Extremism - Dissecting a Phenomenon

EXTREMISM -

Dissecting a Phenomenon

The First IPSA Annual Spring Symposium Sunday 18th October 2009

THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF CURRENT ISLAM The research wing of IPSA

Extremism - Dissecting a Phenomenon The First IPSA Annual Spring Symposium Sunday 18th October 2009

THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF CURRENT ISLAM The research wing of IPSA

c/o Johnson and Duine Rd. Rylands, 7764 Cape Town, South Africa Ph: +2721 6381121 Cell: +2779 9707750 E-mail: ferozaphillips@gmail.com

Table of contents FOREWORD: Prof. M. Faadiel Essop (Hajee Shah Sullaiman Shah Mahomed Trust) PREFACE: Mr LG Njenje (Head of National Intelligence Agency, Ministry of State Security) INTRODUCTION KEYNOTE ADDRESS: The Challenge of Extremism Sh. Siraj Hendricks (University of Johannesburg) DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTS: Muslim Extremism: Myth or Reality?

Dr. A. Rashied Omar (IPSA/University of Notre Dame) Fundamentalism, Extremism and Terrorism: Reviewing and Locating South African Muslims in the Texts Dr Muhammed Haron (University of Botswana) Defining Terrorism: Reflections on The South African Counter Terrorism Bill Dr. Lubna Nadvi (University of KwaZulu Natal) HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS: Political Rebellion in Sunni Muslim Thought Prof Yusouf Dadoo (UNISA) Shia Historical Experiences with Extremism: From the Kharijis to Al-Qaeda Maulana Syed Aftab Ahlul Bait Foundation of South Africa CASE STUDIES: Contextualising Jihad for Muslim Minorities: The Case of the London Bombings Prof. Suleman Dangor (University of KwaZulu Natal) Extremism and Contemporary Islamism(s): Mapping the Taliban and Al-Qaeda Junaid Ahmad (University of Cape Town) PRESS STATEMENTS THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF CURRENT ISLAM The research wing of IPSA

Foreword THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF CURRENT ISLAM The research wing of IPSA

page 2

Foreword Prof. M. Faadiel Essop (Hajee Shah Sullaiman Shah Mahomed Trust)

F

or some time I have been reflecting on how the global Muslim community (ummah) is c o p i n g w i t h contemporary challenges e.g. extremism, terrorism, women's rights, and tolerance. After much thought, my conclusion was 'not very well' and thus the idea of an annual symposium to robustly scrutinize contemporary ''burning issues'' was conceived.

The skeptic among us may question the merits of yet another meeting, or whether this exercise amounts to mere "talk-shops''.

These probing points may indeed be crystallized into a central question, what benefits would broader society derive from a symposium on Muslim extremism? Firstly, the symposium placed a major challenging issue, i.e. Muslim extremism, in the spotlight and thereby facilitated academic scholarship and debate around the issue.. Also, the focus of the symposium was on the 'within'', that is the notion that the extremist agenda stems from an apparent ideological basis already prevalent soon after the death of the Prophet Muhammad (may Allah's peace and blessings be upon him).

This is a crucial aspect since clear positions on this complex issue are not always readily available. For example, some argue that Muslim extremism is largely an external problem that will disappear if these factors are removed. Here the hypothesis put forward is that issues such as ''Muslim extremism'' form part of an intricate, global conspiracy to ''sidetrack'' and/or split Muslims into different factions. However, the first IPSA symposium seriously challenged this perception, largely as a result of extensive research into the precise origins of Muslim extremism.

This was spearheaded by a first-class panel of speakers and further developed by excellent inputs provided by the large audience that attended the meeting. Moreover, this thread continued after the symposium, in the form of vibrant discussions on our local Muslim radio stations.

As part of our plans to further extend the debate, abstracts presented at the symposium are found in this booklet and will be published and in local Muslim newspapers (Muslim Views and Al-Qalam).

We decided to focus on the phenomenon of ''extremism' for the 1st IPSA Spring Seminar since most Muslims are regularly confronted with the issue. The symposium hinged on a critical outlook and hence I believe the word ''dissecting'' in the subtitle is highly appropriate. For example, in my laboratory, students dissect hearts and break down tissues into smaller parts to analyze individual cells, genes and proteins. This is done to gain a clearer understanding of how perturbations of the heart cell's internal balance (or ''homeostasis'') may threaten the well-being of this vital organ and in fact the whole organism.

Likewise, our social scientists, historians and religious scholars critically dissected the phenomenon of ''extremism'' at the IPSA symposium to better understand its etiology and manifestations, and to begin to devise ''therapies'' to remedy or blunt potentially damaging effects.

The Shahmahomed Trust is excited to be part of this venture and the timing of the symposium also displays appropriate symbolism. Here we decided on a ''spring'' theme since it represents a time of hope, optimism and renewal. I am therefore optimistic that the annual IPSA Spring Symposium will become a landmark event on the calendar of South African Muslims since it provides a unique platform to critically and honestly examine challenging issues facing us as a community, and a distinct opportunity to ponder the consequences that such challenges may hold for our future growth, development and well-being as a global ummah, and to begin to provide viable alternatives to counter-act it.

Mr LG Njenje, (Head of National Intelligence Agency, Ministry of State Security) advancing the progress and development of our nation. This is evidenced by your valued contributions and benevolence in a range of areas such as social welfare, business, education and advancing the common shared objectives of t h e s t a t e .

Preface

Preface

I therefore trust that you will emerge from this symposium on extremism with deliberations that speak to the heart of the Muslim community, with a renewed commitment to further intensify in collaboration with government and other faith based communities to address the injustices of the past and that which we see still emerging. In so doing, may you be inspired by the spirit of the Quran that guides humanity to enjoin what is good and prohibit that which is evil, and through your active involvement, bring an end to all form of human suffering, which is the root to all i n s e c u r i t y .

I

am humbled by the opportunity provided to me to address this important meeting, more significantly because it takes place in that part of South Africa, where the earliest seeds of Islam were sowed by illustrious leaders such as Sheik Yusuf and Imam Abdulla Kadi Abdus Salaam affectionately known as Taun Guru, to name a f e w .

Our colonial history has marginalised our Muslim community of the Cape both racially and religiously and its contribution to the development and history of this country has been reduced in the media from food recipes to Gammatjie anecdotes. Our colonial heritage and the dehumanising aspects of slavery and subjugation have, in particular to the Cape, given distortions to names such as ABDULLA which became Abdol and in some cases names of respected imams such as FRANS VAN BENGAL were not known at all. The real history of the Muslim community, its struggles, tears and sacrifices have remained hidden and the voices of its people have been completely unheard. And finally when its history is written, it is done to support stereotypes we have grown accustomed to. It is symposiums such as these that play such a vital role in not only shaping our understanding and perspectives, but also altering our lexicon and the trajectory of our c o m m o n d e s t i n i e s .

The Muslim community of South Africa has played and continues to play a pivotal role in

I look forward to the respective presentations, confident of the fact that insightful and novel perspectives will emerge, thereby allowing us to consider extremism beyond its controversy and t h e m y o p i c v i e w s .

Threats of the contemporary world "The world is one village". This saying, I am sure you will agree, speaks directly to the theme discussion of contemporary religious extremism. Similarly, it demonstrates the complexity of the threats confronting us in today's interdependent global world, where our national security is so closely tied to that of our region, our continent and the wider world.

Not only do these threats know no boundaries, but they are wide-ranging, originate in the domestic and foreign arena and stem from state and non-state actors. They include intra- and inter state conflict, terrorism, nuclear, chemical and biological weapons proliferation, subversion, sabotage, transnational crime and corruption, illegal migration, and drugs, small arms and human trafficking syndicates.

They go well-beyond the so-called hard security concerns, to encompass poverty, underdevelopment, marginalisation, environmental degradation, pandemics, disease, and human-made and natural disasters.

They are fuelled by heightened competition for scarce natural resources, leading to a greater potential for instability, further increasing the insecurity of those that are already vulnerable.

And, if realised, they pose a real danger to our constitutional order, the integrity of the state, and the well-being and livelihoods of our

THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF CURRENT ISLAM The research wing of IPSA

page 3

Socio-economic issues In particular, socio-economic issues underpin and continue to drive the risks to our stability. To this end, South Africa is witnessing sporadic incidents of social as well as industrial protest, sometimes of a violent and disruptive nature, which are linked to various forms of socioeconomic deprivation. The world-wide financial downturn, together with the global food and energy crises, are undoubtedly acting as accelerating factors in this r e g a r d .

p

e

o

p

l

e

.

It is these realities that have informed our government's approach to national security.

As such, we acknowledge our responsibility as a country, born of our common humanity and the shared dangers confronting us, to work with others in promoting the security of one and all. Concerns of the Muslim community, informed by fear of victimisation and arbitrary security scrutiny, has become a widespread international practice which we as a g o v e r n m e n t c o n d e m n .

We recognise the interconnection between security, development and a respect for human rights. Accordingly, we believe that there can be no security without development, no development without security, and there can be neither without a respect for human rights. This approach is reflected in the policy and legislative framework governing our government's activities in maintaining, defending and upholding our national security. It derives from our constitutional injunction, which among others directs government to ensure that national security reflects "the resolve of South Africans as individuals and as a nation to live as equals, to live in peace and harmony, to be free from fear ‌(South African Constitution, 1996) South Africa's Security Priorities

THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF CURRENT ISLAM The research wing of IPSA

page 4

Although we do not discern an overriding or major domestic threat to our national security, there are some developments which are areas of concern.

As government we are sympathetic to the genuine grievances of our people. We are working hard to address their legitimate concerns, as reflected in the ten priorities that constitute government's programme of action, as outlined in deepen our information-sharing arrangements with our partners in state at home as well as with those on the continent and further afield.

T

e

r

r

o

r

i

s

m

I now wish to turn my attention to the threat of terrorism and our policies and strategies in this regard, which you are concerned about. The recent attacks in President Zuma's State of the Nation Address in June this year. We also appreciate that protest is a healthy aspect of any democracy and respect the right of our people to take to the streets to register their dissatisfactions. However, we cannot condone violent or unlawful b e h a v i o u r .

O r g a n i s e d c r i m e Combating violent crime remains a key priority in the next five years. It threatens citizens in our homes, streets and workplaces. The gun is by far the most common instrument used in all forms of violent crime. As a nation we have to join hands in reducing guns in our society and earnestly start a journey towards a gun-free n a t i o n .

Organised crime, much of which is transnational, has an extremely destructive impact on our society. We are particularly concerned with the new forms of organised crime, such as illicit or illegal mining, which is violent in nature, robbing our economy of over billions per annum and has a market in North America, Europe and Asia.

Indonesia, Iraq and Afghanistan and media reports of alleged cells operating in South Africa have once again under-scored the need to find effective solutions to prevent and combat all forms of t e r r o r i s m .

Whilst a terrorist attack on our soil remains unlikely and whilst government has demonstrated a solid track record in countering this threat, we remain vigilant, as no country can claim total immunity. In addition, we have been hard at work to ensure that our defences are in place so that terrorists are not in a position to exploit our territory as a transit point, nor make use of our travel documentation, our infrastructure or financial systems to mount an attack on another state.

Unsubstantiated statements by individuals, purportedly speaking on behalf of the community should be questioned and countered as it unnecessarily raises suspicion about the community. Likewise, the community should be vigilant about extremist views being bandit about in the community that could provide the opportunity to be exploited.

Cooperation for countering terrorism South Africa contributes meaningfully towards enhancing global security and building a safer world. Acting through, and in conjunction with the United Nations, other international, continental and regional organisations, we are working towards building international consensus and the promotion of international standards for countering terrorism.

Continentally, South Africa is a signatory to the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (1999), the Algiers Plan of Action of the African Union for the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in Africa (2002), which is aimed at operationalising the OAU C o n v e n t i o n .

In this regard, we embrace the African Union operational definition on matters related to terrorism, which defines the phrase "terrorist act", rather than "terrorism", as it is easier to classify the former. The definition further reflects "terrorist act" as a non-conventional conflict and specifically excludes the activities of liberation movements', which are conceptually and morally different from those of terrorist

o

r

g

a

n

i

s

a

t

i

o

n

s

.

The requirements of these international and continental counter-terrorism instruments find expression in South Africa's Constitution.

C

o

n

c

l

u

s

i

o

n

Chairperson, ladies and gentlemen, whilst the challenges no doubt remain, I hope I have demonstrated the enormous strides that we have made as a country in preventing the rise of religious extremism through the pursuit of ongoing partnerships, which we will and must continue to strengthen over the period ahead.

In conclusion, allow me to re-iterate the importance of previous cooperation with the Muslim community and to underscore that the community must in anyway possible, counter balance religious extremist activities and views that would raise concerns that could bring into question the loyalty to this country of the South African Muslim community. In addition, we urge the community to recognise attempts to introduce, especially to the youth, religious ideas that could lead to the polarisation of the c o m m u n i t y .

I wish you well in your endeavours and salute this initiative to dissect and address the phenomenon of extremism.

I thank you.

THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF CURRENT ISLAM The research wing of IPSA

page 5

Introduction THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF CURRENT ISLAM The research wing of IPSA

page 6

THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF CURRENT ISLAM The research wing of IPSA

page 7

Keynote Address

The Challenge of Extremism Sh. Siraj Hendricks (University of Johannesburg) current hostility and animosity in that part of the world today, its quite mind boggling that there is so much we have in common with Jews. We can sit at the same table, eat the same food without a problem and yet we slaughter each other. The commonalities far exceed the manifestations of horror and destruction in the political world. Islam of course has a huge scope in mind.

K

halid Abu Fadl in his work 'The Great Theft' says the most emphatic moral values taught by Islam are mercy, compassion and peace. There can be no doubt that the central virtue in Islam is Mercy. No virtue is more emphasized in Islam than mercy. The prophet (S) spoke so much about mercy that the Sahaba said “but we are merciful towards our spouses and our children”. He said: “I mean rahma in the absolute sense towards each and everything.

Towards the world” I shall look at the issues of extremism and the challenges they pose through a model provided by Charles Liebmann in his paper 'Extremism as a religious norm' where he presents three components to an understanding of religious extremism.

I use this as a point of departure because I have serious differences with some of his assumptions. The paper deals with an examination of extremism within Judaic law and Judaism and I was astounded to find similarities between groupings within Israel and groupings within the Muslim world.

He categorises extremism into three categories.

The first is the expansion of religious law.

Number two is the question of social isolation.

Number three is cultural rejection. We know as Muslims, that the questions of assimilation and integration are serious issues although we sometimes misunderstand the precise difference between what assimilation and integration is.

Liebmann divides expansion of religious law into 3 components.

1.What is the scope of it?

THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF CURRENT ISLAM The research wing of IPSA

page 8

His view is that the scope is enormous, even in Judaic law. It includes the public level from government to the private level, into the details of our domestic lives. If we reflect on the

What do we mean and how do we understand things? Or how have we come to misunderstand things.

Any government has a legislative, executive wing and a judicial wing. For example accountability in Islam is ordinarily understood to be accountability towards Allah Subahanahu watalah. Show me one Muslim nation on the planet that has adequately demonstrated that they are indeed accountable to Allah Subahanahu watalah. Accountable to what? To some ineffable, transcendent, unintelligible being? They behave so, don't they? With their despotism, the autocracies, the monarchies, the lack of freedom, the repression of freedom, of association, of speech etc. I've studied there (in a Muslim country) for 11 years. I was a writer for a newspaper and I was banned on more than one occasion. I have more freedom talking here than I had in a hospital in Makkah.

It's not being anti-Saudi or anti-Iran or antiIraq, we should get out of that mindset. What we should develop is a mindset that, through our understanding of Islam, confronts various regimes. This does not exonerate other forces and other countries like for example the state department of the USA. How careful have they looked at their foreign policies. To what extent have they researched and analysed the impact that foreign occupation could have in other countries.

Robert Pate has written one of the most extensive works on terrorism. He links the extent of suicide bombing as a function of the extent of the occupation of certain countries.

It's a moot point that needs to be discussed, but he has opened the discussion.

The obvious fear here for both Muslims and non-Muslims, is that we might tacitly be trying to seek justification for the atrocities that we noticed and witnessed. But we should get away from that mindset too and try to understand what precisely the issues at hand are. There are trends and tendencies within Islamic history that do contribute to that. But

most Muslims and many non-Muslim friends consider the fact that Muslims alone have been earmarked for such a focus and criticism universally unfair.

When it comes to the issues of scope, we as Muslims need to think carefully how these forces interact. How do we interact with these components of Government, these modern institutions? What is the role of the legislature, the judiciary and the executive? With the bungling bureaucracy in all these places, it's difficult to sift through the morass around these things. And we need to understand that and not merely institute our relations around political opportunism. That is bad.

As Muslims our focus should not be opportunism. Our focus should be of being of benefit to humanity. So that is the first, the scope and how that application takes place. Do we for example allow non-Muslims into a Government supposedly constituted of Muslims or claiming to be an Islamic State? To what extent do we do that?

What was the role of the United States in abetting the Mujahideen in 1979? There was a radical Sunni backlash because of the fear of the dominance of the Iranian revolution. We cannot hide those tensions. All agreed with the USA policy to remove the communists from Afghanistan but they were, inexplicably, just left in 1989.

The fact is that there is a correspondence between those two phenomena, because the hatred of the Taliban Islam for the Shia minorities in their own country is awesome. So we need to understand these things. How does such a Government come about? Is it necessary for a Government in the modern world, as you understand it, to emerge in that particular way? But more important for us is to understand the spirit that underlies and drives all these things. A spirit that has made a great scholar of the 20th century, Moulana Fadlurahman Al-Ansari, say that he would reject any notion of an Islamic state if the likes of Abubakr, Umar, Sayyeduna Uthman and Sayyeduna Ali are not around, because of the immensity of the responsibility.

Islam is concerned about its image. Islam has certain sensitivities about how it is projected.

You have intellectual after intellectual, academic after academic, still pledging their commitment as committed believing Muslims because we have seen the trees from the wood. So the question of scope and how we imagine that to manifest itself within the real world is one of serious concern. What we do know is that the vast majority of Muslims in the world do not want to see an Islam in the Taliban form emerging, like it did in Afghanistan.

2. The elaboration of the details of the law.

Religious law requires modesty of dress, particularly among women. The question is, does the law require modesty? To what extent do we focus on these details? To what extent are we concerned whether the cuff of a person is the 2cm or 3cm that is measured under Taliban rule?

These are the draconian measures through which the freedoms and movement of people are limited. Liebmann goes on to say the first two components of extremism share a common characteristic. They emphasise the ordained and they limit the authority of the subjective, the optional and personal interpretation. They objectified the law in a hegemonic sense and they reduced the individual to respond and they are hell bent on reducing and limiting personal interpretation by people. They do not however minimise the importance of inward motivation.

They try to focus on this to motivate them, enculturate them to accepting certain codes.

The third component is very important and is the expansion of law. It is the question of strictness versus leniency. Aisha mentioned the Prophet (S) never did anything except that he chose the easier of the two. Be lenient and do not burden others.

Although I disagree in enormous ways with his understanding of the Khawarij and its impact on Islam today, J. Kennedy in “ Muslims rebels” quite acutely observes that Islam is minimalist in its approach, which it is, and not maximalist.

When it comes to the strictness of application you find the far right scale of extremism being maximalist. If you speak of moderation and leniency you find that they are turning towards the left, which tends towards the minimalist approach.

My own view of the Shariah as I have read it, is that it is minimalist and not maximalist and I am prepared to be challenged on that particular view. There are a number of texts that I can quote. The prophet (S) said, ”beware of extremism in the Deen “. A very pious sahaba heard the prophet(s) once saying “ those of you who say la ilaha illalah will enter jannah. He replied, “even if he fornicates and steals?” The prophet (S) replied, “even if he fornicates and steals”. After he asked him again a second and a third time, the prophet (S) became annoyed. He said “A person who fornicates and he steals will enter Jannah when they acknowledge the Tawhid of Allah. Regardless of your own whims.”

Regardless of your own sentiments. Those are your sentiments. Don't confuse sentiments with the religious law.

Abdullah Ibn Amr expelled his own son Bilaal, who stood up and said that they should ban women from coming to the Masajid after his

THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF CURRENT ISLAM The research wing of IPSA

page 9

Keynote Address

pollination. When the first Muslims landed on the coast of Malabar in India and on the Coromandel Coast, they immediately adopted the dress of those people. Hence creating that sense of camaraderie, that sense of respect for the culture of other people. They were so successful in the way in which they were respected, to the point where the Hindu authorities had granted them their own mosques and their own courts of law. Not because they demanded it but because they respected these people. So the whole issue of social isolation and cultural rejection within non-Muslim societies is an important one.

We live in these countries as so called minorities. But as minorities, we have to be careful because that can be a divisive notion. It can be one that sets you off against another. Islam is not supremacist in its outlook. We have to be very careful about that particular condition. Nationalism only emerged after the postcolonial period and not before that. Before that there were empires –each one struggled and fought for his land. Europe was at war with each other.

father had just quoted the Hadith that men should not prevent women from coming to the masajid. Bilaal got up and said again “ but what about the Fitna?” His father said “I am saying to you that the prophet (S) said, “do not deny women the Masajid.” – and he threw him out of the majlis. And the hadith goes on to say “and he never spoke to his son Bilaal until the day he died”. This is the commitment. We come up with all sort of stories, fitna. Are you or me qualified to decide what is fitna? Is Islam an aggressively patriarchal incarnation about lust or is it about power? It's about power. And we need to be careful about those things. Those are the details that we need to look at.

THE INSTITUTE OF CURRENT ISLAM The research wing of IPSA

page 18

The second fact he mentions is social isolation.

It's an attitude towards those elements of society that do not accept extremist norms, so they engage in a kind of social isolation and identity becomes firmly embedded and emphasized and the focus is not on that identity and it's sphere of integration and assimilation. That is the second one that he mentions.

The third one he mentions is cultural rejection, the rejection of cultural forms and values that are not perceived as indigenous to the religious tradition. There is no sense of cross-

What happened though was that Muslims in particular lost out in the battle and were confronted with a new set of values, new economic systems and industrial machines, in other words with modernity. The way the Christians at the time of the French revolution and the Muslims responded were different. Muslims responded to a post-Colonial phenomenon. The Orthodox Church and the church reacted against the radicals and the revolutionaries of the French revolution, which was fundamentally anticlerical. These things have worked themselves out only in recent years where a degree of tolerance in a democratic state has been attained but those confrontations are extremely violent. Muslims did not confront an overarching religious state with a centralized authority. It has never been so in Islamic history. And therefore our responses have been different. Our responses, unfortunately, were quite peculiar in particular cases. When the Ottoman Empire, believe it or not, was dissolved, the Turks didn't know what to refer themselves as. The response was an identity crisis.

