Operational leadership series interview with maj charles o'brien

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A project of the Combat Studies Institute, the Operational Leadership Experiences interview collection archives firsthand, multi-service accounts from military personnel who planned, participated in and supported operations in the Global War on Terrorism.

Interview with MAJ Charles O’Brien

Combat Studies Institute Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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Abstract Serving in 3rd Battalion, 69th Armor Regiment – part of the 3rd Infantry Division’s 1st Brigade Combat Team in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM – Major Charles O’Brien commanded a tank company during (and for roughly one month following) the conclusion of major combat operations. At the helm of Alpha Company, O’Brien discusses in detail what he considers the “decisive point for the brigade,” namely the efforts of Task Force 3-69 in breaching the Karbala Gap and crossing the Euphrates River, moves, he said, that allowed “the rest of the division to attack the regime at its center of gravity in Baghdad.” “That one day-and-a-half period,” he added, “summed up my experience in the Army and my training and everything I had prepared for.” In this interview, O’Brien also talks about enemy tactics, the death of Atlantic Monthly reporter Mike Kelly, the intersection of counterinsurgency theories and current Army doctrine, and extensively about his unit’s (as well as his personal) conduct of civil-military operations, including developing information operations themes, negotiating with local Iraqi leaders and studying what forms both “national will” and “tribal communities” in order to “understand the impact of our operations on them.” Once the kinetic fight is over, O’Brien observes, soldiers “need to understand that everything they see, hear and do is important for one reason or another.” In these types of stability and support operations, “Everyone’s a scout,” and he offers a number of recommendations for how they could be better conducted.

Turabian: O’Brien, Major Charles. 2005. Interview by Operational Leadership Experiences Project team with Combat Studies Institute, digital recording, 24 February. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. [Digital recording stored on CD-ROM at Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.]

MLA: O’Brien, Charles. Personal recorded interview. 24 February 2005. [Digital recording done by Operational Leadership Experiences Project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, in possession of Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS].

APA: O’Brien, Charles. (2005). Personal interview with the author on February 24, 2005 at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

[Digital recording done by Operational Leadership Experiences Project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, in possession of Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS].

Government Printing Office: Transcript. Interview of Charles O’Brien, Feb. 24, 2005; Operational Leadership Experiences Project/Combat Studies Institute; Records of the Combat Arms Research Library; Fort Leavenworth, KS. [Online version on MONTH DATE, YEAR, at http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/contentdm/home.htm].

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Interview with MAJ Charles O’Brien 24 February 2005 KS: My name is Major Kent Strader [KS] and we are currently at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, at the Combined Arms Research Library. The time is 1209 on the 24th of February 2005 and I am conducting an interview with Major Charles O’Brien [CO]. Thanks for letting me do this interview. I really do appreciate it and your responsiveness. Let me get right to the questions.

Please tell me what unit you were assigned to during your operational deployment.

CO: Alpha Company, 3-69 Armor, part of the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 3rd ID [Infantry Division].

KS: Okay. Also part of XVIII Airborne Corps.

CO: Yes. KS: And then what was your duty position?

CO: Tank company commander.

KS: How long had you been in that position?

CO: Twelve months as a tank company commander and 22 months as an HHC [Headquarters and Headquarters Company] commander prior to that.

KS: So you did HHC and then tank company commander. What was your deployment date?

CO: I think it was around the 23rd or so of January 2003.

KS: And when did you guys redeploy?

CO: The unit redeployed starting in July 2003 and closed at Fort Stewart in September 2003. I myself redeployed upon completion of operations in Baghdad and then changing command on May 17th of 2003.

KS: Please describe your individual and unit training – and this is a big question, so take your time. What did that look like, your pre-deployment training, your individual and unit training?

CO: To start off big scope, the brigade had returned from Kosovo in November 2001, obviously after 9/11. So we started looking at how we could take the skills learned from Kosovo and apply those in any potential future operation. Having said that, upon return from Kosovo, we started up our normal high-intensity training cycle that 3rd ID does. As you’re getting ready for a National Training Center rotation, you’ll go through what they call battalion-level focus training for 3-69 Armor and then a brigade-level training exercise and then a division-level

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training exercise. So there are three distinct training events. The rotation itself, though not formally a mission rehearsal exercise, it was in fact a mission rehearsal exercise in terms of fighting from a column and specifically geographically referenced [inaudible].

KS: How do you feel your individual soldiers were prepared for the action that you saw?

CO: I think we were well prepared as per current training doctrine at the time. I think the only change I would make would be that the tank gunners be more focused on machineguns, multiple targets, not so prescribed with ranges and types of targets that were being engaged, but to allow for a more confusing, complex environment that better represents the current operating environment.

KS: You made a quote in one of the articles I read and it said: “We’re no longer looking for enemy tanks and armored personnel carriers, but sport utility vehicles with paramilitary troops.” Is that something you thought, maybe now with hindsight, would have been good to have been included in scenario?

CO: Yes, definitely. There are a few truck targets in tank gunnery, but nothing prepares you for a Toyota or a Mazda or something like that – as far as just what we envisioned the enemy to look like versus what we encountered.

KS: Based on your wartime experiences, how would you rate your pre-deployment training?

Was it adequate, inadequate?

CO: No, I thought it was adequate. We did additional live-fire training. I spoke of the platoon live-fires, combined arms live-fire exercises. Our NTC [National Training Center] rotation also included additional live-fire exercises; usually we get two or three and we had four, I believe.

They increased all our ammunition allocated for live-fires at the National Training Center. We fired multiple live MCLC [Mine Clearing Land Charge] rockets. So I think we were prepared.

KS: You and I talked have talked previously about your task organization and that you suddenly had imposed on you a new task organization. Talk a little about that and what were the challenges there.

CO: Throughout the training cycle, I had trained as a tank company pure, which means three platoons of tanks plus my headquarters tanks, so 14 tanks, a fire support officer and a Bradley fire support vehicle. So what was seen as my role within the task force fight was support by fire, advance fire-type missions [inaudible]. When we arrived in Kuwait in January and February and started doing our mission analysis – and upon receipt of an additional mechanized infantry company, Bravo Company, 3rd Platoon, 7th Infantry, the task force then, we had two armor and two mech and we task organized all four companies. So I gave up a tank platoon and I received an infantry platoon. At Camp Pennsylvania, I had a few weeks to get to know the guys and talk standard operating procedures and whatever.

KS: Was there any individual training that went on once you got into Kuwait at Camp Pennsylvania that kind of sharpened you up a little bit?

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CO: We did a live-fire training exercise at the platoon level, company commanders executing with battalion resources. We did our normal screening, the bore sighting of our tanks, so livefire was taken care of. We also did some maneuver training. I focused my company on defile drills based on the terrain we thought we’d go through in Iraq, so I thought those were pretty important. We also did the normal NBC, Nuclear, Biological and Chemical, training, and we had some new equipment that was fielded for us that we had to get used to, such as the FBCB2 [Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade-and-Below] and our new chemical suit, the JSLIST [Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology], which was an awesome piece of equipment.

We also focused on close air support, mission planning and execution. Our Air Force liaison officer provided training for us. And also just moved the platoons and companies a lot, moved them around Camp Pennsylvania, focusing just on executing basic, standard missions. A couple weeks prior to the war, we focused on the actual missions themselves. We went through rehearsals after rehearsals. I would go ahead and describe the triggers, the conditions, not telling them which phase of the operation we’re doing and then we’d execute a combined arms rehearsal, basically. That was so everyone understood the conditions, the environment, the triggers, the planning and my intent. Plus we had large sand tables that were left up for a couple weeks, each about 20 by 20 feet.

