Lokayata: Journal of Positive Philosophy, Vol. XII ( 01 & 02) September 2021 by CPPIS Pehowa

Lokāyata Journal of Positive Philosophy

(ISSN: 2249-8389)

Vol. XII, No.01 & 02, September 2021

Chief-Editor: Dr. Desh Raj Sirswal Guest-Editor: Dr. Mudasir Ahmad Tantray

Lokāyata: Journal of Positive Philosophy (ISSN 2249-8389) Lokāyata: Journal of Positive Philosophy is an online bi-annual interdisciplinary journal of the Center for Positive Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Studies (CPPIS). The name Lokāyata can be traced to Kautilya's Arthashastra, which refers to three ānvīkṣikīs (logical philosophies), Yoga, Samkhya and Lokāyata. Lokāyata here still refers to logical debate (disputatio, "criticism") in general and not to a materialist doctrine in particular. The objectives of the journal are to encourage new thinking on concepts and theoretical frameworks in the disciplines of humanities and social sciences to disseminate such new ideas and research papers (with strong emphasis on modern implications of philosophy) which have broad relevance in society in general and man’s life in particular. The Centre publishes two issues of the journal every year. Each regular issue of the journal contains full-length papers, discussions and comments, book reviews, information on new books and other relevant academic information. Each issue contains about 100 Pages. © Centre for Positive Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Studies, Pehowa (Kurukshetra) Chief-Editor: Dr. Desh Raj Sirswal, Assistant Professor (Philosophy), Post Graduate Govt. College, Sector-46, Chandigarh. Editorial Advisory Board:

Dr. Ranjan Kumar Behera (St. Joseph University, Virgin Town, Ikishe Model Village, Dimapur, Nagaland). Dr. Merina Islam (Department of Philosophy, Cachar College, Silchar, Assam). Dr. Dinesh Chahal (Department of Education, Central University of Haryana, Mahendergarh). Dr. Manoj Kumar (P.G. Department of Sociology, P.G.Govt. College for Girls, Sector-11, Chandigarh). Dr. Sudhir Baweja (University School of Open Learning,, Panjab University, Chandigarh). Dr. K. Victor Babu (Institute of Education, Mettu University, Metu, Ethiopia). Dr. Jayadev Sahoo (Jr. Lecturer in Logic & Philosophy, GM Jr. College, Sambalpur, Odisha). Dr. Rasmita Satapathy (Department of Philosophy, Ramnagar College, West Bengal.) Dr.Pankoj Kanti Sarkar (Department of Philosophy, Debra Thana Sahid Kshudiram Smriti Mahavidyalaya, Paschim Medinipur, West Bengal). Mrs. Chetna Gupta (Department of Philosophy, SPM College, University of Delhi). Dr. Kamal Krishan (Department of Hindi, P.G.Govt. College for Girls, Sector-11, Chandigarh).

Declaration: The opinions expressed in the articles of this journal are those of the individual authors, and not necessary of those of CPPIS or the Chief-Editor.

In this issue…………….. Sr. No.

Title of the Paper & Author

Page No.

Philosophical Practice in Present Time: Neetu Bhandari

4-9

Concept of Perception: A Critical Study with Reference to Nyaya and Charvaka: Ifrah Mohiuddin & Sami Jan

10-18

Impact of Yogic Practices on Classical Vocal Music: Nibedita Sabat

19-25

Impact of Buddhist Philosophy on Odia Language and Literature: 26-32 An Appraisal : Manoranjan Dwibedy

Cosmopolitanism and Plurality of Culture: Lalruatfela & Temjenkala 33-39 Jamir

Nature of Existentialism : Sami Jan

40-52

53-61

10.

Wittgensteins Private Language Argument: Fayaz Ahmad Sofi & Priyavrat Shukla Report of the Programme

11.

Contributors to this issue

62-64

Philosophical Practice in Present Time Neetu Bhandari Abstract With the advent of human civilization, a pandora's box of enormous possibilities and choices has emerged before us. This undoubtedly has given us room to explore various dimensions/aspects about our unmounted materialism, alienation from self and others, and of course an erratic lifestyle that is constantly in a struggle within our inner turmoil causing existential challenges/ crises. Hence with this chaos, it is important to understand and acknowledge the role of philosophy and its significance during the pandemic. Since historical times, philosophy has always helped people to understand and question their beliefs and ideas. But with time, our society seems to have abandoned the value system created by philosophy. In regard to this, philosophical practice; a new domain in applied philosophy, helps people address their dilemmas, predicaments, and everyday issues. Through critical thinking and rational reasoning, an individual derives self-reflection and coherent thought processes. Bearing in mind the above arguments, this study aims to shed light on the nature of the philosophical practice, its role, and its need during the pandemic. Keywords - Existential crisis, Philosophical practice, Critical thinking, Epistemic justification, philosophizing. 1. WHAT IS PHILOSOPHY FOR? In the current scenario, if one asks how philosophers have contributed in this pandemic, the common perception would be relating to their academic work. It seems that philosophy is limited to academic philosophy whose aim is to deal with the concepts, ideas, theory-building but it doesn‘t have scope for practical outlook. Thus academic philosophy doesn‘t offer tools in solving the everyday issues of life. Practical philosophy on the other hand, inculcates a rational outlook and critical thinking which in turn helps in developing a deeper understanding of concrete issues or situations. Philosophy, as a discipline, is a way of thinking about reality and human beings. It helps us to figure out: what gives it meaning, what makes it beautiful, where its evils come from, and ultimately what is the nature of reality itself. It is an attempt to question our personal lives. For example, why do we do what we do, why do we think what we think, why do we feel what we feel? All these thoughts, feelings, and actions one understands not because of hormones or neurotransmitters but by personal experiences or hereditary conditions. It‘s an activity of thought which demands a critical and comprehensive attitude. As a comprehensive and critical thought, it helps to settle doubt, unveils 4

presuppositions, differentiates substance, measure situations, readdresses disfigurement, analyzes reasons, inspecting world views, establish actions, broaden different idea and experiences, synthesizes understanding, unravels ignorance, enlarge imaginations, reevaluate emotions and examine different beliefs and values. 2. PHILOSOPHY AND PHILOSOPHICAL PRACTICE IN COVID TIMES It is to be noted that this Pandemic has drawn everyone‘s attention on three things: Human fragility (a virus can kill human beings), Vulnerability (Human condition is exposed), and its impotence (inability to do anything).

With technological innovation and upscaling of possibilities, modern man had

forgotten his sense of fragility. He has the impression of staying in the possibilities of the life of mastering and conquering. Through the scientific innovation of medicines and drugs, he ignores the idea of his fragile nature. But this Pandemic makes all of us realize how fragile human beings are. He can easily infect and kill anyone despite their caste, religion, sex, or social circumstances. Thus, the pandemic has highlighted the position of humans as finite, one who can be eliminated by a virus. Talking about the Vulnerable aspect of humans, the pandemic made us vulnerable in the sense that the human condition is revealed. We can no longer do the same thing which we did earlier in our everyday lives. In this way, we lost our touch with life. Apart from these two, this pandemic has made us impotent. Today the human race has become impotent. His interpersonal relations are in chaos. Even though leading experts from across the world have been trying their best to find a way out of this pandemic, the only available option remains isolation. Besides this, different existential questions arise in this uncertain time. Ontological insecurity1 for life seems prevalent which gives rise to different mental disorders. Isolation has made us anxious and fearful. Lack of social contact disrupts communication between people. This gives people a tremendous amount of mental agitation affecting their everyday living. Sleeping issues, lack of concentration, fear of future, feeling of uncertainty, etc. problems like these come in between. Thus, philosophy acknowledges these conceptions and provide epistemic justification2 of different feelings which the humans are facing in pandemic time. It also acknowledges the incumbent existence

Ontological insecurity refers, in an existential sense, to a person’s sense of “being” in this world. An ontologically insecure person does not accept the fundamental level of reality or existence of things, themselves, and others. (For details, see: Jackson & Hogg 2010) 2

Epistemic justification refers to the justification of the belief system.

of death. philosophers in present times can understand human values and try to re-shape them. Through this, they can rediscover ideas of life for the common good of human beings. 3. PHILOSOPHICAL PRACTICE: A GENERAL CHARACTERIZATION The emergence of applied philosophy has brought philosophical practice into the limelight. It aims to deal with subjects‘ everyday predicaments, their ideas about life, career choice, mid-life crises, personal moral problems, different dilemmas, existential questions, low self-esteem, relationship issues; simply the overall notion of lived understanding. To this end, philosophical practice helps to address individuals‘ problems meaningfully by philosophizing their issues and providing epistemic justification to their ideas. It analyzes the subjects‘ worldviews and structure and logical implications of arguments. It doesn‘t provide ready-made conceptions and theories, rather it offers critical thinking tools and helps individuals to develop their self-understanding, without imposing any prejudiced solution. The idea of dealing with everyday problems philosophically is hardly new. Greek philosophers such as Socrates, Cynics, Stoics, Epicureans, etc. discussed life issues and gave concrete applications to people of how life should be lived. Thus, philosophical practice involves the restructuring of the consciousness by analyzing individual thoughts and ideas and building comprehensive framing of the individual worldview. The manifestation of beliefs and giving logical coherence to thoughts is a key principle of philosophical practice. Philosophical practice, a relatively new field born in 1981 in Germany by Gerd b. Achenbach. From Germany has further spread to other countries such as Africa, Canada, Israel, France, UK, the USA, etc. There are now hundreds of institutions, universities, organizations associated with it. With hundreds of people involved in it, there is no single unitary approach in this, rather there are clusters of approaches. The analysis of various approaches rooted in modern philosophical practice allows us to divide them into three different groups. The first group, the problem-solving approach, aims to solve specific life problems of people. Second, the thinking skill approach aims at improving the tools for, rather than solving specific problems (Valentinovich 2018:150). Third, a development approach aims at developing self by enriching life with meaning and wisdom. Implementation of these approaches can be divided into two groups of philosophical practices where critical thinking and the wisdom-based approach are prevalent. The critical thinking approach is based on reasoning, logical thinking, analysis of concepts and identification of hidden prerequisites, etc. It is used to understand oneself rationally and logically. Second, the wisdom-based approach, an alternative

to the critical thinking approach, aims at understanding the depth of life. ‗It's main task is not to analyze the ideas, but to finish them for a deeper understanding of life‘. (Valentinovich 2018:151 Also, philosophical counseling and philosophical companionship are two kinds of philosophical practices which happen in the form of individual or group work. It is assumed that philosophical counseling is similar to an existential form of psychotherapy where counselors through counseling understand the structure and existential questions of the individual. It tries to understand an individual‘s ontological ideas and worldview. On the other hand, philosophical companionship is another form of philosophical practice where individuals are engaged in understanding different ideas and concepts of life through phenomenological reduction3 and philosophical contemplation. Similarly, Socratic Cafe is another group of philosophical companionship founded by Christopher Phillips where people meet and exchange their philosophical perspectives through the Socratic method. Talking about its therapeutic approach, philosophical practice mainly focuses on solving psychological problems. Through systematization and generalization of the problem, it helps to resolve the interlocutor‘s problem. This approach allows us to understand the synthesis of psychotherapy and philosophical practices. Nussbaum‘s conception of philosophy as therapy is based on the belief that philosophy should not simply focus on cognitive problems, rather also on emotive as well as conative problems. It should focus on irrational fears, invalid conclusions, and misguided assumptions of life. She says that a good life cannot be based on reasons only, rather it is one‘s emotions and actions that constitute a good life. (Sulavikova 2012:134). 4. AN ALTERNATIVE TO PSYCHOLOGY OR PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC APPROACHES? It is difficult to explain the exact difference between philosophical practice and psychotherapy as not only do both fields have different sources and methodologies but, unlike psychology, philosophical practice doesn't have a single unified approach. However, some European philosophical practitioners have made attempts to distinguish these two fields. According to them, theories of psychotherapy are based on the scientific workings of the mind (cognitive, emotive, and conative aspects). Their intervention of seeing individuals is on the parameter of psychological factors, whereas philosophical practitioner inquiry is based on understanding the worldview of an individual. This worldview involves the very basic idea about life, morality, happiness, sorrow, integrity, etc. However, certain human problems can‘t be addressed by philosophical practice, for example, different cognitive disorders and mood disorders. These disorders require medication and psychological counseling. While philosophical 3

Derived from the philosophical traditions of phenomenology and phenomenological psychology, for the study of firstperson experiences of consciousness (For details see, Depraz, N. (1999). The phenomenological reduction as praxis. Journal of Consciousness Studies)

practice may assist persons with such disorders after or in addition to psychological treatment, it cannot serve as a replacement or substitute for the latter in such instances. As a result, philosophical practitioners must establish support and referral networks with psychological counselors as part of their practices. 5. PHILOSOPHICAL SELF-INVESTIGATION TO PHILOSOPHICAL SELFUNDERSTANDING Philosophizing different underlying concepts and hidden assumptions help an individual in selfunderstanding. This philosophical self-investigation examines an individual‘s conscious thoughts, unconscious beliefs, and lives to understand life. Several philosophical practitioners have proposed that investigating conscious thoughts is concerned with those thoughts and opinions of the interlocutor which he/she expresses explicitly. However, this approach seems unsatisfactory as the thoughts and predicaments that an individual goes through daily are not just conscious thoughts. It involves emotions, desires, fantasies, hopes, etc. Thus, this approach restrains philosophical self-investigation completely. Another alternative for carrying out philosophical self-investigation is investigating unconscious beliefs.

Through rational thinking tools, philosophical practitioners examine the

unconscious structure of beliefs, their network, and their pattern. However, this inquiry is only limited to unconscious beliefs. It is not an overall investigation of individual thoughts as it doesn‘t include ontological and existential questions of the individual. The third approach to carry out selfinvestigation of lived understanding explores an individual‘s lived ideas of life (just not thoughts). ‗The basic idea of lived understanding is that in our everyday life we constantly interpret ourselves and the world, or in other words, we express a certain understanding of reality. Not only our thoughts but also our emotions, plans, hopes, behaviors, fantasies, choices are ways of relating to our world, that is, ways of understanding‘ (Lahav 1996: 265). This self-investigation approach examines how coherent those ideas of lived understanding are, including different hidden assumptions, values, assumptions, etc. Thus, lived understanding refers to the various meanings, implications, and logic of a person's attitudes towards life rather than conscious or unconscious beliefs. 6. CONCLUSION With the arrival of this pandemic, we have encountered various mental illnesses all along the way leading to certain crises in our day-to-day lives. We frequently come across questions like "what am I supposed to do with this life? How should I live it? How can I live happily and content in all life situations? What is the meaning of life? What is death? What is our responsibility as a collective social being? To answer these questions, it becomes important to explore the domain of philosophical practice. 8

Thus, the study aims to highlight the fact that there is an urgent need to accept and adopt the method of philosophical practice as it can effectively help people to understand their everyday existential predicaments and help to transform the social system. It is important to note that philosophical practice does not talk about the study of philosophical theories, rather it deals with the practical application of situations and problems that one comes across every day while focusing on self-knowledge and selfreflectivity, thus contributing to the expansion of boundaries of individuals' worldviews. References: 

Lahav, Ran. ―Handbook of philosophical companionships‘‘. Lulu Press, Inc, 2016.



Jopling, David A. ―Philosophical Counselling, Truth, and Self‐Interpretation.‘‘ Journal of Applied Philosophy 13, no. 3 (1996): 297-310.



Lahav, Ran. "Applied phenomenology in philosophical counseling." International Journal of Applied Philosophy 7, no. 2 (1992): 45-52.



Lahav,

Ran.

conceptual

framework

for

philosophical

counseling:

Worldview

interpretation." Essays on philosophical counseling (1995): 3-24. 

Lahav, Ran. "What is philosophical in philosophical counseling?" Journal of Applied Philosophy 13, no. 3 (1996)



Lahav, Ran, and Maria da Venza Tillmanns, eds. ―Essays on philosophical counseling‖. University Press of America, 1995.



Valentinovich, Boris Sergey. "Theory and Practice of Philosophical Counseling: A Comparative Approach." Turkish Online Journal of Design Art and Communication 8 (2018): 149-154.

