MA thesis (Compatibility of 'Political Islam' and Democracy

Maastricht University faculty of Arts and Social Sciences MA Thesis ‘The Compatibility of ‘Political Islam’ and Democracy’

Abstract

This article explores the compatibility between ‘Political Islam’ and democracy by first outlining several concepts which are fundamental to the debate before arguing that the two are compatible. After doing this the article moves on to explore reasons for incompatibility before exploring EU democratization policies and suggesting ways in which these policies can be improved while drawing conclusions which suggest that there is no single answer to the question of compatibility and that any answer will be dependent upon specific context.

Table of Contents

Introduction: Page 1 Chapter 1 –Outline of Key Concepts: Page 5 Chapter 2- Shura as an ‘Islamic Democracy’: Page 10 Chapter 3 –Islam and Democracy are Incompatible: Page 17 Chapter 4- EU Policy and Future Recommendations: Page 24 Chapter 5- Conclusion: Page 32 Appendix A-Glossary: Page 33 Appendix B -Works Cited: Page 34

Introduction “Islam has always been described as a universal religion in the sense that Islam dominates all dimensions of the human existence” (Milton-Edwards, Islamic Fundamentalism Since 1945, 2005, p. 11) Milton-Edwards has captured the all encompassing nature of Islam, which has led many to believe that Islam makes no distinction between the personal and the political.

This belief is further reinforced by the phrase ‘Islam din wa dawla’- Islam is religion and state. This line of argument has been used countless times in an attempt to explain the relationship between religion and politics within Islam.

John Esposito argues that the Islamic community was “spiritual and temporal, church and state” (Esposito, Islam and Politics, 1998, p. 31) . Using these statements, we can conclude that, since a distinction between church and state cannot reasonably be made, the debate concerning the compatibility of Islam and democracy is of the utmost importance. For the purposes of this article, ‘Political Islam’ will refer to the use of Islam to reach political goals and an attempt to politicise the faith or, indeed, to make political action a religious duty.

Debates on this issue are certainly not a new phenomenon but they have undoubtedly gained greater significance within the general context of the ongoing ‘Arab Spring’, while John Voll argues that “nowhere are these tough choices between order and instability, liberalism and democracy, secularism and religious radicalism more stark than in the Muslim world today” (Voll, 2007, p. 171). Recent months have witnessed the desire for political reform spilling onto the streets of several nations in the Middle East and North Africa. Hence an urgent necessity to address the compatibility of ‘Political Islam’ and democracy has arisen Islam has grown as a political force in the past half century as political leaders sought to use the faith as a means to unite the populace against their colonial oppressors. Islam, like all religions, serves as a source of support and community for its adherents in times of hardship (Zartman, 1992, p. 185). A growing sense of alienation existed among the population of Muslim majority states under colonial occupation and it has been observed that “in this sense, Islam as a religion was called upon to play a key role in the liberation and the political, cultural and economic future of the Muslim-majority countries and “it would also act as unifying factor against the divisions imposed by the colonial powers” (Ramadan, 2011, p.

75). Furthermore, Ira Lapidus has argued that “much of the emotional power of nationalism in the Middle East is derived from the capacity of Islam to signify social solidarity and channel the force of Muslim faith into national commitments” (Lapidus, 1992, p. 24).

1

The apparently intertwined nature between ‘Political Islam’ and liberation movements is not surprising when we consider that “since Islam’s foundational texts do not offer detailed instructions on the actual logistics of political administration, reliance on extra-Islamic materials and customs was not unexpected” (Afsaruddin, 2006, p. 165). Consequently, the use of Islam, and the connection between Islam as a faith and the ideas of nationalism and national self-determination, makes perfect sense and helps to frame the context in which the current debates are occurring.

Tariq Ramadan has stressed that talk of ‘Political Islam’ must be viewed within the context of independence movements and post-independence politics, “Slogans that invoke the Qur’an as a constitution, Jihad as resistance or martyrdom as the supreme ambition of action must be understood in the context of the anti-colonial struggle” (Ramadan, 2011, p. 77). Claims that the Qur’an would serve as a constitution of an Islamic state nonetheless continued and the limits that these claims have on democratic compatibility are explored in the third chapter.

It has frequently been argued that, at its heart, the main ‘clash’ within the debate of Islam’s relationship with Democracy is in fact found in Islam’s apparent struggle to adapt to modernity. Processes of modernisation have been relentlessly sweeping throughout the world in recent decades. Indeed, a common line of argument in the mid twentieth century stated that it was uncertain if Muslims could choose between “Mecca and mechanization” (Esposito, 2010, p. 88). Already we see that the prevailing opinion amongst those who debated the issue is that Islam, as a faith system and the basis for a societal structure, was struggling to ‘keep up’ with global advances. This view, which alienates adherents of Islam worldwide, completely overlooks the Islamic concept of Ijtihad which supports a constant reinterpretation of the Qur’an and Sunna to adapt to changing circumstances and will be explored as the article progresses.

John O Voll believes that “for the vast majority of the world, democracy is the sole surviving source of political legitimacy” and, consequently, it has evolved from being a form of government to a way of life (Voll, 2007, p. 175). Democracy itself is, of course, a contested concept (Ahmad A. , Islam and Democracy: Text, Tradition and History, 2003, p. 461) and the importance of this will become evident in the fourth chapter of the article. For the EU, the contested nature of Democracy is of fundamental importance, as imposition of a specific model of democracy can cause more harm than good and Haas has argued that “unrestrained

2

zeal to make the world better could make it worse” (Milton-Edwards, Islam and Politics in the Contemporary World, 2004, p. 93).

Gudrun Kramer has argued that “It is not possible to talk about Islam and democracy in general, but only about Muslims living and theorizing under specific historical circumstances.

This may sound evident enough, and yet it is all too often ignored” (Kramer, 1993, p. 4). This article, while making some references to the past, will place the debate in a contemporary context which is of increasing importance due to the ongoing ‘Arab Spring’. By doing this, the article will, to an extent, disagree with Kramer’s argument and will attempt to make an argument based upon current events and therefore will not have the benefit of historical hindsight.

Examining the writings and arguments of various academics this article will initially outline the concept of Shura (mutual consultation) within Islam while also referring to the notion of a Bay’a (contract) which is frequently seen alongside Shura, thus making an examination of one impossible without mentioning the other. Having outlined Shura, the article will then address Shura as a form of democracy. Moving on, the next chapter will outline why Islam and democracy are incompatible and the answer to this question of compatibility will have a significant impact on the continued restructuring of EU policy towards the Middle East and North Africa.

Subsequently, the article will briefly examine the European Union’s (EU) approach to external democratization concluding with suggestions about ways in which these processes can be altered to facilitate a smoother transition within these states that clearly desire wholesale political reform, as it is only through co-operation that genuine reform can be brought about. In order to bring about this reform it is necessary to have all groups involved ‘singing off the same hymn sheet’ and therefore the EU approach must change, and the belief that democracy can be ‘imposed’ upon a populace must also be changed.

This article’s contribution to the existing body of literature will emerge from its policy suggestions. Many authors have discussed the compatibility of ‘Political Islam’ and democracy yet few will take the next logical step and suggest how democratic concepts can be altered in order to improve this compatibility. These changes to the nature of democracy will be essential since democracy is not a ‘monolith’ and it therefore needs to adapt to fit the needs of the state and populace within which it operates. The specific focus for the article

3

will relate this compatibility to the EU’s desire for external democratization throughout the Middle East and North Africa.

The issues of ethics and reliability are very significant in this article as the author is not Muslim and is therefore not in a position to make informed judgements about the teachings of Islam from the perspective of an adherent of the faith. All concepts discussed will have been analysed by others and not by the author personally. It is important to stress from the outset that the ‘source materials’ of Islam, the Qur’an and the Sunna, have eternal legitimacy whereas academics and theologians have never claimed eternal legitimacy for their work (Moussali, 1994, p. 54). Consequently, anything written by a scholar or theologian must be viewed within the context in which they have been written.

Due to the potential controversy that this topic can raise, it must be stressed that there are no definitive answers and the impact of ‘human interpretation’ is essential, as it is in all religions. Therefore the questions being asked are not necessarily going to be answered by ‘what Islam states’ but by what certain people have chosen to interpret Islam as stating.

Analysis and conclusions will be drawn from what appears to be a logical continuation of the arguments of those who have written extensively about ‘Political Islam’ and the opinions of the author will only become evident as suggestions for policy emerge in the concluding section.