KS: What was it like, the attitude of the soldiers when it came to this training? Sometimes when you’re home station training, soldiers will look for an opportunity to slip away for a moment, not really engaged. Did you find that the soldiers were a lot more engaged once you got to Kuwait than they had been prior?

CO: I had to increase their intensity. The history of the unit prior to my taking command, they’d gone through some rough times. When I took command, part of the challenge was to change the culture of the company. I immediately put them on a war footing and geared all of our training and family readiness group meetings towards future operations. In Kuwait, the soldiers realized where they were and it was pretty focused. We also did some fun stuff, some athletic stuff, competitions. Played lots of football and soccer.

KS: Now when you got into theater, tell me about your RSOI, your Reception, Staging, Onwardmovement and Integration. How did that go?

CO: That was extremely smooth, yet I would rate ineffective if we had to conduct operations immediately. The contractors and the Army have got the process down to a science: six hours, which we completed in five and a half, everything signed for, inventory, all the tanks, all the vehicles uploaded and ready to roll out. We put the tanks on HETs [Heavy Equipment Transporter], moved out and moved towards Camp Pennsylvania. The challenge there was with Class III-P, petroleum, if we had to conduct operations. No COMSEC [Communications Security] for our radios, no ammunition, and Class IX [repair parts] wasn’t available then, or later. That’s a separate issue. Also heat shields and tow cables, they came later in our MILVANs [Military Vans]. So the process was very smooth but they need to consider a few more things.

KS: So in other words, you can’t have the concept that you’re going to have 90 days, 120 days for everybody to get there and all their stuff. You got to be ready to go when you get there.

CO: Yeah.

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KS: You talked about how you prepared for combat operations so I’m going to move on to the next question unless you’ve got anything else you want to add to that.

CO: We talked about our training as a unit. I also directed my platoon leaders to – the challenge of getting all the map sheets together, first of all, but then also doing mission analysis. I want [inaudible] completed and I want that left up so tank commanders would be able to take their crews through [inaudible] and walk through the [inaudible] modified combined obstacle overlay, so they could get a better sense of the terrain and where we were getting oriented as far as future operations. That would probably be the other part of that. Then we did rules of engagement training and law of land warfare, really just trying to visualize for the soldiers.

KS: Did your command give you a checklist of things that they anticipated you’d have to do prior to combat, a real pre-combat checklist of all the things you had to do?

CO: Our tactical standard operating procedures are pretty effective as far as pre-combat checks and inspections. We then focused that once we got there on some of the new equipment we were receiving, modifying the vehicles. But I don’t think we had to do too much additional PCC/PCI, other than just getting ready for specific missions. I would characterize that as mission preparation.

KS: And PCC is Pre-Combat Check and PCI is Pre-Combat Inspection. Take us through your day-to-day duties. I noticed in your briefing to your guys there, the Reserve component, you were giving them a rundown of what an NTC rotation looked like. But in terms of day-to-day duties, things like battle rhythm, briefings and training, what did that schedule look like for the soldiers and for yourself?

CO: For the preparation phase?

KS: Right.

CO: Training that we had scheduled, getting everyone up and accounting for all sensitive items, if we had PT [Physical Training] in the morning or in the afternoon – that depended on what was going on. A lot of health and welfare type stuff then get everyone focused on their training, much more leader-intensive as far as organizing the training versus the usual decentralizing. A lot of movement back and forth between Camp Doha as well as the other camps, Camp New York, Camp Pennsylvania, trying to find equipment, supplies, doing your usual coordination.

Other things such as getting shots, we had to wait on some of our shots. Really just a lot of maintenance on the tanks was a big portion of it. So basically maintenance every day, some training, depending on individual to crew, platoon level and company exercises. Some recreational stuff and that’s pretty much it. Meetings every day in the afternoon with my platoon leaders and platoon sergeants, and with battalion as well. The usual checklist of things to do, see where we stood on that sort of stuff to get ready for the mission.

KS: Okay, let’s kind of transition now from RSOI and start getting towards hostilities. Can you describe the significant events that occurred to you and your unit as hostilities commenced?

And then if you and your unit was displaced, can you describe the locations you moved to and the events that occurred during the move?

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CO: The big muscle moves were out of Camp Pennsylvania to [inaudible] and that was probably about 25 kilometers from the international border and about 10 kilometers away from Camp Pennsylvania. That was truly a [inaudible] and we occupied our portion of the [inaudible], put our CPs [Command Posts] in the middle section. The other thing about Camp [inaudible] was that it was secure [inaudible] went through the mission rehearsals. That way we secured that operational security. We then moved to a staging area, although it was a tactical assembly area and that was just a few kilometers from the international border. I think that was on the 19th of March that we moved out. There we received the final FRAGO [Fragmentary Order] and wanted to make sure that when we moved out, we limited the confusion. That’s why we lined up in columns and you didn’t have to uncoil your vehicles and everything. On the 20th of March, we moved out across the berm. While there, we went into our normal afternoon meeting with the battalion and we received an update that the oil fields were put ablaze and we had to move early. While we were talking about that, we heard some cheering and some noise. We rushed out of the tent and all the soldiers were up on the front decks of their tanks and on their turrets. We had rockets, MLRS [Multiple Launch Rocket System] and everything else that field artillery was throwing at the border outpost – and so the war had started. That’s how we were told was the cheering of the soldiers with the stuff flying overhead.

KS: Do you know what time that was by any chance?

CO: It’s was probably 1700 or 1800. That would have actually been on the 19th, because the 20th, at 0500 I believe, was when we conducted our movement out of the [inaudible] and across the berm and towards our objectives.

KS: How were the soldiers dealing with the fear? Was the chaplain a busy man at this time?

CO: No, he wasn’t as busy as I’d wished he’d have been. My first sergeant and I went to services regularly and I encouraged the soldiers – and I think, covertly, there were quite a few who were talking with the chaplain, reading their Bibles. I told my platoon leaders that I wanted soldiers to feel like they were at NTC, so I wanted NTC to train a part of that, for us to be doing everything that we’d be doing in Iraq, and that was one way to mitigate [inaudible]. If I had a soldier who said that that’s exactly how we did it in training, that’s [inaudible]. The recreational activities, sports, definitely helped out. With soldiers, we discussed some of our concerns, but I didn’t really hear too much about fear. A lot of confidence in our equipment, our unit, from the soldiers.

KS: Okay. Here’s the big question and you can go through it however you want. Can you describe your duties during combat operations? You talked about keeping people from shooting friendlies, getting carried away with their weapons – and if you could take that from Phase II up until what we thought was going to be Phase IV. CO: My duties were to ensure that the battalion commander’s vision was played out. At the company level, things really should be simple, and that’s the way I tried to organize my company, to include a platoon we had just received. I gave them a tactical standard operating procedure and said, “Follow what first platoon normally would do,” and we’d go at these set plays and set roles. So, ensuring things are done correctly – the way things are done versus what is done was most important. Force protection was clearly up there. I felt it was my role to

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put units in the [inaudible], weapons control status and fire distribution, that’s the commander’s role: to distribute fires effectively and safely; to evaluate risk, mitigate it. For instance, at the airport [inaudible] the threat at the time, which was dismounted infantry, posed a sufficient threat to my tanks, but the risk was that there were friendlies, because situational understanding wasn’t the greatest at that point. So I felt the threat wasn’t high enough to assume that risk.