The Egyptians today are still debating whether they are Egyptian or Arab. When it comes to question of identity, the Muslim identity is one of the ethic of spiritual nature. And it is ethical and spiritual. It is not national and ethnic. This is something that we need to be careful about

in understanding identities because identities can be vicious, it can be violent, and it can be extremely negative.

When it comes to Islamic law, the legal issues are very important. There are a number of categories. There are those things that are known by “necessity through the deen� ; we all do our salah, give zakat. There are those things that are mujma alay, particular acts that the entire Muslim community and scholarship has agreed upon and there are those that are muhtalafun fihi, acts where there is no agreement by the Muslim community and scholars. It is at the level of muhtalafun fihi, matters constituting more than 80% of our deen and of our legal history and culture, that the worst problems emerge.

for example, music, giving flowers, clapping, mouloud celebrations and so on. To invoke Islam in the pronunciation of matters that are muhtalafun fihi is absolutely astonishing and should not be happening in this community. As Muslim legal scholars, we should be careful about the process and the way in which we approach these things because that can divide the society. It can kill the livelihood of people.

It can impact in a way that is quite miserable, a way that you and I do not want to be privy to.

So when it comes to the way in which we generate our fatawah we need to understand these particular categories and know with certainty anything that is mujtahadun fihi. It is our moral duty and obligation in the issuing of a fatwah to mention ihtilaaf amongst the ulama.

These are critical matters that influence a very unsuspecting audience.

There are a number of issues: the role of women

THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF CURRENT ISLAM The research wing of IPSA

page 7

Definitions and Concepts

Muslim Extremism: Myth or Reality?

Imam Dr. A. Rashied Omar (IPSA/University of Notre Dame)

“We have made of you an ummah justly balanced (i.e. avoiding extremes) so that (with your lifestyles) you may be witnesses to humanity (of being a community of the middle way) as the Messenger bore witness (to this golden mean) unto you” (Qur'an, 2: 143).

The Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) understood the above Qur'anic imperative and worked tirelessly against tendencies of extremism prevalent amongst even some of his own followers. He is reported to have repeatedly proclaimed “The zealots/extremists will perish.”(Sahih Muslim). What then should our response be to what we perceive to be Muslim extremism in today's context?

Genesis of the Term The attacks on the United States of America in September 2001 and the Bush administration's subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have all served to reinforce the widespread perception that Islam is in some special way linked to extremism and violence. Even conventional academic perspectives regard Islam as having a predilection for extremism and violence. According to this view, Islam is defined as inherently violent and one of the primary sources of global conflict.

THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF CURRENT ISLAM The research wing of IPSA

page 10

In direct opposition to this perspective, Muslims often categorically deny that Islam has anything to do with extremism and violence. In their view, all violence in which individuals or groups who claim an Islamic affiliation are implicated, is either a conspiracy against Islam or alternatively, a vile distortion of the peaceful teachings of Islam. As with all received understandings, there are elements of truth in both of these formulations. The first formulation largely understates the contemporary socio-political and economic

conditions in which people affiliated to Islam are implicated in violence. The second formulation ignores the fact that virtually all Muslims accept that Islam is not a pacifist tradition. The overwhelming number of Muslim schools of law and theology permit and legitimate the use of violence under certain conditions mostly defensively, but some also authorize offensive violence.

Definitions of types of violence and condition differ from one Muslim scholar to the other. It is here that a large measure of the problem lies: Under what conditions does Islam condone the use of violence?

This critical dilemma is not unique to Islam. All religious traditions agonize about the question of what might constitute a “just war” and it becomes particularly acute in situations of deadly conflict. Three central points emerge from this that we need to bear in mind if we were to correctly appreciate the relationship between Muslims, extremism and violence.

The Text is as Moral as its Reader First, it is important for all of us to acknowledge that most, if not all, of our sacred texts provide opportunities for justifying violence. A pertinent example of this was the vociferous theological debate in South Africa concerning the Biblical perspective on Apartheid. The white supremacist policy of apartheid was formed in the name of Christianity. Many of the key leaders of the oppressive apartheid regime were also devout adherents of the Dutch Reformed Church. This led to an important theological document, the Kairos Document (1985), produced by black South African Christians to lament this by posing a challenging question: “Can the Bible be used for any purpose at all?”

The answer of course is yes. This is however not unique to the Bible, all sacred religious texts are open to ambivalent interpretations.

Arguing within the context of the Muslim sacred texts, the contemporary Muslim jurist, Khalid Abou El-Fadl has provided a cogent response to this issue. “The meaning of the text”, he contends, “is often as moral as its reader. If the reader is intolerant, hateful, or oppressive, so will be the interpretation of the text.”

with Jews and Christians (Ahl al-Kitab).”

A distressing Muslim example of this is the interpretations of Qur'anic texts and Prophetic traditions (ahadith) offered in the intermittent messages released by Usama bin Laden and his deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri, to justify hatred and violence. One of their so-called fatwas, urges Muslims to kill any and all American citizens including their allies – irrespective of whether they are civilians or military. They argue that such action is warranted in any country in which it is possible to do so, because American citizens pay taxes to their governments and thus there are no innocent civilians living in America or in the lands of their allies. Such action, they claim, is justified in reference to the Qur'anic verse 5 of Surah alTawbah (chapter 9): "Once the sacred months have passed, you may kill the idolaters when you encounter them, and take them [captive], and besiege them, and prepare for them each ambush. But if they repent and establish worship and pay the poordue, then leave their way free. God is Forgiving, Merciful.”

For these trained scholars and jurists, the Bin Laden-Zawahiri interpretation is unprecedented in Islamic scholarship. Taken to its logical conclusion, the Bin Laden-Zawahiri fatwa would mean that the millions of Muslims residing in the United States and Europe, as well as those non-Muslims, who oppose state policies, are legitimate targets in any “terrorist attacks.” Even more absurd, is the deduction that those who live in majority Muslim countries who are allies of the United States and pay taxes to their governments are also legitimate targets in Al-Qa`ida's war. It is obvious that the Bin Laden-Zawahiri interpretation of this text of the Qur'an has been manipulated to suit their political agendas. It is these kinds of interpretations that have fed into Islamophobic depictions of Islam as an extremist religion.

Freedom of Belief in Islam

This passage has received considerable exegetical attention from classical as well as modern Muslim scholars. The majority of Muslim scholars both past and present have argued that this verse cannot be generalized (`am) and that it relates to a limited context (khass). They point out that this verse was revealed at a time when hostilities between the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) and the enemies of Islam were frozen for a three month period.

During this difficult period, the Prophet (pbuh) encouraged the combatants to join the Muslim ranks, or leave the Muslim controlled areas in peace. If however they rejected both of these options and chose instead to continue with their aggression then the Muslims would have no alternative but to fight back until victory.

The concluding part of the above verse provides still another opportunity for forgiveness, mercy and clemency.

One way of responding to such manipulative interpretations of Muslim sacred texts, is to turn to the central Islamic principle of Tawhid (the Oneness of God). The genius of Islam lies in its strict Monotheism-the belief in the Oneness of God. Islam teaches that the more we embrace diversity in God's creation the closer we are to acknowledging the unity of God. It is essentially this creative paradox that escape Muslim extremists. The latter seek to homogenize Islam and the world and eliminate diversity and pluralism. Their worldview is not that of unity in diversity, but rather that of uniformity and regimentation. Extremists are predisposed to both civic as well as violent intolerance of both non-Muslims in general as well as fellow Muslims who espouse a different understanding of Islam. The latter are accused of working against the interest of Islam and consequently branded as hypocrites (munafiqun).

The vast majority of Muslim jurists conclude from the import and contextual significance of the above verse, that it was permitted to kill non-Muslims only if they posed a clear threat to Islam and Muslims. Moreover, many of the classical exegetes explain that this verse does not apply to Jews and Christians. Their discussion of the verses in question center on relations with the polytheists, to the exclusion of the “People of the Book.” For example, Imam al-Qurtubi (d.1272 CE), renowned for his exposition on the legal implications of the Qur'anic text, states, concerning the verse in question, “… it is permissible to [understand] that the expression 'polytheists' does not deal

In contradistinction to the extremist perspective, the most primary source of Islamic guidance, the Qur'an, regards differences in religious beliefs, perspectives and viewpoints, as being natural and an essential part of the human condition: “Let there be no compulsion in religion”(Qur'an 2:256). A denial of the right of others to hold beliefs and views that are different and incompatible to one's own is tantamount to a denial of God himself: “If your Lord had so desired, all people on the earth would surely have come to believe, Do you then think you can compel people into believing? (Qur'an 10: 99).

“Had your Lord so willed, He could surely

THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF CURRENT ISLAM The research wing of IPSA

page 11

Definitions and Concepts

have made all human beings into one single community: but (He willed it otherwise, and so) they continue to hold divergent views…

(Qur'an 11:118).

All of these aforementioned Qur'anic verses establish the principle of freedom of belief and thought in Islam. Imam Al-Qurtubi cites the doyen of Qura'nic exegesis (tafsir) the companion `Abdullah ibn `Abbas (d.688 CE) as claiming that at the conclusion of the first verse, the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) is himself reproved for transgressing this principle by being over-enthusiastic in convincing others with regard to the truth of Islam. Thus, the Qur'an stresses that the differences in beliefs, views and ideas of humankind is not incidental and negative but represents a God-willed, basic factor of human existence. In the Islamic perspective of religious pluralism, human beings are called upon to excel and celebrate in the contestation of ideas, known as jihad-ul-afkar. This generates intellectual and social vitality. The process of contestation spawns a rich variety of competing solutions for dealing with any particular problem, each of them valid in its own right. There is no moral judgment and vilification of partners/opponents in the contest. The challenge, which Muslim extremists present for mainstream Muslims, is to amplify the Qur'anic teachings on religious pluralism and work hard to make it an integral part of the fabric of contemporary Muslim culture.

Global Injustices and Extremism The third critical point that we need to bear in mind if we are to correctly appreciate the relationship between Muslims and violence is that the religious legitimization of violence does not occur in a socio-historical vacuum. An increasing number of academic studies are beginning to highlight this point. For example, a 1999 study by the Carnegie Commission on the prevention of deadly conflict found that, “religious diversity does not spawn violence independently of predisposing social, economic and political conditions as well as the subjective roles of belligerent leaders.” Graham Fuller, writing in Foreign Affairs, powerfully illustrates this point when he asserts that: “If a society and its politics are violent and unhappy, its mode of religious expression is likely to be just the same.”

THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF CURRENT ISLAM The research wing of IPSA

page 12

Considering the socio-historical contexts in which Muslim extremist behaviours are demonstrated, we note that they are either contexts in which Muslim citizens are subjugated to becoming victims of state

violence or contexts in which Muslims feel vilified for practicing Islam. Globally, the increase in Islamophobic discourse in the western media, the military alliance of western forces against Muslim majority nations in Afghanistan, Iran, and Iraq, and the lackluster response globally to the plight of the Palestinian people, are just some of the conditions that also have to be considered in relation to the emergence of Muslim extremism.

Taking these into consideration, it should come as no surprise that Muslims who feel marginalized, oppressed, victimized, desperate and powerless, resort to their faith and sacred texts to mobilize their resistance, and in some cases, to seek justification for resorting to violence. We should thus always be cognizant of the socio-historical conditions that spawn acts of violent religious extremism, while still condemning the loss of innocent lives.

Conclusion To return to our central question: Is Muslim extremism a myth or reality? In our response we need to avoid apologia, conspiracy theories and simplistic analyses. Instead, we should attempt to understand the reality and root causes of extremism as a complex combination of a number of variables including the socioeconomic and global political contexts. At the same time, we should be wary of interpretations of Muslim sacred texts that are used to justify extremist behaviour. It is our responsibility to reflect on these texts and to ask questions of the morality of the reader offering these interpretations. More especially, we should challenge those interpretations that violate Islamic teachings of tolerance and respect for religious diversity.

It is important to remember that the contemporary global order is not by any stretch of the imagination a just one. Furthermore, Islam places a strong emphasis on social justice and hardly any Muslim scholar interprets Islam as a pacifist tradition. Our challenge today is to uphold the fight for social justice and to defend the principle of pluralism in beliefs, while at the same time mitigate against the flagrant misinterpretations of Islamic texts for extremist purposes. Our primary strategy towards combating Muslim and all other forms of extremism should be that of ameliorating the root causes that provide a fertile ground on which extremism can thrive.

THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF CURRENT ISLAM The research wing of IPSA

page 13

Definitions and Concepts

Fundamentalism, Extremism and Terrorism:

THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF CURRENT ISLAM The research wing of IPSA

page 14

Reviewing and Locating South African Muslims in the Texts Dr Muhammed Haron (University of Botswana) A range of literature, concentrating on fundamentalism and terrorism, has been produced by USA and European based think tanks2 and similar institutions in different parts of the world during the past two decades 3 At first there was a spate of texts dealing with the issue of (religious) fundamentalism as a late 20th century phenomenon as borne out by the series produced by Martin Marty & Scott Appleby research team between 1990 and 19955. Although many employed 'fundamentalism' as an appropriate term to explain the violent acts of religious groups particularly those of Muslim organizations, others preferred the term 'extremism' as an alternative concept in describing the activities that have been carried out. Soon after 9/11 the term 'terrorism' was readily used and mainly if not specifically - associated with Muslim groups and organizations.

This paper undertakes a selected literature review concentrating on fundamentalism and terrorism on the African continent and South Africa in particular. It's focus is 'the production of knowledge', drawing on some of Edward Said's work on research outcomes. Before locating African and South African Muslim fundamentalism and terrorism in the texts, it defines the two terms. It concludes that Africa was not given any serious consideration before 1994 and that even though research interest in Africa grew at a steady pace from 1995 onwards it still has not increased, as expected, at a rapid rate since this continent has been viewed as a safe haven for many sought after fundamentalists and terrorists. The paper seeks to answer why there has been a lack of research.

1.

Introduction Textual studies on Africa's Muslims in the sub-Saharan region and more specifically on South Africa's Muslim community have exploded over the past two decades; this has resulted in the appearance of book length publications and a series of journal articles in national and international journals (cf.

Schrijver 2006). ' a.

The Production of Knowledge' Process When we list the researchers who have been critically involved in 'the production of knowledge' process that concentrated on Muslim communities, we observe a sizeable number of researchers are outsiders (i.e. from abroad) as compared to the number of insiders (i.e. locals) (cf. McCutcheon 1999). In addition, it is noted that there are more males pursuing research than females, more Europeans than

Africans, and more foreign funded projects than locally supported projects. The variety of researchers, who conduct research on the same subject, invariably give rise to an assortment of ambiguous interpretations and debatable findings b.

Research Outcomes Since our interest in this paper is to take a close look at the research outcomes that give particular attention to religious fundamentalism and religiously inspired terrorism in (sub-Saharan) Africa and South Africa in particular, we should bear in mind some of the incongruities that are associated with researchers producers of knowledge that have specific objectives in mind and target particular consumers. The insider/outsider debate impinges directly upon these issues and provide us with some understanding why American and European scholarship differs markedly from African scholarship. It brings to the fore why governments in North America and Europe plough in more funding than their counterparts in Africa. From some of the available literature, we can gauge the reasons why state sponsored research of a European initiated project yields results that are at variance with those produced by African researchers and scholars6.

In fact, there are a host of questions relating to these outcomes that may be posed. Why is it that the USA government affiliated think tanks like RAND Corporation (www.rand.org) have a deep interest in the position and characteristics of African Muslims? For what purpose have they set up special research projects such as investigating the Muslim madrasa system7 and for whom are these projects being conducted? What do they intend to do with the unpublished research that they collated and collected in the field? Do they reveal all or only partial findings in their published reports, articles or books? Do the host communities benefit from these research outputs? If so, how do they gain from these?

Now, when we reflect upon these and other related questions, we are taken back to Edward Said's salient text, Orientalism, that underscored the dominant role that Western scholarship (i.e. Orientalism) played over the many decades in researching the Orient. In this instance, the underlying argument was that they (i.e. the Asians, Africans and Latin Americans) were unable to represent themselves and had to be represented by American/European scholarship. Despite the negative aspects associated with Orientalism that has been severely criticized for its assumptions, it left a legacy that ironically benefited contemporary African and Asian (Muslim) scholarship. In other words, it stimulated and encouraged emerging African and Asian (Muslim) researchers and scholars to seriously grapple with issues such as religious identity and religious fundamentalism that have been extensively researched by American and European scholars.

We need to define the two terms so that we may frame the discussion that follows in subsequent paragraphs. We begin with the concept 'fundamentalism,' and thereafter define 'terrorism.'

2.

Defining and Invoking Contested Terms Though the two concepts are related to one another, they should be treated as separate entities. Of late, some scholars have identified a common thread that binds them (cf. Mentan 2004; Pratt 2006). Since the terms came into use because of different historical and sociopolitical contexts, they should be dealt with as separate and independent terms.

Both fundamentalism and terrorism are said to be highly contested and flawed terms.

Figure 1: Definitions of the F & T Words

a.

Fundamentalism: Explaining the term concept

This word has been so abused that whenever it has been invoked it conjured up negative rather than positive connotations. Emerson & Hatmann (2006: 128) stressed that because this is such as a loosely employed concept, it has been “thrown around like a baseball in the media, backyard arguments and political arenas.” These two sociologists contended that this term couldn't be comprehended outside of modernity or beyond its context. The process of modernization and the concomitant process of secularization have, they argued, ripped religion apart and partly gave rise to this phenomenon.

Nevertheless, during the post-modern period (circa 1990-1995) the Chicago Fundamentalism Studies Project led by Marty and Appleby undertook a detailed study of this phenomenon. The project identified various types of fundamentalists found in different religious traditions8. Despite these informative and invaluable studies, the concept, which was associated with Christianity at the beginning of the 20th century, had by the end of it, been frequently applied to Muslims.

The uncontrollable association with Muslims and Islam has forced Muslim communities to continuously defend their beliefs and practices.

Whilst the informed individual is able to find a way of explaining himself, the uninformed and inarticulate are at a constant loss to find words to clarify the concept.

Religious fundamentalism came to the fore in the 20th century as a response to, and probably as a result of, the twin processes of secularization and modernization. Processes that effected radical change by stressing the relevance and importance of scientific inquiry as the most certain path of arriving at the 'truth' and methods that, in effect, marginalized religion from the public sphere.

The reaction of the Muslim fundamentalists was not unlike that of their Christian counterparts during the early part of the 20th century; they reacted by rejecting secularism and modernism as variables that have impeded the expression of religion as a viable alternative.

Religious fundamentalists have been described as follows: theologically conservative, religious idealists, anti-modern, reactionary, intolerant, unaccommodating, inerrant, literalists, narrow-minded, extremist, fanatical and militant (cf. Kibble 1998; Pratt 2006). The rationale for describing Muslim fundamentalists, for example, in negative terms stems from the fact that fundamentalists · See themselves as countering society for they are the true believers and the rest are not; · Share literalist interpretations of the Quran and Sunnah as well as the secondary

THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF CURRENT ISLAM The research wing of IPSA

page 15

Definitions and Concepts THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF CURRENT ISLAM The research wing of IPSA

page 16

sources and they do not allow for any form of deviation; · Reject western domination and tendencies in the form of cultural hegemony represented by international brands such as Levis and McDonalds; · Stand up against the moderate and passive religious leaders who do not speak out against the social injustices within and outside their communities; and they · Stress the coming of the messiah and the issue of accountability on the Day of Judgment.

According to Rahman (1966), Muslim fundamentalism was initially viewed as a resurgent, reform movement aimed at purifying Islamic societies and bringing them in conformity with the Quran and the Sunnah. He further pointed out that it came about as a reaction to modernity, challenging the power of the Muslim nation-state.

Marty and Appleby (1995) went so far as to argue that religious fundamentalism, though theologically conservative, had been formulated in the form of a political ideology that encompassed all aspects of life. Other scholars have highlighted the notion that it is an ideology as well. In fact, Almond et al identified five ideological and four organizational characteristics respectively. Among the list they considered reactivity, selectivity, dualistic worldview, inerrancy and millennialism as key ideological characteristics one finds in the three major religious traditions.

(Emerson & Hartmann (2006: 134)) Whilst Marty and Appleby stated that “fundamentalism is a tendency, a habit of mind found within religious communities and paradigmatically embodied in certain representative individuals and movements, which manifests itself as a strategy by which beleaguered believers attempt to preserve their distinct identity as a people or a group,” Almond et al (2003: 17) defined it as “a discernable pattern of religious militancy by which self-styled 'true believers' attempt to arrest the erosion of religious identity , fortify the borders of the religious community, and create viable alternatives to secular institutions and behaviours.” Emerson & Hartmann (2006: 130). They further commented that the last mentioned definition is transnational in character. Despite these definitions' inherent shortcomings, they provide guidelines to identify this type of fundamentalism and to distinguish it from other phenomena such terrorism. b.

Terrorism: A Dynamic but an Elusive Term (Silke 2006: 3) Hubschle (2004) made a salient point

that, “Terrorism is a dynamic, highly subjective and mostly Western construct.”

Silke (2006) mentioned that most of the academic research on this theme made attempts to define this elusive term but over the years the researchers failed to reach agreement. He went on to state that, “The problem is a simple one: there is no widely agreed definition of terrorism.” He quoted Schmid and Jongman who identified 109 definitions by the mid 1980s and commented that since then one will probably come across double if not three times that number (also cf. Hubschle 2004).

And he referred to Shafritz et al who in the 1990s said, “it is unlikely that any definition will ever generally be agreed upon” (their emphasis).

Hubschle, who is a senior research officer at the Institute of Security Studies, noted that 9/11 triggered off an extensive interest in this phenomenon. In her articles she argued against a few circulated myths such as terrorism is a new phenomenon, an activity that is perpetrated by groups, a weapon of the weak and one that is associated with religious extremism.

However, to do this she traced its origins and stated that, “Terrorism' per se is nothing new…” and that the concept “was popularised during the French Revolution.” She referred to the 1798 supplement of the Dictionnaire of the Académie Française that listed the words 'terrorism' and 'terrorist' respectively.

These words stemmed from the French phrase 'régime de la terreur', which is a period in European history that took place after the storming of the Bastille and the uprisings of 1789. She pointed out that during this historical context the word had a positive rather than a negative meaning and throughout the early period was considered a leftist strategy. Subsequently, right wing groups became known for committing terrorist activities and they were succeeded by state terror in the form of Stalinism and Nazism.