4

Chapter 1: Outline of Key Concepts Following on from the introduction to the paper, several key concepts which are essential to this text will now be outlined. The concept of Shura is referred to in the Qur’an and is, broadly speaking, a process of consultation. Of course, this raises the question of ‘who is consulted?’ While this is a very important question, a universal answer to it is not possible as different scholars and theologians have assumed different position at different times. These positions have usually been based upon the socio-political climate in which the authors lived and wrote. However when we consider the goal of this paper, finding compatibility between Islam and democracy, we will therefore need to assume that consultation is conducted on the basis of universal suffrage because, without this, democracy cannot exist.

Shura was, for classical scholars, not seen as mandatory but was seen as Mandub (recommended). The view of Shura has changed over time and it is now seen as Fard by the majority of contemporary scholars (Ashour, 2008). Furthermore contemporary scholars who are associated with the Muslim Brotherhood “theorize that the principle of Shura is a Muslim duty and that when it is rightly applied, as was the case in the time of the prophet, and his four righteous successors, it grants all the merits of liberal democracies but risks none of their flaws” (Shavit, 2010, p. 350). This ‘lack of flaws’ is connected to the divine nature of Shura and will be examined as the paper progresses.

A discussion of Shura would not be complete without mentioning the concept of Bay’a.

Bay’a implies a ‘contract’ between the leader and the people over whom that leader governs and, as Omar Ashour has stressed, it is “based on certain conditions” (Ashour, 2008, p. 18).

Obedience to the ruler is implied in Surah IV: 59 which states: “O ye who believe! Obey Allah, and obey the Messenger, and those charged with authority among you.” Nazih Ayubi, while discussing Sunni Islam, stated that “in their traditional theory the ruler is the implementer of the Word of God and in this capacity obedience is due to him from every believer” (Ayubi, 1992, p. 83).

This contract is significant because it is a two way process. Not only do the subjects have a duty to their leader, but the leader also has a duty to their subjects. Scholars such as Omar Ashour have drawn parallels between Bay’a, because it can be revoked, and the Social Contract as envisaged by John Locke (Ashour, 2008, p. 18). The Bay’a implies that the leader, or ‘the state’ is accountable to the people and the checks and balances which are

5

central to maintaining distribution of power in a democracy can be seen in the proper application of the Bay’a.

When viewed within an Islamic context, it has been argued that if the leader is no longer acting within the limits permitted by Islam, not only is the population not obliged to obey, they are in fact encouraged to disobey. This view has been forwarded by, amongst others, Bernard Lewis (Pew Forum, 2006). Abu Bakr, the first Caliph, summarises this when he stated “As I obey God and His Prophet, obey me, if I neglect the laws of God and the Prophet, I have no more right to your obedience” (Ahmad A. , Islam and Democracy: Text, Tradition and History, 2009, p. 27).

The basis for this lack of obedience can be found in Surah XLII: 42 which, after outlining that people cannot be blamed for defending themselves if a wrong is done to them, states that: “The blame is only upon those who oppress men with wrongdoing and insolently transgress beyond bounds through the land, defying right and justice: for such there will be a Penalty grievous.” The parallels between what is implied by Bay’a and the ‘responsibility to protect’, found in international politics are evident The ‘responsibility to protect’ is simply an international standard which is based upon the belief that a government is responsible for the protection of its citizens and, when it fails to protect them, it loses credibility as a government and, in theory, opens itself to external intervention in order to ensure the rights of the citizens. The ICISS has argued that “Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect” (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty , 2001, p. 13). This is fundamental to the democratic health of the state and is a very controversial notion in contemporary world affairs as the ‘responsibility to protect’ has been openly discussed in relation to states such as Libya and Syria, where it has been argued that a failure to uphold this ‘responsibility to protect’ by the governments of those states can be used as a means to justify intervention and initiate a regime change.

The concept of Ijma (consensus) is also an essential component of the debate concerning Islam’s compatibility with democracy. This consensus, when brought about via the application of Shura should, in theory, create a policy or a position which all those who have been consulted have agreed upon and this can easily be seen as an equivalent system to 6

Western democracy. Rachid Ghannoushi, a Tunisian Islamist and co-founder of the Ennahda Movement, believes that “consensus provides the basis for participatory government or democracy in Islam” (Esposito & Voll, Makers of Contemporary Islam, 2001, p. 114). The generation of a consensus is clearly the best way to include as many people as possible in the creation of state laws and, when people have a say in the running of their state, they are much more likely to be content and therefore the process of governance will be much smoother and more appealing to the EU and other Western states. This, in turn, will facilitate greater cooperation between states and help the EU to achieve its overall aim of extending peace, prosperity and democracy beyond its borders.

Theorists such as Hasan al-Turabi, while acknowledging that too great a temporal gap had developed between society and its fundamental foundation in the Qur’an, have promoted Ijtihad as a method of reinterpreting the Qur’an to enable a durable Islamic revival (Moussali, 1994, p. 53). There are two conflicting views in relation to reinterpretation. The first, which is held by Tariq Ramadan, states that everything is permitted unless it is expressly forbidden.

The other argument, put forward by the Salafists, which focuses on a more literal interpretation of scriptures holds the opposite view and states that everything is forbidden unless it is expressly permitted. This debate gains special significance when we attempt to view the Qur’an as a ‘constitution’ for a state. Ijtihad is further supported by Esposito and Piscatori who argue that an examination of history shows us that national and religious traditions “are capable of having multiple and major ideological interpretations or reorientations” (Esposito & Piscatori, 1991, p. 434).

Gudrun Kramer has made a distinction between the Ibadat and the Mu’amalat within Islam.

Any element of Islamic law which is Ibadat is eternal and cannot be changed whereas everything else is Mu’amalat and therefore can be changed. She argues that any changes, via Ijtihad, are acceptable as long as they conform to the Nass (word) and the Maqasid (spirit) of the Shariah (Kramer, 1993, p. 4). “Due to the need to respond to new situations and exigencies, the noted scholar Fazlur Rahman has emphasised the Sunna as a ‘living tradition’ rather than merely a historical template that meticulously and rigidly organises the believers’ behaviour” (Ahmad A. , Islam and Democracy: Text, Tradition and History, 2009, p. 26).

Building upon this, it is evident that evolution of policy and ‘religious doctrine’ is integral to the Islamic faith and this evolution is best achieved via Ijtihad.

7

A process of Ijtihad can be used to change social policies such as marriage and divorce, therefore allowing a broad scope for political change and adaptation to contextual circumstances. Esposito argues that “These manmade laws must be able to respond to changing circumstances and new problems arising in modernity” (Esposito, The Future of Islam, 2010, p. 92). Furthermore, Shariah is not the ‘rigid’ set of laws as portrayed by Western media; it acts as a set of moral and ethical guidelines which can be altered (WohlerKhalfallah, 2007, p. 79). This presents Islam as a ‘living’ faith, which evolves and adapts to circumstances and this adaptable nature further emphasises the fact that Islam is not a monolith and that examples must, as Kramer argued, be viewed within their own particular context. No matter how the faith is interpreted, it must apply to everyone equally and “even if one person remains above such Shariah that is not true rule of law or Shariah at all” (Farooq, 2002).

If, indeed, there is a conflict between ‘Mecca and mechanisation’ within Islam, then Ijtihad will be an essential process if this conflict is to be resolved. Lahouari Addi believes that this conflict can be resolved and she argues that “there is no contradiction, of course, between textual Islam – the Qur’an and the Sunna – and modernism. The contradiction is with the way Islam is lived and practiced today” (Addi, 1992, p. 125). Addi clearly believes that the public manifestation of a religion’s character is neither inevitable nor inherent, and is largely a product of history and this belief greatly undermines any argument stating that there is an inherent incompatibility between Islam ‘en masse’ and democracy. This argument has already been disproved when it was initially stated that neither Islam nor democracy are monoliths and therefore a universal statement about either of them cannot be made. The limits to the extent of Ijtihad, imposed by the Qur’an and the Sunna, can have a significant impact on the compatibility of Islam and democracy as discussed in this article, and these limits will be discussed in the third chapter.

Divine origin of legislation is central to ‘Islamic Politics’ and “in a Hadith, Muhammad states that ‘God allowed the Halal (permissible) in His book and God forbade the Haram (forbidden) in His book, and whatever God did not speak about then he has left it for decisions of people” (Ashour, 2008, p. 12). Shura can therefore only function within the framework of not permitting what the Qur’an and Sunna forbid or forbidding what the Qur’an and Sunna permits (Shavit, 2010, p. 355).