KS: That’s interesting you say that because your commander had said, “I want you to engage everything with the main gun round –” CO: I think what he meant was when you clearly identify – going between the nuances of [inaudible], clearly identifying the enemy versus [inaudible], clearly identifying not friendly – there’s nuances to that. You have to be well trained at that. And for me, I think it’s my role to go ahead and – I’m the one who controls the company’s fires.

KS: Do you find you had to interpret the ROE [Rules of Engagement] at times? I read in an article that sometimes the ROE just didn’t apply as you got later into the stages of the war.

CO: Yeah. At Najaf, our first contact, we had to reevaluate, not just ROE but intent, effects, the way things are done, what our enemy looked like. But yeah, we reevaluated and adjusted to what the threat was and the environment gave us. What was the other part of that question?

KS: Well, just basically looking at your duties. Was there any change to that, to what you just described, because that kind of takes us up to Phase III? Was there any change when you went into Baghdad and now you became the occupying force?

CO: Yes, that definitely changed. Phase III is what we always trained for. It’s brutish but simple, kind of the nature of warfare, it hasn’t changed much. Then going into Phase IV, the stability operations phase, there’s some ambiguity, first of all, as far as what we’re doing, what our mission was, the purpose and intent, that sort of stuff. It wasn’t clear from operations orders, probably all the way down the chain. And not criticizing anyone, other than not quite knowing what was expected. But I quickly assumed – and then received from battalion once they started kicking out operations orders – that we’re there to facilitate the transfer of authority over to an Iraqi government. Part of that was just instilling confidence in the Iraqi people, restoring basic functions, needs, capabilities of the infrastructure. And so, to me, my primary role as the commander was to assess what was in my zone, my sector, 14W, of Baghdad, and to work on whatever I could towards the overarching intent of what I just described – confidence and peace and stability. So I had to develop some information ops themes, some talking points, some recurring tasks, to give to my platoon leaders, especially young platoon leaders. I had very young platoon leaders, and that could be discussed separately. But they’re trained in basic armor lieutenant skills, combat skills, so now we’re in Phase IV and that’s where I thought my experience in Haiti and Kosovo had helped a little bit, as far as in the absence of direct orders, this is what we need to do. We need to ensure routes are cleared, that there’s no violence, start doing some trend analysis and start developing the picture for higher [headquarters].

KS: There was a whole lot more information gathering on your part than you would have expected in a combat operation.

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CO: Yes, definitely. Combat information is completely different than what was going on there in Baghdad at the end of April, May, and that was a transition period. I think both sides were kind of sitting back and waiting for the dust to settle.

KS: What was that feeling like?

CO: We weren’t sure what we had achieved or accomplished. It was an uneasy feeling. We’d all seen our men exposed to experiences, whether it’s Somalia or the Soviets in Afghanistan, that sense of history – not sure where we stood in history – if we’re seen as occupiers or liberators.

We didn’t quite know yet. And you’d get a different answer from every person you talked to, and you had to understand that we’re not going to be liked by all and we’re not going to be hated by all. We’ll operate somewhere in the middle, but they expected stuff from us. A feeling of vulnerability once my tanks were kind of grounded. Tanks aren’t the best for conducting stability operations, but when you’re in contact they are. The infrastructure wasn’t set for heavy tank movement throughout the city. We didn’t have the Class IX available to continue operations with our tanks and we needed to preserve our combat power. So we were operating in soft Humvees and on foot, and as a bunch of tankers, that was new for us. They’re all doing it now but we hadn’t necessarily trained for that.

KS: Where did all the Humvees come from? I know you guys didn’t – CO: I had two Humvees, mine and my first sergeant’s. Then I had a mortar platoon attached to me, so there were M-1064 mortar tracks, but I really left the mortars with their tracks so they could conduct more aggressive patrolling for special missions. Plus they had security of a couple hospitals that were a little more contentious than other facilities in the sector.

KS: I want to talk a little about you for a second. You’ve already been an HHC commander, so your commander – what was his name?

CO: Lieutenant Colonel Rock Marcone.

KS: So he’s already got a level of trust in you that’s probably a little different than most of the commanders. What was that experience like? Here he hands you the mortar platoon – CO: Well, quite honestly, I think that level of trust was across the board. Maybe he did. He wasn’t my commander when I was HHC commander, Lieutenant Colonel Dave Bishop was.

But there was trust across the board. I’m sure he sensed that at least I had a bit more time in command and all that. He trusted that we would all develop the situation and apply judgment, even if it wasn’t described in an operations order, either implicitly or explicitly.

KS: What was the most important learning experience or significant event or events during this deployment – and actually, I should call it a combat experience, not a deployment.

CO: There were the battles, or the engagements, and each of those were different and significant in my professional development as well as my sense of my personal vulnerabilities and style and weaknesses and everything else. There were moments that were significant. The decisive point for the brigade was crossing the Euphrates River. That would allow the rest of the

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division to attack the regime at its center of gravity in Baghdad. That was important. I think everyone understood and sensed that, to include the Iraqis. Operations were a little more intense in the way the company attacked, just giving them a sense of pride, that was pretty incredible. The way my crew reacted was pretty incredible. We were hit pretty much right on top of our position with 152 millimeter howitzer fire. I watched huge palm trees literally get yanked right out of the ground. The way the crews conducted their survivability moves just showed how well trained they were, not from my doing but just as an Army. Conducting a river crossing: we didn’t really train for that, and now we’re here at the Command and General Staff College talking about river crossings. I don’t know if we were just so lucky or everyone was just so professional that it all came together, but it did perfectly, and in combat.

KS: What were the elements of success there?

CO: Intense conducting of battle drills, clarity of purpose, what we were doing: getting the division across the Euphrates River. Fire distribution on our [recording problem; audio missing] a couple of attacks leading up to [inaudible]. Out of an attack position, a company received a fragmentary order to conduct an attack ahead of the battalion. Our scout platoon had established a screen. We’d just finished about six hours of movement so we were going to refuel before we attacked. We had some Apache helicopters operating overheard as well. The fact it being the bridge, they didn’t want to commit – this wasn’t going to be a battalion operation, so my company received the order to go ahead and attack. So the one opportunity I got to attack, employing fire support and really conducting what we had all trained in a conventional fight.

Attacking in zone for about 10 kilometers, going through a company-plus, battalion-minus – whatever you want to call it – of Iraqi forces, artillery, recoilless rifles, etc. So that was one attack, an approach-march type of attack, kind of from an attack column, once the terrain got kind of restrictive. So on the road, they got to a support by fire position on the near side of the Euphrates River and then assaulting across the river, across the canal, and then holding that through the night until the rest of the division passed through. All that, in that one day-and-ahalf period, summed up my experience in the Army and my training and everything I had prepared for, and what the company was trained to do. Another significant event was when my maintenance chief and a reporter, Mr. Mike Kelly, passed away. Their vehicle overturned in the canal and they drowned on our attack on the 2nd of April onto Objective Lions, which was Saddam International Airport. So the emotional loss of a good maintenance chief and a good friend, as well as just finally being at the airport and knowing the significance of being at Saddam’s airport. How we reacted to the loss of Staff Sergeant [Wilbur] Davis and Mr. Kelly.

KS: That was the first time the company was able to really grieve over that and deal with the loss.