Interestingly, she mentioned that the Zionist inspired Stern Gang used terrorist tactics to secure the formation of the Zionist state of Israel. As a phenomenon on the rise, it was connected to nationalist and separatist groups in, for example, the MauMau rebellion in Kenya and the Algerian struggle against the French government. In fact, many post-colonial and post-colonial liberation movements such as the ANC, SWAPO and the PLO were classified as terrorist organizations. Hubschle quoted Yassar Arafat as saying in 1974 that, “The difference between the revolutionary and the terrorist lies in the reason for which

each fights. For whoever stands by a just cause and fights for the freedom and liberation of his land from the invaders, the settlers and the colonialists, cannot possibly be called terrorist” (my emphasis). She, however, mentioned that 'international terrorism' came to the fore during the early 1980's when the USA accused the USSR of funding and abetting international left-wing Marxist organizations of terrorist activities. These developments were, moreover, preceded by 'state terrorism' in countries such as Zaire, Ghana, Angola and South Africa.

During this period right-wing terror groups were also on the rise in the USA and Europe.

When she reflected upon religious inspired terrorism, she relied heavily on Bruce Hoffman's insights. Hoffman suggested that this type of terrorism has a particular set of ingredients, one of which is that “it displays a transcendental function rather than a political one;” and another is that “it is executed in direct response to a theological demand or imperative.” And a third ingredient is that this category of terrorists tends to seek “the elimination of broadly defined categories of enemies” and in the process ignore 'the political consequences of indiscriminate killings.' She also observed that Hoffman maintained, “religious terrorists do not attempt to appeal to any constituency other than themselves.” And she stated that Hoffman argued that the set of theories that have identified religion as the only purpose for certain terrorist acts “display a mono-causal fallacy.” Notwithstanding this position of Hoffman, she referred to the Hezbullah as a classic contemporary example of a religious organization that has been guilty of such fanatical acts.

Before listing a few proposed definitions, we refer to Feroze Osman's critical piece that posed the question: Just who is a terrorist and what is terrorism? He repeated the comments of Silke and Hubschle by acknowledging that international bodies such as the UN and OAU tried for many decades - probably since 1968 to reach an agreement on a satisfactory definition of this word. One of the reasons for this problem was that some opted to exclude the 'state' from being defined as a perpetrator of terror, a point that was also underscored by Hubschle in her article. Osman, an ardent advocate for social justice and a leading member of the Pretoria based Muslim Review Network (MRN), referred to Phil Rees, the author of Dining with Terrorists, who, in his view, accurately stated that, “The failure to define 'terrorist' means that the 'war on terror' can be used as a cloak to legitimise American military power because it portrays the challenge as a loosely defined threat that will never disappear. By being unable to explain exactly who a terrorist is, the 'war on terror' can mutate into a war against any ideology that

challenges America and her allies”. Rees' remark is indeed apt since Bush's 'War-onTerror' campaign subtly forced the international community to join it by compelling nation-states to formulate a special Bill on terrorism. Those states, which have a related (set of) Bill(s) in place, have been obliged to align theirs with that of the USA (cf.

Dunn 2005; Ewi & Aning 2006).

At this juncture, let us record some of the proposed definitions9 with the intention of showing to what extent the one differs from the other. They are: · “Terrorism is the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.” FBI Definition; · “Terrorism is the use or threatened use of force designed to bring about political change.” Brian Jenkins · “Terrorism is the unlawful use or threat of violence against persons or property to further political or social objectives. It is usually intended to intimidate or coerce a government, individuals or groups, or to modify their behaviour or politics.” USA VicePresident's Task Force, 1986 · “Terrorism constitutes the illegitimate use of force to achieve a political objective when innocent people are targeted.” Walter Laqueur · “Terrorism is the premeditated, deliberate, systematic murder, mayhem, and threatening of the innocent to create fear and intimidation in order to gain a political or tactical advantage, usually to influence an audience.” James M. Poland Figure 2: Comparing Definitions This short list of definitions show that some are basic improvements on previous definitions whilst others have made renewed attempts at pinning down this term. When we compare the US State Department's definition to the formulation of USA's Muslim community, the difference in understanding and interpreting the concept is glaring.

Hubschle considered the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 54/110 of 9 December 1999 as an acceptable universal definition. Terrorism comprises “criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes”.

3.

(South) African Muslim Fundamentalism & Terrorism in Texts.

Notwithstanding the unsatisfactory definition of these two terms, researchers have produced a substantial amount of literature since the 1970's on both themes. Religious fundamentalism was invariably associated by

THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF CURRENT ISLAM The research wing of IPSA

page 17

Definitions and Concepts THE INSTITUTE OF CURRENT ISLAM The research wing of IPSA

page 18

Western scholarship with the aftermath of the formation of the 'Islamic Revolution in Iran' at the end of the 1970's and to a lesser extent with the Church's support for the Sandinista's struggle against the Nicaraguan regime during the same period. These two events, which catapulted religion into the public sphere, were looked upon rather sceptically by the secularists who were of the belief that “the wave of fundamentalisms around the globe (w)as a collective last gasp of religion� (cf.

Emerson & Hartmann 2006). Another secularist view was that modernity and secularism served as fertile soil for religious resurgence in general and religious fundamentalism in particular (ibid 133; Ahady 1995). Regrettably for them, religion persisted as a resilient element to this day and it is a phenomenon, we assume, that will continue as a significant in player in international affairs. This has been borne out by a series of books that have been written on 'religion and international relations' (cf. Dark 2001).

1.

Africa's Religious Identity and Politics: When we evaluate the position of African religion in general and religious fundamentalism on the continent in particular, there is ample evidence that suggest that religion is an integral part of Africa's identity. John Mbiti, the wellrespected scholar of African Religious Tradition, once categorically expressed the view that Africa was 'notoriously religious.' This characterization of the African continent by an informed specialist flies in the face of secularists who persisted in arguing that we were residing in a secular world that does not have a place for religion in the public sphere. Since Africa holds a different view of the position of religion in the affairs of nation-states as compared to Western Europe and North America, it is not surprising that religion has been accused by Europe and America's secularly trained and oriented scholars of having a negative rather than a positive influence on the affairs of the African nation-states.

One of the many negative outcomes related to religion is the emergence and the rise of religious fundamentalism; a phenomenon that has reared its head in North Africa10 and that also exists in one form or the other in a few Sub-Saharan African nation-states such as Sudan, Uganda, Algeria and Nigeria11. Since quite a few countries in different parts of the African continent do not have governments that observe good governance and

demonstrate a lack of accountability, religious fundamentalism (mainly Christian and Muslim) seems to use the socio-political circumstances to advance its cause; for example, the Lord Resistance Army in Northern Uganda advocated a particular brand of Christian fundamentalism and has undermined the Ugandan regime for decades. However, Muslim rather than Christian fundamentalists have challenged Africa and this has resulted in the scholars and researchers devoting much of their time to this particular religious fundamentalism.

2.

CIPS and ISS: Purveyors of Knowledge on Religious Fundamentalism Who are the purveyors of knowledge about this phenomenon in and outside South Africa? Searching for the answer to this question has not been difficult because two institutions that have committed themselves to this area have been the University of Pretoria's Centre for International Political Studies (CIPS) and the Institute of Security Studies (ISS), which is an independent NGO. Whilst CIPS is only based in Pretoria, ISS' headquarters is in Cape Town with branches in Pretoria, Nairobi and Addis Ababa. For about five years Hussein Solomon directed CIPS and ISS has been under the directorship of Jakkie Cilliers.

Both are Western trained political scientists and as a consequence have been heavily influenced by the theories and ideas from their American and European counterparts.

Figure 3: Purveyors and Producers of Knowledge CIPS' Solomon, who was previously a senior researcher at ISS, has been the main driving force. Between 2005 and 2008 he co-opted researchers, such as Gerrie Swartz of UNISA, to contribute to the CIPS forum on a regular basis. Solomon coordinated, for example, a 'Perspectives on Terror' symposium in October 2005 to evaluate the phenomenon on African soil. And during late August 2006 CIPS held a joint conference with ISS and The South African National Defence Force War College on 'An Assessment of the Threat of Terrorism in Africa & CounterTerrorism Initiatives.'

Cilliers, ISS' executive director who works with a team of researchers in ISS, has made many inputs on this subject. In one instance he was also severely reprimanded by the Media Review Network (MRN) for some of his assessments that connected international terrorists groups with South African organizations.

ISS has organized joint conferences on

Terrorism. For example, its Nairobi ISS office organized a seminar on 'Terrorism in Africa' in Dar es Salaam on the 20th and 21st of March 2006 with the intention of 'developing a better understanding of how terrorism and its impact are perceived across the continent.' In Addis Ababa on the 17th and 18th June 2009 the ISS Roundtable Conference addressed 'InterRegional Challenges of Islamic Fundamentalist Movement in North Africa in Relation to Network Support' and in Cape Town on the 24th and the 25th of June 2009 it joined hands with the Centre for Global Counterterrorism Cooperation (CGCC) to stage a workshop with its focus on the 'Role of Civil Society in the Implementation of the UN Global CounterTerrorism Strategy in Africa.'

At each and every workshop and conference, ISS members have made their inputs and some of these appeared in circulated occasional papers. Senior ISS researchers such as Anneli Botha and Annette Hubschle have authored and co-authored papers on fundamentalism and terrorism respectively. Botha, for example, co-authored with CIPS' Solomon papers on Muslim fundamentalism and terrorism respectively; the two appear to be regarded by certain stakeholders as South Africa's specialists and experts on the mentioned topics. In fact, Botha produced a monograph entitled Terrorism in The Maghreb: The Transnationalisation of Domestic Terrorism12 (Pretoria: ISS 2008) that was mainly based on newspaper reports and columns. Perhaps it is opportune for us to review, albeit briefly, some of the research that has been produced by these researchers and their respective institutions.

3.

Selected CIPS, ISS and Other Literature Sometime after the setting up of the African Terrorism Bulletin by ISS' Organized Crime and Money Laundering Programme with the objective of reporting “on terrorism and counter-terrorism strategies on the African continent� during early 2004, the then South African Minister of Intelligence, Ronnie Kasrils, announced the establishment of a National Counter-Terrorism Centre13 in October 2004.

The centre was a response to the African Union call for vigilance towards potential terrorist threats. It was also fortuitous that the former Commissioner of Police, Jackie Selebi, was appointed as the first African president of Interpol during 2004.

In his capacity as the director of CIPS, which ended in December of 2008, Solomon initiated a number of projects. One was the issuing of a series of e-briefing papers. These short papers were circulated, according an unofficial report, to about 13,000 subscribers many of whom were apparently policy makers and academics.

The purpose of this set of papers was to

stimulate debate on relevant contemporary issues. These papers were, however, not meant to be 'high-brow' academic texts as they were aimed at policy and opinion makers.

The second set of texts that he edited, co-edited and authored were publications on, religious fundamentalism, terrorism, and political Islam among others.

Islamic Focus (http://www.cips.up.ac.za/index.php?islamicf ocus) was issued as CIPS' third project. This newspaper was set up to publicize issues pertaining to 'political Islam'. We shall restrict ourselves to review a few of Solomon's writings and edited texts, some of which caused a furore within South Africa' Muslim community. a.

Islamic Fundamentalism: Selected Popular Commentaries and Research Outputs During 2006 Solomon issued his ten page ebriefing paper, the second in the series that discussed State Sanctioned Religious Fundamentalism: Perspectives from Washington and Tehran. Although he did not define 'religious fundamentalism' he did demonstrate how Bush Jr and Ahmedinejad expressed their respective religious views that reflected religious fundamentalist strands and, in his opinion, that impacted negatively on the running of nation-states such as the USA and Iran. Solomon extracted examples to show how fellow politicians as well as religious leaders criticized Bush and Ahmedinejad for their management styles that have been deeply influenced by their religious beliefs.

Solomon's comparative study differs slightly from his critical appraisal of Sudan. He co-authored with Gerrie Swartz, one of his young CIPS researchers, another e-briefing paper entitled The Fundamentalist State of Sudan? They assumed without critical questioning the US State Department's list of states that sponsored terrorism, that Sudan along with Iran was guilty of being a sponsor of international terrorism. Sudan was accused of providing a safe haven and meeting place for organizations such as Palestine's Hamas, Lebanon's Hizbollah and Egypt's Islamic Group. This raised the question of how they arrived at this conclusion and if Sudan indeed was guilty of such a 'crime', did it really give financial support to some of the mentioned organizations. Why should it aid Egypt's Islamic Group when it was aware that it could not afford to create a diplomatic rift and cut ties with its powerful northern neighbour?

Nonetheless, what is more problematic throughout their paper is the manner they presented their arguments against Sudan's government, which, coincidently, condemned the 9/11 event. Their unconvincing argument, based on a policy document issued by 'The Washington Institute for Near East Policy' of

THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF CURRENT ISLAM The research wing of IPSA

page 19

Definitions and Concepts THE INSTITUTE OF CURRENT ISLAM The research wing of IPSA

page 20

2001 and a USA Congressional research report of 2002, reasoned that Sudan declared jihad against the non-Muslim South as soon as the Sudanese government opted to impose Islamic law. They deliberately avoided using Sudanese state documents to balance their presentation and to challenge whether the last mentioned views were accurate. In fact, their position, particularly that of Solomon, with regards to Sudan's fundamentalist character was further elaborated upon in his co-authored book that we will now briefly review.

Nikkie Funke, a CIPS associate, joined Hussein Solomon to author Exploring Islamic Fundamentalist Ideologies in Africa (Pretoria: AISA 2006)14. As well-trained South African political scientists, they scrutinized this phenomenon employing American and European theoretical models as a viable method to fully comprehend Islamic Fundamentalist Ideologies. In the first few pages they spelt out the reasons for choosing the different case studies and they averred that their main task was to cross-examine 'ideology' as a significant variable and one that underpinned the ideas of the focused groups.

The authors went on to describe the book's contents before outlining a fairly detailed theoretical framework. This framework paved their way to interrogate the notion of 'Islamic Political Thought'.

Thereafter they took readers on an African 'Islamic fundamentalist' excursion. In the first section they informed readers about the ideologies of the Islamic groups such as the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), on the second leg of their journey they moved to Sudan where they unpacked the ideology of the National Islamic Front (NIF). Prior to concluding their analyses of what Muslim fundamentalism is all about, they returned to South Africa where they critically examined People against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD) as a brand of Muslim fundamentalism.

The question we were confronted with was: how did they define this term? The authors had painstakingly scanned an array of material that inspected the phenomenon in some detail and they thus noted that the word 'fundamentalism was fraught with controversy' and a concept that needed further clarification. Even though they appropriated R. Euben's work, Enemy in the mirror: Islamic fundamentalism and the limits of modern rationalism - a work of comparative political theory (Princeton 1999) as their theoretical model, the authors inadvertently forgot to insert it among the

list of consulted readings in their ten page bibliography. Nonetheless, they accepted Euben's explanation of fundamentalism, which earmarked three positions: (a) it is political in nature, (b) it rejects the authorities of past commentaries on the foundational sacred scriptures, and (c) it has a complex relationship with modernity.

We should state that the authors had no qualms in employing the phrase 'Islamic fundamentalists' which has been problematic to say the least; a more appropriate term in the context would have been 'Muslim fundamentalists.'

Though this might appear on the surface to be a minor issue, there is a major difference in employing the descriptive term 'Islamic' as opposed to 'Muslim.' Related to this, the authors also did not give much thought to using the phrase 'Muslim Political Thought' as opposed to 'Islamic Political Thought' and nor did they attempt to clarify what they meant by 'Islamic neoFundamentalism'.

They gave a historical outline of 'Islamic Political thought' and discussed the relationship between Muslims – they chose the term 'Islam' - and the West and thereafter discussed Islamic revivalism and Islamic fundamentalism respectively. They like other American and European scholars before them accepted the general view that Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab (d. 1792) was and remains the 'father of Islamic fundamentalism'. This assumption is fraught with problems since the term is a modern construct that has retroactively been applied to developments in the 18th and 19th centuries. It is as a result of these types of skewed observations that Wahhabism has come to be viewed as a negative term and one associated with conservatism and retrogression instead of liberalism and progression.

They made another blunder in their assessment when they nonchalantly described Hasan Al-Banna (d. 1949), the founder of the influential Ikhwan ulMuslimin (Muslim Brotherhood), as an Islamic fundamentalist. Those of us familiar with the historical formation of this movement and its global impact know that it was revivalist and reformist in orientation and a movement that did not advocate any form of Islamic fundamentalism. Perhaps it is instructive to bring in Solomon's co-authored chapter on the Muslim Brotherhood that appeared in his book on Political Islam and the State in Africa (co-edited with Akeem Fadare and Firoza Butler Pretoria: CIPS 2008)15.

'The Muslim Brotherhood and the State in Egypt' (pp. 157-179) was the central focus

of Laurence Caromba (University of Pretoria) and Solomon's chapter. They traced the organization's history and referred to the repressive policies of the Mubarak regime with the aim of containing the organization's growing influence. Whilst they correctly concluded that the Egyptian regime had contributed to the export of religious fundamentalism, we cannot agree that the organization evolved into 'a quintessential illiberal democratic movement.' The mere fact that it has representatives in the Egyptian parliament illustrates that it still desires for the formation of a true democratic state.

Returning to the thrust of Solomon's coauthored book, we want to extend the argument that theologians and activists such as Maududi (d. 1979), Qutb (d. 1966) and Khomeini (d. 1989) have demonstrated decisive ideological leadership within their specific socio-political circumstances. As concerned individuals, they found themselves challenged by oppressive regimes and in response drew upon the Quran in an innovative and unique manner that did not make them fundamentalists as they have been made out to be. In fact, the authors failed to properly investigate why, as reformists, they discoursed about the West and Muslims the way they did.

For example, many contemporary political pundits mercilessly crucified Qutb for being an extremist, fundamentalist ideologue and quoted profusely from Milestones, one of his significant books that tangibly demonstrate some of his harsh criticisms about social issues in and beyond the Muslim heartlands and for his proposed method that should be viewed as a possible alternative.

The chapters on Algeria's FIS and Sudan's NIF explored the reasons why Algerians and the Sudanese opted for a fundamentalist type of Islam. In fact both FIS and NIF were influential Muslim groups but were given negative coverage by the Western media and as a consequence were described as Muslim fundamentalists just because they desired to establish an Islamic state in Algeria and Sudan.

According to western theorists and implicitly echoed by the authors, any expression of an Islamic state is regarded as undemocratic and as far as they are concerned every effort should be made to discourage its formation. History confirmed that FIS was literally stopped in its tracks soon after it won a landslide victory in the Algerian elections in 1992. It was never granted the opportunity to demonstrate what it could deliver and unfortunately the elections' outcome engulfed the country in a civil war that witnessed the emergence of Muslim extremist groups such as the Armed Islamic Movement that were definitely fundamentalist in orientation. We could argue that if FIS had

been granted the opportunity to govern Algeria, extremist groups would never have emerged.

When the authors explored South Africa's Muslim community, they acknowledged that, as a community, it never experienced any form of 'Muslim fundamentalism' . It was a term that was foreign to the ears of South African Muslims. Since it gained currency in the Western media in the 1990's, it was applied to organizations such as PAGAD16, which started out as a vigilante organization but ended up adopting extreme methods to deal with the gangs and drug peddlers in the Greater Cape Town. The authors scrupulously argued that PAGAD's leadership was replaced by individuals that came under the influence of Qibla (est. 1980). The latter is presently a minute organization that has lost much of its 'radical' steam, managing to survive because of Achmat Cassiem's persistent leadership17.

During the late 1990s PAGAD's new leadership was accused of coming under Qibla's spell and espousing some of its ideological values.

They authors pointed out that PAGAD's ideology was grounded in 'a strongly moralistic anti-crime, anti-drug stance‌' and averred that 'Qibla's apparent take-over of PAGAD's core leadership meant that there were increasingly calls for an Islamic state, as well as accusations that (the) South African society and government were immoral.' Whilst the authors were correct to state that PAGAD emphasized the rampant immoral acts in the social fabric of South African society, they were off the mark when they argued that 'there were increasingly calls for an Islamic state.' As far as we know there are no extant PAGAD documents that substantiate this point. It is agreed that it was a notion that Qibla bandied about during its antiapartheid struggle in the 1980s. Its leadership realized that this idea, which did not enjoy widespread support, was a pipe dream and backed down. The authors demonstrated and proved the close connection between PAGAD and Qibla as they probed and explored its ideology, which they argued was embedded in fundamentalist thinking.

In conclusion, it may be stated that the authors' wholesale acceptance of the term without sufficient documentary evidence will remain a shortcoming of this text. Their sole reliance on secondary sources drawing from a variety of primary Arabic/French works, which have been written by FIS and NIF's leadership, have also diluted their main arguments proving that they represent 'Islamic fundamentalist ideologies.' Despite these critical comments, it should not detract from the fact that the authors' contribution as political scientists in the theoretical sector has, at times, been compelling and that the text will

THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF CURRENT ISLAM The research wing of IPSA

page 21

Definitions and Concepts THE INSTITUTE OF CURRENT ISLAM The research wing of IPSA

page 22

remain useful to all who are engaged in social science research on religious fundamentalism.

Thus far we have a sense of how Solomon has discussed Islamic fundamentalism and what he understands by this contentious and flawed term. But before we turn our attention to how 'Islamic terrorism' has been sketched by South African researchers at ISS, we should mention the fact that Solomon, who has been overtly provocative in his views, has come under heavy fire from Muslim conservative and traditional groups on a number of issues18. Let us take the most recent debates that he sparked in the South African community. The Sunday Independent (11 October 2009) printed Makhudu Sefara & Peter Fabricius' report Al-Qaeda threat to 2010. The headline immediately sparked an angry reaction from within Muslim organizations. Their dissatisfaction with the report was because it referred to some unnamed sources that averred that Al-Qaeda operatives along with an anti-US Somali cell were relocating to South Africa from where they would strike at USA targets. It was because of these reports that the USA embassy and consulates around the country closed during Heritage week (24th of September 2009).

The source of this report was apparently traced back to Solomon who has consistently argued, together with the ISS and its cohort of researchers, that Southern Africa19 (and particularly South Africa) had been chosen as a possible safe haven for these Muslim terrorist groups.

