Manchester Historian Issue 31 by Manchester Historian

ISSUE 31 | NOV 2018

war, conflict

& VIOLENCE

INSIDE...

Tet Offensive and Mass Media Political Violence in Weimar Germany DÃaz and de Rivera - Parallel Lives? EXCLUSIVE Interview with Dr. Goeschel End of Sengoku, End of Feudalism in Japan Also inside: Book Reviews

ISSUE 31 | NOVEMBER 2018

Contents ARTICLES

BOOK REVIEWS

Defining Political Violence and Terrorism..........................4

Rubicon by Tom Holland.................................................23

Political Violence in Interwar Germany.............................5

Alexander the Great by Robin Lane Fox...........................23

Post-WW1 Masculinities in Crisis......................................4 Sykes-Picot in the Colonial Context...................................6 A Brief History of the Dada Movement..............................7 Cultural Contributions of White Émigrés..........................7 Ethnic, National, and Religious Conflicts in Yugoslavia.....8 Siege of Leningrad, Shostakovich, and Morale.................9

SPQR by Mary Beard........................................................23 The Spanish Holocaust by Paul Preston...........................24 Burning the Veil by Neil Macmaster................................24 The Great Divergence by Kenneth Pomeranz...................24 Battle Cry of Freedom by James McPherson...................25

Soviet-Polish Relations and the Katyn Massacre...............9

The Green Flag by Robert Kee..........................................25 A Fiery and Furious People by James Sharpe..................25

INTERVIEW

HISTORY UPDATE

Dr Goeschel Interview............................................... 10-12

History Society Update....................................................26

ARTICLES Napoleon’s Other War.....................................................13 Diaz and de Rivera: Parallel Lives....................................14 Asociación Madres de Plaza de Mayo – The Search for Argentina’s ‘lost’ Children...............................................15 Narco Tanks - Escalating Violence in the Mexican Drug War..................................................................................15 Remembering the Herero and Namaqua Genocide.......16 African-American Soldiers in Two World Wars.................16 The Treatment of POWs in WWII......................................17 Seeds of Mass Violence during the Partition of India......18 Chinese Labour Corps as Diplomacy ..............................18 The Tet Offensive and Mass Media..................................19 End of Sengoku, End of Feudalism?................................20 A Brief History of Iconoclasm in 16th Century England...........................................................................21 Feudalism in Crisis: Causes of the 1525 Revolt..............21 Reinterpreting Hadrian’s Wall.........................................22 Roman Republican Expansion - Defensive Imperialism?...................................................................22

Encounters Student Journal............................................27

The Team

Editors

Laura Ali Will Kerrs

Heads of Design

Sean Jones Leyla Ozcan

Head of Copy-Editing

Daniel Johnson

Head of Online

Bethany Barker

Head of Marketing

Phil Manktelow

Design Team

Jessica Kelly Ningjing Liu Urussa Malik

Copy-Editing Team Kate Jackson Tara Kathleen Morony Annabelle Sharp Reuben Williamson Online Team Rebecca Bowers Hannah Largue Mollie Ramos Marketing Team Tess Bawden Nieve Elliott Holly Gaffney

www.manchesterhistorian.com

ISSUE 31 | NOVEMBER 2018

A Note from the Editors We begin another year with the themes of war, conflict, and violence. Having recently been the centenary of the end of the First World War (11th November), these themes seem quite appropriate. However, war need not be an interstate phenomenon. As the following articles will show, violence is often committed by and to non-state actors, such as with quasi-legal combat leagues in early Weimar Germany (page 5), or drugs cartels in modern Mexico (page 15). In fact, some of the most transformative violent events and processes have often taken place between clashing social and religious groups - Iconoclasm in early modern Europe (page 21), and mass violence during the Partition of India (page 18) are perhaps the best examples of this. Furthermore, one may also consider that histories of violence need not focus on violent episodes themselves, but the reporting on them, such as with the mass media and the Tet Offensive (page 19).

We depart somewhat from our previous editorial team by focusing specifically on history - We do not intend to comment too much on the present day. Instead, our intention is to provide history from the broadest temporalities (and geographies, for that matter) around our chosen themes. Colonial and PostColonial Sub-Saharan African histories, for example, are frequently overlooked, but we intend to readdress this with articles on the often forgotten Herero and Namaqua genocide of 1904-1908 (page 16), and the lives of African-American soldiers during the first half of the 20th century (page 16). However, history did not begin with the so-called ‘Scramble for Africa’. Ancient history is often overlooked by the modern historian, but one might be surprised to find very familiar stories taking place - for example, debates on the nature of Roman imperialism (page 22) are undoubtedly relevant to other

contexts, if only one can separate the analytical frameworks from the historical content. New approaches to history are also to be encouraged throughout the year. The usual political histories are still as desirable as ever, but one must not overlook more recent approaches such as gender, or even art history. Our first two art history articles concern a brief history of the Dada movement (page 7) and classical composer, Dmitri Shostakovich’s role in maintaining morale during the Siege of Leningrad (page 9) - Indeed, all forms of art can have history written about them. This year we will also provide space for book reviews (pages 2325). We feel that this will allow the reader to look beyond our magazine on the issue’s themes, as well as gain an insight into wider historiographies. This is not just one’s chance to promote their favourite books, but also to critique their least favourite ones. On the subject of book reviews, we were very pleased to interview Dr. Christian Goeschel, senior lecturer in History, about his new book, ‘Hitler and Mussolini: The Forging of the Fascist Alliance’ (pages 10-12), which will inevitably be of relevance to not just anyone wishing to study interwar fascism, but also diplomacy as a historical phenomenon. In sum, this year will be marked by a shift towards history proper, with space provided for all temporalities, geographies, and approaches. That said, the reader may find many parallels with the present day. Indeed, history often appears to repeat itself...

Laura Ali and Will Kerrs

TMH

@TheMcrHistorian

ISSUE 31 | NOVEMBER 2018

Defining Political Violence and Terrorism Terrorism and political violence represent two distinct types of violence. The distinction is vital. This distancing of Terrorism and other forms of political violence is increasingly imperative in an era in which the international community generally condemns terrorist-related violence, whilst simultaneously condoning political violence from governments. Although both kinds of violence are clearly motivated by a desire to affect political change through the use of organised violence, their disparity lies in their differing ideologies. The definition of terrorism considers the perpetrator’s intent, and acts of terror are performed publicly against civilians (often without a specific individual target; “terrorism doesn’t discriminate”). The direct purpose is to cause pain, induce peril, and ultimately further the perpetrators’ ideological goals. Terrorism is driven by the promotion of an individual or group’s own ideology, as reflected by the Al-Qaeda in the 9/11 Attack in the United States of America, The Lord’s

Post-WW1 Masculinities in Crisis The First World War was a conflict fought primarily, at the front at least, by men. As such, the war had profound impacts on conceptions of masculinity, both within the Entente and defeated powers. Broadly speaking, one can perceive a general tendency towards violence, and what may be called ‘toxic masculinity’ today, amongst the defeated

Ernst Von Salomon, Alchetron Encyclopedia

Resistance Army rebel group in the 2008 Christmas massacres in Uganda, and the lone-wolf attack resulting in the 2017 Manchester bombing. Terrorism is the act of politically motivated violence against non-combatants, driven by the distorted ideology of radicalised extremists. In contrast, political violence is usually perpetrated by people or governments to achieve specific political goals, and is often used by a state against other states through war), or against non-state actors (including police brutality or genocide). Violence against an identified enemy group – even if it induces terror – is considered a form of warfare, and is used as a vehicle for political reformation. Political violence is described according to three factors: institutional, ideational, and individual thus considering how state, economic, or social structures inspire political violence. Ideational rationalisations reflect upon the effect of political and/or religious positions in causing political violence and finally, individual explanations consider the motivations of individual persons who participate in political violence. The two terms are ill-defined and incorrectly used interchangeably, and whilst both terrorism and political violence have a political dimension, their differences remain. The blurred spheres of religion and politics intensifies this confusion. Religion is political and the politics are infused with religion, and this intertwined powers. In the Entente, the effect of war can be regarded as effeminising. Elaine Showalter argues that even shell-shock was born out of the gap between pre-war expectations of the warrior hero and the reality of a largely ‘feminine’ experience of war; powerless and passive in the face of chemical weapons and shell attacks. Whilst this may be a bit of a stretch, there was clearly a huge disparity between the belief in a warrior ideal, and the brutal realities of trench warfare and its lack of agency, which Sonja Levsen has claimed made ‘endurance and the ability to suffer as important as courage and strength’ in defining the manly soldier. Ernest Hemingway strikingly portrays the emasculating power of the war in his novel about the so-called ‘lost generation’, The Sun Also Rises, in which the main protagonist has literally been rendered impotent by wartime injury. Whilst the above may apply to masculinity in some of the victorious powers, one may perceive a different change in defeated powers, such as Germany. Here, we may witness a militarisation of masculinity. One such example may be detected in the German Freikorps: right-wing paramilitaries who were veterans of the conflict. One Freikorps member, Ernst von Salomon, gives an insight into the defeated male psyche in his novel Die Geächteten (The Outlaws), in which he discusses his

IRA Paramilitant, Belfast Telegraph

relationship complicates understanding contemporary terrorism and the politics of fear it has created, without considering its religious foundation. Although political violence and terrorism often employ similar techniques, such as the use of violent attacks to punish enemies, whilst non-combatants and ordinary citizens are often targeted by terrorists, political violence usually targets agents associated with the political organisation against which the conflict is directed. Political violence is generally accepted as morally justified, whereas terrorism is not (with the exception of the terrorists’ own perspective). Despite this, both acts of terrorism and political violence often result in atrocities and significant violations of human rights.

Bonnie Radcliffe decision to join the group after seeing troops returning from a ‘war which will never discharge them’. Von Salomon’s description of their ‘deadly determined faces’ gives some hint to the violence which these brutalised veterans would be capable of. Salomon himself was involved in the assassination of Weimar Foreign Minister Walther Rathenau, despite being only sixteen when the war ended. This indicates that new masculinity pervaded German society and was not limited to veterans alone. In many ways this violent response may be a reaction to the perceived emasculation of defeat and the imposed terms of the Treaty of Versailles; a reassertion of traditional masculinity in the face of humiliation more than a response to the brutalisation of the trenches. This would also go some way in explaining why there was little violence amongst the victorious powers. Another example in support of this is the Italian proto-fascist paramilitary seizure of Fiume in 1919, in direct response to the Paris Peace Conference. Mussolini would go on to hold up his own violent and overtly masculine archetype in the New Futurist Man. Although the horrors of the First World War affected all troops, it was its aftermath which shaped masculinity in the defeated powers.

James Rabey www.manchesterhistorian.com

ISSUE 31 | NOVEMBER 2018

Political Violence in Interwar Germany The state of Europe in the years succeeding the end of the First World War can only be described as a continent characterised by violence, war, and revolution, which has recently led historians to suggest lines of continuity of war into peace. Germany emerged out of the war humiliated and facing her with the challenge of rebuilding the nation entirely following the abdication of the Kaiser and subsequent revolution of 1918-1919. Throughout this period of turmoil and uncertainty, it is not surprising that Germany experienced vast amounts of political violence under the Weimar Republic. It has long been assumed that this string of violent political events from 1919 to 1926 significantly weakened the Weimar Republic, despite the Weimar Republic’s impressive resilience in the face of continuous threats from across the political spectrum throughout its early years. What exactly explains the widespread political violence, largely in the form of paramilitarism, of the interwar period?

The Munich Putsch (1923), Holocaust Encyclopedia

than from the left. The Freikorps, under government control, played a significant role in the rise of political violence in Germany in the aftermath of WWI by carrying out state-sponsored violence. Historian Robert Gerwarth estimates that the Freikorps was composed of 250,000 to 400,000 men - largely ex-soldiers. However, the famous Kapp Putsch of March 1920 reveals the disillusionment of some of the Freikorps, who had defended the Weimar government against the communists in 1919 but were now being led by Dr Wolfgang Kapp in an attempt to overthrow the government themselves. Many of those involved eventually joined the Nazis, which reinforces the notion that many ex-soldiers were confronted with beliefs of hyper-nationalism in addition to their brutalising experiences of war. A total of 356 government politicians were assassinated by far-right dissidents in the early years of the Weimar Republic, including Foreign Minister Walther Rathenau in 1922 and Finance Minister Mattias Erzberger. The 1923 year of crisis for the Weimar Republic unsurprisingly paved the way for further political violence in Germany. Most famous of this was the Beer Hall Putsch (also known as the Munich Putsch) of November 1923. Hitler and the SA’s attempted coup d’etat may have failed, but the event brought Hitler and the Nazi party national attention. Despite this, it would be wrong to assume that political violence directly facilitated Hitler’s rise to power or that it caused the collapse of the Weimar Republic, with leading historians such as Dirk Schumann have overwhelmingly rejected this ‘Sonderweg thesis’.