CO: Well, we didn’t get the opportunity to grieve formally until the battalion memorial service a couple days later. I think it was on the 6th of April. I just remember, on the 3rd of April, in the morning – we attacked the airport the night of the 2nd and started consolidating the morning of the 3rd. Some bunkers had to be cleared; we had some combat left to do. I drove my tank across the airport to link up with my XO and the first sergeant who had been coming in the opposite way. Just jumping out of my tank and kind of collapsing, looking at my maintenance guys, saying, “I’m sorry,” and at the same time telling them to be strong – everything you do as a leader. But the company was still getting mortared and attacked so we didn’t get to grieve until

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a few days later when it was a little safer. We moved away from the airport, attacked, seized, cleared one of Saddam’s palaces that eventually became the corps headquarters. So operations weren’t over yet. I’d reported as we attacked from Highway 8 onto the airport grounds, it was very, very bad terrain. It was pitch black; all the lights had been cut out. I just remember saying, “Hey, watch out for that canal,” sending that back, and I guess they didn’t receive that message.

I don’t know, but then I got the report from my first sergeant that we had a vehicle flip upside down in a canal and sort of the silence over the net. I reported it to the colonel on the battalion command net and he said, “Roger, got it, keep fighting your company, drive on. We’ll take care of Sergeant Davis; we’ll get him out.” The pride I had in the tank crew that was with them that tried to rescue them, jumping into the water repeatedly, all the while in contact, to pull those two out. The other occupants of the vehicle had managed to get out and survived. To pull those two out of the water and conduct resuscitation attempts for over an hour until a MEDEVAC helicopter showed up. Good actions, very professional.

KS: I’m sure you’ve spoken to Mrs. Davis, but what about Mrs. Kelly?

CO: We wrote a letter. Unfortunately, I had only met him at Objective Peach an hour prior to conducting the attack on Objective Lions. Colonel Marcone said, “Chuck, this is Mr. Kelly, a reporter with the Atlantic Monthly, and he’s going to be with you.” I said, “Mr. Kelly, I don’t have any extra seats in the tanks. The only thing I’ve got is my maintenance chief’s Humvee.”

He said, “I understand the risks. I want to be as far forward as possible.” And that’s the last time I spoke to him. We wrote a letter to his family. I always think I’d like to talk to the family at some point. I understand one of his children is in journalism – very young, but in journalism – and has already interviewed the president. And I think it’d be kind of neat to sit down and talk to him, but I don’t know if that’d be too painful.

KS: Well, I hope that happens. Did you have any interactions with coalition allies at any time, from start to finish?

CO: Kuwaiti forces cut through the berm but I didn’t really contact them. Not until we got into Baghdad and there were some Australian forces there, and that was just talking to a few soldiers. Pretty much, for me, it was 3rd ID until we got into Baghdad and the 101st [Airborne Division] came in and helped clear the airport and then also conducting stability operations. I had them running through my zone without permission.

KS: Who was doing that?

CO: The 101st – and then Special Forces, of course.

KS: Yeah, they kind of have the run of the battlefield, don’t they? Okay, so what about your interactions with civilians? When did that start and what was the nature of it?

CO: There’s a picture by Jack Gruber of USA Today that’s been out there and it’s of my tank going by some Bedouins, a Bedouin camp. Very picturesque, my formation looked great. We had punched through the berm and entered Iraq and I just remember thinking, “What are these guys thinking?” Their lifestyle is pretty simple and I’m not sure they understand what’s going on, with this bunch of American tanks going through there. We tried to be respectful. Civilians

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at Najaf – that was tricky. Objective Raiders. The enemy used civilians to mask our fires. They placed civilians between us and them. Obviously I couldn’t shoot them so we had to maneuver to engage. I also had a group of civilians try to approach my tank. It was getting dark. I was by myself, trying to link up with my trains. A mob approached my tank, no clue what their intention was. Why it was so tricky was that we didn’t have any contact with civilians up to this point, really. Not face-to-face. How were they going to perceive us and either accept us or not?

Other than trying to push them away through non-verbal communication and pointing of weapons – we just moved out, so really no civilian interface there.

KS: What do you think they wanted?

CO: I don’t know. I didn’t have any interpreters so I’m not sure what they wanted.

KS: Would you recommend an interpreter for each company?

CO: Oh, yeah, definitely. That would have been nice to have. At Objective Peach, we had some civilians come out houses and they were motioning with their hands. I don’t know if that’s coincidental or not but a minute later is when all that field artillery rained down on us. I don’t know if they were trying to warn us or if they were signaling someone. We thought an observer or spotter was on one of the rooftops, so I don’t know if they were complicit with that enemy action or not. But once again, no real face-to-face personal communication going on there, not when you’re inside a tank and trying not to shoot up a bunch of people. We knew their technique was to use civilian clothing and civilian vehicles, so sometimes when you engaged a vehicle after providing warning shots – and sometimes you weren’t able to provide a warning shot. At the bridge at Peach, over the Euphrates River, we engaged and destroyed a couple vehicles. We didn’t know if they were military or civilian, but that was the nature of it at that point. On the far side of the river there was a cemetery. We tried not to put any fire into the cemetery yet we received fire from there. So it’s not interaction like we’re doing right now; it’s sort of from a distance. My wife had asked, “Hey, Chuck, what happens to all the women and children when you guys are attacking in the cities? Where do they go?” Well, you’d like to think they go into basements and stay there. But the fact is, not everyone has that reaction. Some leave their houses, so maybe that’s some of the human traffic. The first real contact with civilians is once we had established at least a temporary base there at one of Saddam’s palaces, just northeast of Saddam International Airport. The battalion assigned us sectors and we started doing our initial stability operations. One big thing was keeping civilians from invading the palace grounds and an adjacent Republican Guard training camp. They’re all walled in, so we had to protect them because we didn’t want civilians coming in and looting. That was one of our tasks, to prevent looting there, but not all over the city. Around this time, I got my first taste of disgruntled Iraqi civilians, asking how dare I invade their country and I must think I’m all big and bad because I’ve got this tank. Okay, not everyone is embracing us. And then, once we moved into 14 West, of course we had daily contact and started establishing contacts, working the schools and hospitals, building relationships and all that.

KS: How did you sort out the Iraqi leadership once you got to 14 West?

CO: You had neighborhoods. We kind of broke them down into professional groups as well as geographic. We had a lot of Christians. It was a good mix, and there are some parts of the city

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that are not. I think we had seven churches, maybe more. Sunni, Shi’ite, about evenly split. I’d say a 45-45-10, maybe even more of the Christians. Lots of doctors, lots of hospitals. The guys would come out and talk to you. The “A” types tend to do that anyway, but sometimes they’ll put someone up to it as well, so you have to watch out if someone’s being a front man for someone else. There were a lot of retired and inactive officers from the Iraqi military who were more than willing to give us advice. They had their own neighborhood watches, their own paramilitary type of thing, to protect the neighborhood. So we tried to get with the leadership of that and talk to them. School principals, teachers, union leaders. We had to conduct labor negotiations, so we sat down with the union leaders there.

KS: Now what about the morale of your unit during combat operations and during posthostilities, during this Phase IV period? Of course, there’s a litany of things that could have affected morale, like mail, food, equipment, phones, email, TV broadcasts, recreation, maybe even just knowing where people were at using Blue Force Tracker. So what factors significantly contributed to morale?