Solomon, according to this report, accused the Somali community of being in cahoots with Al Qaeda operatives to attack US interests during the FIFA World Cup in 2010. The Muslim Judicial Council (MJC) expressed its contempt for the Solomon claims. The MJC issued a statement in which they totally rejected the 'libellous and irresponsible allegations', which 'discredited the reputation of the Somali community living in South Africa.' In fact, the MJC engaged with the Somali community and fully supported their right as a law-abiding refugee community who should be respected. As far as the MJC was concerned, South Africa's National Intelligence Agency (NIA) should be furnished with solid evidence of Solomon's allegations against the Somali community to clear up the matter. According to the online VOC report, “The Somali community has denounced any form of violence and terror as it is counterproductive and contradicts the

harmonious and mutually beneficial relationship which they have built up with the South African community. This reputation, built on hard work, honesty and principles devoid of any engagement with drug dealings, crime syndicates or prostitution which has been built up over 16 years, deserves recourse and restitution for the allegations made against them” (cf. www.vocfm.co.za). The saga between Solomon and the Somali community with the aid of the MJC and Muslim Review Network (MRN) is, however, ongoing at the time of writing this paper; it is unlikely that it will be resolved in or out of court since Solomon who now heads the International Institute of Islamic Studies based in Pretoria, has been unwavering in his stand.

Our discussion regarding the Muslim community's contempt for Solomon would not be complete if we do not return to another report that was prepared by the MRN (www.mediareviewnet.com), a Pretoria based Muslim advocacy group that has, since its inception, been monitoring newspapers, organizations and individuals that have been involved in inflaming communal conflict and circulating alarmist ideas such as Muslim militancy and Al-Qaeda threat in South Africa and other parts of the continent.

Solomon whilst still CIPS' director made a few alarmist remarks that were taken up

by MRN. Feroze Osman, MRN's spokesperson, stated that “Prof. Solomon has, for many years, been beating the drumbeat of 'Islamic militancy' posing a danger to democracy in South Africa.” In the MRN circular they reminded the reader of Solomon's participation at the 7th International Conference of the 'International Institute for Counter Terrorism' in Herzliya, Israel on 10 September 2007. At that conference he addressed the audience along with known 'anti-Muslim bigots' such as Steven Emerson and Daniel Pipes20. At that conference, MRN observed, Solomon made the following irresponsible statements: o “…. you have various Muslim organisations, mosques, madressahs and Muslim Media …….psychologically preparing Muslims for terrorism, martyrdom operations.” o “ There is this fact that military training is occurring in Muslim high schools.” o “………….you find hundreds of South African Muslims going off to Pakistan , Iran and Saudi Arabia for Islamic Instruction. They come back and occupy very powerful positions in terms of

influencing young kids at Madressahs.”

MRN circulated this pamphlet to alert South African Muslims to the fact that “a concerted effort to tarnish the entire ummah of being complicit in a plot to plant 'bombs' in our country.” According to MRN, this information was being carried and circulated by certain media groups and individuals. In addition, MRN stated that the media quoted 'experts in Islam militancy' and these experts purportedly stated that “there will definitely be a bombing campaign....” The 'prime suspect' was, as far as the MRN was concerned, none other than Hussein Solomon. In a letter dated 8 March 2008 to the Freedom of Expression Institute, the MRN representative, Soraya Dadoo, requested support to have Hussein Solomon along with John Solomon blacklisted and stopped from addressing audiences in South Africa (cf. http://fixthefxi.blogspot.com/2008/03/profhussein-solomon.html). We doubt whether this would ever be possible and even though MRN vehemently differs with Solomon on a variety of issues, as an advocacy it should not interfere in Solomon's right to air his views , substantiated or not, in or outside South Africa. b.

Terrorism: ISS and Other Literature Outputs Before commenting on some of the available literature , much of which have been produced

by ISS researchers and associated members, we need to bear in mind that over the past few years ISS has been the main coordinator of conferences, symposia and workshops that gave special attention to 'Terrorism in Africa.'

Although brief mention was already made of some of them, it will be beyond the scope of this paper to list and discuss them all.

However, we wish to mention one conference that gave prominence to the fact that Africa was the target of the terrorists. Between the 29th and the 31st of August 2006 IQPC (www.iqpc.com) organized a major conference with the theme 'Combating and Preventing Terrorism in Africa: Towards a Terror-Free Africa: Minimizing Threats Posed By The Global Surge Of Terrorism and Terrorist Activities' in Kyalami (Gauteng)21.

Among the many prominent guests who addressed the audience were Dr. Magnus Ranstorp (Chief Scientist: Centre for Asymmetric Threat Studies at Swedish National Defence College, and Senior Honorary Research Associate and Former Director at the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, St. Andrews University), Mounir Idriss Lallali (Head: Alert & Prevention Unit: African Centre for the Study of Research on Terrorism, AU), and David Radcliffe (Regional director for Africa in the office of the USA Secretary of Defence). The media extensively

quoted Radcliffe. In his opinion, “the threat is mainly from global terrorist groups seeking refuge, recruits and funds…,” and he added that “Africa is attractive to terrorists because it offers space -- both actual and virtual -- and (that it has) countries with disenfranchised, frustrated populaces ripe for recruitment.” He made the point that Africa as a continent was vulnerable and this was because of “the ease with which terrorists can establish new identities and procure documents that would enable travel without raising suspicion.”

What Radcliffe and others underlined at the conference was that the fundamentalists and terrorists were targeting Africa and that Africans should become wary of their presence.

In fact, the conference audience was reminded of the August 1998, assault when the USA embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were bombed and this resulted in many innocent African deaths (cf. Berger & Pandey 2006: 119120). Despite the number of deaths and the extent of the damage caused, it is surprising, to say the least, to find that substantial research on this event has been lacking. Both insiders and outsiders should share the blame for not having analyzed and produced sufficient material on the event22 (cf. Anangwe 200423; Shinn 2004; Rosenau 2005). Scanning the contents of prominent scholarly journals such as the Journal of Terrorism and Political Violence makes us wonder why very few researchers have investigated this event as compared to 9/11.

When turning to South Africa for example, so many insiders and outsiders wrote about PAGAD, which still featured, along with Qibla and Muslims against Global Oppression, on the 'Patterns of Global Terrorism' list issued by the USA Department of State (Anon 2000; http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/37191.htm2 4) . They also featured in the July 2006 issue of Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism/Military Balance as an extreme/armed group in South Africa. It observed that even though its threat had diminished, , there were still major security concerns that needed to be taken into account in and outside the region (also see appendices in Piazza 2009). Since we have mentioned PAGAD being identified as a terrorist group, it might be instructive to return to the ISS list of papers that studied this organization.

In Anneli Botha's 2005 paper titled PAGAD: A case study of radical Islam in South Africa, she shared her thoughts on how PAGAD emerged and evolved in the late 1990s (also see Botha 2001). She arrived at the conclusion that “indigenous Islamic networks have the potential to engage in terrorist activities on their own or in conjunction with international terrorists (such as Al-Qaeda).” In

THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF CURRENT ISLAM The research wing of IPSA

page 23

Definitions and Concepts THE INSTITUTE OF CURRENT ISLAM The research wing of IPSA

page 24

contextualizing the emergence of PAGAD, she correctly demonstrated the connection between Qibla, which was by then a fairly small organization confined to Cape Town, and the formation of the Islamic Unity Convention but preposterously argued that the IUC saw itself “as a precursor for an Iranian-style Islamic revolution in the country.” As far as we know, few of IUC's leading members such as Shaykh AbdulKariem Toffar did not openly identify with Shi'ism and nor did they ever express the views that Botha mentioned. It should also be stated that whilst Qibla was one of the IUC's founding members that initiated the formation of Radio 786, the station at no stage pandered towards the Qibla leadership's ideals nor was the station at any point under its control. She ludicrously concluded that PAGAD was “ostensibly created to fight drugs and the socioeconomic problems that are associated with it” and that it was “essentially a political organization with distinct Islamist objectives.”

When PAGAD was formed it committed itself to fight gangs and drugs because the drugs affected many of the members' children and their only method was to counter it. And none of the leadership regarded themselves as political leaders and they thus never envisaged turning it into a political organization. Where did she get her information? Did she ever take the opportunity of interviewing those individuals who established the organization? Has she ever made an effort to interview some of those members who have been apprehended and are imprisoned? We believe not, otherwise she would not have arrived at such absurd conclusions. Botha's scholarship cannot go unchallenged and it is not unlike that of Le Roux (1997; 1998) whose objective scholarship should also be called into question.

As a result of Botha's unsubstantiated arguments and other questionable reports, it has been assumed by the media and other (anti-Muslim) stakeholders such as the Jewish Policy Center25 in Israel and the South African Zionists lobby groups that South Africa's brand of 'Islamic terrorism' is indeed a real threat (cf. Combs & Shain 2001; Shain 2005). She regurgitated much of the contents of this paper in a chapter titled 'Domestic terrorism in South Africa' (Pt. II pp. 66-77), this appeared in her and Wafulu Okumu's co-edited text Domestic Terrorism in Africa: Defining, Addressing and Understanding Its Impact on Human Security (Cape Town: ISS 2009) which was based on a joint ISS conference held on the

6th and 7th of November 2007. Botha elaborated on the sub-theme of this book in her complementary article titled 'Challenges in Understanding Terrorism in Africa: A Human Security Perspective' (African Security Review [17(2): 28-41, 2008]).

Whilst Botha's views have been swallowed as the truth and circulated in the Terrorism Monitor issued by The Jamestown Foundation (http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism) in the USA26, an independent scholar based at the University of the Western Cape also wrote a fairly balanced ISS paper titled Vigilantism v. the State: A case study of the rise and fall of Pagad,1996-2000. Keith Gottschalk did not come to any rash conclusions when he interpreted PAGAD's uncontrollable acts. In his view, PAGAD, which represented a section of the community that was faced by the proliferation of gangs and drugs, challenged South Africa's democracy on two levels, would it be possible for the post-apartheid police force to successfully address their concerns and how would this force and the coterie of state prosecutors be able to bring an end to PAGAD's extreme acts that were akin to terrorism? And would the state machinery, which was caught and trapped in the process of transformation, be in a position to arrest and detain PAGAD's irrepressible leadership and unruly elements without violating the rule of law and the Constitution's Bill of Human Rights?

Apart from these papers on a local community organization that was transformed from a vigilante group into an unexpectedly extremist organization, the ISS continued to entertain papers that addressed terrorism. On the 3rd of October 2005 Professor James Lutz (Indiana University-Purdue University) addressed an ISS audience. He reviewed and analyzed 'Terrorism in sub-Saharan Africa' and on the 18th of October 2005 they listened to a seminar entitled 'Terrorism in Africa: African Union's Perception of the Threat and Measures to Prevent and Combat Terrorism.' The two presenters were H.E. Ambassador Abdelhamid Boubazine (Director of the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism [ACSRT]) and Martin Ewi (AU representative). The former spoke about ACSRT's the role, structure and activities in light of the perceived terrorist threat, and the latter discussed the AU's role and efforts in the prevention and combating of terrorism and provided an overview of the terrorism threat on the continent.

Anneli Botha and Hussein Solomon's coauthored e-briefing CIPS paper was titled 'Terrorism in Africa'. Although there is no date as to when it was written, using the reference list as a guide we suspect that this was completed sometime during 2003. The authors opened their paper stating that, “Terrorism, in particular Islamic extremism, presents a real threat to regional and international security.” It could be gathered that they equated 'terrorism' with 'Islamic extremism' and 'Islamic militancy.' They, however, did so without defining what they meant by 'terrorism,' and 'Islamic extremism/militancy.' As far as they were concerned transnational (read Islamic) terror networks were the biggest dangers that might have disastrous consequences if they were left unchecked. Their opening paragraph assumed that 'Muslim' terrorists had a hand in both the USA Kenyan and Tanzanian embassy bombings and 9/11. Instead of posing a few critical questions the way Tarpley (2004) and others27 did, for them 9/11 was the work of Osama bin Laden (cf. http://journalof911studies.com/).

In line with USA policy makers' arguments, they are fully convinced that Africa “is a breeding ground for transnational terrorists' activities” (cf. Abrahamsen 2004: 677) and lamented the fact that African nation-states have not been pro-active enough in countering the possible threats from these Islamic terrorist networks. They argued that despite the moderate teachings of Islam, Muslims have acted insidiously. They accused Iranian advisors of supplying weapons. When, where and who were the recipients of these weapons?

Lebanon has been unstable for decades, how is it in a position to assist others when it is itself experiencing difficulties in maintaining a stable state? In both instances they do not give any relevant and related references, nor did they attempt to quote any authentic source (not newspaper reports from The Washington Post or the like).

Notwithstanding this, we may counter their earlier statement by asking if the USA has not been acting in a sinister manner by backing the one (Muslim) group against the other? Have they not adopted a similar policy, like the British did in the past, of dividing and ruling the Muslims (by proxy – i.e. through the governments that cooperate with the USA administration)? Has the USA not caused unnecessary suffering in countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia that are now described as collapsed or failed states? Has it not been behind the rise of these (Muslim) extremists, radicals and terrorists? Has its intelligence institutions not been instrumental in training some of them?

Do these authors assume that we do not read

and are gullible. There are a string of questions that come to mind as we read their co-authored paper. In spite of the data that they supplied in the rest of their paper, their sources and arguments have been problematic to say the least.

David McCormack An African Vortex: Islamism in Sub-Saharan Africa, regarded 'Islamism', another contestable term, as a potential threat for both (moderate) Muslims and non-Muslims in sub-Saharan Africa. The main thrust of McCormack's debatable paper was that Saudi Arabia's cash injections28 and its support for Muslim organizations in different parts of sub-Saharan Africa had undermined the peaceful African Sufi presence.

It had done so, he contended, through the spreading of its militant Wahhabi ideological teachings (cf. Napoleoni 2005). The persistence of this brand of Islam on the continent would create a “hospitable environment for terrorists with an international agenda.” Jakkie Cilliers, ISS' executive director, argued along similar lines without discussing 'Islamic terrorism' per se, that when reflecting on 'Terrorism and Africa' (in African Security Review 12[4], 2003) we should not ignore the significant relationship that had developed between international terrorism, on the one hand, and terrorism in Africa, on the other. Cilliers firmly held the view that 'sub-state terrorism was already endemic to Africa' and that the continent's future threat may be located in 'a complex mixture of sub-national and international terrorism'. He, like McCormack , strongly suggested that “Africa presents both a facilitating environment and a target-rich environment for potential terrorists.” Some of his arguments in this paper are contained in his article 'Africa, root causes, and the War on Terror' which was published in African Security Review (15[3]: 58-71, 2006).

Contributions from outsiders such as John Solomon and Campbell MacFarlane have added their voices to the debate that terrorism is indeed a real threat in South Africa. The former, who is Head of Terrorism Research for the World-Check Terrorism and Insurgency Unit, reproduced his report from Terrorism Monitor (No. 12 May 2007) in which he reported that terrorist camps exists in South Africa29, a point that was already made by Hussein Solomon according to the MRN pamphlet. John Solomon, however, extracted his information from Bob Gilder, the former coordinator of South Africa's National Intelligence Coordinating Committee, who informed that international terrorists have managed to use false passports and found ways of residing in South Africa which they considered a 'safe haven', undetected on Interpol radar screens. The report referred to

THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF CURRENT ISLAM The research wing of IPSA

page 25

Definitions and Concepts THE INSTITUTE OF CURRENT ISLAM The research wing of IPSA

page 26

numerous newspaper reports such as the Eastern Cape's The Herald and pointed to the existence of a training camp in the Eastern Cape; a camp that was apparently associated with the Majlis ul-Ulama of the Eastern Cape led by the extremely conservative Maulana Seddick Desai and more specifically with the theological seminary (the PE Darul Ulum)30. John Solomon concluded that Muslim opinion makers such as MRN “demonstrate an implicit acceptance of the jihadi discourse;” a point that was made by Rueben Paz (2000) when he discussed the circulation of terrorist funding. John Solomon's final comment was that, “Signs of terrorist support infrastructures and increased radicalization in South Africa should continue to be monitored closely”31.

We have little doubt that South Africa's Muslims have been and are closely monitored by American and European intelligence agencies and this is further borne out by Campbell MacFarlane's earlier published article titled 'Terrorism in South Africa;' it was published in Prehosp Disast Med (18[2]: 133–139, 2003)32.

MacFarlane, who is no expert on Islam nor on Terrorism, is the Head of Emergency Medical Services Training in the Gauteng Provincial Government and also Honorary Lecturer in the Department of Surgery at the University of the Witwatersrand. What has this medical officer to say on this sensitive topic? Not much is the simple answer except in the arena of 'disaster management.' It is exactly non-specialists such as this that complicates the debate.

Instead of contributing an insightful scholarly paper he superficially dealt with the issue towards the end of his article. It is exactly this point that Silke makes (2006: 12) in his introduction. According to MacFarlane's concluding observations, “The likeliest sources of any terrorist acts probably are white right-wingers and Muslim fundamentalists.” MacFarlane hastily acknowledged that “the vast majority of Muslims in South Africa live amicably with their co-citizens and are not supportive of fundamentalist terrorism”33.

In a somewhat more sober assessment of 'Terrorism and Africa,' Garth Shelton (associate professor of International Relations at the University of Witwatersrand) critically addressed the topic, which appeared in Global Insight (61: 1-6, 2006), a publication of the Gauteng based Institute of Global Dialogue. In his introductory remarks he critiqued the Bush administration's impulsive and exaggerated response to the 9/11 tragedy, which has led to more instability in the

Middle East, and for simplistically dividing the world into 'us' and 'them' categories.

He highlighted the USA's subjective definition of 'terrorism' and the demands that it has made on African governments in the global war on terror. He pointed out that it was as a result of the USA's identification of “a future potential base area for attacks against the USA…” that the UN and other international bodies initiated Counter Terrorism programs and activities to prevent terrorism's gradual growth on the continent. These programs fall in line with the USA's Trans Sahara Counter Terrorism Initiative (TSCI) that was designed to empower African states to monitor and police their countries' porous borders. Shelton drew certain lessons and recommended different approaches such as focusing on human security and including civil society's participation in dealing with this phenomenon. He cautioned that “the danger lies in a US-centric Counter Terrorism system” that lays too much stress on hard security instead of adopting short-term strategies based on, inter alia, economic development .Whether these suggestions will be taken up and considered, we very much doubt because the USA appears to be unwavering in its campaign against terrorism and would adopt economic development only as long as it served USA's interest.

Our final text is entitled Dilemmas of Weak States: Africa and Transnational Terrorism in the twenty-first century (Aldershot: Ashgate 2004). This was written by Tatah Mentan, a Cameroonian researcher. Our interest in this book is his chapter on 'Weak African States, Islamic Theopolitics and Terrorism' (ch. 6 pp. 261334). Although Mentan acknowledged that Islam and Muslims played a critical role in Africa's development, he could not contain some of his anti-Muslim thoughts. In his attempt at defining 'Islamic fundamentalism', he was unable to provide a satisfactory answer. In fact, he distinguishes between radical Islamic fundamentalism and Muslim fundamentalism. The latter, he said, formed “part of Islam since its inception in the seventh century” and noted that the majority of Muslims do not identify with violence and terrorism. He argued that extremism is a manifestation of Islamic fundamentalism and that Islamic extremism is related to terrorism (also cf.

Pratt 2006: 8). He discussed what he called 'Islamism in South Africa' , yet another confusing term that has negative connotations.

Nevertheless, when we assess his

evaluation of Al-Jihad, Qibla, and Hizballah we observe that he discussed these groups without referring to any sources. Where did he get his information? Is Hizballah really a prominent organization that needs to be addressed in an academic text? How could he arrive at conclusions when he did not reflect the sources he drew from and relied on? Tayob's work is one reference, but what about other crucial works that would have shed significant light on the subject. All of these and other related questions force us to question the nature of scholarship in and outside South Africa when it comes to evaluating terrorism and more specifically what they erroneously label 'Islamic terrorism.' The author should have left this section aside and concentrated on issues that he knew best. He undoubtedly treads on shaky grounds resulting in problematic conclusions and in the end produced shoddy and subjective scholarship.

Prior to discussing the statistical data as they appear in Schrijver's invaluable bibliography, we want to bring the reviews of some of the literature on Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism in the aforementioned paragraphs to a close. During the past few years, two institutions, namely CIPS and ISS have been in the vanguard of producing research papers and publications on these two significant themes. Whilst we commend the amount of material that they have thus far produced and circulated in digital and print format, we wish to question the quality of research that has been undertaken.

On more than one occasion, we came across research reports and papers that have relied heavily on newspaper clippings instead of relying on informed, authentic published and unpublished sources.

How can one's research be taken seriously when the scholarship is of a shoddy nature? In which way does one expect one's work to be respected if the research methods employed have been and are questionable? Since research output is invaluable to stakeholders, how do we expect them to have confidence in our products when our argument is shredded to pieces at the outset and when our conclusions are preposterous? Since CIPS and ISS serve a South African audience specifically and an African audience in general, we expect them to put in place the necessary quality assurance safe-guards so that reliable information goes out and assists individuals and organizations to make informed decisions based on the research work undertaken. Instead of breeding 'skollieship' (i.e. an uncouth, unreliable, inconsistent, subjective and undependable type of scholarship), the institutions should promote –as far as possible – a respectable, reliable, objective and sound scholarship that would

benefit all stakeholders. c.

Eastern and Southern African Literature: Schrijver's Statistical Data In this section we merely wish to demonstrate statistically to what extent scholars (insiders and outsiders) have given attention to these phenomena during the past few years. It will, however, be beyond the scope of this paper to reflect on all of Africa's nation-states and since this is the case we will concentrate on those countries that are located in the Eastern and Southern part of the African continent. The statistics is, moreover, based upon the entries that appear in Schrijver's invaluable bibliographical compilation. She inserted four and a half decades worth of entries that stretches from the beginning of the 1960s until the end of 2005. When we peruse all the entries over the mentioned period, it is quite obvious that religious fundamentalism or more specifically Muslim fundamentalism and for that matter Muslim terrorism was not a major issue prior to 1995 in Eastern and Southern Africa (cf. Al-Hady 2003). This is borne out by Botha and Solomon's (2003).

Although Schrijver's bibliography is fairly helpful in identifying many entries, there is a range of entries that is conspicuously absent from it. One such entry is the highly speculative study by C. J. B. Le Roux (on) 'Radical Islamic Fundamentalism in South Africa: An Exploratory Study.' in Journal for Contemporary History 23(2): 1-24, December, 1998. There are a number of other related articles that do not appear in this work for which one should consult Muhammed Haron's bibliographical updates on 'South African Muslims' in the University of Cape Town based Annual Review of Islam in South Africa.