8

This is arguably similar to the constraints placed upon a legislative body by the constitution of a state but there is one fundamental flaw in this argument which will be examined in the third chapter. Furthermore, a political system with a strong basis in religion will inevitably have an elevated position for the religion’s divine entity, which emerges from the concept of Tawhid (Oneness of God). Therefore, in this study, Allah will have a central position and it has been argued that this can render democracy and Islam incompatible, an argument which will be further developed in the third chapter.

Having outlined these concepts, the article can proceed to examine the question of Islam’s compatibility with democracy, and the importance of these concepts shall become evident as the article progresses.

9

Chapter 2: Shura as an ‘Islamic Democracy’ Following on from the exploration of key concepts, we now examine Islam’s compatibility with democracy, with a specific focus on the application of Shura. Rachid Ghannoushi believes that Islam “finds in democracy the appropriate instruments (elections, parliamentary system, separation of powers, etc.) to implement the Shura” (Esposito & Voll, Makers of Contemporary Islam, 2001, p. 114). The movement that he co-founded, the Ennahda Movement (also known as the Resistance Party) has applied this logic and, consequently, won more seats than any other party in Tunisia’s first election after the fall of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali’s government. Meanwhile Asma Afsaruddin believes that “nonconsultative, dynastic rule was regarded in most circles as un-Islamic and as a betrayal of the early Islamic ideal of collective decision-making” (Afsaruddin, 2006, p. 160). Therefore there is compatibility between Islam and democracy as long as Shura is properly implemented.

Esposito and Piscatori go one step further by arguing that the basic idea of Shura already existed in the region and predates Islam. They believe that consultation, as observed in Shura, is “a valid continuation of tribal systems of consultation” (Esposito & Piscatori, Democratization and Islam, 1991, p. 435). These suggestions begin to suggest that Islam does in fact have a long democratic tradition which, arguably, predates the democratic traditions of ‘the West.’ The speech given by Abu Bakr, mentioned in the previous chapter, was also significant in that it was intended to reassure recent converts to Islam that they would continue to have a say in governance via consultation and collective decision making (Afsaruddin, 2006, p. 160). This clearly lays the foundation for an all encompassing, inclusive nature which can be found at the heart of contemporary models of democracy and further emphasises the line of argument taken by Esposito and Piscatori.

As Shura existed in the Qur’an and was used by the Prophet Muhammad, ‘pro compatibility’ activists have argued that democracy is, in fact, a Western manifestation of the Islamic concept of Shura and that an ‘Islamic democracy’ based on Shura involves Islam returning to its roots and can therefore sit comfortably alongside the current Islamic revival. Asma Afsaruddin, after referring to the Prophet’s predisposition to consultation, believes that “such attestations have created, in fact, a powerful normative precedent for succeeding generations of the faithful” (Afsaruddin, 2006, p. 159).

“There is no inherent incompatibility between democracy and Islam” (Zartman, 1992, p.

188). By arguing this, Zartman shows that compatibility can be found, as long as we are 10

prepared to look for it. As has already been stated, neither Islam nor democracy are monoliths, and both have been challenged to reinvent new manifestations of themselves by adapting to prevailing circumstances within a given state or context. Compatibility with democracy can be derived from Abulkalam Azad who has argued that “Islam regards every form of government which is non-constitutional and non-parliamentary as the greatest human sin” (Ahmad I. , 2011, p. 459). By a simple process of elimination, when we examine Azad’s argument concerning what Islam is not compatible with, it becomes evident that there is compatibility between Islam and democracy because they are not incompatible.

Furthermore, since it has also been established that Shura allows for consultation within an Islamic context, it is evident that Shura is the key element of this compatibility and it can reasonably be said that “a reformation of both Shura and democracy through a process of historical trimming makes them synonymous and even identical” (Moussali, 1994, p. 58).

Lastly, Dr Fathi Osman believes that “democracy is the best application of Shura” (Farooq, 2002) while Uriya Shavit argues that Shura is less artificial than democracy and is much more deeply rooted in society (Shavit, 2010, p. 355).This therefore places Shura above and beyond democracy, with the implication being that Shura, as an Islamic principle, has a much greater impact on the everyday lives of people than democracy, which is a purely political principle. Having outlined these beliefs, this chapter will explore reasons why these beliefs are held.

While it is not as relevant to the EU as the Middle East and North Africa, Indonesia has proven to be a very good example of democracy within a Muslim majority state. David Cameron, the British Prime Minister, stated in April 2012 during a speech in Indonesia that “what Indonesia shows is that in the world’s largest Muslim-majority country it is possible to reject this extremist threat and prove that democracy and Islam can flourish alongside each other.” Cameron went on to say that the Indonesian case was very important because it proved to Muslims everywhere that this compatibility was possible (Watt, 2012).

Sadek Jawad Sulaiman believes that “No claim of commitment to Islam, no matter how many mosques are built or pious commentaries broadcast from the state-owned media, can be taken seriously where Shura is denied, ignored, distorted, or compromised” (Sulaiman, 1999).

Sulaiman clearly believes that Shura is essential to the functioning of Islam as a political entity and he is essentially saying that since Islam cannot truly exist politically without

11

Shura, and since Shura is an ‘Islamic equivalent’ of democracy, Islam and democracy must therefore be compatible.

Of course there are arguments that, in order for democracy to function, there needs to be a strong and active civil society and the ‘democratic nature’ must be strong within the state’s population. Democracy cannot exist without these and they cannot exist without democracy.

Therefore we have a classic ‘chicken and egg’ dilemma and history has shown that these elements must be allowed to grow simultaneously, a process which is still ongoing in EU member states. Uriya Shavit believes that “the choice is not between flawed democracy and utopia, but between the flaws of democracy and the flaws of tyranny. While the flaws of democracy can be amended by broadening democracy, the flaws of tyranny can only be amended by replacing it with democracy” (Shavit, 2010, p. 363). Therefore it is evident that the ‘democratic nature’ and civil society within a state must be allowed to develop simultaneously, enabling the development of one to ‘spill over’ into the other, and enabling states to continually develop and refine their democratic concepts.

Having assumed that Shura is indeed an ‘Islamic democracy’, we are faced with two distinct concepts, Shura Mu’lima and Shura Mulzima. The essential difference between these two approaches is that the outcome of Shura Mu’lima is non-binding whereas the outcome of Shura Mulzima is binding. Non-binding consultation produces advisory bodies whereas binding consultation will produce parliaments or the passing of laws via referendum.

Advocates of Shura Mu’lima refer to Surah III: 159 in support of their argument. This verse states “.... and consult them in affairs (of moment). Then when thou hast taken a decision, put thy trust in Allah for Allah lovers those who put their trust (in Him).” The equivalent Qur’anic verse used by advocates of Shura Mulzima, Surah XLII: 38, states: “Those who harken to their Lord, and establish regular Prayer, who (conduct) their affairs by mutual consultation; who spend out of what We bestow on them for sustenance.” Both of these verses imply ultimate authority of Allah and this raises issues which will be explored in the next chapter.

Having seen the Qur’anic origin of Shura, it can be argued that a sacred precedent has been set for the application of Shura by Muslims (Netter, 2000, p. 55). Since the Prophet Muhammad himself has enacted Shura before making decisions of importance to the Umma, and a desire to emulate the Prophet and his teachings is strong amongst Muslims, this therefore leads to a logical conclusion that democracy, as a distinctly political version of 12

Shura, ought to be the norm in Muslim societies, and not the exception. Gudrun Kramer has argued that Shura “is now presented as the functional equivalent of Western parliamentary rule, and as the basis of an authentic Islamic democracy” (Kramer, 1993, p. 7). She continues by stating that “most authors tend to regard Shura as both required and binding (Wajiba and Mulzima)” (Kramer, 1993, p. 7).

This further reinforces the claim that Islam and democracy are compatible and it also appears to suggest that the process of democracy could be considered a religious duty for devout Muslims. If Shura is now seen as Fard then political duty and religious responsibility begin to go hand in hand. While this contradicts the separation of religion and state which is promoted by Western democracies, it can lead to Shura being interpreted as a religious obligation, therefore sacralising the political sphere (Kramer, 1993, p. 7).If this argument is applied then democracy, as manifested by Shura, has become a duty for Muslims and would therefore make it the norm in Muslim societies and prove that not only are Islam and democracy compatible, but they can also be seen as inseparable. This inseparable relationship between Islam and democracy will strike a chord with those who are promoting Islamic revivalism.

If we take as our basic assumption the fact that Shura can be seen as a form of democracy, the next question we should ask ourselves is ‘who is consulted?’ This question is answered in the models of Shura that Hasan al-Turabi had proposed. Though al-Turabi had proposed four models, only two will be used in this study, as they are the two that are closest to ‘democracy’ as it is known in the West, Therefore they are the two models that come closest to our study, whereas the other two models involved “specialists” or expressions of public opinion and were non-binding which, in al-Turabi’s opinion, greatly reduced their significance.

