Why was he killed by Lina Guerra

WHY WAS HE KILLED? Colombia demands truth and justice. The Attorney General’s past fifteen years of failure whilst undertaking the investigation of Alvaro Gomez Hurtado’s political assassination only serves to confirm drug traffickers’ continual influence over certain figures of justice1 and in sectors of Colombian society.

Please refer to the rulings made on the following dates: 21 December 2001, which can be found in the Second Criminal Court st th of the Specialized Circuit’s file number JR 4152; 31 January and 25 March 2003, which can be found in the Second Criminal th Court of the Specialized Circuit’s file number JR 6214 C; 6 December 2001 made by the Second Criminal Court of the Specialized Circuit, in Case Number 089-2, against José O. Sánchez C. and José Luis Mangones who were being tried for the murder of Elizabeth Montoya de Sarria, also known as the “La Monita Retrechera”. The statements made by Hernando Gómez th th th Bustamente, also known as Rasguño, on 12 and 13 January and 15 December 2010 regarding the Colombian Chamber of Representatives’ Prosecution Board Investigation Number 3209, published by Semana magazine, also support this statement.

ÂŠ Democracy and Freedom Foundation

“Society needs to see and feel that crimes do not remain unpunished, and that investigations are conducted candidly using efficient investigative techniques. When justice does not prevail it is neither capable of convicting or acquitting.… Impunity, which is the principal reason for justice not warranting the public’s respect, paradoxically leads to the conviction of innocent men”. Alvaro Gómez Hurtado2

GOMEZ HURTADO, Álvaro, Ante la Decadencia, Populibro 1978. P 88.

PROLOGUE It is the intention of this book to analyze Colombia’s recent political history. In 2010 the country celebrated two hundred years of independence from the Spanish crown; a short history, but one that has been pockmarked with violence and bloodshed. The country is a land of contradictions that perplex Colombians let alone those who were not born here, where the precise features that make it unique and unequalled in terms of natural beauty are the same things that have contributed to its vexatious past. The following pages endeavor to give an insight into the political and sociological environment in Colombia through the 1995 murder of Alvaro Gómez Hurtado; an assassination with comparable consequences to that of Luis Carlos Galán’s, yet a crime that has received not even a tenth of the coverage. Alvaro Gómez was one of the country’s most brilliant, but underrated politicians. He had an extensive and extremely successful record of public service, which was characterized by his virtuous and utopian politics. His sense of duty always took president over his own personal gain and ambition. Alvaro Gómez was gunned down because he was candid, and his murder was one of many in this lugubrious and painful period of our recent history. His candle was blown out prematurely when, as a statesman, he fulfilled his duty to the country in endeavoring to depose the corrupt and rotten government of Ernesto Samper: the president who was voted to power after a campaign paid for by the mafia’s blood-soaked bills. The Conservative party had two leaders of unquestionable quality for the 1994 election: Andrés Pastrana, who Samper robbed of the presidency, loosing only by very few votes, and Alvaro Gómez Hurtado. The difference between the two men was of fundamental importance. Andrés was a young leader who was very active in the day-to-day politics of the country. Alvaro however, had retired from mainstream political life after a long and distinguished career: he had been a Senator for over twenty years, represented Colombia as ambassador in Washington and Paris, and had thrice been a Presidential candidate. He did however; remain active, not by his presence in the Senate but with the might of his pen from his editorship in the most distinguished media outlet in Bogotá at the time, Daily TV newscast 24 Horas. During his retirement Alvaro was said to have a patriarchal aura and it was commonly accepted that he well deserved the treatment and status of an ex-president even though he never held the high office. There was something in his demeanor that made the nation want to shout, be heard, and demand justice. Midst this troublesome time Alvaro’s talent to lead shone through 5

and he was afforded an unequalled credibility that very few political leaders, including presidents, have ever managed to achieve. Alvaro had always been a fighter, and it was in the twilight of his life that he fought the hardest. It would be this very fight, this struggle for the legitimacy of a country that would condemn him to be slain by bullets. Gifted with a unique serenity and absolute composure Alvaro managed to take on so many political battles throughout his life. The last battle was waged through his editorials, his lectures, and his protests; tirelessly denouncing Samper’s government by taking the moral high ground, and with every day that passed endangering their tenure in office. What put Alvaro Gómez in such grave danger was not what he was saying, but the fact he had the authority, moral and otherwise, to say it. It was his voice alone that epitomized the cries of a country that demanded the immediate dissolution of a puppet government that been elected due to blood money and were consequently in the pockets of the mafia. It was from his father, the ex-president Laureano Gómez, that he was taught the important difference between power and authority. Alvaro never had power; he always had authority. Alvaro was robbed of the chance to steer the country forward for reasons that date back to the old political wars waged by his father; sectarianism destroyed the social fabric of the country and led it down a path that was to be one of the most violent an savage in the country’s history resulting in a Rojas Pinilla’s military dictatorship. The same political factions that had fought against Laureano made sure that his son and heir apparent did not succeed in gaining access to the most important office in the country. Despite the fact Alvaro was denied the presidential sash he had a knowledge second to none on state matters and his analysis was so astute that he has provided us with a deeper understanding of this complex and temperamental country. When he fought to gain access to the Casa de Nariño3, which he did three times, he was forced to do so against a stigmata left behind by his father from who he inherited a sharp political acumen, but also, without deserving it, historic economic and political grudges. Why was he killed? was refused publication by the biggest publishing houses in Colombia; they viewed it as too ‘risky’. This fact is a somewhat disconcerting reality for both Colombians and free speech. It is thanks to the bravery and courageous efforts of Controversia Editorial that Colombians are able to read the truth of a murder committed in a Colombia that for years had its reputation blackened worldwide.

Colombia’s presidential palace 6

This book will hopefully portray the injustice suffered by the Gómez family, who has witnessed first hand how the courts, the politicians, and the press have endeavoured to wipe this stain from history. The same elite who continue to coldly manipulate the situation are those responsible for the atrocity that happened on 2 nd November 1995 when Alvaro Gómez took his last breath. If Teddy Kennedy was still alive and had published a book entitled Why was he killed? there would be no doubt that the publishing houses would be fighting over the rights to the book. The silence of the Colombian press is characteristic of a country that is still in the grips of the drug trafficking mafia. Moreover, it also shows the intention of some of the political sectors to downplay the significance of the situation through the denial of responsibility and the refusal to tell the truth. They have strived to rid Colombia of the memory of this murder and use smoke and mirrors to hide those responsible. In George Santayana’s words, “he who ignores history is doomed to repeat it”. By remembering this aphorism and through this book it will hopefully be possible to slowly rebuild Colombia’s tarnished reputation and achieve justice not just for Alvaro Gómez Hurtado but for everyone who has lost someone in the gruesome and bloody decades that have formed part of Colombia’s recent history.

PREFACE

Ever since that day, 2nd November 1995, there has been a quiescent need to tell the facts and events surrounding the political assassination of Álvaro Gómez Hurtado and the subsequent investigation. A large number of Colombians are still clearly able to remember exactly where they were and what they were doing the moment they heard of the Conservative leader’s assassination. Even fifteen years after his death, an extensive number of Colombians still believe Álvaro Gómez Hurtado was a great Statesman who “had the country in his head”, and for many it is impossible to Álvaro understand why he did not steer the country’s destiny as President.

His historical magnitude and dramatic death justify the undertaking of this work, in order to tell the story of the investigation’s failure to determine both the perpetrators and those intellectually responsible for his murder. The perverse way in which the investigation has been conducted, the Office of the Attorney General’s position over the past fifteen years in not fulfilling its institutional requirements, the blatant anfractuosity of the investigation, the unjust deprival of freedom suffered by many of those falsely indicted and accused,4 the sentencing of one who was almost certainly innocent; all these factors pile up over the qualities of the victim and become a powerful reason and motivation to document this story. However, having recently succeeded in developing new evidence, a trail of truth has arisen which simultaneously manifests a new image of our country’s history over the past twenty years. This historical reality was brought to light by confessions from several of the Norte del Valle cartel’s major drug lords, former members of the Samper Administration, and heads of the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC).5 The perception of our own history – that we Colombians could have had – is somewhat different to the stark reality. This book deals with the true history of our country, not the history we citizens are made to believe; it is a history of 4

Rulings made by the Second Criminal Court of the Specialized Circuit, found in the following files: JR 4152 (21 December st st th 2001); JR 6214D (31 January 2002); and in Case JR 6214C (31 January 2003). In Trial Number JR6214C (25 March 2003) the Berrío Loaiza and Gaono Ovalle brothers were acquitted of the crimes for which they were accused. This decision was upheld st by the High Court in Bogotá in their ruling that can be found in file number 0021999621402 (21 November 2003). Please also th see the case against the retired Coronel Bernado Ruiz Silva (20 May 2003), and the High Court in Bogotá’s ruling, which can be th found in file number 0021997415205 (13 February 2003). 5 The main paramilitary movement acting in Colombia between 1995 and 2005.

deep and profound corruption, cover-ups, conspiracies, and the shameless use of smoke and mirrors. The very revealing of this hidden reality has turned itself into the decisive driving force of this effort. Finally, by methodologically contemplating the investigation of Álvaro Gómez Hurtado’s political assassination, one finds an open window through which the institutional weaknesses of our justice system; the lack of commitment and competence of public servants, and the negative inertia that distances our criminal system from its institutional mission (making it one of our most discredited State institutions) can be seen. It is hopeful that the critical content of this investigation will help to amend other cases and prevent new investigations from being similarly abused by the perpetrators and their institutional accomplices. Fifteen years on, the Gómez Hurtado family and the Huertas Hastamorir family still hope for justice. They await the individual criminal responsibility to be determined for those intellectually responsible for the political assassination that took place on 2nd November 1995. They also await that the assassination is proved to be part of a conspiracy to conceal the deep penetration of the Cali drug trafficking cartel  a cartel made up of the so called the Four Old Men from Cali (Miguel and Gilberto Rodríguez Orejuela, “Pacho” Herrera and “Chepe” Santacruz)  into Colombian political leadership and the District Attorney’s Office. The purpose of this infiltration was to endeavor to obtain favorable terms (or conditions) for submitting these structures of criminality to the Colombian Department of Justice before the U.S. Government would have time to file drug trafficking charges against the cartel bosses and their deputies. A large part of the country had heard news of agreements made between the mafia and high-ranking national leadership, and of the various parties involved in the so called Proceso 8000, such as Alberto Giraldo, Santiago Medina, Fernando Botero and other incriminated politicians. The purpose of Álvaro Gómez Hurtado’s homicide could have also been to cover-up from both the public and the authorities responsible for fighting crime, both within and outside the country, the existence, as stated by Hernando Gómez Bustamante, also known as “Rasguño”, of other arrangements involving major politicians and the Norte del Valle Cartel: an organization which by 1994 had an ever-increasing position in global drug trafficking. They achieved this by having taken over routes and contacts through Mexico to the United States of America, which had previously belonged to the Ochoa clan of Medellin. The purpose of such agreements was to presumably secure the mafia with the possibility of developing new

trafficking routs with no obstruction from the authorities. They would also not run the risk of judicial or political persecution during that particular administration.6 There is a pattern that manifests a systematic operation employed by the Colombian mafia regarding its involvement in the corruption of public power, and also crimes and political assassinations perpetrated in order to conceal or attain their strategic objectives. Álvaro Gómez Hurtado’s political assassination was governed by and subject to this same pattern the country has witnessed in other infamous crimes and corruption cases of that era. A homicide such as this clearly bears the hallmarks of a State crime, as all the characteristic elements are present. It is clearly a political crime due to the nature of its consequences, which benefited the regime’s desperate fight to cling to power. The principle achievements attained as a result of Álvaro Gómez Hurtado’s violent death were: - The silencing of one of the best qualified and legitimate members of opposition speaking out against the Samper Administration in the latter half of 1995. Álvaro Gómez Hurtado was the first national leader to expressly demand the resignation of the President and his cabinet. - Preventing Álvaro Gómez Hurtado from imposing an Anti-Samper agenda on his Noticiero 24 Horas news channel, during that period the most viewed Colombian television news channel in the country. - Intimidating the remainder of the opposition and high-ranking officials and politicians involved in the Proceso 8000, who could give evidence against President Samper, by imposing an environment of fear. The crime can also be considered a State crime due to active law enforcement agents’ participation in its execution and coordination. Distinct testimonies, given at different times and under varied circumstances, each individually added to the dossier, incriminate the then 6

It should be noted that in a recent document issued by the Office of the Attorney General’s Department of Information and Records, regarding the Investigation Number 3209 (murder of Alvaro Gómez) by the Colombian Chamber of Representatives’ th Prosecution Board, it was stated that the man known as Rasguño was mentioned only twice. The first being on 11 June 1996 th for the crime of tax evasion, and the second on 9 September 2005 the crime of conspiracy to drug trafficking. However, it was th th not until 19 June 2004, and 9 April 2007 (respectively) that he was held under preventative detention. Rasguño the heir to the leader of all Mafiosos, Orlando Henao “el hombre del overol” had, before this date, allegedly not been involved in any proceedings conducted by the Colombian Department of Justice: clearly untrue. Rasguño had become invisible to the Colombian Department of Justice by estoppel and the closing of investigations involving him.

GAULA Bogotá Commander, Police Major Danilo González as being the killer. By 2003, his intimate and long-lasting connections with the Cali and Norte Del Valle Cartels, and the paramilitary Carlos Castaño had been revealed. The supposed institutional coordination of the murder involved several factors: the removing of armed police response units from the area, the assigning of the Bogotá Seccional de Investigación Criminal (SIJIN) instead of Cuerpo Técnico de Investigación (CTI) to the crime scene and the use of false prosecution witnesses in court. The then president’s aide-de-camp7, Colonel German Osorio’s name has risen on countless occasions in the case8 regarding this accusation. Finally, another hallmark of a State Crime is the cover-up of the real perpetrator and those intellectually responsible by consistently derailing the inquiry. During the entire criminal investigation, conducted by the Office of the Attorney General, three hypotheses have been formulated as to the identity of the perpetrator, and one as to those intellectually responsible. These hypotheses, which have been presented as indictments before the Republic’s Judges, have, in every case, failed dramatically resulting in the acquittal of all homicide charges. There is however, one exception: one man, who in the learned opinion of this research team, was unjustly condemned on the basis of solely one testimony, both highly suspicious and previously manipulated. It must be stressed that to date the plaintiffs, acting on behalf of Álvaro Gómez Hurtado’s family, have not found any evidence that President Samper did indeed organize an elite team to investigate the crime, as he promised the public on the day following the homicide. On the contrary, the organization of the investigation was deliberately conducted in an uncoordinated and chaotic manner. At times enquiries were kept as secret as in the case of the Battalion of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, known as the 20th Brigade. As far as is known, there was no Security Council meeting as a result of the homicide, nor was the investigation subject to any special instructions from the President or members of his Administration. For the Samper Government the investigation ended when members of the so-called “Sincelejo Group” were arrested on 18th November 1995, at which time the Government decided that the crime had been conveniently resolved; President Samper had successfully exonerated the drug trafficking mafia.

This can be found Accusation Committee’s file 3209 in Hernando Gómez Bustamante’s, also known as Rasguño’s statement. th The Article “Testigo Explosivo” published by the Samana magazine on Monday 29 June, 1996 details information disclosed by Luis Fernando Farfán. 8 th On 24 June, 2011, Carlos Alberto Lugo, the witness who first talked about the so-called Sincelejo Group told the El Espectador newspaper that he had been intimidated by Colonel Osorio to withdraw his statement.

This is how ex-minster Horacio Serpa remembers events in his testimony to the District Attorney responsible for investigation number 61.434. He stated that he doesn’t remember having been given any specific order to make the investigation more efficient, or that it had been referred to the Security Council. The government’s response was to appoint the case to the District Attorney. Samper’s government’s position was in direct juxtaposition with the way it behaved prior to Gómez Hurtado’s death when it was in a constant state of alert, with respect to the coup conspiracy. Also, his insistence, and that of his high-level political entourage and close ally, the Attorney General Gómez Méndez, that the death of his political opponent was for this reason seemed somewhat incongruous with his reaction. It can be supposed that if Samper’s government’s allegations are both true and legitimate – as Gómez Méndez maintains the death of Gómez Hurtado being absolute proof of this – then it would have surely conducted an exhaustive investigation with the President’s full support to find those responsible. My son Enrique in his capacity as plaintiff has requested, unsuccessfully, from the President, Ministry of Home Affairs, and Ministry of Defense copies of Security Council documents to prove the existence of an elite investigative group. In my opinion it never existed. The intention to cover-up and derail the investigation is both evident and obvious due to several factors: witnesses intimidation through the assassination of their closest relatives, direct threats to witnesses, manipulation of files, the concealment of evidence, the destruction of criminal evidence, systematic preclusion of evidence which contradicted the false witnesses was denounced by Judges, and total lack of support given to the Prosecuting Attorney’s Investigator from the institution of the Office of the Attorney General. This forms part of the criminal conspiracy that continues to exist and has done ever since the time of the events that caused the deceit, as well as the situation that provoked the conspiracy in the Proceso 8000 case. Only the extradition of Colombian nationals by order of the U.S. Department of Justice has allowed for the barrier to be broken, which, over the years, the criminal conspiracy built around the investigation. However, a tool to fight against the mafia has developed; in this particular case the possibility for the victims to have access to relevant proof has increased. The breaking of the Law of Silence, which was caused by the U.S. judicial authorities’ pressure and interest in this case, gave rise to institutional and probative opportunities. Thus, the disheartened family of Álvaro Gómez has decided to directly intervene in order to ascertain the individual criminal responsibility for those both directly and indirectly intellectually responsible for the homicide. This is our sole objective. We in no way desire damages from the Nation, but are aware that

time is rapidly reaching the twenty-year maximum for an outstanding prosecution. When this time has elapsed cover-up and derailment’s rotting corpse will be buried forever. In order to achieve their objective, the family has made economic resources available through the Álvaro Gómez Hurtado Foundation, and the Democracy and Freedom Foundation. They have funded a team of attorneys who over the past three years have undertaken an exhaustive analysis of the murder case file. Their conclusions have made the publication of this book possible. We also acknowledge the work undertaken by the two most recent District Attorneys from the Prosecutor 20 Office, who presented evidence to Francisco Javier Villarreal and Pablo Enrique Murcia Bermeo, Specialized Judges in Bogotá. The Honorable Mr. Villarreal’s decision to reopen the evidentiary period in April 2009, an action that resulted in his immediate dismissal, was of great importance for the gathering of new evidence. Despite personal risks and notorious hostility at higher jurisdictional levels in the Office of the Attorney General, Prosecutor Murcia has taken on the dangerous task of compiling a dossier of evidence that has been proved, and defining a new investigation methodology program. This evidence gathering has, over the past fifteen months, surpassed that of the entire process during the past seven years. This essay provides the reader with a description of the main hypotheses, which over the years have been championed in vein by the District Attorney’s Office. It concludes by detailing the current status of the investigation and the hypothesis derived from new evidence gathered. This paper also delineates the difficulties faced in view of the abject absence of interest and resistance from the Attorney General to adequately carry out an investigation. It is necessary but disquieting to mention that we have seen that parts of the recent procedural investigation have been filtered to the media. Although it is of the utmost importance that people have access to information, serious leaks such as in the Álvaro Gómez Hurtado case cause can have extremely detrimental repercussions: the intimidation of further witnesses, discouraging them from making statements. This allows anyone incriminated by the witness to concoct his own version of events and falsify alibis, thus discrediting witnesses while empowering third parties with a vested interest in the case to derail the investigations. It is for this reason that the intention of this document is to principally make reference to public sources. We still use evidence, that has, by now, been leaked and widely published by the media, or that corresponds to investigations which support prior indictment by the District Attorney’s Office, and which have been made public in trial. 13

I conclude this preface by demanding truth and justice for Colombia in the case of Álvaro Gómez Hurtado. Álvaro Gómez Hurtado’s team of collective attorneys (a Democracy and Freedom Foundation initiative) assumes entire responsibility for the analyses, judgment, and conclusions contained in this paper. I reiterate my tenet: after so many years of investigation failure, this case and the fresh evidence deserves to be reviewed technically, transparently and candidly by the Office of the Attorney General.

II.

PRECEDENTS OF A POLITICAL ASSASSINATION

“The Regime smelled danger when it became aware that important public figures had raised their voices against President Samper. The Regime is endeavoring set its own public opinion among those who are offensively named “the President’s friends”, thus it was able to prevent the President’s fall. The Regime has however, been unable to destroy the belief that he will not remain in office”. NUEVO SIGLO Editorial, 17th October 1995. “This country’s capacity for tolerance cannot be endless. Álvaro Gómez’s political assassination is the ultimate manifestation of the degree of dissolution we have reached. If this murder does not cause a reaction form our institutions that is both consistent and energetic; and if the Head of State does not behave in a way that the people demand, then the violent, murky factions in this country will have won a decisive battle”. This was the final paragraph of Enrique Santos’s weekly column in El Tiempo following Álvaro Gómez’s assassination. Three years later, the then President Andrés Pastrana affirmed that, “Colombia will not be able to compensate for the loss of Álvaro Gómez and will not be able to honor him as he deserves. That is, not until the truth about his martyrdom is discovered and his murderers punished. We all prey that this will happen soon.9 Other claims against impunity have arisen from that day, 2 nd November 1995, when hired assassins killed Gómez Hurtado, who was returning home after giving a lecture at university. Fifteen years on, the same claim can be made, as well as many other acrimonious statements with no change to the institutional disinterest, concealment, and deceit. Undoubtedly, on that fateful November day, the mafia struck Colombian society one of the hardest blows ever received; not only by assassinating one of the best equipped leaders to challenge the establishment, but also by making sure that their impunity prevailed as the years

PASTRANA ARANGO, Andrés, Third Anniversary, Movimiento de Salvacion Nacional (Movment for National Salvation), 1998, p. 14.

passed by. Even fifteen years after the assassination the “decisive battle” seems to have been won by those of our compatriots who are willing to resort to violence. This battle has been a tough and unfair process for the peaceful and law-abiding citizens. How can Colombian society face an enemy that is armed, an enemy thirsty for political power, with an insatiable appetite for corruption and damage? How do we confront these criminal organizations that have penetrated our State institutions with the purpose of being able to increase their levels of criminality while evading prosecution? How do we tackle the mafia? One of the few weapons society has is its capacity to remember. The process of forgetting, which irresponsibly covers up a large number of crimes perpetrated in Colombia, is perhaps the greatest advantage the mafia has in its endeavor to gain impunity. In juxtaposition, it is one of the greatest disadvantages for civil society in their struggle to prevent criminality. It is possible that Álvaro Gómez himself believed in society’s capacity to remember as one of the few and more efficient weapons against crime and violence. This belief alone can explain the significance of a single sentence, one which flowed from his pen and to this very day does not cease to move Colombians: “As is my luck, perhaps being cut down by a burst of machine gun fire should not be considered as an extraordinary misfortune. Maybe it would not be a ‘bel morir’, but given the country’s current situation and global status it would not be a sacrifice made in vein”. One essential purpose of this first chapter is to remind a society about historical incidents that bewilder them. As painful as this may be, it is necessary to explain, contextualize and above all remain indignant about these legitimate claims in order that justice prevails. We must remember. Álvaro’s last dilemma: The Samper Administration, victim or agent of the regime? Sunday 29th May 1994, Ernesto Samper beat Andres Pastrana in the first round of the presidential election with a difference of only 18,439 votes (2,623,210 for Samper and 2,604,771 for Pastrana). It was announced that Noemi Sanin would stand as the conservative candidate. The second round produced an inevitable result: Pastrana was to win as the polls had predicted in early June10. As was recorded by the press at that time, the Liberal campaign suffered a kind of anguish and seriously feared loosing the election. In order to win the second round Samper’s campaign needed to “step up a gear”. The gear was duly stepped up.

EL NUEVO SIGLO, 11th June 1994 issue, p. 7

On 16th June 1994, only four days before the second round of the election, the candidate Andres Pastrana requested a meeting with the President of the Republic, César Gaviria Trujillo. In Palacio (the President’s residents), Pastrana handed the President several cassettes that recorded conversations held between Alberto Giraldo and Miguel Rodríguez Orejuela. In these recordings the Cali Cartel boss conversed with his friend about the money that was to be given to Ernesto Samper to win the election. These tapes proved that incriminating mafia contributions of in excess of three billion Colombian pesos (currency of the time) were given to the Samper campaign. The next day the President sent those recordings to the Office of the Attorney General. Presidential candidate Pastrana abstained from providing the press with copies of the recordings before Election Day. Sunday 21st, Ernesto Samper won the election with 3,733,366 votes; 150 thousand more than his opponent, Andres Pastrana. The very next day the national television news channel 24 Horas11 surprised the country with the “narco-cassettes” revelation. By Tuesday the national press was printing nothing else. Unfortunately, the consequences for the President-elect were not as adverse as expected. On the contrary, since the revelation had come from the defeated candidate, the narco-cassettes were seen as a way of slandering Samper, orchestrated by the “bad looser” Andres Pastrana. Samper claimed that material had been tampered with. Officials working for the U.S. Department of State, speaking on behalf of the Federal Government, assured the President-elect and some of his cabinet members that in fact the mafia had indeed played a fundamental role in funding their campaign. 12 The U.S. government toughened their position and shortly afterwards threatened to “veto” Colombia altogether. 13 Instead of rejecting the President-elect, Colombia experienced a cathartic feeling of nationalism and indignation provoked by the U.S. threats. The narco-recordings were once again perceived as fraudulent material edited by the sore looser Andres Pastrana and exacerbated by an intrusive U.S. Government. President Samper took office on 7th August 1994. He named a mostly Liberal cabinet, although it was not exempt from conservative representation: Alvaro’s followers Daniel Mazuera Gómez,14 Maria Sol Navia, and Rodrigo Marin Bernal.15 Could anyone really have said that 11

News channel owned by the Gómez Hurtado family. VARGAS, LESMES Y TELLEZ, El Presidente que se iba a caer (The President was about to fall), Planeta p.44 & 45 13 EL NUEVO SIGLO, 15th July 1994, p. 2A 14 Álvaro Gomez Hurtado’s nephew 15 Rodrigo Marín was an outstanding Conservative Leader and a follower of Alvaro in the Department of Caldas. 12

Alvaro’s interests were not represented? It was a cunning move by President Samper to divide the historic boundaries of Conservatism before the Government. Álvaro Gómez Hurtado stated in EL NUEVO SIGLO on 7th August that “whenever there is a new Head of State the people have increased hopes and expectations. There is no reason for denying them the new President”.16 Enthusiastic about the new Administration, the nation seemed to be willing to forget about the “narco-recordings” scandal and believed in the new President’s good faith. The same sentiment could be seen in Álvaro Gómez’s attitude, since his editorials condemned U.S. meddling. He showed his solidarity with the recently elected Administration, in which one of his nephews (Mazuera Gómez), a former political ally (Marín Bernal), and a close fiend (María Sol Navia) held Cabinet positions. As will be explained in the following pages, Gómez Hurtado’s editorial position remained prudent and he showed solitary with Ernesto Samper’s Government during the last half of 1994 and the beginning of 1995. Only one week after the new Administration took office, the Attorney General, Gustavo de Greiff found no basis for continuing with the “narco-cassettes”17 investigation. The narcorecordings now resembled like a faint stain and were only remembered by uncomfortable and occasional incidents. One of which happened in September of the same year when Juan Jairo Rodríguez, a Police Officer dismissed by order of the Director of Police, left his Chief’s office yelling “the Cali Cartel forced me out”.18 Another awkward incident was when the retiring DEA Director in Colombia Joe Toft stated in October that Colombia was ruled by a “narcodemocracy”.19 The Government’s response was the announcement that reckless DEA staff who tried to attack national dignity during an interview would be subject to “limits and controls”. Álvaro Gómez himself, from the pages of EL NUEVO SIGLO challenged Joe Toft and invited the Colombian Government to “reconsider bilateral relations with the United States” by not discussing the topic of drugs. He affirmed that, “it becomes impossible to manage international policies if you have to provide explanations every eight days”.20 Other topics of concern on the national agenda were, the eventual negotiation with the guerrillas and the “minimum dose”, which was being discussed by the Constitutional Court. As 16

EL NUEVO SIGLO, 7th August 1884 p. 2A VARGAS. LESMES Y TELLEZ, Operador. cit. p. 59 18 VARGAS LESMES Y TELLEZ, Operador. cit. p. 69 19 st EL NUEVO SIGLO, 1 October 1994 issue. First page and editorial 20 Ibid. 17

a senator I, affirmed on 15th November that “one hundred days was a short time to be able to judge whether the Samper Administration was good or bad”.21 It was the beginning of 1995, and the only thing that seemed to eclipse the Government’s success was the steadily deteriorating relationship with the U.S. Government. No one spoke of the “narco-recordings” and there was solidarity with Samper who was “persecuted by the Gringos”. U.S. Government officials constantly made tough statements; at the end of January the U.S. Ambassador Myles Frechette announced, “the Government is not fighting drug trafficking”.22 Álvaro Gómez, incensed, countered such statements with, “what else does he want Colombia to do?” and branded the ambassador’s words “untimely”.23 At the beginning of February, Cambio 16 published the Cali Cartel’s accountant Guillermo Palomari’s scandalous story; he listed a large number of Samper’s politicians as direct mafia beneficiaries.24 Despite such blatant truths, the public reacted similarly to the way it had during the narco-recordings; people just did not seem to appreciate how serious the matter was. Ironically, the wave of outrage against U.S. Government “interference” increased. Carlos Lleras de la Fuente, Colombian Ambassador in Washington, reacted with anger to Frechette’s assertions. EL NUEVO SIGLO’s editors shared exactly the same view. The former Chancellor Diego Uribe Vargas stated that the North American “big stick policy” had returned. In a gesture without precedent, Alvaro Gómez called Frechette a “persona non grata”, and wrote in editorial “we are united against North American aggression”. He called on Colombians to support Ernesto Samper’s Administration in order to demonstrate that their country was stalwartly fighting the mafia.25 Behind the scenes the atmosphere was tense: worried intelligence officers called the then Minister of Defense, Fernando Botero Zea to advise him of Elizabeth Montoya de Sarria’s constant contact with several mafia groups. She assured them that she was the best possible link between them and “Ernestico”, referring to the President.26 SEMANA magazine began to be critical of the Administration specifically due to Cambio 16’s revelations regarding Guillermo Palomari, a man showed up in the Director of SEMANA’s office and assured him that media was jeopardizing peace efforts between the Government and the mafia. According to him the 21

EL NUEVO SIGLO, 31st January 1995 issue, p.3 VARGAS, LESMES Y TELLEZ, Op. Cit. p. 119 23 EL NUEVO SIGLO, 31st January 1995 issue, p. 3 24 VARGAS, LESMES Y TELLEZ, Op. cit. p. 112 25 EL NUEVO SIGLO, 20th February 1995 issue, p 3 26 VARGAS, LESMES Y TELLEZ, Op. Cit. p. 123 22

Government had informed drug traffickers that SEMANA magazine and the District Attorney’s Office were the two institutions that were putting agreements at risk.27 After a lot of hard work, Colombia was awarded a Conditional Certification from the U.S. Government. The following day, 2nd March 1995, the Colombian Government captured Gilberto Rodríguez Orejuela. A few days later it was public knowledge that that Miguel Rodríguez was able to move freely around Cali, since he had been seen at a notary public.28 The two contradicting facts mentioned above caused an atmosphere of mistrust around the potential pantomime act the Administration and the Cali Cartel were playing. Due to the continuous chain of “small incidents” creating links between the Government and various mafia organizations, the public began to recall the infamous “narco-recordings”. The former Minister of Justice, Enrique Parejo González, made some hard-hitting statements to the press that questioned why the District Attorney’s Office had disregarded the narco-cassettes29. A few days later, on 20th April, the District Attorney’s Office apprehended the well-known Samper sympathizing politician Eduardo Mestre, claiming his association with drug traffickers. As had been recorded in the press at the time, Mestre’s relationship with Rodríguez Orejuela dated back to the Eighties.30 The day after Mestre was captured the Attorney General, Alfonso Valdivieso, announced that in view of Guillermo Palomari’s documents he would open an investigation that involved nine of Samper’s associates, (including Alberto Santofimio). The comptroller David Turbay would also be under investigation, and Santiago Medina, former campaign Treasurer of the “Samper Presidency” would be required to testify. Meanwhile, in an act that had not been head of since the times of censorship during the Dictatorship, officials of the Presidency of the Republic broke into the SEMANA magazine’s offices in order to review article that detailed more cases linking the Government with drug traffickers.31 From EL NUEVO SIGLO’s publishing house, Alvaro Gómez Hurtado denounced the “regime” claiming it was necessary for change, and concluding that President Ernesto Samper was a simple prisoner who was trapped by ‘others’’ interests. Gómez attacked neither the Administration nor the President. He criticized only an amorphous establishment where Samper appeared almost as a victim. Other than this, Gómez Hurtado was still troubled by the North American position, and insisted on the fact that anti-drug policy had been without doubt 27

VARGAS, LESMES Y TELLEZ, Op. Cit. p. 136 EL NUEVO SIGLO, 2nd April 1995 issue. First page 29 EL NUEVO SIGLO, 5th April 1995 issue, p. 14A 30 VARGAS, LESMES Y TELLEZ, Op. Cit. p. 198 31 EL NUEVO SIGLO, 5th April1995 issue, p. 14A 28

managed erroneously, thus claiming solidarity with the Government’s international policy. Early in May 1995 EL NUEVO SIGLO’s editors congratulated Chancellor Pardo García-Peña for having “finally retackled” the U.S. Government.32 Several days later, the President proposed a constitutional reform in order to implement a unicameral system in Colombia. This was perhaps the first of many smoke screens raised to conceal the problem of narco-funding, the idea being expressed in the pages of EL NUEVO SIGLO, calling it a “pretext for something big.”33 Sections of the media, those under the influence of Gómez Hurtado (the 24 Horas News Channel and EL NUEVO SIGLO Newspaper) clearly reflected solidarity with Samper’s Government in their editorial lines. Samper himself was portrayed as the victim of a fallacious anti-drugs policy imposed by the United States. This editorial line was in complete juxtaposition with other media groups for example, SEMANA, Noticiero Q.A.P., CAMBIO 16, and LA PRENSA, all of which, day after day, increased their level of vitriolic criticism against the Government. “When I personally had the opportunity to discuss the situation with Alvaro – recollects my son, his nephew, Enrique Gómez Martínez and by this time his trusted employee – I recall that several circumstances explained the candid editorial line that was taken during the Administration’s early days: Samper belonged to a well known family from Bogotá, with which our family had, in the past, had an affable relationship. This was the very reason that Alvaro had doubts as to whether President Samper could have lent himself to illegal campaign funding. It was his opinion, and he later wrote this in his editorials, that Ernesto Samper was trapped by the so-called “regime”: a mixture of political, private and sometimes criminal interests, coexisting together in, and exploiting the Colombian State… [H]e thought the “regime” was so powerful that the President was merely circumstantial, almost accidental. Due to the fondness that existed between Daniel Mazuera and Ernesto Samper, my cousin Daniel Mazuera Gómez had been wisely appointed Minister: a gesture from the Administration towards my family… I am also aware that Alvaro was rather offended by the tone, scope, and extent of media attention the U.S. Department of State had used to pose doubts as to Samper’s Campaign funding. Alvaro had been Ambassador in Washington, had been exposed to and fought directly against the North American staff’s prejudices towards Colombia. He, together with my father, had for many years criticized the criminalization of drug trafficking as the only social response to the drug problem”.34

EL NUEVO SIGLO, 5th May 1995 issue, p. 3A EL NUEVO SIGLO, 15th May 1995 issue, p. 3 A 34 GOMEZ MARTINEZ Enrique, unpublished document. 33

In June, serious evidence added to that already existing, which indicated that the Government was engaged in a criminal liaison with the mafia. The Supreme Court announced that an investigation would be opened reviewing the Inspector General, Orlando Vásquez’s relationship with the Cali Cartel. At the same time, former Mayor of Barranquilla, Bernardo Hoyos, informed the media that he had met with “Pacho” Herrera and the Rodríguez Orejuela brothers, who had shown him copies of checks in excess of fifteen million Colombian pesos that had been given to Samper’s campaign.35 The Government suddenly proposed the possibility of demilitarizing certain territory in order to begin talks with the guerrilla. This possibility briefly averted the public’s attention from the narco-scandal, but not necessarily in the Government’s favor due to the Military publicly speaking out against the proposal. Samper’s response from Cartagena was, “I am in charge here”.36 Alvaro Gómez was of the opinion that the Government’s tactic was an unwise smoke screen, which directly conflicted with the conservative principles he defended. The aforementioned events continuously troubled Alvaro Gómez. His position, as far as the media was concerned, had, up to this point been somehow “neutral”; this was at a time when taking a particular editorial stance affected the Government’s credibility. “Our discussion [between Alvaro and me] – his nephew recalls - was no longer based on whether Cartel money had entered the campaign; this had become evident for us and a large section of the public. The discussion now centered around trying to determine whether Ernesto Samper was a long term mafia strategy, intended to allow them to usurp power, secure a no extradition policy, and protect their legalized capital; or was he, on the contrary, a victim of circumstance, betrayed by his campaign subordinates.”37 June and July passed, not without their share of incidents, during which time the media continued to animadvert upon the “Samper for President” campaign. The relationship between Alvaro Gómez and the Administration was slowly worsening as Gómez kept discovering moreand-more factual reasons to refute his “prisoner of the regime” hypothesis. Gómez, who had been advising the Government on certain matters that were of personal interest to him, such as justice reform, and Police decentralization, slowly put an end to these liaisons. Minister of Defense Fernando Botero, who was one of the main interlocutors between the Government and Alvaro Gómez, stated in mid 1995 that the bridge between the two parties was showing signs of weakness.

EL NUEVO SIGLO, 22nd June 1995 issue, p. 8 A VARGAS, LESMES & TELLEZ, Op. cit. P. 238 37 GOMEZ MARTINEZ Enrique, unpublished document 36

During the month of June there were an astounding number of mafia members who voluntarily turned themselves in and who were captured by the authorities. Giberto Rodríguez was captured non-violently in Cali (9th June), Tulio Enrique Murcillo, gave himself up (12 th June), and Henry Loaiza who was seventh in command of the Cali Cartel and also known as “El Alacrán” and surrendered on 20th June. Following suit, only five days later (25th June), Victor Patiño Fómeque also surrendered to the authorities. July had barely started when José Santacruz Londoño was arrested while having lunch in a restaurant in Bogotá (4 th July). Four days later Phanor Arizabaleta, fifth in command of the Cali Cartel, turned himself in. “After such a dumbfounding number of arrests – stated my son Enrique Gómez Martínez – I clearly remember a meeting with Alvaro where we laughed about the fact that the Government no longer had to be embarrassed about its charade of persecution against the Cali Cartel. We recalled that less than a week ago the Director of the DAS, Ramiro Bejarano, had been ridiculed by the entire country for announcing Phanor Arizabaleta’s arrest, when the man who had actually been captured was a common thief who simply physically resembled the man fifth in change of the Cali Cartel. Two days after our jovial conversation we learned of the astonishing news that Phanor Arizabaleta’s had turned himself in by walking all the way to the DAS. This was such a shock Alvaro that he called my mobile phone to tell me the news. During my colloquies with Alvaro I felt something in him had changed; his position towards Samper had transformed and it was clear he now had a highly salient degree of cynicism.38 Wednesday 26th July, the District Attorney’s Office arrested Santiago Medina, former Treasurer of the “Samper for President” campaign. Medina was on his way to DAS offices in a CTI car when he received a phone call from the Minister of the Interior, Horacio Serpa, who tried to comfort him with the words, “Santiago, don’t worry, we are with you”. The President is rather concerned and we are going to do all we can to get you out of this problem. “I don’t believe anything you people say anymore”, Medina replied. “And you can tell the President that my loyalty ends when I take my first step up stairs of the District Attorney’s Office”.39 According to Medina himself, and following President Samper’s orders, the DAS Director, Ramiro Bejarano, contacted him, endeavoring to persuade him not to talk.40 Medina confirmed that, “DAS Director, Ramiro Bejarano, visited me in jail and asked the security guard not to record his admittance. [He told me] Nothing would be gained from dirtying others’ reputations. It would be far easier for me to go to jail… and then the legal means necessary for my release would be 38

GOMEZ MARTINEZ, Enrique, unpublished document. VARGAS, LESMES Y TELLEZ, Op. cit. P 263 40 VARGAS, LESMES Y TELLEZ, Op. cit. P. 268 39

found”…41 With little tact, Bejarano warned me that the treatment I would receive, along with the preservation of my personal integrity would depend on my handling of the situation from this moment onward”.42 Ernesto Samper’s former Treasurer was convinced, as he wrote in his book La verdad sobre las mentiras (The truth about the lies), that the Government wanted to kill him in order to prevent him from “singing”.43 Santiago Medina had however, sent the President through the Minister of the Interior and the DAS Director a clear message that he planned to speak openly and candidly with the legal authorities. The day after Medina was arrested, EL NUEVO SIGLO predicted the start of a major scandal, and by no means took a position of solidarity with the Government in their article entitled “Thunderbirds”.44 On the very same day Ernesto Samper appeared on television affirming, “any funds that were secured (from drug trafficking) would have been so without my knowledge”. 45 This statement alerted those close to the President, such as Fernando Botero, and Medina himself, who were aware of campaign affairs, that he was now insinuating, “if anything happened it was them, not me”. Friday 28th July 1995, two days after his arrest, and despite Serpa and Bejarano’s efforts to prevent Santiago Medina from speaking out, he told the District Attorneys that several thousands of millions provided by the mafia had funded Ernesto Samper’s campaign. The presidential candidate was fully aware of this fact, as were his closest advisers, naming among others, Horacio Serpa and Fernando Botero Zea. Medina went even further and stated that President Samper had had a close association with the mafia for an extended period of time. He spoke about what he called the “the peaceful agreement” whereby from 1993 the Cali Cartel and Ernesto Samper had agreed to embark upon a joint political venture. 46 He added that Samper was extremely close to the Rodríguez Orejuela bothers, and had been since the Eighties.47 This statement, in addition to the wave of “narco-evidence”, had the ability to jeopardize the Government’s stability, although it was not yet known publically or by the press, only by the judicial authorities. The President and his closest advisers were aware that in view of the

EL NUEVO SIGLO, 3rd August 1995 issue, p. 12 MEDINA, Santiago, La Verdad sobre las mentiras. Endogeno. Planeta, 1997. p. 176 43 MEDINA, Santiago, La Verdad sobre las mentiras, Ed. Planeta, 1997, p. 172 & 173 44 EL NUEVO SIGLO, 27th July 1995 issue. p. 3 45 VARGAS, LESMES & TELLEZ, Op. cit. P 266 46 th Santiago Medina’s testimony, widely published by newspapers and given on 26 July 1995. Available in print or online. 47 ibid. 42

messages Medina had sent Samper through Bejarano and Serpa, they too could not expect a positive outcome from his testimony. The Government played its final card in trying to persuade Santiago Medina to keep quiet, or to retract whatever statement he had made already. According to several statements made by Santiago Medina, on Saturday 29th July 1995, Ignacio Londoño Zabala48 arrived with a message from the Executive. He came, Medina wrote, “with the purpose of convincing me to retract whatever I had stated during the inquiry… Londoño insisted upon this during the entire Saturday. His argument was that the country would be in pieces if the true facts were known… If I retracted, he assured me that after one year in prison they would make all necessary arrangements for the Department of Justice to secure my release.49 Medina however, held firm and told Londoño Zabala that he would by no means retract his statement. On the same day, in an action that betrayed Samper’s fear of Medina’s testimony, the Government transferred Victor Patiño Fómeque50 from the Palmira to the Modelo Prison; a move that was designed to persuade Medina keep quiet.51 This plan was, however, as unsuccessful as the last.52 The highest echelons of Government were crippled by anguish and mistrust. Medina’s revelation was to cause public amazement and outrage. On Sunday 30 th July at Hato Grande, a presidential residence, Samper and his closest allies discussed what course of action to take in view of Medina’s confession. Amongst others, Fernando Botero, Horacio Serpa, Juan Manuel Turbay, Juan Fernando Cristo, Alvaro Benedetti, Jacquin Strouss, and Ignacio Londoño Zabala, were all in attendance.53 Although not in an official capacity, Ignacio Londoño’s presence was necessary due to his position as “mediator” between the Government and “other factions”. Before this last scandalous escapade, when the former treasurer to the presidential campaign admitted that Samper’s Government had accepted narco-funding and publicly condemned pressure from top Government staff (Serpa and Bejarano) to keep quiet, Alvaro Gómez Hurtado had convinced himself that the Government was no naïve prisoner manacled by a corrupt regime. They were, on the contrary, one of its main agents. Gómez concluded there was no other solution but to orchestrate a political crisis. 48

Ignacio Londoño Zabala, also known as Nacho, known by police authorities as the “mafia attorney”. He was allegedly responsible for handling Police, Prosecution, the Courts, and Congress’ corruption on behalf of the Cali and Norte del Valle Cartels. 49 MEDINA, Op. cit, p. 195 50 Member of the Cali Drug Cartel closely related to the Norte del Valle Cartel. 51 EL NUEVO SIGLO, August 8, 1995 issue, p.3 B 52 MEDINA, Op. cit. P. 197 53 VARGAS, LESMES & TELLEZ Op. cit p. 279 and MEDINA Op. cit p. 189

It became evident to Alvaro Gómez Hurtado that, even before 31 st December 1994, there existed some form of secret agreement between Samper and the Cali Cartel. An agreement that would allow the cartel bosses to give themselves up in exchange for extremely lenient prison sentences. Gómez Hurtado was also privy to evidence that revealed the President intended to make some arrangements in order to be one step ahead of the U.S. Department of Justice’s case against the “Cali Four”. Former Attorney General De Greiff had, before leaving this position, taken several steps to achieve this goal. When this became evident to Gómez Hurtado he intimately regretted his glorification of the attorney upon his resignation. According to Enrique Gómez Martínez a growing feeling of betrayal spurred Gómez Hurtado into reemerging from retirement and to lead a major political offensive with the intention of provoking Samper’s resignation. “Insofar as the worsening of the political crisis54”, said Fernando Botero Zea in a statement given to the District Attorney regarding the investigation of Alvaro Gómez Hurtado’s political assassination, on 12th June 2007; “such meetings (the meetings he had been holding with Alvaro Gómez) became more difficult and less frequent. News published by his media outlets about Presidential Campaign funding in 1994 politically distanced Gómez, progressively further from the Government, until the meetings ended altogether. All communication between Gómez and me desisted. I was perfectly aware of what was going on, and after a couple of unanswered telephone calls I understood the political message, which I respected and accepted. I also informed President Samper of this fact, which concerned him a great deal as it meant loosing, through me, an informal link between the Administration and Gómez.55 Alvaro Gómez was now a member of the opposition.

