted in their home country are hindered from making use of this right. The European Council on Refugees and Exile (ECRE) has been particularly active on this front and on several occasions pointed

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p. 22 out that the current FRONTEX procedures contradict international and EU law. “The result of preventing the arrival of refugees in Europe, is that EU Member States fall short of their human rights values and obligations”.9 In autumn 2011, FRONTEX regulations were amended to explicitly state the duty to respect human rights. In the absence of any enforcement and accountability mechanism, these reforms remain ineffective.10 In the face of growing migratory pressure from Tunisia and the growing tensions in Libya, Italy requested assistance from FRONTEX as early as mid-February 2011. Even before the EU embarked on any meaningful humanitarian action in the region, FRONTEX, an agency that operates in an uneasy tension towards the very rights the EU demands from other countries, had already stepped up its border controls. Against the background of the EU’s human rights discourse towards Middle Eastern countries during the Arab Spring, this seems somewhat ironic. But FRONTEX is not the only thorn in the EU’s human rights story. A recent Human Rights Watch (HRW) report is highly critical of member states’ resistance to resettle Libyan refugees and disputes over rescuing boat migrants. While European operations also rescued a number of migrants in peril, HRW complains about inadequate coordination among the member states. Estimates suggest that about 1,400 migrants paid with their lives when attempting to cross the Mediterranean Sea, fleeing from the precarious situation in Libya.11 Even those migrants who make it into Europe do not arrive in a human rights haven. The conditions in most deten-

“Even those migrants who make it into Europe do not arrive in a human rights haven.” tion centres are miserable. Often they are overcrowded and dirty, amounting to inhumane and degrading treatment, as the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) confirmed in a ruling on the situation in Greek detention centres in January 2011.

Again, FRONTEX got in the firing line of critics, being held responsible for sending migrants picked up at the Greek-Turkish border to those very detention centres.12 Similarly, an upsurge in migrant flows from Tunisia and Libya put a strain on the detention centre on the Italian island of Lampedusa. Italian ships were also accused of intercepting migrant boats in international waters and sending them back, a highly problematic move in light of the right to seek asylum.13 This was confirmed in February this year, when the ECHR sentenced Italy to pay compensations to a group of Somalian and Eritrean migrants who tried to cross the Mediterranean Sea from Libya to Italy in a small boat in May 2006. Thirty-five nautical miles south of Lampedusa, Italian Coastguard ships intercepted the vessel, took the migrants aboard and returned them to Tripoli. They

“Italian ships were [...] accused of intercepting migrant boats in international waters and sending them back, a highly problematic move in light of the right to seek asylum.” were not asked for identification and received no information about their destination. Back in Tripoli, the Somalians and Eritreans were handed over to the Libyan authorities despite vehement opposition; in the months after this incident two migrants died in unknown circumstances. In an attempt to get out of this tight spot, Italian authorities claimed that they had merely upheld a bilateral agreement with Libya.14 However, the ECHR found Italy in breach of human rights law – a rather embarrassing judgement for the EU and its human rights discourse. While the situation is particularly pressing at the immigration hot spots in Southern Europe, Amnesty International paints a similar picture in France.15 Conditions have worsened since the EU adopted a Directive in 2008, increasing the maximum detention period to 18 months. As a result, immigrants pile up in detention centres.

A migrants’ boat in Lampedusa. ‘piervincenzocanale’, 27 August 2009, Creative Commons.

In other European countries, immigrants often face discrimination with xenophobic attitudes and right-wing populism on the rise. According to HRW, the European Commission did little to enforce fundamental rights in the member states.16 As these examples demonstrate, EU rhetoric on external human rights promotion and internal enforcement of these very norms diverge considerably. A key to understanding these double standards can be found in the legal framework of the EU. The applicability of human rights differs substantially between internal and external policies – and member states are keen to maintain this difference. As noted above, human rights are expressly mentioned as guiding principle for EU foreign policy in the Treaties. However, with regard to internal policies, these values play a less prominent role. Until recently, the ECJ could not base its jurisdiction on human rights provisions; it was only with the Lisbon Treaty that the EU’s Fundamental Charter of Human Rights attained legal force. However, member states installed a backdoor, making clear that the Charter is supposed to apply primarily to EU institutions. States can only be judged by the ECJ when they implement EU law, purely national policies do not fall under legal scrutiny. In the words of De Búrca, “whereas the protection of human rights is identified as an overarching objective that cuts across all of the EU’s external relations, the proper sphere of human rights in the EU’s internal policies is limited to those areas of EU power or competence that directly promote human rights – that is, mainly anti-discrimination and social inclusion policy”.17 Against this backdrop, EU assertions that “human rights concerns underpin every internal and external EU policy” need to be questioned.18