Following the Russian Revolution in 1917, Bolshevism as a political system began to be perceived as a plausible and possible reality throughout Europe. On January 1919 Germany faced an attempted communist takeover in the form of the Spartacist or January Uprising, orchestrated by Karl Some historians have attributed the Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, in which proliferation of political violence in inter-war around 50,000 strikers demonstrated on the streets of Berlin. However the Freikorps were employed by Friedrich Ebert as part of a counter-revolutionary mobilization to crush the uprising. The result of this power struggle was the death of over 100 workers and the arrest and subsequent execution of the two leaders of this rebellion. The swift crushing of this protest portrays the realistic terror of the relentless, and sometimes brutal, spread of Bolshevism by European governments. Political violence in Germany during this period is thus partly owed to the strong fear of Bolshevism; fears of a communist takeover, whether real or imagined, motivated the anti-socialist Freikorps into defensive action. It is evident from further political violence throughout the early 1920s that Weimar faced a more serious threat from the right

@TheMcrHistorian

Germany to a ‘brutalisation’ thesis, arguing that the ex-soldiers failed to demobilise from the war mentality, and thus maintained this behaviour, severely struggling to integrate back into civilian life. This thesis however, first developed by historian George Mosse, has faced much criticism in recent years, but what cannot be disputed is that these ex-soldiers were wholly scarred by their experiences of war.

‘‘A total of 356 government politicians were assassinated by far-right dissidents in the early years of the Weimar Republic.” That said, it should also be noted that cases of paramilitary violence were more prolific in the losing states, with Germany emerging out of the war the most humiliated, leading to unimaginable anger and resentment towards the Government officials or the socalled ‘November criminals’ who had signed the armistice and were scapegoated as having stabbed the nation in the back. Of course, this anger and subsequent disillusionment only worsened with the signing of the Treaty of Versailles in June 1919, in which Germany was subjected to extremely harsh conditions. Political violence was also used to suppress the threat of the spread of Bolshevism across Europe. Genuine fears of a Communist takeover were exacerbated by stories of Bolshevik atrocities and the notion that Communism was direct threat to most people’s way of life. Ultimately the political violence displayed in Germany in the interwar period proves to be a legacy of the Great War and therefore leads us to refute the idea that the fighting and atrocities ended on the 11th November 1918.

Polly Pye

The Kapp Putsch, War Relics

ISSUE 31 | NOVEMBER 2018

Sykes-Picot in the Colonial Context How did Britain and France respond?

Sykes-Picot Map, Economist

Before considering the implications of the ‘Sykes-Picot’ agreement (1916) it is important to realise the First World War was, at least in part, fought between European empires vying for colonial control. The division of the Middle East between the two dominant colonial powers, France and Britain, was central to the outcome of the war - this may not be seen as a mere side-effect of a European conflict. Any consideration of the Middle East after 1918 should reflect on the effects of the decline of the Ottoman Empire. In particular the increased autonomy of regional administrations due to waning Ottoman domination, was arguably a weakness which was exploited by the competing European powers. This article will not consider the minutiae of the agreement; instead, it will focus on the political and social concerns behind the colonial conflict embodied in Sykes-Picot. This will show that the focus of British and French colonial ambitions during these years were not merely conventional occupation and territorial control. Instead they intended to create loyal, dependent states furthering their respective imperial economic interests, a process which would intensify and exploit divisions in the Middle East.

The Creation of the Republic While the early twentieth century saw military offensives (primarily from Britain and France) and the ‘Arab Revolt’ led by the Sharif of Mecca in 1916, against the Ottoman Empire, it was not until 1918, after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, that the effects of Sykes-Picot became most significant. After the collapse of Ottoman authority in the Middle East, British and French intervention derived

Faysal was summoned to London for a negotiation over this territory, however in reality the negotiations were solely between Britain and France, leaving Faysal merely a spectator. At the crux of the negotiations was finding a solution to the disrupted balance of power between British and French spheres of influence in Greater Syria, caused by Faysal’s rise to power, as his territory cut between theirs as dictated in Sykes-Picot. Therefore, despite the alliance between France and Britain against Ottoman control, it becomes clear that Sykes-Picot partly served to balance their competing interests, by avoiding inter-imperialist rivalries in the Middle East. This simultaneously ensured stability for the economic interests of the colonial powers. Meanwhile, Faysal’s “Greater Syrian” regime was short-lived, yet he remained a useful asset to British from pre-existing, and worsening, tensions imperialism, and was later placed in between the regional elites; these elites charge of an Iraqi state strongly dependent were representing various overlapping on Britain. administrations that claimed authority in This model of creating dependent Arab place of the declining Ottoman Empire. states, controlled by Britain or France, These tensions were connected to deeper seems to have been an attempt to quieten problems of identity, primarily because the tensions over identity in the region, there had been no unified ‘Ottoman’ although it was by no means a perfect identity, and moreover the various regimes solution. These dependent Arab states – claiming authority failed to unite its peoples that would go on to form the majority of under a single collective identity. This lack contemporary states in the region – were of unity was problematic for demonstrating essentially formed with little consideration the authority of a regime; even the ‘local’ to the populations they would govern. ruling class questioned their authority, National identities were forcibly formed leading to competition over legitimate around these newly created states - yet rule. Competing authorities and identities European powers simultaneously initiated – regional, tribal and clan for instance – competition and division between them indicate that behind the borders of Sykes- whilst certain groups were oppressed, left Picot, conflicts of identity and political stateless or as refugees by this process movements were deeply and inextricably (particularly the Kurds and Palestinians) linked with the peace settlement; both which demonstrates the lasting effects of Britain and France utilised local elites and the conflicts of 1918 and its relevance to political movements alike, in attempts to the current geopolitical climate. control the region. The Balfour Declaration of 1917, produced One prominent Arab leader, a military by Lord Arthur Balfour for the British commander during the ‘Arab Revolt’, government, after negotiations with whose campaigns provoked conflict the Zionist Federation in England, can between the colonial powers, was Amir be interpreted as a document of British Faysal Ibn Husayni. Initially a Syrian imperialism. The context of international general and warlord, in October 1918 Faysal relations of the period must be understood; - despite disagreement over the legitimacy the British Mandate for Palestine was of the republic - declared an ‘independent one of several British-controlled areas Arab constitutional government’ from proposed by the Zionist federation for a Damascus. This Arab regime appealed to state. Meanwhile, Lord Balfour was acting those rising ideas of Syrian nationalism, in the interests of the British Empire. and thus Faysal became the de facto Ronald Storrs, military governor of authority over the formerly Ottoman Jerusalem (1917), argued it would create territory of Greater Syria. This appeared a “loyal Jewish Ulster” to maintain British to be a direct challenge to the colonial interests against a “sea of potentially interests of France in Syria but also hostile Arabism”. Britain, as the territory would expand towards contemporary Jordan and border Nathan Williams the British protectorate of Egypt.

www.manchesterhistorian.com

ISSUE 31 | NOVEMBER 2018

A Brief History of the Dada Movement “This humiliating age has not succeeded in winning our respect.” So spoke Hugo Ball, co-founder of the Cabaret Voltaire in Zurich, Switzerland. This artistic nightclub, created in 1916, would quickly become the foundations upon which the infamous Dada movement began. While the invention of the word ‘Dada’ is disputed, the most popular theory is that the poet Richard Huelsenbeck plunged a knife at random into a dictionary. ‘Dada’ itself is French for ‘bobbyhorse’, while also resembling a child’s first words – such a mix of juvenile absurdity appealed to the group, who desired to create art which was both nonsensical and strident for cultural renaissance. They were irreverently anti-art, antinationalist and anti-bourgeois. Primarily, however, Dadaists were motivated by the horrors of the unfolding First World War. Some of its notable members include Marcel Duchamp, Tristan Tzara, Max Ernst, Hans Arp, Man Ray, Kurt Schwitters

and Hannah Höch. From conception, this disorderly band of visionaries were united in revolting against a war which they viewed as utterly unconscionable. They aimed to unleash the universal anger generated by its terrors. This artistic insurgency against dehumanisation and the trivialisation of evil manifested itself into era-defining works. Ex-artillery soldier Max Ernst’s ‘The Chinese Nightingale’ (1920) and ‘Murdering Airplane’ (1920) – both photomontages – combine images of stark militaria and human limbs to create discomforting, hybrid creatures. In 1917, Marcel Duchamp notoriously placed a white porcelain urinal, which he signed under the pseudonym R. Mutt, on artistic display to challenge the establishment’s view of what could be interpreted as art. Similarly, Man Ray exhibited a flat iron with brass tacks under the title ‘Gift’ in 1921. Hannah Höch’s incisive collage ‘Cut with the Dada Kitchen Knife through the Last Weimar Beer-Belly Cultural Epoch in Germany’ (1919) repurposed images and text from mass media to critique the failings of Germany’s post-war government. While cultivating collage, assemblage, photomontage and ready-made, Dada artists also crafted poetry, manifestos, sculptures and performance. Though aesthetically incoherent, these works

Cultural Contributions of White Émigrés As Tsarists, the Russian ‘White Émigré’ opposed the new political order following the February 1917 revolutions and the alienation of Nicholas II’s autocracy. Under Baron Pyotr Nikolaevich Wrangel - commanding general of the anti-Bolshevik White Army - a fleet of over 100 warships and private yachts transported over 150,000 Russians to Constantinople, now Istanbul, in what is now the largest recorded exodus of Russian emigrants in history. With the cooperation of Russian aid organisations across Europe, ‘rossiya za rubezhom’, or a ‘Russia abroad’ was established under Wrangel’s quest for statism. Away from the city, three separate, army-led refugee camps were established for those who were not transported to allied nations; with educational facilities, places of worship, monuments and later bars, restaurants and cabaret clubs; a ‘mini Russia’. With the emigration came an eruption of new-wave culture in the face of adversity. Many of the emigrants filtered into the

@TheMcrHistorian

Geisha (Robert T.Reedy), Pinterest

were characterised by a subversive condemnation of the very ‘rationality and tradition’ which had culminated in a futile and horrifying war. They expressed their rejection of war’s brutality through chaotic, irrational and polemical creation, provoking a transformative international impact, from New York to Berlin, Hanover and Paris. Despite its short-lived nature – evolving into surrealism from 1924 – Dadaism revolutionised the course of avantgarde European art. Crucially though, Dadaism came to symbolise a vibrant, vital defiance at the dawn of a nightmarish and psychologically catastrophic century of conflict. As poet Tristan Tzara explained: “The beginnings of Dada were not the beginnings of art, but of disgust.” Their legacy was prescient, progressive, derisive and bold: not bad at all for a repurposed urinal.

Madeline Foster

ballet school. This is not forgetting notorious philanderer and founder wof the Maxim-Stella Club, E F Tomas, who had emigrated from Russia before the war.

Alexander Vertinsky, Pinterest

elite membership of the Ottoman Empire, feeding the appetites of the European forces in the city and the curious among the Ottoman elites. In fact, the ‘White Émigré’ in Constantinople became agents of vice and debauchery, developing a Gatsbyesque aesthetic. The city became laced with Russian patisseries, restaurants and, later, more pernicious establishments such as nightclubs and cabaret spots – injecting a champagne and cocaine lifestyle to the previously conservative Islamic city. Such nightclubs also introduced the foxtrot and the charleston to Turkey. Notable ‘White Émigrés’ in Constantinople include singer Alexander Vertinsky, and Lydia Krassa Arzumanova, founder of a prestigious

The most notorious of all were the female emigrants who - undeterred by the tribulation they were facing - found idiosyncrasy and style in the Ottoman empire, a place where most women adhered to traditionalist propriety with Islamic apparel. In public spheres, the female emigrants ruptured gender barriers with lascivious clothing and exhibitionist behaviour. These women were said to have brought fashion to Constantinople, popularising the bowl haircut or ‘Russian hair’ as it became known (having originated from preventative measures against lice) to the city, for example. In fact, these revolutionary women caused great cultural discordance with their promiscuous garments and tomfoolery, often being said to have distracted Turk men with their open air bathing. It is with all of this in mind that J.D Quirk’s description of a ‘Constantinople paradox’ is entirely justified as ‘White Émigrés’ proved themselves in the face of destitution with an eternally enviable quality of throwing off the past, throwing off the fear of the future and making gay of the present.