THREE MONTHS OF TRYING TO “TOPPLE THE REGIME” From Monday 13th July 1995, and up to the day he was killed, Alvaro Gómez held his position behind his articles in EL NUEVO SIGLO. From here, he unremittingly attacked President Ernesto Samper’s remaining in office. That Monday, Horacio Serpa and Fernando Botero contradicted the entirety of Santiago Medina’s testimony, suggesting that if something untoward had taken place, the former Treasurer would be entirely, and single-handedly culpable. Statements were based on Medina’s testimony, which was strictly confidential, thus there was no reason for the Government to have known about it. Why did the government have full access to documents 54

Please refer to statements made on 12 June 2007 and 9 June 2009. These were published by Semana magazine on 28 th July 2007 and 18 July 2009 accordingly, and can be found under investigation number 3209 undertaken by the Colombian Chamber of Representatives’ Prosecution Board. 55 BOTERO ZEA, Fernando. Statement given in Mexico on 12th June 2007.

that were under a gag order? The truth was even more disquieting; the media, had been informed directly by the District Attorney, that Santiago Medina’s testimony had been stolen during the night of Saturday 29th.56 On Monday 29th the EL NUEVO SIGLO editorial stated: “The Liberal election campaign having a double set of books has been disastrous for the President of the Republic… This will begin a long and extremely damaging inquisition… The political consequence and result of this problem could be the legitimizing of resistance against authority: something that has not happened since the fall of Rojas Pinilla. The Regime will solicitously endeavor to prevent the situation worsening… There will be expiatory scapegoating; however, considering a simple change of our main players, or appeasing sentences, will not provide our country with a moral way-out. The idea we so painfully and fearfully express: it is imperative we topple the regime in its entirety – in a final effort to secure the recovery of democracy”.57 The entire country soon became aware of the whole devastating tale of Santiago Medina’s testimony. This, as expected, caused a political earthquake. During the week of 2nd August the SEMANA magazine Director and several journalists, who led the press offensive to reveal the mysteries of the Proceso 8000, analyzed the new Alvaro Gómez editorial position and its implications; as is detailed in their book The President who is about to fall. “The first talk of the day in the magazine’s editorial room was Alvaro Gómez’s editorial in the EL NUEVO SIGLO Newspaper: “Colombia is suffering a shameful Watergate. Will the consequences be the same as in that historical drama? Will there be a logical end to this mess?”58 The editorial also stated: “Right now the legitimacy of the presidential election is under question. If a Congressman is proven to have been criminally involved they will loose their investiture. The same rules should apply to the Head of State if he has committed a crime… It seems as though Mr. Santiago Medina has risen from hell, a place to where he should return. He is now the sole demeritorious party in all the “behind the back” dealings of the former Presidential Candidate, and current incumbent’s campaign money. The worst has

EL NUEVO SIGLO, Tuesday 1 August 1995, p. 11 VARGAS, LESMES & TELLEZ, Op. cit. p. 282 58 VARGAS, LESMES & TELLEZ, Op. cit. p. 282 57

already taken place; nobody is paying attention to Mr. Medina, no one speaks to him, no one knows how he did business, and no one stood up for him”. 59 The editorial began with the fulminating headline, “We demand Serpa and Botero’s resignations.” Before noon, on 2nd August Fernando Botero Zea read his letter of resignation as Minister of Defense in front of a huge media crowd. However, neither the Minister of the Interior, Horacio Serpa, nor the DAS Director, Ramiro Bejarano, both seriously implicated in Medina’s testimony, resigned their from their posts. The following day, EL NUEVO SIGLO editorial posed the question, And Serpa? The article read as follows: “There are so many, and such grave occurrences taking place in the heart of the regime; the country has not witnessed a State crisis of this magnitude for many years. Yesterday, the Minister of Defense bade farewell to his post with a sentimental expression, committing suicide by setting himself on fire, while unexplainably, the Minister of the Interior, who refuses to burn, still stands firm… Besides, Mr. Serpa was the one who found the silver chalice, stolen during the friends’ reunion. This is the metaphor that best illustrates the whereabouts of Samper’s former Treasurer’s testimony: a document that the Minster of the Interior claimed to have received from an anonymous source. We journalists are not allowed to use anonymous sources to legitimize our evidence. How is it possible for a Minister to do so with impunity? Of course, for a regime that has fully lost the trust of the people, any intent to appear honest becomes doubtful… Medina, in his testimony asserts that, his Attorney, Minister Serpa, and the DAS Director pressured him to keep quiet… Furthermore, Medina states that he received a phone call from the Minister [Serpa] asking him not to talk. Serpa, the Attorney, and the DAS Director orchestrated a pernicious plot to prevent the former Treasurer from speaking out. Mr. Serpa has become an agent of concealment… Serpa’s presence in the Cabinet is an insult to national pride, a mockery of the legal system, and an unquestionable offense to the autonomy of public power and independence…”60 The Administration which was about to celebrate its first anniversary in power had to confront, what was, up until that point, the worse crisis it had faced. Exactly one day before its first anniversary, and what must have been of some comfort to the Government, the authorities 59 60

EL NUEVO SIGLO, 2nd August 1995 issue, p.3 EL NUEVO SIGLO, 5th August 1995 issue, p. 3

captured Miguel Rodríguez Orejuela. The media asked the recently captured Mafia boss whether the allegedly black (Ernesto Samper campaign) money scandal was true. He replied, “the President is an honest man”.61 Nonetheless, Alvaro Gómez did not abstain from rating 7 th August 1995 as a “Somber Anniversary”.62 Monday 7th August, SEMANA magazine revealed a scandalous conversations between, the then Presidential Candidate, Ernesto Samper and Elizabeth Montoya de Sarria, the wife of the man known as “Chucho” Sarria: a former policeman who was accused of earning more than fifteen billion Colombian pesos due his involvement in drug trafficking.63 In the recordings, Elizabeth Montoya de Sarria, a well-known intermediary between politicians and the Cali Cartel, had a risible conversation with Samper in which she informed him his wife would receive a ring, and that she needed to put him in contact with some friends of hers who were willing to contribute funds to his campaign.64 Ernesto Samper was unable to deny the conversation due to her perfectly identifiable voice, so he simply claimed, “our relationship originates from the close business friendship between Santiago Medina and Miss. de Sarria”. 65 During the afternoon and well into the night of 8th August my colleagues, Senators Jaime Arias Ramirez, Juan Camilo Restrepo Salazar, and Carlos Martínez Simahan, and I headed an arduous debate against the Government, demanding Minister Serpa’s immediate resignation. During the course of this debate, the Attorney General, Mr. Valdivieso, acknowledged, “there are indeed drug trafficking infiltrations within the Office of the Attorney General”.66 The opposition movement I led in the Senate was becoming another thorn in the side of the highest echelons of the Government. Mauricio Vargas, Director of SEMANA magazine, recalls a conversation he held during those days with the Chancellor Rodrigo Pardo García-Peña: “It is my opinion that you should start thinking about a special investigation, similar to the one that was set up after Escobar’s escape from prison”. Vargas was referring to a investigation of the President, “something that creates a political debate, where the opposition can vent their criticism; where the conduct of those involved are investigated, not only taking into consideration their juridical guilt, but also their political accountability”. The Chancellor interrupted, “You may be right, but within the Administration there are many who believe the 61

VARGAS, LESMES & TELLEZ, Op. cit. p. 305 El NUEVO SIGLO, 7th August 1995 issue, p. 3 A 63 EL NUEVO SIGLO, 8th August 1995 issue, p. 4 B 64 th Please see full transcription of the recordings in EL NUEVO SIGLO, 9 August 1995 issue, p. 2 B 65 EL NUEVO SIGLO, 9th August 1995 issue, First page 66 EL NUEVO SIGLO, 9th August 1995 issue, p. 6 62

President does not have to invent any type of special investigation for Enrique Gómez to screw him”.67 Samper announced he would submit his performance to the House of Representatives’ Accusations Commission, while at the same time holding meetings with different spheres of Colombian society; the purpose being to endeavor to form a “Unified National Government”.68 This was fundamentally a strategy to consolidate his stay in power. My brother Alvaro represented an extremely important political faction. Five years previously he had lead the National Salvation Movement, which held a prominent seat in the 1991 Constituent Assembly, and still held substantial representation in Congress and public support. However, given Alvaro Gómez’s position as a non-elected party, backing Samper’s “Unified National Government” would have meant giving valuable and highly significant support to executive power. Even with full knowledge of the implications, Gómez backed Samper’s proposal from the pages of EL NUEVO SIGLO, published on 11th August 1995: “Proposal for what? This gives the impression that a fictitious parapet is being built to make us support something we have no knowledge of… Our nation will join together to form a united citizens front. These will not be empty sentences spoken in ambiguous tones… It is not clear, however, whether this proposal applies to the whole Government and its institutions, or solely to the President and Minister of the Interior”.69 Andrés Pastrana Arango, for his part, had little enthusiasm. On referring to the notion of a unified Government he claimed that, “if money from drug trafficking was found to have entered my election campaign I would resign public life”.70 A few days later in a television address, Pastrana stated, “today we are not only facing a legal and political problem with no precedent. We are facing a very serious moral crisis… Convictions based on my own political career require me to be extremely respectful of the Presidential privilege. However, that does not prevent me from suggesting that… for the good of the Nation, he *the President+, in accordance with Article 194 of the National Constitution, should temporarily relieve himself of his duties”.71 As if Pastrana’s and Gómez Hurtado’s response to the government’s “call for unity” were not symbolic enough, on the morning of 13th August every newspaper published a letter signed by 67

VARGAS, LESMES & TELLEZ Or. cit. p 289 EL NUEVO SIGLO 9th August 1995 issue, p. 8 69 EL NUEVO SIGLO. 11th August 1995 issue, p. 3 70 EL NUEVO SIGLO, 12th August 1995 issue, p. 6 71 th PASTRANA ARANGO, Andrés, transcript of television address, published by EL NUEVO SIGLO, 18 August 1995 issue, p. 10. 68

over 100 journalists demanding President Samper’s resignation. Excerpts from the letter stated in no uncertain terms, “it is both necessary and urgent that all Colombians learn the truth about black money from drug trafficking rackets funding the previous Presidential campaign… The President of the Republic does not have the right to hide behind smoke screens when the Cali Cartel are suspected of blackmailing and publicly defending the Government”. 72 Just some of the hundred journalists signing the letter included, Alejandro Santos Rubiano, Vladimir Flórez “Vlado”, Alvaro Montoya “Al Fin”, Javier Darío Restrepo, Raúl Gutierrez, and Ricardo Galán. The following Tuesday, 15th August, the authorities arrested Fernando Botero Zea.73 From the Senate, Enrique Gómez Hurtado stated that not only Serpa, but also Ernesto Samper needed to resign. Horacio Serpa responded piquantly, “if you think the President is going to resign you can go to hell! Following the fervid debate in Congress on the morning of Wednesday 16 th EL NUEVO SIGLO editorial reacted with: “It is derisive and ludicrous that after loosing the Nation’s credibility and legitimacy the Head of State is still in office. It is impossible for him to stay in command and thus we must look for an exit strategy to this crisis. Our political history provides us with illustrative precedents to address this matter. When General Reyes found it was impossible for him to stay in power, he fled to Santa Marta from where he organized his own exile. Mr. Suárez, discreetly and humbly resigned from government. Alfonso López Pumarejo resigned from office and Congress elected Alberto Lleras Camargo to complete the rest of his term. General Rojas Pinilla traveled abroad and a Military junta assumed control of the Nation, allowing civil life and democracy to return. Such precedents explicitly manifest that Colombia has succeeded in overcoming presidential crises, and that when an incumbent looses credibility a dignified solution must be provided for them to resign from power. At the same time tumult must be averted as well as and changes to the normal political and constitutional proceedings of the Nation”.74 That same night, Ernesto Samper decreed a state of Civil Commotion in order to “to fight against the violence”.75 Alvaro interpreted this action as another Government “smoke screen”, employed in order to continue concealing the narco-scandal reality”.76

EL NUEVO SIGLO, 13th August 1995 issue, p. 7 EL NUEVO SIGLO, 16th August 1995 issue, first page 74 EL NUEVO SIGLO, 16th August 1995 issue, p.3 75 EL NUEVO SIGLO, 17th August 1995 issue, p. 9 76 GÓMEZ HURTADO, Enrique, unpublished document made available to the author. 73

The same week, Mauricio Vargas, Director of SEMANA magazine, received a death threat. Several days later it was confirmed that the threat came from a mobile phone that belonged to the Palacio de Nariño.77 Under Vargas’ leadership, SEMANA continued to be an excellent media source, which had, since the beginning of the year, revealed the hardest hitting narco-scandals that stained the Government’s reputation.78 The climate of violence and intimidation increased dramatically when the news was revealed about the murder of Horacio Serpa’s driver. This assassination took place while he was on his way to testify at the District Attorney’s Office.79 Statements that backed up Santiago Medina’s testimony piled in. Andrés Talero, former Consul in Miami, confirmed that several million pesos from the mafia had entered the campaign with Samper’s full knowledge.80 The President, however, continued to insist that if dirty money had paid for his campaign it had taken place without his knowledge. A claim to which I replied in a press conference, “if it did indeed happen without his knowledge then his incompetent leadership is highly dangerous”.81 As the hours elapsed the Government continued loosing political support. Both the Ambassador in London, and former Presidential Candidate Nohemi Sanin Posada resigned from office on 24th August. Juan Manuel Santos had already withdrawn his Governmental support in a column he published during the middle of the month.82 Several weeks later, Gloria Pachon de Galán, Luis Carlos Galán Sarmiento’s widow, resigned from her post in the Embassy in Paris. Former President Betancur did not wish to accept any replacement diplomats for those who had resigned one after the other.83 On 24th August 1995 EL NUEVO SIGLO’s editorial diagnosed the country’s political reality as follows: “Every day the revelations are becoming more murky… A torrent of muddy water is pouring. The Regime is drowning in this winter flood that is submerging Colombia in 77

VARGAS, LESMES & TELLEZ Or. cit. p. 315 Ingrid Betancourt, who was at the time Senator of the Republic, was also threatened due to her investigation that intended st to reveal the links between President Samper and the Colombian mafia. On 1 June 1996 she received a letter riddled with insults. It warned her that her children would pay for her actions. BETANCOURT, Ingrid La rabia en el corazón Editorial Grijalbo Ltda. Bogotá 2001. p. 214 79 BETANCOURT, Ingrid La rabia en el corazón Editorial Grijalbo Ltda. Bogotá 2001. p. 182 80 EL NUEVO SIGLO, 19th August 1995 issue. p. 11 81 EL NUEVO SIGLO, 20th August 1995 issue. p. 11 82 VARGAS, LESMES & TELLEZ Or. cit. p 318 83 EL NUEVO SIGLO, 28th August 1995 issue, p. 8 A 78

waste… It has been a continuous display of indecency where every type of falseness, blackmail, half-truths, and intention to deceive have been evident. A play cunningly directed by Minister Serpa who has assumed the unpleasant task of managing the subterfuge. It is loathsome to continue revealing the horrible details of the meaningless words and gifts that try to buy our affection… In view of such scandalous drudgery we must ask ourselves why they insist on prolonging the solution to a crisis – a crisis that perplexes Colombia and fills it with shame both at home and abroad”. 84 THE SHADOW OF THE MILITARY COUP September unfolded in a similar manner as August; with further testimonies and scandals every week, and even more pressure on Ernesto Samper to resign. With the pressure that was exerted by public opinion it was impossible to believe that the Government would be able to remain in power for much longer. Rumors of a coup d’état – almost all of which were diffused by the Government itself – were the cause of its most acute paranoia. Fernando Botero recalls that, “…the highest levels of Government, and President Samper in particular, were convinced that the most serious threat to its survival and integrity was posed by Mr. Alvaro Gómez Hurtado… It is clear to me that the DAS were keeping Mr. Gómez Hurtado under close surveillance: an order that came directly from President Samper. These security measures, somewhat weak at the beginning of the Administration’s term, increased at the same rate the country’s crisis… This intense surveillance focused on Mr. Gómez Hurtado’s public life and in particular everything that was published by EL NUEVO SIGLO. Mr. Samper carefully read the newspaper every day”.85 It was 6th September 1995, I was the harbinger of a large number of Congressmen who had signed the “Declaration for Decency”. In addition to demanding, once again, Samper’s resignation, we stated our indignation that the Congressmen close to Samper, Alberto Santofimio, and Carlos Espinosa Faccio-Lince, were willing to accuse the Attorney General of “conspiring against the Government”. It was their intention to involve him in a debate that was to be televised in congress regarding the investigations he was undertaking against several politicians who participated in the “Samper for President” campaign. “The Government is conspiring against the Attorney General”, I denounced.86 The following are some excerpts from this statement: 84

EL NUEVO SIGLO, 24th August 1995 issue, p. 3. BOTERO ZEA, Fernando, statement given in Mexico on 12th June 2007 and 9th June 2009. Published by Semana magazine on 28th July 2007 and 18th July 2009 respectively. They can also be found under investigation number 3209 undertaken by the Colombian Chamber of Representatives’ Prosecution Board. 86 EL NUEVO SIGLO, 7th September 1995 issue, p. 6 85

“We are witnessing the most abysmal Presidential crisis in the history of our democracy. Realizing the extent to which the current Head of State is marred has forced us to make this statement before the National Congress. It is our desire, that with our continued actions and vigilance all Colombians will learn the whole truth… We can recall from memory the examples of, Suárez, Reyes, López Pumarejo, and even Rojas Pinilla who, albeit a subsequently acknowledgement, patriotically opted for resignation instead of investigation - an investigation that would have destabilized the running of the country… It is now time to undertake a recovery of decency in politics. It is our intention that this be our contribution to Colombia. Signed by Congressmen: Enrique Gómez Hurtado, Fernando Tamayo, Efraín Cepeda, Teresa Viola, Eduardo Pizano, Plablo Victoria, Claudia Blum, Carlos Martínez, Santiago Castro, María Paulina Espinosa, Roberto Camacho, Jairo Clopatofsky, and others”.87 EL NUEVO SIGLO lended its complete support to the above statement in an editorial entitled “Urgent political and constitutional solution”.88 In late September, gunmen made an attempt on the life of the President’s lawyer Antonio José Cancino, leaving the country thoroughly discombobulated. The wave of violence increased and the previous attack was claimed by a new violent actor, the self-proclaimed “Dignity for Colombia”. During the morning of 2nd October, SEMANA magazine Director and other journalists were shocked when reading an EL NUEVO SIGLO editorial. Mauricio Vargas wrote, “To Gómez: it is difficult for Samper to maintain his innocence concerning the narco-funds received by his campaign because the Constitution itself provides that the Candidate is accountable for the organization of his own political accounts”.89 As the days went by, criticism became evermore vitriolic and Gómez’s editorials became darker; one of which, entitled The halo of Disaster included his statement, “no longer are there words to describe the state this country is in”.90 Several days later, General Luis Bernardo Urbina leaked tape recordings of Congressman Heyne Mogollón, who was assigned the task of investigating President Samper’s campaign scandal. He

EL NUEVO SIGLO, 7th September 1995 issue, p.6 EL NUEVO SIGLO, 8th September 1995 issue, p.3 89 VARGAS, LESMES & TELLEZ Or. cit. P. 345 90 EL NUEVO SIGLO, 3rd October 1995 issue, p. 3 88

could, quite clearly, be heard discussing the deviation of certain FINAGRO funds to aide his reelection in the costal city.91 In the course of his conversation, Mogollón said that he was going to “resolve many issues” with the President. The small amount of credibility that Mogollón had was destroyed completely, along with any serious possibility of an investigation into the President of the Chamber of Representatives. The Private Sector Committee, alarmed by the potential discredit Colombia would face internationally, called for control of public Government officials’ public statements, suggesting that they would jeopardize future exports.92 Representative committees of economic, political and military interests, as well as the public sector were all adverse to Samper remaining Head of State. Around mid October, retired Generals Samudio and Landazábal affirmed in different public statements that the President of the Republic was trembling in his office. Not because the Army would be orchestrating a coup d’état, but because of Government illegitimacy. “One of the legal ways for President Ernesto Samper Pizano to leave office would be if the Republic’s Congress were to elect a new Vice President who would in turn assume the Presidency. The President is shaking, but not because he can hear the sound of guns”, 93 concluded Landazábal. The Government began to spread vicious rumors detailing a plan that the North Americans, the “enemies of national peace” and some of the “oligarchs” were attempting to overthrow President Samper. Horacio Serpa gave hard-hitting statements to the press regarding this matter. “When I am asked if there is a conspiracy against the President and Head of State, I will reply affirmatively. When I am asked if the DEA is responsible, I say that sounds about right. I know full-well that at their social gatherings American Embassy staff discuss their presumptions and speculate as to whether the President will fall”.94 DAS Director, Ramiro Bejarano, went much further and asserted that conspirators were not “coffee-shop revolutionaries”, but those responsible for a plan that was “superlatively sophisticated… orchestrated by foreign interests mixed with national ones… and had a combination of objectives” in overturning the President.95 Samper himself, in a televised speech given on 26th September assured Colombians that an international plot was being mounted against him. A team of Samper’s Congressmen, headed by Carlos Alonso Lucio,96 echoed Government rumors regarding a putsch against President Samper, which was supposedly orchestrated principally by the U.S. Government. 91

EL NUEVO SIGLO, 5th October 1995 issue, first page. VARGAS, LESMES & TELLEZ Or. cit. P. 350. 93 EL NUEVO SIGLO, 11th October 1995 issue, p. 6 94 th SERPA URIBE, Horacio. Statements to the press, published by EL NUEVO SIGLO, 28 September 1995, p.9. 95 EL NUEVO SIGLO, 28th September 1995 issue, p. 9. 96 Congressman subsequently found to have a strong association with the mafia and drug cartels. 92

Rumors of a coup d’état, spread by the Government itself, raised a high degree of fear and paranoia among the mafia. According to Hernando Gómez Bustamante, also known as “Rasguño” who was, by that time, a powerful Norte del Valle Cartel leader, the possibility of a coup d’état gave the mafia the feeling of being surrounded and in serious danger. Rasguño said that the mafia outfits which were associated with the Government believed that, “Mr. Alvaro Gómez was, with the backing of military and Bogotá’s wealthy, promoting a coup d’état. ‘El Gordo’ [Samper] and Horacio [Horacio Serpa] sent a message with El Gordo [Ignacio Londoño] that we should do whatever it takes to stop Alvaro Gómez, because if there is a coup d’état they will arrest and extradite everyone. They are afraid that they will receive the same treatment as Noriega in Panamá”.97 Rasguño continued, and said that the mafia felt Alvaro Gómez was “a complete Gringo… He was complete Gringo and if he was given the chance, Colombia would be turned into an American Government farm, full of Gringos, and we’ll have nowhere to go”.98 Rasguño said that by that point, several mafia emissaries had been sent to speak with Alvaro Gómez with the purpose of buying his loyalty to the Government – or at least his neutrality. According to the Mafia boss, Gómez Hurtado in no way cooperated with these attempts. “It was impossible to get near to Mr. Alvaro. We tried every way possible to get close to him and ask him to keep quiet, but that man is very shrewd; he did not want to take any money or speak to anyone”.99 Gripped by mistrust, the Government called General Luis Bernardo Urbina to justify himself. He declared himself “a peaceful enemy of a corrupt Government”.100 The Government saw conspiracies and potential putsches from all sides, the Private Sector, the military, the DEA, opposition Congressmen and myriad sectors it named “conspis”. Fernando Botero claimed, by that time: “Mr. Alvaro Gómez posed a threat to Mr. Samper’s Administration for three reasons: Primarily, what the Government actually had in real terms, in the sense of a fragmented opposition with no clear leader, Mr. Alvaro Gómez had the ability to destroy overnight. He had the prominence and unquestionable leadership qualities to be able to project his image to the public and become the great opposition leader. No other political figure had the same capabilities. Secondly, because Mr. Alvaro Gómez had moved from his

GOMEZ BUSTAMENTE, Hernando. Statement given in Washington, 11 January 2010. th GOMEZ BUSTAMENTE, Hernando. Statement given in Washington, 11 January 2010. 99 th GOMEZ BUSTAMENTE, Hernando. Statement given in Washington, 11 January 2010. 100 VARGAS, LESMES & TELLEZ Or. cit. p. 354. 98

initial position of solidarity with the Government to a continuingly more distant position as details of the 1994 Presidential Campaign funding became public.101

The Government was, therefore, not dealing with a leader who had a premeditated and vindictive position, but a leader who developed a political stance as the 1994 campaign scandal became known. Finally, if we dare mention, Mr. Gómez’s ethical, political and intellectual weight had, by that point, gained him his highest point of political recognition in his entire career. He had been one of the great architects of the new political Constitution and had acquired the image of a Great Statesman on the Colombian political scene. In view of all the above, for the Government, Mr. Gómez Hurtado’s position as the political opposition, symbolized a huge change as well as an obvious political threat”.102 It is clear from media reports and testimonies given at the time, that by late 1995 several sectors of society no longer supported the Government, and were actively calling for President Ernesto Samper’s resignation. This would have, without doubt, generated great difficulties for the National Government. It neither inspired them to remain in power, nor to capitulate to the many resignation invitations. A serious and organized attempt to remove President Samper by the military and other opposition movements, has however, never been proven. Despite this, personnel speaking on behalf of Ernesto Samper insist that the Government was being “besieged” by conspirators whose tanks were expected to role into the Palacio de Nariño at any moment. Horacio Serpa and Carlos Alonso Lucio illustrate the behavior of the most extreme members of the Government. They gave several statements expressing the danger of the conspiracy that was being plotted,103 which subsequently created panic among several sectors of the mafia and was taken very seriously by Gómez Bustamante, also known as Rasguño. In 1996 Alfonso Gómez Méndez, a disciple of Ernesto Samper and the future Attorney General, based most of his investigation of Alvaro Gómez Hurtado’s political assassination on the fact

101

BOTERO ZEA, Fernando, Statement given in Mexico on 12th June 2007 and 9th June 2009. They were published by Semana magazine on 28th June 2007 and 18th July 2009. They can also be found under investigation number 3209 undertaken by the Colombian Chamber of Representatives’ Prosecution Board. 102 BOTERO ZEA, Fernando, Statement given in Mexico on 12th June 2007 and 9th June 2009. They were published by Semana magazine on 28th June 2007 and 18th July 2009. They can also be found under investigation number 3209 undertaken by the Colombian Chamber of Representatives’ Prosecution Board. 103 rd RONDEROS, Carlos. “Was there, or was there not a conspiracy against Samper?” El Tiempo, 23 March 2003. th “The 8000 Proceedings, Day by Day” Semana Magazine. 8 January 1998

that a coup d’état against the Government was indeed being planned. Such a claim will be detailed below and is in need of further analysis.104 A most important detail that should be emphasized is that the “conspiracy” claim came from, and was repeatedly promoted by, H. Serpa, S.A. Lucio, and A. Gómez Méndez, etc., who were all agents of the same Government. What proof did they ever have, and who exactly were these “conspirators”? Although there are myriad records detailing that distinguished members of society publicly demanded the President’s resignation, there is no actual proof that high-level businessmen, politicians or military personnel had at any time been planning to remove the President forcibly. However, a series of meetings held at an Oma coffee shop in Bogotá,105 did take place. They were attended by a group of retirees who had, in the past, held important positions of State, and were deemed by Alfonso Gómez Méndez as highly dangerous to Government stability.106 There is, however, no available evidence to confirm that the coffee shop gatherings attended by the Honorable Viíctor Mosquera Chaux, Hugo Mantilla, Diego Tovar Concha, Alvaro Uribe Rueda, and Felio Andrade were capable of evolving into a military operation on a scale that was large enough to depose the President of the Republic. Distinguished opposition to the Government, such as businessman Hernán Echavarría, General Bernardo Urbina, and Alvaro Gómez himself publicly encouraged social pressure with the deliberate purpose of provoking the President’s resignation. They categorically did not, as was previously stated, intend to stage a coup d’état, as can be understood by the absolute lack of evidence as proof.107

104

Please refer to the copy of El Tiempo, printed on 25 August 1996, containing information based on the following th information: The Second Criminal Court of the Specialized Circuit’s ruling on 25 March 2003 and found in file numbers JR th 6214, JR 6214 A; the Second Criminal Court of the Specialized Circuit’s file number JR 4152 B (20 May 2003), concerning the case brought against retired Colonel Bernado Ruiz Silva; Alvaro Gómez Hurtado’s nephew Enrique Gómez Hurtado’s statements th (9 June 2009), which can be found under investigation number 3209 undertaken by the Colombian Chamber of Representatives’ Prosecution Board. 105 th Mantilla, Hugo. Statement given on 30 April 1998, District Attorney’s Office 11 who presented evidence before Criminal th Law Judges of the Specialized Court in Bogotá (File 27212, Book 42, Page 200). Tovar Chocha, Diego, statement given on 4 May 1998, District Attorney’s Office 11 who presented evidence before Criminal Law Judges of the Specialized Court in Bogotá, nd (File 27212 Book 49, Page 360). Uribe Rueda, Alvaro, statement given on 2 June 1994, District Attorney’s Office 11 who presented evidence before Criminal Law Judges of the Specialized Court in Bogotá (File 27212, Book 43, Page 147). 106 th See the chapter regarding the Hunters hypothesis. Please refer to the copy of El Tiempo, printed on 25 August 1996, th containing information based on the following information: The Second Criminal Court of the Specialized Circuit’s ruling on 25 March 2003 and found in file numbers JR 6214, JR 6214 A; the Second Criminal Court of the Specialized Circuit’s file number JR th 4152 B (20 May 2003), concerning the case brought against retired Colonel Bernado Ruiz Silva. 107 th URBINA SANCHEZ, Bernardo, Statement given on 11 November 1998, District Attorney’s Office 11 who presented evidence before Criminal Law Judges of the Specialized Court in Bogotá (File 27212, Book 47, Page 103).

Alvaro and I did strive to obtain the resignation of a President who was an embarrassment to the dignity of the Republic. We were in the throes of a State crisis and thus it was impossible for Samper to continue in office. The Government was desperately seeking to promote different stories in order to distract public opinion. Just as Chávez is doing now, they resorted to the tired supposed North American intervention accusation, and as usual – also like Chávez – they seemed to have unraveled a conspiracy. It would have not been exceptional, if, given the situation, some people would think of forceful action as a solution; this was unnecessary however, as Samper had already fallen. Samper frequently talked about the “conspis”, in which I was included, as a way to undermine my intervention in Congress and other environments. All that changed when Alvaro was assassinated. A more serious issue capable of distracting public opinion had arisen. The prevaricated story of conspiracy began to gather pace, later championed by future Attorney General Gómez Méndez, which served, and continues to do so, as the shield of impunity. The investigation into the Samper’s campaign funding and the ignominious Proceso 8000 investigation to verify the legitimacy of these claims has, alas, never taken place. GÓMEZ’S LAST DARTS By mid October 1995, Alvaro Gómez was not only convinced that the Government was inevitably infiltrated by the mafia, a situation to which resignation was the only possible solution, but also that they were infiltrating his own media outlets, using a strategy employed by Samper’s followers, which looked to constantly use the media to its own advantage. Gómez Hurtado was surprised that the content of his own television news program 24 Horas did not reflect the harsh Government criticism he himself was leading from the pages of EL NUEVO SIGLO. In contrast to other media outlets such as Semana Magazine and Q.A.P., 24 Horas news did not greatly expose the Proceso 8000 scandal, and systematically abstained from broadcasting the narco-scandals staining the Government. Instead, the news was restricted to the advances in the legal proceedings. Alvaro Gómez decided to “retake” control of his news program and ordered that the meetings with journalist Raúl Gutiérrez, regarding the political editorial line, take place in his own home. The idea was to transmit the same message written in EL NUEVO SIGLO to the millions of prime time television news viewers. In his editorial, Gómez Hurtado, on 17th August, criticized the President for remaining in power in the following terms:

“A Government that needs to beg for forgiveness every day, and is the subject of new discoveries of illicit affairs, cannot have initiative, is unable to organize itself, is incapable of managing the economy, and cannot preserve its own dignity… These sad facts are clearly evident. We, for this reason, propose in front of the Colombian public that there is only one available option: that the Regime is toppled”. 108 The editorial on 23rd October read simply, “the President cannot stay. A country that is stagnant, each day showing signs of cracking has finally found a way out. We have repeated it over and over again: the Regime must go”.109 On 30th October the EL NUEVO SIGLO editorial stated: “The public has found its proof. Mr. Samper did indeed use narco-funds in his Presidential Campaign. He used them in vast quantities. They were spent voraciously, specifically to win the second round of voting so that he would finally win by a weak majority: a majority that could easily have been bought with his millions in illegal funding. This truth is the very reason the Regime we are suffering is illegitimate. It is for this reason we reiterate that the only valid political maneuver is to overthrow it”. 110 The same night Colombians saw Alvaro Gómez on the 24 Horas news program ingeminating what he had written in his EL NUEVO SIGLO editorial, “The President is not going to fall, but he cannot stay either”. Semana journalists, Mauricio Vargas, Jorge Lesmes, and Edgar Téllez, were all in agreement that, for Ernesto Samper, Alvaro Gómez had become the “most important and respected of his critics: the man who from the pages of EL NUEVO SIGLO had, before anyone else, dared to ask him to resign”.111 It was one thing for Alvaro Gómez to voice his opinion against Ernesto Samper in a newspaper with a mid-ranking circulation that was published only in Bogotá. It was however, very different for the former public official to use a prime time news program with the largest audience in the country to state his assertion that the President, “will not fall, but cannot stay”. In late in October 1995 Gómez Hurtado’s media position became extremely dangerous, threatening the President’s stay in office.

108

EL NUEVO SIGLO, 17th October 1995 issue, p. 3. EL NUEVO SIGLO, 23rd October 1995 issue, p. 3. 110 EL NUEVO SIGLO, 30th October 1995 issue, p. 3. 111 VARGAS, LESMES & TELLEZ Op. cit. p. 359. 109

On Tuesday 31st EL NUEVO SIGLO repeated an editorial that was written in the same vein as Monday’s. Alvaro Gómez Hurtado planned to repeat, each time with more intensity, his appearance on 24 Horas television news. We would never have imagined that on Thursday 2 nd November of that same week, now fifteen years ago, he would be assassinated by multiple gunmen while returning home after giving a lecture at the Universidad Sergio Arboleda.112

III.

DEVIATION AND CONCEALMENT

“The new Inspector is the very symbol of impunity” Alvaro Gómez Hurtado referring to Alfonso Gómez Méndez’s election to the post of Inspector General in 1989. SOLDIERS ERGO COUP D’ÉTAT: EVERYTHING RESOLVED Several hours after Alvaro Gómez’s homicide an anonymous call made to the National Police (number 112) definitively influenced the course of the investigation for years to come. A call was received from a supposed school bus driver reporting the presence of soldiers behaving suspiciously in a four-wheel drive vehicle (license plates LIW 003) in the vicinity of the Universidad Sergio Arboleda. This primary information was viewed as credible evidence when the license plates turned out to be from a military intelligence vehicle, being used by the Commander of the Military Cadets School, General Cifuentes. As will be demonstrated in further detail below, this weak clue, at the end of an anonymous call with no factual evidence, justified an investigation that endeavored to prove the existence of a coup d’état. This supposed reality, directly or indirectly, voluntarily or involuntarily somehow involved Gómez Hurtado, explaining his killing by turning the Government into the victim. Another anonymous call reported a different set of military intelligence vehicle license plates in the area, which only served to further derail and corrupt the investigation. The clear weakness of this evidence was made evident when the entire LIW-033 license plates hypothesis collapsed in trial. 112

A University in Bogotá that Alvaro Gómez Hurtado founded with Rodrigo Noguera Laborde.

The damage however, had already been done; the investigation had been successfully derailed and there was now a strong argument to ignore evidence and other conclusive leads that indicated a completely different investigation direction to the one the authorities were pursuing. Before meticulously analyzing the criminal hypothesis that was developed by the Office of the Attorney General, it is important that the reader takes into account that the infamous anonymous does not appear in the case file, but only as an unsigned transcription. Who made this transcription remains unknown. The District Attorney’s Office has never produced a recording of the call or summoned to court the operator who took the call. The multination manufacturer and operator of the 112 number stated during the case that there neither existed any recording of the sort, nor was it possible to change the electromagnetic registers. The phantom call literally appeared on the dossier as if by magic. Unfortunately this is not the only example of evidence appearing, disappearing or being ignored: most probably more by magicians than magic. THE SIGNS OF DISORDER AND NEGLIGENCE The complete lack of any form of methodology in the investigation has been the case’s defining feature from the very beginning. Supposed evidence and clues that were ‘found’, illogically and erratically thwarted the process; dozens of false leads were added to the file, which inevitably led absolutely nowhere. Finally, the few concrete facts that would allow for a conclusive and fair investigation were thoroughly buried under the avalanche of concocted evidence. The huge and extremely suspicious number of eyewitnesses interviewed completely contrasts with the weakness of the crime scene investigation. The report written was less than a page and a half long, the ballistic report produced was inconclusive and not properly investigated, as was the forensic evidence gathered. It is clear that the SIJIN investigators who were the first to crowd the crime scene (the District Attorney’s Office arrived three hours after the crime was committed) were not concerned with managing the crime scene or efficiently gathering evidence. This is regrettably (or intentionally regrettably) characteristic in the pattern of a political assassination. The crime scene after Luis Carlos Galán’s murder was (mis)managed in exactly the same way. 42

The District Attorney’s Office was in no way concerned about the legitimacy of the criminal investigation. For the first seventy-two hours, they focused their efforts on recording witness’ testimonies. Due to the speed and brutality of a violent murder like that of Gómez Hurtado’s this type of evidence is of minimal reliability, and can also fall fowl to false witnesses who seek to mislead the investigation. The lack of both concern and interest continues to be endemic within the District Attorney’s Office. The plaintiffs have recently tried, unsuccessfully to gain access to the criminal evidence (bullets, cases, videos of the crime scene, and other evidence gathered). Every shred of evidence has, however, mysteriously disappeared save the “videos of the crime scene” which, on being reviewed, were found to be ‘learn how to salsa dance’ and tropical music videos.113 When, together with my son Enrique (who is still representing the plaintiffs) questioned the District Attorney in charge of the case, Guillermo Mendoza Diago, about this situation, he calmly asserted that this was of no importance as “time distances us from the truth”, and little could be done about it now. As far as we know none of the staff working in the District Attorney’s Offices have ever been subject to an investigation for the loss of criminal evidence.114

1. Cover-up, derailment, and Attorney General Gómez Méndez’s preconceived certainties Who investigates the investigator? This is a logical question that arises when a known enemy of the victim is assigned the task of finding those responsible. The well-known animosity between Alvaro Gómez and the man responsible for the investigation of his assassination, Alfonso Gómez Méndez, went far beyond simple ideological differences. The hostility ran deeper than Gómez Méndez simply being a privileged member of the political sector, which Alvaro Gómez attacked fiercely in the last days of his life; Alfonso Gómez Méndez was forced to resign as Inspector General in 1989 due to Alvaro Gómez himself revealing various scandals in EL SIGLO

113

The DIJIN’s report (1 September 2010) on the content analysis of the video tape (number J2440823), which can be found in the original investigation, and their analysis within the District Attorney’s Office 20’s investigation number 61434, and also found in the Colombian Chamber of Representatives’ Prosecution Board’s investigation number 3209. 114 The plaintiffs for the Alvaro Gómez case wrote statements concerning the loss of evidence in the case, however it was only th on the 5 May 2011 that the National Director of the Colombian Attorney General confirmed that a copy of the documentation had been sent to the Office of Internal Affairs and Discipline in order to start an investigative process.

and his other media outlets. Gómez Méndez was branded a public disgrace and his associations with criminals and traffickers were revealed. In the same year, 1989, Alvaro Gómez insisted that – for ethical reasons – Inspector Gómez Méndez was unfit to continue in his position. His motives for this accusation were plentiful: in 1984 Gómez Méndez had acted as the Defense Attorney for Antonio Cebollero and Roberto Soto Pardo, the ring-leaders of the robbery where $13,5 million USD were stolen from the Republic of Colombia. The appropriated funds were deposited in the Chase Manhattan Bank, London.115 Moreover, in 1985, Alfonso Gómez defended Jaime Michelsen Uribe and was seriously incriminated, while acting as the controversial banker’s Defense Attorney. Alfonso Gómez was also a member of the new Code of Penal Procedures editing commission. When working on this project he included several hidden clauses in the procedures for the benefit of his client. Their inclusion meant that Michelsen was not required to appear personally in court. Gómez Méndez also added Jaime Humberto Ríos Rincón to his list of scandalous clients when, in 1987, he was indicted of having robbed many millions of pesos from the Medellin customs.116 Alfonso Gómez finished the decade as attorney for Germán Montoya who was President Barco’s confidant. He was requested by his client to sue all Congressmen who opposed him for libel; a task for which the government “rewarded” him by securing his promotion to the position of Inspector General. In March 1989, EL SIGLO ran an article entitled, An Official Ticket; it reacted to Gómez Méndez’s promotion with the following: “When the attorney to the President of the Republic’s Secretary was lavished with praise by being promoted to the position of Inspector General, public morality was struck a hard blow. It was such an unexpected event. The people are dumbfounded and trying to digest the significance of such a promotion. We must not forget that the man chosen to be the keeper of public morality, from today until an unknown time, was the same man who was given the task of suing all of those ministers for libel that had accused him in front of the House. The place where he could not go because he knew he could not defend himself. This Attorney [Gómez Méndez] did not hesitate in undertaking the awkward task of discussing his parliamentary colleagues’ privileges, because he was safe in the knowledge he would be adequately compensated, as he has evidently been”.117

115

EL NUEVO SIGLO, 15th March 1989 issue. th Litigator and legislator at the same time, EL TIEMPO, 13 March 1989 issue, p. 10 A. 117 th EL SIGLO, 13 March 1989 issue. 116

Alvaro’s followers in congress, as well as the social-conservatives were strongly critical of Gómez Méndez, and after fierce debate in late 1989 the solicitor resigned from office. The aforementioned precedent, which under any other circumstances would have been a clear reason to prevent an official from undertaking an investigation, was not taken into consideration by the Samper Administration. It was the Government’s task to provide the Court with three candidates who could investigate its well-known political enemy and public accuser, Alvaro Gómez Hurtado. It is important to acknowledge and remember the above anomaly since it provides a better understanding of the District Attorney’s Office’s huge amount of stumbling around and nonsensical actions that took place time and time again during the most important part of the “investigation”. This inquiry into the assassination of Alvaro Gómez took place between June 1997 and July 2001, a time in which Gómez Méndez held the position of Attorney General. Mr. Gómez Méndez was unable to decide who was actually responsible for the assassination. He accused three criminal gangs located in distinct parts of the country, all with different bosses, of having committed the same crime, (a topic which will be addressed in due course). He did however, discover the reason behind the political assassination itself: Ernesto Samper’s enemies’ objective to overthrow the Government. According to the District Attorney’s Office those soldiers who opposed the Government, led by General Urbina and Cornel Bernado Ruíz Silva, in conjunction with businessmen and members of the non-governmental opposition ordered Alvaro Gómez Hurtado’s assassination in order to make sure that President Ernesto Samper would definitively leave office. The District Attorney, before a judge uttered what he claimed were the intellectual reasons behind the crime: “They wanted the President’s resignation and didn’t care how they got it… The investigation concluded that ‘they’ including General Urbina, General Bedoya, and Colonel Ruíz, as could be expected, were dismissed from duty. President Samper was not going to allow those who showed they were not his friends to remain in the highest echelons of the military… The best way was to commit a crime that would produce a political result: the fall of Ernesto Samper… Mr. Alvaro Gómez’s homicide was a crime committed by the Army… Those responsible, members of the Armed Forces, had a clear motive”.118 118

Please refer to the ruling on 25 March 2003 by the Second Specialized Penal Court of Bogotá, pages 88, 93, and 89, which can be found in file numbers JR 6214, JR 6214 A, and JR 4152 B.

However, Attorney General Gómez Méndez did not reach such a definitive decision after analyzing the file and conducting the necessary investigation. Alfonso Gómez was convinced he knew who was intellectually responsible for Alvaro Gómez’s murder long before he had read the first page of the dossier. In the article he wrote for EL TIEMPO on 25th August 1996, almost one year before assuming the job of Attorney General, Alfonso Gómez stated the following: “It has been suggested… that this attempted coup d’état [against Samper], backed by civilians could have in some way been linked to the heinous crime committed against the former senator Alvaro Gómez… I cannot understand how this myriad speculation, with its information and accusations has not evoked intervention and a subsequent penal investigation by the Office of the Attorney General. It is fundamental to remember that the crime of conspiracy is envisaged in Article 130 of the Criminal Code and is realized when the felons agree to “commit the crime of sedition or instigating a rebellion”. One such form of instigating a rebellion, as stated in Article 125 of the aforementioned code, takes place when the use of firearms are intended to, among other purposes, overthrow the National Government. In order to investigate crimes of this nature there is no need for a lawsuit to be filed, and as such the notion of justice can and must start preliminary enquiries…”119 “If we follow this line of investigation, I will be the one who is found guilty of killing my brother”, I said ironically to the Attorney General. However, when the Attorney took office nearly a year later, he let his imagination run away with his preconceived ideas. It was for this reason that between 1887 and 1999 the District Attorney’s Office ardently interrogated people who admitted to being in opposition to Samper’s Administration. They were presumably expecting to uncover the sinister conspiracy movement; people who, drunk on the idea of overthrowing the President ordered the political assassination. The District Attorney’s Office catechized Hernán Echavarría Olózaga, Luis Carlos Sáchica, Felio Andrade, Diego Tovar Concha, María Paulina “Pum Pum” Espinoza, and many more politicians and former politicians who had vocalized their indignation at the Government’s association with the drug traffickers and were not Samper supporters. Despite these ‘qualifications’ none of the political figures investigated admitted to having orchestrated Alvaro Gómez Hurtado’s murder in an effort to overthrow the government.120

119 120

GOMEZ MENDEZ, Alfonso, published by El TIEMPO, 25 August 1996 issue, p. 12 th APULEYO MENDOZA, Plinio, published in EL ESPECTADOR, 14 November 1998 issue, p. 8 A.