CO: Blue Force Tracker, we only had two – one in my tank, one in my XO’s tank – so there were a limited number of crews who could utilize it. We had a satellite dish that we’d brought up from Kuwait with us, so at Najaf we set up satellite TV. We got Fox News and that’s when I found out the name of this operation, IRAQI FREEDOM. It surprised me because, as I said, “What if they don’t want to be freed?” At the palace and at our subsequent forward operating base on the east side of Baghdad, as a battalion we had satellite TV, getting all the channels in the region, so that helped. We didn’t have phones or any email. At the end of my stay is when we went out shopping for phones and stuff like that, but in May it was still very austere. Hot chow wasn’t coming in. Very scarce. I never quite understood that one. But we got plenty of mail, lots of care packages. We started grouping that up and giving it to schools, students, hospitals. The outpouring of support from back home was really great and we used that to our advantage over there. And it worked until some folks told the kids to stop accepting it. Morale was great during the attack. During the stability ops, Phase IV – two of my infantry guys who were with me during the war, they went back to their company, Bravo 3-7, and subsequently got attached to 2nd ACR [Armored Cavalry Regiment], they ended up losing two guys who were in the platoon [inaudible], so that kind of had an impact. One was hit with an RPG and the other was shot in the back of the head, so morale started to go a little bit there. We had to change up the missions a lot, remind everyone why we were there and how things sort of teetered on success or failure. We’ve got to remain positive, we’ve got to accomplish this, because everything will be for naught if we fail here.

KS: Was there a feeling of spiking the ball, that Phase III was over? And did you have a hard time keeping people focused as you went into Phase IV? CO: We didn’t get that feeling. We took Saddam International, cleared out that palace – and it was huge. It’s hard to visualize but we’re talking about larger than the campus of a big college in the U.S. So we never got that feeling of spiking the ball because we were like, “So what?

We’re here, now what? How does this end?” When 2nd Brigade did their “thunder runs” and we saw the statue of Saddam Hussein fall, I guess the ball got spiked, but we were wondering what we had to do to get out of here. General [Buford] Blount briefed all the company commanders prior to the war and he had said, “Look, guys, we may be here three months or three years.” So

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we didn’t feel like we were leaving right away or had the right to leave right away, but we got the feeling that there wasn’t much planning or intent to use 3rd ID for stability operations. I don’t know if that was ever conveyed by orders, but the feeling was that the 101st, 4th ID, the 82nd [Airborne Division] would do most of this, and that’s probably wrong. Like I said, I don’t think that was ever formally conveyed, but we started receiving redeployment briefs at the beginning of May – and we had soldiers that didn’t actually leave until September.

KS: So a little premature.

CO: Yeah.

KS: And that makes it harder for morale.

CO: That makes it harder for morale, yes. If, when, how things end over there, that’s when we’ll really spike the ball. And I’m pretty positive about it right now, after the elections and all, but we’re still waiting to see. 3rd ID is back in Iraq.

KS: How did that make you feel, when you saw the elections?

CO: Oh, I was elated. There were a couple different moments of elation, when we got Saddam’s sons, when we got Saddam himself, and then when we had the elections over there. That was the manifestation of our operations: democracy and freedom in Iraq. And I think for the Iraqi people it was a big turning point. I would hear from them, “Okay, so what? I’m free but I still have no electricity and no job.” I had to field those complaints for quite awhile. But with the elections, I think there’s really a turning point and they can formally voice their dissent, voice their opinions.

KS: Your unit’s performance, I haven’t heard any negative comments, but were there any failures?

CO: Well, there are probably failures in everything. If you don’t expect that then you’re not being realistic. Just certain ways we did things, I don’t know if you’d say they’re failures – more of being naïve.

KS: What were those things? What about cultural awareness, how about that?

CO: Cultural awareness, that’s a big topic. Getting ready for Kosovo, I put together a book six months out and starting training the company, HHC, for this deployment. But for Iraq, I focused on combat ops, so I didn’t build a book on Iraq. That’s my own failure. I guess the feeling is that it’s not a catastrophic failure, but – KS: Taking the initiative to do a regional study.

CO: Yeah. At the time, we were just focused on other things prior to deploying.

KS: So can we say there wasn’t a lot of anticipating – and at all levels – on what would happen after combat?

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CO: Yeah, that’s an obvious failure, or shortcoming, that lack of anticipation for Phase IV. Our equipment – we could have put MILVANs, extra computers, command and control systems, and other stuff that are structured for those types of operations that are information-intensive.

A tank company command post is only a couple people. We’re just not manned or structured to do that sort of thing.

KS: What about your logistics?

CO: I think some of my old HHC soldiers, combat service support soldiers, were more focused on delivery and logistics than on combat operations – and I had deliberately focused them on that. It just takes so much to reorient a guy who delivers fuel, to reorient him towards combat operations. Indecision, inability to return fires from some of my support assets. We did an after action review at Najaf because of that, and it got kind of emotional. Some guys thought we were pointing fingers and I said, “No, we’re learning from first contact what the nature of war is, what our enemy looks like, how he acts, and why we didn’t engage when we should have.”

Part of that was the way we were conditioned. We thought that they were going to capitulate, so that’s not our own fault, per se. The hesitancy to shoot another human being – it’s not natural until you do it for the first time. But when you’re receiving fire, it should be natural. Were the preparations correct, were the weapons ready to fire, was the ammunition ready to be fed, who’s observing – do we understand all the components of the battle drill? So I’d say those preparations, for those other than my tank and infantry platoons. Now logistics shortcomings, that’s a bigger level. Fuel never ran out. Class IX repair parts: we never received any except that which we brought from home station, from Fort Stewart. Not until May did they start trickling in, and I never understood that. I’m sure there were complexities that I didn’t understand and still don’t understand, but it was very frustrating to not be able to move your tanks and utilize the systems you have.

KS: What about your interactions with the battalion staff?

CO: There was a little frustration when we first got into 14 West. I was told to do a relief in place with the Marines who were there. They had already developed the situation pretty well, I thought. I was told, not so kindly, that I needed to get back to the forward operating base and conduct operations there as opposed to being out among the population. I thought the way the Marines were doing it was better.

KS: Somebody must have read [Roger] Trinquier: A French View of Counterinsurgency.

CO: Yeah. And without being critical of other units, I think that was our greatest failure: conducting operations from bases where you do a patrol, come back – and it’s just unnatural to gear up for combat, possibly die, and then come back to your email and watch some TV. You lose situational awareness with everything that’s going on outside your base until you go back out again, try to regain it for an hour or two, then come back and lose it again.

KS: I don’t think I’ve ever heard anybody say that before. That’s interesting that you make that point.

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CO: And I lost some contacts. In the little bit of time I was out there, they were willing to talk to me, give me information, because I was with them and they felt safe. But once I pulled out and said, “See you tomorrow at 4 o’clock,” they said: “Okay, great, but now I’ve got to live with my neighbors who know I’ve been talking to you.” It’s a great amount of risk that commanders have to be willing to accept, to live amongst the population, but I think that’s the way to go.

KS: Would you change any aspects of your unit’s predeployment training to better prepare for future combat, now that we’ve talked about all that?

CO: The gunnery tables, going through battle drills, training my support soldiers a little better.

That’s about all I can think of right now.

KS: That’s fine. Maybe we can touch on that again in the second interview. Do you think current Army doctrine for warfighting and sustained combat operations is applicable to your actual combat experience?