Hannah Schofield 7

ISSUE 31 | NOVEMBER 2018

Ethnic, National, and Religious Conflicts in Yugoslavia Understanding the roots of tensions in the ‘land of southern Slavs’ When unpacking the brutal national conflicts and ethnic cleansing of the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s, one must understand the ethnic, religious and national foundations of the region. In 1918, during the aftermath of WWI, the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was established. By 1929 these groups of peoples established the name ‘Yugoslavia’ or the ‘Kingdom of Yugoslavia’ for their collective; a name which literally means the Southern Slavic states. To unpack the tensions in the creation of Yugoslavia one element that must be explored is the means by which Yugoslavia came to be in the immediate end of WWI. After the War the Italians had attempted to seize lands off the Dalmatian coast; and it was the Serbian army that saved Croatia and Slovenia from Italian territorial ambitions. The Serbian royal family, the Karadjordjevics, became that of the new country of Yugoslavia and by the 1930s the Serbs, who made up roughly 40% of the population, were dominating the political classes. Upon Yugoslavia’s initial conception, political parties ‘The People’s Radical Party’ and ‘The Yugoslav National Party’ dominated parliamentary proceedings, and a lot of the political decisions made in constructing ‘Yugoslavism’ were sometimes hard to differentiate from ‘Greater-Serbianism’. For example, one of the Radical Party’s bulletins Samouprava talked of how ‘the Serb name, the idea of Serbdom, and the Serb national consciousness – after a certain primary tribe, called Serb, separated itself from the other tribes by virtue of its number, power, and the intelligence of its elders and leaders, and succeeded in excelling [among the other tribes], and distinguishing and uplifting itself. And so the Serb name spread in all directions as the original Serb tribe increasingly succeeded in drawing the other neighbouring, less powerful, and less important tribes into its [political] community.’ More clear Serb dominance was shown when a decision was made by the Ministry of Education in 1928 to impose St Sava’s day as an official school holiday; St Sava is an incredibly important and famous Serbian saint. No

other celebration was made of Croat or Slovene saints or national icons. Serb preeminence led to deep resentment from the Croats and Slovenes and a tenuous balance of tensions sometimes led to political assassinations. Croats especially detested Serb dominance; for a lot of Croats, it represented a new imperial despotism, replacing that of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in Vienna with that of the Serbs in Belgrade. There was also resentment from Kosovo’s Albanian population; these people were not ethnic Slavs and were therefore not allowed to join the newly independent Albanian state.

Saint Sava, Wikicommons

Royal Coat of Arms, Wikicommons

The historiographical position of historians, such as Brubaker and Banac, talk of state seeking nationalisms, namely a competition between Serbian, Croatian, and Slovenian national identities that would inevitably clash. This approach views the very creation of the Yugoslavian state as one doomed to conflict and, it also treats national identities as singular static ideas. Other historiography has suggested that this approach is too narrow and national identities and conflicts should be viewed and interpreted with respect to Yugoslavian political elites’ efforts to construct new Yugoslavian national identities, in specific political and cultural spaces. Whatever interpretation is to be taken, the throwing together of different ethnic, national and religious groups and Serb dominance made the establishment of mutual tolerance and acceptance of these groups into one state very difficult.

The imperial history of the region also gives a significant indication as to why tensions developed as they did. Both the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empire held sway over these regions for hundreds of years; these empires were Islamic and Roman Catholic respectively; so, there was significant religious diversity. For a lot of people, their religion established very specific ethnic and national identities; identities which were supposed to harmoniously thrive in a single nation-building project. Examples of mass diversity include those living in Croatia and Slovenia, who were predominantly Roman Catholic, as well as those in Serbia and Montenegro who were predominantly Eastern Orthodox. Things were particularly complex in Bosnia and Herzegovina as the population was a mix of Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Croat Catholics and Bosnian Serb Eastern Orthodox people. Ideas for such a union had spread as far back as the 1840s; many thinkers dreamed of a new Roman-style Illyrian state of the Balkans. However, it was clear from the outset that this was an incredibly ambitious project; a project with a lot of tension tied up in the imperial history of the region, the new throwing together of imbalanced ethnic and religious groups, and the ultimate political and social failure to create a cohesive nation-state.

George Walker

www.manchesterhistorian.com

ISSUE 31 | NOVEMBER 2018

Siege of Leningrad, Shostakovich, and Morale From the start of Operation Barbarossa in 1941, Hitler wished to annihilate Leningrad. In a siege that lasted over two years, the resilience of those in the city has been well documented by historians, and the siege is recognized as one of the most brutal in history. Indeed, ‘Leningrad,’ as Bryan Moynahan has observed, ‘was purged like no other’. What is of particular interest is how the people of Leningrad themselves confronted starvation, destruction, and death in the city. Dmitri Shostakovich’s role in sustaining morale and hope of victory is ultimately of huge interest to all who wish to understand the Siege of Leningrad. Already a prominent composer across the Western hemisphere, Shostakovich was offered the chance of evacuation to Tashkent, near Moscow, but refused. Remaining in Leningrad, he produced twenty-seven arrangements for front-line concerts (of works by Beethoven and Bizet,

Soviet-Polish Relations and the Katyn Massacre In April and May of 1940, members of the Soviet secret police (NKVD) executed Polish prisoners of war (POWs) from several camps. The number of victims is highly debated; George Sanford provides the figure of 15,000. On the other hand, Andrzej Przewoźnik and Natalia S. Lebedeva refer to the much higher figure of 25,700. These mass executions, now widely known as the Katyn massacre, had a substantial impact on Polish-Soviet relations and they still divide Poland and Russia today. The relationship between the Polish government-in-exile in London and the Soviets during the Second World War functioned until the Germans spoke of the mass graves found in the Katyn forest in 1943. The Germans placed the blame directly with the Soviets - as they were occupying Poland in 1941, at the time of the executions - arguably in an attempt to break down the Western alliance. What it did do was break diplomatic relations between the Polish government in London and the Soviets when the Soviets refused

@TheMcrHistorian

among others and a pair of choral songs, and also volunteered for fireman duty. Patriotic fervour and moral responsibility led Shostakovich to provide these contributions, yet he had larger visions for more substantial work. Writing a symphony, friend Ivan Sollertinsky noted, could ‘express fully all the sorrow, anger and pain accumulated in his heart.’

depicts the striving Russian men and women in a soaring theme of confidence and power, followed by the famous ‘Invasion’ theme, an extended musical episode portraying the advancing German armies. It was then followed by the return of the main theme as an indication of Leningrad’s resistance and eventual victory.

Shostakovich’s determination to premiere the work in Leningrad itself during the siege and the circumstances of its performance are well recorded: only fifteen members of the Leningrad Radio Orchestra were available - the others having starved to death or left to fight; the score being flown in by night for rehearsal; a team of available copyists working for days to prepare the parts despite being short of materials. The premiere was an unparalleled feat - loudspeakers broadcast the performance throughout the city, audible even to the Germans on the edge of the city, and those in the main concert hall are known to have wept in admiration of the significance the symphony held to both themselves and their resistance. In reviews of the work, not only were the Dmitri Shostakovich, Wikicommons musical virtues of the symphony and depth of philosophical conception emphasized, but The Leningrad symphony is defined by its also its public nature, civil significance, and commitment to resistance and the real-time optimism at a time when Leningrad faced inspiration can found both in the premiere possible annihilation. of the work and within the music itself. It is intensely programmatic: the first movement Guy Lockwood to provide information on the POWs or give the International Committee of the Red Cross permission to examine the mass

Memorial to the victims of Katyn Massacre, Wikicommons

graves. After the war, on a more personal level, resentment towards both Polish and Soviet communist governments grew since the memory of Katyn and the fight for its recognition was banned. Both communist governments ensured that Katyn was not a part of public memory and that the Germans were blamed for the massacre. However, with the founding of the trade union Solidarity and the implementation of martial law in the early 1980’s, these earlier tensions came to the forefront as individuals could now contest

the official party line. As the debate was revived, tension between Poland and the USSR resurfaced as the perpetrators were publicly perceived as being ‘within’ rather than an external ‘other.’ Only with the fall of Communism and the opening of archives, have official documents been made available to proved that the mass executions were personally signed off by Stalin. The attempted suppression of the memory of the massacre was a way for those in power to appropriate the past, by aligning Katyn with a Communist narrative aimed to aid Polish-Soviet relations. Yet resentment towards Russia continues today for many Poles, since Katyn has come to represent Stalinism and genocide, as well as the victims. Politically there are still feelings of distrust toward the Russian government as some related documents are still classified as state secrets. It took until 2010 for many of the documents to be published online. Moreover, whilst Putin has paid his respects to the victims of the Katyn massacre, he has not accepted responsibility. Thus the impact of this event on Polish-Soviet relations continues today; as the former Prime Minister of Poland Donald Tusk said, on the 70th anniversary of the massacre: ‘We still have a way to go on the road to reconciliation.’

Caitlin Touhey

ISSUE 31 | NOVEMBER 2018

Interview with Dr. Goeschel

Dr. Christian Goeschel, a senior lecturer in Modern European History at The University of Manchester, speaks to Will Kerrs and Urussa Malik of The Manchester Historian about his new book, Hitler and Mussolini: The Forging of the Fascist Alliance. It was published byYale University Press in August 2018 and is currently retailing for £20.

The Manchester Historian: How would you summarise the book? Dr. Christian Goeschel: This book is the first serious scholarly exploration of the relationship between Mussolini and Hitler, the two most significant fascist leaders of the 20th century.

TMH: Is it possible to determine clear differences between Italian Fascism and National Socialism (Nazism)? There seems to be a major difference in racial policies.

CG: One of the most difficult things about writing this book was that the Holocaust has often stood in the way of meaningful The book is not a sensationalist account comparative and transnational histories which tries to rehash a familiar story, nor of Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. I an attempt to add to the increasingly selfwould disagree with anyone who says that referential debate on ‘generic European Mussolini’s regime was not racist. Antifascism’. Instead, it is an attempt to Semitism was not as central for Fascism in understand from the cultural history of Italy as it was for the Nazis, but we have diplomacy perspective what was going on to remember that this was still a racist between Mussolini and Hitler. It looks at regime. If we adopt a non-Eurocentric two ultra-masculine and ultra-right-wing interpretation of Fascist Italy, we will soon leaders, how they related to each other, discover that most of the people killed and how they wrought destruction on the by Italian forces under Fascism were not world as a result of this fatal relationship. Dr. Christian Goeschel, TMH white Europeans but were actually Muslim or were African, with massacres taking 1980s and 1990s that historians like Roger TMH: Is this a strange time to place during reconquest of Libya in the Griffin, Roger Eatwell, and Robert Paxton be writing about fascism? Has 1920s, and Italian invasion and occupation came up with ideas and typologies to of Ethiopia in the late 1930s. the field changed significantly? understand ‘generic fascism’. My problem with the work on ‘generic fascism’ is that So, having said that, both regimes were CG: This is a really good question. When is has become a very narrow, often self- racist, many political regimes in Europe I started writing the book in 2011, I had referential, field where historians try to at that time were racist, and many no idea that by the time I would complete define the ‘fascist common denominator’. Europeans at that time were racist. The the book in 2017, we would see the rise of This is entirely misleading. If we stick a absolute emphasis on a science-based antithe anti-immigrant populist far-right in label like ‘fascism’ very rigidly on figures Semitism (now we know it was a bogus the United States and in many European like Mussolini and Hitler, we are not going scientific base), the absolute obsession to capture their specificities. countries. I do not want to stress the parallel between now and the 1930s because I think it is a simplistic reading to stick the label of ‘fascist’ on today’s anti-immigrant populist far-right. While these movements certainly share some characteristics with interwar fascism we need to develop a new analytical repertory to understand today’s far-right. Labelling them simply as ‘fascists’ does not explain why they emerged and how they appeal to voters in democratic societies. To answer the other part of your question, the debate on fascism has changed tremendously over the last eighty years, from a socialist definition of fascism to a strong neglect of the term in the Cold War - many historians have favoured the term ‘totalitarianism’. It was in the

Italian soldiers in Ethiopia, Pinterest

www.manchesterhistorian.com

ISSUE 31 | NOVEMBER 2018 of the Nazis with anti-Semitism to the point that they would round up Europe’s Jews and kill them all - that I think makes Nazism different from Italian Fascism.