Two characters in particular added the main fuel to the fire that was the District Attorney’s putsch hypothesis: Hugo Mantilla and Rommel Hurtado. The first, also known as “Crazy Mantilla” was an esteemed coffee-shop conspirator who did actually organize several meetings in order to discuss the lamentable Governmental situation. In attendance at these gatherings were distinguished retired civilians and several retired military personnel. A rumor that has never been confirmed stated that General Camilo Zúñiga was sent by the Government to attend one of these meetings to determine exactly how much of a threat they posed. Mantilla himself admitted that he, on one occasion, requested a meeting with the American Ambassador, Myles Frechette, to discuss the possibility of a coup d’état with the diplomat. Mr. Mantilla, a retired historian and director of the “Bucaramanga Bolivarian Academy of History” wanted to ‘size up’ the U.S. Government and find out their opinion regarding a proposed coup d’état organized by him. This plan however, was bordering on the ridiculous and it was treated as such by the Ambassador.121 Rommel Hurtado, a politician from Quindío who had been a supporter of Alvaro Gómez during the 1970’s and had later distanced himself from the politician because of various indiscretions,122 sent President Samper a document he had been anonymously delivered, entitled “Act of the Constituent Power”. The document content detailed the legal support required to legitimize a coup d’état against Samper’s Government. On 23 rd October 1998, after Rommel Hurtado had leaked the document to the media, the District Attorney’s Office undertook a mysterious raid on Hurtado’s home where the infamous document was ‘rediscovered’.123 This sequence of events raises many more doubts than it does answers: why was it this questionable politician from Quindío who had the document detailing the coup, and why did he decide to announce its existence? If the District’s Attorney’s thesis was true, the facts of the case would surely be as such: i) Hugo Mantilla summoned important businessmen, the U.S. Government, and the military in order to organize the coup; ii) the “Conspirators” wrote the document entitled the “Act of the Constituent Power” and had it delivered to Rommel Hurtado. Due to this the District Attorney’s Office could justifiably raid his home, finding the document, which was kept in the assassination file as documented evidence; iii) The military assassinated Gómez Hurtado for one of two

121

Mantilla, Hugo. Hugo Mantilla’s statement given on 27 May 1998, District Attorney’s Office 11 who presented evidence before Criminal Law Judges of the Specialized Court in Bogotá, (Book Number 43, Page 79 of Case File 27212). 122 “Los Golpistas” in SEMANA (14th December 1998) 123 “Los Documentos del Golpe” SEMANA (2nd August 1999)

possible reasons: either to create tension that would facilitate a coup d’état, or they wanted to punish him for his refusal to take part in their conspiracy. This thesis is confusing and difficult to comprehend. Fundamentally it is a somewhat embellished reality to attribute Hugo Mantilla, neither an important businessman nor an outstanding public figure, with the capacity of organizing a military coup. It is even less likely for him to have pretended to do so with the help of distinguished citizens such as, Luis Carlos Sáchica, Felio Andrade, Diego Tovar Concha, and “Pum Pum” Espinosa. How can it then be explained that the incriminating document detailing the coup ended up in Rommel Hurtado’s safe only to be conveniently discovered by the District Attorney’s Office in 1998. Other than Mantilla and Hurtado there is no other evidence of an actual conspiracy with the intention of deposing of the President. It is not overegging the pudding to add that only several months after, in July 2010, Hernando Gómez Bustamante, also known as Rasguño, made statements that provoked questions about the investigation of Alvaro Gómez’s assassination, Rommel Hurtado was assassinated. His statements were given in reaction to new anonymous statements – that can be found in the District Attorney 20’s (UNAT) File 61.434 – and provided the Office of the Inspector General with concrete evidence regarding the murderers. Given the previous considerations, it is lamentable that the District Attorney’s Office invested such large quantity of time and resources into clarifying a clearly fabricated conspiracy, while at the same time, definitively abandoning other lines of investigation that would have most probably yielded better results. Proof of important events contained in the file was thus ignored as it had been from the beginning. The entire purpose of the District Attorney’s investigation was to link the enemies of Ernesto Samper’s Administration to the assassination. General Urbina (who handed Samper his resignation), General Bedoya, and outstanding opposition politicians and businessmen were continuously interrogated. While this was taking place, there was, surprisingly, no line of investigation seeking to find either the perpetrator or those intellectually responsible from within at the Cali Cartel, the Norte del Valle Cartel, or any other narco-paramilitary or guerrilla organization. There is no doubt that such determination to follow a completely make-believe hypothesis is the reason for the case’s derailment. This explains why from the outset the investigation has been led aimlessly through an eternal labyrinth. It should also be remembered that several days after the murder took place President Samper appeared in front of the press definitively exonerating the cartels of the crime.

Although the District Attorney’s Office had and pretends to maintain a grasp of the identities of those intellectually responsible for the homicide (the Government’s enemies endeavoring to plot its downfall) it failed miserably when endeavoring to apprehend those responsible for actually pulling the trigger. In the absence of one criminal gang that could be attributed with blame, Attorney Generals Alfonso Valdivieso, and subsequently Alfonso Gómez Méndez blamed the murder of Alvaro Gómez Hurtado on three different gangs. From 1998 until early 2000, with neither sense nor logic, the District Attorney insisted on ascribing the crime to three distinct “organizations”, making different accusations, none of which had anything to do with any of them. If we illustrate the facts by turning the protagonists into caricatures then, Gómez Méndez’s team, at the same time accused and attributed different motives to Peter, John and George; all of whom were accused of committing the same crime against Paul. The criminal groups are from, Bogotá, Sincelejo, and Bucaramanga (also known as the Hunters). All of them apparently independently conspired to assassinate the former Presidential candidate. The following section of this book details each one of the three groups allegedly responsible for committing the crime. It also manifests how the trials against them disintegrated before the judges of the Republic, crumbling under their own weight due to clumsy and incoherent hypotheses that intended to prove the groups’ participation in the political assassination. THE SINCELEJO GROUP Two weeks after the murder, on 18th November 1995, the “Commission of District Attorneys who were assigned the task of investigating Alvaro Gómez’s homicide” were ‘mobilized’ and sent to Sincelejo in order to record the sworn testimony of Carlos Alberto Lugo Alvarez. 124 It should be duly noted that to date it has been impossible to determine exactly who was a member of the Commission, how long it operated, and what results were obtained, due to the District Attorney systematically refusing to provide the plaintiffs with the aforementioned information. Although this information has been legally requested, the reason for its denial is to prevent the District Attorneys who worked on the case from being questioned. In his testimony, Lugo insisted that he knew who was responsible for the assassination of Alvaro Gómez. He definitively identified the perpetrators as, Héctor Paúl Flórez Martínez, Manuel Mariano Montero Pérez, and Flaminis de Jesús Tobar Bernal; all young men from a slum area of Sincelejo. Carlos Alberto Lugo stated in his testimony that the assassins had personally confessed their crime to him, both before and after carrying it out. In subsequent 124

Page 217. Book 4 of the District Attorney’s Office 11 who presented evidence before Criminal Law Judges of the Specialized Court in Bogotá’s Case File 27212 (Murder of Alvaro Gómez Hurtado). Carlos Alberto Lugo Alvarez’s statement.

statements Lugo described the operation to kill Gómez; according to his account the killers flew by plane from Sincelejo, landing the same day, 2nd November, on a clandestine runway near Bogotá. They returned via the same route that afternoon after having committed the crime and being ostentatiously entertained at lunch by their unknown commanders. This long-distance journey is however, extremely implausible given the fact that the air space over the Sabana of Bogotá is closely monitored due to El Dorado International Airport’s close proximity. Nowhere in the dossier is this claim supported by evidence; that is to say, air traffic controllers were not interviewed regarding unreported flights, nor were landings and takeoffs that day at the various military and civil airports located in the area checked. No matter how unbelievable Lugo’s clandestine runway story was it was blindly accepted by the shrewd District Attorneys who already had their minds made up as to what they wanted to believe. How the investigators in Bogotá actually found out about Lugo’s intention to testify is never addressed. Presumably Lugo filed his testimony before the SIJIN in Sincelejo, which would have communicated with the District Attorney’s Office in Bogotá as soon as they realized the severity of the claim. It is in these circumstances that the hypothesis of, what became known as the “Group from the Coast” or the “Sincelejo Group”, was formed. This group was made up of boys from Sincelejo who were denounced by Lugo. His accusation went no further than revealing those physically responsible for the assassination; it did not strengthen the District Attorneys’ hypothesis regarding those intellectually responsible for the crime. On 18 th November 1995, when Lugo gave his first testimony, the Sucre Police received the order to arrest Héctor Paúl Flórez Martínez, Manuel Mariano Montero Pérez, and Flaminis de Jesús Tobar Bernal. The young men (all aged between eighteen and twenty-two) were, with immediate effect, transferred in a spectacular display to the Modelo Prison, Bogotá. With the exception of Héctor Paúl, who had previously committed a murder during a fight, none of the men had a previous criminal record.125 When in Bogotá, the men who had been accused by Lugo Alvarez took part in an identity parade were they were viewed by people who happened to be in the area at the time of the crime as well as eyewitnesses. With the exception of Guillermo “Crazy Memo” Vélez, a vicious homeless man who earned his living by watching over cars in the vicinity of the University, none 125

Page 217. Book 4 of the District Attorney’s Office 11 who presented evidence before Criminal Law Judges of the Specialized Court in Bogotá’s Case File 27212.

of the witnesses called were conclusively able to identify Héctor Paúl, Flaminis, or Mariano. These men had all, ever since they were implicated in the crime, denied every accusation made against them, claiming to have been in Sincelejo. It was subsequently proved that they attended the funeral of Flaminis’ Grandmother, Mrs. Purificación de Tobar, which took place late morning, on 2nd November 1999: the same time that they were accused of being in Bogotá. On revising the homicide file and the respective “Sincelejo Group” members’ record it is evident that they contrast greatly with the other groups accused. The “Bogotá Group” consisted of bank robbers, and the “Bucaramanga Group” consisted of former soldiers from the 20th Brigade however, the accused from Sincelejo were simply young men whose previous life experience does not seem to fit with this Hollywoodesque criminal endeavor that Lugo Alvarez denounced. It is hard to believe that a former Sucre farm caretaker (Héctor Papul Flórez), together with two recent high-school graduates (Flaminis and Mariano) would have boarded a plane, landed on a clandestine runway in Bogotá [sic], murdered Alvaro Gómez, and returned to Sincelejo leaving no trace of their crime: a delict that would have remained unpunished had it not been for the bravery of Lugo Alvarez. The four accused men insisted in every one of their interrogations that Carlos Alberto Lugo, who they had known for a long time, and who had previously been a friend of theirs, was falsely accusing them for the sole purpose of collecting the reward the Government was offering to anyone who could provide information regarding the identity of those responsible.126 Given time they were able to provide evidence (school certificates, photographs, etc.) proving that on 2nd November they were indeed nowhere near Bogotá. Several of the group had never even been to the capital of the Republic. Despite this quite conclusive evidence, Guillermo “Crazy Memo” Vélez still claimed to have recognized them in the lineup. Even more bewilderingly, in subsequent statements Memo assured the authorities he had seen, with his own eyes, Héctor Paúl Flórez shoot Alvaro Gómez. He professed to have remembered Flórez due to the fact that the tattoo on his hand was the same he had seen on the hand of the man who unloaded his gun on the morning of 2 nd November 1995.127 It is important to note that the tattoo (less than one centimeter long) is on Héctor Paúl’s left hand. Flórez being right handed makes Memo’s version of events rather implausible. In addition to

126

Book 4 of the District Attorney’s Office 11 who presented evidence before Criminal Law Judges of the Specialized Court in Bogotá’s Case File 27212. Flaminis de Jesús Torres Bernal’s statement. 127 Book 13, Page 311 of the District Attorney’s Office 11 who presented evidence before Criminal Law Judges of the Specialized Court in Bogotá’s Case File 27212. Guillermo Vélez Montenegro’s statement.

his extraordinary testimony, Memo claimed he had also seen Héctor Paúl with Gustavo Adolfo Jaramillo, known as “Tavo”, also accused but not associated in any way with the “Sincelejo Group”. After this charade, in June 1996, Lugo Alvarez admitted that he had simply made the whole story up. A team of CTI investigators approached Carlos Alberto Lugo wanting to interview him in order to address certain parts of his statements. On 6 th and 7th June 1996 two members of the investigative organization met with the witness in a Bogotá café. During one of these meetings Lugo confessed that he had provided the District Attorney’s Office with a false statement, claiming that it was a scheme to fool the Department of Justice into giving him the reward they were offering to whoever provided information regarding the identity of those culpable for Gómez’s murder. Several excerpts from the District Attorney’s Office’s star witness statement, on which an entire criminal hypothesis had been based, manifested not only how weak this theory actually was, but also the intention to falsely implicate the accused ‘criminal’ group. The self-incriminating conversation was officially recorded by members of the CTI. The following are some conversation excerpts relevant to the case: Carlos Alberto Lugo (CAL): “Let’s sit down and put all our cards on the table.” *…+ CAL: “I can have these guys taken out of jail.” Agent: “And how can you do that”? CAL: “With what I have to say.” *…+ CAL: “I invented all this shit, yeah… I was bored. That’s why.” *…+ Agent: “And how was it? Did they tell you anything”? CAL: “They never told me nothing about that shit… They never killed that old man. I can tell you that because they didn’t tell me nothing”. *…+

CAL: Those guys never told me that shit, never. Yeah motherfucker I’m a tough guy. Funny ha? Yeah, ha, ha, I’m a tough guy… I also done it knowing that that those guys done too much shit. Too much fucking shit”.128 It is also an extremely serious and particularly concerning matter that Lugo admits to the CTI agents that he had been in contact with the other witness, the famous “Crazy Memo”. The validity of Héctor Paúl Flórez’s identification in the lineup thus logically becomes null and void. AGENT 1: So, so, so, Memo…? AGENT 2: How was he able to recognize them? LUGO: About what? A1: About what? A2: Memo… LUGO: I don’t know. Memo is crazy… yeah, crazy [laughs], for me, for me the most XXX is the shit, more, more than when MEMO told me that shit, I, [laughs] I cracked up bro, yea I cracked up man, when I saw that shit was on a role, because there was a time when everyone said that shit was good, that it was going alright, I cracked up, you get me? A2: Hum… *…+129 Héctor Paúl Flórez sentencing by the Second Specialized Criminal Court in Bogotá on 21 st December 2001 was in part due to Crazy Memo’s identifying him. It was also because of circumstantial evidence that proved the defendant, as previously mentioned, had committed a prior homicide in Sabanalaraga. Crazy Memo’s hugely flawed testimony is notorious for having been corrupted by information provided by Carlos Alberto Lugo. The District attorney’s Office, highly suspiciously, took absolutely no action after Lugo openly confessed he was lying at the meetings held with members of the CTI on 6 th and 7th June 1996. Despite the fact the author of the Sincelejo Group criminal hypothesis admitted it was a fabrication and that he had also corrupted the other witness Crazy Memo, the group unjustly remained in prison on account of the District Attorney until they were exonerated in 2001. 128

CTI transcript document attached to District Attorney’s Office 11 who presented evidence before Criminal Law Judges of the Specialized Court in Bogotá’s File 27.212, case against Héctor Paúl Flóres and others for the murder of Alvaro Gómez Hurtado and José Huertas Hastamorir. Report No. 107.FGN.DR.CTI.SIA.IJ 0643-123. Officials from the Cuerpo Técnico de Invesigación, nd Bogotá DC, 2 July 1996. District Attorney’s Office 11 who presented evidence before Criminal Law Judges of the Specialized Court in Bogotá’s Case File 27.212, Book 19 A, Page 239 and following. 129 Ibid.

Manuel Mariano Montero Pérez and Flaminis de Jesús Tobar Bernal were acquitted of all charges in relation to the murder of Alvaro Gómez Hurtado. The men were released after having lost years of their lives due to the District Attorney’s Office’s effort to derail the assassination investigation. Héctor Paúl Flórez who continues to be incarcerated is serving a thirty-nine year sentence based on false testimony. The Attorney General is fully aware of this complete miscarriage of justice.130 The Second Specialized Penal Court in Bogotá ruled, on the 21 st December 2001, that certified copies be sent to the District attorney in order that they carry out a perjury investigation into Carlos Alberto Lugo. This took place without the realization that the High Court in Bogotá (criminal branch) had revoked the decision to send certified copies. The office designated to undertake the investigation, Prosecution 253 Office for Crimes Committed Against Individual Freedoms, only began to pursue the line of enquiry in 2007 when the statute limitations for the crime of perjury had elapsed. Thus, on 6th May 2008 the office in change of the investigations declared that all actions were now barred. To date, Office 20 of the National Office for Combating Terrorism has still not recorded the necessary evidence to validate Carlos Alberto Lugo’s version of events. By November 2010 there were nearly ninety pieces of evidence outstanding that the office had not gathered. All calls for the employment of an assistant prosecutor were only heard by the current administration. Carlos Alberto Lugo, most recently on 28th June 2010, admitted to having been in contact with Crazy Memo in a SIJIN building, Bogotá. He made this statement before the Prosecutor 20 National Office for Combating Terrorism, in the presence of Pablo Murcia, his assistant Iván Zorro, Assistant Superintendant of the DIDIN Hernando Castañeda, and the plaintiffs’ Attorney Enrique Gómez Martínez. Lugo claimed that this took place soon after having arrived from Montería and that he had met with Memo several times previously. He also stated that the

130

Police Colonel and Samper’s confidant, Germán Osorio Sepulveda, had influenced his testimony by threatening his family. The investigation was successfully derailed due to Carlos Alberto Lugo’s lies. This, not only, consumed vital energy and institutional resources, which, for years, were focused on proving allegations against innocent men; it, even more seriously, deprived men of their freedom for several years: men who were later fully acquitted of having committed any crime.131 Carlos Alberto Lugo, within the framework of this new investigation, and also in recent statements to El Espectador newspaper, has allegedly admitted that his June 1996 portrayal of events was shaped by threats directed at his family. These threats were supposed to have come from President Samper’s aide-de-camp and Police Colonel Germán Osorio. We have requested that the District Attorney conduct an investigation regarding these extremely serious allegations of corruption involving members of the Police Force affiliated to President Samper. To date there has been no action taken. The absence of punishment for Lugo’s false testimony is a hallmark of the last fifteen years of investigation. The District Attorney’s Office based their prosecution on the testimony of a false witness, focused its attention on implausible events, arrested the allegedly guilty, and tried them in court. When the case completely disintegrated based on the judge’s findings, the District Attorney’s Office simply stopped investigating, and accused the witnesses. The Office of the Attorney General is guilty of this same method of derailing an investigation with five different witnesses. As will subsequently be explained, the SIJIN in Bogotá systematically, during 1995 and 1996, derailed the investigation by actively promoting false hypotheses and allowing Crazy Memo’s mendacious testimony to be heard.132

131

Ruling on 21 December 2001, which can be found in the Criminal Law Judges of the Specialized Court’s file JR 4152. st Please refer to the rulings made on the following dates: 21 December 2001, which can be found in the Second Criminal st th Court of the Specialized Circuit’s file number JR 4152; 31 January and 25 March 2003, which can be found in the Second th Criminal Court of the Specialized Circuit’s file number JR 6214 C; 6 December 2001 made by the Second Criminal Court of the Specialized Circuit, in Case Number 089-2, against José O. Sánchez C. and José Luis Mangones who were being tried for the murder of Elizabeth Montoya de Sarria, also known as the “La Monita Retrechera”. The statements made by Hernando Gómez th th th Bustamente, also known as Rasguño, on 12 and 13 January and 15 December 2010 regarding the Colombian Chamber of Representatives’ Prosecution Board Investigation Number 3209, published by Semana magazine, also support this statement. 132

THE BOGOTÁ GROUP Gustavo Adolfo Jaramillo, also known as “Tavo”, Hermes Ortiz Durán, and Luis Fernando Jutinico were common criminals who, by 1995, branched out their criminal activity. They now focused mainly on car theft and bank robbery, and were involved in commercial sales in San Andresito. Some members of the Bogotá Police were complicit in the bank robberies. In exchange for both information and not rapidly responding to the emergency call, they received a share of the stolen money. By late 1994, Gustavo Adolfo Jaramillo, and his brother Jorje Luis Jaramillo Giraldo, had had a serious fallout with the Captain of the SIJIN, Julio Cesar Villegas: an argument that resulted in the assassination of Jorge Luis Jaramillo in a South Bogotá brothel. Gustavo Adolfo testified that Villegas had personally assassinated his brother,133 and then went into hiding from the Captain. Over a month before the assassination of Gómez Hurtado, on 27 th September 1995, several hitmen opened fire on the vehicle carrying President Ernesto Samper’s Attorney, Antonio José Cancino. Cancino survived the attack, but his two bodyguards were killed. On the very same day the Regional Director of the District Attorney’s Office decided to create an ad hoc team of District Attorneys, which would work together with the DAS and DIJIN, to represent Ernesto Samper’s Government and undertake the relevant investigation.134 The day after Cancino’s attack, the SIJIN for which Villegas worked, contributed, as quoted by the Judge in charge of the case, “substantial information in connection with the attack, which until this point had been unknown”.135 The information they provided was of such great value that the Regional District Attorney decided to formally add the Bogotá SIJIN to the teams of investigators. From this moment onwards, the National Police Force, and especially the DIJIN and SIJIN, were the fundamental driving-forces in the investigation. This practice was remarkably similar to the one that would be seen a month later in the Gómez Hurtado case. Police investigators propelled the investigation forward by means of witness testimonies and evidence. District Attorney’s Offices meekly followed the chain of derailment that the Police investigators chose. On 5th October 1995 Gloria Inés Rivera was taken to the District Attorney’s Office where, anonymously, she was allowed to testify that Gustavo Adolfo Jaramillo, Fernando Jutinico and Luis Eduardo Rodríguez Cuadrado had been the hitmen who opened fire on Cancino’s car.136 It is well-known fact that Gloria Rivera was Jutinico’s former lover.137 133

Gustavo Adolfo Jaramillo Giraldo’s testimony dated 29th April 1996. Page 218, Book 14 of Case File 27212. st Sentenced on 21 December 2001 by the Second Specialized Criminal Court in Bogotá, page 69. 135 st Sentenced on 21 December 2001 by the Second Specialized Criminal Court in Bogotá, page 69. 136 st Sentenced on 21 December 2001 by the Second Specialized Criminal Court in Bogotá, page 70. 137 Book 30, Page 7 of Case File 27212. Jutinico’s sister`s statement. 134

Gloria Rivera’s statement was the reason that the District Attorney’s Office, on the same day (5th October), issued an arrest warrant for the men she accused. The arrest was carried out by the SIJIN, led by Captain Julio César Villegas Gutíerrez. The Police raided Gustavo Adolfo Jaramillo’s home but there was no sign of the suspect: Jaramillo had fled as soon as he knew Villegas was looking for him. In addition to Jutinico’s former lover’s statement, the Police also heard the testimony of Rodríguez Cuadrado: a former policeman who was heavily involved in extortion. His statements guided the investigations regarding the attack on Cancino and later on Gómez Hurtado’s murder. Rodríguez Cuadrado was arrested by Captain Julio César Villegas Gutíerrez. According to the confession he made to another man (Omar Berrio, a member of the Hunters), he was imprisoned and denied the opportunity for his arrest to be authenticated before a judge in the Bogotá SIJIN jail, until he confessed to his part in the attack on Cancino, and accepted the predicted sentence. The truth of the matter is that Gloria Rivera and Rodríguez Cuadrado accused three criminals well known to the SIJIN138 of having attacked Cancino. This institution, along with Captain Villegas, did not cease in their zealous efforts to support the testimonies that focused the investigation on those previously mentioned. Captain Villegas obtained a testimony from David Montes Bello (a witness who like the others, who made statements anonymously) and blamed Cancino’s attack on the exact same people denounced by Gloria Rivera and Rodríguez Cuadrado: Gustavo “Tavo” Jaramillo, Jutinico, and Rodríguez Cuadrado himself.139 Captain Villegas presented photographs of “Tavo” and Rodríguez Cuadrado to David Montes who duly identified them.140 Villegas also used pager messages as evidence that incriminated Hermes Ortiz and “Tavo” in Cancino’s attack. It is important to emphasize that one month prior to Gómez Hurtado’s assassination the Police, specifically the SIJIN had already started investigating the three previously mentioned criminals in connection with the attack on Cancino. Subsequently, two other SIJIN witnesses also accused 138

Rodríguez Cuadrado Luis Eduardo. One of several of Luis Eduardo Rodríguez Cuadrado’s statements, which can be found in st file JR 4152, Page 286, Book 13 A of the ruling made on 21 December 2001 by the Second Specialized Criminal Court in Bogotá (JR 4152). 139 st Sentenced on 21 December 2001 by the Second Specialized Criminal Court in Bogotá, page 78. 140 st Sentenced on 21 December 2001 by the Second Specialized Criminal Court in Bogotá, page 72.

the same three individuals of having assassinated Alvaro Gómez Hurtado. As will be detailed later in this book, although criminals, they had no connection with either Cancino’s attack or Alvaro Gómez Hurtado’s assassination. Quite why some members of the SIJIN were so obsessed with incriminating these people by means of false witnesses we will discover bellow. It is particularly perplexing that one month before Alvaro Gómez’s homicide, members of Government institutions, namely the SIJIN and DAS, were already prosecuting the people who would later be accused of having assassinated Gómez Hurtado. Luis Eduardo Rodríguez Cuadrado, who by 16th April 1996 had already been accused and arrested, declared under oath to the District Attorney’s Office that both he and Gustavo “Tavo” Jaramillo, Fernando Jutinico, Hermez Ortiz, and others were responsible for the attack on Antonio José Cancino, and the murder of Alvaro Gómez Hurtado.141 He stated that they use to meet at the Windsor Bar in central Bogotá, where Jutinico, also known as “Pechuga”, gave them details on how the terrorist attacks were to be carried out. Ten days after Rodríguez Cuadrado made his statement the Police arrested Gustavo Adolfo “Tavo” Jaramillo, who was apprehended in flagrante delicto whilst robbing a bank. The gangster had already been accused of Cancino’s attack, and of murdering Gómez Hurtado. In Tavo’s first statement to the District Attorney he denied any involvement in both the attack on 27 th September and 2nd November. He also reiterated his fear for Captain Julio César Villegas, who he claimed was one of the most corrupt members of the Police Force, had very close connections to the gangsters he was involved with, and had killed his brother during an argument. When asked why he thought he had been accused of the crimes against Gómez and Cancino, “Tavo” answered, without hesitating, that Villegas and Rodríguez Cuadrado had set the whole thing up.142 Luis Eduardo Rodríguez continued with his accusations (and self-incrimination) according to which he, along with “Tavo”, Jutinico, Hermes Ortiz, together with a group of ever-increasing members, had been responsible for the two attacks. The SIJIN presented another witness to the case: Mariela Villarreal Barrero, the ex-wife of Rafael Carvajal Gómez who was also accused of the crime. Mariela, a policeman’s widow and

141

Book 13 A, Page 285 of District Attorney’s Office 11 who presented evidence before Criminal Law Judges of the Specialized Court in Bogotá’s Case File Case File 27.212. Eduardo Rodríguez Cuadrado’s statement. 142 Book 14 A, Page 218 of District Attorney’s Office 11 who presented evidence before Criminal Law Judges of the Specialized Court in Bogotá’s Case File Case File 27.212. Gustavo Jaramillo Giraldo´s statement.

Captain Villegas’ former girlfriend backed up every statement made by Luis Eduardo Rodríguez Cuadrado. She also added a further list of names to the “Bogotá Group” such as Iván Dario Quintero Oquendo. Both Rodríguez Cuadrado and Villarreal Barrera picked out all the accused in the identity parade, and named “Tavo”, Hermes Ortiz and all the others mentioned as those responsible for the crimes. The men who had supposedly been ‘positively identified’ all claimed to have no idea who Rodríguez Cuadrado or Mariela were. Guillermo “Crazy Memo” Vélez Montenegro was soon called to identify suspects in a parade. Completely unsurprisingly he positively identified all the people he saw in the lineup including those members of the “Bogotá Group”, namely Gustavo Jaramillo “Tavo”, and their alleged accomplices. In summary, the “Bogotá Group’s” sequence of unfortunate events are the following: primarily, (immediately after the attack on Cancino, one month before Alvaro Gómez’s assassination) Gloria Rivera who spoke anonymously to police, accused Gustavo Jaramillo, also known as “Tavo”, Hermes Ortiz Durán, and Fernando Jutinico of Cancino’s attempted murder. She made however, no indication that the same people were planning Gómez Hurtado’s assassination, which had not taken place at the time she made the statement. During the second phase of the ‘investigation’, months after Alvaro Gómez had been assassinated, Captain Julio César Villegas presented three new testimonies (Rodríguez Cuadrado’s self-confession, and Mariela Villarreal and David Montes’ statements), which corroborated Gloria Rivera’s testimony and added that the same gang was responsible for Alvaro Gómez’s murder. In order for there to be absolutely no doubt about their guilt the accused were all made to take part in an identity parade in order that some of the eyewitnesses could have the opportunity to pick them out of the lineup. The crime scene, it must be added, is the same one where Guillermo “Crazy Memo” Vélez, the well-known drug pusher and car caretaker on Calle 74 affirmed he had also seen the men open fire on Alvaro Gómez on the morning of 2 nd November: the same Memo who had also witnessed the Sincelejo Group murder Gómez. By mid 1996 a ‘solid’ criminal case against the so-called “Bogotá Group” (“Tavo”, Jutinico, Hermes Ortiz, Iván Dario Quintero, Rafael Carvajal, Rodríguez Cuadrado, and others) had been formed and authenticated by four witnesses who had all given evidence against the accused men. One of the witnesses was a man who had confessed to the crime himself and another was a passerby known as “Crazy Memo” who had apparently seen the men open fire on Alvaro Gómez on the morning of 2nd November 1995. 59

THE COLLAPSE OF THE BOGOTÁ GROUP CASE Despite the District Attorney’s Office’s serious accusations against Gustavo Jaramillo, Hermes Ortiz, Rafael Carvajal, Fernando Jutinico, and others for the attacks on Cancino and Gómez on 27th September, and 2nd November 1995 respectively, the facts clearly indicate that the Bogotá theory was a work of complete fantasy. In contrast with the members of the Sincelejo Group, the criminals accused of comprising the ‘Bogotá Group’ had sufficient economic funds to be able to hire good Defense Attorneys. Mariela Villarreal and Luis Fernando Rodríguez Cuadrado, important witnesses for the conviction of the Bogotá Group, admitted that their entire testimony was false. They claimed to have been under pressure from members of the SIJIN143, specifically from Captain Julio César Villegas Gutiérrez, to concoct false allegations. It should be pointed out however, that there exists no link between Mariela Villarreal and Rodríguez Cuadrado.144 In January 1997 Mariela Villarreal filed a right to petition the Office of the Attorney General, making serious claims that Captain Villegas offered her money to falsely accuse “Tavo”, Rafael Carvajal, Jutinico, and others. She made even more serious allegations by directly associating Villegas with those intellectually responsible for the assassination.145 As did Gustavo “Tavo” Adolfo Jaramillo, Mariela claimed that Villegas was an extremely corrupt man who had close links to many of the crimes committed by the Bogotá Police. Villarreal and “Tavo” have no relation to each other. When making accusations against the Police Captain Mariela Villarreal stated that: “*I+ became the star witness of the National Police Force, the Bogotá SIJIN, and the Regional District Attorney. I was responsible for the web of lies created by the Police

143

One of many of Mariela Villareal’s statements made on 6 April 2000, Book 32, Page 179 and following, which can be found th in the Criminal Law Judges of the Specialized Court’s file number JR 4152. Statement on February 29 in the public hearing of Luis Eduardo Rodríguez Cuadrado, book 1, Pages 200/213. This evidence make up the Criminal Law Judges of the Specialized st Court’s file JR 4152 and can be partially revised in the file containing the ruling on 21 December 2001. 144 th Mariela Villarreal Barrero. Document sent to Spanish television correspondent José Manuel Martín Medem on 4 April 1997 and can be found in Book 22, Page 97 of File JR 4152. It states that a recording has been handed in stating the appearance of the people who were involved in the attack on Cancino, and also that it had been used by the Police and the District Attorney’s th Office. Mariela Villareal’s statement made on 6 April 2000, Book 32, Page 179 and following, which can be found in the th Criminal Law Judges of the Specialized Court’s file number JR 4152. Statement on February 29 in the public hearing of Luis Eduardo Rodríguez Cuadrado, book 1, Pages 200/213. This evidence make up the Criminal Law Judges of the Specialized Court’s st file JR 4152 and can be partially revised in the file containing the ruling on 21 December 2001. 145 Mariela Villarreal Barrero filed a right to petition the Office of the Attorney General in January 1997. A copy of the right to petition is kept in the case file (property of the plaintiffs) of the proceedings associated with the assassination of Alvaro Gómez Hurtado.

Captain JULIO CESAR VILLEGAS, damaging the lives of innocent people and promoting the cause of those responsible for these abominable crimes”. Publicly retracting his statement in court, Luis Eduardo Rodríguez Cuadrado stated that Captain Julio César Villegas had fabricated his entire testimony and had, both physically and psychologically, tortured him by constantly threatening his family if he reused to carry through his accusations.146 His own admission of guilt had, as well, been violently brought about by Captain Villegas.147 Mariela Villarreal and Rodríguez Cuadrado’s denouncing of the SIJIN (which can also be seen as statements of regret) supported Gustavo “Tavo” Jaramillo’s own statements in the sense that the whole affair “is a fictitious setup using false testimonies and evidence invented by Captain Villegas”.148 There were serious accusations made against the SIJIN and even more serious ones against Captain Julio César Villegas, who was heavily incriminated. Mysteriously, the District Attorney’s Office have yet to react against the statements made, and no criminal investigation has ever been undertaken endeavoring to establish the truth behind Mariela Villarreal and Tavo’s revelations. Once again, it seems that whoever was actually responsible for the case clearly decided to follow the Bogotá SIJIN’s line of investigation, and were in no hurry to either uncover the truth or critically analyze the evidence available. It is quite clearly evident that in both 1996 and 1997 the investigation was conducted extremely superficially as the Cancino and Gómez Hurtado Cases were dealt with as if they were one single crime. When the setup framing the Bogotá Group became clear, the District Attorney’s Office desperately struggled, at first before a judge and finally before the High Court in Bogotá, to undo the tangled investigations so they could be treated as individual cases. The judges officially opposed this due to the lack of procedural coherence.

146

Paper written by Omar Berrío Loaiza, kept in the case file (property of the plaintiffs) of the proceedings associated with the assassination of Alvaro Gómez Hurtado. 147 nd The Inspector General’s opinion, First Inspector Delegated for criminal annulment, Francisco Javier Farfán Molina, Bogotá 2 th June 2006. Supreme Court of Justice, Sentencing on 18 September 1973. File No. 24578. MP Alvaro Orlando Pérez Pinzón 148 Book 14 A, Page 220 District Attorney’s Office 11 who presented evidence before Criminal Law Judges of the Specialized Court in Bogotá’s Case File 27.212. Gustavo Adolfo Jaramillo Giraldo’s statement.

When the “Bogotá Group” was taken to trial, the Second Specialized Criminal Court disregarded every one of the accusations, carefully prepared by SIJIN and DAS, and made by the District Attorney’s Office. The Judge refused to hear Mariela Villarreal and Luis Eduardo Rodríguez Cuadrado’s testimonies due to the reasons detailed below. As a witness, Mariela Villarreal not only lost credibility due to the retraction of her own statement and her serious accusation made against the SIJIN, but also because of the fact she had been bribed to “make up this story”. The Second Specialized Criminal Judge, on studying the District Attorney’s accusations against the Bogotá Group, discovered serious DAS interferences, with the clear intention of manipulating witness statements. This institution was being used by the Government long before Alvaro Gómez’s assassination as a means of making false accusations. The ruling below is definitively clear. “The Court thus concludes that the witness’ [Mariela Villarreal] statement… was made through conversations she had with detectives, identified by badge numbers 0153 and 0304, attached to the Department of Administrative Security (DAS). Mrs. VILLARREAL BARRERO made statements to these men and on 1st November 1995 they requested that the Regional District Attorney take the aforementioned witness’ testimony and conduct the identity parade… The identity parade that was requested by DAS agents was ruled by the Second Judge as a farce: “…which was absurdly staged… and orchestrated to find the link between ALEX la Mechuda and IVAN DARIO QUINTERO OQUENDO. It was unexplainably put on record, that when referring to the accused she said, “it is the boy in the purple sweater, number five, whose name is IVAN DARIO QUINTERO OQUENDO, Identity Card Number. 93.289.632, from Libano, Tolima”. Despite this very accurate identification by the witness, in a sworn statement by Mariela Villarreal several days before, “she didn’t recognize” the name Quintero Oquendo. The Court, therefore, concluded that: “It is therefore necessary to ask, that if [Mariela Villarreal] did not recognize the name IVAN DARIO QUINTERO OQUENDO, how is it possible that in the identity parade she knew his name and even the number of his Identity Card? Given these facts it can be 62

concluded that her comments during the identity parade were the result of a prior conversation with Administrative Department of Security agents”.149 There are serious implications stemming from the paragraphs quoted above. On 1 st November 1995, one day before Alvaro Gómez was assassinated, going against procedure DAS agents took Mariela Villarreal to identify the accused perpetrators of Cancino’s attack: the same men who the next day would also be accused of having assassinated Gómez Hurtado. Mariela Villarreal, in a letter she sent to the news program 24 Horas, acknowledged how the Administrative Department of Security (DAS) had promoted her lies from the very beginning. “The plot we made up together was equally generated by both the National Police (the Santa fé de Bogotá D.C. SIJIN) and city’s DAS… they used me to cover up those who were really responsible for the attacks on ANTONIO JOSE CANCINO and ALVARO GOMEZ HURTADO… Both the Police and DAS knew the true facts of the situation: those who masterminded the crimes, but they took advantage the fact I had no money… they offered me heaven and earth and they used me as their key witness for the Regional District Attorney.150 In conclusion, it is evident that the theory behind the Bogotá Group disintegrated due to legal weaknesses and the retractions of the key witnesses’ testimonies that accused the alleged killers. On retracting their statements the witnesses accused members of the Police Force and DAS of having fabricated their versions of events in exchange for either money or by making threats. The truth of the matter is – and this is palpable throughout the entire dossier – that the evidence used to attempt to convict the Bogotá Group was concocted by the Police and DAS; the very institutions that, with the full support of the District Attorney, actually conducted the investigation. The District Attorney has, to date, never investigated DAS or Police officers to establish their involvement in such a clear and serious endeavor to conceal and derail a criminal procedure. No investigation has been conducted even though in January 2010 Luis Hernando Gómez Bustamante, also known as Rasguño, stated in no uncertain terms that it was members of the

149

Sentenced on 21 December 2001 by the Second Specialized Criminal Court in Bogotá, pages 112 and following, located in file JR 4152. 150 Villareal Barrero, Mariela, letter sent to 24 Horas News in January 1997. The letter is kept in the District Attorney’s Office 11 who presented evidence before Criminal Law Judges of the Specialized Court in Bogotá’s Case File 27212, which is property of the plaintiffs of the proceedings associated with the assassination of Alvaro Gómez Hurtado.

Police Force who assassinated Alvaro Gómez and then derailed the criminal investigation. These events, both astonishing and regrettable are now on record in the dossier. When the pattern of concealment, extenuated by the District Attorney throughout the entire investigation was recognized, neither Mariela Villarreal nor Luis Eduardo Rodríguez Cuadrado were charged for making false testimonies despite the Judges’ stipulation.151 THE HUNTERS The Hunters, just like the Sincelejo and Bogotá Groups, were born from the statements of several “hearsay witnesses” who claimed to have a knowledge of the events. Accusations that were made by the District Attorney’s Office stating that members of the Hunters assassinated Gómez Hurtado were based on these witness statements. The links made between the Colombian Armed Forces (specifically the 20th Military Intelligence Brigade) and the assassination originate from an anonymous telephone call made to the National Police several minutes after hitmen shot Alvaro Gómez.152 The caller, whose identity is unknown, reported to have seen four members of the 20 th Military Intelligence Brigade driving around in a beige four-wheel drive vehicle with license plate number LIW-033. These plates belonged to General Ricardo Emilio Cifuentes’ personal bodyguard during the time he was Director of the Military Academy.153 His car however, part of the 20th M.I. Brigade’s fleet, was a red Nissan Datsun not a beige four-wheel drive. It was subsequently confirmed that the license plates had been changed from the red Nissan to the four-wheel drive assigned to General Cifuentes.154 An explanation for this change was given by Military Judge Ana Lucía Ramírez de Rivera, who stated that the Army frequently changes plates for security purposes, endeavoring to reduce risk for personnel using military vehicles.155 It was later verified that the soldiers driving in the four-wheel drive were on their way to buy several Cromos magazines. They were acting on the orders of General Cifuentes who needed 151

Estoppel by silence of the investigation against Mary Kuz Cuadros, Andrés Mauricio Medioreal, and Héctor de Jesús Berrío. rd The delegate District Attorney for the Specialized Circuit Judges. Terrorism Subunit. D.A. Deicy Jaramillo R., 23 August 2003. Can be found in file 61.434, Book 1, Pages 136 – 158. 152 th Second Specialized Court in Bogotá. Ruling on 26 May 2003, Page 153 against retired Colonel Bernado Ruíz Silva. 153 Official response No. 919/041195 from the Santa fé de Bogotá Metropolitan Police, C.A.D. (Computer-aided Dispatch) th Command. Transcript from recording of an anonymous citizen statement to 112 on 7 November 1995. Book 4, Page 41, of District Attorney’s Office 11 who presented evidence before Criminal Law Judges of the Specialized Court in Bogotá’s Case File 27212, which is property of the plaintiffs of the proceedings associated with the assassination of Alvaro Gómez Hurtado. 154 Communication No. 06528/BR20-JEM-497, license plates sent. National Army, 2nd September 1992, Book 03, Page 18, charges brought against retired Colonel Bernado Ruíz Silva. 155 nd High Court of the Judicial District of Bogotá. Ruling on 2 September 2003. MP Humberto Gutiérrez Ricaurte. Pages 9 and 12, located in file JR 6214 D.

the issues in which his interview had been featured.156 The weapons carried by the four soldiers in the vehicle did not mach any of those identified as those used to murder Gómez. Moreover, bodyguards did not test positive when they were given the atomic absorption analysis test; there was also no evidence, either in the vehicle or on their uniforms, that they had engaged in any form of violent behavior, and none of their profiles matched the facial composites. 157 They were therefore released after a short time in custody, and there was no legal requirement for them to be associated with any further proceedings.158 It does appear however, that some of the circumstances surrounding the infamous telephone call seem somewhat anomalistic. Primarily, the communiqué sent on 7th November 1995 by Colonel Arnoldo José Sandoval Salamanca, (Commander of the Bogotá Metropolitan Police C.A.D. Department) to Brigadier General Hugo Martínez Posada (Director of the DIJIN Judicial Police), included the transcript of the telephone call. It was requested however, by Major Marcos William Duarte Valderrama by communication No. 000919 on 8th November 1995.159 This strange sequence of events raises the following question: how is it possible that on 7 th November there was an official response to a demand that was solicited a day later on 8th November 1995? The answer to this anomaly was found in communication No. 0002259, dated 8th November 1995. Colonel Sandoval Salamanca reports to Brigadier General Martínez Poveda that: “The following points address the communication sent by my superiors: 1. It will not be possible to send magnetophonic recordings of the telephone calls. Although special cassettes exist that could be used by the current system, we have not yet received

156

Ricardo Emilio Cifuentes’ statement made on 14 March 1996; District Attorney’s Office 11 who presented evidence before Criminal Law Judges of the Specialized Court in Bogotá’s Case File, Book 12, Pages 48 and 49. General Fuentes Bedoya’s report, Re. Homicide Investigation of Alvaro Gómez, 3rd November 1995, Book 12 A, Page 213.27212 District Attorney’s Office 11 who presented evidence before Criminal Law Judges of the Specialized Court in Bogotá. th Gonzalo Patarroyo Gómez’s Statement, 16 November 1995. District Attorney’s Office 11 who presented evidence before Criminal Law Judges of the Specialized Court in Bogotá’s Case File 27212, Book 4, Pages 83 to 85. 157 th Statements given by Alirio Jérez Sierra, José María Arango Montero, Gioni Betín Pérez and César Oswaldo Rueda Vera on 5 November 1995. District Attorney’s Office 11 who presented evidence before Criminal Law Judges of the Specialized Court in Bogotá’s Case File, Book 2, Pages 24 – 65. Judicial Police Command, Central Criminal Laboratory. Analysis of: twelve firearms, one pneumatic weapon, two projectiles and th one jacket. Proceeding No. 27121, 11 December 1995. 158 Letters from the Regional District Attorney addressed to the Director of the José María Cordoba Military Academy requesting that Alirio Jélez Sierra, José María Arango Montero, Goini Betín Pérez, and César Oswaldo Rueda Vera be released from jail. District Attorney’s Office 11 who presented evidence before Criminal Law Judges of the Specialized Court in Bogotá’s. 159 Answer to communication No. 919/041195, Metropolitan Police, Santa fé de Bogotá, C.A.D. Command. Transcript of a th recording of a citizen’s statement, identity unknown, reported to 112, 7 November 1995. Book 4, Pages 39 – 41. District Attorney’s Office 11 who presented evidence before Criminal Law Judges of the Specialized Court in Bogotá’s Case File 27212.

them from the company charged with their installation. It is also impossible to make recordings on normal tapes (due to their length) as the technology (tape recorders, connectors, cassettes) is currently in the process of being imported. 2. It is unfortunately not possible to comply with either the first or the second demand as the tape recording cannot be transcribed for the reasons detailed above. 3. With regards to the transcription of the communications made through the SIJIN’s standard frequencies, and the first and second channels, I shall report to my General that the relevant recording systems required to undertake this task have not yet been installed”.160 As stated above, it was neither possible to obtain a copy nor the transcription of the anonymous telephone call, despite the fact ‘ALCATEL’, the telephone service provider stated a recording could be made in their letter dated 8th November 1995.161 It is curious however, that in Colonel Sandoval Salamanca’s transcription – from where this was taken is uncertain – the anonymous caller uses different tenses when describing what he is supposedly witnessing. He primarily stated, “I cannot see”162 however, he then goes on to use the past tense when he said, “I saw something like four of them”.163 Such inconsistency in his description only serves to increase doubt as to the presumed validity of the call. Was he witnessing the crime, or was he reporting a crime that he had already seen? It must be taken into consideration that the call was received at 11:15 a.m., forty-five minutes after the incident had occurred. The four-wheel drive with license plates LIW-033 was no longer in the area. Therefore, how exactly was it possible for the mystery caller to still be able to see the aforementioned vehicle? The Second Court arrived at a sound conclusion on 25 th March 2003. It ruled that this information “had completely destroyed the public conception that the document could be considered truthful evidence [response to communication No. 9191-041195] insofar as it is clear

160

Answer to communication No. 0002259. Santa fé de Bogotá Metropolitan Police, C.A.D. Command. Report dated 8 November 1995. Book 4, pages 36 – 37, District Attorney’s Office 11 who presented evidence before Criminal Law Judges of the Specialized Court in Bogotá’s Case File 27212. 161 th Letter CAD BOG/JI/185/95. ALCATEL. Audio Recording, 8 November 1995, Book 4, page 38. 162 Answer to communication 919/041195, Santa fé de Bogotá Metropolitan Police, C.A.D. Command. Transcript of a recording th of a citizen’s statement, identity unknown, reported to 112, 7 November 1995. Book 4, Pages 39 – 41, District Attorney’s Office 11 who presented evidence before Criminal Law Judges of the Specialized Court in Bogotá’s Case File 27212. 163 Ibid.

that the aforementioned transcript was the product of its signatory’s imagination, as, according to procedural evidence it was technically impossible for such a transcription to exist”.164 It is logical therefore, to conclude that the telephone call in question differed to the reality of events, thus potentially being an attempt by the murderers to derail the investigation. The Court also recognizes that the soldiers were several blocks away from the crime scene and that they began the journey back to the Military Academy at 10:00 a.m.; the anonymous call was made around 11:15 a.m., over an hour after the four-wheel drive had left the area.165 Based on the facts of the case the Second Court ruled, on 31 st January 2003 that, “it [the previous information] could not be used as evidence as there is no spaciotemporal connection between the caller and the crime scene”.166 Despite proof that the military personnel were not involved in the murder, the District Attorney’s Office continued to blame the homicide on members of the Colombian Armed Forces. Their accusations were centered around clandestine meetings that supposedly took place to plot the overthrow of Ernesto Samper Pizano’s Government. On 24th November 1995 an anonymous letter arrived at Q.A.P News blaming Gómez Hurtado’s homicide on the 20th Brigade.167 It directly accused Colonel Bernardo Ruiz Silva and Major Carlos Plazas of being those responsible for the murder.168 The letter also stated that the hitmen, most probably came from Bucaramanga, a city to which Colonel Ruiz Silva frequently traveled. On 14th December 1995 Mary Luz Cuadros made a statement in which she declared that her ex-husband, Carlos Gaona Ovalle, a driver in the 5th Military Intelligence Brigade based in Bucaramanga, had been involved in the homicide.169 It was due to this statement that the criminal investigation focused its attention towards Bucaramanga. In addition to the above, on 22nd December 1995, the Technical Investigation Team (C.T.I.) Director (Bucaramanga Section) forwarded the CTI National Director of the Attorney General a confidential report alluding to the possible participation of a man who was working for the 20th Military Intelligence Brigade. Real name Omar Berrío Loaiza, he was known by the pseudonym 164

Second Specialized Criminal Court in Bogotá, Date of ruling, 25 March 2003, Page 183, located in Case File JR 6214, JR 6214 A, and JR 4152 B. 165 st Second Specialized Criminal Court in Bogotá, Date of ruling 31 January 2003. Page 40, located in JR 6214 C. 166 Ibid. 167 th Letter signed by anonymous sender addressed to Q.A.P. News, Bogotá D.C. 24 November 1995, Book 11 A, Page 42. District Attorney’s Office 11 who presented evidence before Criminal Law Judges of the Specialized Court in Bogotá’s Case File 27212. 168 Ibid. 169 th Torres, Edgar, “Gómez’s Assassination, witness I”, El Tiempo Newspaper, Section – Nation, 18 March 1999.

