High Court Judgments

Dr Michelle Sharpe

Castan Chambers, Melbourne

Res Judicata

Foreign divorce

In Clayton v Bant [2020] HCA 44 (2 December 2020) the High Court was asked to determine whether Ms Clayton’s proceedings in the Family Court of Australia (Family Court) were precluded by a ruling made by the Personal Status Court of Dubai (Dubai Court) in divorce proceedings brought by Mr Bant. Ms Clayton and Mr Bant (not their real names) were married for about five years and had a child. Ms Clayton is an Australian citizen and Mr Bant is a citizen of the United Arab Emirates (UAE). They were married in a Sharia court. Marriage under Personal Status Law of the UAE is a formal contract in which provision can be made for a husband to pay dowry to a wife. The written contract here provided for Mr Bant to pay Ms Clayton an “advanced” dowry of AED 100,000 and a “deferred” dowry of the same amount in the event of death or divorce. Mr Bant owns real and personal property in the UAE and many other parts of the world. Ms Clayton owns personal property in UAE. Both own real property in Australia. Ms Clayton left Mr Bant and returned to live in Australia with their child. When Ms Clayton commenced proceedings in the Family Court seeking parenting and, later, orders for property settlement pursuant to ss74 and 79 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (Family Law Act), Mr Bant commenced proceedings in the Dubai Court seeking a divorce. Mr Bant also sought orders for the extinguishment of all of Ms Clayton’s marital rights associated with the divorce in terms of alimony and the deferred dowry. Ms Clayton was notified of the Dubai proceedings but did not appear. The Dubai Court made a ruling in which Mr Bant was granted an “irrevocable fault-based divorce” dissolving the marriage (Dubai Ruling). The Dubai Ruling went on to order Ms Clayton to refund the advanced dowry and pay Mr Bant’s legal costs. In respect of the alimony and deferred dowry, the Dubai Court considered that “this subject is untimely”. Mr Bant subsequently sought a permanent stay of the Family Court proceedings. At first instance, Mr Bant’s application was dismissed. Mr Bant successfully appealed that decision and the Full Court ordered a permanent stay. Ms Clayton then appealed and the High Court unanimously overturned the Full Court’s decision. Keifel CJ and Bell and Gageler JJ gave reasons for their decision in a joint judgment. Gordon and Edelman JJ each delivered separate judgments.

Edelman J observed at [65] four separate rules of finality relevantly applied here. First, res judicata (Latin for “a thing decided”) or the doctrine of merger. The High Court noted at [66] that the doctrine is not just about the finality of litigation. It describes the extinguishment of an independent prior right. That is, when the court order “replicates” the prior right with consequences, such as enforcement mechanisms, the prior right no longer has an independent existence, instead it has merged with the order. Second, cause of action or claim estoppel. If a judgment has finally resolved a conflict about a cause of action then the parties will be precluded from relitigating that cause of action. Third, issue estoppel. If it is necessary for the final resolution of a dispute to determine an ultimate issue of fact or law then the parties will be precluded from denying a state of fact or law inconsistent with that resolution. Finally, Anshun estoppel (or the extended principle in Henderson v Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 100). This rule was recognised in Henderson and Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd (1981) 147 CLR 589. It is an extension of the second and third rules outlined above. The rule precludes a party from raising a cause of action or an issue in a new proceeding if it was so relevant to the subject matter of the previous, resolved, proceeding that it would have been unreasonable not to have raised it in that resolved proceeding at the time. The High Court determined that the Dubai Ruling did not give rise to res judicata because the Dubai Ruling did not, and could not, determine Ms Clayton’s rights under the Family Law Act. As for estoppel (rules 2, 3 and 4) the High Court observed at [30] that Mr Bant bore the onus of proving it. The High Court considered that Mr Bant failed to prove (or at [31] “did not deign to prove”) that it was unreasonable for Ms Clayton to raise her Family Court claims in the Dubai Court (in order to establish an Anshun estoppel). But, more fundamentally, Mr Bant failed to prove substantial correspondence between Ms Clayton’s Family Court claims and any right that might have been asserted by her and was finally determined in the Dubai Court. The High Court noted at [40] and [56] that the only rights that Ms Clayton could have legally put into issue in the Dubai Court was her entitlement to the deferred dowry and to her share in any real property in Dubai (the Dubai Court having no power to alter their interests in property outside the UAE). As Edelman J observed at [64], the proper characterisation of the Dubai Ruling was that the only claim it resolved was the dissolution of the marriage.