CO: We didn’t quite lead with the scouts out front because they were in Humvees and ‘113s that we put them in, and those aren’t survivable. That’s probably one of the biggest ones. Leading with armor wasn’t doctrinal, but after OIF, maybe it has a better chance of being accepted as doctrine or rewritten doctrine. Leading with the most survivable system you have, because you don’t know the situation, and then develop the situation with your infantry – that’s backwards from what we’ve done before. Having said that, I like to lead with Bradleys, with tanks protecting their flanks, because the tanks would shoot long range but the Bradleys would engage close targets. The turret speed and the distribution of fires from the Bradleys are quicker, so I prefer to use them on restricted terrain and roads, if we’re attacking a column, basically. Because I didn’t get to train that, that was sort of learning on the fly. But our doctrine, I think, is sufficient, although relying solely on doctrine is insufficient. We’ve got to be adaptive.

KS: That’s interesting. Let’s take, for instance, Field Manual 71-1 [Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team]. Do you think it has shortcomings?

CO: You know, I think it should be simplified, that’s all. A lot of it is more TTP [Tactics, Techniques and Procedures] than doctrine.

KS: How about actual experience reflecting our theories? You now have looked, in some of your classes, at where our theories come from. So were our theories correct in the development of our doctrine?

CO: When we lean towards [Carl von] Clausewitz, yes; when we lean towards [Antoine Henri] Jomini, no.

KS: Why? CO: Because there is the fog of war and friction and uncertainty.

KS: It’s not mechanical.

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CO: With Clausewitz, correct, and Jomini would prescribe a menu or a set of actions to accomplish the mission.

KS: Do you feel like we paralyzed the enemy?

CO: We paralyzed portions of the enemy.

KS: So did armor doctrine – the slash and move and attack – did that work?

CO: That worked. I think we need to review our acceptance of risk to the flanks and rear when we do that. Studying [Field Marshal Erwin] Rommel, the Meuse River in 1940 in France, he did the same thing. He accepted the risk to his flanks and rear, continued to keep the tip of the spear and the shaft moving, thrusting, and it demoralized, destroyed, disintegrated the [inaudible] of the enemy to achieve operational success. When we have instances where our trains are being ambushed, well, the smart enemy should do that – and we have to better train, man, equip and organize our trains for that.

KS: Our doctrine has a bunch of vignettes in it, always going back to history. Have we looked at the right vignettes, the right time periods, to base our doctrine on? My question is, instead of the Meuse River, shouldn’t we have looked at Hitler’s attack through Yugoslavia, where they had to deal with a lot of partisans, or into Russia – or Vietnam?

CO: And that really nails it. We thought we were facing Rommel, 1940, Meuse River, instead of Hitler going through Yugoslavia and the partisans. Again going back to strategy and strategic sensors and [inaudible] capitulation would occur, such as happened to [General Hermann] Hoth and [General Heinz] Guderian and Rommel and all of them. So yeah, if we had reviewed other vignettes, we would have been better prepared for it.

KS: So we need a little better flexibility in our doctrine that allows us to talk about that. When we say the spectrum, we’ve got to include that.

CO: Yes, definitely. I think the use of full-spectrum vignettes would be applicable.

KS: How did your unit redeploy?

CO: I changed command over there, which I did not like. But I’d been in command for 36 months and they said it was time for me to go, so I went. It was not good to leave my soldiers. I felt like I was abandoning them. Battalion and brigade commanders stayed in command and, I would argue, company commanders should have as well. Part of the reasoning was to give someone else combat experience. He was a Rear-D commander and he came in and took over from me, and I can imagine that was a little awkward for him as well. There’s plenty of experience to be had. If we don’t get it now, we’ll get it later. But the unit, from what I’ve heard, they marshaled their vehicles up and basically convoyed out of there. That was quite awhile after I’d left. My individual redeployment: I was dropped off at what’s now called Baghdad International Airport. I jumped on a C-130 and, once I got into Kuwait City, I bummed a ride with the Marines and went back to [Marine Corps Air Station] Cherry Point, North Carolina. It took me about 24 hours to get home. I hadn’t talked to my wife since early February. We had a

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baby February 1st, so I talked to her right after that, but that was it. So I called her from Cherry Point and said, “Hey, honey, I’m home.” Of course, pretty emotional.

KS: Did you get to do a formal AAR with the unit before you walked out the door?

CO: We did that tactical AAR I mentioned there in Najaf. As commanders, we had to write our battle summaries, our accounts, which are part of the formal unit history. I probably should have brought that to you and I’ll try to find that. It includes bumper numbers and grids and all that. It’s hard to find the time to do that, but we did it along the attack instead of waiting until the very end to do it. Handwritten, to give to someone with a laptop to type that in, but there’s a formal unit history with battle summaries and stuff. So that was sort of an AAR. We AAR’d in Baghdad. The guys who wrote On Point [The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom] came and talked to us, so we conducted an AAR of sorts there as well. That was pretty much it, I think. I’ve gone over it in my head and written multiple things. I’m just looking for some time to write a book.

KS: Are there any other experiences that you think deserve special attention?

CO: We had one private first class, who’d been a troublemaker up to this point. He gets wounded in Baghdad by a frag’ grenade and gets evacuated. He, on his own, found his way back up from Kuwait to rejoin the unit after he was told he wouldn’t be able to get back for quite awhile. He bummed rides in helicopters, with the sergeant major at one point, just to rejoin his unit. Pretty inspiring from a person who was a troublemaker. Soldiers are capable, that’s for sure.

KS: You talked a little about your coming home. I don’t want to get too personal, but – CO: Well, I left a pregnant wife at the driveway. I asked her to stay home because I was going to have all these other wives I’ll be dealing with in the company. So I pulled away from the driveway and waved goodbye. Coming back in, like I said, I call her – and basically shock her. I really wanted to drive back to Fort Stewart. She’s a teacher at Liberty County High School so I wanted to do the whole Officer and a Gentleman thing, walk in on her class, lift her up and take her away, but I couldn’t wait. So I called her from Cherry Point and said I needed a ride. Her friend, whose husband is a Marine who was deployed, they lived at Camp Lejeune. So I ended up getting picked up by a friend and then she gave me the car to drive home. So basically, my homecoming was driving home 24 to 36 hours after being over there, and marveling in all the greenery, trees and grass, and just the American society. Coming in through the doorway was just amazing. My daughter, whom I hadn’t seen in person yet, and holding her. I think my wife was pretty excited. You know, that summer, I wrote my letter of resignation. I’d been in the Army at that point for 14 years. And it was because of that, of never wanting to have to go through that experience again of leaving my daughter, my wife, and now we have a son, too. So I wrote my letter of resignation, showed it to my battalion commander, was ready to drop it, but ultimately reconsidered. I figured God will take care of me and so will good training in the Army. It’s tough. I’d been in Kosovo, in [Operation] DESERT STORM, and in Haiti as well, so I was thinking maybe now I’m starting to push it with this fourth time. But I think I regained my focus. That’s really my story.

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KS: I really appreciate this time and I’m looking forward to any follow-up we might have. I think it’ll be a good experience.

END OF INTERVIEW, PART I KS: Good afternoon, my name is Kent Strader. Today is 22 March 2005 and I’m at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, at the CARL Library, conducting an interview with Major Charles O’Brien. This is a follow-up interview and most of my questions will focus along the stability operations line. Chuck, would you mind talking about your interactions with the population in your area of operations, once you’re in Baghdad and you’re into the stability phase.