Juan Camilo, and worked with, among others, the Franklin brothers, Carlos Gaona Ovalle (Mary Luz Cuadros’ ex husband), and Carlos Julio Rocha.170 Subsequent to this, two CTI investigators, Manuel Salvador Herrera and Iván Vanegas reported that it was possible that the man known as Juan Camilo Restrepo (real name Omar Berrío Loaiza), who worked for the 20th Military Intelligence Brigade, Bucaramanga, and whose Commanding Officer was Colonel Ruiz Silva, had participated in Gómez Hurtado’s homicide.171 As well as Omar Berrío Loaiza, they also incriminated his brother Henry Berrío Loaiza, the Franklin brothers, Carlos Gaona Ovalle, and Segundo Chavarro, who were supposedly associated with the 20th Military Intelligence Brigade at the time the murder was committed. It is important to note however, that it was later proved Henry Berrío Loaiza was never part of the intelligence (infantry) unit; he had by this time already retired and was no longer involved with the army. Despite this he still remained languished in prison for several years before being released.172 From this time onwards, the theory of the Hunters, with their network of support in the 20th Military Intelligence Brigade, gathered pace. Several testimonies were received that helped to convince the heedless and biased District Attorney’s Office that the members of this group, along with help from the top echelons of military command, were responsible for this heinous crime. The principal players accused by the District Attorney’s Office on the basis of this theory were: Retired Colonel Bernardo Ruiz Silva, the former soldiers and brothers Omar, also known as Juan Camilo, and Henry Berrío Loaiza; the brothers who both served in the 20th Military Intelligence Brigade, Carlos and Franklin Gaona Ovalle; former soldiers René Carvajal López and Carlos Julio Rocha, and lastly; Miguel Angel Díaz Méndez, also known as Gustavito. Although the previous individuals were accused of the crime, the District Attorney’s investigators tried their best for several years to “get a General”. There were two reasons for wanting to do this: the entire coup d’état theory would be absurd if none of the top military commanders were involved, and also there was a clear desire to blame the homicide on the highest echelons of the military. This would have an adverse affect on the 20 th Military Intelligence Brigade and strengthen 170

Communication No. DSCTI – 11900, Bucaramanga Technical Investigation Team. 22nd December 1995, Book 19 A, Pages 288-289. District Attorney’s Office 11 who presented evidence before Criminal Law Judges of the Specialized Court in Bogotá’s Case File 27212. 171 th Report No. 0434-UNPJ, Office of the Attorney General, Technical Investigation Team, Bogotá 8 July 1996, Book 20, Pages 167-186. District Attorney’s Office 11 who presented evidence before Criminal Law Judges of the Specialized Court in Bogotá’s Case File 27212. 172 Ibid.

President Samper’s “I’m the one in command” position, which he had been developing since mid 1995. Witnesses who made statements against this group also accused Gustavo Adolfo Jaramillo, also known as “Tavo”, Luis Fernando Jutinico, also known as “Pechuga”, and Hermes Ortiz, who were incriminated under the Bogotá Group theory. Due to a decision taken on 13th November 1996, the District Attorney accused Gustavo Adolfo Jaramillo, Hermes Ortiz Durán and other members of the Bogotá Group of the following charges: first degree murder, attempted murder, illegal carrying of arms, and personal injuries associated with the assassination of Alvaro Gómez Hurtado. On 23 rd February of the same year the District Attorney brought the same charges against Luis Fernando Jutinico Trujillo. Two days later the following charges were brought against Omar and Henry Berrío Loaiza, Carlos Alberto, and Franklin Gaona Ovalle: first degree murder, attempted murder, illegal carrying of Armed Forces weapons for private use, and conspiracy to commit the murder of Alvaro Gómez. The charges of conspiracy to commit a crime were brought against Jaramillo, Duran, and Jutinico on 8th March 1999. On 14th April 2000 the District Attorney charged René Carvajal López, who was previously District Attorney Gómez Méndez’s star witness. Due to pressure to incriminate Army Generals, Carvajal denounced the District Attorney’s manipulation; an action that changed his position from witness to accused. Later the same year, on 2 nd November, Miguel Angel Díaz Méndez, was also charged. The two men were both charged with: multiple first degree murder, attempted murder, conspiracy to commit a crime, and the illegal carrying of Armed Forces weapons for private use (all pertaining to the Gómez case).173 Due to Carlos Julio Rocha’s death during the course of the investigation, the District Attorney’s Office closed the case against him on 15th February 2001. The District Attorney’s principal source of evidence against the aforementioned people charged was that of “hearsay” testimonies, all submitted anonymously in accordance with the current legislation. Since there was no technical or physical evidence that could be used to try the defendants, ballistic and clothing tests, the autopsy, dactyloscopic tests, and general physical evidence were not employed as a method of determining guilt. Trials based solely on witnesses can lead to irrefutable evidence, however, it was clear that the District Attorney’s accusations

173

Charge brought against René Carvajal López. Attorney General, District Attorney’s Office 11 who presented evidence before Criminal Law Judges of the Specialized Court in Bogotá’s Case File 27212.

lacked any evidence whatsoever due to the fact the witnesses presented provided neither consistent, truthful or reliable evidence. The witnesses who, in particular, excelled due to their complete lack consistency, and in whom the District Attorney placed its entire faith were: Mary Luz Cuadros, René Carvajal López (before rejected and himself indicted), Javier Giovani Gómez Galán, Julio Ramón Carrillo (Emilio I), and Mercedes Yolima Guáqueta.174 Each one of these characters’ statements, deemed conclusive by the District Attorney, due to the fact that they were the exclusive basis of their case, were thrown out by the Colombian justice system because of their fantastic and inconsistent nature.175 The other 16 testimonies, all made under non-disclosed identity, were obtained by the Bucaramanga District Attorney’s Office and submitted as evidence fundamental to their case. It was, however, discarded during the trial by the Second Specialized Criminal Court in Bogotá as the witnesses did not appear in court on the Judge’s orders, in accordance with legal requirements. By 2001 faceless regional justice no longer existed. On 19th November 2001, communication FJUE-YN-1146, Ref. DT-11-590 stated the completely unbelievable: the book that recorded the witnesses’ true identities had mysteriously disappeared from the District Attorney’s Office safe. Below individual witnesses’ testimonies are detailed along with the Colombian Judges’ reasons for refuting the strong reliability that the Attorney Generals Alfonso Valdivieso (1884 - 1997) and Alfonso Gómez Méndez (1997 – 2001) had attributed to them.

MARY LUZ CUADROS Late in 1995 Mary Luz Cuadros Blanco appeared before the Bucaramanga C.T.I. denunciation committee to make a claim against her ex-husband, Carlos Gaona Ovalle, for not having paid child support. On this occasion she not only accused Carlos Gaona of owing her child support money, but also told the C.T.I. investigator that she had heard her ex-husband was part of the group of people who murdered Alvaro Gómez Hurtado.176 For the next three years, during which time she was used as a witness, Cuadros gave a series of statements characterized by 174

“Crazy Memo” also testified against these suspects, however, for reasons already explained his testimony was classified a “fishing expedition”, thus not heard. 175 Please see the Second Criminal Court of the Specialized Circuit in Bogotá’s rulings located in file numbers JR 6241, JR 6241 A, th and JR 4152 B (20 May 2003) of the Second Criminal Court of the Specialized Circuit in Bogotá, concerning the case brought against retired Colonel Bernado Ruiz Silva. 176 th Torres, Edgar, “Gómez Assassination, witness I”. El Tiempo Newspaper, Section - Nation, 18 March 1999.

contradictions. They all read like scripts given to her by members of the District Attorney: a charge to which she later publically confessed during the trial. She also admitted to giving a false testimony and engaging in procedural fraud. Many years later, due to this sham, District Attorney Deicy Jaramillo (one of the main endorsers of the Hunters theory) discretely and surreptitiously exonerated her due to a statue of limitations. Mary Luz’s testimony was formally made on 6th August 1996. The evidence she gave was of extremely high importance for the District Attorney’s Office in their case against Gómez Hurtado’s killers. Mary Luz told of meetings, dealings, and all other illegal activities embarked upon by the brothers Carlos and Franklin Gaona Ovalle (her former brother-in-law and husband respectively), the latter of whom she had recently reported for not paying alimony. She also denounced that Omar and Henry Berrío Loaiza, together with another group of men, were associated with members of the no-longer-existing 20th Brigade (Armed Forces): criminals who were prosecuted for the attack on Antonio José Cancino. The group consisted of high-ranking military commanders including: Colonel Bernardo Ruiz Silva; Generals Ricardo Emilio Cifuentes and Harold Bedoya; Police Colonel Germán Osorio Sepúlveda, President Samper’s closest advisor; and even President Ernesto Samper Pizano himself.177 Mary Luz primarily told stories that involved Gaona Ovalle and the Berrío Loaiza brothers, and then continued by making accusations involving the Bogotá Group members. In her grand finale she made allegations that involved high-ranking Army Commanders and Government officials. When her various statements are reviewed in chronological order it becomes evident how she begins to imply the involvement of important Army and Government agents while, at the same time, managing to further involve herself in these activities. At first her statements indicate that she only heard this information,178 however she later admits being present in secret meetings and even having discussed the topic with the people involved.179 In her statements she recounts that meetings, convoked by her ex-husband Carlos Gaona, to plan the assassination were held at her house in Bogotá. They then moved to bar “Windsor”, in Chapinero, later to a farm in Acacias, Meta, and finally to Hotel Casa Medina (also in Chapinero).180 It was during these meetings that the assassination of the President Samper’s 177

Mary Luz Cuadros’ statements, 6 and 9 August 1996 (Book 20, Pages 198 - 204). 30 April 1997 (Book 27 A, Pages 242 th th 251). 20 October 1997 (Book 34, Pages 193 - 213). 27 January 1998 (Book 39, Pages 235 - 237), District Attorney’s Office 11 who presented evidence before Criminal Law Judges of the Specialized Court in Bogotá’s Case File 27212. 178 th th Mary Luz Cuadros’ statement, 6 and 9 August 1996, Prosecution 20’s case file UNAT Bogotá, Book 20, Pages 198 -204. 179 th Mary Luz Cuadros’ statement, 20 October 1997, Prosecution 20’s case file UNAT Bogotá, Book 34, Pages 193 - 213. 180 th th Second Specialized Criminal Court in Bogotá, ruling dated 25 March 2003 (Page 210), and 20 May 2003 (Page 183)

Attorney, Antonio José Cancino, and Alvaro Gómez Hurtado were planned; but what was the motive? Mary Luz purported to have listened to a recording supplied by one of Cancino’s assassinated bodyguards to Colonel Ruiz Silva and Colonel Osorio. It can be understood form this recording that the motive for assassinating Alvaro Gómez was his knowledge of the existence of evidence linking President Samper Pizano to drug traffickers.181 The witness confirmed that those intellectually responsible for the murder included President Samper and his close advisor Colonel Osorio.182 She claimed those culpable of the actual killing included Army Colonel Bernardo Ruiz Silva, a woman known as Vanessa, Luis Fernando Jutinico, and Gustavo Adolfo Jaramillo. These last two men were also, according to the Bogotá Group hypothesis, guilty of pulling the trigger; they had supposedly on the day of the murder been driving around in a gray car purchased in Pereira. Mary Luz also said that she had heard Hector Paul Flórez (accused of this assassination in the Sincelejo Group hypothesis) was driving in a different car with other men whose identities are unknown. She also stated that Segundo Chavarro, the Franklin brothers, and Carlos Gaona Ovalle were driving around in a red fourwheel drive vehicle.183 Her testimony was characterized as having very little supporting evidence, being contradictory, and above all bordering on the fantastic. At the end of 1997, for this very reason, both the Attorney General and the plaintiffs’ attorneys requested a psychological evaluation of the witness by the National Institute of Forensic Science and Medicine.184 The psychiatrist’s report stated that Mary Luz Cuadros showed histrionic personality disorder, a condition which makes it difficult for her to interpret complex situations. Forensic psychologists also believed the witness is affected by circumstantiality, and was, at times, tangential and irrelevant. The implications of this condition are that she has difficulty in differentiating what is real from what is imaginary, which explains her “tendency for the superficial, personality disintegration, and exaggerated or dramatic psychic reactions. It was also concluded that she has a strong emotional dependency and the express need attract attention to herself. It is for these reasons that she unconsciously resorts to compulsive lying”. She additionally shows “low frustration tolerance, which manifests itself through intense emotional outbursts”.185 181

Mary Luz Cuadros’ statement, 8 November 1996, (Book 22, Pages 170 - 180), and 5 March 1997 (Book 24, Pages 172 186) Prosecution 20’s Case file UNAT. 182 th Mary Luz Cuadros’ statement 5 March 1997, Prosecution 20’s case file UNAT, Bogotá, Book 24, pages 172 - 186. 183 th Second Specialized Criminal Court in Bogotá, ruling on 20 May 2003, Page 178. 184 Mary Luz Cuadros Blanco’s forensic psychiatric examination undertaken by Dr. Virgilio Hernández Castellanos, Chief of the National Human Rights Organization, National Institute of Forensic Medicine and Forensic Sciences, Bogotá Organization of th Forensic Psychiatry and Psychology, Bogotá 16 December 1997. Book 39, Pages 46 -54. 185 Ibid.

Notwithstanding the above, both the C.T.I. investigators and the District Attorney’s Office claimed to have concrete evidence that would prove the witness’ testimony was credible. 186 This evidence was based on the psychiatric report’s finding that such a mental condition does not necessarily mean the testimony should be disregarded completely, but instead requires more detailed analysis. The District Attorney’s Office curiously took what a mentally ill woman had to report on the killers as the complete truth, however completely ignored her statements regarding those intellectually responsible for the crime, such as Ernesto Samper and Germán Osorio. It is extremely bizarre that the District Attorney’s Office only brought charges against those accused as being the actual perpetrators of the crime. Credibility was clearly not given to the allegations regarding Colonel Osorio or former President Samper. And what was the reason for this? According to an El Tiempo newspaper article on 18th March 1999: “The District Attorney’s Office decided to bring charges against all those that were perceived to be the actual perpetrators of the killing. However, it decided against giving credibility to those statements incriminating Colonel Osorio, the General identified as Iván, or President Ernesto Samper. Why: there is absolutely no way of proving her that any part of her statements are true; that they are anything other than pure exaggerations and fantasies”.187 What exactly was it that guaranteed the truth of Mary Luz’s statements against the killers? Why was her testimony against Gaona Ovalle, the Berrío Loaiza brothers, Bernardo Ruiz Silva, Héctor Paúl Flórez, and several of the Bogotá Group enough for charges to be brought against them? These men were charged, but an investigation into her accusations of those intellectually responsible was never undertaken. With regards to the murderers, it is surprising that the witness mentioned individuals that formed part of the District attorney’s other two theories: the Sincelejo and Bogotá Groups. Héctor Paul Flórez was accused from the Sincelejo Group and Gustavo Adolfo Jaramillo, Luis Fernando Jutinico, and Hermes Ortiz from the Bogotá group. All of these men were prosecuted for the attack against Cancino. However, the Second Civil Court of the Circuit of Bogotá’s first ruling declared Colonel Ruiz Silva innocent: “Through the investigation it has not been possible 186 187

“The Gómez Assassination, witness I” El Tiempo newspaper, Section - Nation, 18 March 1999. th Torres, Edgar. “The Gómez Assassination, witness I”, El Tiempo newspaper, Section – Nation, 18 March 1999.

to determine any connection between members of the Military and those who confessed to the attack against Mr. Cancino Moreno”.188 The result is equally predictable for both the Sincelejo and Bogotá groups. In her statements Mary Luz asserted that the suspicious car linked to the crime – a red Nissan Datsun – was driven by her ex-husband Carlos Gaona Ovalle and that one of the sketches matched his appearance.189 In her later testimony, given on 25th November 1996 she stated that Omar Berrío Loaiza was friends with Carlos and Franklin Gaona, and his code name in the 20th Brigade was “Juan Camilo”.190 The completely conflicting information in this declaration, which the District Attorney did not take into account, was that that the vehicle was supposed to be beige, not red as she claimed. The license plates had been originally assigned to a red vehicle, but were later swapped to a beige vehicle for reasons previously explained. Those responsible for feeding Mary Luz information on how to testify neglected to take this detail into consideration. The witness also stated that in late November or early December she received a phone call from “Daniel” who confirmed that Carlos Gaona was involved in the assassination and that she would recognize him by the car he was driving.191 The witness said she received the telephone call at her mother’s home, however the Second Court received evidence from the telephone company certifying that at this time, the address was under no contract with their company; thus it was impossible for her to have received the call.192 She also recounted that at around the same time she had traveled from Bucaramanga to Bogotá to meet Segundo Chavarro, who confirmed that Carlos Gaona had taken part in the assassination. Her families’ testimonies were taken and compared with hers to verify the truth, and, according to them, she didn’t leave Bucaramanga until August 1996, when she joined the Attorney General’s victims and witnesses protection program.193 It is necessary to point out that in her various statements Mary Luz gave different versions of the role her husband played in the homicide. On one occasion she claimed that Carlos Gaona

188

Second Specialized Criminal Court in Bogotá, ruling on 20 May 2003. Page 180 th Mary Luz Cuadros’ statement, 6 August 1996, Prosecution 20’s case file, UNAT Bogotá, Book 20, Pages 198 - 199 190 th Mary Luz Cuadros’ statement, 25 November 1996, Prosecution 20’s case file, UNAT Bogotá, Book 23, Page 135 191 th Mary Luz Cuadros’ statement, 10 October 1996, Prosecution 20’s case file UNAT, Bogotá, Book 22, Pages 144 192 th Second Specialized Criminal Court in Bogotá, ruling dated 25 May 2003 (page 204) and May 20, 2003 (Page 179). 193 th th Second Specialized Penal Court in Bogotá, ruling dated 25 March 2003 (Page 205) and 20 May 2003 (Page 180). 189

had pursued the Conservative leader’s vehicle,194 and on another she said he had had only been witness to the crime.195 In a third statement he apparently shot Gómez Hurtado three times.196 Her contradictions were addressed in court when, on 3 rd October 1997 Mr. Jaime Arturo Ríos Vergara was summoned by the District Attorney. He made it clear that Mary Luz Cuadros’ version of events was indeed complete fantasy. According to Mr. Ríos Vergara, Mary Luz sent him a letter, written by her hand, inviting him to participate in setting-up the current defendants. She said he “would make good cash”.197 The following are excerpts from the letter: “Hi Jimmi, today I was at the District Attorney’s Office. I was talking about you, man. An official form the CTI man is going to talk to you, and this is what you are going to tell him: you were with me once in a house in San Mateo, in a meeting with three other men but you didn’t have much contact with them… he was called Daniel… and that other Paisa guy that I told you about is called Tavo. Juan Camilo’s real name is Omar Berrío Loaiza, I don’t know Daniel’s, the Paisa is Gustavo Adolfo Jaramillo… These guys and Daniel were friends of Carlos and Franklin, my exhusband and my brother-in-law… I told you that Carlos, Franklin, Segundo, Daniel, a man called Hermes, Rafael, Héctor Paul, and others were going to be the ones who attacked Cancino, and that they were going to kill Alvaro Gómez… Pay attention man so you can take advantage… Another thing is that this guy Omar Berrío, or Juan Camilo as he’s also known, stole guns from the Army base near 100 Street. Then they took them to Sam Mateo and shared them out. Those were the guns that were used to kill Alvaro Gómez. Pay attention, I had to invent all of that. No worries though, because everything’s going to go perfectly. The only thing you have to do is to learn it all, and learn it well, so that they get you in here and you can make some cash... Bye Jimmi, and destroy this letter when you’ve memorized everything. Next week at the latest they’ll call you. You’ve got to learn all this as if it actually happened, and make it awful. See you Jimmi, as always I trust you. Don’t go behind my back and tell anyone otherwise we’ll get in

194

Mary Luz Cuadros’ statement on 5 March 1997, Prosecution 20’s case file UNAT, Bogotá, Book 24, Page 172 - 186. th th Second Specialized Criminal Court in Bogotá, ruling dated 25 March 2003 (Page 211) and 20 May 2003 (page 183). 196 Ibid. 197 rd Jaime Arturo Ríos Vergara’ statement on 3 October 1997. Prosecution 20’s Case file, UNAT, Bogotá, Book 50, Pages 47 - 53. 195

some real big trouble man. We’ll go to prison for this. No one, not even your mother… Jimmi, this has got to stay between us forever”.198 The letter was written on paper with the District Attorney’s heading. In consideration of the above, it is absurd that the District Attorney used Mary Luz Cuadros’ testimony as evidence that was used to deprive the defendants of their freedom and give support to the Hunters hypothesis. Jaime Arturo Ríos Vergara appeared in court to make a statement to the District Attorneys. In the middle of his testimonial he repented and handed a member of staff the letter to which I give reference. It is for this reason that the Second Specialized Court in Bogotá finally drew the conclusions that: “In view of her statements’ inconsistencies and chimerical nature, and her serious personality disorder, this Court finds that her testimony did not provide truthful evidence of the events, but instead recklessly derailed the investigation”…199 “*F+rom a legal, factual, sociological, and psychological viewpoint this Court has arrived at the conclusion that the testimony signed by this witness is unable to provide certainty regarding the veritable guilt of the defendants”. (underlining off the text)200 The High Court in Bogotá also arrived at the following conclusion: “As such, the myriad inaccuracies in the witness’ account are so exorbitant that we can only but reject it, as a valid special witness’ testimony, for it may compromise Colonel Ruiz’s involvement in the murder”.201 As a result of the innumerable amount of undisputed lies contained in Mary Luz’s statements the District Attorney’s Office opened an investigation into her making false testimonies.

198

Letter from Mary Luz Cuadros to Jaime Arturo Ríos Vergara. Prosecution 20’s Case file UNAT Bogotá, Book 20, Pages 47 - 53. th th Second Specialized Criminal Court in Bogotá, ruling dated 25 March 2003 (Pages 211 - 212), and 20 May 2003 (Page184). 200 th th Second Specialized Criminal Court in Bogotá, ruling dated 25 May 2003 (Page 214), and 20 May 2003 (Page 187). 201 nd High Court of the Judicial District of Bogotá, ruling dated 2 December 2003, MP Humberto Gutierrez Ricaurte, Page 23. 199

Despite the blatancy of the situation, the investigative body decided to halt the investigation against her, exactly the same as with Lugo Alvarez, Mariela Villarreal, and Rodríguez Cuadrado. On 29th August 2003 a preclusion order was supprisingly applied to the Mary Luz investigation, which clearly demonstrated the pattern of cover-up and derailment.202 Throughout the investigation Mary Luz’s calumnies were evident: manifested in the contradictions and inconsistencies in her testimonies, the letter she sent a friend encouraging him to make a false testimony for economic rewards, and her proven psychological instability. The District Attorney’s task to investigate the false testimony she gave in Alvaro Gómez and José del Cristo Huertas’ murder case was not likely to be an arduous task. It was surprising therefore when the body in charge of the investigation applied a preclusion order. Is there any end to this impunity? Who exactly is responsible for thwarting the investigation? RENÉ CARVAJAL LÓPEZ Former non-commissioned officer in the 20th Military Intelligence Brigade René Carvajal implicated the Berrío Loaiza brothers and other military personnel in Gómez Hurtado’s assassination by identifying them in sketches published by the media. His first testimony was given on 21st March 1997: a year and a half after the crime was committed. On identifying Omar and Henry Berrío Loaiza203 from the facial composites, he made clear that any comments he had heard regarding their involvement in the homicide stemmed form their resemblance to the aforementioned facial composite images.204 Carvajal claimed that César Augusto Beltrán, also known as “Monoguto”, told him that he could establish contact for him with the District Attorney’s Office. It would then be possible to make a statement, in the Gómez case, regarding the likeness he noticed between the sketches and certain members of the Hunters.205 Carvajal was thus introduced to Iván and Manuel Herrera, members of the CTI, and gave them his statement in a hotel in Socorro, Santander. 206 The question that inevitably needs to be asked is: why did Carvajal choose to meet with intermediaries and not go directly to the District Attorney’s Office?

202

Preclusion order applied to the investigation against Mary Luz Cuadros, Andrés Mauricio Mediorreal, and Héctor de Jesús Berrío. District Attorney representative to the Specialized Circuit Judges; Terrorism Sub-Unit, District Attorney Deicy Jaramillo R. rd 23 August 2003. File number 61.431, Book 1, Pages 136 - 158. 203 st René Carvajal López’s statement, 21 March 1997. Prosecution 20’s Case file, UNAT Bogotá, Book 25, Page 30. 204 Ibid. 205 th th Second Specialized Criminal Court in Bogotá, ruling dated 25 March 2003 (Page 211), and 20 May 2003 (Pages 192 - 193). 206 th Second Specialized Penal Court in Bogotá, sentences dated March 25, 2003 (Page 221) and 20 May 2003 (Pages 192 - 193).

It is a known fact that from 4th June 1997 Mr. Carvajal received economic support from the District Attorney’s Office under the proviso that he moved from Bucaramanga for his own safety. Despite this stipulation the witness remained in Bucaramanga and continued to receive money from the District Attorney’s Office.207 It was for this reason that an official letter (No. 0167, 25th January 1999) was sent from the Director of the Witness Protection Program to the special secretary attached to the District Attorney’s Anti-Terrorism Department. This letter stated that “The fundamental purpose of the economic aid would be lost if it is given for any other reason than security. As such, if René Carvajal defiantly continues to reside in Bucaramanga, the Program will be unable to provide further assistance, as by doing so its integrity would be compromised”.208 As can clearly be seen, from the time the assistance was given, a year and a half elapsed until its legitimacy was brought into question; Carvajal was, for this entire period of time, receiving unjustified economic assistance. He thoroughly confounded members of the Department of Justice when informing them that several members of the CTI offered him an economic guerdon if he aided the District Attorney’s Office by accusing members of the Armed Forces. To help him successfully increment these men they provided him with a wide array of information regarding the murder of Gómez Hurtado: “Mr. MANUEL HERRERA in the presence of WILLIAM, also a CTI employee, offered me remuneration of one or one and a half million pesos if I helped facilitate Colonel Ruiz’s arrest… *I+ was the useful idiot, used to pin the blame on members of the Armed Forces. I was put in contact with various alleged informants who, as part of the process, provided me with information regarding the death of Alvaro Gómez”.209 Regardless of the allegations’ actual validity, we are left with a sepulchral sense of uncertainty as to the veritable truthfulness of his testimony. However, in order to explicitly demonstrate the witnesses’ complete lack of credibility, his main statements will be presented below. His first two testimonies referred to the origins of the Hunters; they accredited members of this group with the undertaking and development of various illegal activities. 210 He also reported that by mid September 1995 Miguel Angel Díaz Méndez, also known as Gustavo, informed him that Omar Berrío was in Bucaramanga looking for people to get involved in a very profitable job 207

Official letter SAUT No. 0167, dated 25 January 1999, in file 27212. Prosecution 20’s Case file, UNAT Bogotá, Book 2a, page 237. 208 Ibid. 209 th th Second Specialized Criminal Court in Bogotá, ruling dated 25 March 2003 (Pages 227 – 228), and 20 May 2003 (Pages 197 – 198) 210 st th René Carvajal López’s statement, 21 March 1997, and 28 April 1997, Prosecution 20’s UNAT Bogotá, Book 25, Pages 20 – 30. Book 56A, Pages 191 – 194.

that was to be carried out in San Alberto, César.211 Carvajal reached the conclusion that, due to what he had heard, the job must be the Conservative leader’s assassination.212 Thus, the witness’ statement regarding Gómez Hurtado’s assassination is nothing more than mere personal speculation. When he realized the District Attorney was attributing his statements with so much importance, he unequivocally clarified: “I have never explicitly known of any involvement the Berrío Loaiza brothers may have had in Gómez Hurtado’s murder. During a statement I gave to the District Attorney I was shown some sketches, which had been published in El Tiempo newspaper on 4 th November. One of the sketches resembled Juan Camilo, however this by no means confirms his participation in Gómez Hurtado’s assassination… the fact that the sketch resembles Juan Camilo does not mean I am declaring that he is responsible for the crime”.213 Furthermore, the witness later admitted that the sketches of the supposed assassins he was shown by the authorities were not drawn form statements made, but copied from photographs of the soldiers accused. “Among all the sketches I saw I found one that, with no exaggeration, the only thing that did not resemble the photo they showed me was the clothes he was wearing. In the sketch he was wearing civilian clothes and in the photo he was dressed in military uniform. Having a knowledge of these composite sketches, I know that it is impossible for such similarity to exist between the one I saw and the photograph. In my opinion it looked like a simple copy and I would go so far as to say that it would not have been possible for a morphologist to have produced a sketch with such accurate characteristics”.214 Carvajal at no point said he was present during the planning stages of the homicide or that he witnessed it. The District Attorney’s Office showed Carvajal – as is stated on record – photos masquerading as sketches. They also indicated that the men in the sketches were the murders 211

René Carvajal López’s statement 21 March 1997. Prosecution 20’s UNAT Bogotá, Book 25, Pages 21 - 22 st René Carvajal López’s statement 21 March 1997. Prosecution 20’s UNAT Bogotá, Book 25, Pages 20 - 22 213 th th Second Specialized Criminal Court in Bogotá, ruling dated 25 March 2003 (Page 224), and 20 May 2003 (Page 195). 214 th th Second Specialized Criminal Court in Bogotá, ruling dated 25 March 2003 (Page 224), and 20 May 2003 (Page 196). 212

as they had been drawn from witnesses present at the scene of the crime: none of this was true. His support for the District Attorney’s case against the Hunters was limited to his assuring that the men in the photos did indeed resemble the accused. It was due to this that the District Attorney’s Office believed it was in the possession of irrefutable evidence and thus attributed the witness with so much importance. In complete juxtaposition the prosecution attached absolutely no value to the many witnesses actually present at the crime who did not identify the Hunters as the killers of Alvaro Gómez and José Huertas Hastamorir. In subsequent statements Carvajal maintained his first testimony, but also went further by contributing more information; none that he was personally privy to, but instead what he had heard second hand. According to the statement he made on 9th April 1999 he was unaware of anyone who was planning Gómez Hurtado’s assassination; he had only received information from various sources stating that the perpetrators had been members of the Armed Forces.215 Moreover, in the statement he made on 24th August 2000, Carvajal spoke of two CTI agents as those in charge of finding former members of the 20 th Brigade to testify in the Gómez Hurtado assassination trial. These two agents were the same men who had offered him a bribe for helping them accuse members of the Hunters. He was aware that the agents were tailoring the investigation to be able to accuse members of the aforementioned Brigade. Emilio I, an anonymous witness, and someone who shall be subsequently detailed, was one of the pawns used to manufacture this charade. “One of them was Manuel Herrera and the other was William; I don’t know his surname. Both of them work for the CTI… They were always interested in locating all of the Hunters and continuously asked me if they knew of anything relating to Gómez’s death… Something else I found strange was that I was asked if any of the Hunters had ever had a serious argument with Omar, and if he would talk. The status quo was always the same: to find former group members to testify in the trial… I don’t know what the motives were, or are, to do such a thing, but it is evident that the people who conducted the investigation were certainly creative… I testified for the first time in March 1997. If I am not wrong, one year later in 1998 on 4 th June Emilio I 215

Second Specialized Criminal Court in Bogotá, ruling dated 25 March 2003 (Page 224), and 20 May 2003 (Page 194).

made his exultant appearance. If that man claims to have already had information then why did he never show up before? He always appears to make additions to his statements after I receive the call to make additions to mine”.216 Apart from the serious accusations he made against CTI investigators – something that should be emphasized – none of René Carvajal’s statements were of any importance in the investigation. They were perceived by both the Second Court and the High Court in the Bogotá Judicial District as devoid of seriousness and legal weight. Due to this they were awarded absolutely no merit as reliable evidence that could be used to prosecute members of the Hunters.217 René’s statements were clearly unwanted by those who were using him to endeavor to implicate members of the Hunters. He went from being an important witness for the District Attorney to someone who was under investigation. Finally he was ostracized by the District Attorney’s Office along with all the other false witnesses that they themselves had created. The District Attorney’s Office did however, find in his testimony one piece of evidence that they deemed as extremely relevant. The statement he made after having simply seen some sketches and photos was taken as crucial evidence and led to them issuing an arrest warrant for the men he recognized.218 According to his statements Carvajal himself played no part in the crime. He was also unable to confirm whether any of the Hunters were involved. His entire knowledge of the accused men’s movements in Bucaramanga came from second hand sources and third party information. 219 JAVIER GIOVANI GÓMEZ GALÁN Two days after René Carvajal’s first statement on 23rd March 19997, Mr. Javier Giovani Gómez Galán, in a statement to the District Attorney, confirmed that he had worked for Military Intelligence under Omar Barrío Loaiza.220 He claimed that in October 1995 Berrío Loaiza had

216

Second Specialized Criminal Court in Bogotá, ruling dated 25 March 2003 (Pages 227 - 228), and 20 May 2003 (Pages 197 198). 217 nd High Court of the Judicial District of Bogotá, ruling dated 2 December 2003, MP Humberto Gutierrez Ricaurte, Page 17 / th Second Specialized criminal Court Bogotá, ruling dated 20 May 2003 (Page 194). 218 th Second Specialized Criminal Court in Bogotá, ruling dated 20 May 2003 (Page 196). 219 th th Second Specialized Criminal Court in Bogotá, ruling dated 26 March 2003 (Page 223), and 20 May 2003 (Page 194). 220 rd Javier Giovani Gómez Galán’s testimony, 23 March 1997; Prosecutor 20’s Case file UNAT Bogotá, Book 25, Pages 45 and 46.

been in Bucaramanga. According to a friend of his, known only as “Pipicito” (Little Willy), he was on a search for people to take back to Bogotá.221 Based on these facts, Gómez Galán began to form his own theories that concluded with Omar Berrío being involved in the murder of Alvaro Gómez Hurtado: “*I+ knew they came to find people to take back to Bogotá. That’s what a friend, “Pipicito”, told me. I don’t know his real name but he was the one who told me everything about what was going on and what was going to happen. That was how I worked out that he came here so they could do what they did to Alvaro Gómez. I figured that out because General Ricardo Emilio Cifuentes was Commanding Officer in Bucaramanga and Juan Camilo was his little pet. General Cifuentes wanted President Samper to resign; it was his plan to destabilize the country. That’s what I reckon, but of course I can’t say for sure”.222 Gómez Galán’s testimony was based on entirely his own conjectures, and had no actual factual support. In addition to this, he claimed during the trial that it was not possible for him to identify the man he called “Pipicito”.223 His theory stemmed from the only source of information he had: it was never known what was this man’s real name, whether he worked, or if he was known by Military Intelligence. His very existence cannot be verified. “None of the many people who testified at the trial knew of this man’s existence. Surely his hard-to-forget nickname would have stuck in the minds of the other witnesses ”.224 Moreover, the witness affirmed that when he saw the composite sketches broadcast on the news he identified Omar Berrío’s face as the friend known as “Pipicito”: the man who had emphasized that Gómez Hurtado’s homicide had been sanctioned by Colonel Ruiz Silva. The Commanding Officer, as well as other soldiers, had expressed the necessity for President Samper to resign, and for this reason there was a need to destabilize the country.225 He also confirmed that his suspicions were corroborated by Sergeant Cristian who, at that time, was a member of the Second Infantry Division, Bucaramanga : 221

Javier Giovani Gómez Galán’s testimony, 23 March 1997; Prosecutor 20’s Case file UNAT Bogotá, Book 25, Page 52 rd Javier Giovani Gómez Galán’s testimony, 23 March 1997; Prosecutor 20’s Case file UNAT Bogotá, Book 25, Page 52 223 th th Second Specialized Penal Court in Bogotá, sentences dated 25 March 2003 (Page 216) and 20 May 2003 (Page 188). 224 Ibid. 225 rd Javier Giovani Gómez Galán’s testimony, 23 March 1997; Prosecutor 20’s Case file UNAT Bogotá, Book 25, Page 52 222

“*I+ told him – Cristian, that the man in that photo that keeps being shown about Alvaro Gómez’s murder looks just like Juan Camilo. And he told me straight: that Juan Camilo was there when Alvaro Gómez was murdered. He was so certain that right there and then my suspicions, and what Pipicito had told me, were confirmed. Cristian is a Master Sergeant, but I don’t remember his name or his surname”.226 Simón Medina Murcia, Sergeant in the National Army of Colombia, was the man known as Cristian when he was in the Fifth Mechanized Brigade, Bucaramanga. During the time that crime was committed he held the position of Chief of Intelligence.227 Mr. Medina Murcia stated that he did on one occasion speak with Gómez Galán, who arrived at his office under the guise of bringing him information.228 The witness clarified that on this occasion the man identified himself only as “Carlos” and stated that it was his desire to be rewarded economically for his help. Furthermore, he reported that Gómez Galán had never worked for Military Intelligence in Bucaramanga and had no knowledge of Alvaro Gómez Hurtado’s assassination.229 As can be seen, Gómez Galán’s accusations are based either entirely on his own conjectures, or on conversations that he had with people who later deny his statements. He is, in fact, sure of nothing. His statements are, thus, no more than his own personal interpretations of the facts and can, by no means, be used to confirm the truth of anything. JULIO RAMÓN CARRILLO VARGAS (EMILIO I) Emilio I intervened, in his capacity as an anonymous witness, when he gave his first testimony on 4th June 1998.230 However, during proceedings on 22nd July 1999 the District Attorney lifted his anonymity and revealed his true name:231 a sixty-three year old farmer from Santander. He had no connection with the Army or the political world, however managed to become the second star witness. The first was Mary Luz Cuadros, whose testimony was forcefully retracted after it lost all credibility in view its constant contradictions, her debile psychological condition, and the evidence of a set-up that was revealed by Jaime Arturo Ríos Vergara.