The ‘greatest’ form involves all people, while a lesser form involves “ahl al-hall wa-l-‘aqd” (those who are qualified to unbind and bind) – those who act on behalf of Muslims in appointing and disposing of the leader (El-Solh, 1993, p. 60). Muhammad Asad has argued that “the legislative assembly... must be truly representative of the entire community, both men and women” (Esposito & Piscatori, Democratization and Islam, 1991, p. 434). Asad is clearly calling for universal suffrage as seen within the EU and it fits perfectly with the two models outlined by al-Turabi which come closest to matching ‘Western’ forms of democracy.

13

It would appear that what al-Turabi sees as the ‘greatest’ form is essentially the conducting of political affairs via ‘Direct Democracy’. However, conducting political affairs via Direct Democracy involves several logistical problems and it is no surprise that, for the author of this text, the most ‘effective’ model of Direct Democracy was the Athenian city state where all ‘men’ were able to vote on the running of the polis. Straightaway however this raises the question of who is consulted The Athenian model had a very limited suffrage, whereas modern democracy, especially in EU terms, calls for universal franchise.

Furthermore, the Athenian city state contained a relatively small polis which enabled the processing of Direct Democracy but as the size of the polis grew, this processing became much more difficult and, if the polis in question became a state instead of merely a city, any sort of referendum would have been almost impossible. However, this is changing due to rapid advances in technology which can now allow for the almost instant casting and counting votes, therefore making what was almost impossible a century ago very possible at a few clicks of a computer. There are undoubtedly many problems that would need to be overcome in order to enable this, and an exploration of them is beyond the scope of this thesis, but the basic hypothesis of widespread Direct Democracy, envisaged by al-Turabi as the greatest form of Shura, has only now become possible and practical for frequent application.

The lesser form proposed by al-Turabi, which involves ‘those who are qualified to unbind and bind’ directly translates to Representative Democracy as it proposes leaving decisions about the conducting of political affairs to those who are ‘qualified’ to carry them out. This is the system that has been used for centuries in parts of Europe and it could be argued that it has only been used because the constant application of Direct Democracy appeared to be impossible and that society couldn’t function effectively if it was constantly taking time to vote on how its affairs should be conducted. The parliamentary model embodies Shura Mulzima as the decisions made, generally by majority rule, subsequently become state policy.

However, this ‘majority rule’ raises issues which will be explored in the next section.

Councils consisting of ‘those who are qualified to unbind and bind’ exist in several countries throughout the Middle East, such as Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, but in these states the councils are purely advisory, and examples of Shura Mu’lima. Uriya Shavit, when writing about the Shura council in Saudi Arabia, states that “In describing the council, Ibn Saud and his gazette , Umm al-Qura, compared the principle of Shura to Western parliaments, but 14

emphasised its Muslim essence and celebrated its superiority” (Shavit, 2010, p. 366). While this statement alludes to compatibility in theory, it has not always been the case in practice, but the failure of the compatibility in practice frequently owes a lot more to personal, human, intervention and (re)interpretation of scripture than anything else.

In Saudi Arabia the Majlis Ash-Shura (Shura council) serves as an advisory body to the Saudi King and has no power of its own to pass legislation. Its role is, in effect, similar to the Senate of the Roman Republic and other equivalent advisory groups throughout history. The Council provides advice which the King is under no obligation to heed. Even though any advice is non-binding, the Council is still a valid example of Shura as the ruler has engaged in a process of consultation before making a decision, but it is not the form of consultation that EU leaders desire, nor does it appear to be consultation as envisaged by al-Turabi.

In fact, it has been argued by authors such as Uriya Shavit that the existence of the Majlis Ash-Shura merely serves as a ‘token gesture’ towards democracy in order to appease the West while at the same time the Saudi rulers maintain their grip on the state. Shavit believes that “ by institutionalizing non-binding systems of consultation, regimes seek to simultaneously cloak themselves with an aura of Western-Style political reform and with an aura of religious legitimacy, while maintaining their monopoly on strategic decisions” (Shavit, 2010, p. 365). While it cannot be disputed that major change is needed within Saudi Arabia to bring about genuine democracy, the existence of Shura, even in a limited and nonbinding capacity, suggests that this significant transformation would not be impossible.

Academics such as Moussalli have claimed that Islam can ‘perfect’ democracy because Shura, if underpinned by the implementation of Shariah can overcome the human shortcomings that are faced by ‘Western’ models of democracy (Moussali, 1994, p. 57). AlTurabi extends this belief by arguing that Western democracy is based upon a separation of politics and individual morality whereas in ‘Islamic democracy’, which is manifested by Shura, this separation does not exist, therefore rending Islamic democracy superior to its ‘Western’ counterpart (El-Solh, 1993, p. 60). Since Shura is the perfect form of democracy, it has become evident that Shura should be actively promoted and it could even be argued that other democratic models can improve themselves by learning from the example of Shura based democracy.

The compatibility arguments largely originate from the view that Shura is an Islamic version of democracy and that the two are essentially two sides of the same coin. When this is 15

combined with the view that there is a tradition, and perhaps even a’ sacred duty’, to conduct democracy in Islam the arguments in favour of compatibility are very compelling. However, there are various arguments put forward which contradict this compatibility and they will be examined in the next chapter.

16

Chapter 3: Islam and Democracy are Incompatible Now that arguments supporting Islam’s compatibility with democracy have been outlined our attention turns to those arguments which imply that there is no compatibility. Democratic systems are founded upon the principles of consultation and, therefore, this consultation is obligatory. Omar Ashour has argued that Shura is not necessarily an obligation for Muslims, but that it is Mandub. This is a key distinction, as Ashour argues that those who carry out actions which are Mandub may be commended for doing so but they would not be punished for not doing it (Ashour, 2008, p. 14). If we therefore assume that Shura is Mandub then there cannot be compatibility between Islam and democracy via Shura because democratic systems are based upon the compulsory nature of consultation and, without consultation, the political system of a state effectively becomes that of a dictatorship.

Kalim Siddiqur believes that concepts such as democracy and nationalism are Kufr (nonbelief) and he argues that “all political systems based on one or more of these ideas are part and parcel of Kufr” (Voll, 2007, p. 172). Uriya Shavit has indicated a clear incompatibility between Islam and democracy because a state which operates along democratic principles is a state “where personal freedoms, rather than God’s word, are sacred” (Shavit, 2010, p. 360).

Shavit is suggesting that as anything is placed ‘above’ Islam then Islam cannot truly function and this creates a fundamental incompatibility between Islam and democracy, regardless of its manifestation.

The belief that Shura is not an ‘Islamic democracy’ has emerged from the view that Islam, as a system of faith, is perfect and therefore doesn’t need to be changed. This renders democracy, and any other mechanisms for effecting change, obsolete as this change is simply not required, because “Islam does not have any shortcomings that require completion” (Esposito & Piscatori, Democratization and Islam, 1991, p. 453) as argued by Shaykh Fadlallah Nuri.

Scholars such as Samuel Huntington and Bernard Lewis have argued that there has been no tradition of Democracy within Islam since the end of the period of the Rightly Guided Caliphs and that, consequently, there is no democratic culture within Islam which therefore renders Islam and Democracy incompatible (Farooq, 2002). Arguably this absence of a ‘democratic culture’ is the result of a suppression of civil society during the colonial and, in some cases, post-colonial eras. Democracy requires an active civil society, in which the public are well informed of the issues and are able to debate these issues without fear of 17

repression. In order for this to exist, there must be a separation of the judiciary and the legislature and the existence of free speech.

During the colonial era, civil society was repressed in order to ‘keep the peace’ and frequently this colonial legacy has passed on to the post-colonial regimes as we have seen in states such as Egypt, whose oppressive regimes have been supported by Western regimes serving their own national interest at the expense of the liberty of others. Part of the importance of an active civil society to democracy is the idea of ‘grassroots’ politics. This belief states that ideas can work their way up from the populace, through the political elites, to the leadership. This is not how Shura appears to work, as Shura is mainly a ‘top down process’ and since it does not appear that ideas can go both from the leader to the populace and vice versa, the democratic credentials of Shura, and therefore the compatibility of Islam and democracy, are greatly challenged.