We begin by first calculating the outputs of research as it appears in Schrijver's bibliography. Thereafter we make a list of countries and note the number of entries that appear under each country prior to identifying the numbers of books/articles that address the mentioned themes. Below we provide two tables that are based upon the entries in Schrijver's text: Table 1: Eastern African Entries The above list contains six East African countries and a general list of East African entries. Whilst the total number of entries including the general East African entries is 445 altogether, only 6 entries addressed fundamentalism and terrorism. Let us now turn to countries that make up a part of the Southern African nationstates. In Table 2 below there are five countries listed and one general section. Altogether there are 235 entries and only two with their main focus on 'Muslim radicalism' or 'Islamic fundamentalism.'

THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF CURRENT ISLAM The research wing of IPSA

page 27

Definitions and Concepts THE INSTITUTE OF CURRENT ISLAM The research wing of IPSA

page 28

Table 2: Southern African EntriesWhen comparing the two tables, the total number of entries in Eastern and Southern Africa is 680 and only 8 , including the one mentioned above, entries tackled the two themes. A tentative conclusion that we can derive from Schrijver's bibliographical list of entries is that (a) scholars and researchers in and outside the African continent either did not consider 'Muslim fundamentalism' and 'Muslim terrorism' as a major threat; (b) they did not research the area because it was not considered a priority by research & development units in their countries, (c) there was no funding to undertake quantitative and qualitative studies on these phenomena, and that (d) these phenomena were confined to fringe or minority groups whose influence and impact were not serious. As a consequence of all of these factors, they thus did not produce any notable research that covered and reflected upon these phenomena. What can we gather from all of this? Firstly, it demonstrates that these issues were somewhat non-existent or if they were present then they only affected a minute minority across Africa's Eastern and Southern regions. Secondly, it tells the story that the East and Southern African Muslim communities did not experience these phenomena during the late part of the 20th century since they just emerged out of a colonial setting and struggled with the fellow-citizens in the nation-building process. And thirdly, the African Muslim communities and their leaders were generally law-abiding citizens who did not condone any form of violence and shunned any form of extremism and terrorism.

At this point it might be instructive to

insert the list of texts that covered these themes chronologically here below; the idea is to share basic information such as who were the authors of the texts, what did they focus on, in which journals or books did these text appear and when were they published: Ali Mazrui 'The Black Intifadah? Religion and Rage at the Kenya Coast.' In Journal of Asian and African Affairs 4(2): 87-93, 1993.

Sallie Sumba Kayunga 'Islamic Fundamentalism in Uganda: The Tabligh Youth Movement.' In Uganda Studies in Living Conditions, Popular Movements and Constitutionalism (ed. Mahmood Mamdani & Joseph Oloka-Onyango).

Vienna: Journal fur Entwicklungpolitik, pp.

319-363, 1994. (2 entries) Arye Oded 'Islamic Extremism in Kenya: The Rise and Fall of Sheikh Khalid Balala.'

In Journal of Religion in Africa 26(4): 406415, 1996.

Farid Esack 'PAGAD and Islamic Radicalism: Taking on the State?' In Indicator SA 13(4): 7-11, 1996.

David H. Shinn 'Fighting terrorism in East Africa and the Horn.' In Foreign Service Journal. 81(9): 36-42, 2004.

Jeff Haynes 'Islamic militancy in East Africa.' In Third World Quarterly 26(8): 1312-1339, 2005.

William Rosenau 'Al Qaida recruitment trends in Kenya and Tanzania.' In Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 28(1): 1-10, 2005.

From this unreasonably small number of entries, the following will be observed, non-African scholars wrote most of the articles and all of them were males. Three of them were African scholars of whom one was based at an American university.

Most of the contributors focused on East

THE INSTITUTE OF CURRENT ISLAM The research wing of IPSA

page 18

Africa and only one on South Africa.

However, when one looks at footnote number 16 related to PAGAD, it will be observed that Schrijver's text overlooked many that touched upon the theme in the South African context.

In rounding-up this section, we may say that despite the Kenyan/Tanzanian and the 9/11 tragedies, scholarship on Islamic fundamentalism/radicalism and Islamic terrorism has been sorely lacking and that there is a need to make a concerted effort to rectify the situation (cf.

Silke 2006). However, since we have reviewed the research outputs of CIPS and ISS, these institutions have, to some extent, filled the gaps. Moreover, we expect the tertiary institutions in the Eastern and Southern African regions to take a more pro-active role in undertaking research on these themes. Thus far very few theses and dissertations that address the themes have been completed. Let us now draw upon the work of Silke (2006) who reviewed the scholarly outputs in the field of 'terrorism studies' and provided some interesting ideas that can advance the scholarship in a manner that would benefit all stakeholders. d.

Silke's Review of Literature on (Muslim) Terrorism At this juncture we want to draw upon Silke's significant study with particular reference to the issue of (Muslim) terrorism on the African continent. Silke, however, concentrated on the final decade of the 20th century and this resulted in him undertaking, inter alia, a review of the key researchers on this important subject and a quantitative analysis of the entries in two scholarly journals, namely Journal of Terrorism & Political Violence and Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. For the purposes of our paper, we are only interested in

Silke's evaluation of the entries in the mentioned journals.

But before doing that we want to re-state some of the points that Silke made in his assessment. The first is that the USA remains the most important base for terrorism research. This is because the USA has managed to set aside more than $150 billion for terrorism research during the mid 1990s as compared to other western nation-states that have embarked on similar projects. As a result of this amount of funding, its pool of researchers (more than 260) received funding for their projects and many of these subsequently appeared as reports, articles, monographs and books.

Taking into account the amount of money for such projects and the number of researchers that have come on board to research this phenomenon, it begs a number of questions: If terrorism is a major issue, why has African scholarship been lagging behind in terms of research outputs on this subject? What role is the AU's Algiers' based Centre for the Study of Terrorism playing in encouraging and coordinating research? Are there enough capable researchers who can undertake the necessary research so that their respective governments can benefit from their findings? Why are African countries not able to accumulate sufficient funding for terrorism research? How well equipped are the tertiary institutions to deal with these types of research projects? And what are the reasons for the absence or rather the lack of researchers in this field? These are but a few of the many questions that one is faced with when dealing with the issue.

Figure 4: Geographical Regions and Terrorist Typesi.

Geographical Regions Silke identified nine geographical regions and for some reason made a distinction between Asia and the Middle East. It assumed by the latter category he meant Southwest Asia (that includes, inter alia, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait) and North Africa (that includes, among others, Egypt, Tunis, Morocco and Algeria). Nonetheless, the table above records the coverage of terrorism in three regions between 1990 and 1999. In this table we chose only three regions that assist in comparing Africa to developments in other regions. We should say that in order for us to have a better sense of the research outputs, Silke divided them into two time frames; the first covered the

period 1990-1994 and the second 1995-1999.

He (2006: 203) made a general observation regarding the status of Africa and Asia, in both regions there was an increase in terrorism research and underscored the point that “neither of these latter two regions has ever really received the attention they deserved.�

On this point we definitely concur with him based on our assessment of Schrijver's compilation. Nonetheless, during the first period Western Europe recorded 35, Asia 17 and Africa only 7. In these articles the connection was made between religion and terrorism. When we examine the second period, we observe that Africa (14) doubled their output as well as an increase in Asia (29) but a drop in Western Europe (35). Whilst the decline in Western Europe can perhaps be attributed to lack of genuine interest by research institutions and funding cutbacks, the growing interest in Africa and Asia can be attributed to increased levels of terrorist violence associated with religions. ii.

Outputs: Terrorist Types Silke also created another category via which to understand the nature of the research output. This time he created a 'terrorist type' label in which he included various groups who have contributed towards terrorist violence. He identified nine different groups such as Rightwing extremists, Marxists/communists, environmentalists and State terrorism. From the list we extracted only three and they are: nationalist/separatist groups, religious cults and Islamic extremism.

During the first period 11 research outputs covered the nationalist/separatist groups, 2 religious cults and 6 Islamic extremists. When examining the second period, there is an obvious increase in each category. The research on religious cults increased threefold and Islamic extremism experienced a twofold increase.

Having benefited from Silke's insights and conclusions, we went a bit further by scrutinizing the two journals' entries; instead of going back to the 1990-1999 period we decided to cover the period from 2000 to 2009. Let us insert this table and then comment briefly as to what the statistics reveal.

Figure 5: Journal Outputs from 2000 to 2009Before commenting on Figure 5 above, it should be emphasized that these two journals , as already mentioned by Silke , are the two most significant journals that deal with 'Terrorism studies' as a specialized area of focus. Since this is the case, it was expected that the coterie of African researchers who spent time in researching the topic would make a concerted effort to have their research published in these journals. The figures reflect that JTPV and SCT together produced 114

issues that were published between 2000 and October 2009. The statistics further revealed that there were altogether only 12 issues that focused on Africa and most, if not all, of these outputs came from the pens of scholars outside the African continent. When we go back to Silke's 1990-1999 statistics that were based on these two journals, the conclusion reached then was that there would be a definite increase in output. In fact, it was assumed that much more attention was going to be given after the 1998 Kenyan/Tanzanian bombings or for that matter after 9/11. These statistics demonstrate that this was not the case and cause us to question the reasons for the paucity of research inside as well as outside Africa. Despite the USA's programs and activities in Africa since 9/11 and the special AU Center that was set-up alongside the programs that have been mounted at African universities, scholarship has indeed been lacking if not static. Many reasons may be forwarded for this state of affairs. We shall, however, leave that for other scholars and researchers to explore in a followup research project.

4.

Conclusion The purpose of this paper was to demonstrate the extent to which the research output on fundamentalism and terrorism has effectively contributed to 'the production of knowledge' process in South Africa. Apart from having revisited the definitions that have been proposed and forwarded by a variety of scholars, it was shown that pinning down a suitable definition for both concepts was problematic.

The paper thereafter undertook a review of selected literature that specifically covered and dealt with these themes and that related to Africa and South Africa. This review exercise revealed a number of issues. Among the list are the following: firstly, the absence of good, thorough scholarly research, which Silke stressed and lamented about, has been prevalent in African/South African scholarship; secondly, the poor and questionable scholarship could be attributed to the lack of funding or sponsorship and the necessary institutional support; thirdly, many of the outputs have been discussing and dissecting the symptoms instead of scrutinizing the causes; and fourthly, since the research outputs demonstrated much weakness in the methods and approaches that have been adopted, their predictive ability, as happened in the case of 9/11 according to Silke, will remain weak.

Silke's statistics as well as ours that were based on the two journals that devoted their publication to terrorism reinforced the view that even though there has been some movement in the research arena regarding the

THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF CURRENT ISLAM The research wing of IPSA

page 17

topics, the output pertaining to Africa still falls short of what can be achieved. When we compare the outputs in Western Europe and Asia to what we find in Africa, then African scholarship has to become more productive and make a reasonable input into the debate regarding fundamentalism and terrorism.

Finally, if we draw on the reviews and the statistics, we can reach two general conclusions. The one is that whilst it is acknowledged that fundamentalism does exist in different forms on the continent, it is a phenomenon that can be contained through indigenous and other African strategies. The second is that although it is difficult to restrict and nip terrorist activities in the bud, Africa has not been affected by it the way American and European think tanks have made us believe via their policy driven articles, extensive reports and an array of sensationalist newspaper articles. The third is that even though parts of Africa face challenges such as good governance, there are dictatorial states that have continued to use terror tactics to suppress civil society's voices and the oppressive leaders should be replaced through 'regime change' strategies that the USA so slickly speaks about. The fourth is that whilst Africa welcomes outside intervention on these

issues, it would be best if USA and its allies allow Africa to address them by employing their own methods.

The final point is that whilst we agree that small groups and organizations have created havoc and instability in some African nation-states, some researchers, who have not undertaken any in-depth research based on sound sources, have created 'mountains out of mole-hills'. Their exaggerated conclusions have caused unnecessary fear and panic among government departments and circles and this has led to (a) Muslim fundamentalism and Islamic terrorism being overemphasized and blown out of proportion, and (b) decision makers adopting the incorrect approach. Research outputs should work towards reflecting the true expressions of views on the ground and not give the impression that Muslim minority communities condone and support violent behaviour and activities and nor should they convey the idea that these communities are disloyal citizens to the state. Sound research outputs on these phenomena are crucial in that they can assist in making critical interventions that might help in defusing the potential conflicts and thus prevent violence.

Definitions and Concepts

Defining Terrorism: Reflections on The South African Counter Terrorism Bill Dr. Lubna Nadvi (University of KwaZulu Natal) reform or reject a particular piece of legislation.

Moreover, this paper will attempt to understand the reasons that people participated in particular ways, honing in on their differences and similarities. In particular we will argue that participation in this process can be broadly divided into two distinct categories. One being primarily faith based, i.e. the Muslim community and the second, a loose coalition of journalists, unionists, NGO's and activists. The paper will also look at the broad effectiveness of their participation as an exercise in advancing democracy and civil liberties, as well as specific group interests.

INTRODUCTION The South African civil society response to the recently tabled Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist and Related Activities Bill (2004), known initially as the Anti-Terrorism Bill (ATB), raises a number of critical questions around the effectiveness of public participation in terms of resisting a controversial bill that has appeared before parliament for consideration. The outcomes of this particular process has implications for how civil society may respond to similarly proposed legislation in future.

THE INSTITUTE OF CURRENT ISLAM The research wing of IPSA

page 18

This paper attempts to analyse the nature and context of the public's participation in relation to the ATB, by firstly tracing very briefly, its history, and then examining the levels of resistance to the bill and the interesting civil society dynamics that emerged from the various alliances that were formed, nationally, in an effort to respond to the bill. We will argue that this process was somewhat unprecedented in the post 1994 period, particularly within the context of broader civil society participation in the formation of government policy on an issue of such critical national significance. It was unprecedented because never before had there been such a concerted effort by civil society to

It could be argued that the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 served as a catalyst for many countries, particularly the US and the United Kingdom, and South Africa at a later stage, to consider introducing additional legislation to deal with terrorism. In the case of South Africa, the government's argument that the then Anti-Terrorism Bill will bring our country in line with the many other countries that have passed similar legislation was met with public anger and discontent from the time that the draft bill was introduced in 2002. The resistance stemmed primarily from the fact that draconian powers would be given to our law enforcement agencies to investigate and deal with acts of terror. The vague description of 'terrorism' fanned fears that the ATB will seriously impact on civil liberties like the freedom of association, expression, assembly and demonstration.

The South African public was understandably nervous about having its own civil liberties being curtailed yet again after years of having lived under apartheid, given that the experiences of US minority communities in the wake of such legislation being introduced illustrated the dangers of these laws being effected.

These incidences in the US and elsewhere were undoubtedly enough motivation for those groups that felt that they would be most impacted upon by the introduction of this legislation, to act. As a result, South African Muslims together with a range of other interest groups such as COSATU, one of the country's largest labour union federations were propelled to undertake a sustained campaign to challenge and engage the government on this bill. What followed were arguably a rare

and intriguing partnership between faith-based and other non-governmental interest groups, forged together, in order to tackle an issue, which would inevitably affect them all, and their activities as members of civil society.

BRIEF CHRONOLOGY OF THE BILL In September 2002, the Department of Safety and Security introduced the draft ATB for comment and scrutiny. At this point a number of human rights organisations opposed the bill arguing that it was fundamentally flawed. What were at issue were many of the archaic provisions of the law that would significantly curtail civil liberties, which the constitution of the country guaranteed in its Bill of Rights. The initial demand by some was that the bill be completely shelved. This did not happen, and the government showed no leaning towards completely abandoning the bill.

The next course of action for the detractors of the bill was to then actively engage around demanding changes to the technical aspects of the legislation. It is worth noting at this point that the Muslim community in particular would have preferred for the bill to be completely abandoned as opposed to being revised.

A revised bill, with shortened content and a removal of some problematic areas, was then placed before parliament in March 2003.

However, as the excerpt from a Freedom of Expression Institute indicates below, the revised version was not without problems. The Freedom of Expression Institute, on March 10th, 2003 stated:

arguments raised by the various groups and it effectively informed and shaped the foundation of the objections to the introduction of the bill.

In the latter part of 2003, indications were that the bill would be fast tracked through parliament.

However, COSATU's intervention disrupted the process arguing that strike action would be seen as “terrorist action” in terms of the construction of the bill. The April 2004 elections halted any progress on the bill but it was once again revised, taking into account COSATU's concerns, and reintroduced to parliament. A compromise was reached with COSATU, and the bill was renamed and unanimously passed in November 2004.

RESISTING THE BILL: ORGANISING PROTEST AT NATIONAL LEVEL It was clear from the outset that the implementation of this bill was going to affect civil society across the board. The South African government's intention to introduce the bill and bring it into effect as soon as possible was read by many as succumbing to pressure from the United States government to conform to its agenda of dictating the terms of how 'terrorists' were to be dealt with. Groups, who would be severely impacted upon by the bill, and civil society as a whole, began to mobilise to address the proposed legislation. Organisations across the country, from the Freedom of Expression Institute (FXI) to individuals who had either legal or political expertise, joined the national coalition to organise the writing and submission of documents that unpacked the serious problems with the bill.

“The Freedom of Expression Institute in concert with a range of other Human Rights organisations opposes the introduction of this legislation in South Africa. Firstly, the bill itself is fundamentally flawed and the logic behind its motivation curious. Furthermore, the process followed in drafting this legislation is highly questionable as no discussion document was published neither was there proper consultation done by the South African Law Commission with the various stakeholders. Because terrorism is an offence that attracts some of the severest penalties known in law, it would have been thought that the bill would at least attempt to provide a simple, clean and unambiguous definition of the term 'terrorism'. Unfortunately this has not been done and on the contrary the bill presents a vague and incomprehensible definition of what it means by 'terrorist act', which it defines as “ … an unlawful act … that is likely to intimidate the public or a segment of the public.”

For example, a secretariat was set up in Durban, which worked together with the administrative networks of other organisations to synchronise submissions of documents to the parliamentary committee dealing with the bill, as well as issue regular public and press statements. What was no doubt intriguing was the way in which groupings that would otherwise arguably not have formed alliances, undertook to do so, as part of the broader organised resistance. This included religious bodies, NGOs, trade unions, individuals and professional associations. The constitution of the country became the most powerful tool to engage the parliamentarians, with the primary argument being that the bill violated significant rights guaranteed by the constitution.

a) Faith Based Group Intervention: Muslim Resistance to the Bill

Interestingly, a number of organisations also argued that the State had 22 pieces of existing legislation to cover crimes and activities covered by the ATB. This was one of the more significant

The most prominent faith based group in the coalition established to undertake the organised resistance to the ATB was that of the Muslim community.

THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF CURRENT ISLAM The research wing of IPSA

page 19

Definitions and Concepts

The horror of the experiences of the Muslim community in the US and in some other parts of the world, was clearly an indication to South African based Muslims, that they could not allow such legislation to pass without challenging its proposed draconian measures, which would put them first in line as targets, should the bill be passed in its original formation.

The extreme measures with which the US based Immigration and Naturalisation Service (INS) authorities dealt with minority individuals after September 11, was scary, to say the least. US residents from minorities, particularly men of Arab, Muslim and South Asian origin were simply detained, without being charged, or allowed legal counsel. No explanation was given in many instances; many were arrested and refused trial. It was only after sustained protests from the public and human rights groups that the authorities relented, but there are hitherto still some individuals incarcerated unjustly, simply because they were Muslim, or of Arab or South Asian descent. If any of these individuals were found to have sent money to the Middle East or Asia, albeit simply for charitable causes, they were immediately suspected of channelling money to 'terrorist' organisations.

The South African Muslim initiative drew from a broad spectrum of the Muslim community. A range of Muslim organisations played an active role in making submissions and supporting the national initiative. These included the following organisations based across the country: Islamic Medical Association (IMA) Jamiatul Ulama (KZN) Muslim Judicial Council Sunni Jamiatul Ulama (SA) Muslim Youth Movement (MYM) Jamaitul Ulama, (Gauteng) Council of Ulama Eastern Cape Association of Muslim Accountants and Lawyers Al Ansaar Foundation South African National Zakaah Fund (SANZAF) Islamic Dawah Movement (IDM) Human Rights Foundation Institute for Islamic Services Red Crescent Society of South Africa Media Review Network (MRN)

THE INSTITUTE OF CURRENT ISLAM The research wing of IPSA

page 18

A cursory glance of the above list would indicate that they are primarily religious organisations, with IMA and AMAL also representing professional interests. It would

seem that as faith based groups, the level of public participation by Muslim organisations is located within a predominantly religious framework, the implications of which will be unpacked later on in this paper.

A submission made by the above organisations to President Mbeki in November 2003, noted that: “There is no place for such legislation in the new, democratic South Africa. Our government should be the first to OPPOSE a bill of this type because it goes against everything that the freedom struggle stood for.

If the liberation movements, during the apartheid days, were judged today under this bill all would be condemned as terrorist organizations. If the ATB is passed here, no South African will be able to support in ANY way ANY of the liberation struggles presently being waged in many parts of the world. This is hugely ironical because virtually the entire world supported the South African freedom struggle. We are told that the ATB is needed here in order to deal with groups like Pagad and the Boeremag. Both these groups have been apprehended without the bill. It took good police work, not new laws to achieve this.

However, we must emphasize that if measures are contemplated to tighten up domestic security we will certainly be supportive of such moves provided they don't infringe on civil liberties.”

The letter clearly indicated the concerns felt by the Muslim community and other formations, viz, that supporting genuine liberation struggles globally would be severely hampered by such a bill, as would the undertaking of local protests, which had effectively been the hallmark of the anti-apartheid movement. b) Intervention by Broader Civil Society

A number of progressive interest groups undertook to resist the bill. While some of the resistance involved public meetings and protests to a limited extent, oral and written submissions to the relevant parliamentary portfolio committee were the more notable forms of resistance.

In its submission IDASA (Institute for Democracy in South Africa) supported the “intention of the bill” and acknowledged the need for legislation to deal with terrorism in South Africa and internationally, but was concerned that “in an attempt to address the problems of terrorism, there is potential to make provisions which may be in

contravention with the provisions of the constitution.”

IDASA explained that the 2002 draft ATB defined a terrorist act as “acts which intentionally intimidate the public, cause death or serious bodily harm or endanger a person's life.” The amended (2003) version defined terrorist act to mean, “An unlawful act committed inside or outside the Republic.” The latter definition, IDASA argued, is extremely broad and does not give clarity as to what acts constitute terrorism. IDASA also expressed concern that the bill might contravene human rights that are enshrined in Chapter 2 of the constitution. In wrapping up its submission to the portfolio committee, IDASA said, “ Successful anti-terrorism legislation must endeavour to build strong international norms and institutions on human rights and not provide a new rationale for avoiding and undermining them. The legislation should maintain a balance between combating the threat of national and international terrorism while maintaining the hard won rights as enshrined in the constitution. We should be mindful of our repressive history which, at the time, passed legislation which was intended to “protect” the country against organisations such as the ANC and the PAC which were considered to be terrorist organisations.”

The Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope (LSCGH) also voiced resistance to the bill in its submission arguing that existing legislation was more than adequate in dealing with the threat of terrorism and the (then) proposed bill may also have provisions that were unconstitutional. Vincent Saldana, who presented for the LSCGH, reminded the committee that during the apartheid era there had been no transparency and public participation in the legislative process. The opportunity to participate in terms of responding to this bill was a momentous step forward and the LSCGH was opposed to the ATB, which he described as a “stark reminder of old security measures.” The LSCGH went further to warn that the bill failed to deal adequately with the complex relationships underpinning some communities.

The South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) was also not convinced of the need for the bill. In its submission, the SAHRC proposed a number of technical changes to the bill and expressed concern at the limitation to the right to silence. The SAHRC did, however, explain that it understood that the international environment was difficult and South Africa had obligations to meet. However, they made it

clear that the manner in which each country incorporated international instruments depended on the country's circumstances and there was no need to go against the constitution.

Another notable submission was made by the Unemployed and Social Activists Committee (USAC) who rejected the bill as “unconstitutional and a tool of imperialist oppression.” The USAC contended that the bill was more repressive than apartheid itself.

They went on to argue that the bill was defending “imperialist globalisation and the bourgeoisie of South Africa.”

In a number of statements, the Johannesburg based Freedom of Expression Institute (FXI) argued that the bill will seriously impact on individual civil and political liberties.

Moreover, the FXI was also concerned about the impact the bill would have on progressive formations in the country, particularly the social movements. A widely circulated press statement said, “What is worrying is the way the bill interfaces with the terrain of radical political protest in South Africa. One can easily surmise that the activities of social movements such as the Anti-Privatisation Forum (APF), the Landless Peoples' Movement (LPM) and the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) will soon come under the attention of this legislation.”

Journalists were also among those who resisted the introduction of the ATB. The South African National Editors Forum (SANEF) called for the withdrawal of the ATB saying it was “ a serious threat to media freedom because the legislation could be used against journalists.” . Kimani Ndungu of FXI commented that “it violates the rights of the media to operate freely, and will compel journalists to provide information and hand over material to the State.”

The intervention made by COSATU (Congress of South African trade unions) has arguably been the most effective. During the stage of the earlier draft of the ATB (2002), COSATU realised that legitimate strike action could be criminalized as 'terrorist action' and flexed its political muscle resulting in the bill being stalled. In its submission, at this stage, to the portfolio committee, COSATU argued that the definition of 'terrorism' was far too broad and vague. They went on to say that: “This would have the effect of expanding the scope of the bill to include activities, which though unlawful, in no way should be construed as an act of terrorism. This understandably has raised concerns about the potential that this has to be used to suppress

THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF CURRENT ISLAM The research wing of IPSA

page 17

Definitions and Concepts

political dissent. Considering the broad definition of a terrorist act upon which this provision is dependent, it is understandable that this provision has raised concern about it being used against organisations perceived to be left of government. Further, it is unclear how legitimate liberation movements may be distinguished in respect of acts endangering the security and territorial integrity of other countries.”

As a result of the various submissions made by some of the above interest groups, with COSATU having exerted the most notable influence, the bill was revised, and renamed the Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist and Related Activities bill. A compromise was reached primarily with the trade union movement, with the significant change being that the bill now stipulated, “a struggle waged by peoples… in furtherance of their legitimate right to national liberation, selfdetermination and against colonialism shall not be considered as terrorist activity.”

EFFECTIVE PUBLIC PARTICIPATION: DYNAMICS OF ADDRESSING LEGISLATIVE REFORM a) Strategic Alliances and National Engagement Clearly, a number of diverse organisations were involved in resisting the bill. It can be argued that the participation of some organisations was more effective than that of others, for a wide range of reasons. De Villiers reminds us that, “Public participation is about access to power and decision makers. In most systems, certain people or interests have greater access to power and decision makers than others.”

We have attempted to unpack the levels of participation by broader civil society by examining briefly the role played by a diverse range of actors. There were essentially two categories, as identified in the introduction; one was primarily a religious based interest group, and the second a loose configuration of human rights groupings, trade unionists, journalists, NGOs and activists. While there are overlaps between the two categories, there are also arguably some significant differences.

THE INSTITUTE OF CURRENT ISLAM The research wing of IPSA

page 18

The submissions made by the Muslim community were primarily informed by

the kinds of harassment and unfair victimisation that Muslims faced at a global level, in a post 9/ 11 context. Other groupings were not subjected to this kind of treatment, and hence their participation was located within the context of the potential compromise of certain rights guaranteed by the constitution of a democratic South African dispensation.

The Muslim community had, to a great extent, been influenced to act on this issue as a result of what was generally being perceived globally as a politically motivated campaign against Muslims and Arabs, orchestrated primarily by the US government and its allies. The crux of the concern was the possibility of Muslims being identified as “terrorists” because of their historical support of global issues such as the liberation struggles of the Palestinians, Chechnyans, Kashmiris, and of late the Iraqis. Moreover the fear was that their financial contributions to organisations supporting the struggles in the above countries would be severely constrained. In addition the threat of arrest, detention without trial, etc. should for example individuals be found to be in possession of materials that promote certain causes, was also seen as compromising one's essential right to freedom of expression and association.

The submissions made by the second category that we have identified, while alluding to some of the concerns expressed by the Muslim coalition, went further to argue that radical and progressive activities, that entailed criticism of neoliberal interests could easily be labelled as 'terrorist activity'. Dale McKinley, a wellknown social activist argued that; “ The ANC government can use its discretion to define 'unlawful' dissent as terrorism”. He added that; “it does not take a genius to figure out what this might mean for social movements such as the Anti-Privatisation Forum and the Landless Peoples Movement.”

Other significant role-players included the trade-union formation, whose contribution was no doubt one of the defining factors in the revision of the bill. The effectiveness of the resistance offered by COSATU can be attributed to the fact that they are a powerful, well-organised formation.

Moreover, the fact that COSATU is a significant part of the national tripartite alliance helps locate its critique as serious and strategic. Bearing in mind the political

ramifications, the government could not afford to introduce legislation that is seriously at odds with a powerful trade union movement that has the support of the vast majority of organised workers in the country.

While the submissions from the Muslim community played a very significant role in resisting the bill in its original state, it soon became clear that the influence of the trade unions was going to be more substantial in contributing to the final version of the bill, partly because of their power to paralyse the effective functioning of the country. The fact that COSATU has broad based support from working masses, no doubt had greater impetus in convincing government to revise technical aspects of the bill.

CONCLUSION This paper has essentially attempted to analyse the formation of civil society alliances in order to better effect responses and resistance to what it perceived as a common threat. The fact that the process entailed taking on a piece of legislation that could change the landscape of how civil society functions, is a significant point, as it indicates the effectiveness of organised public participation around critical legislative issues.

Habib argues that “ contemporary civil society is distinguished by the fact that it not only reflects the demographic realities of South African society but also transcends the racialised form of the adversarial – collaborative dichotomy that typified civil

society relations with the state in earlier epochs.” He goes on to say, “ Indeed the distinctive feature of this period is not only the longitudinal growth of the sector, but the formal emergence, or at least the surfacing in the political sphere, of a significant part of it, viz black civil society actors who had hitherto either been banned or prevented from operating in the public arena.”

The fact that the participants, involved in the process of resisting the ATB, were from a diverse racial and political spectrum, seemingly confirms Habib's assertion. What it perhaps doesn't explain completely is the reality that the process we have outlined above reflects something of a fragmented approach.

Essentially the non-faith based groupings engaged with the issue, located in the context of class, whereas the former did not, to any significant degree. However, it should be noted that there were individuals in the faith-based category who were sensitive to the issue of class and did indeed tackle it. Also Habib's reference to the emergence of black civil society actors is significant in view of the role played

by COSATU as a representative of majority black, working class interests.

The South African civil society's response to the ATB, has shown that it has matured as a collective force in national politics. The fact that it took on this issue with a modicum of success reflects well on the process of democracy in SA over the last decade or so.

THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF CURRENT ISLAM The research wing of IPSA

page 17

Historical Antecedants

Political Rebellion in Sunni Muslim Thought Prof Yousuf Dadoo

Introduction

THE INSTITUTE OF CURRENT ISLAM The research wing of IPSA

page 18

Causes of political violence, according to Michael Freeman, may be identified at four levels: individual, rational, systemic and ideological. They accord roughly with the social movement theory, which describes or predicts specific behaviour trends.

Individual causes relate to psychological predispositions, and feelings of alienation and victimization. Rational causes deal with the rationale or the objectives for which groups use violence. Systemic causes focus on the conditions that create the root grievances motivating extremism like social and economic deprivation, political repression and modernisation. Ideological causes are connected to implicitly held worldviews that are regarded as inherently logical.

These causes of violence serve five primary functions: they identify the source of the grievance as well as the culprit responsible for it, offer a solution or end-state, justify the means for reaching that end-state, and place the struggle in the broader context.

In this respect, the paper will probe the ideological component of political violence by briefly examining political rebellion in Sunni Muslim thought over time. It will place these in context to enable an impartial assessment of both the status and views of these scholars and/or political activists rather than rehashing

the customary invective against them or making unsophisticated generalizations .

It has to be acknowledged that without solid analysis of contexts, scriptural sources yield contradictory guidelines about the legitimacy of political rebellion. We may cite the following examples to support obedience to those in power: “O believers, obey Allah and the Messenger and those in authority among you …”

“The one who obeys me obeys Allah, and he who disobeys me disobeys Allah. He who obeys the leader has obeyed me and he who disobeys the leader has disobeyed me”.

Believers are prohibited from rebelling, regardless of the ineptitude of rulers. Their only recourse is patience.

Counter-obedience traditions include the following: The Qur'ân consistently demands the establishment of justice and an end to tyranny: “Why do you not fight in the Path of Allah when the oppressed men, women and children pray, 'Our Lord! Remove us from this city whose inhabitants are oppressors. And from Your side appoint for us a protector and an aid'”. The Qur'ân creates a power construct that can easily be used to justify armed resistance to oppression. An explicit Prophetic statement is the following: “There is no obedience in sinful matters”. Let us now move on to analyzing historical cases of rebellion.

Political Rebellions in Islamic History Examples of these will now be given in chronological order. The most illustrious of them revolves around the beloved grandson of the Holy Prophet (S.A.W.), ? usain (R.A.). Al? abarî has provided extensive background details to his involvement in the political struggle of his day that will have to be pruned to fit this presentation.

Upon receiving a written request from the people of Kûfah for a recognized political leader in 60 A.H. (679 C.E.) , he concluded his reply to them as follows: “I swear an oath!

The leader is none other than one who operates

by Allah's Book, observes justice, adjudicates with the truth and restrains himself before Allah's Being”.

Extremely instructive is his later letter to the people of Ba? rah that deserves being quoted extensively: “Allah selected Mu? ammad (S.A.W.) over His creation, honoured him by granting him prophethood and chose him to receive and spread His Message. Then He took him to Himself after he had admonished Allah's

servants and conveyed what he had been sent with. And we are his family, close allies, advisors, heirs and the most eligible of people to occupy his status; therefore our people preferred us while we were pleased and (at the same time) despised disunity and loved safety … And I am calling you to Allah's Book and the traditions of His prophet (S.A.W.) because the traditions have been destroyed and innovation has been revived. If you listen to my word and obey me, I will guide you to the path of wisdom. May Allah's peace and blessings be upon you”.

When he planned to set out for Kûfah, he was confronted by some of his opponents who alleged that by creating dissensions he was leaving the Muslim community. Husain (R.A.) retorted by quoting the following Qur'ânic verse: “To me belong my deeds and to you, yours. You are not accountable for my deeds and I am not accountable for your deeds”.

Finally, his response to ?

Amr bin al-? Â? (R.A.), governor of Egypt and ally of his political adversary, Yazîd, is equally remarkable: “The one who invites people towards Allah, performs virtuous deeds and declares that he is a Muslim cannot oppose Allah and His Prophet. You have offered me indemnity, benevolent treatment and due consideration of our kinship ties. The best safety is the one granted by Allah. On the Day of Judgement Allah will not grant safety to one who has not feared Him in this world. So we ask Allah to grant us His fear in this world that will guarantee us His indemnity on the Day of Judgement. If, by writing to me, you had intended to show me benevolence and appreciation for our kinship ties, may you be rewarded in this world and the hereafter. Peace be upon you”.

The following inferences may be made: - Truth and justice work in tandem. Justice can only be upheld when truth is at its disposal; - Unity of the Muslim Ummah and personal well-being cannot be forged at the cost of truth; - Constant awareness of accountability to Allah is the springboard for all probity; and - Dignified responses to political opponents.

Husain's campaign is among the earliest of recorded political rebellions in Islamic history.

Abû Hanîfah (80 A.H.-150 A.H./699 C.E.-750 C.E.), the acclaimed jurist, displayed sympathies for cAlî's progeny under the leadership of Zaid bin cAlî against the Umayyad ruler, Hishâm bin cAbd al-Malik by sending the former ten thousand dirhams worth of financial support. Subsequently, the Umayyads quelled the uprising in 130 A.H. (730 C.E.) by first killing Zaid and later his son.

**The governor, Ibn Hubairah, perceived rebellion among jurists; so he invited them to assign tasks to them for testing their loyalty.

Abû ? anîfah ignored the summons, upon which his colleagues pleaded with him to comply with the governor's orders willy-nilly.

His refusal caused his imprisonment and torture. Eventually, Ibn Hubairah ordered Abû Hanîfah's release to avert potentially adverse repercussions should he die in prison.

Abû Hanîfah then proceeded to Makkah and continued his campaign there against the rulers until the political order changed. During his response to the new ruler on behalf of all jurists, he praised Allah for having removed tyranny and re-instituting the truth. But later conflicts between the cAbbâsid rulers and cAlî's descendants stirred his sympathies for the latter group once more. Consequently, the ruler, Abû Jacfar al-Man? ûr, had him imprisoned and tortured once more. Abû ? anîfah died soon thereafter.

The influence of his political views is evident in Abû Bakr al-Ja? ? â? 's commentary on the Qur'ânic verse: “My pledge does not cover tyrants”. He quotes the view of Mujâhid to the effect that a tyrant may not be a leader. Ibn cAbbâs states further that pledges to such a person don't have to be kept. Al- Ja? ? â? deduces that a tyrant can neither be a prophet, nor his successor or judge of any kind, which conforms to Abû Hanîfah's interpretation of this topic. No distinction can be made between a ruler and a judge in this regard as both of them need to be endowed with justice. There is a dictum worthy of consideration at all times; namely, ordaining virtue and forbidding vice.

Anyone failing to comply with it deserves to be killed.

But it is in the writings of the Syrian jurist, A? mad ibn Taimîyah (1262-1327) that this topic received an appraisal hitherto unknown.

His life was marked by persecutions at the hands of invading political authorities who, together with their local accomplices, were accused of fickle religious faith by him. He unambiguously explains that rulers accepting the mandatory nature of Islamic practices while failing to discharge them are liable for punishment both in this world ** and the hereafter. Examples of such culprits are the Mongols who tend to Yasa legal codes, thereby having their sense of justice and faith impaired.

Extremist Muslim groups ranging from the Wahhâbis to Al-Qaeda have latched on to these views for different reasons: while the former used a puritanical pretext – namely, the eradication of bidcah (religious innovation) and

THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF CURRENT ISLAM The research wing of IPSA

page 17

Historical Antecedants

shirk (polytheism) – to expel the foreigner Turkish Ottomans the latter have harped upon the failure of Muslim politicians to release their subjects from an all-pervasive godless creed represented by neo-colonialism. But Ibn Taimîyah's views on political rebellion are far more complex than this, as the following discussion will reveal.

In scholarly fashion, he begins by stressing the importance of allegiance to rulers even in times of injustice by referring to some of the Prophetic statements given earlier. Such pledges between rulers and subjects are valid, whether given implicitly or explicitly. He ends this section by presenting Prophetic statements that restrict obedience to virtuous matters only. **He then appraises khilâfah vis-à-vis kingship after quoting some Prophetic predictions about the emergence of the latter after the termination of the former mode of authority.

Kingship has to be viewed as an outcome of deficiencies among both the rulers and the subjects.

Sincere and selfless cooperation with rulers has to be undertaken in matters of virtue. So long as the resulting social misery and chaos exceed the benefit in removing a tyrant, the status quo should not be impaired. This has remained a principle of Sunnî thought.

Similarly, monarchy has to be tolerated even if some aspects of requisite religion are undermined by it as a pragmatic measure.

Whereas khilâfah is mandatory in essence, deviation from its norms is only permitted to the degree of necessity.

There are three positions on this subject:

THE INSTITUTE OF CURRENT ISLAM The research wing of IPSA

page 18

The dissenters (Khawârij), rationalists (Muctazila), and some groups of Sunnîs and ? ûfîs regard the implementation of khilâfah as a permanent duty upon all people. They base their standpoint on the Qur'ânic narratives of the plundering king mentioned in 18:79 or the general observation of Bilqîs about the corruption wreaked by kings upon subjects as mentioned in 27:34; - Others regard such an accomplishment as meritorious but not mandatory; and - Yet others among those who believe in the static nature of faith in a person's heart regardless of the type of deeds performed by that individual and who refer all judgements to Allah (Murji'ah),and also tyrants and freethinkers, grant total approval to monarchy.

There are four possible scenarios for a deviation from khilâfah to royalty: - The inability of citizens to support it at both the levels of knowledge and implementation; in such a condition, the ruler is excused for exercising his outlook;

- Khilâfah only remains within the realms of possibility rather than actuality (hence, an ideal only). Here, all duties for its establishment disappear as the experience of Prophet Yûsuf (A.S.) reveals; - For those who deem its realization in meritorious terms only argue that having a just king is not reprehensible at all. Actually, monarchy was permitted during the lives of Prophets Yûsuf, Dâwûd and Sulaimân (A.S.) and this form of dominion did not reduce their prophetic status. Even more so, it was granted to entire families of prophets (like the family of Ibrâhîm A.S.) as well as pious people (like ? âlût and Dhu l-Qarnain); and - For those who uphold the mandatory status of actualizing the khilâfah, transgression by rulers and their subordinates could be either minor or major. In the former instance, the justice system will not be affected meaning that citizens do not have to resort to any action. But if the sin is major, there are two possibilities: If the culprit's virtues outweigh or equal his vices, he should be tolerated; otherwise his rule is objectionable. There is a dissenting view among some scholars who feel that even a single major sin of a ruler deserves harsh censure even if he has several counterbalancing virtues. But the first view appears more accurate in light of religious texts.

The aforementioned pronouncements confirm the complexity of Ibn Taimîyah's views on this subject. The question that has to be answered is: how do they reconcile with his hostile rulings against the Mongols? It may be asserted that those rulings were inspired by his existential reality whereas his lengthy discourse is more theoretical; hence, it embraces numerous possibilities.

Yahya Michot, currently a fellow in Islamic Studies at the Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies, believes that Ibn Taimîyah was more open-minded and progressive than he is given credit for. Although he is considered the godfather of uncompromising and violent religious extremism he issued four edicts on how Muslim ought to respond when they are under non-Muslim rule. He also examines adjustments Muslims might need to make under those conditions together with the forms and extent of such changes. He thought of a third type of territory, away from the Dâr alIslam and Dâr al-? arb, in which they would be able to live alongside people of other faiths.

We now examine the stance of two ideologues of the twentieth century who acknowledged the role of Ibn Taimîyah in shaping their political thought; namely, Sayyid Abu l-Aclâ Maudûdî and Sayyid Qu? b.

Abu ? l-A'lâ Maudûdî (1903-1979) was a Pakistani journalist, theologian, political philosopher, Islamic revivalist and Islamic thinker. He was a fervent proponent of Islamic statehood. His career began in India prior to the partition of the subcontinent in 1948. He founded the Jamaat-e-Islami revivalist party in Pakistan. In 1953, he was sentenced to death for writing a seditious pamphlet about the Ahmadiyya issue. He refused to file a petition for mercy, preferring death instead. After strong public pressure over a protracted period, his sentence was annulled.

His primary objective was global confrontation of alien systems for the establishment of Islamic rule that would be a “theo-democracy” based on the three principles of taw? îd (Divine Unity), risâlah (prophethood) and khilâfah (Islamic form of political rule). Actually, this was the primary mission of prophets. He states further: “The leadership of the wicked and evildoers is the source of all disasters and calamities that afflict humanity, and the wellbeing and happiness of mankind rests solely upon the reins of authority over the worldly affairs lying in the hands of the righteous and just”. For this objective, they had to seize power from those in charge of worldly civilizations and create the aspired revolution. In principle, he was not averse to political rebellion for achieving his objectives if he found that society to be governed by jâhilîyah (or, ignorant adversarial norms).

According to him, Western modernity was the new jâhilîyah that is based on secularism, nationalism and democracy. It runs counter to Divine sovereignty (? âkimîyah ilâhîyah) required by an Islamic state.

According to historian Philip Jenkins, his concept of jâhilîyah appealed greatly to Qu? b who expanded it further. Likewise, his impact on Middle Eastern Muslim activists, which include Ayatollah Khomeini, has been perceptible, if not substantial. The latter is reported to have met Maudûdî as early as 1963 during ? ajj after which he translated some of his works into Farsi.

Sayyid Qu? b (1906-1966) was the Islamic revivalist figure of the “Muslim Brotherhood” (Ikhwân al-Muslimûn), author and literary critic. He endured several prison terms for voicing his disagreement with the Egyptian government. The relentless tortures certainly radicalised him until he was hanged for treason. His influence on later extremists like Mu? ammad cAbd al-Salâm Faraj (of Jamâcat al-Jihâd), Abû Qatâdah al-Falas? înî (of the Armed Islamic Group in Algeria), Abû ? amzah al-Mi? rî, cAbd Allah al-Fai? al, 'Abd Allah 'Azzâm (the Palestinian Islamic jurist and mentor of Bin Laden) and Osama bin Laden

(the head of Al-Qaeda) has been tremendous.

In turn, Maudûdî whom he often quoted during his Qur'ânic commentary influenced him. For him, jâhilîyah meant one person's lordship over another, which contradicted the system of the universe. This problem, which has constantly assumed the form of a vigorous movement controlling the practical world, confronted every prophet. In reaction to it, the alternative group has to be meticulously organized and clearly distinguishable from it at all levels of life. Its mission is to awaken the dormant human instinct by re-linking it to Allah.