On the other hand, Hitler was also romantically attached to Mussolini which Mussolini and his associates thought was just stupid sentimentalism. Nevertheless, it is very difficult to find out what both leaders really thought of each other. Hitler didn’t leave diaries and neither did Mussolini. We have Goebbels’ diary, and being close to Hitler, he wrote down almost everything Hitler told him about Mussolini. For Mussolini, we have the diaries of his son-in-law, Ciano, who was Italian foreign minister from the late 1930s. However, deciding what was a genuine emotional attachment and what was tactically motivated is very difficult. They were both masters of spin and of propaganda, so much of what they said cannot be taken at face value.

What is also important when we talk about differences and similarities between Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany is that the Holocaust has often been used by apologists of the Fascist regime in Italy to say ‘Well, we weren’t that bad’, the notion of Fascist Italy being a ‘soft dictatorship’ is sometimes resurfaced by the Italian right wing. So, the post-war memory, and how post-war memories of the war, and of the Axis alliance, have evolved cast a very dark shadow over the history of Mussolini and Hitler.

TMH: How did the Italians and Germans view each other after WW1? How did these views affect their relationship? CG: It’s very difficult to give a general answer to your question because there were 60 million Germans, there were 45 million Italians, but what is clear is that national stereotypes, sometimes bordering on the racist, overshadowed the relationship. Let’s remember that Italy and Germany had been at war with each other during most of the First World War but had been allied until 1915, with Italy remaining non-belligerent initially. There was widespread distrust amongst many Germans of Italians – they were seen as treacherous and unreliable, but at the same time in Italy, many saw Germany as a country of bullies prone to world domination. So, as historians, we must find a repertory to integrate these national

Benito Mussolini and Adolf Hitler, Wikicommons

stereotypes, how they evolved, and how they were represented, into the story. Interestingly, Hitler harboured many antiItalian stereotypes, but he always excluded Mussolini from them, and Mussolini harboured very strong anti-German stereotypes himself. This is not surprising as both leaders were ultra-nationalists.

TMH: What drove the HitlerMussolini relationship? Was there a genuine emotional attachment between them? CG: I don’t think there was any serious relationship until the late 1930s. If we go back to the first meeting of the two leaders, Hitler had been craving for a meeting with Mussolini since the 1920s. Mussolini, for diplomatic tactical reasons, refused to meet Hitler. So, Hitler, in June 1934, while he was still consolidating his power in Germany, flew to Venice, but he saw very quickly that there was a difference between his idealistic view on Mussolini nurtured by Fascist propaganda and the real Mussolini. The meeting was a complete disaster, full of misunderstandings, full of gaffes, and it was for reasons of political strategy, rather than for mere reasons of ideological overlap that Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy became increasingly entangled with each other. Certainly, geopolitical considerations played a role such as Italian international isolation as a result of the invasion of Ethiopia, and the German and Italian entanglement in the Spanish Civil War played a role. What is interesting is that Mussolini eventually wanted an alliance with Hitler, although he didn’t like Hitler very much, and was extremely jealous of Hitler after 1933.

Dr. Goeschel’s second book, Yale.edu

@TheMcrHistorian

TMH: What made the new form of fascist diplomacy different to other contemporary forms of diplomacy? What was the ‘new world order’ Mussolini and Hitler were seeking? CG: Both Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy loathed the world order that had been established at the Paris Peace Conferences of 1919 - a liberal internationalist order manifested by the League of Nations. Principles were enshrined such as the notion of national self-determination, the idea that collective security was preferable to wars of aggression, the idea that peace was preferable to war, and the idea that one sovereign state cannot simply occupy another sovereign state. The new diplomacy was rarely spelt out directly by Fascist and Nazi diplomats, but what was happening from 1937 onwards when Mussolini went on a triumphant visit to Nazi Germany was that there was no time devoted to political negotiations - the visit was all about performance. What sets this new fascist diplomacy apart from other forms of diplomacy that were prominent at that time was the idea that one could dispense completely with bureaucratic forms of diplomacy. The image was created that all important decisions were to be made by the leaders themselves. This was a notion that was believed increasingly by Italian and German diplomats, but also foreign observers. Another crucial part of this diplomacy was mingling with the crowds. The hundreds of thousands of people who were mobilised by the regimes to attend these diplomatic pageants weren’t simply spectators. Without these crowds, the performance wouldn’t have worked. So, one pretends that, as part of this new fascist diplomacy that you are simply fulfilling the will of the people. In reality, matters behind the scenes were so much more complex, but on stage both regimes invested heavily

ISSUE 31 | NOVEMBER 2018 invested heavily in creating an image and a ‘display of unity and friendship’, as I call it. This image became so powerful that even British, French, and American diplomats thought that an alliance was inevitable and in the making, and it was this this propagandistic image that took on its own political significance so the myth of the Adxis became stronger than the reality of the Axis.

TMH: The relationship is highly performative, and the book analyses even the smallest gestures such as handshakes, etiquette entering and exiting vehicles, and so on, but is this analysis more relevant to fascist leaders due to the performative nature of fascist ideology, or can it be applied universally? CG: I don’t think that the analysis of gestures should necessarily be restricted to fascist or to other authoritarian leaders. I think all historians interested in diplomacy would be well-advised to study the seemingly unimportant aspects of diplomacy such as handshakes or the food that is being eaten at state banquets, to give some examples. This can change the reality of what is going on, so I think if I hadn’t been aware of the cultural history of diplomacy, the book would have been much more boring, and it would have been less fun to write it. For example, I discuss the German foreign ministry’s requirements cabled to the Italian foreign ministry about Hitler’s personal requirements that he needed German mineral water, that he needed a camel hair blanket, and so on [page 99]. One could say that this is simply unimportant detail – I don’t think it is – by that time, while it was normal for foreign governments to express preferences of their head of state, when Hitler went on a state visit 1937, the Germans clearly

thought that they were in a position of authority to be able to dictate such details. So, if you use sources which traditional historians of diplomacy wouldn’t use – images, seating plans, these sort of pitless preferences - you are able to write a completely different history of interwar diplomacy and relations.

TMH: What was the overall significance of the relationship? How did it affect the course of the war? CG: I think the relationship is one of the key factors in shaping Axis strategy during the war. At first, there was no Axis strategy because Mussolini and Hitler never actually discussed this during their meetings, and later very rarely they discussed this indepth. Many German and Italian highranking officials believed that ultimately decisions would be sorted out by Mussolini and Hitler, so many problems were put off because people thought that these two leaders will sort them out – they never did. So, there was the idea that amongst the Italian general staff, and certainly shared by Mussolini at the beginning of the war, that Italy would be able to fight a parallel war in the Mediterranean, independent from the Germans but it depended on the Germans in so far as the Germans were taking on the British. It’s certainly the case that the MussoliniHitler relationship had developed to such an extent that neither could exit the relationship without losing face. This is something that I think prolonged the war. There was an absolute determination by Hitler not to let down Mussolini, at least in public, which led to Hitler committing more and more German troops. I’m not saying that the German ‘bailout’ of Italy in the Balkans meant that Germany lost the war - this is a myth very popular among German WWII veterans who argue that if Germany hadn’t invaded the Balkans to

Mussolini’s body, Pinterest

bail out Mussolini in early 1941, they would have invaded the Soviet Union earlier and Germany would have defeated the Soviets before the onset of the winter. I don’t think that is true, but there is certainly quite a lot of evidence to suggest really that the relationship between Mussolini and Hitler prolonged the war. More broadly speaking, there was a clear choice to be made in that war between a global alliance (if one includes Japan from 1940) trying to create a new world order based on conquest, exploitation, and subjugation, and a liberal internationalist world order spearheaded by Churchill and Roosevelt; this being one of the principle battles of the Second World War and driven, at least in part, by the HitlerMussolini relationship. If you look at the sort of massive displays of unity and friendship, and if politicians, especially dictatorial politicians, constantly preach ‘This is our main alliance! This is our main alliance!’, they are basically stuck with the alliance until the very end. This relationship had developed its own dynamism and one of the chapters is called ‘Point of No Return’ [Chapter 6], and I mean this quite literally - they were stuck. One thing to mention is that it was Hitler who initiated the correspondence when he asked for a signed photograph of Mussolini in April 1931, and it was Hitler, a few days before his suicide, who ended the relationship by writing a strongly worded letter to Mussolini imploring him to fight until the final victory. So, fanaticism and the refusal to surrender certainly kept both dictators together, although Mussolini at the very end was realistic enough to see that it might make sense to negotiate for peace.

Interview conducted by Will Kerrs & Urussa Malik

(L-R) Will Kerrs, Dr. Goeschel, Urussa Malik, TMH

www.manchesterhistorian.com

Napoleon’s Other War Bandits, Partisans and Deserters

To this day, Napoleon Bonaparte remains one of the most intriguing figures in European history - famed for his military genius at battles such as Austerlitz, Jena, and Friedland as well as his ruinous invasion of Russia and eventual defeat at the Battle of Waterloo. However, many historians have overlooked the dramatic impact partisans, bandits, and deserters had on the fall of Napoleon and the First French Empire.

Napoleon, Napoleon.org

Partisans in the Spanish and Russian conflicts proved a fatal blow to Napoleon’s war efforts. This stratagem, deployed by Napoleon’s opponents, earned the famous name of “guerrilla warfare” and set a precedent in the military tactics used by groups such as the Bolsheviks during the Russian Revolution, and the Vietcong during the Vietnam War. To give some brief context, Napoleon had initially been allied with Spain, but had made enemies with her after he attempted to install his brother Joseph onto the Spanish throne. The Dos de Mayo Uprising in 1808 saw a Spanish-led rebellion against occupying French troops in Madrid. This emboldened the British to send an expeditionary force, further encouraged by Napoleon’s attempt to invade Portugal as Portugal had been helping Britain to bypass the damaging effects of Napoleon’s earlier Berlin and Milan Decrees. These Decrees stated that any British ship could be destroyed or seized, in an attempt to cut Britain off from the world (most particularly her Empire), after Horatio Nelson’s triumph at Trafalgar in 1805. Although, the Dos de Mayo Uprising was quickly suppressed, with Napoleon returning and temporarily re-taking control of Spain, anti-French sentiment spread across the country. This proved vital to the Duke of Wellington’s forces, allowing them to later take

Salamanca and win a victory over French General Auguste de Marmont. This allowed Wellington to advance to Madrid and begin the push into Southern France whilst Napoleon was concentrating his attention on the Eastern theatre and the fallout of his infamous defeat in Russia. Therefore, France’s defeat in Spain would have been unlikely if it was not for the efforts of Spanish partisans and bandits, as they pinned down French forces and left them vulnerable to attacks from the British. One of the most famous uses of partisan forces came in Russia, as small bands of civilians harassed French troops before and after the retreat from Moscow. Like Wellington, the Russian General Kutuzov used partisans to his advantage by adopting an effective yet controversial “scorched earth tactic”. This was achieved by destroying Moscow, thereby making it impossible for Napoleon to supply his Grande Armée with food, munitions, and horses. As a result, Napoleon had to go on a gruelling retreat through an unforgiving Russian winter. Partisans helped to isolate French troops, making them susceptible to overwhelming attacks from Russian Cossack bands. Due to this, popular legend has suggested that only 22,000 men survived Napoleon’s catastrophic Russian campaign. On top of this, desertion was common. According to historians Blanton, Stoker, and Schneid in ‘Conscription in the Napoleonic Era: A Revolution in Military Affairs?’, 10% of Napoleon’s army deserted, which greatly hurt his exertions. After Russia, Napoleon had lost many of his most experienced veterans within his army seeing the Sixth Coalition, comprised of nations like Britain, Russia, Austria, Prussia, and Portugal, launch a major offensive against Napoleon. This forced Napoleon to abdicate his throne for the first time and witness the restoration of the Bourbon Monarchy in the rotund form of Louis XVIII.