226

Javier Giovani Gómez Galán’s testimony, 23 March 1997; Prosecutor 20’s Case file UNAT Bogotá, Book 25, Page 52 th Simón Medina Murcia’s testimony, 4 October 1997, Prosecutor 20’s Case file UNAT Bogotá, Book 37, Page 14 228 th Simón Medina Murcia’s testimony, 4 October 1997, Prosecutor 20’s Case file UNAT Bogotá, Book 37, Page 18 229 Ibid. 230 th Julio Ramón Carrillo Vargas’ testimony, 4 June 1998, Prosecutor 20’s Case file UNAT Bogotá, Book 44, Page 70 231 th th Second Specialized Penal Courtin Bogotá, sentences dated 25 March 2003 (Page 230) and 20 May 2003 (Page 200). 227

In his first statement, Camilo Vargas indicated that Colonel Bernardo Ruiz Silva was both the instigator and organizer of Alvaro Gómez Hurtado’s homicide. The witness claimed that he arrived in Bucaramanga wearing civilian clothes, did not stay in Army barracks, and left the city with the Berrío Loaiza and Gaona Ovalle brothers around the time the homicide took place.232 He subsequently claimed that Colonel Ruiz Silva had followed orders from Army General Camilo Zúñiga, accessory to and commissioner of the crime.233 He also accused politicians, such as Pablo Victoria, Hugo Mantilla Correa, Fabio Valencia Cossio, and “Gaga” (apparently Horacio Serpa, the Minister of the Interior’s, nickname for the Antioquenian Industrialist Henán Echavarria Olózaga), of having a meeting at Myles Frechette’s, (the U.S. Ambassador) house. The purpose of this meeting was supposedly “to plot a coup d’état [and to elect] Alvaro Gómez Hurtado to be its leader”.234 Since Gómez Hurtado refused to be involved in such an effort, the conspirators, he claimed, ordered soldiers to murder him. Vargas, in his statement, incriminated General Ricardo Emilio Cifuentes, Director of the Military Academy, General Luis Bernardo Urbina, Director of Military Intelligence, General Iván Ramírez, Chief of Intelligence of the Armed Forces, and General Camilo Zúñiga Chaparro, Chief of Staff of the Colombian Armed Forces.235 He also stated it was most likely that General Harold Bedoya Pizarro, National Army Commander, would also have known about the assassination plans.236 Carrillo Vargas also confessed that General Urbina, a close friend of Gómez Hurtado, had informed him that roughly one month before the murder, Pablo Victoria, Hugo Mantilla, Hernán Echeverri Olózaga, General Harold Bedoya, General Ricardo Cifuentes, General Camilo Zúñiga, and others, had convened to finalize the assassination details.237 It seems extremely curious that a General of the Republic such as General Luis Bernardo Urbina would discuss a matter as delicate as a conspiracy to overthrow the Government and the plan to murder Gómez Hurtado with a humble peasant from Santander whom he did not know. The witness also accused General Zúñiga of being involved in General Landazábal’s assassination. He claimed that the latter General was killed as he was planning on revealing the military plot to overthrow Ernesto Samper’s Government and assassinate Alvaro Gómez.238

232

Julio Ramón Carrillo Vargas’ testimony, 4 June 1998, Prosecutor 20’s Case file UNAT Bogotá, Book 44, Pages 70 - 74. st Julio Ramón Carrillo Vargas’ testimony, 1 December 1998, Prosecutor 20’s Case file UNAT Bogotá, Book 50, Page 119. 234 th Julio Ramón Carrillo Vargas’ testimony, 4 June 1998, Prosecutor 20’s Case file UNAT Bogotá, Book 44, Page 71 235 st Julio Ramón Carrillo Vargas’ testimony, 21 August 1998, Prosecutor 20’s Case file UNAT Bogotá, Book 49, Pages 125/251. 236 th Julio Ramón Carrillo Vargas’ testimony, 4 June 1998, Prosecutor 20’s Case file UNAT Bogotá, Book 44, Page , 72 237 st Julio Ramón Carrillo Vargas’ testimony 21 August 1998, Prosecutor 20’s Case file UNAT Bogotá, Book 49, Page253 238 st Julio Ramón Carrillo Vargas’ testimony, 21 August 1998, Prosecutor 20’s Case file UNAT Bogotá, Book 49 A, Page 253 233

Vargas claimed that those intellectually responsible for this plot convoked in Bucaramanga, both in Cristian Chaparro’s house and in Los Gansos, a motel he owned. Cristian Chaparro, Colonel Ruiz Silva, Daniel Rey, also known as “El Cebo”, and René Carvajal were all in attendance at these meetings.239 He maintained that the Berrío Loaiza and Gaona Ovalle brothers along with Colonel Ruiz Silva, and a non-commissioned officer in the Army nicknamed ‘el Veleño’ were the men who planned the scheme.240 It is of the utmost importance that it is noted that he is a hearsay witness, due to the fact he was never actually present at any of the meetings. René Carvajal López, Cristian Chaparro, Hernando Amado, Guillermo Montoya Prada, and a woman called Myriam Cancino were those responsible for providing him with the information. Carvajal, the former Military Intelligence Officer and intermediary between General Zúñiga and Colonel Ruiz, would have been told everything regarding the planning of Alvaro Gómez’s assassination.241 He would have received the names of those intellectually responsible and the men who were actually going to carry out the murder from two men: Chaparro, the proprietor of the motel where the conspirators convened, and Amado who worked for the Army in intelligence and counter-intelligence.242 With regard to what he said about the others: Guillermo Montoya alleged that it was a Universidad Sergio Arboleda student who had witnessed the crime. Myriam Cancino claimed that an employee who worked in psychiatric clinic had heard compromising conversations between her boss, the Uruguayan Doctor Juan Carlos Martínez Santoro, and a politician Hugo Mantilla Correa.243 The falsity of these statements was subsequently ascertained however, due to either his supposed informers discrediting him, or simply because he was proven to be lying. It is for this reason that the Courts attributed this evidence with no legal worth.244 Carrillo Vargas stated that his relationship with René Carvajal began when they met at a pool hall, in which he was entrusted with all the information that was revealed during the trial.245 As Carrillo Vargas acknowledges in his statement, it appears rather peculiar that René Carvajal 239

Julio Ramón Carrillo Vargas’ testimony, 21 August 1998, Prosecutor 20’s Case file UNAT Bogotá, Book 49 A, Page 250 st Julio Ramón Carrillo Vargas’ testimony, 1 December 1998, Prosecutor 20’s Case file UNAT Bogotá, Book 50, Pages 121 - 122 241 st Julio Ramón Carrillo Vargas’ testimony, 1 December 1998, Prosecutor 20’s Case file UNAT Bogotá, Book 50, Pages 120 242 st Julio Ramón Carrillo Vargas’ testimony, 21 August 1998, Prosecutor 20’s Case file UNAT Bogotá, Book 49 A, Pages 249 - 242 243 th Julio Ramón Carrillo Vargas’ testimony, 4 February 1999, Prosecutor 20’s Case file UNAT Bogotá, Book 52, Pages 301 - 302 244 nd High Court of the Bogotá Judicial District, ruling dated 2 December 2003. MP Humberto Gutierrez Ricaurte, Pages 28 and th th 29 / Second Specialized Criminal Court in Bogotá, ruling dated 25 March 2003 (Pages 230- 240), and 20 May 2003 (Pages 200-207). 245 st Julio Ramón Carrillo Vargas’ testimony, 21 August 1998, Prosecutor 20’s Case file UNAT Bogotá, Book 49 A, Page 250. 240

would entrust information as delicate as planning Gómez Hurtado’s murder to a person whose name he didn’t even know.246 For this very reason the Second Criminal Court in Bogotá came to the conclusion that: “The circumstances that are suggested in the witness statements most certainly lack verisimilitude. The witness himself rules his statement out from being used as evidence. He outrageously claims that General Camilo Zúñiga Chaparro, Commander of the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, used a Master Sergeant as a messenger, to inform Colonel Ruiz Silva of his intention to coordinate Mr. Gómez Hurtado’s assassination. It is even more outlandish that the mysterious confidant who was entrusted with such sensitive information was not really a confidant at all since Zúñiga Chaparro did not even know his name”.247 Furthermore, Carvajal who retired from the Army in 1991, was never General Zúñiga’s courier and never discussed Gómez’s assassination with Carrillo Vargas.248 It is for this very reason that the following question arises from his statement made on 24 th August 2000: “If this man claims to have had information previously then why did he not come forward before? He is always amending his statements after I am called to amend mine.” He makes the additional claim that he was introduced to Hernando Amado by Ender Castillo, a CTI investigator.249 It can be deduced from his testimony that he had only an amorphous, superficial relationship with all of the aforementioned individuals. It is therefore completely irrational that they trusted him enough to have confided in him the information to which he claims to be privy. In the words of the Second Court: “It seems once again that he is the confidante and holds highly important information as to those intellectually responsible for the murder. Most bizarrely, while one of the actual killers – previously unknown to him – revealed details of the operation, another party revealed the plan behind the crime. What is it exactly about this man’s character that 246

Julio Ramón Carrillo Vargas’ testimony, 21 August 1998 and 1 December 1998, Prosecutor 20’s Case file UNAT Bogotá, Book 50, Pages 119-126, and Book 49 A Page 248. 247 th th Second Specialized Criminal Court in Bogotá, ruling dated 25 March 2003 (Page 232), and 20 May 2003 (Page 202). 248 th Julio Ramón Carrillo Vargas’ testimonies, 16 June 1999, Prosecutor 20’s Case file UNAT Bogotá, Book 59, Pages 151-152 / th “The Alvaro Gómez Case Collapses” El Tiempo newspaper, Nation Section, 10 December 1999. 249 st Julio Ramón Carrillo Vargas’ testimony, 21 August 1998, Prosecutor 20’s Case file UNAT Bogotá, Book 49 A, Pages 246-253

means he was chosen as suitable confidant, and is privilege to the valuable information that clarifies the events that occurred on that fateful November day in 1995? These questions remained unanswered in the trial. Not only because his different versions of events are not consistent, but also because if we consider his social, cultural or political milieu, we reach the undoubtable conclusion that it would be impossible for him to have access to the information which he claims to be apprised”. 250 His testimony is also based on the premise that held Cristian Chaparro’s confidence, who is supposedly reported to have informed him that Colonel Ruiz Silva was in Bucaramanga selecting the men who were to assassinate Gómez Hurtado: the Berrío Loaiza and Ovalle Gaona brothers as well as members of the Hunters.251 In response to these statements made, Cristian Chaparro admitted to knowing Carrillo Vargas, but stated he was merely an acquaintance and never a close confidant.252 He stated that on one occasion he had attended a funeral with the witness and at this event he had been warned to be careful as there were reports on the news that his motel was a place where conspiracies and criminal meetings took place. His reply was that his motel was used for no such activities, least of all to plan a murder. Although Colonel Ruiz Silva did visit his motel, the purpose of such a visit was never to hold such illicit meetings as had been mentioned.253 When questioned on the subject, Guillermo Montoya clarified that he did not witness the murder and was a student at the Universidad Javeriana, not at the Universidad Sergio Arboleda. He also said that the reason why Carrillo Vargas was involved in this tale was that he had, at one time, worked in his father’s farm.254 Lastly, when revising the Martínez Santoro Clinic files, the District Attorney itself asserted that Myriam Cancino had neither worked there, and nor had she been a patient.255 Despite the obvious flaws in Carrillo Vargas’ testimony the District Attorney considered it to be of significant importance. It was attributed with so much worth that it secured, during the trial, the detention of, Bernardo Ruiz Silva, the Berrío Loaiza and Gaona Ovalle brothers, René Carvajal, and Miguel Angel Díaz Méndez. In complete juxtaposition, the courts recognized that the witness’ statements were in no way credible. 250

Second Specialized Criminal Court in Bogotá, ruling dated 25 March 2003 (Page 233), and 20 May 2003 (Page 203). st Julio Ramón Carrillo Vargas’ testimony, 21 August 1998, Prosecutor 20’s Case file UNAT Bogotá, Book 49 A, Page 250. 252 th Second Specialized Criminal Court in Bogotá, ruling dated 20 May 2003 (Page 204). 253 th th Second Specialized Criminal Court in Bogotá, ruling dated 25 March 2003 (Pages 234-235), and 20 May 2003 (Pages 205 205). 254 rd Apuleyo, Plinio, “The edge of the razor” El Tiempo newspaper, 23 December 1999 255 rd Apuleyo, Plinio, “The edge of the razor” El Tiempo newspaper, 23 December 1999 251

The reasons detailed above explain why Julio Ramón Carrillo Vargas’ testimony could not be used as reliable evidence against the accused men. As you the reader can imagine, despite the serious crime of making a false statement, which severely affected the investigation, Carrillo Vargas was never investigated by the District Attorney’s Office. MERCEDES YOLIMA GUÁQUETA Mercedes Yolima Guáqueta, allegedly a former Military Intelligence officer, 256 allegedly gave her first statements on 24th May 2000 when she was incarcerated in the Chiquinquirá Circuit Court’s jail. She was being investigated for fraud and influence peddling; “the investigations revealed the witness’ skill to mislead her victims and her subsequent economic benefits”.257 On this occasion she had provided information on the Hunters, including its members and the role high ranking members of the Army (notably Generals Harold Bedoya, Iván Ramírez, Camilo Zúñiga, Luis Urbina, and Ricardo Cifuentes) played in planning the crime. “Generals Bedoya, Ramírez, Cifuentes, and Urbina’s real intention was to gain Gómez’s support. The putsch would not be democratic and General Bedoya was to assume power through military means… Their idea was to use Gómez Hurtado who would be blamed for the military intervention, and as such they thought they would immediately get Samper’s resignation“.258 The witness claimed that the one who the keenest for Gómez Hurtado to disappear was General Harold Bedoya, as this situation would facilitate the implementation of a military government. “Happy with himself [General Bedoya] had a few drinks in the Army Headquarters and again talked about becoming President. He was however, quite frustrated because it was not allowed for the Minister of Defense to be a soldier”.259 According to Mercedes Yolima it was General Bedoya himself who gave the order to terminate the Conservative leader’s life on the tragic morning of 2nd November 1995:

256

Her alleged role of either Military Intelligence informant or operative was never proved during the trial. th th Second Specialized Criminal Court in Bogotá, ruling dated 25 March 2003 (Page 254), and 20 May 2003 (Page 221). 258 th Mercedes Yolima Guáqueta’s statement, 24 May 2000, Prosecutor 20’s Case file UNAT Bogotá, Book 78, Page 98. 259 th Mercedes Yolima Guáqueta’s statement, 25 May 2000, Prosecutor 20’s Case file UNAT Bogotá, Book 78, Page 107. 257

“*T+he order for the execution was received from Colonel Ruiz. Colonel Ruiz gave the instruction himself, but we knew that it was really given by General Bedoya after discussions with the other two Generals. One of them was [Iván] Ramírez, I don’t know the other, but Generals Ramírez, Bedoya, Urbina, Cifuentes, and Colonel Rubio were all in attendance…”260 It is an important point to note that the witness recounts her story as if she were present.261 She stated that the 20th Brigade Special Unit (Hunters) consisted of fifty-four men, all of whom were trained to undertake operational and intelligence missions whenever and wherever.262 She also clarified that the group was divided into three sections: command, operational, and reinforcement.263 The first was a unit of four personnel, all non-commissioned members of the Army. The operational unit had over twenty-five people and was responsible for undertaking the missions. Reinforcement with the same number of personnel “made sure things were as they should be after the mission had been completed”.264 The witness recalls that the meetings to plan the assassination started roughly three months before it took place and were principally held in Army Headquarters, the Military Club, and at the 13th Brigade.265 None of the group members attended the Generals’ meetings but they were kept informed due to information passed on by Colonels Ruiz Silva and Alvarez Lopera. Sergeant Cristian was also a source of information as well as what was heard on the grape vine.266 She also said that: “There are three members of the group who, first-hand, heard General Bedoya give the order to execute Gómez Hurtado: Christian, “el Pecoso”, and Colonel Ruiz. He gave the instruction directly in Bucaramanga. He informed the entire group that Gómez was really a traitor. It was necessary for the country and for the army and even though everyone

260

Mercedes Yolima Guáqueta’s statement, 24 May 2000, Prosecutor 20’s Case file UNAT Bogotá, Book 78, Page 97. th th Mercedes Yolima Guáqueta’s statement, 24 & 25 May 2000, Prosecutor 20’s Case file UNAT Bogotá, Book 78, Pages 95 113. 262 th Mercedes Yolima Guáqueta’s statement, 24 May 2000, Prosecutor 20’s Case file UNAT Bogotá, Book 78, Pages 95 - 113. Book 78, Page 95. 263 th Mercedes Yolima Guáqueta’s statement, 24 May 2000, Prosecutor 20’s Case file UNAT Bogotá, Book 78, Pages 95 - 113. Book 78, Pages 98 and 99. 264 th Mercedes Yolima Guáqueta’s statement, 24 May 2000, Prosecutor 20’s Case file UNAT Bogotá, Book 78, Pages 95 - 113. Book 78, Page 99. 265 th Mercedes Yolima Guáqueta’s statement, 24 May 2000, Prosecutor 20’s Case file UNAT Bogotá, Book 78, Pages 95 - 113. Book 78, Page 100. 266 th Mercedes Yolima Guáqueta’s statement, 24 May 2000, Prosecutor 20’s Case file UNAT Bogotá, Book 78, Page 100 261

already knew the name of the victim would be revealed on the day of the assassination”.267 It is hard to believe that, even if they were not ‘officially’ aware, over fifty people would have had knowledge of such a sensitive operation as the assassination of one of the most wellknown political leaders in the country. If this was really the case then General Bedoya and the other high-ranking officers would been digging their own graves; maintaining the secrecy of an operation with over fifty people aware of its existence is both completely impractical extremely difficult to contain. The version above is, therefore, less than credible. According to Gómez Hurtado the Regime was in power while Samper was President. 268 Could it be that this Regime was influencing the witness’ troublesome testimonies? Mercedes Yolima went as far as saying that, “their [Generals Bedoya, Ramírez, Cifuentes, and Urbina] idea was to use Gómez Hurtado who would be blamed for the military intervention, and as such thought they would immediately get Samper’s resignation“.269 By using this witness was it really the Regime’s desire, to start rumors accusing President Samper himself of the homicide? These rumors supposedly came from high echelons of the Army and pointed blame principally at General Bedoya? This is not a concern to be immediately discarded. In a statement given postdating 26th May 2000, Mercedes Yolima hands in to the authorities previously unseen VHS films. She assured the Police that they contain footage of Colonels Ruiz Silva and Alvarez Lopera conducting training exercises with the Hunters.270 However, on 30th May 2000 the District Attorney’s Office sent a report containing the analysis of the videos detailing that there was footage of music programs and sports shows, but no images of anything that the witness had claimed.271 It is possible to believe that the images Mercedes Yolima had spoken about had been erased. However, the statements the witness gave were so riddled with errors that the Second Court concluded she must have told myriad different stories endeavoring to involve many innocent people:

267

Mercedes Yolima Guáqueta’s statement, 24 May 2000, Prosecutor 20’s Case file UNAT Bogotá, Book 78, Page 99. st th th Gómez Hurtado, Alvaro, El Nuevo Siglo, Editorials on: 31 July 1995, 24 August 1995, 17 October 1995 among others. 269 th Mercedes Yolima Guáqueta’s statement on 4 May 2000, Prosecutor 20’s Case file UNAT Bogotá, Book 78, Page 98 270 th Mercedes Yolima Guáqueta’s statement on 24 May 2000, Prosecutor 20’s Case file UNAT Bogotá, Book 78, Page 120 271 th Attorney General’s Report. Work Mission No. FV-0545/2000, National Reference Laboratory, 30 May 2000. Book 78, Pages 223-227 268

“In view of the fantastic nature of her accounts, which, as can be seen, were not given the least amount of time in court, but served only to mislead gullible investigators, the Court rejected her testimony as prosecution evidence… This action has been taken, not without making clear to representatives of the Attorney General’s Office and investigators to exercise more caution in the future, with reference to such individuals. People who seek their own benefits and who have an objective that is eminently of such prime importance – as could be seen most clearly ever since her first appearance – great efforts for the implementation of justice are encouraged with all the strength that is required from the state”.272 The following are the main inconsistencies that can be found in Mercedes Yolima statements: In the statement she made on 30th May 2000: when asked if meetings were held in Bucaramanga to organize Gómez Hurtado’s murder, she claimed that in addition to meeting in the 5th Brigade barracks the murderers also met in Miguel Angel Díaz Méndez’s commercial property known as ‘Patomar’.273 She said that these meetings were organized by Juan Carlos, referring to Omar Berrío Loaiza;274 then went on to declare that Omar Berrío’s nickname in the 20th Brigade was Juan Camilo. Despite this, Mercedes Yolima herself calls him Carlos.275 It seems curious that a former intelligence officer who was allegedly well-informed of the plan to murder Alvaro Gómez would not know the pseudonym of the man ‘elected’ by the high-ranking Army Command to carry out the task. Similarly, it also appears odd that the meetings to discuss this clandestine matter took place in a public establishment where they could have been overheard by absolutely anyone. Due to this fact the Second Court determined: “They met… in an establishment to which the public had access, with no privacy and were they discussed before the collective ear of the general public a murder of the significance as the one that is currently under investigation”.276

272

Second Specialized Criminal Court In Bogotá, ruling dated 25 March 2003 (Pages 255-256), and 20 May 2003 (Pages 222 223) 273 th Mercedes Yolima Guáqueta’s statement 30 May 2000, Prosecutor 20’s Case file UNAT Bogotá, Book 78, Page 127 274 th Mercedes Yolima Guáqueta’s statement 30 May 2000, Prosecutor 20’s Case file UNAT Bogotá, Book 78, Pages 127 - 128. 275 th Mercedes Yolima Guáqueta’s statement 25 May 2000, Prosecutor 20’s Case file UNAT Bogotá, Book 78, Page 105 276 th Second Specialized Criminal Court in Bogotá, ruling dated 20 May 2003 (Pages 222 - 223).

The aforementioned establishment was raided on order of the District Attorney’s Office on 4 th June 2000, as the witness claimed that hidden in a cache was information that would be of great importance to the investigation.277 Despite this claim, the search found absolutely no trace of the cache.278 The facts of the witness’ statement were once again without evidence. In contrast, she claimed that soldiers were responsible for the homicide with the help of DAS agents who supposedly provided intelligence on the victim. She also said that the individuals were chosen in Bucaramanga to carry out the murder and that General Bedoya subsequently decided on who the assassins would be in Bogotá.279 Taking the above in to consideration, it is necessary to emphasize the contradiction in the witness’ statement. She had, up until that point, specified that all the intelligence, monitoring and plans were controlled by Juan Carlos, a former Hunter who was assassinated in May 1996.280 The DAS had not been mentioned. Such contradictions in a story do give rise to uncertainty to its veritable veracity. Finally, during the statement Mercedes Yolima gave on 3rd June 2000 she handed over seven hard disks to Police, which she claimed contained details of the Army’s connections with Paramilitary groups.281 On revising this evidence, the District Attorney’s Office found four blank hard disks and three that contained irrelevant information.282 For this reason the judges rejected Mercedes Yolima Guáqueta’s testimony. The complete lack of truthfulness in her testimony led them to attribute her as a witness with an antisocial behavior disorder. “The term is ascribed to individuals… who are always restless and incapable of learning from previous mistakes or punishments. These people are usually apathetic, hedonistic, and possess a high level of emotional immaturity. They are not responsible, lack

277

Mercedes Yolima Guáqueta’s statement 3 June 2000, Prosecutor 20’s Case file UNAT Bogotá, Book 78, Page 250. Premises located at Calle 33 No. 31-46, Bucaramanga search warrant, Specialized Prosecutor of Santa fé de Bogotá and CTI th Bucaramanga Districts, 4 June 2000, 10 A.M., Book 78, page 264. 279 th Mercedes Yolima Guáqueta’s statement 30 May 2000, Prosecutor 20’s Case file UNAT Bogotá, Book 78, Pages 128 and 129. 280 th Mercedes Yolima Guáqueta’s statement 24 May 2000, Prosecutor 20’s Case file UNAT Bogotá, Book 78, Pages 95 - 113, book 78 page 99. 281 rd Mercedes Yolima Guáqueta’s statement 3 June 2000, Prosecutor 20’s Case file UNAT Bogotá, Book 78, Page 249. 282 Judicial review of the hard disks submitted as evidence by Mercedes Yolima Guáqueta Hernández; Specialized Prosecutor th Deicy Jaramillo, 6 June 2000, Book 78, Page 295. Attorney General. Report No. 03310, Work Mission DI. No. 2860, Book 79, Pages 87 - 106. 278

judgment, but very artful in rationalizing their behavior so presenting it as if they were correct, wise and justified”.283 It is for the very reason stated in the above report that the Colombian system of justice found no reason to use Mercedes Yolima Guáqueta’s testimony as valid evidence that could be used to convict the defendants. Despite the fact they were subsequently exonerated of any blame for the crimes committed, the District Attorney’s Office had however, previously used the testimony as a justification for the arrest, detention, and subsequent incarceration of the Hunters. OTHER WITNESSES The witnesses that have been detailed up until this point are those used by the District Attorney’s Office to support its hypotheses. In addition to these, there exist other “hearsay” witnesses that were used to support the theory that incriminated the Hunters. Yolanda del Carmen Cárdenas de Parra Yolanda del Carmen was allegedly a witness present at the crime scene who accused Luis Fernando Jutinico Trujillo. During the trial however, her role as a witness could not be ascertained as her name was not included on the list of those who actually witnessed the murder. Moreover the court was unable to find the mandate issued by the District Attorney’s Office to request taking her testimony.284 Esperanza Figueroa de Millán Esperanza Figueroa was a previous Hunters informant, and also Javier Giovanni Gómez Galán’s mother-in-law. She made statements that were discredited due to their complete lack of chronological consistency.285 Diego Edison Cardona Uribe Diego Edison was a former member of the Hunters. His testimony was rejected by the Second Court due to the discovery of many inconsistencies and a general lack of credibility.286 283

SOLORZANO NIÑO, ROBERTO Clinical and Forensic Psychiatry. Temis Editorial, 1990. Statement cited by the Second th Specialized Criminal Court in Bogotá, ruling dated 20 May 2003, Page 221. 284 th Second Specialized Criminal Court in Bogotá, ruling dated 25 March 2003, Page 174. 285 Ibid. Page 240

CONCLUSIONS DRAWN ON THE HUNTERS There is a complete lack of credibility in the statements made by all of the aforementioned witnesses. This highlights the importance for both those investigating the case and the Judges to carefully evaluate the evidence provided that intends to support of convict the defendants. It has been proved by past experience that during the standard process of a case (provided that there are no vested interests) people involved tell the truth over the course of the investigation.287 In contrast, experience manifests that if the witness is, in some way, profiting or their statement is against the interest of justice, they will continue to lie for their own benefit.288 The Judge’s assessment of the witness, for the purpose of determining his or her character, is therefore, of the utmost importance. As far as is possible, it is the Judge’s job to establish the existence of connections or relationships between those parties being assessed as part of the process, and also possible vested interests within proceedings.289 It is also necessary for the judging bodies to identify aspects of a witness’ background that will in turn discredit their statement. It is understandable why therefore, in this case the Second Court decided to reject the main witnesses’ testimonies. The reasons for the discrediting and subsequent rejection of testimonies were: personal or economic interests (as was admitted by René Carvajal López), or due to various psychological issues (as was the case with Mary Luz Cuadros). Guidelines are, with reference to the above, stipulated by Criminal Law. They are to be applied by the judge on evaluating the merit of evidence that is to be considered in a proceeding. The Code of Criminal Procedures, Article 404 reads thus: “On evaluating a testimony the Judge is to consider technical and scientific universals relating to perception and memory. Also, particular interest must be paid to matters associated with the nature of the perceived object, the sanity, or condition of senses through which the witness had the perception; the place, time, and way in which (s)he perceived them, the processes of remembering the testimony, the witness’ behavior during interrogation and cross-examination, the way in which questions are answered, and his or her personality”.

286

Ibid. Pages 242-245 Ibid. Page 199 288 Ibid. Page 199 289 Arenas Salazar, Jorge; Criminal Evidence. Doctrine and Law Editions, Bogotá 1996. Page 142 287

A testimony, as is indicated in the above extract, is a form of evidence that must be very carefully analyzed and evaluated as it is a product of humanity; consisting of fragile beings who are not exempt from lying for personal gain. This cases’ testimonial evidence, which seemed to reveal the perpetrators of the crime contrasted with the scarce criminal information that has now disappeared. If the allegations are true that those individuals from the District Attorney’s Office, and other institutions who did derail the investigation, and mask the identity or those intellectually responsible, then they were methodological in their approach. They would have presumably, in the first instance, made sure that any objective evidence was destroyed and then subjected the investigation to a series of false witnesses. When these witnesses were discredited they were unfathomably exonerated by the District Attorney’s Office, which itself had primarily introduced them as highly credible. As a concluding point, and in relation to the importance of evaluating testimonial evidence, it is necessary to draw attention to the following doubt, which, until now, has remained unresolved: The District Attorney’s Office used evidence to indubitably accuse the perpetrators of the crime that was based on the above witnesses’ testimonies. Therefore, why did the District Attorney not use this very same evidence to identify those who were intellectually responsible for the crime? The evidence is exactly the same; the only difference is the powerful positions that are, or were, held by these individuals. The District Attorney’s Office knew all the results of the evidence that was evaluated. They were however, systematically ignored safe in the knowledge that the all accusations would, in turn, dramatically be found out to be false. The investigation would thus continue to be advancing in the wrong direction while important evidence remained concealed in the file. All of those individuals who formed part of the Hunters hypothesis were finally acquitted by Colombia’s courts after having been unjustly deprived of their freedom for several years. Omar Berrío Loaiza, remains imprisoned, he is still awaiting trial for a murder that he was alleged to have committed in 1992. He was incarcerated after having served time in prison for a separate homicide during the same year. Both crimes were committed in Bucaramanga, the city in which his Hunters operated with greater success. Relentlessly prosecuted by the District Attorney’s Office, Berrío will most certainly end his days in prison with the knowledge that 95

there were ulterior motives for his false involvement in the Alvaro Gómez crime. Is it possible that some individuals who worked for the District Attorney’s Office (who are close to the ELN), members of which Berríos’s group had previously exposed, sought to destroy him? Could it be that the murder of Alvaro Gómez was the perfect battleground to settle old scores against the military intelligence, and that for this reason they conveniently derailed the investigation?

Chapter III NEW EVIDENCE AND TESTIMONIES. THE CONSPIRACY REMAINS ALIVE

“Facts do not cease to exist because they are ignored”. Aldus Huxley “Samper and his acolytes would be willing to kill innocent people in order to give credibility to any of his speeches that could swing public opinion in his direction. How far, and for how long… The atmosphere had never before been so tense, so noxious. Like a blow to the face a new atrocity has woken us up this 2 nd November. Alvaro Gómez, the conservative leader has been murdered. For the past year Alvaro Gómez was the only politically-minded man of great importance who publically called for Samper’s resignation. The entire country was aware of his close links with the United States, and as such he was recognized as Washington’s choice on Samper’s fall. Although no one dares mention it, least of all write it, the fact is, if we are left speechless it can only be Samper’s doing… In his seventy-fifth year, and when death came looking for him, he possessed a shining spiritual and moral aura that meant he was held in much higher regard by people than those typical of the political class. He was the man who one looks to when forming an opinion on current affairs because he was never afraid of telling a truth that caused public discomfort. For many, he was the personification of the last resort”.290 In the following pages sound evidence is concisely presented, regarding a new hypothesis detailing those intellectually responsible for the murder. This theory perfectly matches the motive, based on the political climate at the time, which was exposed in Chapter Two of this book. I vehemently believe and demand that the very least the country should expect is a scrupulous investigation of the witnesses’ claims that is in turn made public. It is not acceptable for the case to be closed due to malicious and unpleasant comments made by the former Attorney General Mendoza Diago who, at that time, was actively trying to ignore very important evidence highlighted in the following pages while at the same time endeavoring to revive an old catatonic hypothesis. 290

Betancourt, Ingrid “La Rabia en el corazón”, Editorial Grijalbo Ltda., Bogotá, 2001, p. 189 – 190.

TESTIMONY OF THE WITNESS KNOWN AS “H.H.” José Ever Veloza García, also known as “H.H.”, the paramilitary boss who in detention, on 27 th August 2008 gave an in-depth testimony before the courts as part of the Justice and Peace public hearings.291 In one of his many statements he revealed what he professed to know about Alvaro Gómez’s assassination. H.H. claimed that, Orlando Henao, also known as “el hombre del overal”, one of the main Norte del Valle Cartel bosses was the one who ordered the retired Police Colonel, Danilo González,292 by that time In charge of and Major in GAULA Bogotá, to undertake the assassination of Alvaro Gómez Hurtado. The man known as H.H. added that when Orlando Henao ordered the murder he claimed to be following instructions from close friends who worked at high Government level. The reason was to prevent Ernesto Samper’s fall. Ever Veloza warned that he could not be certain about contact between the Government and Orlando Henao. H.H.’s testimony is kept on file at the District Attorney’s Office. It is necessary to emphasize the striking similarity between the testimonies given by the men also known as Rasguño and H.H., who both come from rival criminal outfits. They have no alliances, nor are they cell mates, but provided a practically identical version of the facts: Rasguño’s version being far more in-depth than H.H.’s. This can be attributed to the lower rank that H.H. held at that time in Castaño’s organization, the reasons for which shall be detailed below. RASGUÑO’S TESTIMONY Luis Hernando Gómez Bustamante, also known as Rasguño, from a prison cell in Washington, on 12th and 13th January 2010 provided the Colombian Department of Justice (District Attorney 20) with extremely detailed statements regarding Alvaro Gómez’s assassination. These statements were primarily made at the District Attorney’s Office 20 (UNAT) on 15th December 2010, and repeated to the Chamber of Representatives’ Prosecution Board on 13 th and 14th June 2011. Rasguño stated that he had found out about the criminal operation that ended Alvaro Gómez’s life several days after the murder. He also affirmed that the assassination order came directly from the highest echelons of Government and was carried out by Orlando Henao, Efraín Hernández and Danilo González. The first two were renound Norte del Valle 291

This took place in front of District Attorney 20 National Body of Justice and Peace on 27 August 2008. Former member of the Pablo Escobar Search Bloc, highly honored for his intelligence work. He was probably the Norte del Valle Cartel’s man in this organization against Escobar. Due to his criminal activities the U.S. Government accused him of drugtrafficking and corruption a few months before he was killed. He constantly provided services of corruption and debt collection to all the high-ranking mafia and paramilitary bosses. For further information: rd ADAMS, DAVID, Danilo’s War, St. Petersburg Times, 3 January 2005. Available at: http://www.sptimes.com/2005/01/03/Worldandnation/Danilo_s_war.shtml 292

Cartel bosses, and González was a well-known National Police Force mafia infiltrator who was assassinated by gunmen in March 2004. According to Rasguño the connection between high Government and the mafia bosses who coordinated the assassination had been José Ignacio Londoño Zabala, who acted as intermediary between the Norte del Valle Cartel and Ernesto Samper’s Government. Rasguño claimed that Danilo González, as well as Ignacio Londoño, had told him personally that they had carried out the murder. According to Rasguño who at the time of the assassination was one of the leaders of the Norte del Valle Cartel, he and most of the mafia bosses were overcome by paranoia. They were under the impression that the United States Government was orchestrating a coup d’état that would overthrow Ernesto Samper; after the putsch a new Government would be installed and they would all be extradited, à la Panamá after Noriega’s defeat. Rasguño asserted that Samper’s Government was like a “partner” for the Norte del Valle Cartel: unhindered transport routes for narcotics were guaranteed, no merchandise would be seized by the authorities, and there would be a general atmosphere of “solidarity” and “complicity” between the State and their drug-trafficking counterparts. Rasguño indicated that this alliance between Samper’s Government and the traffickers was born out of the huge amount of economic support the major drug bosses (including him) had provided the “Samper for President” campaign. Due to the status quo it was of vital importance for the drug traffickers that the Government did not fall. In the event that it did they could face extradition or their businesses would at least loose their trafficking privileges and a vital strategic ally (Samper’s Government). Rasguño claims that the mafia began to view Alvaro Gómez as a dangerous enemy to the stability of the Government, which they would protect no matter what the cost. The drugtrafficker, who has now been extradited to the United States, said that the mafia first endeavored to approach Gómez Hurtado. The purpose of this was to appease the President and Minister Serpa and to persusde him that his stubborn opposition to the Government was not a good idea. Despite their intentions Rasguño details Gómez’s stance: “We couldn’t get close to Mr. Alvaro. We tried everything possible to approach him and make him quiet, but that man’s a real pain. He didn’t want to take money. He didn’t even want to speak about it”. Rasguño then made a claim about Ignacio Londoño Zabala, who he accused of being the fundamental link between Samper’s Government and the Norte del Valle Cartel bosses. The claim being that in view of Alvaro’s uncompromising attitude Londoño passed on instructions 99

from Ernesto Samper and Horacio Serpa to Orlando Henao, “el hombre del overol”, that Alvaro Gómez Hurtado was to be assassinated. When Ignacio Londoño had passed on the message Orlando Henao and Efraín Hernández hired the services of their key man in the National Police Force, Major Danilo González; his task was to personally carry out the assassination. Rasguño relinquished the Cali Cartel, Carlos Castaño and the soldiers who were previously incremented (individuals who have been accused of the crime on many occasions) of all criminal responsibility. According to the extradited drug-trafficker, Carlos Castaño was extremely angry when he heard the news, thus the reason why he distanced himself from the Norte del Valle Cartel bosses. Rasguño has insisted three facts time and time again: the order to assassinate Alvaro Gómez was given by Ignacio Londoño, who acted as Ernesto Samper’s Government’s “spokesperson”; the Norte del Valle Cartel bosses funded the assassination, and it was carried out by Danilo González. Rasguño’s story also makes reference to a meeting called by Carlos Castaño when it was found out that the Cartel had ordered Gómez’s assassination. ‘El hombre de overal’, don Efra, Danilo, and Rasguño himself were all in attendance at the meeting in which a furious Castaño severely castigated the mafia for the homicide; it reached the point where Rasguño thought that none of them would leave the room alive. During the meeting Orlando Henao bought Castaño’s silence, and Rasguño confirms that those intellectually responsible for the murder were the mafia bosses and high-ranking Government ministers. The man who actually pulled the trigger was the sinister Danilo. VALIDITY OF RASGUÑO AND H.H.’S TESTIMONIES The credibility of Rasguño and H.H.’s testimonies, similarly to those of any criminal, should most certainly be subject to many doubts. Moreover, with the exception of Ernesto Samper, Horacio Serpa, Ignacio Londoño, and some members of the Cali Cartel, all of the people they incriminated are now dead. This is the case with Efraín Hernández, don Efra; Orlando Henao also known as el hombre del overall; and the retired Police Colonel Danilo González. However, Rasguño and H.H.’s testimonies cannot automatically be rejected. It is necessary, as far as it is possible, to endeavor to scrutinize in detail every one of their serious allegations. The drug-traffickers’ claims do however, tally with certain facts of the murder and facts established by the judicial procedure. It would seem foolish therefore to fully discard their testimonies as Semana magazine have done on several occasions. This media outfit has reiterated with a very bizarre insistency that Rasguño is in fact mad, and all of his statements are without foundation. 100

A large part of Rasguño’s statements has been proved to be correct by the investigation by means of comparing it with documentary and testimonial evidence, and also by official letters. The various mafia bosses’ revelations certainly deserve close attention and should be subject to in-depth investigation. This however, is a difficult task due to the Attorney General’s reluctance in providing the means to investigate. There also exists a conspiracy to intimidate witnesses, which will be detailed in the following pages. THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE UNTOUCHABLE JOSÉ IGNACIO LONDOÑO ZABALA Despite the information detailed below, which will be a surprise to all readers, Mr. José Ignacio Londoño Zabala not only enjoys absolute freedom and substantial influence, but several of his relatives work as public officials. José Ignacio Londoño Zabala stands accused by the extradited drug-trafficker of having liaised on the matter of Gómez’s murder preparation with both the mafia and Government. He was a man who had extremely close links with Ernesto Samper’s Administration. According to Santiago Medina’s statements, which he made after having been arrested, making him ready to give details of all he knew about the narco-scandal; Ernesto Samper sent Ramiro Bejarano (director of the DAS), and Ignacio Londoño Zabala to persuade him to keep quiet. Medina also revealed that Londoño Zabala was a regular guest of the President, who admitted to having invited him to the “Hatogrande” residence293 (see the first chapter for further details). At the time of Gómez’s assassination Londoño Zabala was a well-known pro-Samper political leader in the Norte del Valle area. He is the son of the liberal politician known as “El Tigre” Londoño, and Jesusita Zabala, a former mayoress of Cartago. It was clear that Ignacio Londoño, also known as “Nachito”, “La Gorda”, or “El Tigrillo”, from a young age would be an outstanding regional politician in Valle. According to several statements he was also expected to be the link between the Norte del Valle Cartel and Ernesto Samper. Londoño was introduced to Ernesto Samper’s Campaign by a politician from the Coastal area of Colombia, Vicente Blel Saad, a man who was investigated and a well-known mafia dummy. The former Treasurer Santiago Medina recalled that the extradited drug-trafficker Victor Patiño accompanied Ignacio Londoño to a dinner that aimed to raise funds for Samper’s Campaign. This took place on 16 th June 1994 at Medina’s house.

293

MEDINA, Santiago, “La verdad sobre las mentiras”, EDITORIAL PLANETA, 1997

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Londoño’s capacity as the intermediary man acting between drug-traffickers and Ernesto Samper has not only been admitted by “Rasguño” and by Santiago Medina, but also by, former Minister Fernando Botero. The extradited Victor Patiño Fomeque and by his mother Daisy Fomeque294 have confirmed this allegation as well as several extradited members of the Cartel who made the claim before the Supreme Court of Justice. On several occasions Daisy Fómeque has gone even further and accused Ignacio Londoño of being the man responsible for several massacres of her family. She also claims that he was the liaison between her children, Victor and Luis Alfonso Patiño and politicians. Moreover, Londoño Zabala was Patiño Fómeque’s puppet. In July 2005 Semana magazine published the following excerpt from a statement made by Mrs. Fómeque in Miami: “Many of the properties currently registered in Ignacio’s [Ignacio Londoño] name belong to my son Victor. He was responsible for managing my sons, Victor and Luis Alfonso’s, public relations with politicians. Over 1000 million Colombian pesos were transferred to him, his wife, Maria Isabel Henao, known as “Maritza”, and to his mother, Jesusa Zabala, for taking care of corruption all over the country, both on a political and judicial level. I’ve got copies of the checks sent to him and his family. I also know that Mr. Londoño had been connected to a homicide in Cali, but was acquitted by the District Attorney. When he, at one time, came to my house for lunch I asked him how he was doing. His exact response was, “I am the king of corruption in Colombia, on every level”.295 Mrs. Fómeque made a desperate statement at “La W” radio station on 29th June 2010, not only confirming her previous statements about Ignacio Londoño but also adding that Nacho was orchestrating massacres against the whole Patiño Fómeque family. He was attempting to

294

This information can be found at the following gweb addresses: st SEMANA.COM. “…Y cantó!” Sunday 21 January 2005. http://www.semana.com/noticias-nacion/canto/88479.aspx [Material accessed on 21st January 2010]. - ELTIEMPO.COM. “Ignacio ¡El Gordo’ Londoño Zabala el enlace de la campaña con los capos del Norte del Valle”, 23rd March 2007 http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/CMS-3489001 [Material accessed on 21st January 2010]. - SEMANA.COM. “CRECE LA LISTA” 29th April 1996. http://www.semana.com/noticias-nacion/crece-lista/31347.aspx [Material accessed on 21st January 2010]. - EL PAIS “Nacho Londoño, El eslabón perdido del Proceso 8000” 23rd March 2007. http://www.elpais.com.co/historico/mar232007/NAL/nacho.html [Material accessed on 21st January 2010]. - EL PAIS “Patiño Fomeque fue quien prendió el ventilador” Thursday 21st January 2010. http://www.elpais.com.co/paisonline/notas/Octubre062007/nac.html [Material accessed on 21st January 2010]. - EL PAIS “Yo diría que “Rasguño” puso varios alcaldes en Cartago”. http://www.elpais.com.co/paisonline/notas/Marzo252007/NAL/rasgu.html [Material accessed on 21st January 2010]. 295 st SEMANA.COM. “…Y cantó!” Sunday 21 January 2005. http://www.semana.com/noticias-nacion/canto/88479.aspx [Material accessed on 21st January 2010]. -

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intimidate them so he could permanently take over drug-trafficking routes and properties that belonged to her son. The recording is stored in the radio archives. Joaquin Emilio Vélez, also known as Zarco Emilio, the infamous Norte del Valle Cartel hit-man, on 1st December 2008 made a spine-chilling recording on the same radio station in which he confessed that Ignacio Londoño had hired him to kill several politicians. Since he had failed in his task (he was unable to kill them all) Ignacio Londoño had put a price on his head meaning he himself could be killed at any moment. Joaquin Emilio Vélez was murdered on 26th May 2009 roughly six months after making the statement. This recording is also stored in the La W radio archives. The investigations that dealt with Hernán Giraldo’s (who was included in Nacho’s contract to kill several politicians) attempted murder, and Zarco Emilio, slipped through the hands of the honest men working at the Cartago District Attorney’s Office. That is until plaintiffs in Alvaro Gómez’s murder investigation requested information in an effort to validate Rasguño’s story. The DIJIN has been in charge of the investigation since May 2000. During the meetings held early in 2010 in which Rasguño gave his testimony, he warned about Ignacio Londoño’s immense criminal capacity. According to Rasguño he was doing everything in his power to prevent him from becoming a witness in the investigation regarding Alvaro´s murder. Rasguño stated as evidence that only five days before he testified Ignacio Londoño had ordered two of his nephews to be killed in Cartago, Valle del Cauca. This was an effort to pressurize him into remaining silent about the Gómez Hurtado case. The killings were supposed to be staged as a public “pig slaughter” at an infamous bar in Cartago. Although it is not possible to say for certain that it was Ignacio Londoño who ordered these killings on 7th January 2010, it is a fact that several days before Rasguño gave his testimony two of his nephews were attacked in Cartago: one fatally. Rasguño’s nephew who was killed in the attack, Diego Buitrago Gómez, was known to have been considered the adopted son and favorite of the drug-trafficker. There are witnesses in Colombia who assure that the murder was ordered by Ignacio Londoño who himself paid for and promoted the social event where the homicide took place. Moreover, Nacho Londoño’s presence at the event was confirmed and he was said to be in the company of the man known as “el Indio”, a member of the “Los Rastrojos” criminal outfit. This criminal gang is the current outfit responsible for both providing protection for Nacho, and also for the drug distribution in Cartago and Pereira. This was the situation as reported by the man known as “Comba”, the current mafia boss in the area. Criminal 103

proceedings were undertaken in the District Attorney’s Office, Valle del Cauca regarding these events. They were however moved to Bogotá to a National District Attorney responsible for terrorism charges at the request of the plaintiffs’ legal representative. Ignacio Londoño has extremely close family ties with both the political class in Valle del Cauca, and national politicians, as well as with the District Attorney’s Office. Jaime Angel Londoño, one of his cousins, held the position up until early 2010 of District Attorney’s Office Section Director in Risaralda. The advances in the investigation against Nacho have coincided with, Jaime Angel Londoño’s appointment to the position of District Attorney’ in Cartago. One must not forget that many of the procedures undertaken into the Alvaro Gómez assassination have been conducted before the District Attorney’s Office in Cartago. The case of Ignacio Londoño’s alleged crimes was however, especially reassigned to Bogotá. This happened to coincide with Jamie Angel Londoño’s recognition for outstanding work and subsequent promotion to Director of District Attorneys in Antioquia: new trafficking territory for “Los Rastrojos”. His brother, Carlos Andrés Londoño Zabala took office in January 2009 as the Welfare Manager for Valle del Cauca. He is one of the managers who has the closest relationship with the former (now dismissed) Governor of Valle del Cauca Juan Carlos Abadía. His mother Jesusita Zabala has held many public offices such as Mayoress of Cartago, congresswoman, adviser to the Valle del Cauca Government, and is currently manager of the Santa Ana international airport, Cartago. This previously detailed résumé of Mr. Ignacio Londoño Zabala’s, political life and connections cannot lead us to the conclusion that he is a transparent citizen who has had no links with the mafia over the past twenty years. Multiple testimonies, previously reported, claim that Londoño Zabala is the man who authorized many murders. He is stands accused of being the vital connection between corrupt politicians, members of the District Attorney’s Office, members of the Police Force, and the mafia. The plaintiffs have also contacted important witnesses who only wish to testify in court (where their identity will be guaranteed and not through the media) with regards to Londoño Zabala’s acts of corruption in order to prevent his ordering them being threatened or even assassinated.