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pg. 23 Considering that it is actually the internal sphere where the EU has mostly integrated its policies, this imbalance between the internal and external dimension of EU human rights policies appears to be rather paradoxical. However, migration policy remains a very sensitive topic for national governments, going to the very heart of national culture, identity and security. This is not to suggest that EU member states do not share common interests in this policy field – on the contrary, the creation of the Schengen Area and free internal movement have led to a convergence on a number of policy preferences. Member states retain, however, control over large parts of EU immigration policy. Intergovernmental bargaining situations, marked by an absence of restraining factors such as democratic scrutiny, civil society pressure groups or national courts, allow countries to pursue their national interests and restrictive migration policies to an extent that would not be possible on a domestic level. Given the highly sensitive nature of immigration and integration policy, it is hardly surprising to see that member states are wary to preserve their leeway and control in these areas and consequently have an interest in continuing to limit the jurisdiction of the ECJ.19 This divergence between own standards and official human rights rhetoric raises a number of critical issues. It is not only problematic from a moral perspective, but

“Incoherence and double standards greatly undermine the credibility and effectiveness of the EU as a global actor.” also has far-reaching political implications. Incoherence and double standards greatly undermine the credibility and effectiveness of the EU as a global actor. Koh’s analysis of American Exceptionalism provides interesting insights into the implication of applying different standards internally and externally. Discussing the ramifications of double standards in US human rights policies, he points out how such an approach undermines the legitimacy of policy aspirations and claims

to leadership.20 Given the importance of leading by example, it is not difficult to see how such double standards erode claims to a normative power Europe. The EU’s approach to human rights during the Arab Spring further speaks the language of incoherence. By pursuing incompatible, inconsistent policies, it becomes problematic to legitimise either of them. Most importantly, the EU loses credibility as an international actor and consequently the ability to defend its interests and principles on a global scale. Admittedly, incoherence has long been identified as one of the core hurdles for the EU as a global actor, official references to a need of ensuring consistency in EU policies date back to the 1970s. A number of reforms introduced with the Lisbon Treaty aim specifically at addressing this issue. In particular, the double-hatted post of Catherine Ashton as both the High Representative and the Vice President of the Commission as well as the inception of the European External Action Service have been designed to strengthen the coherence of external policies. While a lot of these newly created institutions are still in their infancy and have yet to carve out their role in the EU foreign policy making process, the EU’s performance during the Arab Spring does not provide a very promising preview of the Lisbon innovations in this regard.21

Manners, I. (2002). ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’ Journal of Common Market Studies, 40(2), pp.235-258. 2

Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union (2010), Art.21(1); see also Art.21(2)(b) and Art.3(5). 3

Ashton, C. (2011). ‘Libya: EU HR Ashton Statement on UNSC resolution and latest developments’. Available at http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/fr/article_10723_fr.htm [Accessed 20 March 2012]. 4

European Commission (2011). Joint Communication. A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean. COM(2011) 200 final. Available at http://eeas.europa.eu/ euromed/docs/com2011_200_en.pdf [Accessed 20 March 2012], p.2. 5

Ibid., p.5

European Council (2011). ‘Extraordinary European Council on Libya and the Southern Neighbourhood. European Council Declaration’. Available at http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/11/st00/ st00007.en11.pdf [Accessed 20 March 2012], p.1. 7

Ashton, C. (2011). ‘Libya: Statement by EU HR Ashton following the Cairo Group conference call’. Available at http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_11315_en.htm [Accessed 20 March 2012]. 8

Berenskoetter, F. (2011). ‘Caught Between Kosovo and Iraq: Understanding Germany’s Abstention on Libya’. Available at http://www2. lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/ideasToday/08/berenskoetter.pdf [Accessed 20 March 2012], p.12. 9

ECRE (2007). ‘ECRE and BRC joint response on House of Lords inquiry on Frontex’. Available at http://www.ecre.org/component/content/article/57-policy-papers/96-ecre-a-brc-joint-response-to-houseof-lords-inquiry-on-frontex.html [Accessed 20 March 2012], p.3. 10

HRW (2012). ‘Country Summary, European Union’. Available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/eu_2012.pdf [Accessed 20 March 2012], p.3. 11

Ibid., pp.1-2.