Concept of Perception: A Critical Study with Reference to Nyaya and Charvaka Ifrah Mohiuddin & Sami Jan Abstract In this research article, I shall determine the critical relation between Charvakas and Nyayankas description about perception and further I shall define perception in an analytical manner. The outcome of my research would be the clarification of the perception and its role in contemporary philosophy. I shall relate both the viewpoints of Charvakas philosophers and Nyaya philosophers and henceforth their effect on contemporary Indian philosophers. This research work would be a systematic and clear work on the concept of perception in Indian philosophy especially with respect to Nyaya and Charvaka philosophical approach. Moreover I shall examine the impact of Charvakas and Nyaya philosophers on contemporary world philosophies and science. Key Words: Perception (Pratyaksha); Nyaya; Charvaka; Sense Perception. Introduction: Perception is a process which has been defined in many ways in Indian philosophy. In Indian terminology perception is known as Pratyksha. Perception is not a single process but it is a name for diverse processes. Nevertheless perception in Indian philosophy has very deep meaning and sometimes all Indian philosophical wisdom is termed as Darshana (perception). This problem is an epistemological problem which rests on the questions like ‗the origin of knowledge, the place of experience in generating knowledge and the place of reason in doing so; the relationship between knowledge and the responsibility of error and changing forms of knowledge that arise from new conceptualizations of the world. all these issues link with other central concerns of Indian systems. There are four factors involved in any knowledge i.e. the subject who knows (Pramata); the object of knowledge (prameya); the means of knowledge (Pramana); the resultant of Valid knowledge (Prama). Indian philosophy starts with perception as it is recognized as the first source of knowledge. What we see, visualizes, hear, taste, smell, feel, touch, think, recognize is all perception. It a matter of fact that all Indian philosophical schools more or less accepts perceptions as a valid prama. Indian philosophical system is comprised of nine major schools of out which six as known as orthodox and remaining three are heterodox. While six orthodox schools (Nyaya-Vaisisika, Sankya-Yoga, Purava Mimamsa-Utter Mimamsa) accepts perception as a valid source through which we can attain knowledge and three schools (Charvaka, Jainism, Buddhism) as well accepts the same. Gotama defined perception as ‗nonerroneous cognition which is produced by the intercourse of the sense organs with the objects. Visvanatha defined perception as ‗direct or immediate cognition which is not derived through the instrumentality of any other cognition‘. According to Nyaya perception is classified into ordinary and extraordinary perception. Ordinary perception is further divided into two kinds; Internal (Manasa) and External (Bahya). Extra ordinary is divided into three kinds; Samanayalakshana (perception of class), Jnanalaksana (perception by complication) and Yogaja (perception of intuition). While ordinary perception is the perception which presupposes the sense organs, the objects, the manas, and the self and their harmonious contact. On the other hand extraordinary perception is the perception in which perception is assumed and apprehended by some medium but not directly. There are two stages in perception as per Nyaya philosophy is concerned one is Savikalpa and other is Nirvikalpa Perception; Savikalpa perception is 10

determinate and Nirvikalpa is indeterminate. Vatsayana says that if an object is perceived with its name we have determinate perception; if it is perceived without name we have indeterminate perception. Jayanta Bhatta says that indeterminate perception apprehends substance, qualities and actions and universals as separate and indistinct something and is devoid of any association with name, while determinate perception apprehends all these together with a name. Gangesha Upadhyaya defines indeterminate perception as non-relational apprehension of an object devoid of all association of name, genus, differentia etc. Annam Bhatta defines it as the immediate perception of an object as well as of its qualities, ‗but without the knowledge of the relation between them. A review of literature is a test of scholarly paper which includes the current knowledge including substantive findings as well as theoretical and methodological contributions to a particular topic. Literature reviews are the secondary sources and do not report new or original experimental works. Kamal, M. M. (1998): According to Charvakas, perception is of two kinds; (a) external and (b) internal , that means perception is produced by exernal sense organs or by the inner sense, mind. The external perception means the contact between five sense organs and objects. But they don‘t admit the mind as an independent sense organ, so they don‘t admit internal perception through mind. Shaw, J. L: Nyaya‘s extraordinary perception matches with Russell‘s Knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. Rather it is superior than it because Russell‘s knowledge by acquaintance and description lead to solipsism. The Nyaya claims that there are both set of positive and set of negative causal conditions of perception. The sense object contact is the operation (Vyapara) and the sense organ is the special instrumental cause (Karana) of perception. In this work I shall consider the methods like dialectic method to discuss and reach towards the problem, rational method in which arguments are presupposed and validity and reliability of the problem could be determined, hermeneutical method in which terms are interpreted clearly, analytical method which provides the self evident, clear, simple, and obvious understanding of the problem. Obviously I will apply inductive-deductive method, descriptive method, empirical method, rational method and analytical method in this piece of research work. Since this research is a deductive and descriptive type of research and the application as well as the use of this research is good in developing the creative and relative thought. We can apply this research in knowing the Indian perspective and contribution in the world of philosophy. This work is carried out on the knowledge of Indian philosophy and its philosophies and it will help people, students, academicians, researchers, thinkers to develop rational thought about other continental philosophies and interdisciplinary approaches to philosophies. Further this research work can be applied to know other religions, philosophies and different perspective. Prama is valid knowledge. Knowledge can be valid or invalid; valid knowledge is known as aprama. Pramana is valid means of knowledge and its important four means include perception (pratyaska), inference (anumana), verbal testimony (sabda), and comparison (upamana). Different schools of Indian thought accept or reject different ones of these methods. All methods are accepted by mimamsa; only perception, inference and testimony by yoga; only perception and inference by Buddhism and Vaisesika; and only perception by carvaka. According to Carvaka school, pratyaksa or perception is the only source of knowledge; i.e., what cannot be perceived through the senses must be treated as non-existent. They refute all other sources of knowledge. They admit only four elements; i.e., earth, water, air and fire. We experience all the four through perception. So, perception is the only 11

authority. There is no space because we cannot perceive any such element. The world of common sense perception is the only world that exists. Again, the physical body is the self of an individual. There is no mind, no consciousness, no soul, over and above the physical body. We do not perceive mind or soul. Hence they are unreal. Even consciousness is a byproduct and epiphenomenon of matter. ‗matter secretes mind as liver secretes bile.‘ A particular combination of elements produces consciousness through the elements separately do not possess it. it is similar to the red color being produced from the combination of betel leaf, areca nut and lime, none of which is red. Charvaka and Nyaya The Carvakas don't admit the inference as a means of valid knowledge. They argue that if inference is to be regarded as a means of valid knowledge, it must presuppose knowledge about which we can have no doubt and which must be true to reality. But inference cannot fulfill these conditions, because when we infer, for example, the existence of fire on a mountain from the perception of smoke, we take a leap in the dark, from the perceived smoke to the unperceived fire. A logician perhaps will point out that such a leap is justified by our previous knowledge of the invariable relation between smoke and fire, and that the inference stated more clearly would be: all cases of smoke are cases of fire, but the Carvakas refuse it and argue that this contention would be acceptable only if the major premise stating the invariable relation between the middle term "smoke" and the major terms "fire" are beyond doubt. But this invariable relation can be established only if we have knowledge of all cases of smoke. However, this is not possible because we cannot perceive even all the cases of smoke and fire existing in different places all over the world now, to say nothing of those which existed in the past or will exist in the future. So no invariable universal relation can be established by inference. Neither can it be based on another inference, because it will involve a fallacy, since in the case of this inference we should also require another inference to establish it, and so on, and hence would arise the fallacy of an ad infinitum." Also invariable relation cannot be based on testimony of reliable persons who state that all cases of smoke are case of f ire. For the validity of testimony itself requires to be proved by inference. They argue that "we cannot infer by testimony, since we may allege in reply, in accordance with the Vasesika doctrine of Kanada, that this is included in the topic of inference; or else we may hold that this fresh proof of testimony is unable to leap over the old barrier that stopped the progress of inference, since it depends, itself, on the recognition of a sign in the form of the language used in the child's presence by the old man, and moreover, there is no more reason for our believing another's word that smoke and fire are invariably related, than for our receiving the ipse dixit of Manu etc., which, of course, we Carvaka reject"". And again, if testimony are to be accepted as the only means of the knowledge of the universal proposition, then in the case of a man to whom the fact of the invariable relation between the middle and major terms had not been pointed out by another person, there could be no inference of one thing as fire on seeing another thing as smoke; hence, on your own showing, the whole topic of inference for own self would have to end in mere idle words." The Carvakas don't admit any constant class characters like 'smokeness' and `f ireness' which must be invariably present in all instances of smoke and fire respectively. They insist that even if we grant a perception of a relation between smokeness and fireness, we cannot know there from any invariable relation between all individual. If it is possible to infer a particular f ire , we must know that it is inseparably related to the particular smoke. In fact, it is not possible even to know by perception what "smokeness" or the class characters universally present in all particular instances of smoke are, because we do not perceive all cases of smoke that are found to be universally present in the perceived cases of smoke, but may not be present in the unperceived ones.") Moreover, they insist on other counter argument that due to the 12

inherent nature of things that they possess particular characters such as fire is hot and water is cool. No supernatural principle need to be supposed to account for the properties of experienced objects in. nature."' There is neither any guarantee that uniformity perceived in the past would continue in future. We cannot base our knowledge of the invariable relation between smoke and fire on a causal relation between them. Because, a causal relation being only a kind of invariable relation, can not be established by perception owing to the same difficulties"). They point out that a causal or any other invariable relation cannot be established merely by repeated perception of two things occurring together. For one must be certain that there is no other unperceived condition on which this relation depends. If a man perceives a number of times fire accompanied by smoke, and another occasion he infers the existence of fire on the perception of smoke, he would be liable to error, because he failed to notice a condition, namely, the wetness of fuel, in the presence of which alone fire is attended with smoke. So long as the relation between two phenomena is not proved to be unconditional, it is an uncertain ground for inference, and absence of conditions cannot be established beyond doubt by perception, as some conditions may always remain hidden and escape notice. It is true that in our life we very often act unsuspectingly on inference. But that only shows that we act uncritically on the wrong belief that our inference is true. It is a fact that sometimes our inference happens to be true and leads to successful results. But it is also a fact that sometimes leads to error. Truth is not then an unfailing character of all inference , It is only an accident, and a separable one, we find only in some cases. Inference etc. cannot be regarded, therefore, as a valid source of knowledge. Thus they demonstrated a new path to Indian philosophers for new thinking and the evaluation of their doctrines. It may be noted that the contribution of the Carvakas epistemology is not insignificant to other Indian philosophers and it has also helped to make them more logical and rational. The Carvakas view that no inference can yield certain knowledge is the view of many contemporary western thinkers such as the empiricists, pragmatists and logical positivists. Charvaka's philosophy is based on its epistemology which is positivistic. According to it, Perception is the only source of valid knowledge as it is reliable and authentic. All other pramanas like inference, verbal testimony and comparison etc are rejected. Inference is based on Vyapti gyan. but according to charvaka Vyapti gives rise to the fallacy of illicit generalization, petitio principi and infinite regress. So inference cant be accepted as a pramana. Charvakas have refuted verbal testimony as a valid source of knowledge because it is based on the statement of some reliable person/ scripture. And to find a reliable person is based on inference which is not a valid source of knowledge. Comparison is also not accepted as the source of valid knowledge by charvakas. We can find knowledge of similarity through perception so no need of a separate pramana for that. But in process of refuting other pramanas. Charvakas themselves have taken help of inference. Also, accepting that perception always gives reliable and authentic knowledge, leads to the fallacy of illicit generalization. It also limits our scope of knowledge. In this way charvakas have left many a loopholes for criticism and debate in their epistemology. However it enriched Indian philosophy by bringing it out from dogmatism through refutation of transcendental entities in their metaphysics which is the logical outcome of their epistemology. Charvaka philosophy is a positivist philosophy. The whole theory of Charvaka rests on their Theory of 13

Knowledge, where they accept Perception as the only source of valid knowledge. as it provides valid, reliable and authentic knowledge. In defense of Perception, charvakas had refuted other sources of valid knowledge like Inference/Anumana , Shabd Pramana, Causal Theory etc., They believed only perceptual knowledge to be true, limiting the purview of one's knowledge and limiting humans from further scientific developments where Inference is an important tool. e.g., the earth is flat, sun is a smaller place etc. Perception by the five sense organs was accepted to be true knowledge i.e, Eyes, Ears, Nose, Tongue and Skin. Being materialistic, Charvaka Philosophy had refuted the existence of transcendental elements just by Perception thereby drawing criticism. When they refute the existence of transcendental elements because they cannot be perceived, all they were doing is Inferring. b. In the process of refutation of Inference they used Inference, with the statement 'anything that is not perceived, doesn't exist' being the Vyapti Gyan. But by defending their stand on Perception and providing arguments against other Pramanas, he has saved Indian Philosophy from the dogmatic slumber. Carvaka is a positivist in his epistemology and accepts Perception as the only pramana,or valid source of knowledge. Carvaka says that perception always gives us reliable, authentic knowledge unlike other Pramanas. Also, doesn't accept Samanya lakshan perception like Nyaya on the basis of which it explains inference. Carvaka says our perception is ordinary, limited in scope. He refutes inference and, like Hume, says that there is only psychological relationship between perceptions and no logical relationship. He refutes verbal testimony as choosing a reliable person requires inference. He says knowledge of similarity is possible through perception, there is no need to accept separate Upman pramana for it. b. Process of refutation of inference is in itself an inference---- gives arguments in support and infers. Also, Buddhists say it is only through inference he could know that his opponents use inference as a pramana. Jainism says that refutation is in the form of a syllogism (inference). c. Svantantrika, Locke says that sense perceptions only lead to impression on retina, inference needed fro synthesis of knowledge. d. Charvaka inferred non-existence of transcendental entities when he couldn‘t perceive. e. Kant, says, percepts without concepts are blind and concepts without percepts are empty. But, importance of Carvaka can't be undermined. He is the Hume of Indain philosophy and forced other philosophers to give sound arguments for accepting pramanas and transcendental entities enriched the debate in Indian philosophy. In his epistemology, Charvaka recognises perception is the only pramana or dependable source of knowledge. Originally, Charvakas equated perception with visibility but afterwards they widened its scope and maintained five types of perception based on the five senses. Whenever there is a contact between the object & the sense organ, perception takes place. Charvaka defines perception in terms of sense object contact. Charvaka says perception is only reliable, definite & non-erroneous source of knowledge. Giving credence only to perception, Charvaka philosophy repudiates other means of knowledge. Charvaka refutes all other sources of knowledge like inference and testimony, by saying that they are sometimes erroneous & misleading. But sometimes perception also becomes invalid when we usually perceive rope as a snake and it also goes wrong in case of an illusion & hallucination. Moreover while refuting the reality of transcendental entities, Charvaka resorts to inference because when Charvaka was unable to perceive those objects, he infers the non-existence of those entities. So this is kind of self-contradiction.

Going with the Charvaka‘s view considering perception as only valid source of knowledge is to limit our horizon of knowledge. Verbal testimony has assumed increased importance in present scientific & technological world because everybody needs to believe experts of various fields. Also according to Kant, perception is a mere sensation and combination of loose threads of data & we need to ―infer‖ from this data to create useful fabric of knowledge. So a reasonable course would be to consider any source of knowledge as valid as long as it yields knowledge which isn‘t misleading & conforms to established facts. Nyaya philosophy defines perception as: A perceptual cognition arises by means of the connection between sense faculty and object, is not dependent on words, is non-deviating, and is determinate. This sūtra provides four conditions which must be met for cognition to be perceptual. The first, that cognition arises from the connection between sense faculty and object, evinces Nyāya‘s direct realism. It is such connection, the central feature of the causal chain which terminates in perceptual cognition, which fixes the intentionality of a token percept. Uddyotakara enumerates six kinds of connection (sannikarṣa) to account for the fact that that we perceive not only substances, but properties, absences, and so on: (i) conjunction (samyoga), the connection between a sense faculty and an object; (ii) inherence in what is conjoined (saṁyukta-samavāya), the connection between a sense faculty and a property-trope which inheres in an object; (iii) inherence in what inheres in what is conjoined (saṁyukta-samaveta-samavāya), the connection between a sense faculty and the universal which is instantiated in a property-trope; (iv) inherence (samavāya), the kind of connection which makes auditory perception possible; (v) inherence in what inheres (samaveta-samavāya), the connection between the auditory faculty and universals which inhere within sounds; (vi) qualifierqualified relation (viśeṣya-viśeṣaṇa-bhāva), the connection which allows for the perception of inherence and absence in objects. In all cases, the perceptual cognition is born of connection between a sense faculty and an occurrent fact or object. The second condition, that the cognition produced is not dependent on words, has a somewhat complicated interpretive history. Generally, Nyāya holds that ordinary perception involves concept deployment. Therefore, this restriction does not endorse a view held by the Buddhist Dignāga and his followers, that genuine perception is non-conceptual (kalpanā-apodha). Still, the meaning of avyapadeśya is disputed amongst Naiyāyikas. On one reading, this qualification serves the purpose of distinguishing between perceptually and testimonially generated cognitions. The latter also require information provided by the senses but further require the deployment of semantic and syntactic knowledge. An allied reading suggests that while involving the application of concepts, perception of an object is often causally prior to speech acts involving it. The third, ―non-deviating‖ condition blocks false cognitions, like the misperception that an oyster shell is a piece of silver, from the ranks of pramāṇa-born. This is tied to the Nyāya notion that pramāṇas are by definition inerrant, and that false cognitive presentations are not truly pramāṇas but pseudopramāṇas (pramāṇa-ābhāsa). Though we may mistakenly take a pseudo-pramāṇa, like the illusion of a person in the distance, to be the real thing, it is not. ―Perception‖ and similar pramāṇa-terms have success grammar for Nyāya. The fourth, ―determinate‖ condition blocks cognitions which are merely doubtful from the ranks of the pramāṇa-born. Dubious cognitions, like that of a distant person at dusk, do not convey misleadingly false information, but being unclear, they do not properly apprehend the object in question. It could be a person or a post. As such, one neither correctly grasps its character nor falsely takes it to represent accurately a certain object. Later Naiyāyikas, most notably Vācaspati Miśra, read the qualifiers ―notdependent on words‖ and ―determinate‖ disjunctively, in order to say that perception 15

may be non-propositional or propositional. However anachronistic this may be as an interpretation of the Nyāya-sūtra, this division is accepted by later Nyāya. Nyāya admits of certain kinds of extraordinary perception in order to account for cognitive states that are perceptual in character, but distinct from those commonly experienced. They involve modes of sense-object connection other than the six kinds noted above. Later Nyāya (beginning at least with Jayanta) recognizes three kinds of extraordinary perception: (i) yogic perception, (ii) perception of a universal through an individual which instantiates it, and (iii) perception of an object‘s properties as mediated by memory. Yogic perception includes experiential states reported by contemplatives in deep mediation. Their cognitive objects (usually the deep self or God) are taken to be experienced in a direct and unmediated way, but generally without the operation of the external senses. Given their experiential character and their putative agreement with other sources of knowledge like scripture and inference, yogic experiences are prima facie taken to be veridical, produced by non-normal perception. Perception of a universal through an individual which instantiates it is Nyāya‘s response to the problem of induction. Nyāya holds that universals are perceptually experienced as instantiated in individuals (see the third of Uddyotakara‘s six kinds of connection above). But the notion that we may have apprehension of all of the individuals which instantiate a universal, qua their being instantiations of the universal, is further accepted by Nyāya in order to explain how we attain to knowledge of vyāpti, or invariable relation between universals, which undergirds causal regularities of various sorts. Unless one‘s experience of some particular smoke instance as conjoined with a fire instance allows him to experience all instances of smoke qua smoke as being conjoined with all instances of fire qua fire, through the natural tie between the universals smokiness and fieriness, inductive extrapolation would be impossible. Nyāya thus solves the problem of induction by appeal to extraordinary perception. This does not imply that we are always able to recognize such relations. It may take repeated experience for us to notice the ever-present connection. But when such recognition arises, it is due to perceptual experience, not an extrapolative projection of past experience. Perception of the properties of an object mediated by memory involves the visual experience of unpresented properties of an object which is currently seen. Standard examples include seeing a piece of sandalwood as fragrant or seeing a piece of ice as cold. Here, there is a standard kind of sense object connection, but some of the phenomenal features of the experience, while veridical, are not generated by the ordinary connection. They are rather mediated by a special connection grounded in memory. What distinguishes this kind of perception from straightforward inference is that the property in question is experienced with a phenomenal character lacking in inference. This suggests that what may be considered inference for some may take the form of perception for others, depending on their familiarity with the conceptual connection between the properties in question. Nyāya holds that while cognitions reveal or present their intentional objects, they rarely present themselves directly. When they are directly cognized, cognitions are grasped by other, apperceptive cognitions. As apperceptive awareness reveals a cognition along with its predication content or ―objecthood‖ (that is, my cognition of a red truck is apperceptively cognized as having the predication content ―red‖ and ―truck-hood‖), it is practically indefeasible. But, as Gaṅgeśa notes, this indefeasibility does transfer to the content of the original cognition (which is itself object of the apperceptive awareness). I may have mistaken a purple truck for a red truck, forgetting that my eyewear distorts certain colors. Apperception is subsumed by Nyāya into the category of perception. In 16