ISSUE 31 | NOVEMBER 2018

In respect of his Empire, bandits proved to be yet another bothersome matter for Bonaparte. Napoleon established the Gendarmerie, which was described by historian Broers as “violent men policing an equally violent society”. Napoleon, who had been a General in the First French Republic, witnessed the disputes created by Royalists, such as the Chouannerie, making him well aware of the dangers of public disorder. During his short reign, revolts broke out across France due to anger over conscription policies (or, as many saw it the “blood tax”). The Gendarmerie was controlled by Etienne Radet, who was appointed General of Brigade by the Napoleon in 1800 and stuck with the Emperor to the bitter end at Waterloo. Napoleon appointed Radet as the head of the Gendarmerie with the aim of pacifying the hinterlands of his Empire, in order to secure political and social stability, that was vital to the build-up and maintenance of his military. Although partisans in both Spain and Russia had dealt damaging effects on Napoleon, the Gendarmerie were very fruitful in achieving their aims by 1810, hence historians see this as one of Napoleon’s greatest domestic successes. To conclude, despite his serious errors, Napoleon Bonaparte will be seen as one of Europe’s greatest leaders and military geniuses. Not only did Napoleon revolutionise modern military tactics, but his Napoleonic Code is still a civil structure that is adopted by many countries today. However, it is true that Napoleon was the victim of his own desires for expansion, as making war in the Iberian Peninsula and Russia lay the foundations for his demise. Bearing this in mind, it is of great importance to respect the massive impact partisans, bandits, and deserters had on Napoleon, as without these elements, Napoleon could have potentially put into place his dreams for a grand European Empire and the world itself would be in a much different place than it is today.

Jack Ulyatt

Grand Army soldiers, Pinterest

@TheMcrHistorian

ISSUE 31 | NOVEMBER 2018

Díaz and de Rivera: Parallel Lives Both Spain and Mexico are considered to be very colourful and vibrant countries, yet they also have dark pasts. The brutal dictatorships of Porfirio Díaz in Mexico and Miguel Primo de Rivera in Spain marred the uniquely spirited countries during the 19th and 20th Centuries. The regimes’ mirrored each other in many ways because the social landscapes of the two countries were so similar. However it was the contrasting personalities of the leaders of the two regimes that led each country to very different fates. The Díaz regime in Mexico emerged first, dubbed the ‘Porfiriato’ (a diminutive of the General’s first name) and held power from 1876 to 1911. Díaz was a prominent military figure during the battles against the French and the Austrians in the mid-19th Century. Despite failed attempts to gain political control through elections and a short lived insurrection in 1871, Díaz finally staged a successful coup in 1876 after the sudden death of the Liberal President Benito Juárez. Díaz forced an election, which he won - under very suspicious circumstances - and remained President until the uprising of 1911.

Porfirio Díaz, Wikicommons

Also a soldier, de Rivera led a military coup against the Cortes, the Spanish Parliament, in 1923. The politicians had been deeply offended by the army, and had raised an investigation into military corruption. A hurt sense of pride stemming from Spain’s declining Empire compounded de Rivera’s frustration at the Cortes, who went on to lead the conservative army in a coup against them. The coup gained the support of the then King, Alfonso XIII, who legitimised Primo de Rivera rule for the next 7 years. Primo de Rivera’s regime lacked any particular base of electoral

support. Therefore, the regime was heavily reliant on a sense of tradition, monarchy, religion, and a Nationalistic conservatism that made him very dependent on the Spanish elites. Similarly, Díaz prioritised the upper classes of Mexico however, he also encouraged foreign investment from the US and Western Europe, especially in the mining industry, with significant tax breaks. A period of economic boom towards the end of the 1800s saw the building of railways and a process of modernisation that left behind the rural poor and the working classes. His military background and virulent loyalty to the Catholic Church largely explains de Rivera’s appeal to the wealthy elites of Spain. Additionally, he was seemingly only concerned with enriching the landowners (called ‘Hacendados’) ignoring the fate of the agricultural workers (‘Campesinos’), who remained trapped in an almost feudal state of poverty. In reality however, de Rivera attempted to raise taxes to fund public works. When this was rejected he funded the projects through borrowing, and by the 1930s Spain had amassed a huge National Debt, which would plague the subsequent Second Republic. This reveals the most prominent difference between the regimes: Primo de Rivera was not as skillful a politician as Díaz was. In Mexico, the entire regime was centred around Díaz himself. No other General or Regional Leader was allowed to accrue loyalty or public support, lest they detracted away from the top dog. Díaz played the minor politicians off against each other in order to keep his position stable. By contrast, Primo de Rivera was a member of the aristocracy, who expected certain things from their political representative. He became trapped between those upon whom he relied upon for support, and the majority of his population. Furthermore, Primo de Rivera was evidently an undemocratic ruler, whereas Díaz kept up the charade of elections - even if they were rigged - to maintain a façade of liberal democracy. What both the men had most in common, however, was their military background. Díaz had risen from poverty through the ranks of the Mexican army to become a war hero before he staged his rebellion. Primo de Rivera was a member of the aristocratic officer class; the elite section of Spanish society was therefore a product of a topheavy army frustrated by a lack of action, and resentful of the previous generation of supposedly un-patriotic politicians. Therefore, under both dictatorships, the military was the main vice through which

civilians would interact with the State. Both Díaz and Primo de Rivera used their armies to enforce their authoritarian rule through violence. In Mexico Díaz used the famous phrase “pan o palo”, meaning “bread or the bludgeon”. Journalists and critics were threatened, or simply disappeared, and in Spain in particular state violence towards protestors and Trade Unionists was almost constant. Under Díaz, the Mexican army became a highly stratified entity, with appointed officers in smart uniforms who had proper training. Again, to the detriment of the poor, Díaz used his well presented officers to efficiently quell any

Miguel de Primo de Rivera, Wikicommons

resistance to his rule. Primo de Rivera, however, lacked Diaz’s organisational skills; he was above all a Spanish patriot, and for him the military was more of a lifestyle than a political tool. When he abolished the democratic Cortes, he set up a Directory of 8 military advisors, and replaced regional politicians with officers. Unlike Díaz, he struggled to retain control over his support base, and when King Alfonso withdrew his support, the military soon followed. Whereas Díaz clung onto his draconian rule until he was ousted by the forces of rebellion, Primo de Rivera conceded to resign in January 1930 after it became clear he had lost the support of the Army and the Monarchy. Thus, whilst Mexico was plunged into an infamous Civil War which lasted 9 and half years, Spain had many more years of tensions and cultural battles, all the while teetering on the edge of disaster, before it would finally crash into its own tragic age of bloodshed.

Sophie Marriott

www.manchesterhistorian.com

ISSUE 31 | NOVEMBER 2018

The Search for Argentina’s ‘lost’ Children Associación Madres de Plaza de Mayo “We want our children back” demanded ‘Asociación Madres de Plaza de Mayo’ - the Argentinian mothers whose children were ‘disappeared’ by military officers during the dictatorship which lasted from March 1976 to 1983. This remains their objective today, as grandmothers, mothers, and their supporters continue to march in protest through the square outside the presidential palace. After seizing power, Jorge Videla, the first leader of the military junta, launched Argentina into the ‘Dirty War’, characterised by its brutal state terror against suspected dissidents – a term which the government used to label anyone who spoke out against the regime. Amongst the most horrific instances of this was the disappearance by the regime of any suspected terrorists. One of the most brutal events of this period was La Noche de los Lápices (‘the Night of the Pencils’) in 1976 during which group of students protesting for educational

Narco Tanks Escalating Violence in the Mexican Drug War

and political reform were kidnapped and held in detention centres, where they were tortured, raped, and murdered. Only four survived. Furthermore, perhaps the most inhumane aspect of the regime’s persecutions was the detention and torturing of pregnant women. Many women were forced to give birth whilst in custody. These children were abducted at birth, deprived of their true identities, and raised by military families, unbeknownst to the fact that their birth mothers had been detained and usually murdered by the regime.

such as the National Committee for the Right to Identity (1992), pledging to help young adults doubting their identities by ‘investigating all documents and referring them for blood analysis’. 400 are still unaccounted for.

larger. Larger Narco Tanks based on trucks are seen in fewer numbers and seem to be used exclusively as an offensive weapon. However, these gargantuan vehicles are perhaps best understood as symbolic in their use, as they are tactically inferior to their smaller and more agile counterparts. Using such monstrous vehicles is not only a display of the resources of a cartel, but also its power - the very use of such vehicles is open defiance of the authorities. For locals, the cartels are the law, and these vehicles proved it.

Or has it? In the last few years, more and more clandestine internal armour kits have become commercially available especially due to the prevalence of violence and the subsequent demand by Mexican consumers for personal protection. It has been noted by the authorities that cartels have began purchasing these kits for themselves seeing as though they are not illegal. The crackdown on cartels, too, has become less aggressive, with current President Enrique Peña Nieto hoping to reduce the levels of violence across the country by offering amnesties.

Whilst these technological advancements have accelerated the search, the identification of ‘stolen children’ highlights a serious crisis of identity. How can these individuals respond to the discovery of “Children were abducted at their biological families and the suffering birth, deprived of their true inflicted upon them, often by the very identities, and raised by parents that have raised them? This leaves the children torn between two families and military families.’’ two opposing identities. Fortunately, many ‘Asociación Madres de Plaza de Mayo’ of those reunited with their biological arose in this period of civil conflict, with families have managed to form a close the aim of identifying their disappeared relationship with their grandparents. children and grandchildren, and, more Tara Kathleen Morony recently, reuniting these ‘stolen’ children with their biological grandparents. ‘Las Madres’ and ‘Las Abuelas’ persevere in their activism, which has become a ritual, and is an important aspect to Argentinian identity. The organisation has had much success, as over 100 children of the ‘disappeared’ generation have been found. DNA evidence has been used to identify Argentinian Protest, Wikipedia people and legislation has been passed

The phenomenon of Narco Tanks gained the attention of a US congressional committee, which reported that it would “Narco tanques” (Eng: ‘Narco tanks’) is expect to see a development of them into an umbrella term used by the media to advanced weapons platforms featuring refer to improvised armoured cars used autocannons and military-grade armour. by drugs cartels in Mexico. Around 2010, However, there has been no such it was reported that SUVs and commercial continuum of designs. The reality is that vehicles were being tooled up with armour, the Mexican authorities have cracked down turrets, mounted weapons, and even on cartels and their illicit armoured vehicle James Bond-like gadgets by drugs cartels. workshops, with major operations against Created in illicit workshops, these vehicles them having taken place in 2011 and 2012. are well-known for their exotic designs, Indeed, whilst the state has been unable but for the locals, they are weapons of an to maintain the monopoly on violence, it ever-escalating and ever-deadlier interhas managed to maintain the monopoly on cartel war that even the military has been armoured vehicles… involved in for over ten years. President Enrique Peña Nieto and Barack Obama, CNN

The smallest Narco tanks are based on SUVs and tend to be stealthy and defensive weapons to protect drugs shipments. They may carry mounted heavy weapons such as .50 cal sniper rifles, but rarely anything

@TheMcrHistorian

‘‘Over 100 of the ‘disappeared’ generation have been found.’’

‘‘Mexican authorities have cracked down on cartels and their illicit armoured vehicle workshops’’

Thus, it seems that after a brief period of Mad Max-esque ingenuity and violence, drugs cartels have opted to remain somewhat less conspicuous to ensure that business remains uninterrupted, and the authorities, likewise, hope to have a more peaceful future.