This lack of an active civil society is not a result of the application of Islam; it is the consequence of corrupt governments who have denied the masses their right to freedom of speech and assembly. To this end, considering Kramer’s argument as outlined earlier, the recent history of states in the Middle East and North Africa cannot be ignored during this debate. Their apparent unwillingness to impose democracy as it is known in the West is a product of the recent history of those states. By contrast Indonesia, which also has a large Muslim population and a great importance placed on Islam, has, in recent years, developed into a fully functioning democracy and can serve as a good example to other states with Muslim majorities which wish to follow suit.

Having stated earlier that the increase in Islam can be linked to a desire for self-determination and freedom from colonial rule, it has been argued by El-Solh that this current Islamic revival, and the resulting increase in the relevance of Shura, are a consequence of Islam returning to its roots, and not a response to the democratic challenge of the west (El-Solh, 1993). Consequently, the theoretical argument proposed by some that Islam and democracy are compatible or that Shura and democracy are ‘two sides of the same coin’ may simply have been put forward in order to placate those who seek democracy, rather than being a genuine belief. Not only that, but there was also an awareness that by utilising concepts such as democracy and self-determination, the independence movements of states in the Middle East and North Africa were far more likely to succeed as they were framing their arguments around concepts which their colonial powers had great belief in, and it would be hypocritical 18

for those colonial powers to deny a push for nationalism and self determination to their colonies when it was something that they themselves had demanded and continued to promote. This is especially true since Europeans tend to accept nationalism as a basis for political society, as argued by academics including Ira Lapidus (Lapidus, 1992, p. 21).

If indeed Shura has been applied it does not necessarily mean that this application is ‘democratic’. It would appear that the consultation process, as proposed by Shura, is ‘top down, with the leader consulting only those who he feels that he or she needs to consult.

When we combine this with the concept of Shura Mu’lima, we find a top down consultation process which has no informative power whatsoever and is, in effect, no different to a dictator seeking advice from close companions. There is an implication within ‘top down’ consultation that not everyone will be consulted, and this contradicts a key principle of democracy, universal suffrage. Furthermore, the leader is under no obligation to act upon this advice. By its very nature, Shura Mu’lima cannot be described as democratic, because democracy implies an obligation to act, not merely the creation of a ‘talking shop’ which is brought about by the application of Shura Mu’lima.

Surah XLII: 10 states “Whatever it be wherein ye differ, the decision thereof is with Allah: such is Allah my Lord: in Him I trust, and to Him I turn.” This verse from the Qur’an can be used to argue that a process of consultation should not be carried out, as Allah is the ultimate authority and, if taken independently and literally, renders Shura obsolete and, therefore, Islam and democracy would be incompatible, as would Islam and any form of government, as the only authority is Allah, and is therefore not human.

Mostapha Benhenda argues that there is no temporal limit to the obedience implied by Bay’a.

As long as the leader acts within the limits of the Qur’an and Sunna, therefore never losing legitimacy, the leader can rule for life as there is no process for the renegotiation of the Bay’a. This appears to go against one of the central tenets of Democracy, namely alternation of government. While he states that the leader can only command obedience if he acts within the confines of his faith, there are no mechanisms in place to remove the leader and therefore the system that Benhenda has described can be a labelled a ‘benign dictatorship’ He argues that the Umma (community) has political power when the Bay’a with a ruler is agreed but that the ruler relinquishes this power once the Bay’a is agreed and the power is returned to the Umma upon the death of the leader, at which point a Bay’a is agreed with a new ruler and the cycle repeats itself. (Benhenda, 2011, p. 103).

19

Benhenda proceeds to argue that this Bay’a can be seen as ‘pure majoritarianism’ and that it endangers the political power of future generations. Benhenda has argued that, in theory, the Umma could, by following democratic processes, choose to disenfranchise itself and consequently also future generations by voting to transform the political system. This is an extension of the ‘tyranny of the majority’ argument and highlights an inherent danger of democracy; the fact that democracy today can, with complete legitimacy, remove democracy tomorrow. However, it is important to remember that most contracts in Islamic law and the Islamic tradition have a fixed time period, and once this period has expired the contract must be renegotiated (Ashour, 2008, p. 19). Consequently, this renegotiation of a contract can be interpreted to justify a change of government after a fixed period of time, which is the basis of the alternation of power as seen in democracies, and provides a much more favourable view of Islam’s compatibility with democracy than scholars such as Benhenda.

The concept of popular sovereignty lies at the heart of Democracy and is very problematic for some Islamic interpretations. The concept of Tawhid is a fundamental principle of Islam and, as a consequence it implies that all Muslims are equal under God. Bearing this in mind, advocates of Islam’s compatibility with democracy have been faced with a huge problem since democracy has, at its base, popular sovereignty whereas in Islam sovereignty is divine.

Mohammad Omar Farooq states that “Islam altogether repudiates the philosophy of popular sovereignty and rears its polity on the foundations of the sovereignty of God and the vicegerency (Khilafah) of man” (Farooq, 2002).

It has also been argued that the concept of popular sovereignty “denies the fundamental Islamic affirmation of the sovereignty of God and is, therefore, a form of idolatry” (Esposito & Voll, 2011, p. 1). Progressing logically from this starting point, Islam and democracy are fundamentally incompatible, as accepting the governance of anyone other than God is committing an act of idolatry and, arguably, contravenes Surah XXI:92 which states: “Verily, this Brotherhood of yours is a single Brotherhood, and I am your lord and cherisher: therefore serve Me (and no other)”. Senior political figures such as Sayyid Qutb have argued that not only does popular sovereignty usurp that of Allah, but it can be seen as a form of tyranny because it subsumes some individuals to the will of others. (Esposito & Piscatori, Democratization and Islam, 1991, p. 435).

The notion of one being subjected to the tyranny of another can be seen as a violation of Tawhid for yet another reason. While Tawhid, as a principle, argues that Allah is the ultimate 20

sovereign it therefore also argues that all people are equal under Allah. Consequently, citizens being ruled by the will of other citizens’ should not happen because it privileges some over others when, under Allah, all citizens should be equal, and the concept of ‘primus inter pares’ as seen in Western forms of democracy, does not exist. However, Scholars such as Moussalli have argued that “if Shura is subsumed under Tawhid then it indicates the equality of people before God and their political freedoms – two essential components of democracy” (Moussali, 1994, p. 60). Therefore, as long as Shura and Tawhid operate simultaneously, compatibility can be found but, once either of these concepts becomes manipulated or removed entirety, any political system based on the compatibility of Islam and democracy could no longer continue to function.

Mohamed Talbi argues that despite what some scholars and theologians believe, the Qur’an cannot be seen as a constitution and he therefore rejects any direct link between Shura and democracy. He believes that Shura, as envisaged by the Qur’an, functioned in a time and place which had no conception of democracy as we in the contemporary world know it (Netter, 2000, p. 55). It is clear from his beliefs that Talbi does not believe that Ijtihad can revise the act of consultation and ‘update’ it for our time. This argument need not be accepted as valid, as it can be argued that a referendum can transpose Shura from the Qur’an into the modern era, though this can only be done via Ijtihad and within the limits outlined by the Qur’an and Sunna.

One important distinction between democracy and a state with Islam at its core must be stressed. If a state holds Islam in a central position, and derives policy from interpretation of the Islamic faith, there are certain polices that simply cannot be enacted because they contradict that which is explicitly stated in the Qur’an. This is in stark contrast to ‘democratic’ states which can, in theory, enact any policy and can legalise or outlaw things as they please by, if necessary, altering the constitution of the state.

Talbi’s belief that the Qur’an is not a constitution is of fundamental importance because, while the Qur’an can be reinterpreted, it cannot be rewritten and this suggests an incompatible relationship with democracy since many democracies have, as their foundation texts, a constitution which can be rewritten. If we assume that a democratic state must have a way to alter its foundational text, if one exists, then Islam as a political idea is not compatible with democracy due to the unchangeable nature of the Qur’an. Furthermore, there is a prevalent fear among of popular sovereignty leading to the legislation of that which is 21

prohibited by Islam, and this fear leads people to argue that they are not compatible.

However, as has been outlined, this need not be the case as long as the democracy functions within the limits of the Qur’an and the Sunna, while also allowing for equal treatment of nonMuslims living within the state’s boundaries.

Alternation of power is a perquisite for democracy and for this to happen there needs to be a plurality of political parties. This plurality of parties is impossible according to certain interpretations of Islam as the existence of parties divides the population which had been united under Allah, and whose ultimate goal is service to Allah. Hasan al-Bana, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, was one of the most vociferous in opposing the existence of political parties because of the disunity among the population that they can create and exacerbate (Shavit, 2010, p. 351). However, scholars such as Yusuf al-Qaradawi have argued that this need not be the case and they support their argument by stressing the existence of multiple schools of interpretation of Islamic law (Shavit, 2010, p. 358).