this case, the operative sense faculty is the ―inner organ‖ (manas) and the object is a cognition conceived of as a property of a self. Gaṅgeśa argues at length with a Prābhākara Mīmāṁsaka (a representative of another leading Hindu school), defending Nyāya‘s version of apperception against the Mīmāṁsā view that each cognition itself has a component of reflectively self-awareness. A few words on manas (the inner organ): Nyaya Sutra argues that the absence of simultaneous cognition from all of the senses indicates the presence of a faculty which governs selective attention. The manas is identified as this faculty, an insentient psychological apparatus which processes the information of the senses. A formulation of perception by the Vaiśeṣika school (Vaiśeṣika-sūtra 3.1.18), accepted by Nyāya, is that it normally consists in a chain of connection between four things: a self and its manas, the manas and a sense organ, and the sense organ and an object. Manas also is the faculty which governs mnemonic retrieval and, as noted above, apperceptive awareness of mental states. Selves, in the Nyāya view, are fundamentally loci of awareness, cognition, and mnemonic dispositions (saṁskāra). But just as they rely on the five senses to experience the world, they rely on manas for the functioning of memory and apperception. Conclusion: The conclusion of this study would be critical in which I have correlated Nyaya philosophers approach of describing perception with the Charavakas concept of perception and will show the different aspects of perception. This world is a multidisciplinary world in which every philosophical concept would be treated as fundamental and rational and these multidisciplinary problems of the humanities science shall be correlated and defined with different types of approaches and understanding. Perception is not only the concepts in which five sense are modeling the world but it is very deep and exploring. Perception is the backbone of the idea of conception. The world of research starts with perception. Still philosophers debates about perception and conception are reviving around the walls of science. Thus perception is very significant and creative concept in Indian philosophy and Charvaka philosophers and Nyaya philosophers lead this concept towards new research path and scientific realm otherwise perception was recognized as only limited to five sense and their sensations. Charvakas and Nyayankas treated theory of perception as matter and everything begins from it. To conclude, we may note that perception is commonly called the jyeṣṭapramāṇa (the ―eldest‖ knowledge source) by Nyāya, since other pramāṇas depend on perceptual input, while perception operates directly on the objects of knowledge. Indeed, Gaṅgeśa suggests the following definition of a perceptual cognition: ―a cognition that does not have another cognition as its proximate instrumental cause.‖ Inference, analogy, and testimony, on the other hand, depend on immediately prior cognitions to trigger their functioning. The normative status accorded to veridical perceptual cognition is primarily a matter of causation and intentionality (viṣayatā). If a cognition is caused by the appropriate causal chain, starting with the contact of a sense faculty and an external object (or, in the case of apperception, the internal organ and an immediately prior cognition), and the cognition produced has an ―object hood‖ or intentionality which accurately targets the object in question, the cognition is veridical and has the status prāmāṇya (pramāṇā-derived).

References: 1. Chatterje, S. & D. Datta. An Introduction to Indian Philosophy. Calcutta: University of Calcutta. 1960. 2. Chatterje, S. Nyaya Theory of Knowledge: A Critical Survey of some Problems of Logic and Metaphysics. Calcutta: University of Calcutta. 1960. 3. Dasgupta , S. N. History of Indian Philosophy. Vol. 1 to 5. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. 4. Hiriyana, M. Outlines of Indian Philosophy. Delhi. Motilal Banarasidas Publishers. 5. Kamal, M. M. (1998). The Epistemology of the Charvaka Philosophy. Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies. Vol. 46, No. 2, P. 1. 6. Max Muller, F. The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy. New York: Longmans. 1928. 7. Potter, Karl. Indian Metaphysics and Epistemology. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1977. 8. Puligandla, Ramakrishna. Fundamentals of Indian Philosophy. New Delhi: D.K. Print World, 2008. 9. Radhakrishnan, S. Indian Philosophy. Vol. 1, Vol. 2. London: George Allan and Unwin Ltd. 10. Raju, P. T. Structural Depth of Indian thought. New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 1985. 11. Sharma, Chandradhar. A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas, 1983. 12. Shaw, J. L. Sources of Knowledge: Perception, Inference and Testimony: Some Contemporary Problems and their Solutions from the Indian Perspective. 13. Tantray, M. A. & Atequllah D. (2016). ―Nature of Philosophy‖, International Journal of Humanities and Social Studies. Vol. 4, Issue 12. 14. Tantray, M. A. & Tariq Rafeeq Khan, Language and Education: A critical approach to Gandhi and Wittgenstein, Lokayata journal of positive philosophy, Sept. 2019, Vol. X, (02), 68-74. 15. Tantray, M. A. (2015). ―The nature of universal proposition (Udharana) with special reference to Nyaya logic‖, International Journal of Social Science & Management Studies. Vol-3- no- 2, pp, 8-15 16. Tantray, M. A. (2016). ―Proposition: The foundation of logic‖, International Journal of Social Studies and Humanities Invention. Vol-3, Issue-2, pp-1841-1844. 17. Tantray, M. A. (2018)., Reason, authority and consciousness: An analytical approach to Religious pluralism, International Journal of Creative Research Thoughts, 6 (1), 832-834.

Impact of Yogic Practices on Classical Vocal Music Nibedita Sabat

Abstract Veda means knowledge and this knowledge is directly related to God. Among the four Vedas, Samaveda is the Veda of songs. Singing is directly related to emotional-sensation or expression of feelings. Any stream of knowledge is expressed through three mediums: prose, poetry and song. Poetry was found to have more capacity for expression and upliftment than in prose, and when this poetry was added to the song, the flow of emotion was more complete. When the poetic hymns of the Vedas were animated in the form of singing, the Samaveda was formed. That is why, in the Bhagavad Gita, Shri Krishna has revealed the dignity of Samaveda by saying "Among the Vedas I am Samaveda". It expresses that, by understanding the Samaveda, one can realize the Supreme Consciousness. Singing leads us directly to self-realization. Indian classical music which is one of the oldest forms of music is sung in the form of ragas and khayals to express emotions. Knowing the characteristics of music, everyone should give it a place in their life and yoga activities can prove to be helpful in this. Yoga Vidya, whose origin is considered to be the Vedas, is also helpful in our self-realization. The practices of yoga not only have a spiritual effect on man, but they also help in his all-round development. It is a complete science as well as an art, which is directly or indirectly related to other genres of the Indian tradition, of which Indian classical music is one. Keywords: Indian classical music, Yoga, Mind, Voice, Omkar, Pranayama

Introduction: Yoga and classical vocal music are the lofty ancient lore of India. Although we can find the main source of these lores in Vedas but the truth is that they existed even before Vedas. Yoga and music are directly related to human nature. Music is related to emotion and its expression and Yoga is related to the human mind. The purpose of Yoga and music is to live a happy and healthy life and they are the means to reach the Supreme Being. Therefore, yoga and music have parallel concept and they are complementary to each other. Music is an easy path for practicing meditation which purifies our thought. Yoga in particular helps in achieving the best purpose of music by enhancing the endurance of body and mind which in turn, enhances the skill of music. According to Pythagoras, "Music is the remedy of many mental diseases and philosophy is the greatest music".

Music is most beautifully described as the, ―Ornamentation of silence with swaras‖. Swami ChinmayanandaSaraswati When we sing or listen to good music our mind goes into silence or meditation. Satvik music alone will take the person to God. This type of music is God inspired, devotional, fresh, ever new in every moment. So, it is beautiful and there is no artificiality in it. It neither decays or degenerate nor does it become old or boring. The beauty of music is such that it melts our heart and fills it with noble sentiments. Thus, music is undoubtedly a form of Sadhana. Musicians seeking salvation will have to take up music in the spirit of 'work-worship' with widely accepted motto of Satyam-Shivam-Sundaram (that is truth lies in grace and beauty). Music makes our life God centred and so it leads us to Satyam, Shivam and Sundaram (which is beautiful). |4

According to Sangeeta Ratnakar, "Music is the combination of three fine arts namely: singing (vocal), playing instruments (instrumental) and dance. In fact, these three arts are independent of each other, but despite being independent, instrumental music is based on songs and dance is based on instrument music. So, the vocal music (gayan) is main among all. | |5 It means dance is based on instrument and instrument is based on songs. Therefore, in these three arts, singing has been given priority. Indian music is one of the most ancient and most difficult art- forms which is expressed in terms of Raga. Raga also includes alap, dhrupad, dhamar, khayal, tappa and thumri. Each Raag is a connected series of sweet-sounding musical notes ascending and descending with the Octave which form the basis of all Indian melodies. These notes are Sa-Re-Ga-Ma-Pa-Dha-Ni. Raga is: what pleases, excites, entertains and elevates. This definition is more or less valid for any kind of music, because in essence all music is the sound that entertains and elevates. So, Indian classical vocal music needs a lot of patience, regular practice and some qualities in practitioner such as devotion, sincerity, dedication, having allegiance, having a pure mind, loving heart

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and deep concentration. The practitioner should be capable of holding his breath for a long time and can sit in a proper position for some time. Ashtanga Yoga, Yama, Niyam, Asan, Pranayama, Pratyahara, Dharana, Dhyana, Samadhi all these are the parts of Yoga.6 In addition to the Abhyaasa and Vairagya the two major tools and Kriya Yoga described by Maharshi Patanjali are applicable to all situations in life and very effective in enhancing the skill of practitioner both in the fields of yoga and music. The practice whether it is Yoga or music has to be continuous in sincerity. The Vairagya, that is detachment, which is more essential in today's life by avoiding irregular routine, and bad food habits comes by practicing Yoga and devoting time to music. Yama and Niyama lead people to become good human beings. If one follows Yama and Niyama regularly one learns to appreciate the good in others. When we see only the positive side of people, we look at them with appreciation and then we are able to recognise and admire their qualities of singing and expressing ourselves freely. Singers who are encouraged can sharpen their skills and become talented. Singers need to be philanthropes in order to attract a large audience and to spread their talent among others. Yamas are set of five ethical practices which help us get along in society and within our relationship. Ahimsa (nonviolence), Satya(truthfulness), Asteya (non-stealing), Brahmacharya (self-restraint) and Aparigraha (nonattachment). These observances are recommended to produce a comparatively peaceful condition of the mind, which is the prerequisite for the practice of yoga and music. Ahimsa is interpreted as nonviolence or non-harming towards self or others as well as includes more subtle form of violence such as negative thoughts, language and action directed at the self or others. Art is killed by critics. High self-criticism found among singers, musicians and other artists prevents them from expressing themselves. People shy away from producing original works of art. By cultivating ahimsa, the performing artists are able to establish a healthy relationship with the self and others. In case of satya (truthfulness), it not only means saying the truth only but also giving up an act of deceit or idea of deceiving. For a musician cultivating satya leads him to maintain a good character without involving in deceit and fraud and this may be pertinent in terms of being authentic and honest with themselves and their art about their motivations and limitations. This leads to vairagya which is essential in practising Yoga. Asteya means non-stealing is not limited to actual purloining of things from others which rightly does not belong to oneself. Even an intention or desire to possess things belonging to others is a mental steya

6P.Y.S (2:29)

that is stealing. Instances of verbal stealing are not unknown. The plagiarism often practised by writers and speakers is an example of this. More often than not even compositions, tunes and lyrics are copied and presented in the guise of original music, a practice which has been followed since ages. The word Brahmacharya is made up of two words: Brahma is the highest reality and charya means mode of behaviour. Thus, the basic and broad meaning of Brahmacharya is a mode of behaviour which will be conducive for reaching the highest goal for the spiritual practitioner and in the same way for the music practitioner. Aparigraha refers to the non-greed and cultivation of nonattachment. This means training the mind to experience neither the loss or lack of anything. The sadhaka should sincerely strive to reduce his needs to the bare minimum and should completely avoid the tendency to collect and hoard thingsand stop hoarding the mind with unnecessary thinking. So, cultivating Aparigraha may lead the musician to produce more creative music through his clear, positive mind and a non-greedy, selfless attitude. The second limb of yoga is Niyama (rule of behaviour) having five observances. Saucha(cleanliness), Santosh(contentment), Tapa(austerities), Swadhyaya (one‘s own study) and Ishwarapranidhan (pujan with surrender). Saucha refers to the purification of body and mind. And it is very important for a practitioner to relieve the mind from stress, anxiety, conflicts and its negative emotions like anger, frustration, fear, hatred, passion, greed, delusion and pride. Saucha shows the importance of self-care which cultivates a healthy body and mind which is also needed for a singer to make a perfect voice quality by cleaning the vocal cord and the disturbances of the mind. Santosha(contentment) is a mental attitude in which one should be satisfied with whatever one has gained or lost or whether one is victorious or defeated in any phase of life. Similarly in music there is a lot of competition among singers and musicians. They compare themselves with others and look for faults in their own singing or the songs of others. This comparison is often an obstacle in the practice of music. So, one should observe Santosh in their pursuit of music and constantly try to improve their own skill. Tapa, Swadhyay and Ishwar pranidhan leads to Kriya Yoga. Tapa means austerity: that which cleanses. The best way to practise Tapa means good food habits and by practicing this one can clean any system of body. Just as in yoga, Tapas is necessary in music too. We can thus clean our vocal cords and give a distinct lilt to the music being rendered. Swadhyay means analysing oneself which is an essential part of music making it soulful. Ishwarapranidhana is to surrender oneself to the Supreme and singing with the Lord Almighty in mind our soul is lifted to bliss and the music resonates in hearts and minds of all people who listen to it. 22

|7 Any posture of the body, which can be maintained steadily for a long time, is comfortable and makes one feel good is called Asana according to Patanjali Yoga Sutra. The yogic postures are helpful in building endurance in musicians and creating a balance between body and mind specially during some stressful conditions which impact the comfort of a singer either by increasing heart rate or the breathing level on the stage. This may happen in an audition, or in juries. Yogic practices allow the musician to recalibrate his mind and helps to breathe through stressful conditions. The Yogic postures strengthen the abdominal muscles and these abdominal muscles are responsible for controlling and regulating our voice. Breathing is most important for singing. Properly coordinated breathing mechanism takes an important role in a vocal technique. Basic mechanism of respiration is an essential starting point for the singers as it is much important to control the voice because one has to put out exactly the amount of breath one needs for producing sound. So, exhalation controls the quality of the sound, volume of the sound and partially controls the pitch and the tone of the sound. And our exhalation depends upon our inhalation. And breathing is an autonomous activity of our body that we can also control to some extent by giving a conscious attention to it and can channelize it the way we want. And this activity is known as Pranayama, which is a conscious awareness of breath. For singing we need more breath, than the breath we need for the survival. So, for the better performance in singing, one should practice Yogic Pranayama because the better our breath the better will be our voice quality tone, pitch and range. According to Maharshi Patanjali Pranayama is, the break in the regular rhythmic movement of inhalation and exhalation when being seated in Yogic Asana is known as Pranayama as in this sutra, :

:|8

Here the word 'Prana' originally stands for a subtle, fundamental, ultimate life-force, in a practical way this force is most closely linked to and represented by respiration. The last three parts of Ashtanga Yoga is called Antaranga sadhana. And they are Dharana, Dhyana and Samadhi. Samadhi is fixing our mind on a spot within a limited sphere. The ability to focus all the minds attention towards one thing is the dhyana and is absolutely necessary, if the practitioner is to reach the state of samadhi. A concentrated mind cannot be distracted and for a singer it is necessary to concentrate upon the bhava (emotion), lyrics, scale and the modulation of the song to give a better performance. 7P.Y.S (2:46)

8 P.Y.S 2:49 23

Samadhi which is the last part and can be called as the goal of Yoga which is the union with God. And it is true that if we pursue our art with devotion, dedication and faith then, the art will convert into Yoga itself and leads us to God. And in the same way this is also happening with a singer who really feel oneness with God and sings to please God who can produce a real voice which reaches everyone's heart. Here I want to add a talk between the Mughal emperor Akbar and the great musician Tansen. Once Akbar asked Tansen, "your Guru, Hari Baba ji sings so beautifully". Why cannot you sing like him? Tansen replied, I will never able to sing like my Guru because he sings to please God but I am singing to please you. So, my Guru's music is God inspired. It is devotion that takes the person to God. Conclusion: The core of the Indian voice culture lies in the sound of Omkar, which is the soul of Indian civilization and culture. When a child cries, its sound is hoarse but at the time of happiness its same voice becomes melodious. The centre of hoarse voice and sweet voice is in its brain which keeps on conducting itself effortlessly. So, if we sing without stress, then surely it will be melodious. If the sound is the symbol of our mind, then our mind is also the symbol of sound.And to make our mind stress free, then yoga is the best remedy. Hence, we have seen, Yoga is holistic by nature in itself and is able to give its advantages in the field of music too. Yoga practice improves all the qualities needed for a singer especially when someone learning music and this is true that a good singer is always pursuing to get more knowledge in music and continuing to learn how to polish his voice to make it more melodious, tuneful, euphoric and harmonic for a better performance. And Yogic practices are helpful to enhance all these qualities of a classical vocalist in order to bring beauty in their singing. References: 1-

Singha Vijay Prakash (2014), An Introduction To Hindustani Classical Music, forward by a ShyamBenegal, Typeset in Cochin LT Std by Roli Books Pvt. Ltd. Printed at Devtech Printers Pvt Ltd, The Lotus Collection An imprint of Roli book Pvt. Ltd, M- 75, Greater Kailash, 2market, New Delhi 110048, ISBN: 978-81-7436-919-2, Page- 3 ,5

Bhat Jayashree Thatte (2009), Hindustani Vacal Music(hv), Shakti Malik, Abhinav Publication, E- 37 Hauz Khas, New Delhi-110016, ISBN NO. 81-7017-500-3, page no. 15, 16

Karambelkar, Dr.P.V, Patanjala Yoga Sutra, Printed at ACE enterprises, pune-411029, and Published by O.P.Tiwari, Secretary Kaivalyadhama, 117, Valvan, Lonavala 410403, page no.287,298.