CO: Sure. It’s really two different phases. The first – maybe for about two weeks in the west side of Baghdad – it was consolidating forces. So after taking Saddam International Airport and the palace grounds, which subsequently become V Corps headquarters, consolidating around that location, trying to clear out specific target sites that were Republican Guard training areas, weapons storage places. The focus there was to get as much information as possible about the specific sites from the populace. There were a lot of questions. It was the return of the population back to the area, so they had more questions for us: “What are you doing here? Can I get into this certain area that you’ve now secured? Have you seen a certain relative whom I fear is either dead, wounded or lost?” For us, it was very specific. For the Iraqi people, it was getting to know who we were and what we intended to do. Obviously, as a company commander, I didn’t have many specifics that would satisfy their information requirements.

When we moved from the west side of the Tigris River over to the east side and did a relief in place with the Marines, that’d be the second phase. It became a little more permanent, where we developed key nodes, targets, key infrastructure sites, and anything else we felt was important within the society and culture there. So getting to know the leaders, developing relationships with the local community to get information from them to identify their requirements and their needs. I think everyone was still trying to catch their breath at this point and get a feel for what’s next. On our side, especially as units are leaning forward towards possibly getting relieved by follow-on divisions and moving on out back to home station. From the Iraqi citizen’s perspective, it was, “How do I put back together my life?”

KS: Based on that experience, what are your thoughts on cultural awareness training in retrospect?

CO: I don’t think we fully appreciated the impact of the last decade or so – the sanctions, the embargoes, the no-fly zones – and what that had done to the people of Iraq as far as forming their opinion of coalition forces, specifically U.S. forces. And also this being an invasion, an offensive operation, versus a permissive environment. To get a better feeling of the tribal aspects and the nationalism, that some people say doesn’t or didn’t exist – I don’t think we had a good understanding of that. We could do a little better training on what forms national will, what forms tribal communities, in order to understand the impact of our operations on them.

Understand what the elements of that will are, so we will then know how to address their weaknesses and their strengths. So identify what are the components of society, the culture and everything else, that makes up a nation.

KS: Did you feel, at any point, that you received training on the Iraqi culture?

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CO: No, no. It was very minimal training. It was cursory. Very minimal language, if even that.

We were really just looking at specific units, Special Republican Guard, Republican Guard divisions, Fedayeen Saddam, etc. It had nothing to do with the environment.

KS: Once you get into a stability operation and you start doing targeting, you’re looking at the populace, the infrastructure, a lot of different things. Lethal and non-lethal both. So talking a little about targeting after combat operations: did you have battalion targeting meetings, company targeting meetings, to be able to determine your central focus, what you wanted to achieve?

CO: We had battalion targeting meetings, but they weren’t formalized that they involved company input until after I had changed command. So we were still sort of developing our process and our systems from the first week in April to the end of May. I have to say that we understood both lethal and non-lethal targeting and the whole process; it just hadn’t been put into place yet. We were just still trying to protect ourselves, protect the citizens, assess the infrastructure and all that. But as far as targeting, when we did start identifying our needs list, those environmental factors that would alter our mission or determine success or failure, such as labor union disputes, getting schools up and running, which would have the effect of getting the kids off the streets and returning things to normal. We understood that sort of targeting, and that was all company level, at least primarily. At battalion level, it was more using resources that were starting to get provided to us, whether it was NGOs [Non-Governmental Organizations], the CPA [Coalition Provisional Authority] – which at the time was called ORHA [Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance] – using key administration personnel to come in when needed to settle disputes, using rank and that sort of thing. That’s what battalion was more about. Company was identifying what was needed in each of the subcommunities and, if nothing else, keeping it at a certain level versus degrading it.

KS: So you’ve done your targeting process and you’re figuring out how to shape your area.

Now you’ve got to conduct raids, take down anti-government forces. Talk about how you came to that, how that all happened.

CO: Top-down information and bottom-up information is how we get to it. We had to figure out what the second- and third-order effects would be as far as our actions, and then determine if it was something we could do ourselves or if we had to get higher permission or resources to do. Typically, if I conducted a raid, I would cordon first to develop the situation and at least go to higher with it, unless I had to do it immediately and then I’d report up after the execution.

Typically, deliberate raids were more at the battalion level, battalion-directed C2 [command and control].

KS: But if you came into a chance contact, then you would go into that operation on your own, cordon and search.

CO: Right, the search would be the raid.

KS: What were some of the tools, as the commander, that you found helpful during this particular phase? Obviously, you’re prepared for kinetic operations, you’re resourced for it,

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now you go to stability ops. What were some of the tools you pulled together or developed on your own?

CO: Organizing a company, you need to have a plan to do that before you deploy. We thought of using the fire support officer as my CMO, my civil-military operations officer, civil affairs officer, whatever you want to call it – the guy who’s keeping his eye on the big picture. That worked somewhat but I had a brand new second lieutenant. He was trying his best, he was a great officer, but he was just very young. So I tended to go more towards platoon leaders having lines of operations: one lieutenant will develop the schools, another will develop the hospitals – the key nodes, the key elements of infrastructure and society that we felt were important. That doesn’t mean they didn’t have terrain or a geographical responsibility; they had both. They were also patrolling, doing checkpoints and developing relationships as well. I went with a hybrid matrix type of organization, even within the company. Then the organization of the company command post, conduct analysis on the information and, if necessary, pass it to higher. Battalion asserts are really great. During this phase of the operation, we had to lean on battalion quite a bit. It’s too much for the company to handle.

KS: Regarding CA [Civil Affairs], PSYOP [Psychological Operations] and IO [Information Operations], how did you get yourself integrated into that process?

CO: CA and PSYOP were battalion assets at the time, and they would be given to companies for specific missions or just to escort around the sector so they could conduct their own general support missions. Brigade-, division-, ORHA-level assets were put into each of the sectors or zones. They were dispersed throughout Baghdad and the country, and they were a sort of general support as well. We could go to them for assistance. Typically, they would actually come to us for assistance because we’re the guys who owned that territory, if they had a security issue or something. They would conduct deliberate missions, direct-action type stuff.

As far as information operations and themes and talking points, etc., initially we developed those at the company level.

KS: Because of your interaction with the populace?

CO: That, plus you have to give your soldiers something, because if you have 20 to 30 patrols or missions a day, you want to make sure everyone’s on the same sheet of music. So I felt like I understood end-state conditions, ROE, intent, although maybe not effects as well as I do now.

My soldiers definitely didn’t understand that, so I had to give them something they could understand. It was really just to keep them focused and limit the unintended consequences of their actions, so they wouldn’t misspeak and to make sure their actions were in line with their words. But the focus was kinetic, maneuver-centric.

KS: How’d you combat rumors? My experience in the Middle East is that rumors are rampant.

CO: Yes, we dealt with that, through the IO talking points. Armed with what to say, the soldiers would go out and, when encountered with a rumor, they would respond with a talking point which, hopefully, would counter or neutralize that rumor. Then you set up your meetings and, again, going back to the key players, the key nodes: what influences society and the culture?

When you set up your community watch and you had meetings, that was a great time to

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counter rumors and also to show how words are connected to actions. We promised this, we delivered, and this is what will happen in the future as well. Going into the hospitals, ensuring unity of action, things like that.

KS: So it all goes back to basic services, doesn’t it? That’s quality of life for people and where there’s quality of life, there’s confidence.

CO: Right. Believe in the system, we’re here to help the system, and if you cooperate and take charge of the future of Iraq, then things will be good for you.

KS: Back to the populace, and we’re talking a lot about the populace now. What impacts did you see from Arab culture on your operations?