In the early days of Islam, adherents of the faith belonged to multiple tribes and among these tribes there were elements of conflict. Nonetheless these tribes were united as part of the Umma because of their faith (Wohler-Khalfallah, 2007, p. 81). This example can be used to argue that a plurality of political parties and opinions can exist because the bonds of the Umma are able to transcend human and political disputes and, therefore, multiple political parties can exist and are able to disagree without jeopardising the Umma itself. In fact, by working through these disagreements, the Umma can be strengthened.

Equally, however, the existence of an openly ‘religious’ party could undermine the free nature of the election. If we presuppose that a Muslim is bound above all else to follow his or her religion then it can therefore be argued that they must vote for this religious party because a vote against the religious party could be seen as a vote against the religion itself. (Addi, 1992, p. 125). Assuming that this is the case it is impossible for an election to be truly ‘free’ and therefore democratic if there is a perceived religious obligation to vote for one party over the rest of its competitors. Therefore, in theory, devout Muslims are obliged to remain obedient to the state and its rulers, but only as long as the rulers adhere to Islamic principles as outlined earlier.

Arguments that Islam and democracy are not compatible have, as we have seen, emerged from specific interpretations of certain concepts and it is undeniable that certain individuals and groups in Muslim societies have used these interpretations to further their own interests, 22

frequently to the detriment of the rest of the population. This again emphasises the fact that the ‘human’ element of this debate is of central importance, but it is beyond the remit of this paper to examine the reasons why political leaders will (mis)interpret scriptures and traditions in order to further their own interests. For the purposes of this paper it is sufficient to simply state that that does happen.

23

Chapter 4: EU Policy and Future Recommendations Now that arguments both for and against Islam’s compatibility with democracy have been outlined our attention turns to EU external policy and ways in which it can be changed in order to help facilitate democratic transition in third countries with Muslim majorities. David Cameron, when discussing the recently deposed authoritarian leaders in the Middle East and North Africa, has argued that “In each case the Arab spring has shown that denying people their rights in the name of stability and security actually makes countries less stable in the end. Over time, the pressure builds up until the people take to the streets and demand their freedoms” (Watt, 2012). It is only through genuine stability and governance in states that true peace can be experienced.

A recent report by the Council of the European Union states that “The European Union is founded on a shared determination to promote peace and stability and to build a world founded on respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law. These principles underpin all aspects of the internal and external policies of the European Union” (Council of the European Union, 2012, p. 1). “As the democratisation of non-Member States is both a normative and strategic aim of the EU, democracy promotion is a main element of its foreign policy. It is reflected in its relations with third countries in general, particularly through the European Neighbourhood Policy” (Reinhard, 2010). These quotes outline the importance of external democratisation to EU policymakers, as they continually seek to surround themselves with friendly, democratic states in order to spread peace and prosperity beyond the borders of the EU. The EU’s view of democratisation is very ‘Western’ and there is a tendency to desire democracy as practiced in ‘the West’. This has led to Richard Youngs observing that “most critics of international policies berate Western governments for an inflexible and inappropriate adherence to a specific form of ‘liberal democracy’” (Youngs, Misunderstanding the Maladies of Liberal Democracy Promotion, 2011, p. 1).

The emphasis on democratisation as practiced by the West has grown in the years since the Cold War, due to the changing nature of global political dynamics. Richard Youngs has argued that “the judgement that the demise of bipolarity no longer required pro-Western autocrats to be supported appeared to be given substance by Western governments’ pledge henceforth to prioritise the promotion of democracy in their external relations” (Youngs, The European Union and the Promotion of Democracy, 2002, p. 2)

24

“Europe’s experience tells us that true democracy is the necessary foundation of tolerance, peace and prosperity. In North Africa and the Arab world that destination will not be reached quickly or without setbacks. But building deep democracy is the only way that the destination will be reached at all” (Ashton, 2011). Catherine Ashton, as High Representative for foreign affairs and security policy, has outlined her view of how democratisation should occur and this view forms the basis for current EU policies. As the ‘Arab Spring’ continued, the External Action Service issued a memo stating that “Since the first demonstrations in Tunisia in December 2010, a wave of popular discontent has shaken the Arab world, with people calling for dignity, democracy, and social justice. Despite the unexpected magnitude of these uprisings, the EU has been quick to recognise the challenges of the political and economic transition faced by the region as a whole. Furthermore, it has also recognised the need to adopt a new approach to relations with its Southern neighbours” (EEAS, The EU's Response to the 'Arab Spring', 2011).

The origins of democracy in EU states must be considered before the EU can attempt to tell other states how to introduce democracy. “Westerners did not construct modernism and democracy with an ear to Hobbes, Rousseau or Kant. Only after having suffered the tragic excesses of absolute power and tyranny, only after being instructed by Robespierre and Napoleon, did the consciousness of common interest prevail” (Addi, 1992, p. 129). Bearing this in mind, it is evident that any democratic transition within a state must be framed by the context of that state and society, and that there is no ‘one size fits all’ approach to external democratisation. EU states needed to be ruled by tyrants in order to discover what was best for them, the way in which a democracy must be run cannot simply be learned by studying the writings of scholars and political philosophers who themselves were influenced by the temporal and societal context in which they were writing.

The EU seeks to build a “Deep Democracy” which will involve, amongst other things, a free press and an active civil society (EEAS, The EU's Response to the 'Arab Spring', 2011).

While this desire for democratic transformation is very admirable, there is one major issuenamely the fact that the democracy that the EU looks to help create is a democracy on the EU’s terms. This is made evident by the use of a “European Endowment for Democracy” (EEAS, A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood, 2011). This shows the very European led support for democratic transition. Obviously a large European element is to be expected as the EEAS aims to take the lead in promoting democracy within its extended neighbourhood, but the promotion of European organisation over their international 25

counterparts suggests that ulterior motives may be in play. Furthermore, conditionality is frequently used in EU agreements with third countries in an attempt to ensure that these countries do what the EU wants them to do. There are equally valid arguments claiming that this conditionality is either voluntary choice or coercion by the EU. Either way, the use of conditionality when drawing up agreements ensures that there is either agreement on the EU’s terms or there is no agreement whatsoever and this contradicts the fundamental equality between states which is an essential aspect of democracy. at the international level The EU has a long tradition of support for processes of democratization beyond its borders and this desire for external democratization has been reflected in documents such as the European Security Strategy of 2003. However, many have asked how ‘the West’ can justify the promotion of Democracy when Western states have been content to support autocratic regimes such as that of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt because support for these regimes was deemed to be in the ‘national interest’ of Western states. The perceived hypocrisy of the West’s approach to Democracy has resulted in Western calls for Democracy ‘being taken with a pinch of salt.’ Of course, this shrewd analysis carried out by states to determine what is in their best interests is still ongoing, and “Behind the smoke screen of fulsome praise for democracy, liberty and human rights, cold and cynical calculations are underway” (Ramadan, 2011, p. 188). In recent years the EU has clearly promoted interests over values; frequently sacrificing democracy in order to achieve what it believes is in its interest. Richard Youngs, writing in January 2011, argues that “the EU is currently negotiating a large number of trade deals with autocratic regimes, without any apparent worries over the absence of democracy in these states” (Youngs, Misunderstanding the Maladies of Liberal Democracy Promotion, 2011, p. 6).

It cannot be stressed enough that these democracies that the EU hopes to see in its neighbourhood simply cannot be formed overnight’ In the West, the supposed ‘beacon of democracy’, the processes of democratisation have been underway for centuries and reforms are still taking place to this day. While it is a very clichéd argument, the idea that ‘Rome wasn’t built in a day is very appropriate in this context and therefore the EU must be prepared to allow democracy to genuinely take root, a process that could take decades. There simply are no ‘quick fixes’ to this issue.

As recent history has shown us, EU member states have sometimes followed the American example of democratization by taking part in ‘coalititions of the willing’, most notably in the 26

2003 Iraq war. While there may be a belief that democracy can be externally imposed by the barrel of a gun, Asef Bayat stresses that “Democracy cannot be ‘promoted’ on top of a mountain of corpses” (Bayat, 2009). Direct ‘Western interference’, through actions including having ‘boots on the ground, can be very counterproductive as they have the potential to unite the public against what they see as Western aggression, therefore making them support the very regime that they had previously tried to overthrow, because that regime now faces external interference (Ryan, 2007, p. 156). Therefore, in order to allow processes of change to occur, the EU ought to remain neutral, and not become directly involved with ‘boots on the ground’ unless they have been ‘invited’ by those who desire change within their state and they must only become involved if this involvement has been mandated by the United Nations Security Council.