Dasgupta S.N, Yoga Philosophy In Relation To Other System Of Indian Thought, printed in India by Jainendradra Prakash Jain at Shri Jinendra press Motilal Banarsidasspublishers Private Limited, Bungalow Road Delhi- 110007, ISBN: 81-208-0917-3, page no.330,331

Swami Kuvalayananda, Pranayama, Printed by Ace Enterprises, (first published January 1931,and tenth edition April 2005) Madhu- Raj Nagar, 137/A, Paud Road, Pune-410038, ISBN:81-902803-6-8, Pageno-124

Tejomayananda Swami, Swara to Ishwara, (first edition 2010, second edition 2011), Printed by Unik

printers

pvt.Ltd.

Mumbai,

Published

by Central

Chinmaya

Mission

Trust,

SandeepanySadhanalaya, Saki ViharRoad,Mumbai 400072, India, page no.3. 7-

Vakta Narayan, (2008), Humare Sangeetkar, Agrawal Printing press, Moujpur, Delhi, Published by Pustak mahal, J-3/16, Dariyaganj, New Delhi-110002, Page no.11

Vasant, 2007(26th edition), Sangeet Visharad, Prakashak Sangeet Karayalay, Hathras-204 101(U.P), Published by Sangeet Karyalaya, Hathras, Page no.- 33, 600.

Bose Sushil, 1990, Indian Classical Music (Essence and Emotion), Printed at Sanjeev Offset, Vikas Publishing House Pvt.Ltd, Delhi ISBN-0-7069-4943-9. Page no.15 to 17, 20, 26.

Impact of Buddhist Philosophy on Odia Language and Literature: An Appraisal Manoranjan Dwibedy The history of Buddhist philosophy commensurate with the Lord Buddha at Bodhgaya, India in th

6 century BCE. He has been named in Sanskrit as Sakyamuni Buddha. Sakyamuni Buddha had preached his teachings in Pali language. Pali was the language of common people in 6 th century BCE till the arrival of Kushanas in 1st century BCE. Pali is a literarally language of Prakrit family1. This is the reason why we are getting inscriptions of the Mauryan king Ashoka in Brahmi script and Prakrit language. After the Kalinga War of 261 BCE, Asoka, the great emperor of Magadha popularised Buddhism and made all out efforts for spread of this new faith even to lands beyond the boundaries of the present Indian subcontinent. The use of the Brāhmī alphabet for commercial or administrative purposes during the reign of Asoka and the possibility that Kharosothī or even Aramaic might have been used sometimes for diplomatic or commercial activities as is known from the distribution of Asokan Edicts throughout the sub-continent2. From the time of Asoka onwards, the Buddhist texts could have been written down; this is not to say that anywhere. Buddhist ideas only have been preserved by a process of memorization and oral recitation up to the advent of the Mauryan king Asoka. And it is highly probable, if not certain, that they continued for the most part to be so preserved for some time after this too3. Since Sanskrit including the Vedic language had little impact and influence on the spoken language of the people inhabiting this land, the two rival kingdoms of Magadha and Kalinga were nonAryan and non-Brahminical for many centuries as a result of which Jainism and Buddhism flourished side by side in these two kingdoms. Gautam Buddha got enlightenment and preached his new philosophy in Magadha. Later, this new ‗Anti-Vedic religion´ having rebellious attitude towards VedicKarmakandas spread into Kalinga4. The spread of Buddhism through these languages enriched the literature of India. Sakyamuni Buddha used several languages for spreading his teachings. But the scripture of early Buddhism, namely the Pali Tripitaka has been preserved in organized form particularly in Sri Lanka. Ven. Mahinda, a pupil of Tissa Moggaliputa and brother (or son) of Emperor Asoka said to have brought Buddhism and Buddhist texts to Ceylon5. Here, mention may be made of the opinion of one renowned scholar Oldenburg. He says in the introduction of Vinaya Pitaka that ―Buddhism was not introduced to Ceylon by Mahinda as related in Singhalese chronicles, but spread gradually over the Island from neighbouring Kalinga land and that Pali is the language of the Kalinga land. However, he admitted that no proof of this‖6. But some material culture discovered in Odisha recently substantiate the opinion once Oldenburg had made which needs a separate discussion. However, kernel of historical truth is visible in his remark. Now archaeological and epigraphical 26

sources can usually be dated with some confidence, but also, according to Schopen, because they tell us what actually happened as opposed to the fictions invented by the composers of the texts. These texts supposed to have been handed down at first orally until under the Singhalese king Vattagamini, in the first century BCE, these were committed to writing. The Tripitaka or the three baskets was codified in Pali language and brought into the written form by this king7. The native place of Pali language was North-Western India; and with the advent of Buddhism, the people there adopted the Pali language which become a Lingua Franca (common language) among the Buddhist monks of South Asian counties8. Then, there is persistent confusion as to the relation of Pali to the Vernacular spoken in the ancient kingdom of Magadha, Bihar. The term ―Pali‖ literally signifies ―line or ―canonical text‖. This name for the language seems to have its origins in commentarial traditions, where in the ―Pali‖ was distinguished from the commentary or vernacular translation that followed it in the manuscript. In relation this, the book ―Buddhist India‖ written by T.W. Rhys Davids and the book‖ Pali Literature and Language‖ written by Withelm Geigar explain that Pali may have originated as a form of a lingua franca or common language of culture used among the people in Northern India as dialects at the time of Buddha and employed by him9. Many scholars hold that Pali was Old Magadhī (eastern), but took on western forms as the empire grew west10 (per Buddhaghosa, Geiger, Childers). Others highlight the fact that the Buddha was born and educated in Kosala and would have spoken Koslan - also a great province though later eclipsed by Magadha11 (per Rhys Davids, Winternitz). Still others have suggested: Kaliṅga (southeast, per Oldenberg, Muller & Barua), Taxila (northwest, per Grierson), Vindhya (central, per Konow), Ujjain (central-west, per Franke, Westergaard and Kuhn) as Mahinda‘s mother tongue was the language of Ujjain; Kauśāmbī (central-east, per de La Vallée Poussin) or Avanti (western central; per Lamotte)12. Many Theravada sources refer to the Pali language as ―Magadhan― or the ―language of Magadha‖. This identification first appears in the commentaries and may have been an attempt by Buddhists to merge themselves more closely with the Mauryans13. It had been found that the Buddha taught in several closely related dialects of Middle Indo-Aryan, which had a very high degree of mutual intelligibility. There is one attested dialect of middle Indo-Aryan with all the features of Pali. It has some relevance with both the Ashokan inscriptions at Girnar in the west of India, and at Hattigumpha, Bhubaneswar, Odisha in the East. After Buddha‘s Nibbana (Nirbana), several councils were found among Buddhists. Among them, the important ones were the first councils at Rajagrha, the second at Vaisali and the third at Patiliputra. But according to the report of the chronicles of Ceylon, a real canon of sacred texts was compiled probably only during the third council, which took place at the time of the famous king Ashoka.14 Besides, the language of Buddha‘s ―Tipitaka ―Can scarcely be the same as of canon of the third century BCE. Buddha himself spoke the dialect of his native province Kosala which 27

was almost similar with the dialect that he first began to proclaim his doctrine15. In the Pali-Canon of the Buddhist Tripitaka, most of the speeches and addresses were attributed to Buddha himself. But of all these, what really originated from Buddha can perhaps be hardly ever decided. Although none of the works belonging to the Buddhist literature might have originated from the time of Buddha, individual texts contained in these works may be considered as the words of Buddha. Among the early disciples of Buddha, there were also certainly some excellent scholars and some of them might be the authors of a few of the speeches, sayings and poems found among our collections.5 Almost the whole of the earliest literature of the Buddhists consists of collections-that is- collection of speeches or dialogues, of sayings, songs, stories and rules of the holy order. It is evident that the collection of Tripitaka is nothing but a large collection of such collections. Buddhist Tripitaka was categorised into three ways, such as Vinayapitaka, Suttapitaka and Abhidhammapitaka. That to Vinayapitaka was read by disciple Anand when the Buddha departed. It deals with the code of conduct of Buddhist monks. Suttapitaka deals with the Buddhist religion and the prose. Abhidhammapitaka was created in the Fourth Council when Buddhists were divided into Hinayana and Mahayana16. All these texts were compiled in Pali language. Mahabivasha was another collection of Buddhism which was compiled in Sanskrit. Similarly, the other collection of Buddhism were ‗Sariputta Prakarana‘, ‗Vajra Suchi‘ and ‗Sutralankara‘, which were also compiled in Sanskrit. As a result, the literature also flourished due to rise of Buddhism. Gautam Buddha always conveyed his ideas using simple languages. Initially he used Prakrit language. Later on, he started using Pali language with the gradual march of time, Sanskrit became the medium of preaching Buddhism17. During Kaniska‘s time, the Buddhist monastics had preached the massage and teachings of Buddha in Sanskrit. Sanskrit became the languages most probably after the Kushans in first century BCE/CE but the legacy of oral spoken language in Sanskrit was very much in vogue since the Vedic age around middle of 2nd millennium BCE18. In this way language and literature developed due to the rise of Buddhism. The writings on the pillars and rocks give us an insight about the script of the period, which was Brahmi-which later became the basis for many northern languages like Gujarati, Marathi, Hindi, Bengali, etc. The Impact of Buddhism has deeply affected every aspect of Odishan culture and religion. That to, the basic Philosophy of Buddhism was to abandon the limits of lift in terms of addiction to worldly gratification or a lift of painful austerity along with self –mortification. Buddhism was mainly concentrated in the awareness that life is temporary and so as the sorrow. It also teaches us where sorrow and change prevail and the idea of an immortal or Permanent Soul is meaningless. This short Buddha‘s teaching not only impacts sanctity in the mind of Odishan Buddhist followers but also creates great renaissance in the mind of common people in Odisha. We are getting good number of Dharnai mantras written in sanskritised form about 6th-7th century from the Udayagiri-Ratnagiri-Lalitgiri Buddhist sites19.

Bharata Muni composed Natya Shashtram which belongs to second century CE (some scholars place Natya Shashtram, composed in 2nd century BCE.). In Natya Shastram there is reference of Udra Bibhasha which was then the mother tongue of the majority of the people of Udra Bhukhanda (Udra Desha/ Udra Land). Gradually, what happened the Kalinga Palli of Hatigumpha inscription and Magadhi Prakrit of Ashokan edicts amalgamated with locally spoken dialect (if any and possibility is on affirmative side) to emerge as Udra Bibhasha, most probably. No literature in Udra Bibhasha is forthcoming and available at present except a few lines/ sentences available in Prakrita Vyakarana (grammar) namely Prakrita Sarvaswat of Markendeya Dasa20. The use of Odia words can be seen in the 7th -century palm leaf manuscripts. Buddhist and Doha texts from Nepal, such as Yogindra Dandadhua (Doha) and body language hymns, are written in ancient Odia. Written by the Buddhist Acharya, this charyasahitya is the destination of the ancient Odia words. ‗Dev Kahi Bhakti Karun Bolanti Vho Kumar Sheen‘ in an 8th century inscription of Maharajas from Bhadrak is a self-contained Odia word written in Odia21. The role of Tantric philosophical tenets of Buddhism was intensely felt in the socio-religious culture and literature of Odisha. Among the important Tantric literature mention may be made of Janansiddhi of Indrabhuti, Advyasiddhi of Laksminkara and Cakra Sambara Tantra of Pitopada.22 In later period many Siddhachaayas appeared and composed several Ganas and Dohas to expound the tenents of Tantric Buddhism. The beginnings of Odia poetry coincide with the development of Charyapada or Charyagiti, a literature started by poets of Vajrayanist Buddhist in around 12th-13th century CE. This literature was written with a certain metaphor called "Sandhya Bhasha", and some of its poets like Luipa and Kanhupa came from the same territory as present day Odisha. The language of Charya was considered to be Parkrit.23 The origin of the Odia literature can be traced to ―Bauddha Gana O Doha―, otherwise known as Charyapada written by the Buddhist Siddhas of Odisha24. The Odia language begins to appear in inscriptions with Odia scripts in temples, copper plates, palm-leaf manuscripts, etc. (7th century). The earliest use of prose can be found in the Madalapanji or the Palm-leaf Chronicles of the Jagannatha temple at Puri, which date back to the 12th century25. Several Kaalpanika (imaginative) and Pauraanika (Puranic) Kavyas, many Chautishas (a form of Odia poetry). The famous ones being Milana Chautisha, Mandakini Chautisha, Barshabharana Chautisha, Rasakulya Chautisha which were composed during this time around 17th century26. Sarala Dasa refers Jagannatha as a Buddha frequently in his Mahabharat. According to him Jagannath has assumed the shape of Buddha to liberate the people of the world from bondage. 29

―Samsara janaku tariva nimante Buddha rupe vijaya karichanti Jagannath‖ Five Odia poets emerged during the late 15th and early 16th centuries: Balaram Dasa, Atibadi Jagannath Das, Achyutananda Das, Anata Das, and Josabanta Das. Although they wrote over a span of one hundred years they are collectively known as the "Panchasakhas", since they adhered to the same school of thought, Utkaliya Vaishnavism27. The Panchasakhas were Vaisnavas by thought. In 1509, Sri Chaitanya came to Odisha with his Vaishnava message of love. The great Vaisnava poet, Jayadeva, earlier had prepared the ground for Vaishnavism through his Gita Govinda. Chaitanya's path of devotion was known as Raganuga Bhakti Marga. He introduced chanting as a way to make spiritual connection and taught the importance of Hare Krishna mantra. Unlike Chaitanya, the Panchasakhas believed in Gyana Mishra Bhakti Marga, similar to the Buddhist philosophy of Charya literature stated above28. The Panchasakhas were significant not only because of their poetry but also for their spiritual legacy. In the holy land of Kalinga (Odisha) several saints, mystics, and devotional souls have been born throughout history, fortifying its culture and spiritualism. The area uniquely includes temples of Shakti, Shiva and Jagannatha Vishnu. Several rituals and traditions have been extensively practised here by various seers, including Buddhist ceremonies, Devi "Tantra" (tantric rituals for Shakti), Saiva Marg and Vaisnava Marga. The Odia poetry owes its origin to the Charyapadas, a form of Buddhist mystical verses, composed presumably in the tenth century CE. The Mahabharata of saint poet Sarala Das, written in the fifteenth century, clearly shows that Odia had already matured as a language and became the fit medium for a stable literature. Medieval Odia poetry, composed between the fourteenth and eighteenth centuries, consisted mostly of kavya (romantic/narrative poems), Puranas (narrative

poems with

themes borrowed from the Ramayana, the Mahabharata, the Bhagabata and folklore), Bhajanas (devotional poems), Champus, Chastises and Chhandas (poetic forms with a variety of themes). Medieval poets mostly depended on the Royal Court and the folk performers for popularizing their work among the masses. One of the important contributions made by Buddhists to the literature were the Dhoas or Gitis (songs) composed by Buddhist Siddhas in apabhramsa29. The 84 Siddhas were responsible for the popularisation of tantric Buddhism in India and Tibet. All these Siddhas belong to Odisha, Bengal and Assam of Eastern India. Some Siddhacharayas like Sarhapada, Nagarjunapada, Sabaripada, Luipada, Bajraghanta, Kambalapada. Indrabhuti, Padmasambhava, Santarakshita ,Lakshmikara., Birupapada, Kanhupada, Darikapada, Vusukapada and Pitopada. They were the great learned Pandits and had their 30

education in the Buddhist centres of Nalanda, Sriparvata (Nagarjunikonda), Ratnagiri etc30. They were the propagators of Charyagitika, Shaja, Sunya, Tathata, Karuna, Sahajachita etc. Thus for quite a long time Odisha was reeled under spell of Buddhism and its impact was seen in every aspect of the society so as on literature as discussed. References: 1. M. Winternitz, trans by V.S. Sarma, 1983, A History of Indian Literature, Vol. II, Delhi, Motilal Banarasi Dass, pp. 9-10. 2. R.Thapar, 1997, Asoka and the Decline of Mauryas, New Delhi, Oxford University Press .p,225. 3. L.S. Cousins, 2013, ‗Early Development of Buddhist Language and Literature in India‘, Journal of the Oxford Centre for Buddhist Studies, 5, pp. 89–135 4. K.C.Panigrahi,1981, History of Orissa, Cuttack, Kitab Mahal p.212. 5. K.L. Hazara,1994, Pali Language and Literature, (rpt) vol.II, Delhi, D.K. Print World. 6. Ibid. 7. Steven Collins,1990, ‗On the very idea of the Pali Canon‘. JPTS 15 (1990) pp. 89-126 8. Norman, K. R.,1983 Pāli literature: including the canonical literature in Prakrit and Sanskrit of all the Hīnayāna schools of Buddhism, ed. J. Gonda (A History of Indian Literature, vol. vii, fasc.2 ); Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz). 9. Alexander Wynne,2006, ‗The Historical Authenticity of Early Buddhist Literature A Critical Evaluation‘, Vienna Journal of South Asian Studies, Bd. XLIX/2005, pp.35-70 10. L.S. Cousins,2013, ‗Early Development of Buddhist Literature and Language in India‘ in JOCBS,2013(5) pp.89-139. 11. Ibid 12. Ibid 13. Alexander Wayman, Op.cit 14. Ibid 15. A..K.Warder,1970 (2015,rpt) Indian Buddhism, New Delhi, Motilla Banarsidas, p.11. 16. Ibid. 17. M. Winternitz, op.cit, pp. 253-54 18. J.K.Nariman,1920, Literary History of Sanskrit Buddhism, Bombay, D.B.Taraporevala, p.6. 19. S.K.Patnaik, 2021, Buddhist Heritage of Odisha (3rd Edn), Bhubaneswar, Mayur Publications. 20. Kapila Vatsysyan,. Bharata: The Natyasastra. New Delhi: Sahitya Akademi, 2001. 21. K.C. Panigrahi , op.cit 22. Karuna .Kara,1969, Ascharya- Charjya Chaya, Odisha Sahita Academy ,Bhubaneswar

23. R.P.Mishra, 1991, Sahajayana –A Study of Tantric Buddhism, Calcutta, Punthi Pustak, pp.135136. 24. Khageswar Mahaaptra,1965, Charjya Giti, Cuttack, J.Ratha Publications. 25. Artaballabh Mohanty, ( rpt. 2020), Madalpanji, Odisha Sahitya Academy, Bhubaneswar. 26. K.C.Panigrahi, op.cit. 27. K. C.Pradhan,1999, Boudha Dharma O Odia Sahitya (Odia),Cuttack, Sudha Prakashan. 28. R.P.Panigrahi, 2017,History of Ancient Odia Literature, New Delhi, Abhijit Publications. 29. S.B.Dasgupta , 1976, Obscure Religious Cult, Culcutta, K.L. Mukhopadhyay; (3rd edition) p.52 30. S.K.Patnaik, 2021, Buddhist Heritage of Odisha (3rd Edn), Bhubaneswar.