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Furthermore, despite the fact Nacho Londoño has publicly denied his history of a close relationship with Rasguño, a significant proportion of Rasguño’s properties ended up in Londoño’s hands.296 The statements made by Rasguño in early 2010 that incriminate Londoño are far from absurd or ridiculous, that is despite the efforts of some national media outlets who have assumed the task of discrediting them. It must also be highlighted that Rasguño has not been the first person to accuse Londoño Zabala of being highly involved in criminal activities of great significance. Danilo González - the alleged killer On reviewing the retired National Police Colonel Danilo González’s history it does not seem naïve to claim that a man of his ilk could have been involved in Gómez’s assassination. 296

The following are examples of how Ignacio Londoño Zabala is a manager of corruption and puppet in connection with properties transferred to him by the man known as Rasguño: th th Certificate of Tradition and Freedom Real Estate No. 475-32610, dated 8 February 2010. On 4 March 1993, Mr. Jorge st Quintero López transferred the ownership of the premises to Luis Alfonso Gómez Bustamante. 1 June 1994, premises are transferred to Gaviotas Ltda. a company owned by José Ignacio Londoño Zabala, José Ignacio Londoño Uribe, and nd María Isabel Henao Angel. Finally, on 22 June 1998 the property is transferred to the company Los Heroes Ltda., also owned by the Londoños and María Isabel Henao Angel. th th - Certificate of Tradition and Freedom Real Estate No. 375-39494, dated 8 February 2010. On 12 January 1993, Mr. Jorge st Quintero López transferred the ownership of the premises to Luis Alfonso Gómez Bustamante. 1 June 1994, premises are nd transferred to Gaviotas Ltda. On 22 June 1998 the property is transferred to the company Los Heroes Ltda. - Certificate of Legal Existence and Representation of the company Gaviotas Ltda. Issued by the Cartago Chamber of th Commerce, Valle del Cauca on 11 March 2010. - Certificate of Legal Existence and Representation of the company Gaviotas Ltda. Issued by the Cartago Chamber of th Commerce, Valle del Cauca on 17 February 2010. The certificate manifests that partners who own the company are José Ignacio Londoño Zabala, José Ignacio Londoño Uribe, and María Isabel Henao Angel. rd th - Certificate of Tradition and Freedom Real Estate No. 375-35236, dated 3 February 2010. On 6 November 1990, the company Revel Ltda. transferred Olga Cecilia Gómez Jaramillo, the wife of Hernando Gómez Bustamante, ownership of the th premises under the purchase-sale title. 11 October 1999, Olga Cecilia Gómez transferred the property to José Ignacio Londoño Uribe. th th - Certificate of Tradition and Freedom Real Estate No. 375-35223, dated 11 March 2010. On 18 November 1990, the company Revel Ltda. transferred Ana Cecilia Gómez Bustamante premises ownership of the premises under the purchaseth th sale title. 16 August 1997, Mr. Alvaro Velásquez Uribe, who acquired the property on 14 March 1997 sells the premises th to Jesusita Zabala de Londoño, mother of Ignacio Londoño Zabala. 13 September 2006, Jesusita Zabala changed the regulations of horizontal property ownership. th - Certificate of Tradition and Freedom Real Estate No. 375-14363, dated 3rd February 2010. On 8 January 1992, the Municipality of Cartago sold Luis Hernando Gómez Bustamante the premises. It should be noticed that such purchase-sale st agreement was undertaken while Jesusita Zabala was the Mayoress of Cartago. 31 January 1995 Gómez Bustamante transferred the property to Miguel Antonio Chaljub Abisambra. th - Sale Contract No. 20545 dated 7 December 1991 whereby the Mayoress of Cartago, Valle del Cauca transfers the ownership of the premises to Luis Hernando Gómez Bustamante, identified by Real Estate Registration No. 375-0014363. The contract refers to “the sale by public instrument of real estate, by public bidding No. 003 of 1991 covering the premises located on calle 11 with carrera 5, the former residence of the Municipal Town hall, to Mr. Luis Hernando Gómez Bustamante, for the amount of one hundred and fifty million Colombian pesos”. The contract clarifies that “upon completion of bidding Mr. Luis Hernando Giraldo’s offer for the premises subject to the bidding process was accepted according to the resolution number three hundred and seventy one (371) dated October sixteenth (16) nineteen hundred and ninety one (1991)”. th - Aforementioned resolution 371 of 17 October 1991 awarding Luis Hernando Gómez Bustamante the public bidding No. 003 of 1991 is signed by the Mayoress, Jesusita Zabala de Londoño, mother of Ignacio Londoño.

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During the hunt for Pablo Escobar Danilo González shone as one of the most outstanding National Police officers; at which time González allied with the Norte del Valle Cali Cartel in what was known as “the war against Pablo”. Danilo was instrumental in the organization of a group named “Los Pepes”, and in time became known as “Pepe Mayor” (Chief Pepe). The connections that Danilo formed with the Valle del Norte Cartel sustained the test of time and he was the Cartel’s key man inside the National Police Force. Rasguño however, maintains that Danilo had been associated with the Norte del Valle Cartel ever since he was a sub-lieutenant; he came from where the Cartel operated and his role was to protect the Cartel’s runways. Danilo González, at the time of the Proceso 8000, in conjunction with Victor Patiño (who was at that time one of Ignacio Londono’s allies), Orlando Henao, and other bosses of the fearful Norte del Valle Cartel,297 developed their criminal and drug-trafficking operations on nationwide scale. They worked with their allies in the Colombian Self-Defense Forces. On 25th March, after his retirement from the National Police Force, Danilo González was assassinated by several hit-men when entering the office he shared in Bogotá with Gerardo Candamil: another infamous lawyer who had worked for members of the Norte del Valle Cartel. The killing, which took place on 25th March seemed to be an attempt by his Norte del Valle colleagues to prevent González from betraying them during the negotiation process he was to hold with the North American authorities. González had been issued with a formal charge from the United States Department of Justice. Other important witnesses with mafia connections have, during the Alvaro Gómez Hurtado investigation, definitively confirmed Danilo González’s close relationship with the Norte del Valle Cartel bosses. His capacity to take control of corruption in the Police Force, his debt 297

For more información on Danilo González please consult: EL ESPECTADOR, Arrazola, María del Rosario, “El ‘Pepe’ Mayor”, 13th September 2008 2:58 a.m. http://www.pabloescobargaviria.info/idex.php?option=com.content&task=view&id=168&itemid=32 [Material accessed on 21st January 2010]. EL TIEMPO, “Los pasos de Danilo González” Sunday 8th March 2004 http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-1595627 [Material accessed on 21st January 2010]. EL TIEMPO, “Asesinado el Coronel Danilo González” Friday 26th March 2004 http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-1499392 [Material accessed on 21st January 2010]. EL TIEMPO.COM “así se gestó el crimen del Coronel R. Danilo González” http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM1551959 [Material accessed on 21st January 2010]. rd

ADAMS, David, “Danilo’s War”, Article published in Storage. St. Petersburg Times 3 January 2005. http://www.sptimes.com/2005/01/03/Worldandnation/Danilo s war.shtml

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collection service, and his availability for a wide array of criminal activities was also detailed. Sources also revealed that despite their mutual mistrust Carlos Castaño repeatedly hired Danilo González’s services for releasing prisoners or resolving problems with his cargo. With the knowledge of Danilo González’s criminal profile, it is not in the least bit surprising to read in Alvaro Gómez’s homicide dossier that members of the National Police Force had a high level of involvement in the inquiry and hypotheses relating to the assassination. They also played an important role in crime scene control in the immediate aftermath of the murder. As manifested in the previous chapters of this book, it is not rash to assert that the Sincelejo and Bogotá group hypotheses were meant to derail the investigation and were devised and implemented by members of the National Police Force. Many of these men, Captain Julio César Villegas for example, resulted in being the main driving force behind the successful derailment and cover-up of the crime. The alleged connections between Ignacio Londoño, Danilo González, and Orlando Henao through the medium of the Norte del Valle Cartel, does not seem so outrageous. It would, therefore, – as the plaintiffs have always called for – not be misguided to investigate more thoroughly the version of events offered by the man known as Rasguño in which he names Danilo González as the killer. FERNANDO BOTERO ZEA’S TESTIMONY Botero Zea was the Minister of Defense in Ernesto Samper’s Government until July 1995 – four months before Alvaro Gómez was assassinated. He has given public statements and also testified before the Department of Justice that Gómez Hurtado’s assassination was a “State Crime”. Botero Zea has stated that the highest levels of Government were greatly concerned about the growing opposition of which Alvaro Gómez was emerging as leader. He claimed that the Government ordered the DAS to closely follow Gómez’s activities; a policy that increased in potency as the crisis worsened, each day increasingly threatening the longevity of President Samper’s power. The following statement is the former Minister’s words verbatim, already quoted in the first chapter of this book. “Mr. Alvaro Gómez posed a threat to Mr. Samper’s Administration for three reasons: primarily, what the Government actually had in real terms, in the sense of a fragmented opposition with no clear leader, Mr. Alvaro Gómez had the ability to destroy overnight. He had the prominence and unquestionable leadership qualities to be able to project his image to the public and become the great opposition leader. No other political figure 107

had the same capabilities. Secondly, because Mr. Alvaro Gómez had moved from his initial position of solidarity with the Government to a continuingly more distant position as details of the 1994 Presidential Campaign funding became public. The Government was, therefore, not dealing with a leader who had a premeditated and vindictive position, but a leader who developed a political stance as the 1994 campaign scandal became known. Finally, if we dare mention, Mr. Gómez’s ethical, political and intellectual weight had, by that point, gained him his highest point of political recognition in his entire career. He had been one of the great architects of the new political Constitution and had acquired the image of a Great Statesman on the Colombian political scene. In view of all the above, for the Government, Mr. Gómez Hurtado’s position as the political opposition, symbolized a huge change as well as an obvious political threat”. (Refer to the quotation in the first chapter of this book). Botero also claimed that in the course of the more than twenty visits Horacio Serpa paid him in the Cavalry School where he was imprisoned he tried to convince him not to testify against President Samper. Serpa requested his silence on issues like the illegal funds that entered the campaign for the purpose of being able to enter Congress with Mafia support. Also he spoke of a change in criminal law, which due to favorability would permit his release from jail. Serpa explained the reason why high-level Government needed to invent a story and create a smoke screen or a traumatic event. This was intended to completely deprive the Proceso 8000 political crisis of oxygen. What was needed was an event that would allow President Samper to have public opinion focused on exactly what he wanted it to be focused on. Hardly five hours after Alvaro Gómez Hurtado had been murdered, at three p.m. on 2nd November 1995, President Samper called former President Pastrana and many other sectors of the public to join him in forming a Government of National Unity. CARLOS CASTAÑO’S PUBLIC CONDEMNATIONS The files held by the Justice and Peace Prosecution that belonged to Carlos Castaño and were submitted by H.H. contain many e-mails from the Paramilitary boss that identify retired Colonel Danilo González as the killer.298 For some inexplicable reason however, they have not been added to the case file.

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Investigation by District Attorney 17 of Justice and Peace.

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Furthermore, in his book My Confession he admits to knowing the identities of those intellectually responsible for the crime and also outlines the motives set forth in Rasguño’s testimony. SANTANDER LOPESIERRA Lopesierra, the politician come smuggler, close friend of President Samper and his life-long contact with the “Sanandresitos”299 businessmen was extradited to the United States in 2003. He admitted his relief on being removed from the country as having knowledge of who killed Alvaro Gómez meant that there was a serious threat to his life in Colombia. He explained, in his interviews to the press300 that the powerful Orlando Henao, el hombre del overal, had wheedled him into contributing the sum of five hundred thousand U.S. dollars for the killing of Alvaro Gómez. The assassination, according to Santander Lopesierra, was apparently a favor for President Samper. EL ALEMAN Fredy Rendón Herrera also known as “El Aleman”, a paramilitary soldier who was close to Carlos Castaño confessed to the Justice and Peace Prosecutors that Castaño was certain that the highest levels of the Government with the aide of the Valle del Norte Cartel were responsible for Gómez death. He also asserted that Castaño directly confronted Serpa with this information in one of the meetings held to negotiate Piedad Cordoba’s release. THE CONSPIRACY IS ALIVE A ‘pig’ slaughter here, threats there, and a controversial appointment. The edict requesting Hernando Gómez Bustamante, also known as Rasguño’s, testimony was sent to the District Attorney’s Office in 2007. It was however, only possible to obtain his statements in April 2009 despite the notorious drug-trafficker’s desire to cooperate with the investigation. The first consequence of filing for this evidence was, as explained before, the dismissal of the District Attorney who dared to make the claim, and his repositioning to Arauca as Terrorism

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Well-known shopping centers commercial centers located all over the country that specialized in contraband goods. They are so called due to the Island smuggled products and so called by reference to the Island of San Andres, which is a free port. Contraband products of mass consumption Massive consumption products (cigarettes, liquor, spirits, clothes, toys, electronic goods) contraband have historically been used as a way of money laundering for the Colombian drug-traffickers. 300 th Cambio Magazine. 8 September 2003.

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Prosecutor. The institution’s management explained this appointment as a perfectly normal decision that was fully expected. The District Attorney’s Office of International Affairs, from May 2009 to November 2009, shuffled slowly along with the U.S. Department of Justice’s procedures that needed to be satisfied in order to be able to hear Rasguño’s testimony. Due to the insistence and complaints made by the plaintiffs to the District Attorney in charge, a request was finally made that was immediately dealt with by the U.S. Department of Justice. During this interregnum, in Colombia a battle was being fought to secure Rasguño’s testimony. At the same time, in the various U.S. prisons where drug-traffickers were being held another secret and silent war was being waged. Humberto Domínguez, a well-known attorney for Colombian drug-traffickers, was acting as Rasguño’s counsel. Working within the U.S. Department of Justice’s jurisdiction he struggled to convince his client of the impertinence of making a statement in the Alvaro Gómez case and involving his former attorney and partner in crime José Ignacio Londoño Zabala along with his family in Cartago. For over a year Domínguez had endeavored to convince his client not to cooperate with the U.S. Department of Justice. He tried the patients of the District Attorneys in-charge to such an extent that they requested that the Judge sentence Rasguño to forty years imprisonment and made the decision to take him to trial. This seldom occurs in American justice for drugtrafficking cases due to the cost of the trial, which is a dissuading factor for both the prosecuting attorney and the defendants. Finally, at the end of October 2009 the Colombian District Attorney’s Office processed the application to gain access to Rasguño’s testimony. At this point the prisoner was in complete despair because of the severe prison conditions and his worry about a harsh sentence, which could mean spending the rest of his life behind bars. This preoccupation led him to seriously evaluating the options available: complying with the process of formal cooperation. Domínguez started the necessary proceedings for Rasguño to cooperate with the authorities as a witness. Despite this and at the same time, the attorney was exerting an increasing amount of pressure on his client to prevent him from informing both the North American and

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Colombian authorities about his knowledge of those responsible for Alvaro Gómez Hurtado’s assassination. In this meeting Rasguño told the Court that when Ignacio Londoño’s mother was mayoress and politician she had always been in his pocket; a privileged positon for which she had received substantial remuneration. This was a serious failing for the attorney Domínguez. The fact is that for at least a year he had fallen into one of the most tried-and-tested tricks Nacho used in his web of corruption. During one of his trips to Colombia, when his path crossed with Nacho’s, his former boss introduced the attorney to the world of frenzied parties and beautiful prostitutes. Nacho’s adroitness in running this scam is notorious within the mafia world; he surrounds himself with pimps who provide him with the most beautiful and willing women. The old trick made Domínguez fall flat on his face, so much so that he ended his marriage. Rasguño knew nothing of this in his prison cell. He testified against Jesusa Zabala (Nacho’s mother) in an interview in which his identity was not revealed, however inexplicably Domínguez revealed the entire content of the statement to Nacho. On 30th December 2009 Rasguño had a meeting with his lawyers, including Humberto Domínguez, in which he voiced his opinion about cooperating in the Gómez Hurtado case. At this point Domínguez realized that his efforts to protect the interests of Nacho Londoño, or “la Gorda” had failed. As a final attempt to prevent any links between Nacho and the Alvaro Gómez Hurtado case being revealed Domínguez warned the former mafia boss of Nacho’s extreme displeasure of his mother being incriminated. On hearing these words Rasguño feared that his Attorney, present at the judicial proceeding with the Supreme Court of Justice, had provided his old partner with information. Rasguño, who subsequently hired a new attorney to represent him before the U.S. Department of Justice, had his doubts confirmed about Domínguez and thus dismissed him from the case. The damage however, has already been done. In early January 2010, Nacho started to become active in Cartago and got together many old faces from the Cartel to celebrate a friend’s birthday at the “Barra Paisa” disco in the city. Word insistently got around that “two pigs were to be slaughtered”. Surprisingly, the wealthy

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attorney, who is renowned for his huge and spectacular parties in Cartago, requests a price of twenty thousand pesos per person. Five days before the date when Rasguño is to testify in the Alvaro Gómez Hurtado case, on 7 th January 2010, the “pig slaughter” party takes place. Facts, that still remain to be established, indicate that Diego Buitrago Gómez, known as Ñoño, Rasguño’s nephew who he considered to be his adopted son, and his brother Santiago had been sent invitations by Blackberry to attend the “pig slaughter”. When they arrived, they became aware of Ignacio Londoño’s presence and also that he was accompanied by the man known as “El Indio” who was known to carry out crime “waves” and provide hitmen to the brothers Luis Enrique and Javier Antonio Calle Serna, known as the “Comba”. To their detriment Rasguño’s nephews decided to stay. Witnesses claimed that at around midnight a group of three people clad in black came into the disco and spoke with Ignacio Londoño. The brother who survived the attack claims Londoño “pointed” at him and his sibling; in that area a signal that you had been singled out to be murdered. An hour later, Diego Buitrago Gómez was brutally murdered in a bathroom, and his brother Santiago was shot several times in front of all sixty guests. Santiago was bleeding heavily as a result of the shot he took to the head, chest, and one in the spine. The attack took place in the middle of the restaurant, and no one came to his aid for several minutes. At last a friend dragged him to a vehicle that took him to a Clinic in Pereira where doctors miraculously save his life. The driver of the vehicle was murdered on 23 rd January 2010, and the man who dragged him to safety had to leave the country to protect his own life. The short-term objective of the murder was to prevent Rasguño from testifying on 12th January 2010. This was however, not the sole motive for the “pig slaughter”. It was the Norte del Valle mafia’s symbolic practice, which meant Ignacio Londoño was to be crowned as the new criminal power: a position that had previously been held by Rasguño. Moreover, the presence of El Indio at the event served to notify the Cartago community that Ignacio Londoño now had the backing of the Comba organization. They are the new drug lords in Pacific and south Colombia and are the leaders of “Los Rastrojos” gang, an organization they inherited from the deceased Wilber Varela, also known as “Jabón”.301

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It is relevant to note that although the Comba took over “Jabón’s” extensive organization, they are not Norte del Valle natives; they were born in Casanare and moved to Valle del Cauca in the 90’s. This is a novelty in the history of the mafia in Norte del Valle. Over the years the violent succession of mafia bosses had always taken place between people born in the ‘historical’ Cartel areas. It is for this reason that Ignacio Londoño can claim territorial dominance in the absence of Diego Montoya who was extradited, and “Jabón” who was murdered in Venezuela in 2008.

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Another important objective was to deliver a clear message to the rest of the extradited Norte del Valle Cartel bosses and deputies who are vital to confirm the former boss of bosses Rasguño’s statements. The murder, as an implicit message, contained three different components: 1. The first is the violent power of the homicide itself. 2. The second is to make “El Indio’s” presence well-known to demonstrate that Ignacio Londoño is backed by a powerful organization. 3. Finally, the murder of Rasguño’s loved one manifests, to the extradited men, Ignacio Londoño’s impunity and also what valuable assets he has in the Cartago Police and District Attorney’s Office. On the subject of Cartel penetration into the Cartago Police, it is necessary to draw attention to the fact that although it is known Diego Buitrago received the invitation to the “pig slaughter” via his Blackberry, the lead has never been investigated. The policeman attached to the SIJIN who wrote the homicide criminal report stole the phone from Buitrago’s dead body and most probably destroyed it. Although the policeman was dismissed from the service and formally charged, thanks to the DIJIN, the level of power and influence the mafia exerts over institutions in Cartago and Norte del Valle in general is evident for all to see. The risk that Diego Buitrago González’s killers will remain free from punishment is high. When, on 4th February 2010, the Terrorism Office investigating the Alvaro Gómez murder reviewed the investigations into the homicide on 7th January 2010 in order to verify what Rasguño had said, they found the information not in the file, but in the crime report. The investigation is currently steadily progressing thanks to DIJIN leadership; for this reason the file had to be transferred to Bogotá. Let us return once again to the plot lead by Ignacio “Nacho” Londoño: his interference with Alvaro Gómez Hurtado’s investigation has not been limited to the intimidation of extradited mafia bosses. He has repeatedly, and at least once personally at the El Dorado international Airport, Bogotá before witnesses of great credibility, threatened to have Fernando Botero killed. Ignacio Londoño used this tactic previously during the Proceso 8000. These treats have, quite understandably, put an end to Botero’s willingness to cooperate. He is now completely undesirous to involve himself in the details that he insinuated in his initial statements. As previously mentioned, the most recent phase in the plot hatched by Ignacio Londoño to have the latest stage in the Gómez Hurtado assassination investigation fail, has been the 113

sending of a blunt and devastating message to those members of the Cartel and the authorities who intend to support the investigation. Mr. Jaime Angel Londoño, undeniably had huge power in the Norte del Valle and his cousin Ignacio Londoño’s area of influence. In the first half of 2010 in Cartago as Diego Buitrago Gómez and “Zarco Emilio’s” homicide investigations progressed he accepted the position of Prosecutor overseeing the case, 302 despite the fact accepting this position meant a demotion and most probably a salary reduction. The plaintiffs have questioned the Attorney General regarding Prosecutor Angel Londoño’s appointment and previous history. Mr. Mendoza Diago has however, systematically refused to explain the very ‘coincidental’ appointment of Ignacio Londoño’s cousin. The plaintiffs endeavored to take legal action to gain access to this information and to reveal the unsuitability of Mr. Mendoza Diago’s appointment. They were however, denied of this path primarily and on appeal the Judicial Branch of Government. WHERE IS THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE? Along the course of the past fifteen years District Attorneys Valdivieso Sarmiento, Gómez Méndez, Osorio Isaza, Iguarán Arana, and Mendoza Diago have all demonstrated their inability to face the challenge brought about by the investigation of a State Crime. Three lustra after the crime was committed neither has the truth has been determined nor has justice prevailed. Over the past few months however, new lines of investigation have emerged and deserve to be explored in the search for Gómez Hurtado’s intellectual and actual murderers. It is regrettable though, as has been the case over the course of the investigation, that the District Attorney’s Office does not seem interested in advancing the inquiry as quickly and thoroughly as is required. All the testimonies that have been previously detailed, together with many others, the details of which lie hidden somewhere in the authorities’ files provide a reasonable case for the Attorney General to review the Gómez assassination investigation. There are also sufficient grounds to order new evidence to be taken, both expert and testimonial. The purpose of this being, to either confirm or reject the versions of events told by former Minister Botero, former paramilitary soldier H.H., former mafia boss Rasguño, and other individuals who comprised the mafia and political groups fifteen years ago. 302

For reasons altogether unclear, the District Attorney’s Office in Cartago maintains a structure similar to the old criminal system, with one Investigative District Attorney who has the responsibility for investigating nearly 1000 crimes. There are also three Prosecutors overseeing the cases to whom the first sometimes reports his progress. Such an antiquated structure is evidently very pleasing for “Los Rastrojos” who rule over the area. They only take hits from the District Attorneys working on a national level, who have the help of DIJIN.

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A grave and undeniable fact should be stated regarding the new wave of testimonies, detailed previously, that began to emerge in 2007 and all speak of the same criminals responsible. For the first ten years of the investigation there was a lamentable chain of derailment and concealment. This only succeeded in presenting a falsely constructed hypotheses, so weak that it was attributed with no credibility by the legal system or the public. It is fundamental that the case be investigated in greater detail in order to confirm or reject new testimonies, which have not been reviewed to the degree that is necessary. Moreover, would it not be wise to open proceedings to investigate who was behind the fake hypothesis, the false accusations, and the entire procedural farce that has been derailing the investigation for over ten years? If anything can be concluded after reviewing the Sincelejo, Bogotá and Hunters Groups criminal hypotheses, is that they were a crude farce orchestrated by false witnesses and members of Government staff (such as Captain Villegas, the agents who groomed the star witnesses, etc.). It must also be recognized that the Second Specialized Criminal Judge in Bogotá acknowledged in her ruling dated 21st December 2001 (and subsequently ratified by the High Court in Bogotá) how the majority of those accused were acquitted. Despite everything that has happened the District Attorney’s Office continues to remain silent in the face of existing evidence and well-executed attempts to derail the investigation over the past fifteen years. For how long will this silence last, and why do they keep silent? There exists absolutely no institutional desire to make progress in the investigation. The Attorney General and the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center have themselves tolerated and presided over the paralysis in the investigation for more than eight years. The Plaintiffs have repeatedly made several demands: that safety of the District Attorney in charge of the case is ensured, support from the Judicial Police through the CTI is given, the appointment of a supporting District Attorney is made, and the identity and current offices of District Attorneys previously in charge of the case are revealed. The purpose of the last request is to confront them about all the inconsistencies in the case as well as the staggering loss of evidence. To date, none of these requests have been satisfied. There is one simple response to any request for aid from the Prosecutor overseeing the case; the office management, through the Specialized Judges, increases the Office 20’s caseload, which is the institution responsible for the Gómez Hurtado investigation. District Attorney Murcia’s order that evidence be taken that 115

may be of interest to confirm witnesses’ statements has been met with a punishment. For his troubles, his caseload has been increased by twenty-five percent, of which he had been assigned cases with an increased level of obligation, both professionally and with longer time constraints. The institution’s modus operandi is clearly to flood the District Attorney with work in order to prevent progress in the investigation and newly gathered evidence from being validated. He is already additionally responsible for processing Raúl Reyes’ computers. As a result of the victims’ request, from 2007 to 2009 the District Attorney’s Office did not order the testimonies of men who had been extradited such as Santander Lopesierra and the man known as Rasguño. These individuals had claimed publicly that they had information about the case. The District Attorney’s Office had equally lost interest in following up the first statement former Minister Fernando Botero made in July 2007. In April 2009 Santander, Rasguño, and Botero gave their statements, as did H.H., whose statement was transferred by the Justice and Peace Prosecutors. As I previously stated, District Attorney Villarreal received a clear message of support form his colleagues when he was immediately removed from office and transferred to Arauca. He was notified and his reappointment was implemented with immediate effect the day after he came back from Mexico City where he had taken Botero’s testimony. In view of this situation, to express our protest, and also in view of the petition, we scheduled a meeting in June 2009 with Attorney General Iguarán. The reason behind this meeting was not only the evident desire to retaliate, but also to question the temporary appointments of the District Attorneys in charge of the investigation. This had served as well-aimed blow to make sure that the dossier of over 150,000 pages remained impotent and ill investigated. Four months later, Attorney General Mendoza, was kind enough to meet with the plaintiffs’ Attorney, Enrique Gómez Martínez and myself. We requested that whoever was to be the incumbent of Office 20 Prosecutors remain in charge over a long period of time as that they would be able to assimilate the enormous quantity of information on the case. In addition to asking for resources and security measures to continue with the investigation we also sought answers regarding the disappearance of evidence during the process. When presented with the above requests the former Attorney General informed us that the permanent appointment of an incumbent was an irrelevant factor with regards to ensuring the quality of the investigation. In his opinion, time had distanced us from truth and we would, 116

therefore, gain nothing from revising old criminal evidence, although we would, obviously, be provided with manpower and the Judicial Police to support the continuation of the investigation. The Attorney General never did provide the manpower he promised, and denied the security previously offered for the District Attorney. The possibility of judicial support from the CTI is so unlikely that Office 20 is no longer even bothering to request it. SUPPORT FROM THE NATIONAL POLICE FORCE Due to such an unacceptable position held by the Attorney General, blatant and shameless intimidation of witnesses and complete obstruction of the investigation because of the lack of support from the Judicial Police, the victims turned to the National Government. They gained its unrestricted support through the Director General of the Police Force, General Oscar Naranjo. Without absolutely any hesitation and in full knowledge of the serious intimidation and obstruction of justice that had taken place, he arranged security for both the District attorney overseeing the case and the plaintiffs’ representative. He also provided helpful resources from the DIJIN, both for the Alvaro Gómez Hurtado case and for the relatives of witnesses who had been murdered. The support provided by the Police Force has allowed great advances in the murder inquiry. It has also aided in identifying the violent groups who continue to intimidate potential witnesses. What is the District Attorney’s Office doing? Former Attorney General Mendoza Diago was active as far as the press were concerned. He played the role of discrediting Rasguño’s statements with the aid of absolutely no evidence. The Attorney General has repeatedly rejected the mafia boss’ testimony without supporting his claim with facts. Neither has he provided any evidence of this nature to the District Attorney overseeing the case. There is, however, additional information that needs to be revealed and will come as quite a surprise, especially for the patient reader who has trudged through the saga that is this investigation. Mr. Mendoza Diago has intended to revive, pay close attention to this part, the hypothesis that incriminated the soldiers from the 20 th Brigade for Alvaro Gómez Hurtado’s assassination in a supposed concealment of an alleged coup d’état.

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Under the Right to petition, the plaintiffs’ Attorney required that the Attorney General provide evidence for the assertion he made to the media. In his cynical response the Attorney General stated he had absolutely no evidence; his statement was his own personal opinion and were basically general comments that should not be taken too seriously. Mr. Mendoza Diago clearly has no interest in assassinations. It is hard to comprehend why the Colombian press does not stop reiterating his qualities in relation to Luis Carlos Galán’s homicide investigation. He gave an excited and media-focused debate on the topic for personal gain in the wake of General Maza Márquez being charged and arrested. Later however, despite this display, he changed his mind and returned the investigation to the District Attorneys who were originally in charge of the case. The reason for this was to allow his appointment to expire, thus facilitating the General’s release. THE NEW ENFORCEMENT OF THE LAW OF SILENCE The consequences of the Attorney General’s delay, Diego Buitrago Gómez’s homicide, Romel Hurtado’s assassination, which occurred on 15th July 2010, Botero’s threats, Jaime Angel Londoño’s appointment, and other measures of intimidation in the investigation have been both well-known and disastrous. The remaining extradited Norte del Valle bosses have decisive power in confirming Rasguño’s version of events. They have recounted in-depth testimonies to the Supreme Court of Justice incriminating Ignacio Londoño, and also having, in principle, agreed to cooperate in the Alvaro Gómez Hurtado homicide investigation. They are now however, expressing their fear of appearing to testify in court as witnesses. The first priority of Mafia bosses who had power under Carlos Ramírez Abadía, also known as “Chupeta”, is assuring the safety of their families and close friends in Colombia, before contemplating the possibility of taking part in the investigation. Some however, may well finish their sentences in the United States and be doomed to deportation back to Colombia where they will be seriously preoccupied about their chances of survival. The extradited bosses, as well as the authorities, are very well aware that Ignacio Londoño Zabala was instrumental in launching the “Comba” against Victor Patiño Fómeque’s family. They also know that he was the man responsible for Luis Alfonso Ocampo Fómeque’s murder and quartering for his intention to comply with the United States Department of Justice. It seems that Londoño’s sharp moves have enforced the return of the “law of silence”. Despite this, the dynamism of the American justice system and decisive action from the part of the 118

Colombian authorities will finally allow the silence to be broken. The country will, at last, be told the truth, and the men responsible for Alvaro Gómez Hurtado’s murder will finally be brought to justice. The House of Representatives’ Accusations Commission announced their plan to question several ex mafia bosses, the main man being Rasguño. After this the threats towards and pressure exercised on the Gómez family and others interested in pressing on with the investigation became serious. On 19th May 2011 my son Miguel Gómez Martínez, who is a member of the Chamber of Representatives of Colombia, and represents Bogotá, received a recording. This recording informed him, in no uncertain terms, that he was under surveillance and his mobile telephone was bugged. This was an extremely serious situation: our security advisors informed us that those wishing to intimidate us wanted to send him the message that his location could be easily identified through his phone. Also, they were monitoring all his communications. Eleven days before Rasguño was to testify, on 2nd June 2011, a powerful explosive device was placed near a monument erected in honor of my father, the ex-president Laureano Gómez. The monument is located in the north of Bogotá in calle 94. The authorities decided that they had little interest in investigating the explosion because the device comprising of 12.5 kilos of Indugel did not explode. Threats continued to be made. In New York on 14 th June 2011 whilst Rasguño’s testimony was being recorded, Augusto Posada, the representative to the Investigative Chamber passed an important message to my son Enrique. The information was that two thugs had physically assaulted a member of his legal team on 3rd June 2011. The purpose was to leave him with no clear doubt that he should cease to be involved in the investigation. The representative himself had also been directly threatened. Despite having tried on three previous separate occasions to personally submit this information to the commander of the National Police, on 15 th June the fourth meeting was once again cancelled. Fourteen days after the unsuccessful attack of 2nd June, not only was there no record made of the terrorist attack, but we had also received absolutely no information from the Police Chief, one of his subordinates, or the District Attorney.

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During the night of 15th June 2011 the representative to the Investigative Chamber, Héctor Vergara received a threatening email. The reason was the Alvaro Gómez Hurtado murder investigation. Neither my son’s, nor my security detail had been warned of the implicit danger of the explosion on 2nd June and we subsequently received no increased security measures. To endeavor to gain a deeper understanding of the situation we hired the services of private security consultants. They considered that the threat to Miguel’s in the recording, and the explosion at the monument (which consists of a giant bronze portrayal of my father’s head) was a direct warning for the head of the family: without doubt my son, and politician Miguel. As a result of the authorities’ complete silence, Miguel erred on the side of caution and in the early morning of 16th June took his wife and children to the airport and fled the country. During the night of the same day a bomb exploded in exactly the same place as it had been placed before, at the statue of ex-President Gómez. It caused serious structural damage to the area, and also to the monument. “Nacho” Londoño, who was one of those responsible for this intimidating behavior was seeking to return to the time of “the law of silence”. Despite their best intentions there are several factors that will smash the silence: American Justice, decisive action from the authorities in Colombia, and my family’s pledge. With this combination we will be able to tell the country the truth, and bring those responsible for Alvaro Gómez Hurtado’s murder to justice. Let us prey that this will be an example of a citizen’s complete commitment to defeat the sad impunity that affects so many Colombian families and which undoubtedly day-by-day serves to feed the violence and criminality.

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CHAPTER IV APPENDIX

The following appendix consists of a collection of different evidence that reveals the manipulation of the crime scene. It also proves how over the years there has been an absence of technical criteria when conducting the investigation. FORENSIC AND EVIDENTIAL CONSIDERATIONS ON THE DAY OF THE CRIME “As my luck seems, perhaps being cut down by a burst of machine gun fire should not be considered as an extraordinary misfortune. Maybe it would not be a ‘bel morir’, but given the country’s current situation and global status it would not be a sacrifice made in vein”. Alvaro Gómez Hurtado Alvaro Gómez’s bodyguard used to arrive at his house very early in the morning. However, on the morning of 2nd November 1995, without having previously notified his employee, Ignacio Rueda was unable to arrive at the Gómez Hurtado apartment until 9:00 A.M. Gómez had, by this time, already been driven to the Universidad Sergio Arboleda by his veteran driver Luis Ojeda. Ignacio Rueda set off on foot from Gómez’s apartment to the University where he met up with Ojeda, who was waiting outside the car he had left in a car park while waiting for Alvaro Gómez303 to finish his class. The former Senator was giving his regular Thursday hour long ‘Culture and Civilization’ class from 9:00 to 10:00 A.M. José Huertas, Gómez’s former bodyguard and his class monitor at that time, was the first to leave and approach the car at around 10:05 A.M.. Gómez had not yet left for the car park as a student had stopped him in the corridor asking him when it would be possible to schedule a tutorial. Smiling, Gómez replied “next week” without stopping on the way to his car; he wanted to be on time for lunch in La Calera with his friend Orlando Garcia-Herreros. Before reaching his car Gómez bumped into and spoke briefly with Gabriel Melo Guevara, a long-standing political follower of Álvaro’s for ten minutes before getting into the car. At roughly 10:20 A.M. Gómez Hurtado and his assistant José Huertas climbed into the back of the dark blue Mercedes Benz parked inside University grounds. The driver and bodyguard sat in 303

RUEDA, Ignacio, statement made on 15 November 1995, Book 03, Page 268, in Case file 27212

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the front. The car started, moved forward to the campus exit located in front of Calle 74 and a few meters east of Carrera 15. The car had not even managed to leave the gate when the shouts could be heard, “There he is! There he is!” Then shots were fired at the unarmored car’s rear windows. José Huertas leapt on top of Alvaro Gómez body; his last living act would be to try and protect his boss and mentor. The hitmen who were close to the car on each side fired heavily at the rear of the car: “Move it man, I’ll take ‘em on” Ignacio Rueda shouted at the driver, who accelerated, stupefied. Rueda fired back at the men who were still unloading on the back seats, and was injured in the process. Ojeda, who remained unhurt by the attack, sped off to the Country Hospital, which was not far from the University. Alvaro Gómez’s body, unconscious but showing vital signs, was taken in; José Huertas was dead. The hitmen, although disappearing quickly refrained from running frantically around the surrounding streets. Several hours later a doctor who worked at the Country Hospital announced Alvaro Gómez Hurtado’s death in front of a large group of student doctors. Reason for death: several bullet wounds. Gómez was assassinated on 2nd November 1995. THE CRIME SCENE The same day, at 1:30 in the afternoon, Mauricio Torres González, Delegated Municipal Criminal District Attorney 394 (URI) arrived at the crime scene. In conjunction with an agent from the DIJIN Criminal Office he carried out the judicial inspection, which is currently kept on file in the Attorney General’s Office. It is important to note that, to date, there is still no record kept of the DIJIN agent’s identity; in neither the file kept by the District Attorney’s Office, nor the one that the Second Specialized Criminal Court has on record. As a result of the process that is currently underway the District Attorney’s Office started a file,304 on which evidence compiled was recorded. Subsequently, a more detailed report was drafted on the crime scene and the evidence taken. From the beginning, it is necessary to draw attention to very serious inconsistencies associated with the undertaking of an investigation of this type, and the consequent grave repercussions on the investigation due to the mistakes made. It is of paramount importance, for any criminal investigation, that there is an appropriate and efficient analysis of the crime scene.305

304

Book 1, Pages 49 - 51 “A meticulously detailed and methodical analysis of the crime scene allows for the discovery, identification, observing, recovery, and technical collection of all that reveal the facts behind the illegal behavior. At the same time they establish links and relations between these facts and the perpetrator of the crime”. COLOMBIA. NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUDICIAL POLICE Standard Manual of the Judicial Police National Printing Press of Colombia, n.d. P. 33 305

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The initial report recorded the finding of a total of ten firearm impacts to various buildings in the vicinity of the Universidad Sergio Arboleda. It accounted for nine 9mm cases and three other ballistic components, which according to the officer who signed the report were “cones”.306 These were assumed to be projectiles with an undetermined caliber. Moreover, the agent from the District Attorney’s Office who carried out the procedure discovered a trail of blood two meters away from the door on Gómez Hurtado’s side of the car. There was however, no record taken of appearance, shape or direction of the trail. This regrettable omission inevitably denies the investigation of an important element required to identify exactly whose blood it was. Evidence therefore does not exist which would clarify if one of the attackers was wounded, or if indeed the blood was shed by one of the victims. It is also on record in the report that photographs were taken everywhere evidence was recovered, as well as the collection and documentation of all material evidence found at the scene of the crime. The aforementioned recovery of evidence was undoubtedly affected by the late arrival of the judicial police and the complete lack of cordoning off the crime scene and isolating it from the public, as can be seen in press videos. It must be noted that it has been impossible to confirm this fact in the video that was allegedly taken by the crime scene investigators as it disappeared. Neither the Second Specialized Court nor the District Attorney’s Office claim responsibility for this loss. At the end of the report, it is signaled that all individuals taking part in the investigation signed to acknowledge the facts. It is curious therefore, that District Attorney Torres González’s signature is the only one visible, and DIJIN agent’s name who supposedly accompanied District Attorney González does not appear.307 When taking into account the suspicious involvement of the National Police Force over the course of the investigation, and especially in the primary evidence gathering phase on the day the crime was committed, these circumstances seem somewhat conspicuous. The following day of the investigation on 2nd November, Delegated District Attorney 324 received Report No. 416 LACRI – 772.308 This report described the marks of physical violence 306

Original Book, Appendix 1, Pages 50 and 51. Original Book 1, Page 51. 308 The report was written by ballistics technicians Henry Navarro Villalba and Gladys Neila Bonilla Moreno. It consisted of a total of 21 pages. Marlon Aux Villarreal (Chief of the Central Criminal Laboratory) confirmed that these technicians were active members of the Judicial Police (Original Supplementary Book, Appendix 5, Page 21). The drawings and sketches hwever (at least one of them) were drawn by José Luis Mendoza Varela, and approved by José Angel Mendoza Guzmán (Chief of the Criminal Division). Original Book, Appendix 5, Page 22. 307

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found at the crime scene,309 the judicial inspection of Alvaro Gómez Hurtado’s vehicle, and ended with the technical conclusions drawn by the officers who undertook the investigation. There are serious chronological inconsistencies in the preliminary judicial inspection report and final report regarding the times of the judicial inspection at the crime scene. 310 The former states that the inspection took place at 1:30 P.M., while the latter indicates that it took place at 11:45 A.M.311 The details of the description of the place where the crime took place begins with the impact of two bullets to the metal plate below a window in restaurant “Erase una Res”.312 The position of one of the bullet holes manifested that the projectile responsible for the impact was heading in an east – west direction (originating from the Sergio Arboleda University side). Unfortunately, there is no detail of whether the actual bullet was recovered from the hole or the surrounding area. Omission was continuous throughout each description of evidence taken and thus prevented a clear identification of those involved in the attack, and also the origin of the “cones” found. Subsequently, a bullet hole located in the entrance to a restaurant called “Bar los 70’s”, 313 and two more impacts over three meters away from the door were detailed. The report also refers to four dents in the garage door of the “María Clara” residential building, and an impact to one of the windows in apartment 202. This was caused by a bullet that also made a hole in an entrance to one of the bedrooms.314 Among the evidence found in the bedroom, investigators managed to identify fragments of “armor and lead”.315 Taking into consideration that the only weapons fitted with armored ammunition on the day of the event were those of the killers, it can be concluded that the damage was caused by a bullet that came from one of the hitmen’s guns. The report lastly details a bullet hole found in one of the “Nicopan” shop’s windows. The crime scene report includes five drawings316 of the places where the five previously detailed impacts were found.317 In the drawing identified as No. 0564 - A318, which manifests

309

Original Book, Appendix 5, Page 22. Original Book 1, Page 50. 311 Original Book Appendix 5, Page 22. 312 Located on Calle 74 # 14-44, Book Appendix 5, Page 14. 313 Located on Calle 74 # 14-50, Original Book Appendix 5, Page 14. 314 Located on Calle 74 #14-47. Original Book Appendix 5, Page 51. 315 Original Book Appendix 5, Page 15. 316 Identified by serial number #0564, Original Book Appendix 5 Page 22 and 23, and from 25 - 27. 310

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the line of vision form Calle 74 to the south-east, an unexplainable omission becomes apparent. The drawing does not identify the position of the “María Clara” building where four dents and two holes made by firearms were found. As a consequence, it is impossible to identify from where the bullets came, and also if they were fired by the hitmen or by Gómez Hurtado’s bodyguard when fighting off the attack. EVIDENCE FOUND AT THE CRIME SCENE The report also detailed the finding at the crime scene of 10 spent 9mm rounds, 319 made in Perú and marked with “FAME82” at their base. When a ballistics analysis of the 10 rounds320 was carried out the conclusion was that nine of them revealed the same indentation on the primer, and that the last one had a different mark. Therefore, the specialists concluded that the rounds had been shot from two different weapons. This is hugely important information if we take into consideration that the only individuals who used 9mm weapons were the hitmen and Huertas Hastamorir. On the day the crime was committed the only weapons that were used were the hitmens’ and arm that Rueda Jauregui carried on his person. According to the DAS bodyguard assigned to Gómez Hurtado’s on the day of his death, he was carrying two guns: an issued .38 caliber revolver,321 and his own .22 Llama pistol.322 According to statements made by people who witnessed the crime, and by Rueda Jáuregui himself, he fired back at the attackers using his .38 caliber gun,323 until it was empty. The gun was immediately handed over to police when they arrived at the crime scene. The other pistol that Rueda Jáuregui was carrying that day fell off him when he was shot, and was then picked up by one of the University security guards who unsuccessfully tried to fire it.324 The weapon was subsequently delivered the District Attorney’s Office on 6 th December 317

The diagrams referred to were drawn by José Luis Mendoza Varela, DIJIN Criminal Division, Planimetric Technician, Planimetric Unit, and signed by José Angel Mendoza Guzmán, Chief of the Criminal Division, National Police Force, Original Book Appendix 5, Page 22. 318 Original Book Appendix 5, Page 23. 319 Original Book Appendix 5, Page 23. 320 Original Book Appendix 5, Pages 20 and 30 321 Information thanks to a report written by Roberto Arguello Palacio, Commander of the Second Police Force, Bogotá, for the attention of the Commander of the Metropolitan Police, Bogotá, Luís Ernesto Gilibert. It identifies the issued gun carried by Rueda Jáuregui: a .38 caliber RUGER revolver No. 158-92476. Evidence Book 9, Page 94. 322 Agent Edgar Ignacio Rueda Jáuregui’s additional testimony. Book 3, Pages 268 - 272. 323 Edgar Ignacio Rueda Jáuregui’s testimony. Original Book 3, Page 155. José David Rojas Cotrino’s testimony, Book 3, Pages 81 - 86. 324 José David Rojas Cotrino’s testimony. Original Book 3, Pages 81 - 86

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1995,325 which tried to carry out a series of tests in order to determine the possible use of the gun during the event.326 The Police Central Criminalistics Laboratory327 determined on 21st December 1995 that the gun had not been recently used. Also, due to the caliber of the weapon, it was asserted that it would have been impossible for this weapon to have fired the bullets that killed Alvaro Gómez Hurtado. Moreover, a question arises that addresses the lack of care and attention on gathering evidence. If the multiple impacts that were recorded on both sides of the vehicle indicated that there were, at least, two hitmen, then why was only one shell from one of the weapons recovered on the day the crime was committed. The answer is simple: the necessary measures required for ensuring the correct chain of custody for protecting the evidence collected on the day of the homicide were not taken. It should be noted that in the description of the aforementioned rounds the primer and ejector prints left by the gun upon firing were identified. However, it was never discovered if any microscope study of the print left by the extractor and the gun chamber was ever undertaken. Such a study would have allowed for a complete ballistic identification of the weapon used. 328 This grave omission substantially restricted the ability to identify the gun that fired those rounds. It is however, evident that the positions of the shells at the crime scene had been moved. It was clear that the distance between some of the shells had been reduced from photographs taken during the judicial inspection. If their material (brass) is taken into account as well as the surface on which they landed (the pavement), a simple analysis can demonstrate that they should have ricocheted on the pavement, concluding thus that the position in which they were found was not their original position. It is also important to take into consideration that the direction in which the shells are ejected on leaving the weapon’s chamber is relative and depends completely on the position in which the gun was fired. As a result of this analysis it can be said that the position of the shells at the crime scene was changed. Who would have been able to change their positions? Who would be interested in tampering with the evidence?