Non-Islamic society is permeated with oppression against which a struggle has to be waged globally because all people deserve freedom from the clutches of jâhilîyah. He was inspired by Maudûdî's views in The Moral Foundation of the Islamic Movement to conclude that this struggle, using all appropriate methods, has to be first waged against the external society to ensure the prosperity of the inner being. Muslims have to first establish an Islamic society to attain spiritual perfection and nearness to Allah. This jihâd has to be waged against institutions – like government sectors – and organizations rather than against individuals.

The resulting freedom opens the way for people's release from enslavement to other people: it does not compel them to change their beliefs. Therefore, people of other religions would still be allowed to practice their faith as long as it did not infringe upon the nature of the Islamic society.

When the community is disenchanted with a ruler, his authority must end. If he transgresses the Sharîcah, he must be eliminated even if the community disagrees.

But for Mezzi, Qu? b's support for an armed insurrection against the state is far from clear.

While discussing the rationale for the absence of Divine backing for military confrontation in the Makkan phase, Qu? b speculates that it could be attributed to the objective of not associating bloody conflicts with Islam. Or it could have been to avoid fights within every home for which Islam would be blamed. Had Qu? b been able to complete the next phase of his writings, as he had promised, this enigma would have been resolved.

We can now provide a general overview of this topic.

General overview of political rebellion

THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF CURRENT ISLAM The research wing of IPSA

Abou El Fadl says that traditions stressing the impermissibility of using force against Muslims

page 17

Historical Antecedants

or the loyalty to those in power were quite popular in the first two centuries of Islam. For this reason, we may contend, the terms employed in juristic discourse for opponents have always been Khawârij and bughât (rebels), thereby pejoratively connoting their disobedience to the status quo and social stability. In this context, the word fitnah (sedition) is also found. Despite this phenomenon, there are traditions condoning rebellion that has been quoted earlier thatare not developed into systematic positions.

Al-Qur? ubî (d. 595 A.H./circa1205 C.E.) summarises the Sunnî position thus: “On the basis of 2:124, a group of scholars has inferred that the leader has to be endowed with justice, virtue and bounty besides being able to uphold them. In this context, the Holy Prophet disallowed wrangling with competent people.

But transgressors and tyrants are incompetent on the basis of the Qur'ânic injunction just mentioned. For this reason Ibn al-Zubair and Al-? usain rebelled …, as did the eminent persons and scholars of Iraq against Al-? ajjâj.

The people of Madînah revolted against the Umayyads for which Muslim bin cUqbah hurled a volcano at them.

But the majority believes that patience when obeying a tyrant is better than rebelling against him, as in doing so they would be replacing their security with fear, bloodshed, the granting of free rein to fools, raids against the Muslim population and corruption throughout the land.

The first view is held by groups of rationalists and all dissenters”.

Abou El Fadl clarifies the entire debate as follows:

THE INSTITUTE OF CURRENT ISLAM The research wing of IPSA

page 18

“Muslim jurists exhibited a remarkable tolerance toward the idea of political rebellion.

Because of historical circumstances in the first three centuries of Islam, Muslim jurists, in principle, prohibited rebellions even against unjust rulers. At the same time, they refused to give the government unfettered discretion against rebels. The classical jurists argued that the law of God prohibited the execution of rebels or needless destruction or confiscation of their property. Rebels should not be tortured or even imprisoned if they take an oath promising to abandon their rebellion. Most importantly, according to the majority view, rebellion, for a plausible cause, is not a sin or moral infraction, but merely a political wrong because of the chaos and civil strife that will result. This approach made rebellion a civil,

and not a religious, infraction.

The classical approach to terrorism was quite different. Since the very first century of Islam, Muslims suffered from extremist theologies that not only rejected the political institutions of the Islamic empire, but also refused to concede legitimacy to the juristic class…These movements considered opponents and indifferent Muslims to have exited the fold of Islam, and therefore legitimate targets of violence. These groups' preferred methods of violence were stealth attacks and the dissemination of terror in the general population.

Muslim jurists reacted sharply to these groups, considering them enemies of humankind.

They were designated as mu? âribs (literally, those who fight society)…Many jurists classified rape, armed robbery, assassinations, arson and murder by poisoning as crimes of terror and argued that such crimes must be punished vigorously regardless of the motivations of the criminal. Most importantly, these doctrines were asserted as religious imperatives”.

But with the advent of modernity, this earlier navigation between principled thinking and pragmatism ended due to the dismantling of traditional institutions of civil society by despotic governments. The establishment of the state of Israel in the Muslim heartland, and the human tragedy that followed exacerbated the siege mentality. Global Western cultures aggressively penetrated the Muslim world.

In response to these problems, many Muslims employed the ideologies of resistance to colonialism and imperialism found in the Third World. Al-Kawâkibî, the Iraqi, is a useful example in this regard.

Moreover, puritanical Wahhâbi theology, assisted by mammoth oil revenues, especially after 1975, stridently advocated a return to a pristine Islam that was bereft of juristic and mystical traditions. Salafism, a movement originating in Egypt in the late nineteenth century, which was equally austere but more tolerant of divergent views than Wahhâbism, accompanied it. It absorbed the former movement during the last quarter of the previous century after which apologetic discourses on Islam flourished among its followers, which often lapsed into moral arrogance. The cultural and political powerlessness against the West was portrayed in terms of an antithesis towards it.

In the aftermath of 9/11, many commentators

asked if Islam somehow encourages violence and terrorism. They invoked concepts like jihâd and shahâdah (martyrdom) in support of their positions. However, they ignored the ethical dimension to Islamic tradition, concentrating purely on a power-hungry and supremacist puritanism that is dismissive of all moral norms.

What this assessment ignores is that the previously mentioned national ideologies of revolt and terrorism that emerged in the Muslim world have, in many cases, assumed global dimensions through networks like AlQaeda.

Schleifer, while reviewing earlier literature on this topic, comments that the genre of writings during the era of Muslim political ascendancy grant a de facto recognition to prevailing political authorities. The overriding concern of the jurists was to keep the door to armed insurrection closed. None of them ever outlined any rules of procedure of how to depose a ruler. They could thus produce works dealing with state theory together with rights and duties of rulers, like Al-Mâwardî's AlA? kâm al-Sul? ânîyah. Al-Ghazâlî's Na? î? at al-Mulûk, on the other hand, contains an ethical theory of state without losing its sense of political realism.

According to an editorial on the Al-Jazeerah TV website, many religious scholars at that time enjoyed royal patronage and provided a rationale for rulers to pursue their imperial dreams; they thus won juridical legitimacy in the eyes of the monarchs. But over time, they lost spiritual legitimacy in some quarters by restricting the employment of armed struggle to be in the hands of the state and constantly denying its role in the ethical rectification of unjust government.

Sadly, this synopsis ignores the role played by the mystical ? arîqah of the Naqshbandîs. They believe that piety may be expressed through social activity rather than by withdrawal from the world, when circumstances demand it.

This order's success may be attributed to the versatility with which it interacts with varied political situations, collaborating with worldly powers where necessary but confronting them by force where circumstances make this desirable.

In India it spearheaded the campaign against Akbar's Dîn-e-Ilâhî under the leadership of Shaikh A? mad Sirhindî in the seventeenth century. It stopped the process of Indian Islam's disintegration into syncretism and gave it the conservative stamp that it bears today.

In the Far East it played a prominent role in stimulating resistance to the Dutch in Acheh (Northern Sumatra) and contributed to Muslim militancy in the Philippines. **So too did it galvanise Shaikh Shâmil (1797-1871), leader of the Caucasian Muslims, against the Tzarists between 1837 and 1859.

Conclusion Conflicting reports are found relating to rebellion in ? adîth literature. Although cases of political rebellion have been cited, most jurists up to the pre-modern era have weighed this ideal against the existential reality of their times. They have been constrained to opt for the lesser of the two evils between political rebellion and subsequent civil upheavals that would possibly engulf the entire population.

Generally, they reconciled themselves to the state of their times as a fait accompli and rather endeavoured to highlight ethical values relating to both rulers and subjects. In this framework, Ibn Taimîyah's scholarly and balanced exposition has to be acknowledged.

During the modern era, Islamic institutions of civil society have either been nationalised or emasculated, resulting in a huge chasm in Islamic thought. As a result, movements using popular national paradigms found in the Third World have ultimately given way to transnational ones like Al-Qaeda who are stimulated by extremist discourses. While they simplistically attribute their guidance to Ibn Taimîyah, their understanding of social dynamics is shallow. They also acknowledge the role of Maudûdî and Qu? b, although it remains debatable whether those thinkers would have spontaneously resorted to all the measures adopted by these groups.

Most advocates of rebellion mentioned in this presentation were imprisoned which left dreadful imprints on their memories. The most formidable example was that of Sayyid Qu? b, whose progressive hardening of attitude towards the regime was in proportion to the cruelty he underwent.

Political rebellion from the Naqshbandî branch of mysticism has also been documented which indicates that it is not as pacifist and otherworldly as assumed by many people.

THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF CURRENT ISLAM The research wing of IPSA

page 17

Historical Antecedants

Shia Historical Experiences with Extremism: From the Kharijis to Al-Qaeda Maulana Syed Aftab - Ahlul Bait Foundation of South Africa

óäæõßóíóæ Ó ö Ç? äáÇ ìóáóÚ Áó ÇóÏóå õÔÇæõäæõßóÊöáÇðØÓ ó óæ Éð ? ã õà ãú ß õ ÇóäúáóÚóÌ ß óá ö? óÐóßóæ ó ÇðÏíöåóÔãú ß õ úíóáóÚ á õ æõÓ? ÑáÇ ? ÉÑÞÈáÇ :143 The concept of Ummatan Wasatah or reasonbased disposition of a community is deeply rooted in Qur'an. The characteristic, which defines this position, role and character of the Islamic community, is codified in verse 143 of Suratul Baqarah above. · The word óßöá? óÐóßóæ implies “moderation” as an inherent quality of Islam in every aspect of communal life. It establishes the social parameters of the Muslim individual as a vibrant entity within a collective paradigm. · The Word ÇðØÓ ó óæ defines moderation in terms of justice, balance and avoidance of extremes by adopting a rational and measured approach to universal issues of human rights and social existence. · öÓÇ? äáÇ ìóáóÚ Áó ÇóÏóå õÔ·(Witness against humanity): The ultimate goal of the Ummah is a position within human society that can only be achieved through the exercise of moderation, balance and the implementation of justice. In this manner the Holy Prophet (S) is just and fair towards his own community and as a result a witness against you [see Surah Nisa: verse 135; “O you who believe! Stand out firmly for justice, as witnesses to Allah, even as against yourselves”].

The Phenomenon of “Ghulow”

THE INSTITUTE OF CURRENT ISLAM The research wing of IPSA

page 18

The Holy Quran draws a picture of the Ummah as a moderate and balanced nation in faith, practice and dealing with others. It elaborates by dealing with “Ghulow” or extremism, which was rebuked as a matter of principle within communities, even before Islam. In dealing with Ghulow, in Chapter 5

verses 77 Allah (SWT) says: ÇæõÑÊ õ úÞóíãú á óóæ ÇæõÝ öÑÓ ú õíãú á ó ÇæõÞóÝ úäóà ÇóÐöÅ ä ó íöÐ? áÇóæ Çðã ÇóæóÞß óá ö? óÐ óäí ú óÈä ó Çóßóæ( And those who, when they spend, are neither extravagant nor niggardly, but hold a medium (way) between those (extremes).

After dealing with different forms of exaggeration, the Quran deals with the causes of this disease in human behaviour. Sometimes certain classes of society misinterpret the Almighty's message, due to their vested interests and sometimes ignorance or naivety leads to a deficient understanding of Deen that prepares the ground for the growth of extremist tendencies. äæõÚóã úÓóíãú åõ úäöã Þ ñ íöÑÝ óä ó Çóß Ïú óÞóæ ãú ß õ óáÇæõäöã úÄõíä ú Ãó ä ó æõÚóã úØÊ ó óÝ ó(75 )åÑÞÈó ä ó æõã óáúÚóíãú åõ óæ åõ æõáóÞóÚ Çóã Ïö úÚóÈä ú ãö åõ óäæõÝ ÑÍ ? ó õíã?Ë õ åö ? ááÇ ãó Çóáóß äó Beside materialistic motives, the Quran analyses issues like animosity between nations or people (eg. Racism, Tribalism) as fertile grounds for development of these diseases. In Sura Maida, the Almighty warns us to establish Taqwa as safeguard for Justice and Moderation:…and let not the enmity and hatred of others cause you to avoid justice. Be Just: that is nearer to Piety; Extremism in Islamic History The history of Islam shows that some of its followers, in previous religions, resorted to extreme forms of interpretation when facing diverse challenges.

Extremism in Beliefs Ghulat The first appearance of this in Islamic Faith was in relation to the personality of the Prophet Muhammad, 'Ali and his family.

When a group of people attributed them with godly characters as in Roman or Greek legends of old, or incarnations of Allah (SWT), it assumed huge proportions. These tendencies gradually evolved into schools of thought in Shia known as GHULAT. These groups fallaciously raised the slogan of attachment to the Ahlul-Bait (AS), who in fact cursed and denied them. They also alleged that Allah, the Most Glorified, had transmigrated into the bodies of the Imams of the Ahlul-Bait (AS).

Extremism in Attitude and Approach One of the foremost historical examples of extremism was the Kharijites or Khawarij.

They appeared in the first century of Islam and after splitting up into more than 20 different sub-sects, survived for almost two

Historical Antecedants THE INSTITUTE OF CURRENT ISLAM The research wing of IPSA

page 18

centuries thereafter.

1. Rigidity (Jumood) and Ignorance (Jahl): two major role players in Extremism.

Usul Fiqh has played a significant role in preventing immoderate views from flourishing in Shiite circles over centuries.

Ayatollah Mutahhari writes “There are two dangerous diseases that always threaten man in this connection. These are: the disease of inflexibility and conventionalism, and the disease of naivety and instability. The consequence of the former is stagnation, and … of the latter is backsliding and taking the wrong direction.

An inflexible person does not distinguish between the means and the end. To him, religion is about protecting ancient traditions.

In his view, the Qur'an was revealed for the purpose of stopping the flow of time and nailing down the situation of the world exactly as it is.”2 In studying the history of the Khawarij the two factors alluded to by Mutahhari are very clearly evident in the shaping of their ideology.

None of them have any firm Islamic background or education. We witness in the history of the Holy Prophet (S) that he trained and groomed his followers both ideologically and culturally for more than 15 years before permitting them to become the vanguard of the Islamic Mission. They were not permitted to engage threats on a physical level (such as Jihad) until they were fortified by their ideological and spiritual education.

According to Ali ãå Ý ÇíÓÇ ìáÚ ãå ÑÆÇÕÈÇæáãÍ æ “they carried their insights and visions on their swords”. In contrast, Imam Ali says of the Khawarij Denying the role of Aql has caused substantial problems in the past. Numerous Shiite revolutionary movements who broke away from mainstream Shia, like Zaidiya and Ismailiya believed that this principle should be followed regardless of any rational possibility of a positive outcome. Due to their extreme approaches, these movements either vanished or were quickly compelled to become fringe underground movements.

Kharijites had similar beliefs and their extreme nature limited their existence to a relatively short time in the history of Islam. Not all were Anti-Rationalism. Beyond doubt we find among their debates plenty of rational arguments when it suited their insanely fanatical ideas.

Extremists of today while very smart in their tactics, exhibit Ashari thinking and Hanbali tendencies when it comes to religious interpretation of Deen. On the one hand they are proud of being literal followers of the words of Hadith thus refuting any type of Ijtihad, yet on the other they display cunning innovation in their tactics and operations.

Strengthening the rational aspects of Islamic principles is the most effective means to combat Religious Extremism. Principles like in

3.

Superficial Piety, Courage, Sacrifice and Determination Superficial piety and excessive devotion in worship is another common attribute of Kharijites of the past and the present. Their apparent ascetic lifestyle deludes the masses from realizing the real underlying danger.

Ibn Abbas describes them in the following words“They have foreheads with prostration marks and rough hands due to hardships of long prayers, they wear shirts made of coarse fabrics while they are determined in their aims.“ The seriousness of the danger of this fictitious pious but ignorant class of society can be determined from the well-known Hadith from the Holy Prophet (S).Two people have broken my back: A corrupt scholar and a Pious Ignoramus. Courage, zealousness, sacrifice and uncompromising determination are striking attributes of Kharijites, which, unfortunately, are combined with their illinformed agenda.

Ibn Abdu Rabbhei writes:“There is no one among sects in history more committed to their ideas, more devoted to their aims and more ready to die in its path than the Khawarij. One of them got injured with a spear that pierced his body, he moved forward toward his killer while saying; “I am rushing toward you oh my Lord to acquire your pleasure”.

These positive characteristics naturally win sympathy and support in a way that is challenging to counter. It is easier to fight against Kuffaar or even Muslims with deviant behaviour than against those whose façade appears untainted yet deep down are ideologically bankrupt. It demands a great deal of courage to confront them. Imam Ali describes this accurately when he says: I have put out the eye of conspiracy and sedition. No one except me has the courage to handle it when its gloom was swelling and its madness was intense like a mad dog.

Careful note should be taken of two important analogies. He likens the environment to a gloomy sky with plenty of confusion, doubt and questions due to the illusory exterior. He portrays fitna as a mad dog aptly describing its fanatical, maniacal character and contagious nature.

This analysis dovetails closely with the present when we look at the challenges the Ummah faces at the hands of this huddle of so-called devoted Mujahedeen. Instead of serving Islam, which is what they claim, they have created nothing but mayhem, destruction, chaos and discord in the name of Islam.

4.

Racism, tribalism ulterior motives or Early Aspirers of Democracy!!!

The vast majority of Khawarij were simple, naïve, uneducated and sincere people who stood for what they believed was the truth.

Their motives and attitudes of extreme piety and discontent with worldly affairs are proof of this. However the motives of the pioneers and leadership of this movement remain ambiguous.

What is astonishing is that western thinkers, who today more than ever are outspoken critics of Islamic Extremism, have gone as far as commending Kharijites. Wellhausen and other orientalists have praised Khawarij as Muslims whose actions were based on their taqwa and conscience. They have introduced them as the first aspirers of Democracy in Islam. Their argument being that the Khawarij removed the condition of being Quraishi, (in the case of the Sunni School) or divine appointment of Ahlul Bait (in the case of the Shia). Any pious Muslim nominated by other Muslims could be eligible as caliph.

Obedience to the caliph was binding as long as he managed the affairs of the community with justice and consultation. If and when he deviated, it became obligatory to confront him, demote him or even murder him. This is the precise mentality that exists amongst extremist groupings today.

It is not clear what the motives of some western intellectuals are in fashioning heroes out of these fanatical elements from the history of Islam. What is clear from historical evidence is that the leadership of this cult-like phenomenon were never sincere. Instead they exploited the sincere emotions of people and exploited their lack of information and naivety in furthering their own goals.

This pattern of the Khawarij is not very different to the new self-acclaimed saviours of Islam. It is important to examine in detail different aspects of their concept of IMAMAT. 1.

Racism and Tribalism amongst the Leadership of Khawarij was evident. Almost all of them were from Bani Tamim and their racial tendencies were recorded in history during the lifetime of the Holy Prophet7.

2.

Animosity with the Quraish was the motive for removing the condition of being Quraishi from eligibility for Caliphate, not democracy or equality8.

3.

How could they be considered democratic in their practices if in principle they did not believe in any sort of human leadership?

4.

For short periods of time they were compelled to select leaders but not via a democratic system. This resulted in a number of divisions creeping in. Their ideology is closer to

Marxism as they ascribed to the idea of society in its ideal phase as being a commune thus dispelling the need for a state.

5.

In the hundred and fifty year history of the Khawarij there was only one non-Arab leader, Thabit Tammar, who ascended temporarily. He was told to select a capable Arab leader as soon as possible.10 (It is worth studying similar tribal tendencies in the Taliban scenario between Pashtoons, Tajeeks, and Persians etc) 6.

They imposed arbitration on Ali. Even before getting the results of the arbitration, they raised the slogan of “No Rule but for Allah” and declared arbitration Kufr and everyone including themselves Kafir and demanded Tauba. On Ali's refusal they initiated a revolt.

7.

Extreme intolerance of any opposition or difference of opinion or error provides more evidence of their autocratic rather than democratic system.

5.

Takfeer and Absolutism Takfeer or declaring Muslims as Non Believers due to difference in opinion or committing a greater sin is another bida'a introduced by Kharijites. What is important to note is the phenomenon of ”absolutism” hidden behind this Fitna.

According to Mutaharri “Absolutism” is the result of ignorance which leads to bias and bigotry and closes all the doors of the mind to thought and progress.

Takfeer has caused and continues to do inconceivable damage to Islam and Muslims.

Conclusion The Khawarij as a religious Group or sect has vanished from Muslim Society long ago but a study of their history, approaches and attitudes reveals that the spirit of the Khawarij is alive and well in our midst. It is also worthy to note that certain Kharijite tendencies are not confined to only the Extremists of our time. different aspects of their concept of IMAMAT. 1.

Racism and Tribalism amongst the Leadership of Khawarij was evident. Almost all of them were from Bani Tamim and their racial tendencies were recorded in history during the lifetime of the Holy Prophet7.

2.

Animosity with the Quraish was the motive for removing the condition of being Quraishi from eligibility for Caliphate, not democracy or equality8.

3.

How could they be considered democratic in their practices if in principle they did not believe in any sort of human leadership?

4.

For short periods of time they were compelled to select leaders but not via a democratic system. This resulted in a number of divisions creeping in. Their ideology is closer to Marxism as they ascribed to the idea of society in its ideal phase as being a commune thus

THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF CURRENT ISLAM The research wing of IPSA

page 17

Historical Antecedants

dispelling the need for a state.

5.

In the hundred and fifty year history of the Khawarij there was only one non-Arab leader, Thabit Tammar, who ascended temporarily. He was told to select a capable Arab leader as soon as possible.10 (It is worth studying similar tribal tendencies in the Taliban scenario between Pashtoons, Tajeeks, and Persians etc) 6.

They imposed arbitration on Ali. Even before getting the results of the arbitration, they raised the slogan of “No Rule but for Allah” and declared arbitration Kufr and everyone including themselves Kafir and demanded Tauba. On Ali's refusal they initiated a revolt.

7.

Extreme intolerance of any opposition or difference of opinion or error provides more evidence of their autocratic rather than democratic system.

5.