Admissibility of evidence

In Roy v O’Neill [2020] HCA 45 (9 December 2020) the High Court was required to consider whether a police officer was trespassing on private property when he administered a breath test, the results of which were used in evidence against the appellant (Ms Roy). A Domestic Violence Order (DVO) was issued against Ms Roy out of the Local Court of the Northern Territory of Australia. The purpose of the DVO was to protect Ms Roy’s partner, Mr Johnson. The DVO restrained Ms Roy from being in the company of Mr Johnson, or at a place where he lived, when she was consuming alcohol. Sometime after the DVO had been issued, Constable Elliott visited Mr Johnson’s home. At the time, the police in the Northern Territory were engaged in a “proactive policing” operation targeting domestic violence. Constable Elliott later gave evidence that he was concerned about Mr Johnson’s welfare. Mr Johnson lived in a unit in a public housing complex. Constable Elliott entered the complex from the footpath and walked along one of the pathways, shared by the units, to the door of Mr Johnson’s unit. Constable Elliott knocked on the flyscreen door and, looking in, saw Mr Johnson seated on the couch and Ms Roy lying on the floor. Constable Elliott called Ms Roy to the door. As Ms Roy approached the door, she displayed signs of intoxication. Constable Elliott required Ms Roy to provide a breath test and Ms Roy complied. The machine gave a positive reading for alcohol and the results were subsequently used against Ms Roy in proceedings against her for breaching the terms of the DVO. At trial, evidence of the breath test result was objected to. Constable Elliott asserted that when he took the breath sample, he was exercising power under reg 6 of the Domestic and Family Violence Regulations (NT) (Regulations). Regulation 6 requires a defendant to comply with a reasonable direction by a police officer to submit to a breath test. For the direction to be reasonable, it is not necessary for the officer to suspect that the defendant has consumed alcohol. But, importantly, the regulation does not authorise a police officer to enter private property. Section 126(2A) of the Police Administration Act (NT) (Act) though does authorise entry if the officer believes, on reasonable grounds, that a contravention has occurred. The trial judge found that neither the Regulations nor the Act gave Constable Elliott power to attend Mr Johnson’s home to check Ms Roy’s compliance with the DVO. The decision was overturned by the Court of Appeal of the Northern Territory. And the High Court, in a 3:2 split, upheld the Appeal Court’s decision.

Keifel CJ and Keane and Edelman JJ (the latter two justices in a joint judgment) considered that Constable Elliott was not a trespasser at the time that he administered the breath test. Their Honours noted at [11] and [66] that to lawfully enter private property permission to enter must first be given by the occupier. And that permission, their Honours observed, can be implied. Citing Halliday v Nevill (1984) 155 CLR 1, their Honours explained at [14] and [68] that a (revokable) licence to enter will be implied to walk on a path or driveway for the purpose of lawful communication, or delivery, to any person on the property if access is unobstructed and there is no notice, or other indication, that entry is prohibited. Their Honours considered that Constable Elliott lawfully entered onto the private premises because he used an unobstructed pathway to access the property for the lawful purpose of carrying out a welfare check. Keifel CJ at [19] also considered that when Constable Elliott saw Ms Roy in an intoxicated state, he had the requisite belief for the purposes of s126(2A) of the Act to remain on the property and require Ms Roy to provide a breath sample under reg 6 of the Regulations. But Keane and Edelman JJ at [93] thought it unnecessary to decide whether the Act or Regulations applied because it was an undisputed fact that Ms Roy had voluntarily provided a sample of her breath. Bell and Gageler JJ, in dissent, in a joint judgment redolent of the film “The Castle” opined, at [31] that “In the Australian way of thinking, a home is a sanctuary”. Their Honours recognised at [34] that the implied licence can be invoked by a police officer. But their Honours considered at [40] that a police officer exceeds the limits of that licence if the officer has any conditional or unconditional intention of ordering the occupier to do anything. Their Honours concluded that Constable Elliott was a trespasser because they considered that he intended to take a sample of Ms Roy’s breath when he entered onto the property and, as such, he had exceeded the limits of the implied licence.

Dr Michelle Sharpe is a Victorian barrister practising in general commercial, disciplinary and regulatory law, ph 9225 8722, email msharpe@vicbar.com.au. The full version of these judgments can be found at www.austlii.edu.au.