Acknowledgement I am very much thankful to the authorities of Odisha State Museum, Utkal University of Culture and OIMSEAS allowing me to use their library and extend my gratitude to Dr. S.K.Patnaik who have supervised the at all levels while preparing the article.. ……………………………………………………………………………………………

Cosmopolitanism and Plurality of Culture Lalruatfela & Temjenkala Jamir Kant in his ‗Perpetual Peace‘ says, ―The idea of cosmopolitan right is therefore not fantastic and overstrained; it is a necessary complement to the unwritten code of political and international right, transforming it into a universal right of humanity‖.9 This paper tries to assess the idea of perpetual peace and the reason why cosmopolitan right is not fantastic or an ideal imagination. It tries to show that, from Kant argument, how Perpetual Peace and cosmopolitanism is the destiny of humanity and how the argument is sound and validated by the present condition of the world. The article also argues that the burden to solve the possible conflicts between cultures falls on those who criticized Kant‘s notion of perpetual peace. Keywords: Cosmopolitanism, perpetual peace, plurality of cultures, humanity, freedom. Scholars have dwell upon the concept of International state as conceived by Kant. There has been disagreement regarding what it means: Is it a federation of state or state of states? What are their differences? Kant compared nations to individuals who has formed a contract to leave war and savage life. The state of war which prevents the world from having a peace in perpetuity can be abolished only after the federation of states joined together to formed a nation10. For Kant this is the only rational way to have perpetual peace. But, he does not assure that this is a guarantee of peace. In this paper, we will not dwell upon whether perpetual peace is feasible or not. We will rather try to show why it is the destiny of mankind if there should be a solution to global conflict. This essay is a study of Kant‘s idea of perpetual peace with special reference to ‗cosmopolitanism‘. It tries to show that cosmopolitanism is feasible even though there are multiple cultures with different values and lifestyle. Kant in the first section of Perpetual Peace mentioned how states should maintain peace and trust between themselves which comprised seven articles. These seven articles contain prohibition which nation should not do. When there is refraining from these acts nations can talked about and move towards perpetual peace. In the second section there are three articles which nations must do to achieve perpetual peace. I will dwell into these three articles in the following with the assumption that the first section articles are adhered to by the nations. I will try to clarify the meaning of cosmopolitan right and the reason why it is essential in achieving perpetual peace and why it is the destiny of nations.

9 Kant, Immanuel. 2009. “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch.” In An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?, by Immanuel Kant , 12-66. London: Penguin., p. 31. 10 Ibid., p. 28.

The first of the article which nations must follow is that the constitution of every state should be republican. According to Kant republic is the appropriate political system in attaining perpetual peace. A republican constitution is founded upon three principles: freedom of every citizen, every citizen is a subject of a (Kant 2009) common legislation and equality of every citizen under the rule of law. In the law of the republic the territories and the office within the state are not owned by any individual, but by the collective. The prospect of war is lesser in republican constitution as the responsibility falls upon the collective citizen. The toll of war affected all the citizens, which is not in the interest of the citizen. So, the decision makers, which are the citizen, will stand together against going to war. But, this is not the case in other forms of government where the head of the state or the decision maker is not the citizen. The owner of the state does not care about the effect of war, because it does not affect him directly. Here, the assumption is that war has a bad effect on the loser and winner. Where one is sure to win it is very easy for one to go to war, and without much cost on him/her or his/her family. So, the decision maker should be the citizen who will experience the effect of war. Kant made it clear that a republican form of government, where there is separation between the legislative power and executive power is the only form of government which can achieve perpetual peace. Kant criticizes democratic form of government where every citizen can dream of having power. This means that the prospect of power corrupts people and clouded their reason. Kant took as an example, Frederick II, where he said that he is a servant of the state. For, Kant, this kind of attitude is not possible when everyone is fighting for power. So, the best form of government is the one which is capable of attaining peace and has the smaller number of ruling persons and who represents the largest interests of the citizen. Kant is concerned with the representative system which can be almost equated with the republican form of government where the ruler or rulers of the state represent the interest of the citizen in every matter. The best form of government for him is the one which represent the interest of the citizen, but he does not say that democracy is better than autocracy. As long as any republican form of government represent the interest of the people it is a good government. The second article is that of the right of each nation shall be based on a federation of free states. According to this article, every nation should form a league where their rights will be protected by a single constitution. In this league there will be no superior, every nation should be equal. This so called right will be protected by a single constitution made in agreement with the nations concerned. The

agreement of different nations guided by rationality is crucial to achieve peace11. The rationality is that war is not good for anyone and there should be peace for the good of humanity. So, any rational man should strive for peace. This peace could be achieved by a federation of republic states. This United Nations will join together so that everyone will enjoy similar rights and freedom in every part of the world. There is a presupposition in Kant‘s argument which is an international right. This international right is bring about by the existence of cosmopolitan right which is seen in the third article. Kant says, ―There is only one rational way in which states coexisting with other states can emerge from the lawless condition of pure warfare. Just like individual men, they must renounce their savage and lawless freedom, adapt themselves to public coercive laws, and thus form an international state, which would necessarily continue to grow until it embraced all peoples of the earth‖12. For perpetual to be possible Kant endorse the idea of international state, where each state will follow a common laws which will protect their rights. The federation of nations is not a peace treaty which ends a war; rather this federation would aim at ending all wars for the future. The achievement of perpetual peace will come only when nations accept a common legislative body which will protect their rights. The peace treaty between nations is not enough to prevent war, because there is no common code which every nation should follow and which in turn would protect the right of every nation. The third principle is the cosmopolitan right. Cosmopolitan right presupposes the idea that human beings have the freedom to go to others‘ territories as long as one acts peacefully. The host nation also does not have the right to get rid of their guest. This right originated from the fact that the earth is a globe, it is not an infinite stretch of land. The earth is owned by humanity, but several territories may be claimed by a particular group of people (or nation). The owner of that territory should understand the situation of their guest. The federation of states is responsible to bring about the cosmopolitan constitution where every human being will have right to be treated justly in every part of the world. The guest cannot claim the right of a guest, but only a right of resort13, which means that no one can go anywhere and claim to be a part of one‘s territory, but stay in one place to find safety and resort. The situation of the guest may be evaluated by the rules of the territory. The cosmopolitan right cannot be limited to a particular nation, because the right granted to guest and how the guest should behave cannot be protected by a single nation alone. Kant notion of peace is intricately linked to a rule of law which will check nations who does not respect the rights of another

11 Ibid., p.26. 12 Ibid., p. 28. 13 Ibid., p.29

nation. To safe guard the cosmopolitan right there should be a proper legislator who will safeguard the rights of every individual where ever they are, which might be called human rights. ―The idea of a cosmopolitan right is therefore not fantastic and overstrained; it is a necessary complement to the unwritten code of political and international right, transforming it into a universal right of humanity‖.14 Those are the three articles which every nation must adhere to in order to achieve perpetual peace. The question which remains is how is that the interest of nations and their citizens? How is cosmopolitan right the interest of each nation? In the following I will try to point out the reason why it is the interest of humanity to attain perpetual peace, which also amount to following the course of nature. The fate of humanity is what nature has given us. The federation of state should bring about the establishment of cosmopolitan right. The cosmopolitan right is based on international right. This international right can be realized only through the creation of federation of free states. The federation of free states will be a state guided by rationality. These free states will be guided by the enlightenment spirit. The spirit of enlightenment will results in the realization of the design of nature. This spirit will be guided by the use of reason. How is the use of reason going humanity to perpetual peace? Kant argue that how nature works is the sole testament that peace is inevitable for mankind if they want to survive. The attainment of peace is possible because of the design of nature, Kant mentioned three: i. She has taken care that human beings are able to live in all the areas where they are settled. ii. She has driven them in all directions by means of war, so that they inhabit event the most inhospitable regions iii. She has compelled them by the same means to enter into more or less legal relationships The peaceful dealings between nations originated from nature, as long as one does not recognized this facts there will be no war. The presupposition of perpetual peace is that war is bad for mankind. In order to fulfill the destiny of nature there should be peace. There is a notion of human in Kant‘s argument in his advocacy of republic, where the interest of the people in general is concern. The interest of an individual human being is different from the interest of the people as a whole. Things which serve the purpose of the individual do not necessarily leads to the interest of the community as a whole. The interest of the ruler is not important as much as the community as a whole. The whole which is made up of the individual is much more important than the part.

14 Ibid.,p.31

The right of man to live in peace is guaranteed by the mechanism of nature. It provided us with a means to communicate with each other. Nature is using war as a tool. War has driven humanity to the edge of the planet and stay in places where they won‘t otherwise. Perpetual peace should be realised by the abolition of ignorance and replaced it with reason. There may be many other factors for the realization of peace, but the most important thing is to have freedom to exercise one‘s own thinking. When the society is enlightened, if the day has come, humanity will realised that the path to peace is the way forward.

I will take the case of overpopulation to see the fate that nature has given us. As long as human has the desire to reproduce there will be growth in population to the point where it might be threatening to the survival of mankind. The earth is a globe, and we cannot disperse indefinitely so we have to share the land and water. We cannot fight over water or land if we wanted to survive. One with reason will realized that there should be peace if mankind wanted to survive.

The destiny of mankind depends on how nations conduct. To survive there should be peace among nations. We have known for decades that the problems which occur in one part of the world can be felt in different part of the world. We can take the case of environment and climate change. Environmental pollution can be felt in every part of the world, and when one part is polluted it is felt in some other part of the world. The polluting of an ocean is also a collective result of different nations. So, the protection and saving of planet earth is the task of every nation. Some might play more significant role than others, but everyone has their own share. To survive, nations must work together. To work together there should be peace among themselves and trust each other.

One might question the freedom of human beings: whether they have a choice other than attaining peace or whether peace should be achieved anyhow? The freedom lies in the fact that a nation can choose whether they wanted to be a part of the treaty of peace which will bring about peace. But, the result of not choosing will have consequences. In Kant‘s argument perpetual peace is the good which any moral being that is using their reason should will. This is shown in the working of nature and the fact that our planet is a globe which everyone must share. There have been serious doubts towards the realization of Kant‘s notion of cosmopolitanism in the face of diverse cultural practices and values. Humans have different cultures and values: What they considered good and what they count as acceptable differ. Even though there is human nature by means of which we can understand each other, but there is no doubt that there are different practices and values. Cosmopolitan law can be understood as implying an obligation for mankind to live under one 37

value system. There has been various interpretation and understanding of cosmopolitanism; whether human beings are obliged to give up their cultural values and join the cosmopolitan culture and lifestyle? Individuals‘ attitudes and the sense they give towards the world is founded on culture and it will lose meaning for those individuals if we take away their culture. Culture breathes life on their actions, that is their actions are authenticated by culture. For some, cosmopolitanism is an encroachment to the uniqueness of culture and many cultures must disappear to make room for cosmopolitan law. Garrett Wallace Brown argues that Kant‘s cosmopolitanism does not contradict the existence of multiple cultures and values. His defence for cosmopolitan law is that cultural communities are already living in a cosmopolitan world. Cultural practices and values are not fixed, they are changing from time to time dur to different reasons. We have seen in history that different cultures have encounter one another, and they exchange goods and ideas. Individual can have different values and attach meaning to their life in different ways, both from inside and outside of their culture. What we value and what we find meaningful are not fixed and we can have multiple obligations, and cosmopolitanism can be one of them. Cultural boundaries are not fixed like physical boundaries, there is no clear demarcation between cultures. They influence each other and share practices; it can be seen clearly in the present world where people around the globe influence each other in their taste and attitude. There have been disagreements between different cultures and conflict in interest, according to Brown cosmopolitan law offers solution to the difference of interest and conflicts between cultures. Even though it might not be able to fully realize the idea of cosmopolitanism it provides solution to the conflict that exist between cultures. Kant has offered a way to perpetual peace in which cosmopolitan law is one of the most important part. The burden to work out the conflict falls on the critique, not on Kant‘s. The cosmopolitan right is an essential part of perpetual peace where one can have shelter in any part of the world. But, to protect this right every country should have an agreement that every individual of the world should be given access to any land of the earth. This should be based on the idea that, ―all rational beings are members in a single moral community. They are analogous to citizens in the political (republican) sense in that they share the characteristics of freedom, equality, and

independence, and that they live under their own laws. Their common laws, however, are the laws of morality, grounded in reason‖15 The idea of cosmopolitanism suggests that human beings are interacting with each other and there has been exchange of ideas long before Kant developed his concept of cosmopolitanism. Christianity has spread all over the world from the land of Judea. There has been an infusion of ideas in which the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle were appreciated by mankind. The beauty of Shakespeare words was appreciated by different culture. It was based on the belief and trust in the idea of human nature. He recognized that there are different cultures and lifestyle which are specific to societies. Bibliography: 

Brown, Garrett Wallace. 2009. Grounding Cosmopolitanism: From Kant to the Idea of a Cosmopolitan Constitution. Edinburgh: Edinbugh University Press Ltd.



Harari, Yuval Noah. 2011. Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind. London: Penguin Random House UK.



Kant, Immanuel. 2009. "Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch." In An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?, by Immanuel Kant , 12-66. London: Penguin.



Kleingeld, Pauline, and Eric Brown. 2002. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Ferbruary 23. Accessed

August

14,

2021.

<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/cosmopolitanism/>. 

Pojman, Louis J. 2005. "Kant's Perpetual Peace and Cosmopolitanism." Journal of Social Philosophy 62-71.

15 Kleingeld, Pauline, and Eric Brown. 2002. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 23 Ferbruary. Accessed August 14, 2021. <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/cosmopolitanism/>.

Nature of Existentialism Sami Jan

Abstract This paper tries to determine existential philosophy as a methodology and a unique way to look at problems. This paper exhibits different approaches to resolve existential problems. Humans could not ignore his existence and the main questions of existentialism are: who I am? What is my duty? Who created me? What is my duty towards others and towards oneself? What is relation between me and the world? This paper provides the answer towards these problems and different philosophers has given different view about these problems. Since existentialism is the description of human being through passion, desire, will, freedom, responsibility and care, and existentialist philosophers defines human through these concepts. Key words: Existentialism, Freedom, Passion, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche.

Introduction: It is commonly acknowledged that existentialism is a philosophy about the concrete individual. It is also known for its methodology and way of looking towards things. This is both its glory and its shame. In an age of mass communication and mass destruction, it is to its credit that existentialism defends the intrinsic value of what its main proponent Sartre calls the ‗free organic individual‘, that is, the flesh-and-blood agent. Because of the almost irresistible pull toward conformity in modern society, what we shall call ‗existential individuality‘ is an achievement, and not a permanent one at that. We are born biological beings but we must become existential individuals by accepting responsibility for our actions. This is an application of Nietzsche‘s advice to ‗become what you are‘. Many people never do acknowledge such responsibility but rather flee their existential individuality into the comfort of the faceless crowd. As an object lesson in becoming an individual, in the following chapter, I trace what Kierkegaard calls ‗spheres‘ of existence or ‗stages on life‘s way‘ and conclude with some observations about how Nietzsche would view this project of becoming an existential individual.

Existence precedes Essence: ‗Existence precedes essence‘ is the phrase given by Kierkegaard and also upheld by Satre. This phrase is very much significant in existentialism which emphasis on existence rather than essence. This phrase is antagonistic against Descartes statement ‗Essence precedes Existence‘. According to Kierkegaard, truth and existence are always prior to thinking. True knowledge is always subjective. It is direct, unmediated experience. Subjectivity is fundamental to all knowledge and action. Kierkegaard 40

is severely critical of Descartes assertion that thinking precedes existence, Cogito ergo sum. According to Kierkegaard, truth is just the opposite of it. We must exist before any thinking is possible. As Kierkegaard puts this reversal of Descartes phraseology, I must exist in order to think. In the realm of existence, I precede thinking. I must exist before there can be any activity of thinking in me. Therefore, even if logically thinking is the reason for our knowledge of the self and therefore, logically thinking precedes existence, but from the view point of ontology or existence, I is prior to thought and it is a basic belief of all existentialists that in philosophy ontology is prior to and more fundamental than epistemology. According to Kierkegaard, I Think, entails the fact of the existence of ‗I‘. Therefore, Descartes dictum ― I Think, Therefore I exist‖ is a mere tautology, a repetitive and superfluous addition of the proposition ―I am‖ to the self evident proposition ― I Think‖. The philosophical mistake committed by Descartes was, according to Kierkegaard that he wanted to know ―I‖ or ―Self‖ as an object , whereas the self is pure consciousness and ever a knower and never the known. While the knower is always prior to the known and can never become an object of knowledge. All attempts to know the self as an object are doomed to failure. Descartes has made full attempt to prove his self as well as the selves of others to be objects, to be materials of knowing. This, however, is most unjustified. As a matter of fact every one possesses an intimate personal experience of his own self and there is no way or procedure to know the ―experience‖ in another. Neither one‘s own experiences nor the similar experience of others can be open to observation; only introspection here of it is possible. Sartre formulates the basic principle of existentialism in these words: existence precedes essence. Here he uses the terms existential and essentia in the old sense of metaphysics which says since Plato: the essentia precedes the existentia. Sartre reverses this sentence. But the reversal of a metaphysical sentence remains a metaphysical sentence. Being such a sentence, it remains, like all metaphysics, in the oblivion of the truth of Being.‖ Some of the main characteristics of Existentialism are:  Traditional and academic philosophy is sterile and remote from the concerns of real life  Philosophy must focus on the individual in her or his confrontation with the world.  The world is irrational  The world is absurd, in the sense that no ultimate explanation can be given for why it is the way it is.  Senselessness, emptiness, triviality, separation, and inability to communicate pervade human existence, giving birth to anxiety, dread, self-doubt, and despair.  The individual confronts, as the most important fact of human existence, the necessity to choose how he or she is to live within this absurd and irrational world.

 The individual confronts, as the most important fact of human existence, the necessity to choose how he or she is to live within this absurd and irrational world.