Will Kerrs

Narco Tank, Washington Post

ISSUE 31 | NOVEMBER 2018

Remembering the Herero and Namaqua Genocide

Additionally, the colonial government drove the Nama into the desert and did seized land from indigenous people for not let them escape. Survivors of both German settlers. massacres were put in concentration camps where they worked as slave labourers and As a reaction to the resulting economic were used for medical experimentation, hardship and harsh social conditions, the resulting in hundreds more deaths. Herero people, who were native to SouthWest Africa, attacked German farmers in Some historians have suggested a link 1904. This marked the start of a brutal between the unleashing of violence in war, for which the German government colonial wars such as this and the policies imported one of their harshest military of extermination carried out by the Nazis commanders, General Lothar von Trotha. later in the twentieth century. Jürgen Between 1884 and 1916, Germany He developed a strategy that interpreted Zimmerer sees the Herero and Namaqua engaged in the European ‘Scramble for the war as racial in character and which genocide as part of a longer ‘prehistory of Africa’. In 1884, South-West Africa, would lead to, in his words, “rivers of genocide’. German historians have often now known as Namibia, became the first blood”. After defeating the Herero at struggled to handle the events in SouthGerman ‘protectorate’, and would go on the Battle of Waterberg, Trotha gave West Africa with proper ‘impartiality’ to become one of its most contentious. his infamous extermination order to and have long described the massacres A central ambition of the governor, shoot any Herero on German territory, as merely ‘suppression’. However, the Theodor Leutwin, was to turn Southincluding women and children. German revisionist argument that understands West Africa into a settler colony. This led government reports describe how Trotha’s the events as genocide has now become to the implementation of laws aimed at men chased the Herero “from one watering hegemonic in discussions of the war. promoting a segregated, exploitative state. hole to the next,” until eventually “the waterless Omaheke [Desert finished] Together, these butcheries decimated two what the German arms had begun: the African peoples. The census of 1911 reported annihilation of the Herero.” Dehydration a total of only 15,000 Herero, compared and exhaustion killed thousands. Those to 80,000 in 1904. Similarly, the Nama who attempted to emerge from the desert population was reduced from 40,000 to 20,000. For this murder, inhumanity and were killed by German patrols. cruelty, Trotha was awarded the Imperial Later that same year, the Nama, another medal ‘Pour le Mérite’ upon his return to ethnic group native to the region, declared Germany. outright war on the Germans after years of Africans in medical experiments, Wikipedia guerrilla operations. Trotha was equally Sheridan Wagstaff-Dent brutal in his handling of this conflict and

African-American Soldiers in Two World Wars Despite the contradiction of fighting for freedom wwhilst being denied these basic rights themselves, African-American men enlisted in great numbers for both world wars. This hypocrisy is most obviously embodied by the segregation of US regiments, which remained unchanged throughout both wars. In World War One, 370,000 AfricanAmerican soldiers served in segregated regiments that received unequal resources, with only two of these regiments being combat divisions. This continued into World War Two, where 2.5 million African-Americans registered for the draft but only 10% served in combat divisions. Meanwhile, blood banks were also segregated. African-American soldiers did not escape racism in service, as the 1917 Houston Rebellion exemplifies. This rebellion grew from tensions between the police and African-American 24th US Infantry Regiment soldiers. Houston was ruled by Jim Crow and African-American soldiers were increasingly angered by the police’s

treatment of African-American citizens and fellow soldiers. This anger culminated in a riot that killed 20 people, soldiers and civilians. The subsequent court martials resulted in 19 soldiers being executed and the life imprisonment of 41. African-American soldiers hoped that the progressive messages which the US preached, alongside its wartime patriotism, would bring benefits and progress after the war. In some ways, African-Americans were able to make advancements, particularly economically. WWI gave African-Americans increased economic opportunities through improved job prospects. This was one of the contributing factors in the ‘Great Migration’, which significantly changed the demographics of the US at the time. In reality, however, the efforts of African-American soldiers went unrecognised, with soldiers returning home to racial oppression and segregation following the war.

True Sons of Freedom (War Poster), Pinterest

During WWII, the ‘Double V’ Campaign called for the double victory against fascism abroad and racism at home, highlighting the injustice of soldiers giving their lives for rights that they themselves were denied. The continued hypocrisy of the US, in relation to the military and at home, provided further basis for civil rights activism. A significant number of veterans became active in the Civil Rights Movement, particularly within the NAACP. Despite initial optimism, however, veterans returned to a continuation of Military service did give African-American discrimination, with veterans in the South men some opportunities they would facing targeted racial violence. not have had as civilians. This not only concerned access to resources but also Despite their sacrifices, patriotism in created an opportunity to travel to other service, and the US’s supposed commitment nations. These experiences, along with to equality and liberty, African-American the failed promises and hypocrisy of the soldiers’ hopes for improved rights failed United States’ wartime calls of fighting for to materialise following the two world equality, fuelled the politicisation of many wars. veterans and gave new ammunition to Lily Pearson Civil Rights campaigners.

www.manchesterhistorian.com

ISSUE 31 | NOVEMBER 2018

The Treatment of POWs in WWII

During World War Two, tens of thousands of soldiers became prisoners of war (POWs), across Allied, German and Japanese forces. POWs were subject to horrific crimes against humanity, the focus of this article however, will be on those committed by the Japanese armed forces. Many articles are keen to highlight that there were more than 140,000 allied prisoners in Japanese POW camps, yet hardly any mention that 40,000 of those prisoners were British Indian troops. Over a third of all prisoners died from starvation, disease, or gross mistreatment both on the Japanese mainland and outside locations, such as Thailand and New Guinea. It is safe to say that, despite the ‘forgotten’ nature of colonial POWs experiences during WWII, the treatment of colonial and white POWs was equally terrible due to power structures imposed by a guard/ prisoner relationship. Experiences in camps differed greatly, however, due to factors such as environment, culture and religion.

Brutal Treatment of Allied Soldiers Allied soldiers captured by the Japanese were notoriously treated badly. An estimated 70,000 soldiers who had been fighting on the East-Asia front were captured by the Japanese forces and transported in dire conditions to the west of Thailand. There prisoners conducted work on the Siam-Burma railway, otherwise known as the ‘death railway’ due to the horrific treatment of POWS and the high death rates. Death rates along the railway were 20% higher than that of European POW camps. Due to intense forced labour, tropical diseases and an inhospitable climate some 12,000 POWs died in the first 8 months of construction alone. This construction would normally have taken years to complete. Given the intensity of the war, however, POWs were forced to build the railway connecting Siam (Thailand) to Burma in only a year, some days working 16 hours straight. The conditions on the railway site have been catalogued by a former POW, Eric Lomax (who published the book The Railway Man about his experiences), who described the experience as emasculating and traumatic. Not only were prisoners beaten daily for defying rules or slowing down the work process but they were also tortured for insolence, and left to die if they contracted various diseases, such as cholera or a

“POWs as shooting targets” “Cannibalism” ‘‘12,000 out of 70,000 DIED in the first 8 months” “Starved and humiliated” “Emasculating and traumatic”

@TheMcrHistorian

POW at Siam-Burma Raliway (woodcut by George Mennie, 1943), Wikicommons

tropical ulcer. So badly beaten were prisoners that even when in a position to flee, or attack a guard, in some cases with easy access to weapons, they did not do so attempt due to mass feelings of emasculation resulting from their mistreatment. The prisoners’ feelings of isolation and helplessness are displayed in Lomax’s account when he describes the vast countryside that the camps were situated in. POWs were allowed to roam during the little free time they had. This created a sense of helplessness as their freedom seemed unattainable when they were situated in an unknown environment, with little civilisation nearby. This account exemplifies that the mistreatment of POWs was not only physical, but psychological.

Religous Abuse and Cannibalism in India After the fall of Singapore in 1942, men of the Indian Arms were transferred to camps in New Guinea, New Britain, and Bougainvillea. Many of these POWs were given the option to flee these camps and join the Indian National Army who supported Japan throughout the war, but many chose to adhere to their soldierly ethos. Indian POWs came under great persecution while under the command of the Japanese. In Wewak, New Guinea, POWs were forced to work between 12 and 14 hours a day and were left exposed to any air raids that occurred. Men who were too sick or haggard, with no life left in them to work, were often dragged to shooting ranges where they would be used as targets for Japanese recruits who were training for warfare. Similarly to Allied POWs, daily beatings

and torture occurred, which included: plunging electrical plugs into their bodies, reducing rations, and death threats. However, there are a few key differences in the Indian POW experience compared to Allied forces. These differences are massively overlooked in WWII literature despite the honourable resilience these troops showed. Firstly, many of the POWs suffered religious abuse. For example, Hindus were beaten for refusing to eat beef and Muslims were prevented from fasting during Ramadan. Extra fatigues were even imposed to enforce eating. Secondly, in 1946 newspapers across India were publishing articles that reported on mass cases of cannibalism that had occurred throughout POW camps. The issue of cannibalism was taken to the War trials, with one lieutenant being found guilty of the murder of fourteen Indian soldiers in 1944. This particular crime could even be considered a power projection tool employed to prevent POWs from ‘stepping out of line’. Only 5,500 Indians came out of Japanese captiwvity alive. The mistreatment of POWs may be the result of power structures amongst the Japanese army, and the captor/captive hierarchal relationship, not exclusive to race, class, or religion. Indian POWs endured parallel experiences of captivity to their white counterparts; however, they were subject to gross discrimination due to their religion. It is important that the experiences of all POWs are not forgotten amongst the literature of WWII.

Tori Williams 17

ISSUE 31 | NOVEMBER 2018

Seeds of Mass Violence During the Partition of India

unlike other provinces they were to be further partitioned on communal lines, with devastating results. For example, following the so-called ‘First Indian War of Independence’, the Indian army was reorganised to stop the mixing of different castes and creeds in the regiments. The Raj also created separate electorates for Hindus and Muslims and partitioned Bengal in 1905 on communal lines which, despite being short-lived, formed the The partition of India is largely agreed to be foundation of Muslim separatism. one of the greatest humanitarian tragedies One must also consider the shortof the post-war period. The inhabitants of this diverse state were to divide themselves “The Raj partitioned Bengal on the basis of religion, disregarding in 1905 on communal lines, centuries-old ethnic nationalisms for the which formed the foundation of zeal of theocracy. An estimated one million Muslim separatism’’ were killed, unaccountable numbers of women raped and converted, and fifteen sightedness of political parties. By 1946, million uprooted from their ancestral Pakistan seemed more like a bargaining homes. Why the partition of India resulted chip than a staunch demand. Jinnah, in such widespread and brutal violence can Pakistan’s founder, was willing to see India be understood by looking at the following united, and provided Muslims were selfthree themes: divide and rule, the short- governing in a deeply decentralised federal sightedness of political parties, and the system, which the Cabinet Mission’s May denial of British responsibilities. 16th Plan entailed. This plan theoretically Although not the sole cause of the communal violence, it would be absurd to the British colonial policy of divide and rule. Pitting the indigenous populations against each other was decisive in the conquest of the subcontinent. Bengal and Punjab are indicative of this, as

Chinese Labour Corps as Diplomacy The Forgoten Allies of the Western Front

The 100,000 coolies of the Chinese Labour Corps (CLC) are known as the “forgotten of the forgotten”. Afforded no settlement, nor pension rights from Britain in the aftermath of the First World War, their contribution to the war effort remains largely unrecognised. CLC coolies, who enrolled almost entirely in Shandong Province, were shipped to the Western Front to serve as labourers. It is pertinent that they be described as having been “enrolled” - legal experts in Whitehall determined that describing them as having been “recruited” would confer upon the British government a formal responsibility to provide them with benefits. Despite legally being aliens, they were completely at the disposal of the British, with little hope of recourse from their own government. Why did the Chinese government allow these men to be drawn into the war effort by the British? The obvious answer is that they could not prevent it. The “raw importation” of manpower plays into the

appealed to both sides but was vehemently opposed by the dominant Congress Party (secular, but enjoyed Hindu support) who abhorred the idea of having communal based provincial groupings in which they shared equal power with a party they outnumbered. The breakdown of these

oft-cited ‘century of humiliation’ narrative as another example of unwanted foreign intervention in China. However, this interpretation oversimplifies the complex legal situation surrounding Weihaiwei, the city from which the coolies came. The Colonial Office attempted to determine Weihaiwei’s legal status in 1916 but struggled to do so. The original lease transferring the territory to the British had never been ratified by the Chinese, nor had any payment been made. Upon further investigation, it was found that Weihaiwei was functioning independently of both the Chinese and the British, and that “the only allegiance it knew was to Commissioner Lockheart (of the British Army)”. Such ambiguities were perfect - Coolies could be enrolled into the CLC whilst maintaining Chinese neutrality in the war.

talks led to the reckless actions of The Muslim League, whose Direct Action Day initiative resulted in the Great Calcutta Killings of 1946. These killings triggered a series of riots which forced Congress to accept a partition in a disastrous attempt to end the violence. Finally, the British denied their responsibilities in the decolonisation process. The British government’s departure from India was hurried and reckless. No provisions were made for the impending refugee crisis, nor to protect Indian civilians. British soldiers were ordered to act only in the event of saving a British life. The border itself, being two days late in its publication, was a source of avoidable violence. It was drawn up by an English lawyer who had never been east of Paris, using incorrect census data, outdated maps, and with little will or time to inspect the contested areas. The mass violence witnessed during the partition was the result of a multitude of factors and factions from within the imperial administration and the indigenous political arena. What could be seen as an inevitable consequence of centuries of colonial policies in a region rich with religious strife, was both unforeseen and very nearly avoided.