325

Report on the discharge of one firearm. Original Book 6, Page 203. th Resolution No. 110 issued by the Delegated District Attorney before the Regional Court Specialized Terrorism Unit, dated 7 December 1995. Original Book 6A, Page 242. 327 Communiqué 951723/LABAL – 772, Book 8, Pages 81 - 86 328 “…each firearm can be identified by the prints it leaves on the cylindrical surface of the round it fires (at the place of impact) and on the butt and body of the discharged round…” Criminalistics Manual. GUZMAN, Carlos A. La Roca Editions, 1997, Buenos Aires, Page 514. 326

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As the investigation progressed, the District Attorney’s Office began to contemplate the idea of a connection with the attack on Attorney Antonio José Cancino. He was, at that time, working as Defense Attorney for President Samper in the campaign that had sent him straight to Congress. It was for this reason that the investigator ordered a comparative analysis of the shells found at both crime scenes.329 Despite this request, the results of an analysis have never been found in either of the two case files, manifesting, once again negligence in the investigation. The results could have been instrumental in confirming or rejecting a connection between the perpetrators of both crimes. It is still present in our minds that the District Attorney’s Office consolidated the two investigations and then subsequently tried to undo this action and separate them, without The High Court in Bogotá’s permission. Two .38 bullet fragments were identified at the crime scene as pertaining to the rounds from the .38 gun fired by Rueda Jáuregui. The first one 330 weighed 6.6 grams and there were “two visible fragments” from the lands and grooves. When technicians examined their form, they recorded “full deformation of the body, base and cone”.331 The second fragment, weighing 7.1 grams showed a total of three “visible fragments”332 from the lands and grooves. The report concluded that the bullet described was a .38 caliber weighing 9.09 grams with “three visible fragments” from the lands and grooves and partial deformation of the whole body, caused by contact with harder objects during course of the bullet’s trajectory.333 In view of the above, is it curious that only three fragments and one bullet were recovered from the crime scene. This is a very low figure taking into account the fact that Rueda Jáuregui said he had emptied his weapon, and also the high number of marks of physical violence that were found in buildings surrounding the Universidad Sergio Arboleda. It is equally important to draw attention to the fact that the report written on 3 rd November did not specify where either the fragments or rounds were found. This omission has resulted in the loss of very useful information, which could have been used for locating the position of the murderers at the crime scene, and also to identify the weapons used by the hitmen.

329

Report dated 19 December 1995 issued by Martha Liliana Rosero Gómez, Regional Management of the District Attorney’s st Office and Special District Attorney’s Office Unit employee. Book 7, Page 117, Report 2598 dated 21 December 1995. 330 Original Book Appendix 5, Page 16. 331 Original Book Appendix 5, Page 16. 332 Original Book Appendix 5, Page 16. 333 Original Book Appendix 5, Page 16.

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In addition to the above, the description of the projectiles’ characteristics is incomplete. The class characteristics are missing334 such as: the gauge, the lands and grooves of the barrel,335 weapon inclination and direction,336 the number, mass and width of the lands and grooves,337 inclination angle of the bore,338 and depth of the grooves.339 The report concludes by referring to the three fragments found inside the plate below the window in the restaurant “Bar los 70”.340 These were the only pieces of ballistic material that were recovered from buildings surrounding the crime scene. They “…do not show areas that can be compared zones fit for comparison. Due to their characteristics they were probably fired by a .38 Special revolver”. In view of the description’s absence of clarity a series of questions naturally arise. Are the projectiles described by the report the same as the ones collected from the crime scene or are they different? If they are not capable of being compared then how can it be concluded that their caliber is .38? JUDICIAL INSPECTION OF ALVARO GÓMEZ HURTADO’S VEHICLE At two o’clock in the afternoon of 2nd November 1995 the officers went to Country Hospital to undertake the judicial inspection of Gómez Hurtado’s dark blue Mercedes Benz, license plates BCE-578. The results of the inspection are recorded in the report No. 416 LACRI – 772,341 which includes a diagram342 showing the impacts of the bullets. Surprisingly, only some of the bullet’s trajectories discharged at Gómez Hurtado and his bodyguard Huertas Hastamorir have been detailed. On first inspection of the report a serious error can be encountered; the license plate number of the car Alvaro Gómez Hurtado was killed in has been incorrectly recorded. The number in the report is different from the number displayed in the photograph of the Mercedes Benz. 343 Such an elementary mistake only goes further in manifesting the preliminary investigator’s negligence: a characteristic that is will become all too common in the investigation.

334

“…all distinctive features which, in view of the varying specifications of different manufacturers frequently provide a promising clue as to the make and model of the weapon that discharged the round”. Excerpt from GUZMAN, Carlos A. Criminalistics Manual; First Edition; Buenos Aires, Argentina, La Rocca Editorial, 1997, Page 323. 335 Criminalistics Manual; Guzman, Carlos A. La Rocca Publications, 1997, Buenos Aires, Page 514 336 Criminalistics Manual; Guzman, Carlos A. La Rocca Publications, 1997, Buenos Aires, Page 514 337 Criminalistics Manual; Guzman, Carlos A. La Rocca Publications, 1997, Buenos Aires, Page 514 338 Criminalistics Manual; Guzman, Carlos A. La Rocca Publications, 1997, Buenos Aires, Page 514 339 Criminalistics Manual; Guzman, Carlos A. La Rocca Publications, 1997, Buenos Aires, Page 514 340 Ibid. Page 19 341 Original Book Appendix 5, Page 17 342 Original Book Appendix 5, Page 24. Identified by map No. 0564-B 343 Original Book Appendix 5, Page 30

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While undertaking their investigation the agents found a total of ten bullet holes in the bodywork of the Mercedes Benz, which were caused by firearm projectiles. There were four on the left hand side of the car, behind the passenger seat where Alvaro Gómez was sitting, and six on the right hand side where José del Cristo Huertas Hastamorir was positioned. Four of the impacts on the right hand side were to the rear of the vehicle and two were to the front. According to investigators’ account, the first bullet hole on the left hand side was an entry hole twenty centimeters away from the external back door handle, and presumably had a “right to left” trajectory from back to front. The round that made the hole went straight through, leaving an exit hole in the internal door cover at a distance of 10 cm from the armrest. The agents determined that second bullet hole344 was located 10 cm away from the back left back door molding, and 15 cm from the mid part of the rear fender arc. The round that made the hole followed a back-front, inside-outside, and “right to left” trajectory and continued until creating an exit hole located 10 cm below the back door armrest.345 It also made a new reentry hole located on the left edge of the back seat,346 continuing in its path and producing an exit hole in the front part of the same seat.347 The round finally ends its “back front” course by making a dent in the back right hand side of the seat rack.348 If the diagram referred to is carefully studied, one can observe an unexplainable omission that generates confusion between the projectile and the last impact in the left front seat: 349 a bullet hole made by a projectile on exiting the back seat. It is not comprehensible that the technicians conclude in their report that one of the projectiles found inside the vehicle “entered through existing hole number 2”,350 as no argument is presented to support the theory. In neither the report nor in the diagram is there any reference to the question of, if the round ended up in the dent where its projectile ended, or if indeed it was recovered. There is also no reference to a technical study that could be used to draw conclusions.

344

Original Book Appendix 5, Page 17. Original Book Appendix 5, Page 17, identified in the diagram as bullet hole 2A 346 Original Book Appendix 5, Page 17, identified in the diagram as 2B 347 Original Book Appendix 5, Page 17, identified in the diagram as 2C 348 Original Book Appendix 5, Page 17, identified in the diagram as 2D 349 The report confuses the 2C bullet hole orifice and the last 2D dent in the front left seat. 350 Original Book Appendix 5, Page 19 345

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It is equally surprising that the technicians also contradicted themselves when explaining that the dent where the projectile that made the second bullet hole ended its path came through the “back front seat”.351 This type of explanation only serves to make any form of analysis more difficult. Continuing with the account, the third entry hole was identified,352 located 5 cm above the lower part of the external door handle of the rear left door. The round that made the hole continued its path and made a new hole, however, this time exiting from the internal part of the door, 15 cm from its lower edge. The round followed an outside-inside, “right to left”, and back-front trajectory. The fourth bullet hole was located in the metallic part of the door, near the back left glass wind deflector.353 The projectile continued in its trajectory and made an exit hole in the inside upper part of the rear left door. The round followed an outside-inside, back-front, and “right to left” path. The aforementioned bullet holes (at least for the ones for which there exists evidence) were located on the left hand side of Alvaro Gómez Hurtado’s Mercedes Benz, license plate number BCE-578. Thus, the rounds’ trajectories that caused the four holes as described by officers who undertook the investigation, are therefore completely inexplicable. There was a serious mistake when describing their trajectories as it is said the projectiles moved from “right to left”, a route that is totally impossible if the diagram of the vehicle is interpreted correctly. As the theory of criminalistics states, the diagram354 should be analyzed on a vertical plane: the hood being located in the upper part, and the trunk being located in the lower part. If the above is taken into account then the path of the projectile is not as detailed in the report, but exactly the opposite. The rounds that impacted the door closest to where Alvaro Gómez Hurtado was sitting and that consequently killed him were fired from left to right. In addition to the impacts mentioned above, the vehicle received six additional impacts 355 on the right hand side. The first was located a few centimeters below the rear windshield; caused by a round that went straight through, piercing the fuel tank, and ending its path in the right

351

Original Book Appendix 5, Page 17. Original Book Appendix 5, Page 17. 353 Original Book Appendix 5, Page 17. 354 GUZMAN, Carlos A., Criminalistics Manual; First Edition, Buenos Aires, Argentina; La Rocca Publications, 1997, p. 323. 355 Original Book Appendix 5, Pages 17 - 19. 352

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speaker. The projectile was found in this area.356 Three impacts were also found in the back door next to which José del Cristo Huertas Hastamorir was sitting. The first left an entry hole in the right glass wind deflector and continued in its path in the same direction across the vehicle, making an entry hole on a rim located between the window and the internal right door cover. It had a slight descending trajectory.357 The second bullet hole was found on the rear right door. The round went through the door and ended up in the back seat. It is quite curious that during the investigation the officers did not recover any item from the place where the projectile’s trajectory allegedly ended.358 The third round entered the car at a perpendicular angle through the rear right door, passing through it and exiting a few centimeters from the ashtray inside the door.359 The other two bullet hole orifices were located in the front door at passenger level. The first impacted the Mercedes Benz in the front right door, 10cm from the mould, and made a new entry hole in the vehicle’s radio console.360 The projectile that caused the previous hole was recovered from the place where its trajectory ended. The last projectile361 perforated the right door at the level of the mould, continuing straight through and ending its path “on the running board”,362 presumably of the left door. As it can be seen, both the description of the impact and the photographs are unclear, which makes the trajectory difficult to determine. It is necessary to draw attention to, regarding the bullet holes stated above, the recurrent error that is made upon detailing the trajectory of the projectiles. The error was made when describing the direction of the first four right hand side impacts; when their direction is described, the projectiles are said to have come from “right to left”. This however, is in complete contradiction to the actual trajectory. The reason for the error is that of the incorrect interpretation of the vehicle’s position. The lack of attention to detail when undertaking the report is deplorable; if something as simple as the vehicles’ position confused the investigators, not much can be expected from their analysis. Furthermore, the largest majority of the descriptions of the bullet holes are incomplete: the holes’ morphology is not specified, and neither are points of reference to identify them, such as

356

Bullet hole identified in the report as No. 5. Original Book Appendix 5, Pages 17 - 18. Bullet hole identified in the report as No. 6. Original Book Appendix 5, Page 18. 358 Bullet hole identified in the report as No. 7. Original Book Appendix 5, Page 18. 359 Bullet hole identified in the report as No. 8. Original Book Appendix 5, Page 18. 360 Bullet hole identified in the report by No. 9, Original Book Appendix 5, Page 18. 361 Bullet hole identified in the report by No. 10, Original Book Appendix 5, Pages 18 and 19. 362 Original Book Appendix 5, Page 19. 357

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the angle the round was shot at, (the position of the gun barrel in relation to the floor), 363 the angle of incidence (formed by the angle between the entry hole and the position of the body following the projectile’s trajectory),364 or the penetration angle (explains the projectile’s trajectory and the affected body).365 The ballistic technicians who wrote the report believe that the three bullet holes in the right hand side of the car were “probably” caused by 5.56 caliber rounds;366 rather a frivolous judgment taking into consideration the previous tests. Moreover, it is impossible to determine the caliber of the projectile from a bullet hole that was caused by the round making contact with a second surface,367 as the hole diameter varies depending on the angle it was fired at, and also the density of the material with which the round made contact. Concluding thus, with no supporting evidence contributing to the investigation, derailments are inevitable to ensue; particularly if it is taken into consideration that the guns used in the attack were of the same caliber as those generally used by the armed forces. Another conclusion, which was detailed by the technicians who wrote the crime scene inspection report, is that the projectile that caused the second bullet hole in the left hand side of the car “matches with a 9mm caliber shot by MADSEN, UZI, or STEARM SUBMACHINEGUNS.368 This conclusion is however, supported by no evidence: primarily, as stated previously, due to the fact that a round’s caliber cannot be ascertained from the from bullet hole made after the round has passed through. Secondly, and most importantly, it is completely impossible to identify the weapon that made the hole by simply observing the hole. A more through study is required, using a pattern (projectile) that is fired by a weapon suspected of being involved, and the respective comparison with the actual projectile found.369 This is the way in which features that are shared by all weapons made by one manufacturer can be identified. After doing so, it can then be determined whether the gun firing the projectile in question belonged to one of the suspected brands of weapon.

363

GUZMAN, Carlos A., Criminalistics Manual; First Edition, Buenos Aires, Argentina; La Rocca Publications, 1997; p- 317 364 GUZMAN, Carlos A., Criminalistics Manual; First Edition, Buenos Aires, Argentina; La Rocca Publications, 1997; p. 317 365 GUZMAN, Carlos A., Criminalistics Manual; First Edition, Buenos Aires, Argentina; La Rocca Publications, 1997; p- 317 366 Original Book Appendix 5, Page 21. 367 Opinion of Julio Alberto Mejía, ballistics expert 368 Original Book Appendix 5, Page 20. 369 Opinion of Julio Alberto Mejía, ballistics expert

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When investigators undertook the judicial inspection of the Mercedes Benz they found three 9mm projectiles inside the car.370 According to the report each round was fired by a different weapon, due the diverse features of each one.371 If this evidence is valid, it can be deduced that the vehicle was attacked by no less than three individuals, all armed with 9mm guns. The diagram of the car does not show the position of the two recovered projectiles. It only shows the position where the projectile impacted near the rear windshield on the right hand side. Taking into consideration all of the evidence detailed up to this point, as well as the marks of physical violence found in the vehicle, it is possible to draw the conclusion that the criminals who took his life were fully aware of the former presidential candidate’s activities. They were also aware of his movements and the security measures that he had in place. The previous statements can be inferred from the fact the hitmen did not attack any other car or person other than Alvaro Gómez’s Mercedes Benz. Furthermore, bullet impacts to the door at the front left of the car (where DAS bodyguard Ignacio Rueda Jáuregui was sitting) manifest that criminals were aware of both his presence, and where he would be located on the day of the attack. Lastly, all the detailed evidence also indicates that the hitmen knew the position they needed to be in at the time they perpetrated the crime. When viewing the bullet holes in the left hand side of the vehicle, it is evident that the deadly projectiles followed a back – front and slightly descending trajectory, meaning that the hitmen were located to the left of the car near the University entrance. However, the perpendicular trajectory of the rounds on the right hand side of the car reveals that the attackers were firing from a position that was parallel to the car. It is evident as a result of the facts of the murder that Gómez Hurtado was victim of a steadfast, and calculated plan. This very fact provokes questions about those responsible for providing his security. 1. 10 bullet cases 2. Four 9mm projectiles 3. 4. 5. 6.

370 371

One .38 caliber projectile Four lead fragments One photograph album One map

Original Bok Appendix 5, Page 19. Original Book Appendix 5, Page 19.

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The contradiction is clear when viewing the above list of items and comparing them to the descriptions that are detailed in the report. The above list is inconsistent with the list attached to the report. For example, only three caliber 9 mm projectiles found inside the vehicle were detailed. How then is it possible for one more projectile to have been submitted as evidence? A similar inconsistency is repeated under the details of fragments found. The report only details having found three,372 and not four as recorded above. Moreover, it is definitively asserted that the remains of the projectile are “caliber .38”. They are supposedly however, fragments that do not contain “areas that can be analyzed”.373 EVIDENCE SUBMITTED IN THE TRIAL. ANOTHER METHOD OF DERAILING THE INVESTIGATION? It is evident that during the investigation there was a persistent intention to delay and deviate the initial inquiry. The gathering of material evidence over the course of the investigation gives a clear indication of a cover-up. There was, for example, an attempt to introduce many types of weapons and ammunition into the investigation, all of which had absolutely nothing to do with the case in question. One of the most disconcerting examples of a cover-up was the introduction, at the beginning of the investigation of a gas operated toy gun.374 The toy was seized during a raid375 at the home of a man who was reported to the authorities anonymously on the day of the crime. 376 The District Attorney’s Office, on 2nd November 1995, introduced this as evidence in conjunction with the cases, projectile fragments, and projectiles found at the crime scene. The most curious part of the process is in the District Attorney’s Office report377 where it is recognized that the seized weapon is in fact a toy. It was however, confiscated anyway. The gun was subsequently subject to analysis at the Police Central Criminalistics Laboratory378 as requested by the District Attorney’s Office; unnecessarily making use of limited investigation resources available at the time of the crime. The laboratory concluded that the aforementioned gun could not have been used in the attack in view of its characteristics, already detailed.

372

Original Book Appendix 5, Page 16. Original Book Appendix 5, Page 20 374 Crossman Air Guns .357 pistol, black with a brown grip, identified by number 592309782. Original Book Appendix 5, Page 82. 375 Raid on Fernando Torres Gálvis’ home. Original Book 1, Page 82. 376 Original Book 1, Page 42. 377 Delegated District Attorney 374, before the circuit Judges – Original Book 1 378 th Communiqué No. 951582/LABAL – 772 dated 11 December 1995; Book 7, Pages 74 - 80 373

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Another example of the District Attorney’s Office’s negligence is the confiscation and subsequent inclusion in the case of eight .38 caliber revolver shells,379 one 7.62mm caliber rifle cartridge,380 and one .38 caliber revolver cartridge marked “INDUMIL 38 SPECIAL.”381 The confiscated materials were drawn to the attention of the District Attorney’s Office by the anonymous call made on the day of the crime. All of these objects were also subject to analysis by the Police Central Criminalistics Laboratory, which determined that the cases had been all fired by the same gun,382 and that the .38 cartridge was spent, but had never fired.383 The results of this analysis had absolutely no impact on the murder inquiry as the report contained no evidential support, and the items had no relationship whatsoever to the rest of the evidence gathered on the day of the crime. The fervid public can often provide such leads in an assassination investigation. These leads must however, be carefully evaluated, and not used for strategically diverting efforts. AUTOPSY OF ALVARO GÓMEZ HURTADO AND JOSÉ DEL CRISTO HUERTAS HASTAMORIR When Gómez Hurtado and Huertas Hastamorir died on 2 nd November 1995 at 11:00 A.M., although not fully established by the investigation, their bodies were most probably transferred to the Institute of Forensic Sciences in order that the respective autopsies be carried out. On undertaking Alvaro Gómez’s autopsy, the pathologists concluded that he had a total of six injuries caused by a firearm.384 The first was an entry hole on the left side of the back in the second intercostal space close to the armpit.385 The projectile that was responsible for the injury moved in a left to right, back to front, and up to down motion. Following the bullet’s trajectory it could be determined that it ended in the right hand side of the chest in the eighth intercostal space. This was the bullet responsible for Gómez Hurtado’s death. It perforated, among other organs, the right and the left lungs, the pericardia, the heart (both the left and right ventricles), the peritoneum, and the liver.386 Both of Alvaro Gómez’s lungs collapsed and he suffered hypovolemic shock whereby his heart was unable to pump enough blood to the body as a result 379

Made in Colombia, marked “INDUMIL 38 SPECIAL” Original Book 8, Page 77 Made in Colombia, marked “IM 92, 036”, Original Book 8, Page 76. 381 th Raid at the home inhabited by Clara Inés Espitia, taking place 15 November 1995, Original Book 4, Page 111 382 Original Book 8, page78 383 Original Book 8, Page 76 384 rd Autopsy protocol No. 6637-95 dated 3 November 1995. Protocol implemented by Forensic Pathologist Pedro Emilio Morales Martínez, and assisted by Anatomist Ignacio Cucaita. Original Book 1, Page 107 385 Bullet hole identified by number 1.1, Original Book 1, Page 107 386 Original Book 1, Page 107 380

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of the injuries he sustained to the organ. The consequent hemorrhaging of all the injured organs was evidently the cause of his death. His injuries were so severe that none of the surgical procedures387 to suture his heart and undertake cardiopulmonary resuscitation that were performed in the Country Hospital were successful. The second entrance bullet hole388 was located in the inside of the right forearm, near the wrist.389 In addition to soft tissue damage, the bullet shattered the ulna. The second, and final round was removed from Gómez Hurtado’s corpse through this wound. The entry hole of the third wound was 1cm x 1cm and located three quarters of the way up the outside left forearm.390 The projectile causing the wound continued through his body and then caused the fourth wound (1.6cm x 0.8cm exit hole) in the left forearm, both front and back. 391 Other that the soft tissue damage, injuries caused by this bullet were: shattering of the ulna and radius. The round’s trajectory was from left to right, back to front and up to down. The entry hole of the fifth wound measured 1cm x 1.7cm and was located 105 cm from the vertex in the upper inside section of the right thigh.392 The projectile that caused this wound went through the leg and exited through the third mid external section of the right thigh. 393 It is curious that this wound is not recorded in the photographic record, but what is recorded instead is a burn from a firearm (2cm x 1cm) located in the upper left section of the thigh. 394 There are two possible implications of the previously detailed facts: the autopsy protocol omitted describing a wound (a burn located on the upper left thigh). Or, quite the opposite: that there was a poor description of the photographic study of the wounds. A burn was described instead of an exit hole in the leg where the wound did not originate. The inconsistency could also be due to the photographic record omitting the projectile impacting the right leg exit hole. The mistake is however, serious and causes confusion regarding the way Gómez Hurtado was attacked. Instead of clarifying the event it generates further doubts. 387

Gómez underwent a thoracostomy in the hospital in an effort to suture the heart wounds, and then a cardiopulmonary nd resuscitation. Epicrisis written up at the Country Hospital on 2 November 1995, Original Book 1, Page 8. 388 Bullet wound No. 2.1. Original Book 1, Page 107. 389 Exact bullet wound location was “79 cm from the vertex and on the internal anterior right forearm lower third section”. Original Book 1, Page 107. The photographic record of the wound is stored with the photographic report of the corpse, No. 7177-2862 photograph 11315-08. Original Book 1, Page 237. 390 Bullet wound 3.1 Original Book 1, Page 107. The wound is illustrated in photograph No. 11315-06. Original Book 1, Page 107. 391 Bullet wound 3.2 Original Book 1, Page 107. The wound is illustrated in photograph No. 11315-09. Original Book 1, Page 236. 392 Bullet wound 4.1 Original Book 1, Page 107. The wound is illustrated in photograph No. 11315-07. Original Book 1, Page 236. 393 Bullet wound 4.2 Original Book 1, Page 107. The wound is not graphically illustrated. 394 Photograph 11315-10. Original Book 1, Page 238.

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José del Cristo Huertas Hastamorir’s autopsy took place on the same day as Gómez Hurtado corpse was examined.395 The first wound detailed was a 2.5cm x 1cm burn on the interior upper third section of the right arm.396 The projectile that caused the burn continued along from its 1.5cm diameter entry hole in the back right side and became lodged in the fourth intercostal space.397 The projectile made a 0.7cm diameter exit hole, 44 cm from the vortex, and 17 cm from the mid front line in the seventh left intercostal space of the exterior armpit line.398 This projectile was responsible for the death of José del Cristo Huertas Hastamorir as it perforated both the right and the left lungs, the pericardium, the diaphragm, and the left ventricle, making a 3 cm x 2 cm wound and causing hypovolemic shock which led to his death. When the path of the projectile that caused the wounds described above was followed, it was observed that the projectile subsequently impacted the victim’s left arm causing an 1.2cm x 0.5 cm oval wound in the interior lower third section of the extremity,399 where the pathologists recovered one projectile. The pathologists who carried out the autopsy reported that the projectile’s trajectory went from right to left, up to down, and back to front. Lastly a 3 cm x 1 cm burn was found on the external side of the palm of the left hand, caused by contact with a firearm projectile.400 As well as the previously described autopsies, an analysis of the projectiles found in Alvaro Gómez Hurtado and José del Cristo Huertas Hastamorir’s corpses was ordered.401 The armored projectile found in Gómez Hurtado right thorax402 was identified as being 9 mm caliber, flattened along the center, and having a break in the bullet case that covers the lead inside the

395

Autopsy results are recorded in autopsy protocol No. 6638 – 95, performed by Mario Alberto Hernandez Rubio. Original Book 1, Pages 110 - 112 and in the photographic study located in the Original Book 1, Pages 222 - 228. 396 Orifice 1.1 Necropsy Protocol 6638; Original Book 1 page112. Photographic study kept in the Original Book 1 page 223; Photograph 11316-02 397 Bullet hole 1.2, Autopsy Protocol 6638. Original Book 1 page 112. Photographic study kept in the Original Book 1 page 223. Photograph 11316-02 398 Bullet hole 1.2, Autopsy Protocol 6638-95 in Original Book 1, Page 112. Photographic study kept in the Original Book 1, Page 223. Photograph 11316-03 399 Bullet hole 1.3, Autopsy Protocol 6638-95. Original Book 1, Page 112. Photographic study kept in the Original Book 1, Page 223. Photograph 11316-04 400 Bullet hole 1.2, Autopsy Protocol 6638-95. Original Book 1, Page 112. Photographic study kept in the Original Book 1, Page 223. Photograph 11316-05. 401 The study was conducted by Institute of Legal Medicine and Forensic Sciences by forensic technician Carlos Yesid García rd Muñoz on 3 November 1995. 402 Original Book 1, Page 108

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projectile. Moreover, flattening on the sides was identified as well as a loss of projectile material.403 It was also concluded that the second armored projectile recovered from Gómez Hurtado’s right forearm was also 9 mm caliber with a break in the copper lining and deformations on the entire projectile’s body. It was the primary conclusion of the Institute of Legal Medicine and Forensic Sciences that according to the number and rotation of the prints left by the gun that shot the projectiles, it is possible that they were fired from a Beretta Ingram, or Heckler & Koch submachine gun, or by a Prieto Beretta, Browning, Walter, Astra or Tauros pistol.404 Taking the above into account, the same report was able to conclude that both projectiles had different marks. This signified that the projectiles were fired from different weapons.405 This conclusion is however, opposite to the conclusion drawn by the National Police Force Laboratory of Criminalistics, in a study conducted on 11 th December 1995 undertaken upon request from the District Attorney’s Office.406 One of the purposes of this study was to compare the projectiles found in Gómez Hurtado and Huertas Hastamorir’s corpses with cases and projectiles found at the crime scene and also with the guns carried by General Ricardo Cifuentes’ (Director of the José Maria Cordova Academy) bodyguards. The procedure concluded that none of analyzed guns fired the projectiles that ended the lives of the two murdered men.407 It also stated that projectiles found in Gómez’s corpse, due to the features of both rounds, were fired by the same gun.408 Moreover, the study found that the only projectile recovered from Huertas’ corpse was fired by a weapon409 different from the one that took the life of Gómez Hurtado. The study on the projectiles found in the victims’ corpses also analyzed entry holes found in their clothes. The conclusions drawn were the same for both sets of the deceased’s clothes: there was a distance of over 120 cm between the barrel of the gun and the victims’ bodies. The

403

The same report indicates that the projectile showed visible signs of six lands and groves that rotated to the right. It weighed 8.143 grams. Original Book 1, Page 108 404 Original Book 1, Page 107 405 Projectile two, different from projectile one that was found in the victim’s thorax in that is had five grooves and four lands visibly rotating to the right. 406 th Communication No. 951582/LABAL – 772 dated 11 December 1995 addressed to the Regional Director of the District Attorney’s Office, sent by Captain Ricardo Caballero Sánchez, Director of the Central Criminalists Laboratory. The study was undertaken by Corporal Henry Naranjo Villalba, Ballistics Technician for the Sub-directorate of the DIJIN. (Book 7, Pages 74 80). 407 Original Book 1, Page 77 408 Original Book 1, Page 77 409 Original Book 1, Page 77

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report also indicates that the results could be inconclusive if the bullet had, previously to entering the victim, gone through another object. The projectiles in question could have first gone though the car’s bodywork or rear windows, which could be a reason that the results were affected.410 ATTACK ON ANTONIO JOSÉ CANCINO Antonio José Cancino Moreno, in the La Concordia neighborhood on 27 th September 1995, was the victim of an attack. He was on Carrera 1 with Calle 13, and had just dropped his sons off at Universidad Externado de Colombia. He was, at that time, working as time the defense attorney for President Samper in his investigations that the Chamber of Representatives were conducting against him, otherwise known as the Proceso 8000. Cancino was riding in his Mercedes Benz, license plates number MEK-156, with Agent Omar Galindo Muñoz of the Administrative Department of Security (DAS). The Agent was part of the security team put in place due to the series of threats the lawyer had received since agreeing to represent President Samper in Congress. In addition to his bodyguard he was also accompanied by a van belonging to the DAS. It was a Toyota Land Cruiser, license plates HA-7369, and carried agents Ancízar Gutiérrez Cuevas and Jaime Acevedo Quimbaya, who also worked for the DAS. According to Cancino Moreno and Galindo Muñoz,411 at approximately 7:10 A.M. on Carrera 1 with Calle 13, in La Concordia neighborhood, a stakebed truck crossed the path of the Mercedes Benz and the Toyota van carrying Cancino and his bodyguards. When the Mercedes Benz was a few meters away from the truck, Cancino’s bodyguard realized what was about to happen as he saw a man holding a gun approach. At that very moment he shouted “they’re going to kill us” at Cancino who tried to reverse the Mercedes Benz. An armed man appeared from nowhere and started firing at Cancino, who covered himself with his hands to try and protect his body when he realized what was happening. He did however receive shots to the limbs form the gunfire. When the bodyguard Galindo Muñoz realized that Cancino was under fire he fired back at the criminals. Unluckily however his gun jammed so he decided to get out of the car and find cover where he could unblock his weapon. 410 411

Original Book 1, Pages 109 and 114 Copy Book 1, in file JR 4152, Pages 197 - 203

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When Cancino saw that the firefight had stopped he opened the car door and tried to get out, but as soon as he tried one of the hitmen held his arm and said “move you son of a bitch” while pushing him towards the truck. Cancino Moreno broke free from his aggressor and ran to the van that was escorting him. He suddenly realized that the two DAS agents who were accompanying him were dead, so he ran north to try to get a taxi. Luckily, a car carrying several women who recognized him passed by. They bundled Cancino Moreno in and took him to the Central Military Hospital, while trying to stop the bleeding from the wounds he had received during the attack. While Cancino ran from the scene Agent Galindo Muñoz fired at the attackers who immediately fled the scene of the crime. As a result of the attack, DAS agents Ancízar Gutiérrez Cuevas and Jaime Acevedo Quimbaya were killed. Agent Galindo Muñoz and Cancino Moreno himself were seriously wounded. When the Attorney General learned of the attack, he ordered412 through the Regional Director of the District Attorney’s Office of Santa fé de Bogotá, that a Special Unit of District Attorneys were to be formed. This was to be comprised of Delegated Regional District Attorneys and a Special Judicial Police Unit combined with members of CTI Judicial Police, DAS and DIJIN. The investigations that were undertaken by the aforementioned special unit, in order to find those responsible for the attack, were profoundly different from the investigations conducted after Alvaro Gómez Hurtado’s death. In the investigation into Cancino Moreno’s attack a large number of Colombian state security and investigative organizations took part in the preliminary enquiries,413 for example the National Police DIJIN and SIJIN, DAS, District Attorney’s Office, CTI and the Institute of Legal Medicine and Forensic Sciences. Due to the nature of the investigation’s organization, at any given time two or more entities would be jointly investigating. They would produce separate and different findings, for example the crime scene and vehicle inspection yielded independent results obtained by CTI,414 the Police415 and DAS.416 The outcome is, evidently, a far better knowledge of the facts and evidence found during the investigation. 412

Resolution 387 of 1995 issued by the Regional Prosecution Direction of Santa fé de Bogotá, signed by Carlos Guillermo Castro Guevara, General Prosecution Director, Copy Book 1, Page 154 413 Copy Book 1, in file JR 4152, Page 167 414 Copy Book 4, located in JR 4152, Pages 91 - 125 415 Copy Book 1, file JR 4152, Pages 118 - 146 416 Copy Book 4, file JR 4152, Pages 155 - 201

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This investigation methodology was never implemented during the primary stages of Alvaro Gómez Hurtado’s homicide investigation. As has already been detailed, the entire crime scene was analyzed solely by the National Police, thus generating the inconsistencies that have been described above. It is of serious importance to detail to the omissions encountered in the investigation undertaken by the DIJIN in their analysis of the crime scene and vehicles carrying Cancino. In the report the DIJIN submitted417 there is no map that located the position of Moreno’s car, thus it is not possible to undertake an analysis of how the attack was carried out, or precisely determine the trajectory of the projectiles that impacted. It is also important to comment on the fact that, in juxtaposition with Gómez Hurtado’s vehicle sketch, the DIJIN sketches of the van containing Cancino Moreno’s two bodyguards described, as well as the aerial view,418 the right419 and left hand sides,420 thus facilitating projectiles that caused impacts to be identified. There exists no explanation for the difference in investigations, taking into account that bullet holes found in Gómez’s vehicle were located on both sides of the car. This meant that the investigators were required to draw, in addition to the initial sketch, diagrams of both sides of the vehicle. This however was never carried out during the investigation of the crime on 2 nd November 1995. Additional information that can be found in the file of the investigation into the attack against Cancino Moreno is the names of those responsible for the judicial inspection at the crime scene.421 Unexplainably, this did not happen in Gómez Hurtado’s case. The names and identifications of the DAS officers participating in the procedures were not put on record and signed by the District Attorney.

417

Copy Book 1, in file JR 4152, Page 145 Copy Book 1, in file JR 4152, Page 141 419 Copy Book 1, in file JR 4152, Page 144 420 Copy Book 1, in file JR 4152, Page 145 421 In the crime scene inspection report, District Attorney Javier Cubillos Morales provided proof that “… Ballistics Technician Portela Zabala, Badge number 4126, and photographer Jairo Méndez, both DAS staff, who cooperate with this office, collected the mentioned items and drew a detailed map of the place where each piece of evidence was found…” Copy Book 1, in file JR 4152, Page 104 418

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Moreover, while the facts of the attack on Cancino Moreno were established, a ballistics analysis of the bodyguards’ guns was also ordered.422 This same procedure was not ordered on the gun Rueda Jáuregui used to fight off the hitmen who killed Gómez Hurtado. The weapon was also never presented as trial evidence following Rueda Jáuregui submitting it to one of the police officers who arrived on the crime scene. During the investigation conducted after Cancino Moreno’s attack the District attorney in charge of the case required Omar Galindo,423 Cancino Moreno and Joaquín Cuervo Coy’s weapons to be examined in order that their injuries and any disabilities that may have been caused could be identified. Also, and most importantly, so that the weapon that was responsible for the injuries be identified. In response to this demand, the Institute of Legal Medicine and Forensic Sciences submitted the reports, which detailed the nature of wounds the victims suffered as well as their location.424 In complete contrast to the previous case, in the Gómez Hurtado investigation no such analysis was ordered. It has not been possible to locate a file in any report that was addressed to the Institute of Legal Medicine and Forensic Sciences requesting an examination into the injuries of Rueda Jáuregui425 and Sandra Merchan. The lack of any such investigation not only prevented the number of weapons at the crime scene being determined, but made it impossible to identify whether the hitmen who killed Gómez and Huertas were the same ones who fired at Rueda Jáuregui or Mrs. Sandra Merchán. THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE MATERIAL EVIDENCE RECOVERED ON THE DAY OF THE CRIME To date, all the evidence recovered on the day of the crime has disappeared and neither the Attorney General nor the Second Specialized Penal Court of the Circuit, in which the trial against the indicted was conducted, responded as to its whereabouts. This manifests the negligence and carelessness with which the most important evidence in the case was handled. The disappearance of evidence has precipitated irreparable damage to the investigation and thus to the efforts to finding those responsible, both physically and intellectually, for Gómez 422

Copy Book 1, in file JR 4152, Page 22 Copy Book 1, in file JR 4152, Page 42 424 Reports written by Forensic Doctor Germán Fontanilla from the National Institute of Legal Medicine and Forensic Sciences. Copy Book 1, in file JR 4152, Pages 154 and 155 425 The only evidence regarding the police bodyguard’s injury was the report written by Rigoberto Arguello Palacio, Comander of the Second Police Station of Bogotá, addressed to the Commander of the Metropolitan Police of the same city, Luis Ernesto Guilibert. In the report he stated on record that Rueda Jáuregui showed “…injuries to the right forearm and injuries to the abdomen, caused by a firearm”. Copy Book 9, Page 94 423

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Hurtado’s assassination. The cover-up completely wiped out the possibility of finding the guns used to end the lives of Alvaro Gómez Hurtado and José del Cristo Huertas Hastamorir. It also limited one of the most conclusive ways of endeavoring to identify the whereabouts of those who ordered the crime. TESTIMONIES GIVEN REGARDING THE DAY OF THE CRIME The testimonies that were recorded during the course of the investigation have played a decisive role in its outcome. On 2nd November, the day of the crime, the people who gave their statements of what happened at the gates of Universidad Sergio Arboleda can be divided into three large groups. The first is formed by the people who were in the car with Gómez Hurtado when the attack took place; the second group includes statements made by students attending classes at the University; and the last group were the versions from people who did not attend the University, but were present at the crime scene and witnessed the attack. ALVARO GÓMEZ’S DRIVER AND BODYGUARD EDGAR IGNACIO RUEDA JÁUREGUI426 Edgar Ignacio Rueda Jáuregui had been working in security for slightly over a year and a half, and was an officer in the National Police Force. He provided security for Gómez Hurtado on Tuesdays and Thursdays and accompanied him to Universidad Sergio Arboleda where Gómez gave a one-hour General Culture class, which started at 9 A.M. According to the bodyguard, it was not usual for Gómez to remain at the University after his class. As normal, on Thursday 2nd November 1995 Rueda Jáuregui, Alvaro Gómez, José Huertas Hastamorir, and the driver-bodyguard Luis Ojeda Páez all arrived at the University. That day however, their routine was to be slightly different from normal. At roughly 10:05 A.M. Huertas Hastamorir left the classroom to meet Rueda Jáuregui in the car park and wait for Gómez to finish. At 10:40 A.M. Gómez Hurtado left the building, accompanied by a student who, according to Rueda Jáuregui, was asking for a tutorial with Gómez. He gave the student a telephone number and told him to call in the afternoon. When he got to the car Gómez Hurtado sat in the back right side next to Huertas Hastamorir. Rueda Jáuregui sat in the front right seat; when inside

426

Original Book 1, in file 27.212, Page 184. Procedure was conducted by District Attorney Carlos Arturo Orozco.

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the vehicle he took out his gun and placed it in the right door. The car pulled off from the car park and came to a halt in front of the University gate. When Rueda Jáuregui looked to the right to check for oncoming traffic the attack on the car began. Rueda Jáuregui reacted by getting out of the car and shouting to the driver, “Move it man, I’ll take them on”. He also heard Huertas tell Ojeda Páez “move it Luis”. Rueda Jáuregui fired his .38 weapon at the attackers, trying to cover the Mercedes while it moved past the other cars on the street. At this moment the hitmen fled the scene of the crime, but not before one of them managed to hit him while he was standing at the door. It was for this reason that he fell in the middle of the street and lost the .22 caliber pistol he was carrying in his trousers. Rueda Jáuregui got to his feet and ran to one of the University buildings where one of the institution’s doctors provided him with medical assistance. Several minutes later the Police arrived; he gave them the pistol that he was issued, and shortly after was taken to the Country Hospital. In his statement Rueda Jáuregui said that there were four hitmen. He saw one of them only four steps away from his position. The man was 5’7” tall, had straight hair combed backwards, was dark skinned, and wore a black leather jacket and black trousers. He was carrying a black pistol, “like a 9 mm”. The second man was leaning against the University fence. He was short, heavy, dark skinned with very curly hair and a pointed mustache. He was wearing a leather jacket and holding a silver gun. The witness was however, unable to identify the third and fourth hitmen. When asked about the hitmen’s positions during the attack,427 he said that one of them stood on the right hand side of the car, and the other “in the corner of the car park fence”. Another was in the center of the fence, and the last was by the main entrance. In the final part of his statement Rueda Jáuregui detailed an event that took place two days previously in the building where Gómez Hurtado had his office (located on Calle 99 with Carrera 9). The bodyguard recalled that at one point in the afternoon the chief of security in the building came running to the eighth floor with several other security guards apparently looking from someone. The chief of security did not want to give them any information, but Rueda managed to hear them say they would have to look “floor by floor”. There exists no evidence in the dossier that this lead was investigated. 427

Original Book 1, in file 27.212, Page 184

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Rueda Jáuregui was, at one point, implicated in, but eventually acquitted of Horacio Serpa’s driver’s murder. This occurred on 16th August 1995 a few minutes before he was scheduled to enter the District Attorney’s Office to testify in relation to the illegal funding of the Presidential campaign. LUIS OJEDA PÁEZ In a building belonging to the SIJIN Bogotá,428 on 2nd November 1995 at 5 P.M., Luis Ojeda Páez, a DAS agent, recounted his version of events. Ojeda Páez began his story by declaring that he had been Gómez Hurtado’s driver for the past sixteen years. He continued by stating that on 2nd November they arrived at the University at roughly 9 A.M. as Gómez was going to give his weekly General Culture class. As well as himself and Gómez Hurtado, José del Cristo Huertas and Ignacio Rueda Jáuregui were also inside the car. Ojeda Páez said he parked in the University car park and waited for Gómez Hurtado’s class to finish. When the class ended at 10 A.M. Gómez Hurtado stayed for another hour in the Universities’ buildings. When he emerged he was accompanied by Rueda Jáuregui and Huertas Hastamorir and made his way to the Mercedes Benz where Ojeda Páez was awaiting them. Gómez Hurtado was sitting behind Ojeda Páez in the back left seat. When the car reached the University entrance gate Ojeda Páez heard a blast that drew his attention to the right hand side of the car. He saw that the back right window was smashed and Huertas Hastamorir lying over Gómez Hurtado. Rueda Jáuregui immediately got out of the car and started firing his issued weapon at the hitmen while Huertas Hastamorir shouted at him, “move”. Seconds later Ojeda Páez witnessed Rueda Jáuregui falling wounded in the middle of the street. When the firefight was over Ojeda drove to the Country Hospital and managed, with several people’s help, to get the two men into the hospital. Ojeda stated clearly that both Gómez and Huertas were alive when they entered the hospital. He knew because he heard them breathing, but he saw that Huertas Hastamorir was in a more critical condition because his mouth was bleeding heavily. Ojeda Páez also stated that he was armed with a caliber .38 Smith & Wesson revolver, DAS issue. He did not use the weapon however, as his principle concern was to take the wounded men to hospital. 428

Original Book 1, in file 27.212, Pages 155 - 158. Procedure undertaken by the Commander of the Judicial Police Investigative Unit, Jorge Arturo Sánchez Hernández.