Revolt against traditional rationalistic philosophy: It is a commonly accepted half-truth that existentialism is a revolt against traditional Western rationalistic philosophy. It is also a demonstrable half-truth that existentialist philosophy is very much a continuation and logical expansion of themes and problems in Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Marx, and Husserl. But two half-truths provide us with less than the whole truth. Existentialism is not simply a philosophy or a philosophical revolt. Existentialist philosophy is the explicit conceptual manifestation of an existential attitude—a spirit of ―the present age.‖ It is a philosophical realization of a selfconsciousness living in a ―broken world‖ (Marcel), an ―ambiguous world‖ (de Beauvoir), a ―dislocated world‖ (Merleau-Ponty), a world into which we are ―thrown‖ and ―condemned‖ yet ―abandoned‖ and ―free‖ (Heidegger and Sartre), a world which appears to be indifferent or even ―absurd‖ (Camus). In philosophical terms, the modern stress on ―the individual‖ provided the key themes of the Enlightenment, the ―Age of Reason,‖ the philosophical rationalism of Descartes, Kant, and Hegel. In these authors, however, the theme of individual autonomy was synthesized and absorbed into a transcendental movement of reason. But in a contemporary culture that harps so persistently upon the themes of individual autonomy and freedom, there will always be individuals who carry these to their ultimate conclusion. Existentialism begins with the expression of a few such isolated individuals of genius, who find themselves cut adrift in the dangerous abyss between the harmony of Hegelian reason and the romantic celebration of the individual, between the warmth and comfort of the ―collective idea‖ and the terror of finding oneself alone. Existentialism is this self-discovery. Its presupposition is always the Cartesian ―I am‖ (not ―I think‖). Like its successor, ―postmodernism‖ (which rejected even the ―I‖), existentialism marks the ever-increasing failure of modern humanity to find itself ‗at home‘ in the world. According to many existentialists, every act and every attitude must be considered a choice. Yet the existential attitude itself is apparently not chosen. One finds oneself in it. Dostoevsky tells us that self-consciousness is a ―disease‖; Nietzsche adds, in his discussion of ―bad conscience,‖ that it is ―a disease—but as pregnancy is a disease.‖ Although many existentialists speak of the universality of ―the human condition,‖ this universality is itself a view from within an attitude which is less than universal. Most existentialists, no less than Descartes, Kant, and Hegel, take Self-consciousness to be the home of a universal first truth 'about everyone. But selfconsciousness itself is not universal, although once one becomes self-conscious, he cannot go back, no matter how he denies himself, drugs himself, leaps or falls away from himself (the terms, from Kierkegaard and Heidegger respectively, carry their evaluations with them). In Utilitarianism, John 42

Stuart Mill argues for ―quality‖ of pleasures by contrasting the dissatisfied Socrates with a satisfied pig. The first is preferable, Mill argues, because Socrates has experienced both Socratic pleasures and pig pleasures and he, like other men, has chosen to remain Socratic. Actually Socrates has no choice. He can act like a pig, but he cannot enjoy himself as one. Socrates can no more imagine the selfless indulgence of pig pleasure than the pig can appreciate the arguments of the Apology.

Death of God: Nietzsche has spoken eloquently of the loneliness of the individual who has risen above the herd. As is often the case with existentialists, his personal life gave tragic witness to the price often demanded for such nonconformity as he sought in the manner of Socrates to harmonize his life with his teaching. For years, Nietzsche moved around Europe, never remaining in the same place more than a few months, living in rented rooms or as the guest of others, suffering from severe migraines and stomach problems, often having to pay for the publication of his own books, which never reached a large audience during his lifetime. He himself to Spinoza, a 17th-century Dutch philosopher of Jewish descent who was excommunicated from the Synagogue for his unorthodox views. One of his aphorisms reads: ‗To live alone one must be either a beast or a god, says Aristotle. Leaving out the third case: one must be both – a philosopher.‘ Insisting that the philosopher must act against the received wisdom of the age. Today . . . when only the herd animal is honored . . . the concept of ‗greatness‘ entails being noble, wanting to be oneself, being capable of being different, standing alone and having to live independently; and the philosopher will betray something of his own ideal when he posits: ‗He shall be the greatest who can be the loneliest, the most hidden, the most deviating, the human being beyond good and evil. Nietzsche never read Kierkegaard, but there are remarkable parallels between them: their stress on the individual and disdain for the ―herd‖ or ―public‖; their attacks on hypocritical Christendom and upon the bloated philosophical celebration of reason in Kant and Hegel; their hatred of personal weakness and anonymity. But Nietzsche will have no part of Kierkegaard‘s new Christian; indeed, he turns Kierkegaard on his head and defends the aesthetic life against both morality and Christianity. This defense, however, begins with the Dostoevskian premise that all of our claims—scientific, moral, and religious—are now without foundation. ―God is dead,‖ ―the highest values devalue themselves,‖ and the foundations of science are but errors (―necessary errors,‖ perhaps, that is, necessary for the life of the species, yet not ―true‖). The negative, or ―nihilistic,‖ side of Nietzsche‘s philosophy consists of an attack on Christianity and Christian morality. One argument proceeds from the crumbling of the religious foundations and sanctions (the ―death of God‖) to the invalidity of morality.

Critique of Values: Nietzsche argues from a general thesis about values (―the value of value‖) to the rejection of both God and Christian morality. To do this, Nietzsche takes a naturalistic approach to moral reasoning. There are no a priori moral principles; there are only desires, all of them reducible to a single psychological drive, ―the will to power.‖ Values can be defended only insofar as they maximize one‘s power (in this regard, Nietzsche has in mind more the ―spiritual‖ power of the artist or saint than political power). Christian morality, Nietzsche argues, is also a manifestation of the will to power, but the will of the weak, originating out o f inferiority and ressentiment, a ―slave morality‖ whose purpose is the preservation of the herd rather than the excellence of the strong. The positive side of Nietzsche‘s philosophy is much less focused, but it tends to celebrate the ―this-worldly‖ and the creative potential of the greatest human beings. Frequently appearing in his mature works is the notion of the Will to Power, and Nietzsche was beginning to elaborate on this when he was struck down by a debilitating illness that ended his writing career. What remains of that effort are only unpublished notes, a few of which are included here. One of Nietzsche‘s most famous ideas is his fantasy of an ―Ubermensch‖—a more than ―human-all-too-human‖‘ being who is to serve as our new ideal. But this idea, too, is rather sketchy and limited to a single book, the prologue of Nietzsche‘s pseudo-biblical epic, Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Finally, Nietzsche seemed to take great pride in his idea of ―eternal recurrence,‖ the idea that what has happened and what will happen repeat themselves, over and over again. For Nietzsche, this would be the ultimate test of life-affirmation, whether one could accept his or her life with all of its joys and sufferings an infinite number of times. Nietzsche developed his critique of morality and Christianity in a remarkable series of works over the last seven years of his productive life, 1882-1888. He begins with a famous slogan, ―God is dead‖ (in the Gay Science, reprinted here), and in Thus Spoke Zarathustra he provides us with a complex portrait of the ―this-worldly‖ attitude that is to take God‘s place. In quick succession, Nietzsche wrote Beyond Good and Evil, On the Genealogy of Morals, Twilight of the Idols, The Antichrist, and several other works. He considered himself a ―good European‖ rather than German, and he spent virtually his entire career in Switzerland and Italy. Absurd Camus is described by Sartre, in the obituary he wrote at the tragic end of a long and sometimes bitter feud between them, as the ―Cartesian of the absurd,‖ the ―stubborn humanist.‖ Whereas ambiguity, alienation, anxiety, Existenz, the polarity of for-itself/in-itself, are central in other authors, the key concept in Camus‘s philosophy is the ―absurd,‖ the confrontation between ―rational man and the indifferent universe.‖ Against the absurd there is rebellion, the scorn of Sisyphus, the ―revolt of the flesh,‖ the ―I rebel, therefore we exist.‖ For Camus there is no Kierkegaardian leap, which he degrades as ―philosophical suicide‖; there is no appeal to transcendence, which he dismisses as pointless hope; nor is there any role in Camus‘s philosophy for Sartre‘s notion of existential commitment. Rather, the 44

point is to ―keep the absurd alive.‖ Politically, Camus‘s philosophical neglect of commitment manifests itself in his painful debates with Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. Always the moralist, the pacifist, Camus is hesitant about taking sides in the Algerian war, finding himself, like Meursault in The Stranger and like Clamence in The Fall, often feeling for both sides at once. He sympathizes with Sartre‘s and MerleauPonty‘s efforts to inaugurate a new Left, but he continuously moves away as they find themselves increasingly in alliance with the Communist Party. Camus objects to their Marxism, their lack of humanity, their violence, and their belief that ends justify means (a topic that ruptured Camus‘s friendships with both Sartre and Merleau-Ponty). Central to Camus‘s works is a resolute moralistic concern with good and evil, the source of the absurd in The Myth o f Sisyphus, the source of guilt in The Fall. In The Stranger, Camus creates an innocent young man whom he describes elsewhere as ―totally honest,‖ but honest in a peculiar way. He never reflects and thus never sees the significance of his actions. After committing a bizarre murder, neither intentional nor unintentional, Meursault (in the following selection) comes, while facing death, to the hesitant recognition of the absurd. In The Fall Clamence (a pseudonym) relates in retrospect his lucidity regarding the absurdity of his previous selfesteem as a successful defender of good causes and his ―fall‖ into the role of Judge-Penitent. He is resentfully ―happy‖ as Sisyphus is ―happy,‖ in scorn and in constant recognition of his avoidance of judgment (―Judge that ye not be judged‖)

Truth as Subjectivity: According to Kierkegaard, truth is inward, subjective, and intuitive. Subjectivity is truth and objectivity is falsehood. Truth is the inward experience. It is subjective and personal. There is no objective truth. Ethical experience of true individuality or subjectivity alone is the truth. Man, the unique individual is the real. According to Kierkegaard, truth must not satisfy the intellect but must satisfy the entire being of man, it should not satisfy head but heart also. If truth is accepted to be outside the individual then the individual would be slave to external considerations and would be inwardly discrete, a dry, shriveled subject. Upanishads and Greek philosophy insisted on subjective and intuitive knowledge. Socrates, insists that philosophy begins by ‗knowing thyself‘ is very close to the views of Kierkegaard, what I am to do, what is my duty, these questions can be answered by one‘s own self and personal decision. Thus, as Copernicus has reversed the Ptolemic theory about the universe by establishing Heliocentrism, that is, earth revolves around the sun and not vice versa, Kierkegaard, too, completely reversed the old epistemic order of objectivity as the source of truth and subjectivity the source of error.

If impersonal space and time can be personalized and brought into the domain of our choice and responsibility, so too can the notion of ‗objective‘ truth. As mentioned at the outset, Kierkegaard 45

distinguished between ‗objective‘ and ‗subjective‘ reflection and truth. He allowed for the common scientific uses of objective reflection, which he described as follows The way of objective reflection makes the subject accidental, an thereby transforms existence into something indifferent, something vanishing. Away from the subject the objective way of reflection leads to the objective truth, and while the subject and his subjectivity become indifferent, the truth also becomes indifferent, and this indifference is precisely its objective validity; for all interest, like all decisiveness, is rooted in subjectivity. The way of objective reflection leads to abstract thought, to mathematics, to historical knowledge of different kinds; and always it leads away from the subject, whose existence or nonexistence, and rightly so, becomes infinitely indifferent. The existentialists are not irrationalists in the sense that they deny the validity of logical argument and scientific reasoning. They simply question the ability of such reasoning to access the deep personal convictions that guide our lives. As Kierkegaard said of the dialectical rationalism of Hegel: ‗Trying to live your life by this abstract philosophy is like trying to find your way around Denmark with a map on which that country appears the size of a pinhead.‘ In contrast to the objective reflection that ignores individual existence, Kierkegaard speaks of subjective reflection and its corresponding truth as subjectivity: when subjectivity is truth, subjectivity‘s definition must include an expression for an opposition to objectivity, a reminder of the fork in the road, and this expression must also convey the tension of inwardness [the self‘s relation to itself]. Here is such a definition of truth: the objective uncertainty, held fast in an appropriation process of the most passionate inwardness is the truth, the highest truth available for an existing person. Here too it is a matter of a change in the direction one is taking in one‘s life, the ‗fork in the road‘. That is what makes the option for subjective reflection an ‗existential‘ choice. Were it simply a question of an impersonal claim about a fact or a law of nature, we would be dealing with ‗objective certainty‘ and the wager of one‘ personal existence would be irrelevant. One would simply be following the complete directions. Such would be the case of Socrates if his belief in personal immorality were merely the conclusion of an argument. But here the ‗truth‘ is more of a ‗moral nature. As Kierkegaard says, it‘s a question of ‗appropriation‘ (of ‗making it one‘s own‘ rather than of ‗approximation‘ to some objective state of affairs, the way one weight the probabilities of a possible outcome or reads the distance markers along the way to a destination. As he notes elsewhere, for truth as subjectivity, the emphasis is on the ‗how‘ and not on the ‗what‘ of our belief. This has led some to misunderstand him as claiming that it doesn‘t matter what you believe so long as you believe it. Though scarcely espousing religious relativism, as a deeply committed Christian, Kierkegaard was more concerned with combating lukewarm or purely nominal religious belief than with apologetics.

Stages of Existence: The most extended analysis of the project of becoming an individual appears in two places, Kierkegaard‘s Either/Or and his Stages on Life‘s Way. Both are examples of his method of oblique communication. Each tells a tale, actually several tales, by pseudonymous authors in order to enable us to see and test the respective morals of these stories on our own lives. Together, their narrative arguments provide a rather complete description of the three spheres of existence that Kierkegaard formulates in order to trace the process of becoming an individual. Though we shall have to modify and nuance

this

process

once

has

been

laid

out,

the

L spheres or stages are three (the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious). Each stage has its own model as befits a morality tale: Don Juan, among others, for the aesthetic, Socrates, again among others, for the ethical, and Abraham for the religious sphere. These figures convey a concrete, emotional force to the ‗argument‘ as it unfolds. Like the docent in an art gallery, Kierkegaard keeps referring to the model as he enables us to see how it instantiates the quality under discussion. So let us follow this path and encounter its literary and historical characters as we progress on the road towards individuality. As one should expect from an existentialist analysis, each stage or sphere will reveal its own relation to temporarily that distinguishes it from the others. Again, time is of the essence.

Freedom: Existentialism is a philosophy of freedom, even if these thinkers do not agree on the precise meaning of that basic term. Nietzsche, for one, famously denied the notion of free will and the moral choice that it exercises. His project of bringing the human being back to earth and away from its illusions about the transcendent and eternal turned him toward the biological dimension of human existence, its irrational instincts and drives: what he called ‗will-to-power‘, which, despite its popular association with choice and dominance, is really the answer to the metaphysical question? ‗What is there, ultimately?‘ – and this, notwithstanding his animus against metaphysics. Taken in its cosmic sense, will-to-power is the force that moves the universe; understood biologically, it is the irresistible life impetus that drives the biosphere; psychologically, it is the drive to dominate and control. Its ‗highest‘ expression is the self-control exercised by the free spirits for whom Nietzsche reserves a ‗higher‘ morality than the chiefly religious ethics of the herd. As French philosopher Michel Haar observes, ‗Nature as a whole is will-to-power‘, and it manifests itself in every dimension of existence. This is why philosopher Paul Ricoeur could list Nietzsche among the ‗masters of suspicion‘, along with Marx and Freud. Each thinker casts doubt on our ostensive accounts of why we do what we do. The real reason for our behaviour, they claim, lay elsewhere. In Nietzsche‘s case, that ultimate source is will-to-power. As Foucault will later say in a Nietzschean mode, the most high-minded efforts at penal reform in the early 19th century, for example, were ultimately expressions of the desire for more 47

effective control of populations. All What place is there, then, in such a universe for creative freedom in the existentialist sense? What is the ground for the responsibility we feel in ourselves and ascribe to others? This is the perennial problem of freedom versus determinism, but given a more dramatic twist as befits an existentialist version. In a universe where every event has a cause and every cause is necessitating (both claims open to dispute), no place seems left for the ‗absolute beginnings‘ that popular understanding of existentialist freedom proclaims. Every event has an antecedent (whether natural or cultural according to the kind of determinism one is proposing) and every cause is necessitating. In effect, under this description, nobody could have acted otherwise than they did. The ‗error‘ of free will, Nietzsche insists, is the belief that choice rather than physiological and cultural forces is the basis of our judgments of moral approval and disapproval. Displaying his predilection for psychological rather than ontological explanations, he remarks: ‗The evil acts at which we are most indignant rest on the error that he who perpetrates them against us possesses free will, that is to say, that he could have chosen not to cause us this harm.‘ If Nietzsche is correct, it would seem to follow that our tolerance could know no bounds because, to quote the pre Romantic French novelist Madame de Staël, ‗to understand all is to forgive all‘. Though this may be the wisdom of Spinoza and his German admirer, it is scarcely the common sense of the herd. But Nietzsche, in his allegory of a religious prophet, Zarathustra, sets forth the possibility of a ‗higher‘ ethic based on the freedom/ ability to create values. In a sense, with the ‗death of God‘, that is, with the increasing irrelevance of the idea of the Judaeo-Christian God, the ‗free‘ spirits (Nietzsche‘s true individuals) are challenged to assume divine prerogatives, among which the most important is that of creating life-affirming moral and lifeenhancing aesthetic values. ‗Man is an evaluating animal‘, Nietzsche claims, and moral values of nobility and aesthetic values of the beautiful coalesce in the project of making of one‘s life a work of art. Sartre wrote an essay entitled ‗Cartesian Freedom‘ where he developed the Nietzschean view that, in the absence of belief in God, we should assume the absolute freedom that Descartes had ascribed to the Divinity. In phenomenological terms, this meant that the entire ‗world‘ (the horizon of our meanings) is our creation for which we hold total responsibility. ‗We are without excuse‘, he insisted. Like Nietzsche, Sartre focused chiefly on the creation of moral values, as we have seen. But unlike his predecessor, he claimed that these values were the result of our creative ‗choices‘. Nietzsche, on the contrary, seems to believe that ‗those who can hear‘, that is, the free spirits, are genetically capable of being moved by the force of his arguments, which elude or threaten the herd. If so, he is subscribing to a kind of psycho-biological determinism (we must follow what we perceive to be the strongest argument and only the free spirits are capable of appreciating those motives that are properly life-affirming). This certainly separates him from Sartre and de Beauvoir but not unambiguously from Kierkegaard, as we have just seen. 48

Being in the World: The glory of ‗man‘ (or what Heidegger calls Dasein, meaning the human way of being) is his openness to Being. It is his ability to conserve a place in the world for what Heidegger calls the occurrence of Being. In a well-known expression from his later work, Heidegger calls man/Dasein ‗the shepherd Being‘. It is his glory to remain open and attentive to the ‗call‘ or the dimension of the ‗holy‘ that eludes our daily concerns. Heidegger counsels that we should learn to ‗dwell poetically‘ rather than behaving merely pragmatically. If one accepts this advice, then the later Heidegger can be seen as preaching the ‗true‘ humanism, one that underscores the most profound possibilities of the human. That was his claim in this Letter. But we should add that such discourse seems far distant from the existentialist themes and theses we have been discussing thus far. In fact, the earlier Heidegger, the author of Being and Time, adopts many Kierkegaardian and Nietzschean concepts to elucidate how we gain access to a Being of which we already have some inkling. He employs a ‗hermeneutical‘, or interpretive, method to articulate that basic inkling. The unpacking of that pre-understanding brings his existentialist relevance to the fore. Though we shall pursue the matter at greater length in our final chapter we should note here that such concepts as Angst (existential anguish) and ekstatic temporality, already discussed, figure centrally in his early thought. So too does the notion of our mortal temporality (our being-unto-death), the realization and positive acceptance of which serve both to concretize our finitude and to open us to the meaning of Being by facing us with the possibility of our ceasing to be.