The events of the ‘Arab Spring’ have emphasised the fact that ‘Western’ policy must change and “It is no longer acceptable for the ‘democracies of the North’, in the name of security or of their economic or geopolitical interests, to countenance dictatorship, repression and torture” (Ramadan, 2011, p. 191). This need not mean that perceptions of the national interest need to be abandoned altogether, it simply means that the national interest needs to be reassessed and if, for example, the argument of Democratic Peace Theory was applied, then it would become the national interest of EU states to promote democracy in all states due to the belief that democracies to not fight wars against each other. On the issue of national interest, Ramadan argues that “As for the defence of ‘our’ interests that often causes us to forget our principles, we would do well to remember that in the long term the respect of peoples and of their dignity is the only way to ensure the security of the West” (Ramadan, 2011, p. 191).

Global actors need to do everything they can to promote democracy, especially in societies with potential for conflict. Lahouari Addi has argued that the conduct of politics can, in effect, institutionalise politics (Addi, 1992, pp. 128-129). This is a very big step in the right direction as this institutionalisation of the conflict takes it ‘off the streets’ and places it in the political arena. Once this occurs, reasons behind the conflict can be negotiated and hopefully overcome. Furthermore, the supports of the rival groups will ‘do battle’ in the ballot box and the changing fortunes of the opposing groups will become alternation of power. Once effective government can begin then policies can begin to be implemented which will, hopefully, improve the standard of living and this will increase prosperity among the populace which, in turn, will help to reduce the tensions among the population which led to the conflict in the first place.

27

The article now briefly turns its attention to recent events in Egypt in an attempt to place theoretical discussions into context. On the 24th June 2012 Mohammed Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood backed candidate, won the first presidential election held in post-Mubarak era Egypt. A statement by a spokesperson on behalf of Catherine Ashton, issued a few hours after the election result was announced, stated that “the High Representative looks forward to engaging with President Morsi and his executive, which she trusts will be inclusive and representative of Egypt’s diversity. In this regard, the High Representative encourages the President-elect to reach out to all other political and social groups” (European Union, 2012).

While there can be no doubting the admirable nature of the statement, the author cannot help but detect a very condescending undertone to it, and an automatic belief that Ashton, and consequently the EU in general, are ‘better’ than Egypt. This indicates a major flaw in the current EU thought and policy process. If the EU genuinely believes in democracy and letting states determine their own futures then they simply cannot continue to ‘preach from on high.’

At the heart of democracy is a fundamental equality which assumes that no one person, or state, is better than another and yet the EU, in its statements and policies, continues to believe that it is better than the third countries, particularly within its neighbourhood, which are not ‘democratic’ in the way that they EU wants them to be. A desire to heavily influence Egypt’s continued development springs from this statement and this contradicts the widely believed view that external influence must be ‘hands off’ if a genuine and deep political and societal transformation is to take place. Furthermore, democracy itself is not a monolith and there have been many different manifestations of it in recent history and therefore democratic states, just like differing groups within a democratic state, must be able to respect the different beliefs and approaches that the others have if a genuine sense of community and prosperity is to exist. This echoes Tariq Ramadan’s call for respect and dignity as outlined earlier.

In the wake of Morsi’s election, the Council of the European Union has concluded that “Egypt remains a key partner in the region. The EU stresses therefore the importance of Egypt’s continuing commitment to the goal of building stability; peace and prosperity in the Mediterranean and Middle East region” (Council of the European Union, 2012). It is not unreasonable to argue that there is a desire for a ‘domino effect’ to occur, with the example of Egypt, Tunisia and Libya sweeping throughout the rest of the Middle East and North Africa, though with as little violence as possible, but it is safe to say this ‘genuine’ desire for change

28

only exists now that the situation eighteen months ago, with leaders such as Mubarak, has evidently become unsustainable.

Prior EU support to Mubarak’s regime in Egypt was based upon the fact that Mubarak was ‘the devil they knew’ and, therefore, he was not affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood. Now we have seen that these democratic process, which the EU has always been so keen to promote verbally, but not necessarily in policy, has elected a representative of the very group that they had hoped to keep excluded from the political process and it will certainly be interesting to see the evolution of rhetoric and policy between the EU and Egypt now that Morsi is President-elect. Of course, the very fact that Egypt has just held a democratic Presidential election is a sign of great progress and an opinion article in a recent issue of The Economist has argued that “Egyptians now can at least say what they want and vote for whomever they like. If they opt for Mr Morsi and the Brothers, they face a future full of risks.

But that is better than a return to the oppressive past under Mr Shafiq” (The Economist, 2012, p. 15). This clearly reflects the point made by Uriya Shavit, who argued that democracy was progress and that, if the system was flawed, it could be changed by continued democratic processes.

The EU has had a tendency to ‘freeze’ certain groups out of the political process because of their actions and the most obvious example of this in our context is Hamas, which currently governs the Gaza Strip in the Palestinian Territories, and is classed as a terrorist organisation by the EU. Acts that can be classed as terrorist have certainly been carried out by Hamas, but they are usually carried out by their Al-Qassam brigades and it is therefore wrong to treat every member and supporter in the same way. As clichéd as it sounds, one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter and, while the killing of innocent civilians can never be condoned, there needs to be a genuine desire to resolve the issues which lead to the violence in the first place, something which EU leaders seem to be forgetting when they classify as ‘terrorist’ organisations such as Hamas.

As has already been noted, Shura as a form of democracy is most effective and most representative of the wide range of opinions when it includes as many differing groups and opinions as possible. This cannot happen when groups are undermined and excluded.

Lahouari Addi’s argument concerning democracy’s ability to move conflict into the political arena, where it can subsequently reach a peaceful resolution, is very appropriate here but it simply cannot happen unless the EU are prepared to take the first step and ‘negotiate with 29

terrorists.’ It appears that negotiations have been ongoing in recent months (Barzak & Laub, 2012) and this may be an indication that EU policymakers are finally realising the once in a generation opportunity for change that the ongoing Arab Spring presents.

The Responsibility to Respect, as mentioned in the first chapter, has become increasingly relevant in global politics in recent years as the notion of universal, fundamental human rights and dignity gains prevalence. However, the attempts to invoke this responsibility as a means to justify intervention have not been universal and self-interest of states have clearly been at play, as evidenced by approval for limited intervention in Libya, which Resolution 1973 of the UNSC had paved the way for. Contrast this with the apparent ‘heel dragging’ by the UNSC over the situation in Syria which appears to be deteriorating daily. This only furthers the frustration felt by those who desire genuine change in Syria and the continued spread of democracy yet it also provides a good example of the burdens that democratic systems must overcome. The UNSC is itself a system that requires its own Ijma, due to the potential for vetoing by permanent members and therefore it can serve as a good, functioning example of how compromise ought to be reached. The evident lesson from current events is that more must be done by states, including EU members, to sacrifice what they believe to be their national interest in favour of a larger, more ‘humanitarian’ interest.

The two models outlined by al-Turabi, examined in chapter two, are perfectly acceptable to the EU and therefore everything must be done by the EU in order to promote to application of these models in third countries, particularly those with Muslim majorities, but some changes to EU policy will be needed. One essential principle of ‘Western’ models of democracy which must change in order to facilitate further democratisation in the Middle East and North Africa is the insistence upon secularism. The previous chapters have shown that, as long as certain interpretations of the Islamic faith are being used which intertwine Shura and Shariah while making sure to not undermine Tawhid, Islam and democracy can co-exist. This is something which must be emphasised by all groups that are interested in democratisation.

The fact that democracy is not a monolith has already been established and, progressing from that initial fact, there needs to be a greater willingness to allow for more religious and cultural specific alterations to democratic models. If the populations of third countries are genuinely free to create their own democratic model, and not simply adapt a model imposed upon them by the EU, they will be more willing to make the political transformations. This will ultimately work to the benefit of the EU and the third countries, ensuring mutual respect and 30

dignity of peoples which, as Tariq Ramadan has argued, is the best way of ensuring the security of the West. By ensuring continued security, the EU will also be able to ensure continued prosperity and preservation of interests, two fundamental elements of a Realist analysis of external relations. Consequently, the EU must be encouraged to allow for nonsecular forms of democracy.

31

Chapter 5: Conclusions After weighing up everything that has been presented in this paper it is evident that, since neither Islam nor democracy are monoliths, there cannot be a generalised ‘one size fits all’ answer. The questions asked by this paper have been further complicated by the vast plethora of Islamic interpretations that exist in the contemporary world, which have been altered at different times by different groups in order for them to further their own interests. However, it is evident that a much more open and embracing policy from global leaders would help to facilitate a faster and more peaceful democratic transition throughout the Middle East and North Africa.