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When questioned about Huertas Hastamorir, Ojeda states that he was a former DAS agent who had been part of Gómez Hurtado security team since 1992. Huertas had studied law, finishing his studies two and a half years ago, and was currently working for Gómez Hurtado. The part of his testimony that most catches one’s attention makes reference to Gómez Hurtado’s security. At the time the crime had taken place, Gómez had been assigned two bodyguards: one of them being Rueda Jáuregui, who was a police officer, and the other was a DAS agent called Uriel Marín. In addition to these two bodyguards, Gómez Hurtado was also assigned a police motorcycle that was strangely out of service in the Tierra Linda substation facility the day of the murder. This meant that the bodyguards had to rotate the days that they provided Gómez Hurtado’s security. According to Ojeda, this agreement was approved by Gómez Hurtado. As a final point, when Páez was questioned about any knowledge he may have regarding potential threats towards Gómez Hurtado, he claimed to have no knowledge of any. Gómez had however, several months before the attack informed him, “that they had to be very careful because the situation was tense”. Students at Universidad Sergio Arboleda BEATRIZ EUGENIA RODRÍGUEZ Included in the first group of student’s statements was that of Beatriz Eugenia Rodríguez. 429 She was, at the time of the attack, in her fifth year. Rodríguez Sánchez was studying inside the University, near the entrance, when she heard noises that sounded “like fireworks”. She immediately turned round and saw one of her friends talking to Gabriel Melo Guevara. She caught sight of a man six meters away. He was slightly bent over and firing at about one meter and twenty centimeters away from one of the right side windows; the car was Gómez Hurtado’s dark blue Mercedes Benz, which was waiting to cross Calle 74. Seconds later she ran into the University library to hide. The shooting continued. The witness described the shooter as, a thin man of 5’4”, dark skinned with a mustache, short curly hair, who was wearing a red checked shirt and dark blue jeans. The witness is also sure 429

Original Book 1, in file 27.212, Pages 39 - 41. Procedure was undertaken by Delegated District Attorney 280.

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that the shots she heard were bursts of fire. She finally stated that the gun held by the only person she saw was small and fired in bursts. This suggests that it could have been an INGRAM sub-machinegun. KATHERINE MATUK VELASCO At 12:15 A.M. inside one of Universidad Sergio Arboleda buildings, the student Katherine Matuk Velasco430 gave her statement. According to her version of events she was at the University entrance when she saw Gómez Hurtado pass by with Gabriel Melo Guevara and someone else who she did not recognize. She spoke to Melo Guevara for only about three seconds while Gómez Hurtado got in his car. The car started and a few minutes later the witness began hearing shots. Melo Guevara immediately pushed her to the ground and Matuk Velasco then crawled to one of the parked cars in search of her friend Beatriz Eugenia Rodríguez. She said she heard three bursts of fire. During the first burst she managed to see a white Mercedes leave with one of the doors open behind which a man was shielding himself. Matuk Velasco stated that at no point was she able to see the hitmen who were firing at Alvaro Gómez. She also said that shortly after the attack she silenced her friend Beatriz Rodríguez as she was shouting and crying, “I saw them! I saw it”. Matuk told her to keep quiet because the hitmen could still be close by. Matuk Velasco lastly described the person who was accompanying Gómez Hurtado before he got into the car. According to her description, the man was approximately fifty years old, 5’7”, had grey hair, was dressed in suit and tie, and was engaged in a friendly conversation with Gómez Hurtado. CARLOS IGNACIO MUÑOZ CÁRDENAS On the same day, 2nd November 1995, at 12:30 A.M. the witness Carlos Ignacio Cárdenas431 went to the MEBOG SIJIN Crimes against Life and Personal Integrity Unit to provide his version of events regarding Gómez Hurtado’s attack.

430

Original Book 1, in file 27.212, Pages 206 - 208. Procedure undertaken by DIJIN investigative officer Jorge Eliecer Garrido Torres. 431 Original Book 1, in file 27.212, Pages 173 - 174. Procedure undertaken by DIJN Lieutenant Eduardo Ramírez Rozo.

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The witness was in the restaurant Erase una Res, which is located next door to the University car park entrance. He was with a friend who was, at that time, talking on a public payphone. Muñoz Cardenas noticed that at 10:45 A.M. a man between the ages of twenty-eight and thirty, and dressed in a brown jacket was staring at him. At the moment that Gómez Hurtado’s car stopped to turn onto Calle 74, the man removed a gun from his trouser belt and started firing at the car’s right window. The witness also noticed, in addition to the aforementioned hitman, a second man dressed in a black jacket with his back turned to him. As soon as he realized the men were shooting, Muñoz Cárdenas threw himself to the floor. He, with his friend, went to the restaurant’s kitchen and only left to go to the University’s Administrative Offices some time after the shooting had stopped. The witness also declared that he only saw one of the men fire: he was holding a weapon with both hands. At 2:00 P.M. the DIJIN also took Claudia Patricia Mesa’s432 testimony. She was a Law student at Universidad Sergio Arboleda and was talking on the payphone in the restaurant in Muñoz Cardenas’ company. Her testimony corroborates Muñoz Cardenas’s version of events. OTHER WITNESSES PRESENT AT THE SCENE OF THE CRIME JOSÉ ANTONIO ROJAS CÁRDENAS Retired Army Colonel José Antonio Rojas Cárdenas433 was a member of the public present at the crime scene who witnessed the fateful event on 2 nd November. The former soldier made his statement on 3rd November 1995.434 He began his statement by stating that at approximately 10:45 A.M. on 2nd November 1995 he was on the second floor of the Condor building, which is located on the west corner of Calle 74 with Carrera 15 (facing Calle 74). Two cars passed by where he lived. He was looking through the window and heard two explosions followed by bursts of fire. He saw three armed men move towards Carrera 15 who were trying to hide behind parked cars and hide their guns.

432

Original Book 1, in file 27.212, Pages 176 - 177 Original Book 1, in file 27.212, Pages 90 - 94. Procedure undertaken by Delegated District Attorney 324. 434 nd José Antonio Rojas Cárdenas also made a statement on 2 November 1995 to Lieutenant Eduardo Ramírez Rozo, DIJIN Officer. Original Book 1, in file 27.212, Pages 178 - 180. 433

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The first hitman ran down Calle 74 crossing Carrera 15 and was moving south on the west side of the street. According to Rojas’ observation the gunman was about 5’6”, thin, white, had a thin mustache, and short curly hair. He had small aggressive eyes and a nervous gait. The man was wearing a black leather jacket, beige shirt, and light brown trousers. Rojas claimed that the man was carrying an “Uzi or Ingram” sub-machine. He was trying to holster it in his trousers, but was unsuccessful because the ammunition clip had got tangled. The second attacker followed in same direction as the first, but did not cross Calle 15; instead he moved south on the east side of the street. The man was about 5’7”, and thinner than the first. He was wearing faded jeans and a violet shirt with green stripes. The shirt was hanging out of his trousers, which he used to try to hide his gun and change the magazine. According to the witness this man was providing covering fire for the first man’s getaway. The third and last man came down Calle 74, crossed Carrera 15, and headed towards Avenida Caracas. Rojas stated that the man was approximately 5’7”, thin, white, and rather nervous because he was unable to hide the gun properly under his jacket. He was wearing a light colored leather jacket and a blue-black pistol. Rojas Cárdenas was unable to identify the gun the man was carrying, but he thought he saw “a hand-held machinegun, probably Uzi because of its size and shape…” The dentist Armando Peña Pinzón435 who also made a statement on 2nd November at 6:30 P.M. referred to the manner in which the hitmen fled the scene of the crime. Moreover, he corroborated information provided by Rojas Cárdenas. He was however, only able to identify two of the criminals due to him being on the fifth floor in a building located on Carrera 15 with Calle 74. On witnessing the homicide, Rojas Cárdenas ran towards the University and saw Alvaro Gómez’s car move east along Calle 74. The right hand side windows were completely shattered and thus he was able to see the silhouette of a person in the back left seat of the car. He also saw someone running towards the University building. When he got to the scene of the crime there were already around twenty University students there. He later encountered a woman who was injured with a bleeding leg. She was consequently taken by car to hospital. Rojas heard that she was identified as a woman who sold 435

Procedure undertaken by Silvio Moreno Rodríguez, DIJIN Judicial Police officer. Original Book 1, in file 27.212, Pages 209 210.

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cakes in the area. He noticed twelve bullet cases lying on the floor and was surprised how the people at the scene of the crime were contaminating the evidence. Rojas Cárdenas continued with his version of events by recounting that three minutes after he arrived at the scene of the crime several Police officers were present. They were immediately informed about a wounded man who was in one of the University buildings. The wounded man was none other than Police Sergeant Ignacio Rueda Jáuregui. Rojas Cárdenas explained that his running to the University was because his sons studied there, and was also a reaction due to his military training. Moreover, the witness gave a detailed description of the distance between the crime scene and the building he was in, and also precisely described the distance at which he saw the criminals. There is however a part of Rojas Cárdenas’ testimony that seems rather strange. When he finished making his statement, completely unprovoked by the District attorney in charge of he case, he claimed to have not seen the criminals use any vehicle or motorcycle and that there was no policeman at the scene of the crime. He also stated that the man who watched over cars at the University, known as “Memo”, was yelling about everything he had seen when the attack was over. The concern about this spontaneous recount at the end of his statement is that Memo was to be one of the main protagonists in the process because of his various accusations against all suspects. Crazy Memo as he was also known, played a rather controversial role as a witness. He was a key part of the several failed hypotheses that were constructed around different people responsible for both intellectually planning the murder and those who did the killing. There are two possibilities: Rojas Cárdenas could have been the one who introduced him into the investigation, or, Crazy Memo had already been planted at the scene of the crime by the assassins. It is lastly necessary to state that officers working for the District Attorney’s Office endeavored to contact the witness so as he could provide continued cooperation as part of the investigation. He reluctantly responded that, “…he would like to cooperate with the investigation at a later date, provided, however, he would liaise with the Regional District Attorney’s Office in charge of the case…[as]…the Police had sold him out”.436 VICTOR RAÚL VENECIA CHARRY 436

Original Book 1, in file 27.212, Page 91

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One of the most interesting testimonies given, on 3 rd November 1995, was from a young man called Victor Raúl Venecia Charry.437 He was nineteen years old and resided in the Municipality of Pelaya, Department of Cesar. Venecia Charry appeared before District Attorney 19 of the Unit in Aguachica, Cesar in order to tell the authorities about an alleged kidnap of which he was the victim, on 2nd November 1995. Venecia Charry traveled to Bogotá on 29th October of the same year to try to find work. However, on 2nd November while he was walking form the residence in which he was staying to a local shop he was approached by three men who forced him into a black car. When he was inside the car they told him he had to take part in a terrorist attack they had planned otherwise they would kill him. In order for him to carry out the task they gave him a gun. According to him, and despite the fact he knew nothing about guns, it was a 9mm caliber. Venecia Charry claimed that his job was to give covering fire to the hitmen in the event that something went wrong. The vehicle continued and finally stopped five hundred meters away from Universidad Sergio Arboleda.438 Three men got out of the car, one of them with a pistol and the others with “machineguns”. They forced Valencia Charry to get out of the car. The fourth man stayed in the driver’s seat. When they arrived at the University, Valencia Charry and the other three men waited for about five minutes until Gómez Hurtado’s car left the car park. As soon at the car left its parking space the men surrounded it on each side and opened fire at very close proximity. Valencia Charry noticed that there were four people inside the car and that Gómez Hurtado was sitting in the back left seat. When they had finished their attack, the men forced him to walk one kilometer away and took the gun from him a few meters after leaving the University. With regards to the motive behind the attack, Valencia Charry claims that the assassins were trying to force Samper into stepping down as President of the Republic. This story is consistent with the activities of the self-styled group “Dignity for Colombia”. The witness claimed that the reason he decided to confess and give a statement was his sense of guilt, and also for the “love of Colombia”. Despite the implausible nature of this tale, it is curious that his testimony refers to how the Mercedes Benz carrying Gómez Hurtado was attacked.

437

Procedure undertaken by District Attorney 19, Gloria Esmeralda Cassiani, in the Municipality of Aguachica, Cesar. Original Book 1, in file 27.212, Pages 116 - 122. 438 In his version of events Venecia Charry confuses the University name calling it Saulo Arboleda. When questioned by Police Officers, the explanation he gave for the mistake was that: he was confused because the media had mentioned a politician by the name of Saulo Arboleda. Original Book 1, in file 27.212, Pages 117-118

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SANDRA MERCHÁN Sandra Merchán439 on 2nd November 1995 at 12:30 P.M. made a statement. She was seventeen years old and was born in Bucaramanga. She was selling cakes at the crime scene when the attack occurred, and was wounded in the middle of the firefight. The witness recounted that she arrived at Universidad Sergio Arboleda entrance in a taxi at about 10:30 A.M., and a few minutes later started to set up her cake stall. It was at this moment that she saw Gómez Hurtado’s car pull out and stop at the entrance to the University car park. She suddenly saw a person approach the car and open fire at the dark blue Mercedes Benz. After the attack the car quickly left the University and the attacker ran west towards the Avenida Caracas. It was at this moment that she realized one of her legs was bleeding and went over to Mrs. Tilsoa Quitian440 a mango seller who told her to remain calm. She was taken to hospital by a university security guard and several students who picked her up and put her in a car. Sandra Merchán managed to get a look at one of the attackers, and described him as a 5’6” male, twenty-five years old, thin, and with short black straight hair. She also described him as a dark skinned with deep-set eyes, a long face, and thin eyebrows. He was wearing a black jacket, black trousers and shoes of the same color. According to the witness, the weapon the hitman was carrying was a, “very small revolver”, black, and from about fifteen to 20 cm long. The man held it with both hands and was making movements from left to right and then from right to left. The witness also claimed that it was impossible to determine how many shots were fired since there were many in such close succession. At that moment she claims to have been approximately two meters away from the hitman and that he was firing at the car from less than one meter away. Sandra Merchán lastly stated that several days before the murder a man who introduced himself as Jaime Acevedo Londoño asked her if it was true that the University had good

439

Testimony given on 2 November 1995 to the Chief of Judicial Police Investigative Unit, Jorge Arturo Sánchez Hernández, and investigator Jairo Alfonso Restrepo Velandia, (who both worked for the DIJIN). Original Book 1, in file 27.212, Pages 155 163 440 nd Testimony given 2 November1995 to Chief of Judicial Police Investigative Unit, Jorge Arturo Sánchez Hernández, and Secretary Carlos Arturo Londoño Forero, (who both worked for the DIJIN). Original Book 1, in file 27.212, Pages 164 - 166.

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lawyers. He claimed to be the father of one of the bodyguards killed in the attack against the lawyer Cancino. JOSÉ GUILLERMO VÉLEZ MONTENEGRO Mr. Jose Guillermo Velez Montenegro,441 who was born in Chinchiná, Caldas, on 2nd November 1995, appeared before DIJIN officers at 11:45 A.M. At the time, Vélez Montenegro’s job was to watch over cars parked in the street near Universidad Sergio Arboleda. In the following investigation and proceedings against those indicted for carrying out the attack the man was later known as Memo or Crazy Memo. Vélez Montenegro began his story by stating that he heard at he University entrance, “a burst form a 9mm Mini-Uzi” between 10:30 and 11:00 in the morning. He witnessed that one of the criminals who was wearing a black jacket and black trousers shot Rueda Jáuregui in the back. The bodyguard fired back before falling to the floor injured, and managed to wound one of the attackers who was wearing a yellow sweatshirt. After the attack the hitmen fled towards the Avenida Caracas. When questioned about the number of attackers and their appearance, he said he saw three men. The first was 5’7”, had curly hair and a mustache, was wearing a black leather jacket, and holding a “machinegun”. The second man was wearing a yellow sweatshirt and blue pants. Vélez claimed that he did not get a good enough look at the third man to be able to describe him. There are three parts of his statement that stand out. The first is the time that Gómez Hurtado left the University.442 He first described the attack as taking place between 10:30 and 11:00 A.M., but then says that Gómez did not come out of the University until around 11:30 A.M. The second is the inaccuracy regarding Rueda Jáuregui’s position during the attack. 443 He said the bodyguard was trying to free up the way for Gómez Hurtado’s vehicle to enter Calle 74. However, he was inside the car and only got out when the shooting started.

441

Testimony given 2 November1995 to Chief of Judicial Police Investigative Unit, Jorge Arturo Sánchez Hernández, and Secretary Carlos Arturo Londoño Forero, (who both worked for the DIJIN). Original Book 1, in file 27.212, Pages 164 - 166. 442 Original Book 1, in file 27.212, Page 165 443 Original Book 1, file 27.212, Page 165

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The last curious part of the statement is the information the witness gave regarding the hitmen’s positions before the attack. Vélez Montenegro said that they were drinking sodas at a restaurant called La Rosa. This establishment was however, not listed in any report during the crime scene inspection. Crazy Memo gave a new version of events on 20th November 1995.444 This new version was somewhat contradictory to his previous testimony. Apparently, the bursts of gunfire and shooting he heard no longer came from an “Uzi machinegun”. It instead came from an INGRAM weapon. Memo also seemed to remember that a few minutes after the attack he saw the hitmen ride past on a “ninja” type motorcycle. Vélez Montenegro immediately informed the DIJIN agents of these facts, and they replied telling him that one of their cars had gone in pursuit. However, the hitmen had left in a Montero 4x4. He also recalled that several days before the attack he had seen people behaving suspiciously in the University’s vicinity. In particular, a thin white man who was 5’7”, had curly hair, a mustache, and was wearing a black leather jacket, black trousers, and shoes. According to Vélez this man sat beside the lady selling mango at the University exit, and every once in a while he would go for a cup of coffee. In this new version of Vélez Montenegro’s events this was the man who was carrying the machine gun on the day of the crime. During the attack he was with a man wearing a yellow sweatshirt, brown trousers and shoes of the same color. He also stated that the man was carrying a 9 mm pistol. Moreover, he claimed that on the day of the crime, in addition to the hitmen, there were another two people located between Carreras 14 and 15 with Calle 74. They were also supposedly armed, one with a machinegun, and the other with a nickel plated “Prieto Beretta” gun. Vélez claimed that both attackers were located on the right hand side of the car when firing at Gómez Hurtado’s vehicle. This however, is clearly untrue since Gómez’s car sustained gunshots to both sides, indicating that the hitmen had fired from both sides of the vehicle. When questioned as to the Police presence at the time of the crime, the witness said he had not seen any. The “Search Block” did however use to patrol the area daily at about the same time as the attack.

444

Testimony taken by Prosecutor 306. Original Book 1, file 27.212, Pages 28 – 30.

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Crazy Memo lastly recalled that the assassin wearing the yellow sweatshirt had been wounded in the stomach, on the right side. Due to his injury he had dropped a magazine and had to go back to try and pick it up. YOBANY PORFIRIO DAZA MORA As part of the investigation undertaken of the day of the crime the DIJIN also took a statement from a waiter, Yobany Porfirio Daza Mora; a twenty-two year old man who worked in the Ejecutivo 74 restaurant.445 The witness was cleaning one of the restaurant tables when he heard a shot. His reaction was to go to the window to find out what was going on outside. He immediately heard a burst of gunfire and saw a man in a black jacket and trousers twice fire a machinegun at a vehicle. According to Daza Mora, the white male carrying the gun was 5’3”, had short hair, and was wearing a black leather jacket and blue jeans. When he stopped firing he walked quickly away towards Carrera 15. At this moment in time the witness turned around and looked in the direction of the University. He saw another longhaired man wearing a yellow shirt and pushing another person in one of the restaurants near by. He described this man as 5’4”, with black long straight hair. He was wearing a yellow shirt, a black jacket, and was holding a revolver. JOSÉ DAVID ROJAS COTRINO On the day of the crime José David Rojas Cotrino was working as a security guard in Universidad Sergio Arboleda. He began his account of events446 by stating that Gómez Hurtado arrived at the University at about 9 A.M. and that normally, he left about an hour later. However, on the day of the crime he was slightly delayed as he was talking to Gabriel Melo Guevara and “Mr. Miranda”. Shortly after finishing the conversation with his two friends Gómez Hurtado got into his vehicle. Moments after the car left he heard shooting on the street. He jumped to the floor and saw Gómez Hurtado’s bodyguard lying on the ground and shooting in the direction of Carrera 15 at a man clad in black. He went over and took the wounded man’s pistol trying to fire it, but the

445 446

Original Book 1, in file 27.212, Pages 211 - 212 Original Book 1, in file 27.212, Pages 81 - 86

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gun jammed so he decided to help Rueda Jáuregui. He claimed to be unable to identify any of the hitmen as he was on the other side of the University fence. This group of witnesses also includes Rafael María Quitian and Javier Johnson Fonseca, who made a sketch of the attackers that he saw. POLICE-ARTIST’S SKETCHES As a result of statements given by different individuals who witnessed the crime, both the District Attorney’s Office, DAS, and DIJIN were able to make a series of police-artist’s sketches of the hitmen who murdered Gómez Hurtado. For this reason the file kept by the Attorney General includes sketches drawn from Sandra Merchan,447 José Antonio Rojas Cárdenas,448 José Guillermo Vélez Montenegro,449 Javier Johnson Fonseca,450 Armando Peña,451 and Juan Enrique Caro’s452 descriptions. CONCLUSIONS There is a vast contrast in the interpretations of the little evidence gathered by the authorities (District Attorney’s Office, DIJIN, and DAS) responsible for conducting the investigation. The District Attorney’s Office where prepared to listen to, and attributed the testimonial statements (from students, passers-by, homeless people, undisclosed witnesses, confidential witnesses, and any one else who wanted to testify) with a huge weight of importance. A plethora of police-artist sketches were recorded, which confused the investigation from the very first day. What use exactly are twenty or thirty sketches that bare absolutely no resemblance to each other? In the day that followed the murder the District Attorney’s Office gathered myriad versions of events: all of which were vague, contradictory and were never categorized or classified according to the witness who gave them. Within the countless testimonies that the District Attorney’s Office had to sift through, they encountered that of José Guillermo Vélez Montenegro, better known as Crazy Memo. According to students, this man, who for years had hung around Universidad Sergio Arboleda, was a drug dealer. Despite the fact his testimonies were inconsistent throughout the

447

Original Book 1, in file 27.212, Page 163 Original Book 1, in file 27.212, Pages 181 and 182 449 Original Book 1, in file 27.212, Pages 31 - 35 and Page 167 450 Original Book 1, in file 27.212, Page 170 451 Original Book 1, in file 27.212, Pages 3 and 5 452 Original Book 1, in file 27.212, Pages 8 and 10 448

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investigation Memo was turned into the “conclusive evidence” for whichever hypothesis the District Attorney’s Office decided they wanted to follow on that particular occasion. In addition to the plentitude of statements made, many anonymous denouncements began to appear, all purporting to know the identity of those responsible for the crime. It is virtually impossible to determine the truth behind these allegations, as they may well have been intentional strategies to derail the investigation by the murderers themselves. The first anonymous call received accused Fernando Gálvez of being the man responsible for the actual murder. Gálvez was brought in for questioning and he turned out to be a salesman who peddled his wares around the towns of the Sabana de Bogotá. Another anonymous call was received, allegedly from the driver of a school bus that reported the presence of suspicious vehicles, belonging to the 20th Brigade, loitering around the scene of the crime. Which school bus driver is capable of recognizing the presence, not only of a military vehicle, but a military vehicle carrying members of the 20th Brigade? There have, however, been many explanations for this anomaly: that it was the “gringos” accusing the army, the Police accusing the Army, the drug-traffickers accusing the Army, and several other variations thereof. The only thing that is known for certain is, that from the very beginning of the investigation a serious accusation was made against the 20th Brigade’s suspicious presence close to the scene of the crime. Several days later it was proven that an Army vehicle was in the area, with the apparent (and confirmed) purpose of purchasing Cromos magazines. The vehicle’s license plates were LIW-033, and the vehicle was assigned the personal bodyguards of General Ricardo Emilio Cifuentes, at that time the Director of the Military Academy. The vehicle was in fact the property of the 20th Brigade, and the owner was identified as CONTRI LTDA.453 The license plates had been recently been changed, the original ones being AH-2048. On the day of the assassination, General Iván Ramírez, Director of Military Intelligence ordered several of his staff to go to the Department of Transportation in order to locate the vehicle’s log.454 The soldiers informed the Department of their concern, explaining that in view of the serious anonymous accusation it was of the utmost importance to ascertain exactly what vehicles belonging to the Brigade had been near the scene of the crime and find their logs: a request that is not in the slightest absurd. Moreover, General Cifuentes also gave 453

It is curious that this legal name, has up until recently been used by DAS to hide the identity of its vehicles, as has recently been seen during the trailing of the magistrates at the Supreme Court of Justice Magistrates. It is used as a way to send other intelligence agencies a signal and prevent confrontation between them. Each agency has its own identification code. 454 Page 180. Book 4, in file 27.212,

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several valid accounts of the need to buy various copies of the Cromos Magazine; the reason being that they were required for a report being written. However, it is slightly suspicious that four soldiers would have been dispatched to pick up a few copies of a magazine. The soldiers who were riding in the vehicle (LIW-033) were subsequently questioned. Their versions of events matched each other’s perfectly and thus they were rapidly removed from the investigation. At some point before 7th November the DAS provided information to the District Attorney’s Office (obtained from an anonymous source), which claimed that José Gabriel Carvajal Durán, from Bucaramanga, was the man who had committed the murder. Durán was then arrested and when his wife was questioned she confirmed that he, on occasion, collaborated with the 20th Brigade. Several days later, the authorities held a reasonable belief that the man played no part in the crime, and he was thus removed from the investigation. “DIGNITY FOR COLOMBIA” ADMITS RESPONSIBILITY Despite the authorities’ negligence at the scene of the crime scene, and their disinterest in gathering evidence at Calle 74 with Carrera 15, on a national level they did seem concerned. On 2nd November, the day of the crime, the Government declared the Republic of Colombia to be in a state of Civil Commotion. They claimed that, “today an outstanding political leader, former minister and President of the National Constituent Assembly, Mr. Alvaro Gómez Hurtado was assassinated.” They also stated that, “those are unequivocal expressions both of the existence, and the intentions of different agents. They have themselves, a huge capability for imminent destabilization of State security, the stability of legitimately organized institutions, and the lives of citizens in the community, as a result of these attacks ”.455 Decree 1900, which was issued on 2nd November 1995 was the first of many more to come. They aided Ernesto Samper’s Administration to overcome one of his most difficult periods as Head of State, while at the same time taking advantage of the civil commotion. Gómez Hurtado’s assassination was the perfect excuse to run the country by issuing decrees in a time of complete disorder, which both the President and his entire Cabinet were unable to control. On the same day of the murder, other decrees were issued, sheltered by the state of interior commotion. This gave the Government the power to intervene in and even to ban certain media programs from broadcasting (Decree 1902). They also had the power to restrict people’s

455

DECREE No. 1900, dated 2 November 1995.

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movements, and carry out raids and arrests (Decree 1901): extremely useful tools during a time of such crisis. A short time after the attack on Gómez, around midday, RCN broadcasting received a phone call. A person whose identity is unknown spoke to journalist Jaime Tarazona and claimed: As we told Mr. Tulande. “Dignity for Colombia” claims the attack Alvaro Gómez Hurtado; we told you before and we’ll tell you again. Tell those motherfuckers, *sic+ the President and that man with the mustache to just wait. We’re preparing something that’s really going to hurt Samper. We don’t get scared by them increasing punishments, civil commotion, or that people like General Urbina who defend the dignity of Colombia get removed from their offices. You can tell Gossain not to worry. We’re going to get other targets until Samper resigns.456 On the night of 2nd November 1995, Marcos Ruíz, a photocopier assistant in a company located near Calle 100 with Carrera 7 was kidnapped by members of “Dignity for Colombia”. He was given a message to send to the President of the Republic and to RCN, which claimed responsibility for the crime in similar terms to message above. Previously, “Dignity for Colombia” had already claimed the attack on Antonio José Cancino on 27 th September, as well as another in Itagüi, Antioquia on 10th September, and an attack on the Medellín Metro one day later.457 The intention of all of these acts of terrorism were the same – to “overthrow and destabilize” the Government of Ernesto Samper.

456

Page 20, Book 5, in file 27212; Intelligence Report submitted by the District Attorney’s Office, in which the identity of “DIGNITY FOR COLOMBIA” is examined. 457 Page 20, Book 5, in file 27212; Intelligence Report submitted by the District Attorney’s Office, in which the identity of “DIGNITY FOR COLOMBIA” is examined.

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2. Table listing those accused by the District Attorney’s three hypotheses Name

Héctor Paúl Flórez Martínez – Sincelejo Group Hypothesis

Manuel Mariano Montero – Sincelejo Group Hypothesis

Charge

Crime

First Sentencing

Second Sentencing

13/11/1996 (C.23 Page 1 & following)

First degree murder, attempted murder, carrying an illegal firearm, violence against the person and conspiracy to commit an act of terrorism.

40 years imprisonment sentence for all charges – Second Specialized Criminal Court in Bogotá – Sentenced on 21/12/2001

Sentence upheld by the High Court in Bogotá Sentenced on 13/02/2003

13/11/1996 (C.23 Page1 & following)

First degree murder, attempted murder, carrying an illegal firearm, Violence against the person and conspiracy to commit an act of terrorism.

Acquitted by the Second Specialized Criminal Court in Bogotá Sentenced on 21/12/2001

___

Case 4621 A 13/11/1996 C.23 Page 1 & following)

Gustavo Adolfo Jaramillo Giraldo, also known as “Tavo” – Bogotá Group Hypothesis Case 6214 A 8/13/1999 C.23F216 & sbs)

Case 4621 A: First degree murder, attempted murder, carrying an illegal firearm, Violence against the person

Case 6214 A: Conspiracy to commit an act of terrorism.

Case 4621 A: Acquitted by the Second Specialized Criminal Court in Bogotá Sentenced on 21/12/2001

Case 6214 A: 8 years imprisonment for the relevant charges, Second Specialized Criminal Court in Bogotá Sentenced on 25/03/2003

Case 4261 A: Sentence upheld by the High Court in Bogotá Sentenced on 21/11/2003 Case 6214 A: Sentence upheld by the High Court in Bogotá Sentenced on 21/11/2003

Supreme Court of Justice – Chamber of Criminal Appeals Statute of limitations reached for the following crimes: carrying an illegal firearm, violence against the person and conspiracy to commit an act of terrorism. Resentencing Sentenced on 13/07/2006 – SCJ Statute of limitations reached for the following crimes: carrying an illegal firearm, violence against the person, and conspiracy to commit a crime Sentenced on 13/07/2006 – SCJ Case 4621 A: Statute of limitations reached for the following crimes: carrying an illegal firearm, violence against the person. Sentenced on 13/07/2006 – SCJ Case 6214 A: Statute of limitations reached for the following crimes: conspiracy to commit a crime Resentencing. Sentenced on 7/09/2006 – SCJ 160

Name

Charge

Case 4621 A: 13/11/1996 C.23 Page1 & following)

Hermes Ortíz Durán, also known as “Pastel” – Bogotá Group Hypothesis

Flaminis de Jesús Tovar – Sincelejo Group Hypothesis

Luis Fernando Jutinico Trujillo Bogotá Group Hypothesis

Crime

Case 4621 A: First degree murder, attempted murder, carrying an illegal firearm, Violence against the person.

Case 6214 A: 8/13/1999 C.23A Page 216 & following)

Case 6214 A: Conspiracy to commit a crime.

13/11/1996 Revoked on 30/05/1997 (C.23 Page 1 & following)

Conspiracy to commit a crime and obstruction of justice, which the District Attorney’s Office revoked on 30/05/1997 (Sentenced on 21/12/2001 – Page 17)

Case 6214: 23/02/1998 C.40A Page 211 – 242)

Case 6214: First degree murder, attempted murder, carrying an illegal firearm (Armed Forces firearm intended for personal use)

First Sentencing

Case 4621 A: Acquitted. Sentenced on 21/12/2001

Case 6214 A: 8 years imprisonment for the relevant crime Second Specialized Criminal Court in Bogotá Sentenced on 25/03/2003

Acquitted of the th charge on 30 May 1997

Case 6214 – Acquitted by the Second Specialized Criminal Court in Bogotá Sentenced on 25/03/2003 First sentencing

Second Sentencing Case 4261 A: Sentence upheld by the High Court in Bogotá Sentenced on 21/11/2003

Supreme Court of Justice – Chamber of Criminal Appeals Case 4621 A: Statute of limitations reached for the following crimes: carrying an illegal firearm, violence against the person. Sentenced on 13/07/2006 – SCJ

Case 6214 A: Sentence upheld by the High Court in Bogotá Sentenced on 21/11/2003

Statute of limitations reached for the following crimes: conspiracy to commit a crime. Immediate released ordered. Sentenced on 7/09/2006 – SCJ

___

Case 6214: Sentence upheld by the High Court in Bogotá Sentenced on 21/11/2003

Case 6214 A: ----

161

Case 4621 A: 8/3/1999 C.23A Page 216 & following)

Case 6214 A: Conspiracy to commit a crime

Case 6214 A: 8 years imprisonment for relevant crime Second Specialized Criminal Court in Bogotá Sentenced on 25/03/2003

Case 6214 A: Sentence upheld by the High Court in Bogotá Sentenced on 21/11/2003

Case 6214 A: Statute of limitations reached for the following crimes: conspiracy to commit a crime. Resentencing Sentenced on 13/07/2006 – SCJ

162

Name

Franklin Gaona Ovalle – Hunters Group Hypothesis

Carlos Alberto Gaona Ovalle – Hunters Group Hypothesis

Omar de Jesús Berrío Loaiza – Hunters Group Hypothesis

Henry Berrío Loaiza – Hunters Group Hypothesis

Bernardo Ruiz Silva – Hunters Group Hypothesis

Case

25/02/1998 (C.40A Page 244 – 373)

8/11/1998 (C.69 Page & following)

Crime First degree murder, attempted murder, carrying an illegal firearm (Armed Forces firearm intended for personal use), and conspiracy to commit a crime. First degree murder, attempted murder, carrying an illegal firearm (Armed Forces firearm intended for personal use), and conspiracy to commit a crime. First degree murder, attempted murder, carrying an illegal firearm (Armed Forces firearm intended for personal use), and conspiracy to commit a crime. First degree murder, attempted murder, carrying an illegal firearm (Armed Forces firearm intended for personal use), and conspiracy to commit a crime. Key agent in the First degree murder, attempted murder, carrying an illegal firearm (Armed Forces firearm intended for personal use),

Supreme Court of Justice – Chamber of Criminal Appeals

First Sentencing

Second Sentencing

Acquitted by the Second Specialized Criminal Court in Bogotá Sentenced on 25/03/2003

Sentence upheld by the High Court in Bogotá Sentenced on 21/11/2003

Sentence upheld, sentenced on 07/09/2006 SCJ

Acquitted by the Second Specialized Criminal Court in Bogotá Sentenced on 25/03/2003

Sentence upheld by the High Court in Bogotá Sentenced on 21/11/2003

Sentence upheld, sentenced on 07/09/2006 SCJ

Acquitted by the Second Specialized Criminal Court in Bogotá Sentenced on 25/03/2003

Sentence upheld by the High Court in Bogotá Sentenced on 21/11/2003

Sentence upheld, sentenced on 07/09/2006 SCJ

Acquitted by the Second Specialized Criminal Court in Bogotá Sentenced on 25/03/2003

Sentence upheld by the High Court in Bogotá Sentenced on 21/11/2003

Confirmed Sentence dated 07/09/2006 CSJ

Acquitted by the Second Specialized Criminal Court in Bogotá Sentenced on 25/05/2003

Sentence upheld by the High Court in Bogotá Sentenced on 02/12/2003

___

163

René Carvajal – Hunters Group Hypothesis

Name

Miguel Angel Díaz Méndez – Hunters Group Hypothesis

Carlos Julio Rocha – Hunters Group Hypothesis

14/04/2000 (C.79 Page 195 & following)

Indictment Resolution

02/11/2000 (C.82 Page 229 – 301)

Case closed on 15/02/2201 due to death of the defendant. Decision undertaken by Delegated District Attorney for Judges of the Specialized Circuit, Deicy Jaramillo (retired) (C.86 Page 91-94)

First degree murder, attempted murder, carrying an illegal firearm (Armed Forces firearm intended for personal use), and conspiracy to commit a crime.

Acquitted by the Second Specialized Criminal Court in Bogotá Sentenced on 31/01/2003

___

Crime

First Instance Sentence

Second Instance Sentence

Supreme Court of Justice – Penal Cassation Chamber

First degree murder, attempted murder, carrying an illegal firearm (Armed Forces firearm intended for personal use), and conspiracy to commit a crime.

Acquitted by the Second Specialized Criminal Court in Bogotá Sentenced on 31/01/2003

___

164

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Contents I.

PREFACE ............................................................................................................................. 8

II.

PRECEDENTS OF A POLITICAL ASSASSINATION ............................................................. 15 Álvaro’s last dilemma: The Samper Administration, victim or agent of the regime?............... 16 THREE MONTHS OF TRYING TO “TOPPLE THE REGIME” ............................................................................ 26 THE SHADOW OF THE MILITARY COUP ................................................................................................ 33 GÓMEZ’S LAST DARTS ...................................................................................................................... 39

III.

DEVIATION AND CONCEALMENT ................................................................................... 41

SOLDIERS ERGO COUP D’ÉTAT: EVERYTHING RESOLVED ........................................................................... 41 THE SIGNS OF DISORDER AND NEGLIGENCE ........................................................................................... 42 1. Cover-up, derailment, and Attorney General Gómez Méndez’s preconceived certainties 43 THE SINCELEJO GROUP .................................................................................................................... 49 THE BOGOTÁ GROUP ...................................................................................................................... 56 5.1.

BOGOTÁ GROUP CASE ..................................................................................................... 60

THE HUNTERS ................................................................................................................................ 64 MARY LUZ CUADROS................................................................................................................... 70 RENÉ CARVAJAL LÓPEZ ................................................................................................................ 77 JAVIER GIOVANI GÓMEZ GALÁN .................................................................................................... 81 JULIO RAMÓN CARRILLO VARGAS (EMILIO I) .................................................................................... 83 MERCEDES YOLIMA GUÁQUETA .................................................................................................... 88 OTHER WITNESSES ...................................................................................................................... 93 CONCLUSIONS DRAWN ON THE HUNTERS ........................................................................................ 94 Chapter III ...................................................................................................................................... 97 NEW EVIDENCE AND TESTIMONIES. THE CONSPIRACY REMAINS ALIVE ...................................... 97 TESTIMONY OF THE WITNESS KNOWN AS “H.H.” .................................................................................. 98 RASGUÑO’S TESTIMONY ................................................................................................................... 98 VALIDITY OF RASGUÑO AND H.H.’S TESTIMONIES ............................................................................... 100 THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE UNTOUCHABLE JOSÉ IGNACIO LONDOÑO ZABALA ............................................ 101 Danilo González - the alleged killer ......................................................................................... 105 FERNANDO BOTERO ZEA’S TESTIMONY.............................................................................................. 107 CARLOS CASTAÑO’S PUBLIC CONDEMNATIONS .................................................................................... 108 SANTANDER LOPESIERRA ................................................................................................................ 109 166

EL ALEMAN ................................................................................................................................. 109 THE CONSPIRACY IS ALIVE ............................................................................................................... 109 A ‘pig’ slaughter here, threats there, and a controversial appointment. ........................... 109 WHERE IS THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE? ............................................................................... 114 SUPPORT FROM THE NATIONAL POLICE FORCE ............................................................................... 117 What is the District Attorney’s Office doing? ..................................................................... 117 THE NEW ENFORCEMENT OF THE LAW OF SILENCE............................................................................ 118 CHAPTER IV.................................................................................................................................. 121 APPENDIX .................................................................................................................................... 121 FORENSIC AND EVIDENTIAL CONSIDERATIONS ON THE DAY OF THE CRIME ......................... 121 THE CRIME SCENE ................................................................................................................. 122 EVIDENCE FOUND AT THE CRIME SCENE ..................................................................................... 125 JUDICIAL INSPECTION OF ALVARO GÓMEZ HURTADO’S VEHICLE ..................................................... 128 EVIDENCE SUBMITTED IN THE TRIAL. ANOTHER METHOD OF DERAILING THE INVESTIGATION? ............... 134 AUTOPSY OF ALVARO GÓMEZ HURTADO AND JOSÉ DEL CRISTO HUERTAS HASTAMORIR ..................... 135 ATTACK ON ANTONIO JOSÉ CANCINO ....................................................................................... 139 THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE MATERIAL EVIDENCE RECOVERED ON THE DAY OF THE CRIME ................... 142 TESTIMONIES GIVEN REGARDING THE DAY OF THE CRIME ............................................................... 143 POLICE-ARTIST’S SKETCHES ..................................................................................................... 156 CONCLUSIONS ...................................................................................................................... 156 “DIGNITY FOR COLOMBIA” ADMITS RESPONSIBILITY ..................................................................... 158 2. Table listing those accused by the District Attorney’s three hypotheses ........................ 160

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I have gruelingly investigated and thoroughly reviewed the entire extensive case file. My work has been to evaluate and analyze the evidence. After several years of doing so I finished this book in June 2011.

LAUS DEO SEMPER

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AUC – AUTODEFENSAS UNIDAS DE COLOMBIA – COLOMBIAN UNITED SELF-DEFENCE FORCES CAD - CENTRO AUTOMÁTICO DE DESPACHO – COMPUTER AIDED DISPATCH CTI – CUERPO TÉCNICO DE INVESTIGACIÓN – TECHNICAL INVESTIGATION TEAM THE PRINCIPLE FUNCTION IS TO ADVISE THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON POLICIES RELATING TO FORENSIC INVESTIGATION, CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS, AND ASSESSES HOW THIS INFORMATION IS USED IN THE PROCESS OF ENDEAVOURING TO GAIN A CRIMINAL CONVICTION.

DAS – DEPARTAMENTO ADMINISTRATIVO DE SEGURIDAD – ADMINISTRATIVE DEPARTMENT OF SECURITY THE COLOMBIAN SECURITY SERVICE RESPONSIBLE FOR PROVIDING STATE INSTITUTIONS WITH SECURITY AND ALSO ACTS AS A COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. DIJIN – DIRECCIÓN CENTRAL DE POLICÍA JUDICIAL E INVESTIGACIÓN – CENTRAL DIRECTORATE OF THE JUDICIAL POLICE AND INVESTIGATION THIS ORGANIZATION IS INVOLVED IN THE CRIMINAL ELEMENT OF JUDICIAL INVESTIGATIONS AND IS RESPONSIBLE FOR CERTAIN INTELLIGENCE GATHERING TASKS. ELN – EJÉRCITO DE LIBERACIÓN NACIONAL - NNATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY A MARXIST-GUERRILLA, NARCO-TERRORIST ORGANIZATION THAT HAS BEEN OPERATING IN COLOMBIA SINCE 1964. FINAGRO - EL FONDO PARA EL FINANCIAMIENTO DEL SECTOR AGROPECUARIO – FUND TO FINANCE THE AGRICULTURAL AND LIVESTOCK SECTOR

GOVERNMENT FUND DESTINED FOR THE DEVELOPMENT FOR SMALL AGRICULTURAL BUSINESSES GAULA – GRUPOS DE ACCIÓN UNIFICADA POR LA LIBERTAD PERSONAL – UNITED ACTION GROUPS FOR PERSONAL LIBERTY

MEBOG – POLICÍA METROPOLITANA DE BOGOTÁ – BOGOTÁ METROPOLITAN POLICE LOS PEPES – PERSEGUIDOS POR PABLO ESCOBAR – PEOPLE PERSECUTED BY PABLO ESOCBAR A SMALL GROUP OF PEOPLE WHO WERE PERSECUTED BY THE DRUGLORD, HOWEVER THE GROUP MAINY CONSISTED OF RIVAL DRUG TRAFFICKING FACTIONS WHO WANTED ESCOBAR DEAD FOR BUSINESS PURPOSSES. THE GROUP HAD CONNECTIONS TO BOTH THE COLOMBIAN POLICE AND RECEIVED FUNDING FROM THE

DEA. SIJIN – SECCIONAL DE POLICIA JUDICIAL E INVESTIGACIÓN – LOCAL BRANCH OF THE JUDICIAL AND INVESTIGATIVE POLICE

UNAT – UNIDAD DE APOYO TÉCNICO – TECHNICAL SUPPORT UNIT URI – UNIDAD DE REACCIÓN INMEDIATA – IMMEDIATE REACTION UNIT

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NARCO NICKNAMES CALLE SERNA, LUIS ENRIQUE, AND JAVIER ANTONIO – “LOS COMBA” OR COMBATIENTES – THE COMBATANTS GÓMEZ BUSTAMANTE, LUIS HERNANDO – “RASGUÑO” – SCRATCH (OBTAINED AFTER BEING GRAZED ON THE CHEEK BY A BULLET THAT HE DISMISSED AS “JUST A SCRATCH” HÉLMER HERRERA BUITRAGO, FRANCISCO – “PACHO” – SHORT FOR FRANCISCO HENAO, ORLANDO – “EL HOMBRE DEL OVEROL” – THE MAN IN THE OVERALL HERNÁNDEZ, EFRAÍN – “DON EFRA” – MR. EFRA JARAMILLO GIRALDO, GUSTAVO ADOLFO – “TAVO” – SHORT FOR GUSTAVO LOAIZA CEBALLOS, HENRY – “EL ALACRÁN” – THE SCORPIAN LONDOÑO ZABALA, IGNACIO – “NACHITO”, “LA GORDA”, OR “EL TIGRILLO” – LITTLE NACHO, THE FAT ONE, OR LITTLE TIGER MONTOYA DE SARRIA, ELIZABETH – “LA MONITA” – BLONDIE ORTÍZ DURÁN, HERMES – “PASTEL” – CAKE PATIÑO FOMEQUE, VICTOR JULIO – “EL QUIMICO” – THE CHEMIST RAMÍREZ ABADÍA, JUAN CARLOS – “CHUPETA” – LOLLIPOP RENDÓN HERRERA, FREDY – “EL ALEMAN” – THE GERMAN RODRÍGUEZ OREJUELA, GILBERTO – "EL AJEDRECISTA" – THE CHESS PLAYER RODRÍGUEZ OREJUELA, MIGUEL – "EL SEÑOR" – MR. SARRIA, JESÚS AMADO – “CHUCHO” – JESUS VARELA, WILBER – “JABÓN” – SOAP VÉLEZ, JOAQUIN EMILIO – “ZARCO EMILIO”

170