CO: I saw some of the factionalism or sectarian effects between the Sunnis and Shi’a, and the Christians as well. We had a sizable Christian population. Now, pre-conflict, they had all gotten along pretty well. Post-conflict, there was an influx of Shi’ites, mostly from Iran. So one of the biggest challenges right off the bat was that we had not liberated the country to allow Shi’ites to come in and do a land grab – but that was the rumor, the accusation. Understanding the nuances, the differences between Shi’ites and Sunnis and, of course, the Christians – and even within the Christians there were four or five different groups. Understanding – and I still don’t understand too well – the Arab mind as far as God’s will and fatalism.

KS: What about talking with women? Did you find that that was a problem?

CO: The women we talked to tended to be Christians. At this point, April/May 2003, it was still bold men who would come out and talk to us, if it was something more than to request basic services. I just don’t remember too much interaction with women.

KS: How did your soldiers deal with all this?

CO: They had basic skills. Going back to Kosovo, a good portion is a secular Muslim society and that’s where our prior service and experience was.

KS: So maybe the training was essential but you were able to draw on previous experience from other soldiers.

CO: Yes. KS: Along the lines of Muslim and Arab culture, did you have local leaders coming to you – sheiks as they call them – and also spiritual leaders coming to you?

CO: Well, my part of Baghdad didn’t really have sheiks. I didn’t see the tribalism as much. I saw the sectarianism and also it was segmented by function, if you will. There was a business district, a residential district. There may have been tribal sheiks but they did not let on, and that was not the impression we had through May of 2003. The company did, later on, move to a part where that sort of lifestyle is more prevalent. The 14 West area of Baghdad is a pretty modern part of the city.

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KS: Is that a largely Christian area?

CO: No, I’d say 20-30-50.

KS: Twenty Christian, 30 Shi’ite and 50 Sunni.

CO: Right. It really went more towards who was the local leader community watch-wise, the school leader, the business leaders, university officials, the hospital administrators – that’s really who the power players were. Now there may have been sheiks and they just didn’t come out.

They may have been behind the curtain.

KS: What about information gathering? Ultimately, you’re out there with your patrols and you’re daily gathering information. How did that mature; how did that grow?

CO: Initially, when we were forward deployed out in the zone, away from the forward operating base – the battalion established a forward operating base and we fairly quickly collapsed back in it and conducted operations from the forward operating base. But prior to that, when we were out living in the zone, we established relationships and that’s how we gathered a lot of information, either receiving or going out and finding that. Because we were out with them, people were much more willing to talk to us. After that, we had to rely on hastily built relationships, and when we did our patrols to go meet with these people, it was a little more dangerous once they realized they were basically on their own until an American patrol comes by.

KS: Did you end up doing patrol debriefs?

CO: Yes, we did debriefs every single time, on whatever type of mission. They’d fill out the report, sit there and talk to someone and, if there was any question or if something important happened, we’d send it to battalion as well. The big issue for me was how much should I develop at my level and how much should I just filter or sort through, collate, and then send to battalion.

KS: How did you synthesize all that information? Any recommendations?

CO: First of all, you’ve got to stay somewhere longer. It takes a long time to do this sort of thing.

Experience will tell you what’s true, what’s false, what’s important, what’s not. You have to keep the framework very simple and make sure every soldier knows what you’re going after.

It’s totally different than kinetic warfare. Soldiers need to understand that everything they see, hear and do is important for one reason or another. Everyone’s a scout.

KS: What role did the mosque play in the communities?

CO: The mosques weren’t in my sector.

KS: You had none?

Operational Leadership Experiences Project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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CO: None. So they all had to travel, and that was important because of the traffic, traffic patterns. The churches that were there, they tended to be small and dispersed. Really, what we wanted to know was what the message was during prayers.

KS: What about interactions between Sunnis and Shi’a? Did you notice anything that would be of interest?

CO: The part of the city I had, the southern boundary of it was along the Tigris River and right across the river from one of the Hussein palaces. I was told that that part of the town had been kind of favored pre-conflict. Because of that, there was no tolerance for sectarian differences.

That’s why the Christians felt somewhat comfortable with Saddam Hussein in power, at least in that part of town. They didn’t fear any backlash. When we removed that safety net, it kind of changed the relationship a little bit. That was the complaint, that we had opened up the valve and upset the balance. And it’s a complaint of the Sunnis throughout Iraq still today, which is basically that they’ve been stripped of their power and, as a minority, there’s no one looking out for them. And now here we also took out some jamming sites along the border with Iran and thus the message was coming via FM airwaves from Iran daily. We were told that we’d basically set the conditions for Shi’ite takeover of that part of town. There was no sectarian violence while I was there. It was primarily land-grabbing, people saying, “This is now my house. So-and-so has given me the authority to claim it.”

KS: Who was the authority – spiritual leaders?

CO: Yeah. They dipped their hand in red paint, put it on the house, called it a blood claim or whatever.

KS: What was their pretext for that? Had they owned it previously?

CO: No, just that now they had the right to claim it. So we had to figure it out. Where’s the deed on a house maintained? How do you negotiate that? Do I use violence to stop this sort of thing or do I let it go? Well, we threatened we were going to do certain things if it didn’t stop – and it did stop. It may have been just targeted houses, as far as I know.

KS: Primarily Sunni houses?

CO: They were all Sunni houses.

KS: Had the people left or were they there?

CO: They left, because they were Saddam supporters.

KS: They were Ba’athists?

CO: Well, they had benefited from Saddam being in power, and they thought we would threaten them. They didn’t know the nature of our operations. They thought, “We’re being invaded by the coalition, by Americans. I’m with Saddam, maybe I’m a target of this.” When they found that we didn’t operate that way, they felt comfortable in coming back.

Operational Leadership Experiences Project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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KS: One last question here about negotiating – what did you learn about that? Did you find yourself in that situation a lot, where you had to negotiate situations?

CO: I had a couple formal negotiations, but that was more of a delay/stall kind of thing: receive the complaints and then go to higher and bring in the heavies to settle it. Sometimes I was the heavy, and that was more community watch type actions. Who was going to utilize a vacant lot to construct something? That sort of thing.

KS: So you were a self-imposed mayor?

CO: Yes, definitely. City manager. The hasty negotiations were the frustrating part. Someone’s car has been damaged by one of your tanks, or it was rumored that it was. Somebody took his neighbor’s can of gasoline. All the complaints and you just sit there and negotiate your way through, so you don’t look like the bully. “I’m the American and it’s because I said so.” You don’t want to come off like that. You have to give the time and the patience. It’s difficult. There are a lot of needy people. So most of that I tried to give to my platoon leaders, let them work on their negotiating skills.

KS: [Laughter] Good idea. Is there anything we haven’t covered that you’d like to add?

CO: I think we’ve pretty much covered the nature of the operations. The grand conclusion is the same it’s always been throughout history: do your job and be professional. The most frustrating part was probably at the end there, when we didn’t quite understand the big plan on conditions. What was the future of Iraq to look like and what was our role in that? How do we utilize assets and capabilities to get to that? We just did not have a clear understanding. And I think a discussion on that beforehand would have helped.

KS: Well, I really appreciate your time. It’s been a delight to interview you. So, thank you. This is Major Kent Strader, on 22 March 2005, concluding the interview with Major Chuck O’Brien.

END OF INTERVIEW Transcribed by John H. McCool, 28 February 2005

Operational Leadership Experiences Project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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