Pallav Roy

might be willing to cancel or reduce the remaining indemnity owed to them (or rather, extorted) for their intervention in quelling the Boxer Rebellion, but only if cooperation with labourer enrollment was forthcoming. However, it would be wrong to take this line of argument too far. China did not have the military capability to put a stop to Britain’s plans. China simply had to agree.

At the end of the war, the largest painting in the world was put upon display in Paris to commemorate all those who contributed to the war effort. With saddening symbolism, Chinese labourers were painted out in order to instead honour the American troops, as the painting had been started before they had entered the war. The organisation ‘Ensuring We Remember’ continues to campaign for a permanent In addition to this, some see the CLC as memorial to the CLC in central London. a useful diplomatic tool for the Chinese. Britain had strongly implied that they Ciarán O’Dweyer

Chinese Labour Corps, CGTN.com

www.manchesterhistorian.com

ISSUE 31 | NOVEMBER 2018

The Tet Offensive and Mass Media The Vietnam War reached its apex in 1968 when American ground troops reached their highest number yet. This heightened involvement was met with an increasingly popular anti-war movement which was particularly fertile in universities, and began to seep into the home. One of the critical contributions to this sentiment was the Tet Offensive, arguably the most significant event in the Vietnamese conflict; but how far was this campaign distorted by an overly critical press and television campaign? The Tet Offensive gained its name because it was organised to coincide with the beginning of the Tet Lunar new year. It was designed by NVA (North Vietnamese Army) high command to be the largest full-scale assault on American forces yet, which they hoped would trigger a general uprising against the occupying forces in South Vietnam. Initially succeeding in misdirecting General Westmoreland, the American commander, to believe that the uprising would take place in Khe Sanh by the DMZ, the subsequent offensive that popped up in Saigon and Hue threw the US forces completely. With the Viet Cong on the streets of Saigon and even gaining entrance to the U.S. embassy, the boundaries of the conflict were blown wide open, placing travelling journalists right in the centre of the fighting. Thanks to the surprising resilience of the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN), the lack of cooperation from Southern Vietnamese and the effective mobility of the U.S. army, the uprising was quashed and South Vietnamese control of Hue was resumed. Considering their casualties, and their complete failure to initiate revolution in South Vietnam, the Tet Offensive is conventionally understood as a resounding failure for the Viet Cong. The Viet Cong had suffered far greater losses than the U.S. and ARVN forces, and, encouraged by the ambivalence of the South Vietnamese,

many U.S. officials felt this was a positive step towards defeating the NVA. But the damage done to Hue and Hanoi symbolically had a far greater effect on the conflict than any casualty figure could. With over 100,000 civilians homeless and thousands killed, the U.S. displaying an inability to prevent the Viet Cong from infiltrating the South, news reporters witnessing the old imperial capital of Hue lying in ruins while facing shell fire and reporting next to piles of bodies, the real cost of American involvement and strategy in Vietnam was being exposed. On February 27th 1968 immediately after the Tet Offensive, Walter Cronkite (dubbed ‘the most trusted man in America’) who had just returned from Vietnam epitomised the situation on CBS News:

‘‘It seems now more certain than ever, that the bloody experience of Vietnam is to end in a stalemate. To say that we are closer to victory today is to believe in the face of evidencce, the optimists who have been wrong in the past.’’ The perception of the course of the Vietnam War changed. Throughout his time as a reporter, Cronkite had enjoyed popularity for his distinct middle of the road observations and commentary. Coverage of current affairs in general was harnessed by the Fairness Doctrine which enforced neutrality on public affairs. The avuncular figure of Cronkite telling middle America that their sons were being sent off to a brutal battle they would not escape from was a key cause of the public beginning to re-evaluate their stance on the war and question the authorities who had been telling them daily that victory was in sight. President Johnson allegedly commented after the ‘Cronkite Moment’: ‘If I’ve lost

Cronkite, I’ve lost middle America.’ Most significantly, media coverage emphasised that death-tolls were by no means an adequate representation of success as had been conventionally believed by American generals at the time. Many were furious at the ‘Cronkite

Photographers around body, History and Journalism

Moment’, arguing that it was a misrepresentation of the conflict. In his account of the Tet Crisis, Peter Braestrup argued that the journalism of the Offensive veered wildly from the truth. Many ‘hawkish’ politicians and army officials of the generation have propounded a ‘stab-in-the-back’ theory, suggesting that media hostility distinctly played a part in denying the U.S. forces imminent victory. But this is far from the truth. Coverage may have been bleak, but most of the damage to public support for America’s involvement in Vietnam was done by Johnson’s administration, whose blind optimism looked so starkly detached from reality, and whose relentlessly violent ‘pacification’ policy displayed their sheer disregard for human life. At this point, it became clear that who was ‘winning’ was not the point: if piles of bodies was the way in which the U.S. was to define victory, then many people were not willing to support this vision any longer. The debate over the domestic effect of the media on the course of the War is ongoing, the political effects of the Tet Offensive undoubtedly represented a paradigm shift in the narrative of the Vietnam War. The bell had tolled for Johnson and later in 1968 he announced he would not be running again for the Presidency. Robert F. Kennedy’s challenge for the Democratic Candidacy on an ambitious anti-war platform, is further evidence for the growing anti-war sentiment in America, despite his assassination. Johnson’s eventual successor, Nixon, would truly redefine the conflict through his policy of Vietnamisation. The course of the war had been changed irreversibly: Tet was a turning point, home and away.

Wilfred Kenning Reporter Dan Southerland covering fighting in Vietnam (May 1968), Radio Free Asia

@TheMcrHistorian

ISSUE 31 | NOVEMBER 2018

End of Sengoku, End of Feudalism? Did feudalism in Japan, a military oriented caste system in effect since the twelfth century, truly end with the close of the Sengoku Period (Sengoku Jidai) in 1603? Feudal Japan has often been dubbed the “Age of the Warrior”. Society operated on a strict militaristic hierarchy since the beginning of the Kamakura Period in the late 12th century, when the Shogun, Japan’s military governor and general, usurped the Emperor’s powers as leader of the nation. Despite being at the top of the caste system, the Emperor had been reduced to a mere figurehead with no political authority. Consequently, Japan officially came under the control of a military government, the Bakufu.

transformations that occurred throughout the Edo Period. Japan’s changing landscape from war to peace engendered transitions within castes, an interesting development is within the class of the noble Japanese warrior, the samurai, as the Tokugawa Period was a time of general harmony and samurai could no longer rely on war for a reliable income. With the decline of military conflict, the samurai sword became less a practical instrument of battle than a symbol of social status seeing as though peasants were forbidden to possess a weapon themselves. To survive an era of peacetime, it became necessary for the samurai to distance themselves from being a warrior class and they instead converted to a group of educated bureaucrats. It was during the Tokugawa Period that the samurai became a symbol of obedience and honour who was expected to serve as an example of morality to lower classes within the community. These virtues of loyalty and respectability were instructed

The Sengoku Period, also known as “The Warring States Period”, was a century of civil unrest and ceaseless battling between daimyōs and feudal warlords, for the position of Shogun. It was one of the bloodiest periods in Japanese history, during which millions lost their lives over the allocation of the position of supreme power of state. The Sengoku Period officially ended with the unification of Japan, when the Tokugawa clan, headed by Tokugawa Leyasu, had secured control of the Shogunate. Throughout history, mass bloodshed and death has typically sparked some form of social change: from the emergence of the welfare state in Britain following World War Two, to the implementation of Civil Rights after the American Civil War. Considering this paradigm, can it not be said that a whole century of ceaseless warring was enough to initiate the social upheaval of the feudal system in Japan? by Bushidô, or “the way of the warrior,” At first glance, the answer to this question a code of living that became increasingly would be “No.” In fact, during the significant in Japanese culture throughout Tokugawa Shogunate (also known as the the Edo Period. The transformation of the Edo period), the caste system became samurai after the Sengoku Period therefore more rigid. The right to travel freely was epitomises the changing dynamics of taken away from peasants and government the feudal system in Japan; no longer a forbade marriage between members of distinctly warrior class but a symbol of how different social classes. Furthermore, the ordinary Japanese citizens should conduct right to own weapons was stripped away themselves in society. Japan’s caste system from peasants to discourage rebellion was gradually becoming less militarised. and this right was instead reserved for the warrior classes only. These policies to strengthen the existing caste system reveal the priorities of the Tokugawa Shogunate: to ensure social stability and to suppress possible threats to the authority of the Shogun. It could even be suggested that the feudal system after Sengoku Jidai was a necessary stage in ultimately providing a state of civility and lawfulness in Japan that had been absent for an entire century.

Another fascinating transformation within the feudal system at the end of Sengoku Jidai was the evolution of the merchant class, who overcame being the most despised group in Japan to becoming one of the wealthiest and most influential classes. According to Confucianism, the more you contributed to society, the higher you were regarded. Merchants did not produce rice and were looked down upon for cheating money from honest However, to conclude that feudalism workers, they were considered useless to simply continued after the Sengoku Period the prosperity of Japan and so, despite would be to dismiss the complex social their considerable wealth, they were

placed below peasants as the bottom of the caste. Merchants were even forbidden to wear silk as it was a symbol of wealth and luxury within Japanese society! However, with growing urbanisation and a rise in commercial economy – geisha entertainers and kabuki theatres beginning to emerge throughout Japan – the merchants, as well as becoming even wealthier, found themselves becoming a powerful class, rising within the social hierarchy. With the escalating affluence of the merchant class and the declining wealth samurai, it was not uncommon during the Tokugawa Period for samurai to marry merchants to erase their debts, thus further elevating their social status. The transformation of classes within the feudal system illustrates a growing influence of material wealth within Japanese society, meanwhile the significance of a military-based class system was beginning to erode.

Daimyo rebelling against the Emperor, Totalwarhistory

It can be argued that the end of the Sengoku Period brought an end to the existing Japanese hierarchy, a warrior-based class system, however feudalism in Japan would not officially end until the dawn of the Meiji Restoration Period in the nineteenth century, when the emperor was restored to the position of ultimate political authority over Japan. The Meiji Restoration was a period of dramatic modernisation driven by western influences. The nineteenth century saw to the emergence of the Bank of Japan in 1881 and the creation of a national Constitution eight years later, it was this refreshing series of politics that initiated the beginnings of a democratic system and the official dissolution of feudalism in Japan.

Caitlin Diahanne Norbury

www.manchesterhistorian.com

ISSUE 31 | NOVEMBER 2018

A Brief History of Early 16th Century English Iconoclasm

out monastic life in England through executions and the confiscation and destruction of relics, icons, and buildings. It was during this period that widerreaching state sponsored iconoclasm emerged, the most notable casualty being the focal point of English pilgrimage and religion: Thomas Becket’s tomb and shrine at Canterbury Cathedral, which was destroyed on Henry VIII’s orders in 1538. The identity of the English iconoclast is

Iconoclasm left, for the modern onlooker, perhaps the most profound legacy of the English reformation. The acts of desecration which occurred in almost every English ecclesiastical building during the 16th century, visually remain as monuments to the doctrine, politics, anger and hatred. The 1534 Act of Supremacy, traditionally identified as the starting point of the English reformation, does not mark the birth of the Church of England but rather the new Church in England. Doctrine remained Catholic and the crown’s focus was instead placed on challenging the wealth and corruption of monasticism. Henry VIII’s approach in tackling this has been remembered as The Dissolution of the Monasteries. The suppression which took place between 1536 and 1541 was organised largely by Thomas Cromwell, who succeeded in his aim of wiping

Feudalism in Crisis: Causes of the 1525 Peasants’ Revolt The Great Peasants’ Revolt was the culmination of an inflammatory period of widespread social unrest that swept through much of the Holy Roman Empire, in what is now modern-day Germany and Austria. Popular revolt enveloped the peasantry of cities and rural municipalities alike, with a devastating outcome for those who partook in the uprising. Aristocratic mobilisation of Swabian League mercenaries to deal with dissidents brought about staggering casualties, with contemporary sources estimating in the region of 300,000 deaths endured by the peasantry across a dozen battles and massacres. Decisively defeated, a brutal event within Early Modern Europe, but what were the causes of this popular revolt? Growing dissatisfaction amongst the peasantry is often ascribed to changes within the feudalist system implemented throughout the early 1520s. Feudal