Bad faith : No existential category is better known in Sartrean existentialis than ‗bad faith‘. It certainly has wider usage in common parlance than ‗good faith‘. This is probably because, as a kind of selfdeception, it is more widespread in its relevance. Heidegger argues that we are for the most part immersed in the average everyday where the inclination is to neglect our openness to Being and to simply ‗go with the flow‘, that is, to live inauthentically as ‗they‘ do. In an obvious allusion to the Biblical notion of Original Sin, Heidegger refers to this immersion as fallenness (die Verfallenheit). Sartre seems to agree that our usual inclination is to deny responsibility for our situation, that is, to be in bad faith. This is especially true in societies where exploitation and oppression are rampant, as he will later come to recognize. In fact, he claims that Being and Nothingness was a phenomenological study of individuals within an alienated society. Such societies foster self-deception about the structural injustices that our practices sustain. In these cases, even our protestation to be in good faith is a claim made in bad faith because it assumes that we can be in good faith the way a stone is a stone, that is, as completely identical with ourselves and free of responsibility, whereas we are always more than ourselves and hence without excuse. In other words, our temporalizing consciousness of what we are is always enough ahead of what we are that Sartre can claim that whatever we may be, we are in the 49

manner of ‗not-being‘ it. It is this gap which temporalizing consciousness introduces into our lives that accounts for our freedom and grounds our responsibility. It is also the source of that famous existential anguish (Angst) which denotes our implicit awareness of our freedom as the sheer possibility of possibility. It is flight from the anguish of our freedom that motivates our bad faith, and it is the duality of the human condition as both facticity and transcendence that makes bad faith possible. Bad faith is the attempt to escape the tension of this duality by denying one of its poles. Accordingly, Sartre speaks of two forms of bad faith. The more common form tries to collapse our transcendence (our possibility) into our facticity (our antecedent condition). In effect, one flees responsibility by claiming: ‗That‘s just the way I am.‘ The various forms of determinism from the Marxist economic to Freudian psychological variety provide theoretical versions of this basic form of bad faith. They relieve us of the anguish of our freedom by denying that we are free in this creative, existentialist sense. This type of bad faith is resigned to the pattern of life laid out in advance and over which one has no control and hence is free of responsibility

Conclusion: There are five basic themes that the existentialist appropriates each in his or her own way. Rather than constituting a strict definition of ‗existentialist‘, they depict more of a family resemblance (a criss-crossing and overlapping of the themes) among these philosophers. First, Existence precedes essence means what you are (your essence) is the result of your choices (your existence) rather than the reverse. Essence is not destiny. You are what you make yourself to be. Second, Time is of the essence. We are fundamentally time-bound beings. Unlike measurable, ‗clock‘ time, lived time is qualitative: the ‗not yet‘, the ‗already‘, and the ‗present‘ differ among themselves in meaning and value. Third, Humanism is a person-centred philosophy. Though not anti-science, its focus is on the human individual‘s pursuit of identity and meaning amidst the social and economic pressures of mass society for superficiality and conformism. Fourth, Existentialism is a philosophy of freedom. Its basis is the fact that we can stand back from our lives and reflect on what we have been doing. In this sense, we are always ‗more‘ than ourselves. But we are as responsible as we are free. Fifth, ethical considerations are paramount. Though each existentialist understands the ethical, as with ‗freedom‘, in his or her own way, the underlying concern is to invite us to examine the authenticity of our personal lives and of our society. Existentialism is concerned with the problem of becoming than the problem of being. It deals more with particulars than universals. Moreover, it asserts more on existence than essence. Human person and his freedom are given great importance. personal growth and development can take place through individuals own efforts and none can help him in this regard. Existentialism is a movement of protest against traditional philosophy i.e. Greek rationalism, and Hegel‘s absolute idealism. It also 50

opposes naturalism that tries to explain life through cause and effect. Traditional philosophy says that man is essentially rational, but existentialist philosophers say that man is guided by passion and not by reason. They further emphasis on Will to power, Consciousness, feelings and emotions. Existentialism lays emphasis on the authentic existence of man (authentic being). Existence assets on the dictum ―Existence precedes Essence‖. Nothing can be more above than human existence. Human existence is the sole aim of all thoughts. Man‘s existence alone, as he lives with his physical experience, is what matters. His actual existence cannot be conceptualized. So, the existentialist philosophers emphasis on the primacy of human existence. Existentialist philosophy lays stress on human subjectivity and it rejects materialism and idealism. Existentialism lays emphasis on the freedom of the individual. Man is free but is dominated by sorrow, fear, pain, dread, anxiety and guilt. These are ‗angst of life‘ and man should find out the cause of these feelings, and sufferings. Nietzsche asserts that ―Will to power‖ and ―Faith in self‖ will help us to be free from the ―Angst of life‖. A genuine or authentic self exists, accepts choice, takes decision, and accepts responsibility for them.

References : 1. Aho, K. (2014). Existentialism: an introduction. John Wiley & Sons. 2. Bigelow, G. E. (1961). A primer of existentialism. College English, 23(3), 171-178. 3. Bigelow, G. E. (1961). A primer of existentialism. College English, 23(3), 171-178. 4. Crowell, S. (2004). Existentialism. 5. Díaz, J. W. (2018). The major themes of existentialism in the work of José Ortega y Gasset. The University of North Carolina Press. 6. Flynn, T. (2009). Existentialism. Sterling Publishing Company, Inc.. 7. Krill, D. F. (1966). Existentialism: A philosophy for our current revolutions. Social Service Review, 40(3), 289-301. 8. Löwith, K. (1952). Nature, history, and existentialism. Social Research, 79-94. 9. Macquarrie, J. (1972). Existentialism. 10. Magrini, J. (2012). Existentialism, phenomenology, and education. 11. Mart, C. T. (2012). Existentialism in two plays of Jean-Paul Sartre. International Journal of English and Literature, 3(3), 50-54. 12. Mudasir Ahmad Tantray & Atequllah Dar. (2016). ―Nature of Philosophy‖, International Journal of Humanities and Social Studies. Vol. 4, Issue 12, 13. Mudasir Ahmad Tantray & Tariq Rafeeq Khan. (2018). Philosophy and Anthropology: A critical relation. Worldwide Journal of Multidisciplinary Research and Development, Vol. 4. Issue -5, pp. 230-234.

14. Mudasir Ahmad Tantray, & Tariq Rafeeq Khan. (2018). How mind, logic and language, have evolved from medieval philosophy to early modern philosophy: A Critical Study. Worldwide Journal of Multidisciplinary Research and Development, 4(5), 222-229. 15. Mudasir Ahmad Tantray. (2017). ―Ethics of Environmental Conservation‖, International Journal of Social Science & Management Studies. Vol. 3, 15-19. 16. Mudasir Ahmad Tantray. (2018). Reason, authority and consciousness: An analytical approach to Religious pluralism, International Journal of Creative Research Thoughts, 6 (1), 832-834. 17. Mudasir Ahmad Tantray, Tariq Rafeeq Khan, Ifrah Mohiuddin Rather. (2020). Nature of Analytical Philosophy, Ravenshaw Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 3, 2020, PP. 16-33. 18. Olson, R. G. (2012). An introduction to existentialism. Courier Corporation. 19. Priyavrat Shukla & Mudasir Ahmad Tantray. (2021). Moral Consciousness and Environment, Unnati Journal of Multidisciplinary Scientific Research, 2, 11, 106-115. 20. Richmond, S. (1992). Existentialism. 21. Sartre, J. P. (1965). The humanism of existentialism. Essays in existentialism, 31-62. 22. Sartre, J. P. (2021). Existentialism is a Humanism. Yale University Press. 23. Sartre, J. P., & Dieckmann, H. (1947). Existentialism (p. 48). New York: Philosophical Library. 24. Tariq Rafeeq Khan & Mudasir Ahmad Tantray. (2018). Impact of Religious Pluralism on the World: An Analytical Approach. Lokayata: Journal of Positive Philosophy. Vol. VIII, No. 02. 25. Tillich, P. (1960). Existentialism, psychotherapy, and the nature of man. Pastoral Psychology, 11(5), 10-18. 26. Warnock, M. (1970). Existentialism. 27. Yadav, M. K., & Sharma Yadav, M. (2019). Edward Albee‘s The Zoo Story as the Play of Absurd and the themes of Existentialism.

Wittgensteins Private Language Argument Fayaz Ahmad Sofi & Priyavrat Shukla

Abstract I personally feel, much more has been written on Wittgensteins private language argument than any other aspect of his philosophy because this aspect gets us back to the familiar grounds of which the modern philosophy has had, many battles. It had also been a recurrent theme, since Descartes where the foundation of knowledge is explained in subjective self-certainty. There has been an enormous literature on this subject and there is room for disagreement about this tradition of the elements of subjective certainty but they might be evident truths. The aim is to construct the edifice of knowledge on their foundation. This paper deals with the study of language and its privacy or private language argument in the analytical approach by Ludwig Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein claimed that the relation between words and physical phenomenon in not contingent but essential and language is not the product of one person but has evolved with human life. Wittgentein rejects the possibility of a private language as it involves obeying a rule privately. He says there is nothing that can occur in an essentially private language. A person needs no private language to register his thoughts and feelings as we always register them in the ordinary language. A misunderstanding of our everyday sensation talk combined with a misunderstanding of our everyday sensation talk combined with a misunderstanding of how meanings are mixed conspire to generate the image of a private language.

Key-words: Private language, recurrent theme ,subjective self-certainty, edifice, physical phenomenon, contingent, conspire.

Introduction: Wittgenstein was one of the great philosophers of analytical tradition and exponents of analytical philosophy. He used language as a tool to clarify the facts that are palpable in the analysis and his philosophy is known as ordinary language philosophy. His famous book “Tractatus Logico Philosophicus” rather simply “Tractatus” brought the revolution in the contemporary era. We find in his philosophy the concepts of symbolism and its principles along with relations which are necessary between words and things in any language. He introduced his philosophy to make clear traditional philosophical preposition as Vague and Contradictory because it is without objective reference or does not prefers actual state of affairs. He also stated, that the traditional philosophy and ancient philosophical solutions are full of ignorance in the principles of symbolism and they have totally misused language. 53

Wittgensteins Private Language argument: Wittgenstein speaks about the notion of private language in his book, Philosophical investigations in the following passages. The individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language (PI 243); the language which describes my inner experiences and which only I myself can understand; (PI 256). Hence from the above passages we can conclude that private language is that which refers to the experiences of speaker alone and about which only the speaker is aware and is logically not possible to anyone other than speaker to understand the private language . So the words are only known to the speaker which cannot be understood by others to which the speaker only has a privileged access. He also means that it should not have even a single common word with the ordinary or public language. Wittgenstein says that one who tries to use private language not only fails in understanding his meaning toothers but also fails to communicate this meaning even to himself rather he fails in communicating anything at all. He further explained that the private language argument rested on two big mistakes (i) mistake about the nature of language (ii) mistake about the nature of experience that they are private. He says that confusion regarding the privacy of experience is in two senses- The first sense deals with possession that is something is private to me if and only if I can know about it. The second sense deals with possession that is something is private to me if and only if I can have it. Also Wittgenstein rejects the possibility of a private language since it involves obeying arule privately. Obeying a rule is a practice and to think oneis obeying a rule privately ;obeying a rule is a practice and to think one is obeying a rule privately ; otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same thing as obeying it (PI 202) Wittgenstein also claims it is impossible to obey a rule privately. Hence to follow a rule means to conform to a practice that is to act in a generally acknowledged way. Wittgenstein has been insisting that agreement between people is part of the framework on which the working of our language is based(PI240). But it also lays emphasis upon then public use of language seems to ignore its private employments. I sometimes talk to myself. I remind myself of things, encourage myself sometimes note things for future reference etc. I might even maintain a dairy about my own innermost feelings and moods for my personal purposes, perhaps putting it into a library or cipher so that others can read it. Hence there is no difficulty; I am simply pulling public language to a private use. But can I conceive of a language that is private in a way that is stronger than this rather can I conceive a language that is essentially private. Although another person can‘t read my private diary unless he cracks the code. In the present case however it makes no sense to speak about cracking the code , for it is the meaning of the words that are private, not just the method for encoding them But Wittgenstein rejects such possibility of private language as it also involves obeying a rule privately. The private language however has been defined as one which its user can only 54

understand so there is no trainer available who can initiate someone into it. Hence a User of private language could not distinguish between a rule and his impression of a rule. A user of private language would needs some criterion of identity to recognize the same thing again, but he is not in position to supply himself with such a criterion since, again, he has no basis for distinguishing between those things that actually meet the criterion and those things that only seem to. Thus we arrive at the result that an essentially private language is not open to human beings or when we say that a private language is possible, it leads to the result that a language could be invented, which is absurd as it is impossible for invention of a language, it needs a new way of following rules, making promises, giving orders and so on. He also means to invent a new style or form of life and a form of life is not invented but it is evolved. Therefore private language is impossible. Wittgenstein shows that not only private language is not possible that those who are of the view that a language can be –private are making a category mistake. In his Philosophical Investigations, the Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein lays out what later commentators have dubbed ‗the private language argument.‘1 Wittgenstein imagines a case roughly like the following. Suppose a person is stranded on a deserted island and has managed to bring along a diary. One day he decides (maybe in order to keep himself sane) to begin recording a mark – ‗S‘ for example – in his diary whenever he experiences a certain sensation. Whenever the sensation occurs, he focuses his attention upon it (in effect, he tries to mentally ‗point‘ to it) and marks ‗S‘. Wittgenstein‘s conclusion is that it is not possible to meaningfully use a term to refer to a private mental state in this way. Thus, there can be no private language. In brief, Wittgenstein‘s complaint is that ―in the present case [the speaker has] no criterion of correctness...whatever is going to seem right to [him] is right. And that only means that here we can‘t talk about ‗right‘.‖ (Wittgenstein 1953: p. 258, my emphasis). In other words, in our desert island case there would be no criteria for determining when ‗S‘ is used correctly, and when it is not. Two questions now present themselves. First, why must there be some ‗criterion for correctness‘ in order for a sign to be meaningful? Second, why think that there are no such criteria in our desert island scenario? The first claim (that for a word to be meaningful one must be able to apply it correctly or incorrectly) seems very plausible. If it were the case that, no matter how I used a word, I could never use it incorrectly, then it would seem that the word had no meaning. For suppose you asked me what my word meant. Any answer that I gave you would be arbitrary; I could just as easily (and correctly) have chosen some other answer. So it would seem that there must be criteria of correctness for a word to be meaningful. What then could determine the content of our words, and so determine their correctness conditions? There are several possibilities. A natural place to start – and one which Wittgenstein spends a great deal of time investigating — is with the concept of a rule. Suppose that learning a word 55

involves learning a rule which governs the use of that word. The rule might say, in effect, ‗use ‗S‘ in these and only these situations‘ or ‗use ‗S‘ to apply to these and only these objects‘. So, perhaps what provides the correctness conditions for our words are the rules that we learn when we learn the various expressions in our language. The trouble with this approach is that it only pushes the question back a step. As Scott Soames notes, ―the problem…is that such rules are themselves made up of words or symbols which must be understood if the rules are to be any use. Obviously this sort of explanation cannot go on forever,‖ (Soames 2003: 33). In order to know how to follow a rule, we need to know what the rule means. A rule doesn‘t carry its meaning on its face; it needs to be interpreted. But in order to do this we need to invoke yet more rules. It would seem, then, that internalized rules cannot play the role of criteria of correctness, on pain of infinite regress. So much for rules. But why not say that the man with the diary can appeal to his belief that he is now having the same sensation that he had when he originally marked ‗S‘ in his diary in order to determine that he is using ‗S‘ correctly? Why can‘t the beliefs (or intentions) of a speaker determine when she is using an expression correctly and when she is not? The trouble is that beliefs, intentions, and other contentful mental states must — just like rules — get their content from somewhere, and so we run into the same regress problem that bedeviled appealing to internalized rules (cf. Soames 2003: 34).2 If someone were to behave as if they understood a language of which no one else can make sense, we might call this an example of a private language. It is not sufficient here, however, for the language to simply be one that has not yet been translated. In order to count as a private language in Wittgenstein's sense, it must be in principle incapable of translation into an ordinary language – if for example it were to describe those inner experiences supposed to be inaccessible to others. The private language being considered is not simply a language in fact understood by one person, but a language that in principle can only be understood by one person. So the last speaker of a dying language would not be speaking a private language, since the language remains in principle learnable. A private language must be unlearnable and untranslatable, and yet it must appear that the speaker is able to make sense of it. Wittgenstein sets up a thought experiment in which someone is imagined to associate some recurrent sensation with a symbol by writing S in their calendar when the sensation occurs. Such a case would be a private language in the Wittgensteinian sense. Furthermore, it is presupposed that S cannot be defined using other terms, for example "the feeling I get when the manometer rises"; for to do so would be to give S a place in our public language, in which case S could not be a statement in a private language. It might be supposed that one might use "a kind of ostensive definition" for S, by focusing on the sensation and on the symbol. Early in The Investigations, Wittgenstein attacks the usefulness of 56

ostensive definition. He considers the example of someone pointing to two nuts while saying "This is called two". How does it come about that the listener associates this with the number of items, rather than the type of nut, their colour, or even a compass direction? One conclusion of this is that to participate in an ostensive definition presupposes an understanding of the process and context involved, of the form of life. Another is that "an ostensive definition can be variously interpreted in every case". In the case of the sensation S Wittgenstein argues that there is no criterion for the correctness of such an ostensive definition, since whatever seems right will be right, 'And that only means that here we can't talk about "right". The exact reason for the rejection of private language has been contentious. One interpretation, which has been called memory scepticism, has it that one might remember the sensation wrongly, and that as a result one might misuse the term S . The other, called meaning scepticism, has it that one can never be sure of the meaning of a term defined in this way. However, memory scepticism has been criticized as applying to public language, also. If one person can misremember, it is entirely possible that several people can misremember. So memory scepticism could be applied with equal effect to ostensive definitions given in a public language. For example, Jim and Jenny might one day decide to call some particular tree T; but the next day both misremember which tree it was they named. If they were depending entirely on their memory, and had not written down the location of the tree, or told anyone else, then they would appear to be with the same difficulties as the individual who defined S ostensively. And so, if this is the case, the argument presented against private language would apply equally to public language. This interpretation (and the criticism of Wittgenstein that arises from it) is based on a complete misreading however, because Wittgenstein's argument has nothing to do with the fallibility of human memory but rather concerns the intelligibility of remembering something for which there is no external criterion of correctness. It is not that we will not, in fact, remember the sensation correctly, but rather that it makes no sense to talk about our memory being either correct or incorrect in this case. The point, as Diego Marconi puts it is not so much that private language is "a game at which we can't win, it is a game we can't lose". Wittgenstein explains this unintelligibility with a series of analogies. For example, he observed the pointlessness of a dictionary that exists only in the imagination. Since the idea of a dictionary is to justify the translation of one word by another, and thus constitute the reference of justification for such a translation, all this is lost the moment we talk of a dictionary in the imagination; for ―justification consists in appealing to something independent". Hence, to appeal to a private ostensive definition as the standard of correct use of a term would be "as if someone were to buy several copies of the morning paper to assure himself that what it said was true." 57