Ibid., pp.6-7; HRW (2011). ‘EU: Border Agency Exposes Migrants to Abusive Conditions’. Available at http://www.hrw.org/ news/2011/09/21/eu-border-agency-exposes-migrants-abusive-conditions [Accessed 20 March 2012]; Economist (2011). ‘The Unstoppable Flow.’ Available at http://www.economist.com/node/18178167 [Accessed 20 March 2012]. 13

HRW (2012), pp.8-9.

European Court of Human Rights. Judgement on returning migrants to Libya. Hirsi Jamaa et autres c. Italie/and Others v. Italy [GC], no/no. 27765/09, 23.2.2012. 15

Amnesty International (2011). ‘French Detention Centre Highlights Mistreatment of Migrants in Europe’. Available at http:// www.amnesty.eu/en/press-releases/human-rights-in-the-eu/roma/ french-detention-centre-highlights-mistreatment-of-migrants-ineurope-0384/ [Accessed 20 March 2012].

As the example of the Arab Spring has shown, in order to legitimately water the seeds of human rights to blossom elsewhere, the EU should ensure to remove its own weeds first. Jeopardised by double standards and national interests in the field of immigration policy, so far, the Union’s norms-based approach towards the Arab Spring has lacked unity, credibility and impact. This perception is also shared by some commentators in the Middle East. An Egyptian newspaper, for instance, complained about a lack of support from Europe for democratic transitions in the Arab World.22 If the EU wants to make credible claims to normative leadership in the field of human rights, it cannot ignore its internal situation.

HRW (2012), p.1.

De Búrca, G. (2011). ‘The Road Not Taken: The European Union as a Global Humanrights Actor’. The American Journal of International Law, 105(4), pp.649-693., p.682; p.674. 18

Delegation of the European Commission to the USA (2009). ‘Advancing Human Rights World Wide.’ EU Focus. Available at http:// www.eurunion.org/News/eunewsletters/EUFocus/2009/EUFocusHumRts-05-09.pdf [Accessed 20 March 2012]. 19

Lavenex, S. (2006). ‘Shifting Up and Out: The Foreign Policy of European Immigration Control’. West European Politics, 29(2), pp.329-350. 20

Koh, H. H. (2003). On American Exceptionalism. Stanford Law Review, 55(5), pp. 1479-1528; p.1487. 21

Gebhard, C. (2011). ‘Coherence’. In C. Hill and M. Smith (eds.), International Relations and the European Union, 2nd ed. pp.101-127. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 22

Shalaby, A. (2011). How Europe responded to the Arab uprisings. Al-Ahram, issue 1084 (9-15 February 2011). Available at http:// weekly.ahram.org.eg/2012/1084/op5.htm [Accessed 20 March 2012].

Inviting interested editors, graphic designers, illustrators, and writers to contribute to our next issue Climate change. Energy. Green technology. Nuclear waste. Oil. Endangered species. Overpopulation. Natural disasters. Erosion. Deforestation. Environmentalists. Diseases. Drought. Corporations. Treaties. Mining. Dirty water. Polluted air. Recent years have found the environment at the forefront of political and social policy. Environmental disasters, food supply, scientific research, and debates over climate change ever-increasingly form headlines and policy. They incite activism and affect lives in both the developed and developing worlds. We are surrounded by something that has become thought and action-provoking yet remains contentious. This generation and its successors face monumental challenges. What is the future of our planet, and how does it affect us? What kind of a world are we leaving for future generations? What responsibility and power do we as individuals have to affect change? How serious are these issues, where did they begin, and even more controversially, who is to blame? The deadline for submissions is August 5th, 2012. Email us at leviathanjournal@gmail.com to find out more.

Pollution in China, Source: Mafe, Flickr, Creative Commons