Takfeer and Absolutism

Takfeer or declaring Muslims as Non Believers due to difference in opinion or committing a greater sin is another bida'a introduced by Kharijites. What is important to note is the phenomenon of ”absolutism” hidden behind this Fitna.

According to Mutaharri “Absolutism” is the result of ignorance which leads to bias and bigotry and closes all the doors of the mind to thought and progress.

Takfeer has caused and continues to do inconceivable damage to Islam and Muslims.

Conclusion The Khawarij as a religious Group or sect has vanished from Muslim Society long ago but a study of their history, approaches and attitudes reveals that the spirit of the Khawarij is alive and well in our midst. It is also worthy to note that certain Kharijite tendencies are not confined to only the Extremists of our time.

THE INSTITUTE OF CURRENT ISLAM The research wing of IPSA

page 18

Case Studies THE INSTITUTE OF CURRENT ISLAM The research wing of IPSA

page 18

Contextualising Jihad for Muslim Minorities: The Case of the London Bombings Prof. Suleman Dangor (University of KwaZulu Natal)

In this paper, I will analyse the London bombings of 7th July 2005 in the context of British Muslims as a minority community. In this respect, the terms “minorities”, “contextualizing” and “jihad” contained in the title are extremely relevant.

The following three questions relating to minorities are pertinent: (a) Are the interests and concerns of Muslim minorities identical to those of Muslim majorities? (b) Do Muslim scholars, activists and leaders address the problems and concerns of minorities in relation to their specific context? c) Is jihad - in the sense of physical combat – a valid way to express a minority's grievances against the state?

Before we can attempt to answer these questions, we need to examine the profiles of the bombers, identify who or what influenced them and determine if their approach is appropriate.

PROFILES OF THE BOMBERS Mohammad Sidique Khan (age:30).

There is no evidence that he held extremist or violent tendencies while at school. In fact, it is reported that he condemned the 11 September attacks on the United States.

It appears that the turning point in his life was his visit to Pakistan when it is alleged that he came into contact with the al-Qa'ida network.

On his return to London, he began to praise Usama bin Ladin, Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi as heroes (Profile: Mohammad Sidique Khan).

Shehzad Tanweer (age: 22) He had accompanied Mohammad Sidique Khan to Pakistan. According to family members, he attended a madrasah there during his visit. Since many madaris are known to have promoted jihad against “infidels”, we can assume that his

association with the madrasah must have had a significant impact on his thinking. It is claimed that he met the leader of Jaish-eMuhammad, which is said to be linked to al-Qa'ida (Profile: Shehzad Tanweer).

Hasib Hussain (aged 18).

He travelled to Mecca for pilgrimage and then proceeded to Pakistan, ostensibly to visit relatives.

On his return to the UK, he is said to have displayed greater religiosity. He also expressed his admiration for al-Qa'idah and referred to the 9/11 bombers as "martyrs". The possibility of his having met either followers or admirers of al-Qa'idah during his brief visit cannot be ruled out (Profile: Hasib Mir Hussain).

Germaine Lindsay (aged 19).

Unlike his three accomplices who were all of Pakistani descent, he was from Jamaica. He converted to Islam in 2000. It is reported that he was disciplined at school for handing out leaflets in support of al-Qa'ida. His views were also shaped by a fellow Jamaican, Abdallah al-Faisal who will be discussed below (Profile: Germaine Lindsay).

The profiles of the bombers reveal three common features: (i) The bombers were all young and impressionable – except for Khan who was a little older. (ii) Three of the bombers had visited Pakistan (iii) All the bombers supported or admired alQa'idah and its leaders.

The bombers were also said to have been in contact with Abu Musa al-Hindi, who is alleged to have been an al-Qa'idah operative, from whom they probably learnt how to make various types of explosives. He is discussed below.

We can safely assume, therefore, that all the bombers were influenced by al-Qa'idah's radicalism, even if their direct links to the group cannot be proven beyond reasonable doubt. It is apposite, therefore, to examine the ideology of Abdullah al-Faisal, Abu Musa al-Hindi and the al-Qa'idah leaders.

THE IDEALOGUES Ayman al-Zawahiri He joined al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun in Egypt in 1967 and then switched his allegiance to Islamic

Jihad in 1979. When Said Qutb was charged with treason and executed by the Egyptian government, al-Zawahiri and four other students helped form an underground cell to overthrow the government and establish an Islamist state. His cell later merged with others to form the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ).

Al-Zawahiri was one of hundreds arrested following Sadat's assassination in 1981.

Following his release in 1984, al-Zawahiri travelled to Pakistan where he worked in a Red Crescent hospital treating wounded refugees. It is here that he met Usama bin Ladin and was offered refuge in Afghanistan, where several alQa'ida families had already settled.

Al-Zawahiri returned to Egypt in 1989, after the Soviets left Afghanistan.

The massive attack on tourists at the Temple of Hatshepsut in Egypt is attributed to him, in collusion with al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya. Due to mounting pressures against him, he moved to Sudan in 1992 where he teamed up with Usama bin Ladin. In 1996, he and Usama returned to Afghanistan.

It was on 23 February 1998 that he issued a joint fatwa with Usama under the title "World Islamic Front against Jews and Crusaders". He has been indicted in the US for his role in the US Embassy bombings in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi and sentenced to death in absentia by an Egyptian military tribunal.

Al-Zawahiri blamed the Tony Blair government's foreign policy for the July 2005 London bombings. He claimed responsibility for the bombings, proclaiming: "The lands and interests of the countries that took part in the aggression against Palestine, Iraq, and Afghanistan are targets for us”.

There seems little doubt that al-Zawahiri was influenced significantly by Usama bin Ladin and he, in turn, influenced others, including the London bombers. His willingness to attack civilian targets, conducting jihad against Jews and Christians and blaming British foreign policy for the debacle are echoed in the words of Mohammad Sidiqui Khan: “And your support of them makes you directly responsible, just as I am directly responsible for protecting and avenging my Muslim brothers and sisters.” (Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri) “We are at war and I am a soldier .. fighting a war against Western governments and their supporters in the general population.” (Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri).

Abu Mus`ab al-Zarqawi: In 1989, al-Zarqawi left Jordan for Afghanistan to join the insurgency against the Soviet invasion. It was then that he met and befriended Usama bin Ladin.

In the mid-1990s, Zarqawi travelled to Europe and started al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, a paramilitary organization to install an Islamic regime in

Jordan. This led to his arrest in Jordan in 1992, where he spent five years in prison for conspiring to overthrow the monarchy and establish a caliphate.

Upon his release from prison in 1999, Zarqawi fled Jordan and made his way to Pakistan. He established a militant training camp near Herat, near the Iranian border where poisons and explosives were manufactured. After the September 11 attacks, Zarqawi again travelled to Afghanistan and joined Taliban and alQa'ida fighters resisting the U.S.-led invasion.

It was in 2002 that Zarqawi moved to Northern Iraq, where he joined the Ansar al-Islam group that fought against Kurdish-nationalist forces in the region. In late 2004 he joined al-Qa'ida and pledged allegiance to Usama bin Ladin. He dispatched numerous suicide bombers throughout Iraq to attack American soldiers and areas with large concentrations of Shi`ah militias. He is also held responsible for hostage executions in Iraq.

In June 7, 2006, Zarqawi was killed in an American air strike while attending a meeting in an isolated safehouse (Abu Musab alZarqawi).

Usama bin Ladin In 1979, Usama bin Ladin, the mastermind of the September 11 attacks on the United States, joined Abdullah Azzam to fight the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan and lived for a short while in Peshawar. In 1992 he moved to Sudan where he established a new base for Mujahideen operations. He is said to have assisted jihadis financially and/or militarily in Algeria, Egypt and Afghanistan. .

In 1996, under increasing pressure from Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the United States on Sudan, Usama bin Ladin returned to Jalalabad, Afghanistan. In 1998, he and Ayman alZawahiri began to campaign for the restoration of Shari`ah law and the eradication of panArabism, socialism, communism and democracy. Their fatwa – referred to above – declared that the killing of North Americans and their allies is an "individual duty for every Muslim".

This fatwa is significant; it gives a green light to Muslims everywhere – including those living as minorities – to kill American and other citizens (not only combatants) whose countries are involved in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. According to Usama bin Ladin, civilians, including women and children, are legitimate targets of jihad. Furthermore, he does not consider governments that do not fully implement shari'a as truly Muslim. This explains why he initially targeted his own country, Saudi Arabia.

This perception of British citizens being

THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF CURRENT ISLAM The research wing of IPSA

page 17

Case Studies THE INSTITUTE OF CURRENT ISLAM The research wing of IPSA

page 18

legitimate targets no doubt influenced Shehzad Tanweer who declared: ..the non-Muslims of Britain deserve such attacks because they voted for a government that continues to oppress our mothers, children, brothers and sisters in Palestine, Afghanistan, Iraq and Chechnya (Osama bin Laden).

Abdullah al-Faisal A Jamaican, he converted to Islam at the age of 16. After completing his studies at an Islamic institution in Guyana, he left for the UK. He then travelled to Saudi Arabia where he studied Islam for seven years.

On his return to the UK in 1992, he became the imam of the Brixton mosque. His attacks on Salafi Muslims led to his expulsion a year later.

He subsequently began to give lectures to study groups throughout UK, and also travelled throughout Nigeria giving lectures.

In 2003 he was found guilty, by a British court, of inciting his audience to kill Jews, Hindus and Americans. He was sentenced to nine years, of which he served 4 years. He was then deported in 2007.

Abdullah al-Faisal had a major influence on Germaine Lindsay (Profile: Sheikh Abdullah al-Faisal) Shaikh Umar Bakri Muhammad Shaykh Umar Bakri joined the Ikhwan in Syria as a young man. After obtaining a BA in Shari'ah and Usul al-Fiqh, he left for Beirut where he joined the Hizb-ul-Tahrir (HT). In 1979 he left Lebanon and moved to Cairo where he studied at Al-Azhar University and maintained contacts with Hizb al-Tahrir.

In 1979 he moved to Saudi Arabia, where he joined the Madrassah Al-Saltiyyah and started a Hizb al-Tahrir cell. In 1983 he launched alMuhajirun in Jeddah. Three years later he moved to the UK where he assumed the leadership of Hizb ul-Tahrir.

In 1996 Umar Bakri split with Hizb al-Tahrir over disagreements on policy, style and methods, and declared al-Muhajirun an independent organisation and continued as its leader until 2003. After the Sept 11, 2001 attacks he praised the attackers as "magnificent", and changed his leanings towards the theology and philosophy of Al Qaeda.

In November 2004 Bakri disbanded AlMuhajirun, saying, "all Muslims should unite together against a hostile West”. In 2005 he returned to Lebanon and assumed the leadership of Atibba' Ahl us-Sunnah wal Jama'ah movement Shaykh Umar Bakri Muhammad made several profound statements that I have no doubt made a significant impression on the London bombers. Apart from Abdullah al-Faisal

whose influence was limited, he was the only ideologue who spent some time in the UK. The following pronouncements contain serious implications for Muslim minorities: "I believe the whole of Britain has become Dar al-Harb (land of war). The kuffar (nonbeliever) has no sanctity for their own life or property."

We don't make a distinction between civilians and non-civilians, innocents and noninnocents, only between Muslims and unbelievers. And the life of an unbeliever has no value, it has no sanctity.“ This brings us to the issue of the relevance and validity of the bombers' actions, which they considered to be a form of jihad (Omar Bakri Muhammad).

Abu Musa al-Hindi Like Germaine Lindsay, Abu Musa converted to Islam at a young age. At the time of the bombings he was only 20. He was born in Baroda, India into a Hindu family but his parents had migrated to Kenya and eventually to UK in 1973. In 1995 he travelled to Pakistan where he participated in campaigns against Indian forces in Kashmir. It is alleged that in the 1990s and early 2000 he served as an agent for al-Qa'idah.

Abu Musa wrote a 39-page memo, advocating the use of simple explosives for distribution among al-Qa'ida operatives. After visiting the United States, he returned to the UK in 2001.

In 2004 he was arrested and charged by UK authorities with several offences relating to planning violence and murder.

In 2006 Abu Musa was sentenced to life imprisonment (Dhiren Barot).

Core Ideas of the Idealogues Here, we will sum up the core ideas of the idealogues: · Christians, Jews and Hindus are legitimate targets · Civilians are legitimate targets · Collective punishment is valid · Hostage taking is valid · Lands involved in war against Muslim countries are legitimate targets · Jihad against a Muslim government that does not implement shariah is valid · Britain is dar al-kufr There is no way to measure the bombers propensity to violence or to radicalism. This is, no doubt, an important consideration.

However, the statements and actions emanating from the bombers indicate that the views and rulings issued by the idealogues mentioned above have had a profound influence on these young people.

We now turn to the issue of the relevance of

the London bombings.

THE LONDON BOMBINGS: AN APPROPRIATE FORM OF PROTEST? The first point to note is that the location of conflict which produced the idealogues described above is Muslim majority states: Afghanistan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Jordan, Syria, Iraq, and the Sudan. This means that their attitudes were shaped by a context where Muslims were in the majority.

The conditions that inspired Al-Zarqawi, Usama bin Ladin, Al-Zawahiri, Omar Bakri, Abdullah al-Faysal and Abu Musa al-Hindi were occupation of Muslim lands, atrocities against Muslims, foreign support for autocratic Muslim regimes, non-implementation of shari`ah in Muslim states and societies, etc.

The aims of al-Qa'idah, al-Ikhwan alMuslimun, al-Muhajiroun, Hizb alTahrir, and al-Tawhid wa'l –Jihad, in response to the above conditions were the establishment of shari`ah states, ending foreign occupation of Muslim lands, overthrowing corrupt or puppet Muslim regimes. It is evident that none of these can realistically be the goal for Muslim minorities, while they may share the sentiments of Muslim majorities on all these issues.

Established scholars such as Shaykh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Shaykh Taha Jabir al-Alwani and Dr Tariq Ramadan have been calling for rethinking the classical definitions of dar al-harb and dar alIslam and the status of Muslim minorities who now constitute over 30% of the world's total Muslim population (numbering over 300 000 000). These contemporary scholars believe that the appellation dar al-harb is no longer applicable in the situation that Muslim minorities find themselves in today.

Taking new realities into account, they argue that the lands in which Muslim minorities reside should be designated as dar al-`ahd (land in which there is a mutual contract between the citizens and the state), with a few exceptions. Tariq Ramadan has penned the term dar alshahadah (land where Muslims can bear witness to Islam), Shaykh al-Alwani prefers dar al-da`wah (land affording an opportunity to invite people to Islam), while Shaykh al-Qaradawi suggests dar al-wa`d (land of promise for promoting Islam).

Using the categories of hukm (directives of the shari`ah) as a framework, Shaykh Abdullah ibn Bayyah proposes the following in respect of the legitimacy of Muslims residing in non-Muslim lands:

· Harâm [Prohibited]: If one fears abandoning Islam or his/her children (by remaining) and finds another country where there is no “fitna” · Makrûh [Reprehensible]: If one does not fear the non-Muslims but witnesses wrongdoing and one finds another country where there is less wrong doing. · Mubâh [Permissible]: when all options are equal · Mandûb [Recommended] If there is opportunity to engage in da'wah · Wâjib [Obligatory]: If there is benefit for Muslims in continuing to reside or their leaving contributes to corruption.

If this approach were to be adopted, Muslim minorities would no longer behave as temporary migrants (as many continue to do in Europe to this day), and would hopefully transform their confrontationist approach to the government of the day to one that embodies cooperation and dialogue.

While making demands as full citizens entitled to rights under the constitution, they would also be conscious of their obligations to the state and their fellow citizens.

CONCLUSION Returning to the three questions that were raised at the beginning, I would like to submit the following: (a) The interests and concerns of Muslim minorities do not always coincide with those of Muslim majorities. Muslim scholars, activists and leaders must not impose a majority solution or approach on minorities. (b) Muslim minorities need to determine their own approaches to dealing with their own governments, taking into account their political, social, economic, military and educational circumstances. © For minorities, jihad cannot but take on a non-violent form. This is in conformity with the Makkan phase of the Prophet's life. When the Muslims constituted a small minority, there was never any suggestion that they should challenge the Quraysh who were numerically superior and militarily better equipped than the Muslims.

In this context, the actions of the London bombers were certainly misplaced. They failed to convince the British government to change its policies on Iraq, if that was indeed their ultimate objective. The greater tragedy is that they have brought hardships upon Muslims in Britain who are now viewed as potential supporters

THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF CURRENT ISLAM The research wing of IPSA

page 17

Case Studies

or sympathisers of al-Qa'idah, prone to violence, and invited monitoring and scrutiny of Muslims individually and collectively.

It must be concluded that the use of force or violence is both inappropriate and inadvisable for Muslim minorities. Their strategy of jihad cannot be based on the majoritarian paradigm, but has to be suited to their specific context.

BIBLIOGRAPHY Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Wikipedia, the free encyclopaedia. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abu_Musab_alZarqawi.

Arman, Abu Bakr. Global Politician - Islam in the Age of Extremism. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dhiren_Barot Ayman al-Zawahiri.Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ayman_al-Zawahiri Dhiren Barot.Wikipedia, the free encyclopaedia. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dhiren_Barot Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri –Profile and Biography. atheism.about.com/library/FAQs/.../blfaq_isl am_zawahiri.htm Maqsood, Ruqaiyyah Waris, On the Hijacking of Islam. www.islamfortoday.com/ruqaiyyah01.htm Murad, Abdal-Hakim. Bin Laden's violence is a heresy against Islam. www.islamfortoday.com/murad04.htm Omar Bakri Muhammad.Wikipedia, the free encyclopaedia. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Omar_Bakri_Muhamm ad Osama bin Laden.Wikipedia, the free encyclopaedia. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Osama_bin_Laden Osama bin Laden's Goals – Waging war on the infidel West. atheism.about.com/.../osamabin-ladens-goals-waging-war-on-the-infidelwest.htm -

THE INSTITUTE OF CURRENT ISLAM The research wing of IPSA

page 18

BBC NEWS/UK/Profile:Germaine Lindsay.www.news.bbc.co.uk/go/rss//1/hi/uk/4762591.stm BBC NEWS/UK/Profile: Hasib Mir Hussain. julyseventh.co.uk/7-7-profile-hasib-mirhussain.html BBC NEWS/UK/Profile: Mohammad Sidique Khan.news.bbc.co.uk/go/rss//1/hi/uk/4762209.stm BBC NEWS/UK/Profile:Shehzad Tanweer. news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4762313.stm Profile: Sheikh Abdullah al-Faisal. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/ 692243.stm Qaradawi Rejects al-Qaeda's Killing of Innocents. www.islamfortoday.com/qaradawi02.htm

Case Studies THE INSTITUTE OF CURRENT ISLAM The research wing of IPSA

page 18

Extremism and Contemporary Islamism(s): Mapping the Taliban and Al-Qaeda Junaid Ahmad (University of Cape Town)

THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF CURRENT ISLAM The research wing of IPSA

page 17

Case Studies THE INSTITUTE OF CURRENT ISLAM The research wing of IPSA

page 18

THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF CURRENT ISLAM The research wing of IPSA

page 17

Case Studies THE INSTITUTE OF CURRENT ISLAM The research wing of IPSA

page 18

Muslim Press Statement on World Cup 2010 1) As religious leaders and official representatives of the Muslim community we unequivocally condemn any plan to attack the soccer World Cup tournament to be hosted in our country, South Africa in 2010.

2) We call on the Muslim community not to tire from saying repeatedly, loudly and clearly that acts of terrorism and barbarism are contrary to the teachings of Islam.

3) As committed citizens of this country, we pledge the Muslim community's unequivocal support to the South African government, and its security agencies to assist them in whatever way we can to avert any attack on our people or visitors to our country during the World Cup tournament.

4) While we call on all South African citizens to remain vigilant we condemn attempts by agent provocateurs and information peddlers who mislead the public with spurious information which has no basis in facts.

5) We call upon anyone who has concrete evidence of planned attacks to produce such evidence and work with our police services to arrest such individuals 6) One of the key objectives of the IPSA conference on extremism this weekend, is to critique the iniquitous use of the term “extremism� and to probe the real trends of intolerance and fanaticism, globally and within our midst.

THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF CURRENT ISLAM The research wing of IPSA

page 17

Press Statements

Somali Community Board of South Africa (SCOB) Disputes the recent Somali terror links.

Wednesday 14th October 2009 Johannesburg; Somali Community Board of South Africa (SCOB) an umbrella body that brings all Somalis nationals in south Africa and representative of the transitional federal government of Somalia, on the affairs and the well being of Somalis in south Africa are concerned about the media reports that started on the weekend which make allegations about intercepted cell phone conversations between a Somali national in Khayelitsha, Cape Town and alleged radical group in Somalia, claiming that it was the reason that the US offices in SA were closed down in recent month.

While we all need to be concerned about such threats to security from radicals groups that are believed to have link with al-Qaeda, as community leaders we are more worried, the implication or consequences of such allegations to our nationals who suffered more than any other migrants community in South Africa, and who are targets of violent attacks and intimidation, victims of xenophobia, discrimination, looting, and brutal killings on daily basis, all due to the perception that they are of different culture, faith and look different, and don't speak any of the local languages in the local communities in which they settled and make livings.

SCOB National Secretary, Amir Sheikh, said, on behalf of the Somali community living in South Africa, we are worried that the media have made unsubstantiated claims about the involvement of our nationals in these activities, when the Department of National Intelligence, and the U S Embassy are disputing and challenging the source of the media claims.

We call for a peaceful and mutual relationship; whilst we recognise the impact such allegation can have on our nationals, the host country and our celebration of African humanity, and we totally dispute the claims and the Allegation and negative publicities that are likely to intensify human rights abuses, harassment, deliberate arrest, ethnic profiling of Somalis refugees and communities, increasing hostility and ill feelings toward the notion of anti terrorism that negatively impact the lives and living of the Somali communities.

South Africa's reputation as a leading economic powerhouse on the African continent is baseless, when the bad/deteriorating situation of the Somalis in South Africa, are made worser by baseless allegation through the mass media.

Lastly we call upon South Africa's political leaders, and in particular the presidency office, the ministry of intelligence and other concerned ministries and government departments, to take effective measures that will combat such heinous action and we promise on our side as Community leaders to play a crucial role in ensuring a harmonious society amongst South African nationals and our nationals by offering the government and all other related support, counsel and partnership in order to effectively deal with the such claims in south Africa.

For further info or queries please don't hesitate to contact:

THE INSTITUTE OF CURRENT ISLAM The research wing of IPSA

page 18

ABDUL HAKIM MOHAMED 011 022 8220, 082 210 8039 SCOB National Chairman Info.scob@gmail.com