Another interpretation, found for example in the account presented by Anthony Kenny has it that the problem with a private ostensive definition is not just that it might be misremembered, but that such a definition cannot lead to a meaningful statement. Let us first consider a case of ostensive definition in a public language. Jim and Jenny might one day decide to call some particular tree T; but the next day misremember which tree it was they named. In this ordinary language case, it makes sense to ask questions such as "is this the tree we named T yesterday?" and make statements such as "This is not the tree we named T yesterday". So one can appeal to other parts of the form of life, perhaps arguing: "this is the only Oak in the forest; T was an oak; therefore this is T". An everyday ostensive definition is embedded in a public language, and so in the form of life in which that language occurs. Participation in a public form of life enables correction to occur. That is, in the case of a public language there are other ways to check the use of a term that has been ostensively defined. We can justify our use of the new name T by making the ostensive definition more or less explicit. But this is not the case with S. Recall that because S is part of a private language, it is not possible to provide an explicit definition of S. The only possible definition is the private, ostensive one of associating S with that feeling. But this is the very thing being questioned. "Imagine someone saying: 'But I know how tall I am!' and laying his hand on top of his head to prove it." A recurrent theme in Wittgenstein's work is that for some term or utterance to have a sense, it must be conceivable that it be doubted. For Wittgenstein, tautologies do not have sense, do not say anything, and so do not admit of doubt. But furthermore, if any other sort of utterance does not admit of doubt, it must be senseless Rush Rhees in his notes on lectures given by Wittgenstein, while discussing the reality of physical objects, has him say: We get something similar when we write a tautology like "p → p". We formulate such expressions to get something in which there is no doubt – even though the sense has vanished with the doubt. As Kenny put it, "Even to think falsely that something is S, I must know the meaning of S; and this is what Wittgenstein argues is impossible in the private language." Because there is no way to check the meaning (or use) of S apart from that private ostensive act of definition, it is not possible to know what S means. The sense has vanished with the doubt. Wittgenstein uses the further analogy of the left hand giving the right hand money. The physical act might take place, but the transaction could not count as a gift. Similarly, one might say S while focusing on a sensation, but no act of naming has occurred. 58

The beetle-in-a-box is a famous thought experiment that Wittgenstein introduces in the context of his investigation of pains. Pains occupy a distinct and vital place in the philosophy of mind for several reasons. One is that pains seem to collapse the appearance/reality distinction. If an object appears to you to be red it might not be so in reality, but if you seem to yourself to be in pain you must be so: there can be no case here of seeming at all. At the same time, one cannot feel another person's pain, but only infer it from their behavior and their reports of it. If we accept pains as special qualia known absolutely but exclusively by the solitary minds that perceive them, this may be taken to ground a Cartesian view of the self and consciousness. Our consciousness, of pains anyway, would seem unassailable. Against this, one might acknowledge the absolute fact of one's own pain, but claim skepticism about the existence of anyone else's pains. Alternatively, one might take a behaviorist line and claim that our pains are merely neurological stimulations accompanied by a disposition to behave. Wittgenstein invites readers to imagine a community in which the individuals each have a box containing a "beetle". "No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle." If the "beetle" had a use in the language of these people, it could not be as the name of something – because it is entirely possible that each person had something completely different in their box, or even that the thing in the box constantly changed, or that each box was in fact empty. The content of the box is irrelevant to whatever language game it is used in. By analogy, it does not matter that one cannot experience another's subjective sensations. Unless talk of such subjective experience is learned through public experience the actual content is irrelevant; all we can discuss is what is available in our public language. By offering the "beetle" as an analogy to pains, Wittgenstein suggests that the case of pains is not really amenable to the uses philosophers would make of it. "That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of 'object and designation', the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant." Conclusion: The

private

language

argument

appears

part

Wittgenstein‘s

posthumous

epic Philosophical Investigations, part one of which consists of 693 numbered remarks, which were arranged by Wittgenstein himself, and few of which are more than a page in length. Part two was assembled after his death and is more loosely structured, with fourteen sections of various lengths. Wittgenstein first raises the idea of a private language in remark of part one. He says: ―But could we also imagine a language in which a person could write down or give vocal expression to his inner 59

experiences – his feeling, moods, and the rest – for his private use? – Well, can‘t we do so in our ordinary language? – But that is not what I mean. The individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language.‖ The last point at which he mentions private language is in p. 275, and the main attack that is considered to be ‗the private language argument‘ occurs between these two remarks, although Wittgenstein continues to discuss related issues concerning sensations (pain in particular) until around p.317. Something that most commentators will agree on is that one of Wittgenstein‘s main aims is to show that such a private language is impossible, and that even if it were possible it would be completely useless. But this is just one strand of the argument. Intertwined with the remarks about private language is a separate but related discussion about the relationship between public language and private sensations. In fact, these two interwoven strands are so closely related that one could see them as two sides of the same coin. But as suggested above, the range of possible interpretations is vast, and before we start thinking about what it could all mean, we should first take a look at what Wittgenstein actually said. Notes and References: 1. O. R. Jones (ed.), Private Language Argument , London: Machmillam, 1970, introduction. 2. Alston, W.P (1964) Philosophy Of Language, New delhi. PHI Learning private limited 3. Copi - I.M. (1979) Symbolic Logic, 5th ed New Delhi Pearson, Prentice Hall. 4. Wittgenstein, Tractatus, introduction by Bertrand Russel F.R.S.P.XIV 5. Wittgenstein L (2001) Tractatus (New York Routledge). 6. L. Wittgenstein, Private Experience‘, ed. 7-8 Rush Rhees, Philosophical Review, LXXVII, 1968 7. The Blue and Brown Books , Oxford; Basil- Blackwell, 1960; p. 69. 8. Zettle , Oxford: Basil Blakwell, 1947, p. 571 9. cf. L. Wittgenstein; private experience. 10. Binkley, Timothy (1973) Wittgenstein Language, The Hague, Nijoff 11. Cf. W. Todd, Wittgenstein On Private Language, Philosophical Quarterly, 12 (1962). 12. Tantray, M. A. & Atequllah D. (2016). ―Nature of Philosophy‖, International Journal of Humanities and Social Studies. Vol. 4, Issue 12. 13. Tantray, M. A. & Tariq Rafeeq Khan, Language and Education: A critical approach to Gandhi and Wittgenstein, Lokayata: Journal of Positive Philosophy, Sept. 2019, Vol. X, (02), 68-74. 14. Tantray, M. A. (2016). ―Proposition: The foundation of logic‖, International Journal of Social Studies and Humanities Invention. Vol-3, Issue-2, pp-1841-1844. 60

15. Tantray, M. A. (2018)., Reason, authority and consciousness: An analytical approach to Religious pluralism, International Journal of Creative Research Thoughts, 6 (1), 832-834. 16. Tantray, Mudasir A. (2017). A critical relation between mind and logic in the philosophy of Wittgenstein: An Analytical Study. Lokayata Journal of Postive Philosophy, 7(2). 17. Tantray, Mudasir A. (2018). Wittgenstein on critique of language, International Journal of Creative Research Thoughts, 6 (1), 5-9. 18. Tantray, M. A. & et. al. (2020). Nature of Analytical Philosophy. Ravenshaw Journal of Philosophy. vol. 6. 16-31. 19. Tantray, M. A. (2020). Philosophical Grammar: Wittgenstein and Chomsky. Lokayata: Journal of Positive Philosophy. 11. (01-02), 7-21. 20. Tantray, M. A. (2017). A Critical Relation between Mind and logic in the philosophy of Wittgenstein: An Analytical Study. 8 (2), 45-57.

Report of the Programme ICPR, New Delhi Sponsored Indian Philosopher’s Day

The Department of Philosophy and the Department of Sanskrit, Post Graduate Govt. College, Sector46, Chandigarh organized ―Indian Philosopher‘s Day‖ on 9th October, 2021 on the theme ―Indian Ethics‖. Prof. (Dr.) Abha Sudarshan, the Principal of Post Graduate Govt. College, Sector-46, Chandigarh gave a floral welcome to the guests and introduced the distinguished speakers and told that the Indian Philosopher‘s Day is celebrated to commemorate the birth anniversary of Adi Shankaracharya on Panchami tithi of Vaishakh Shukla Paksha. The invitees included Prof. Lakhvir Singh (Head, Department of Sanskrit, Post Graduate Govt. College for Girls, Sector-42, Chandigarh), Mr. Lallan Singh Baghel (Chairman, Department of Philosophy, Panjab University, Chandigarh), Dr. Shivani Sharma (Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, Panjab University, Chandigarh) and Dr. Ashutosh Angiras (Associate Professor, Department of Sanskrit, Sanatan Dharma College, Ambala Cantt.(Haryana). In the first lecture, Prof. Lakhvir Singh, Head, Department of Sanskrit, Post Graduate Govt. College for Girls, Sector-42, Chandigarh delivered a talk on ―Shrimadbhagvadgita: A Wonderful Book of Art of Living‖. He discussed the relevance of the ethics of Gita in the modern times. According to him, today we are very much focused on materialistic pleasures of life and we can see the decline in the social values and morality in this digital age. He said Lord Krishna is a source of inspiration even today as he stated the purpose of life for everyone. He also emphasized that one should focus on karma, not on its 62

result. A balanced mind can only be achieved through the end of all desires. A healthy diet and a proper schedule are important factors in achieving success along with physical and mental well-being. Yuktahara (Right Food and other inputs) advocates appropriate food and food habits for a healthy living. However, practice of Dhyana (Meditation) helping in self-realization leading to transcendence is considered as the esssence of Yoga Sadhana (The Practice of Yoga). He also stressed upon the purity of soul, high morality and good deeds. He concluded that ancient scriptures are still relevant in the contemporary age. In the second lecture, Mr. Lallan S. Bhagel, Chairperson, Department of Philosophy, Panjab University Chandigarh made a presentation on the theme ―Deconstructing the idea of ‗Compassion and Empathy‘ in Buddhist Ethics: Some Philosophical Narratives from Ambedkar‘s Normative Vision‖. He discussed Dr. B. R. Ambedkar‘s approach to Buddhism in detail and reflected upon its basic characteristics. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar recognizes three most important elements in Buddhism: Compassion, Empathy and Friendship i.e. he believed that ―mukti‖ cannot be achieved unless the suffering of the others end. The concept of compassion and empathy are found in Mahayana Buddhism. He also discussed about caste system in India and showed the relevance of compassion, empathy and friendship for Indian social system. Sant Kabir in the 15th century was also a vocal opponent of the caste system around 500 years before Dr. B.R. Ambedkar. Untouchablity has been rooted in the Indian social structure from centuries and a lack of compassion and empathy has been considered as one of the major factors in its growth. The concept of fraternity, popularized by French revolution has also been recognized by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, as one of the most crucial concepts in Buddhism. Compassion, empathy and friendship are crucial in bridging the gap in the contemporary world. Comparing Buddhism with Hinduism, Ambedkar writes, ―Hinduism is a religion which is not founded on morality. Morality is a separate force which is sustained by social necessities and not by injunction of Hindu religion. The religion of Buddha is morality. It is imbedded in religion. It is true that in Buddhism there is no God. In place of God there is morality. What God is to other religions, morality is to Buddhism.‖ Ambedkar then differentiates between ‗Dharma‘ (Hinduism) and ‗Dhamma‘ (Buddhism). ―The Vedic meaning of the word ‖Dharma‖ did not connote morality in any sense of the word. The Dharma as enunciated by the Brahmins meant nothing more than the performances of certain karmas or observances, i.e. Yagans, Yagas and sacrifices to Gods. The word Dhamma, as used by the Buddha, had nothing to do with ritual or observances. In place of Karma, Buddha substituted morality as the essence of Dhamma.‖ In the third lecture Dr. Ashutosh Angiras, Associate Professor, Department of Sanskrit, Sanatan Dharma College, Amabala Cantt. (Haryana) delivered his talk on ―Critique of Form & Essence of 63

Yogic Philosophy in 21st Century‖. He discussed the philosophy of Mahrishi Patanjali with its basic characteristics and reflected upon relevance of Yoga ethics in modern times. He said that yoga practice has many benefits in behavioural transformation of a man. It upgrades his/her mental strength. It also helps us to manage our time well and helps us to control the flow of emotions and reactions and helps us to take decision well. The importance of yoga in modern life is abundant. Yoga teaches us the knowledge of how to lead a healthy life. It improves our concentration, creativity and sharpens our memory. Another importance of yoga in modern life can be that yoga improves our muscle strength, stamina and brings immune and mental stability. In the fourth lecture Dr. Shivani Sharma, Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, Panjab University, Chandigarh delivered her talk on ―Being Virtuous: Exploring the Domain of ValueSystem‖. She explored the value-system of ancient Indian culture and religion. She also compared both Indian and western value systems. She emphasized on the encouragement of the practice of questioning and the learning process of the methodology of questioning in Indian tradition. The purpose of life is happiness. However, rationality is the mean to achieve happiness. Both Western and Indian schools of thought reason that knowledge is the light that leads us away from darkness of irrationality and ignorance. Indian culture plays an important role in inculcating values. There are four main values of life that have been highlighted from Vedic periods that have been considered as basic values. They are Dharma (righteousness), Artha (wealth), Kama (enjoyment) and Moksa (salvation or liberation). This programme had an interactive session in the end and students discussed various concepts related to the lectures such as Indian ethics, Gita, Purusarthas, Buddhist ethics and yoga ethics and got clarification from the esteemed speakers. These lectures were related to students‘ graduation syllabus and they enjoyed and reflected what they learnt from the scholars. All the lectures were highly participative and the interaction between the delegates and speakers yielded a fruitful discussion. Dr. Ramandeep Kaur, Convener of the event, proposed Vote of thanks and pointed out that the present lectures are a significant step to teach and acquaint students with basic themes of the subject through the experts. Dr. Rajesh Kumar (Dean), Dr. Simmi Arora (Vice-Principal) and more than 100 faculty members, and students from college and various institutions of Chandigarh participated in the event. Dr. Desh Raj Sirswal, Head, Department of Philosophy coordinated the event.

Contributors to this Issue Dr. Mudasir Ahmad Tantray, Assistant professor at Govt. M. A. M College Jammu. Ms. Neetu Bhandari, Ph. D Research Scholar, Department of Philosophy, Panjab university, Chandigarh. Mr. Ifrah Mohiuddin, Research Scholar (English), Islamic University of Science and Technology Awantipora. Mr. Sami Jan, Associate Professor, Govt. College for Womens M. A. Road Srinagar (Cluster University). Ms. Nibedita Sabat, Research Scholar, Department of Philosophy, Govt. Hamidia Arts & Commerce College, Bhopal. Mr. Manoranjan Dwibedy, Lecturer in Logic & Philosophy Maa Basulee Degree Mahavidyalaya AT/PO/VIA/PS-Thakurmunda Dist.-Mayurbhanj. (Odisha) Mr. Lalruatfela, Faculty, Department of Philosophy, Aizawl, India.

Pachhunga University College,

Mr. Temjenkala Jamir Department of Philosophy, North Eastern Hill University, Shillong, Meghalaya. Fayaz Ahmad Sofi, Research Scholar at Dept. of Postgraduate Studies and Research in Philosophy, Rani Durgavati University, Jabalpur Prof. Priyavrat Shukla, Dept. of Postgraduate Studies and Research in Philosophy, Rani Durgavati University, Jabalpur.

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CPPIS, Pehowa (Kurukshetra) Centre for Positive Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Studies (CPPIS) Pehowa is a joint academic venture of Milestone Education Society (Regd.) Pehowa and Society for Positive Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Studies (SPPIS), Haryana (online) to do fundamental research in the field of Humanities and Social Sciences. SPPIS Newsletter The Centre also circulates a Newsletter, which includes new information related to events, new articles and programme details. One can register himself on the below given address and will get regular updates from us. Link for registration: http://positivephilosophy.webs.com/apps/auth/signup

All contributions to the Journal, other editorial enquiries and books for review are to be sent to: Dr. Desh Raj Sirswal, Chief-Editor, Lokāyata: Journal of Positive Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, Post Graduate Govt College, Sector-46, Chandigarh Mobile No.09896848775, 08288883993 E-mail: cppiskkr@gmail.com Website: http://lokayatajournal.webs.com

“My objective is to achieve an intellectual detachment from all philosophical systems, and not to solve specific philosophical problems, but to become sensitively aware of what it is when we philosophise.” - Dr. Desh Raj Sirswal

Lokayata: Journal of Positive Philosophy, Vol. XII ( 01 & 02) September 2021

Articles inside

Contributors to this issue 65

Nature of Existentialism : Sami Jan 40-52

Report of the Programme 62-64

Wittgensteins Private Language Argument: Fayaz Ahmad Sofi Priyavrat Shukla

Concept of Perception: A Critical Study with Reference to Nyaya and Charvaka: Ifrah Mohiuddin & Sami Jan

Impact of Buddhist Philosophy on Odia Language and Literature An Appraisal : Manoranjan Dwibedy

Cosmopolitanism and Plurality of Culture: Lalruatfela & Temjenkala Jamir