There is no universal solution and all groups concerned must be prepared to allow for slight alteration to democratic systems as they adapt to the specific contexts in which they function.

By allowing populations to ‘find their own way’ the political systems will have a much better opportunity to genuinely take root and this will limit the potential for a future return to authoritarianism. A ‘middle ground between Islamic and ‘Western’ manifestations of democracy can be easily found, as long as all groups are prepared to look for it. This does not change the fact that there will be groups of people, both ‘Western’ and Islamic, who will, in order to advance their own interests, deny that there is any compatibility. This cannot change overnight but it is possible that gradual change will occur if genuine global equality is promoted and no country or faith is made to feel inferior to another. By promoting equality in this way it is possible to begin to resolve the vast chasms of difference which appear to exist between ‘Western’ and ‘Muslim’ cultures.

The future direction of EU policy now appears to be evident. There must be a major shift away from the apparently ‘superior’ mindset in the approach of EU policymakers. This superiority, and the insistence that ‘it is our way or the highway’ that conditionality creates can be very off-putting to states and it contradicts the fundamental equality which is at the heart of a democratic system and is the best way of ensuring a lasting peace which, as has been stated, the EU desires.

A combination of a change in EU policy and the once in a generation opportunity that the Arab Spring is presenting can spread democracy and equality throughout the Middle East and North Africa as long as all parties are prepared to make compromises and, with the proper support, states throughout the region can prove that Islam and democracy are indeed compatible.

32

Glossary Bay’a : Contract between leader and the governed Fard : A religious duty Halal: Permissible Haram: Forbidden Ibadat: Eternal and unchangeable element of Islamic doctrine Ijma: Consensus Ijtihad: Process of revision of Islamic doctrine Jihad: A personal struggle Khilafah: Caliph. Leader of a Muslim state Kufr: Non-belief Majlis Ash-Shura: Shura Council Mandub: Recommended Maqasid: Spirit Mu’amalat: Element of Islamic doctrine which is not Ibadat Nass: Word Shura: Consultation Shura Mu’lima: Non-binding consultation Shura Mulzima: Binding consultation Tawhid: Oneness of God Umma: Community of believers Wajiba: Required

33

Works Cited Addi, L. (1992, November). Islamicist Utopia and Democracy. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (524) , 120-130.

Afsaruddin, A. (2006). The "Islamic State" Genealogy, Facts, and Myths. Journal of Church and State , 48 (1), 153-173.

Ahmad, A. (2003). Islam and Democracy: Text, Tradition and History. The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences , 20 (1), 20-45.

Ahmad, I. (2011). Democracy and Islam. Philosophy & Social Criticism , 37 (4), 459-470.

Ashour, O. (2008). Democratic Islam? Assessing the Bases of Democracy in Islamic Political Thought. McGill Journal of Middle East Studies , 9 (1), 7-27.

Ashton, C. (2011, February 4). The EU Wants 'Deep Democracy'to Take Root in Egypt and Tunisia. Retrieved June 13, 2012, from www.guardian.co.uk: http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/feb/04/egypt-tunisia-eu-deep-democracy Ayubi, N. N. (1992). State Islam and Communal Plurality. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (524), 79-91.

Barzak, I., & Laub, K. (2012, May 2). Hamas Says it's Holding Talks with Five EU Countries. Retrieved June 23, 2012, from wwww.news.yahoo.com: http://news.yahoo.com/hamas-says-holding-talks-5-eu-countries-192353113.html Bayat, A. (2009, March 6). Democracy and the Muslim World: the "Post-Islamist" turn.

Retrieved May 16, 2012, from www.opendemocracy.net: http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/democratising-the-muslim-world Benhenda, M. (2011). Liberal Democracy and Political Islam: The search for Common Ground. Politics, Philosophy & Economics , 10 (1), 88-115.

Council of the European Union. (2012, June 25). Council Conclusions on Egypt. Retrieved June 25, 2012, from www.consilium.europa.eu: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/131163.pdf Council of the European Union. (2012). EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy. Luxembourg.

EEAS. (2011). A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood. Retrieved June 14, 2012, from www.eeas.europa.eu: http://www.eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/2011/250511_en.htm EEAS. (2011, December 16). The EU's Response to the 'Arab Spring'. Retrieved June 13, 2012, from www.europa.eu: http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/11/918&format=HTML&a ged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en

34

El-Solh, R. (1993). Islamist Attitudes Towards Democracy: A Review of the Ideas of alGhazali, al-Turabi and 'Amara. British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies , 20 (1), 57-63.

Esposito, J. L. (1998). Islam and Politics (4 ed.). Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.

Esposito, J. L. (2010). The Future of Islam. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Esposito, J. L., & Piscatori, J. P. (1991). Democratization and Islam. Middle East Journal , 45 (3), 427-440.

Esposito, J. L., & Voll, J. O. (2011, November). Islam and Democracy. Retrieved May 13, 2012, from www.artic.ua.es: http://www.artic.ua.es/biblioteca/u85/documentos/1808.pdf Esposito, J. L., & Voll, J. O. (2001). Makers of Contemporary Islam. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

European Union. (2012, June 24). Statement by the Spokesperson of High Representative Catherine Ashton on the Election of Mohammed Morsi as the President of Egypt. Retrieved June 25, 2012, from www.consilium.europa.eu: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/131145.pdf Farooq, M. O. (2002, May). Islam and Democracy: Perceptions and Misconceptions.

Retrieved May 12, 2012, from www.globalwebpost.com: http://globalwebpost.com/farooqm/writings/islamic/democracy.htm International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty . (2001). The responsibility to protect . Ottowa: International Development Research Centre.

Kramer, G. (1993). Islamist Notions of Democracy. Middle East Report #183 - Political Islam , 2-8.

Lapidus, I. (1992). The Golden Age: Political Concepts of Islam. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science: Political Islam (524), 13-24.

Milton-Edwards, B. (2004). Islam and Politics in the Contemporary World. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Milton-Edwards, B. (2005). Islamic Fundamentalism Since 1945. London: Routledge.

Moussali, A. S. (1994). Hasan al-Turabi's Islamist Discourse on Democracy and Shura.

Middle Eastern Studies , 30 (1), 52-63.

Netter, R. L. (2000). Islam, Politics and Democracy: Mohamed Talbi and Islamic Modernism. The Political Quarterly , 71 (S1), 50-59.

Pew Forum. (2006, April 27). Islam and the West a Conversation with Bernard Lewis.

Retrieved June 6, 2012, from www.pewforum.org: http://www.pewforum.org/Politics-andElections/Islam-and-the-West-A-Conversation-with-Bernard-Lewis.aspx

35

Ramadan, T. (2011). The Arab Awakening: Islam and the New Middle East (Kindle Edition).

Allen Lane.

Reinhard, J. (2010). EU Democracy Promotion Through Conditionality in its Neighbourhood: The Temptation of Membership Perspective or Flexible Integration?

Retrieved June 18, 2012, from www.cria-online.org: http://www.cria-online.org/12_1.html Ryan, D. (2007). Frustrated Empire: U.S. Foreign Policy 9/11 to Iraq. London: Pluto Press.

Shavit, U. (2010). Is Shura a Muslim Form of Democracy? Roots and Systemisation of a Polemic. Middle Eastern Studies , 46 (3), 349-374.

Sulaiman. (1999). The Shura Principle in Islam. Retrieved June 14, 2012, from www.alhewar.com: http://www.alhewar.com/SadekShura.htm The Economist. (2012). Vote for the Brother. The Economist , 403 (8789), 14-15.

Voll, J. O. (2007). Islam and Democracy: Is Modernisation a Barrier? Religion Compass , 1 (1), 170-178.

Watt, N. (2012, April 12). Cameron Calls on Islam to Embrace Democracy and Reject Extremism. Retrieved June 22, 2012, from wwww.guardian.co.uk: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/apr/12/cameron-islam-embrace-democracyextremism Wohler-Khalfallah, K. K. (2007). Democracy Concepts of the Fundamentalist Parties of Algeria and Tunisia - Claim and Reality. International Journal of Conflict and Violence , 1 (1), 76-88.

Youngs, R. (2011). Misunderstanding the Maladies of Liberal Democracy Promotion.

Madrid: FRIDE. Youngs, R. (2002). The European Union and the Promotion of Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Zartman, I. W. (1992). Democracy and Islam: The Cultural Dialectic. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (524), 181-191.

The Qur’an translated by Abdullah Yusuf Ali, 2000, London, Bibliophile Books

36