@TheMcrHistorian

Bath Abbey pews, Bathneuseum

wide-ranging and almost all-encompassing. Aside from Edward’s visitations, which took place at every church throughout the country and affected almost every parishioner, newly appointed protestant clergy begun to make alterations to their own church buildings as they saw fit, spurred on by new translations of seminal European iconoclastic writings, such as Marshall’s translation of Martin Bucer’s treaty ‘Pyctures [and] other ymages which traditions nurturing an imbalanced but mutually beneficial relationship between lord and serf were being sidelined in favour of Roman civil law. Nobles would utilise this law code to increase their wealth and status, and in doing so they diminished the role of the peasantry within society. Lessening opportunity and a further relegation of social status likely inflamed tensions. However, the root causes can be explored in other schools of thought. Stalnaker frames this period in a socio-economic context, postulating that “rising expectations” can be found within the peasantry. This is found against the backdrop of technological innovations occurring in this period, such as new harvesting techniques and greater crop yields. Aristocratic hoarding of the benefits accrued would have undoubtedly placed the peasantry at an economic disadvantage. Beyond these diverging expectations, there is also a religious-cultural context to be explored. The contemporary document, ‘The Twelve Articles of the Upper Swabian Peasantry’, which outlined the grievances the peasantry felt at the time, has been identified by the likes of Baylor and other historians as hugely influential in the intellectual debate over the relationship of peasants within society. The use of religious language tied to the idea of

were wont to be worshypped, ar i[n] no wise to be suffred in the temples or churches of Christen men.’ Illustratively, arch-iconoclast Robert Horne, later Bishop of Winchester, used his position as Dean at Durham Cathedral to personally order the destruction of 15th century glass depicting the life and miracles of St Cuthbert in the cloister, as well as St Cuthbert’s tomb. In addition, he reportedly broke the Corpus Christi shrine at St Nicholas’ Church with his own feet. The protestant iconoclasm of Henry and Edward’s England depict a church in turmoil and, more than anything, captures the strength of doctrinal opinion and conviction at all levels of society. The idea of iconoclasm not just as an act of violence or anger but of rejuvenation only mellowed rather than disappeared in the following years. Still today we see ecclesiastical architecture and design falling victim to the process of reinvention within the church; one need not look any further than the 2018 removal and sale of George Gilbert Scott pews at Bath Abbey to see that the iconoclast is still amongst us!

Harry Spain

Providence is rife throughout. Customary rites to hunt and tend land, curbed under the new aristocratic laws, can be seen as evidence of the antagonism to the peasantry’s way of life - but was it enough to spur on revolution?

Peasants’ Revolt, MilitaryHistoryNow

Perhaps most crucial in understanding the 1525 Peasants’ Revolt is that, according to Sreenivasan, the uprisings were an amalgamation of separate events, by individual communities, rather than one single effort or movement. The parallel nature of events, aided by the dissemination of information through newly available printed literature, did create one overarching issue.However, to identify one root cause over another discredits the importance each issue is due. Social, economic, and cultural reasons all arguably played a part in the events of 1525.

Sean Jones 21

ISSUE 31 | NOVEMBER 2018

Reinterpreting Hadrian’s Wall For nearly 300 years, Hadrian’s Wall marked the north-west frontier of the Roman Empire. Traditionally, it was believed that the Wall’s purpose was to solve the issue of Barbarian incursions. This conventional view has, however, been debunked. Historians, such as Anthony Everitt, have instead suggested that the Barbarians did little to threaten Roman Britain and that the Wall served an alternative purpose. The Wall was commissioned following the emperor Hadrian’s visit to Britain in AD122. It was to run for 73 miles, emphasising its grandeur and size. The wall acted like a border, ensuring control over immigration, smuggling, and customs. People within and beyond the vicinity of the Wall travelled into Roman territory each day. Historians argue that the Wall was designed to extract taxes from tribes on both sides of the border. More so, the Wall was fairly open, with gates every mile that allowed the locals to move back and forth between Roman and Barbarian territories. Soldiers, to ensure the charging of customs, monitored these movements.

Roman Expansion - Defensive Imperialism? By the close of mid-Republic Rome had established itself as the supreme power of the Mediterranean, controlling an empire that spread horizontally from the Iberian Peninsula to Greece. Yet the nature of Roman expansionism in the period is ambiguous: whether the citystate was guided by an imperialist desire to conquer, or instead branched out in the name of defending vital interests, is contentious. Rome’s reactionary policy in the Eastern Mediterranean hints that it was drawn into a complex web of alliances for survival. Indeed, the 1st Macedonian War (215 - 205 BC) was spurred by the realisation that a CarthaginianMacedonian treaty had been formed: two of Rome’s greatest enemies had conspired against it. The need for new allies and a foothold in the region made the expansion into Greece necessary. Bonds were formed with the Aeotolian

The Wall’s sole purpose as protection from Barbarian incursions is not compatible with this hypothesis. As such, the use of the wall as evidence of hostile relations between the Romans and the ‘Scots’ is undermined. Secondly, and quite simply, Hadrian’s Wall was constructed to reflect the power of Rome. The propaganda value of this ambitious project ensured that local tribes were awestruck by the power and might of Rome. Everitt has suggested that once the Wall was constructed, it was covered in plaster and then whitewashed. This allowed the Wall’s now shining surface to reflect the sunlight; its magnificence would be visible for miles. The Wall offered security and comfort for soldiers, boosting morale and ensuring that Hadrian was a popular Emperor amongst the military factions of the Roman Army. Nevertheless, to ascribe a singular reason as to why the Wall was built would be nonsensical. Thus, it would be wrong to define Hadrian’s Wall as simply a product of war and raiding. Instead, it offered a plethora of opportunities for trade and taxation, whilst the scale and appearance of the Wall offered a symbolic influence for local Britons and Roman settlers. This symbolism has continued to influence us in the modern day.

Hadrian’s Wall, Telegraph

For example, The Times, in 1930, described Hadrian’s Wall as a historically interesting, romantic, and beautiful tourist attraction. In this instance, Hadrian’s Wall was reinterpreted to promote Britain’s Roman heritage and encourage Britain to engage with its past. Its status as a World Heritage site further suggests that the significance of the Wall lives on in the modern day.

Tom Verheyden

League and Pergamum, whilst Rome made Emboldened by recent military success, necessary territorial gains at the expense Rome began to actively destroy its rivals. of a weakened rival, Macedon. Hence the Greek historian Polybius describes the Romans waiting for a Antiochus III of Syria represented another pretext to start the 3rd Punic War (149 antagonist to the precarious balance of - 146 BC) and honour Cato the Elder’s power in Greece. The Roman-Seleucid famous oratorical plea: ‘Carthage must be War (192 - 189 BC) was triggered by Syrian destroyed’. Both Corinth & Carthage - two attempts to displace Roman hegemony great cities of antiquity - were razed to the in the sphere. Tellingly, victorious Rome ground in 146 BC, a testament to Rome’s refuted the opportunity to enlarge its imperial mission. domain in the peace negotiations. Once order had been restored and interests Economic imperialism was another secured, the legions retreated. catalyst for the proliferation of the Roman empire. After defeating Carthage in the 2nd Punic War (218 - 201 BC) Rome expanded into Spain. Although the region proved difficult to subjugate, it became a great source of commodities - particularly gold, silver and tin - in the later republic, and foodstuffs in the imperial period. Further, the redirection of tax payments in conquered lands like Macedon enriched the treasury, this influx helped to fund Roman territory in (140 BC), PlacedeLuxembourg domestic infrastructure projects and more foreign campaigns. A picture emerges, then, of Rome reluctantly sucked into the East in The birth of the Roman province of the name of protection. Separate Macedonia in 146 BC, and the commitment empires were vying for control, and a to pacifying the Iberian Peninsula non-interventionist policy would be highlighted the movement towards a detrimental. It is shortsighted, however, to more formal brand of imperialism as the understand Rome’s expansionism from a century wore on. purely defensive perspective; imperialism offered new riches and the chance to stifle Jordan Brunel competing empires.

www.manchesterhistorian.com

ISSUE 31 | NOVEMBER 2018

BOOK REVIEWS Rubicon, The Triumph and Tragedy of the Roman Republic TOM HOLLAND When one considers ‘war, violence and conflict’, few eras of history can encapsulate this description better than the last two centuries of the Roman republic, with its numerous invasions, civil wars, and rapid expansion across the Italian peninsula and beyond. This is the story that Tom Holland seeks to tell in Rubicon: The Triumph and Tragedy of the Roman Republic. His preface, which describes Julius Caesar’s bold, possibly mad decision to cross the Rubicon, which gives this book its title, and changed the course of Roman history, tantalises the reader with a taste of what is to come across the next 300 pages, and the preceding years that led to this incredible moment in Roman History. The book covers the period from the First Punic War in 264BC to the death of Augustus, the first emperor, in 14AD. Anyone who has taken Peter Morton’s module ‘From Republic to Empire’ will recognise this period, and I would highly recommend this book to anyone who is taking this module. Holland’s writing style is fluid and accessible to those without prior knowledge of Ancient Rome, as he takes great lengths to explain complex concepts like the Roman voting system or the cursus honorum (stages of the Roman political system). Despite this, the suitability of the

SPQR: A History of Ancient Rome MARY BEARD In an incredibly detailed yet accessible exploration of the culture, history, and people of ancient Rome, Mary Beard provides an exciting history in her book SPQR: A History of Ancient Rome. This book highlights the reasons people are drawn to the study of ancient history and classics; a history lost in the stories told in myth, political drama, and no small number of scandals. Mary Beard gives the reader a real feel for the unpredictability of the ancient past, whilst reminding us that the society in which these Romans lived was not so different from our own. Complete with a lovely set of maps, the history begins with a brief tour of the foundations of Rome, before beginning with ‘Cicero’s Finest Hour’. Beard takes the reader on an entertaining yet learned journey through aristocratic strife and corruption of the first century B.C. Familiar names such as Julius Caesar and Mark Antony make and break alliances, and Augustus, whom Beard amusingly refers to as “the old reptile”, forces his way into power through military prowess.

book’s academic foundations are unquestionable he regularly references ancient sources from Livy to Plutarch to Cato. Therefore, readers who wish to delve deeper into certain events or people can quickly locate the relevant primary sources, and I believe this makes Holland’s book very clever in its ability to appeal to a wider audience than most literature about the Roman Republic. The book is structured chronologically, rather than thematically, which I believe to be highly effective as it presents the events through a gripping, dramatic and well-paced narrative – exactly how the history of the Roman Republic should be described. Furthermore, this also allows the reader to follow the turbulent journeys of individuals like Crassus and Cicero, as they attempt to deal with, and moreover shape the events unfolding around them. That is not to say that Holland neglects the key themes of the time; he repeatedly comes back to important issues such as gender inequality, religion, imperialism, and power, but they are cleverly interwoven so that they do not detract from the story being told. Overall, Rubicon is a highly enjoyable read, which often makes one forget that it is an academic book in its purpose, and it is highly recommendable to anyone beginning their journey through Ancient Rome, or those who wish to revisit an old friend.

Review by Rebecca Bowers

As a professor of Classics at Newham College, Cambridge, Beard has heavily contributed to scholarship which has helped develop our understanding of Roman society. With this in mind, it is important to recognise that SPQR is written in such a way that it is accessible for even the least knowledgeable of any reader interested in the history of Rome. Beard introduces the reader to the ancient literature, material evidence and archaeology which has shaped our modernday understanding of Roman history. SPQR also caters for the more experienced readers of Roman history; Beard details the advances made in recent scholarship, the difficulties in translating Latin inscriptions, and also includes a rather extensive list of further reading for those interested. Beard is not afraid to shy away from the gritty details of Roman society, which are so often cast aside out of embarrassment, or in an attempt to portray Rome as a gleaming marble city of intellect. When discussing a particularly grotesque insult against Mark Antony’s wife Fulvia, which was inscribed on a rock and thrown over the city walls, Beard highlights the intensity of misogyny woven through Roman society. This book is an incredible read, whether you’re familiar with the high political drama of Rome, or whether you are curious as to why Roman history is important.

Alexander The Great ROBIN LANE FOX Setting out to write a biography of a figure who lived over 2000 years ago is a gargantuan task, even if that person did conquer 2 million square miles by the age of 32 in just a 13-year period. Even recent biographies of Alexander the Great have noted that the more we uncover about the young conqueror, the less we find we actually know about him. Indeed, Alexander’s exploits became the stuff of myth and legend during his own lifetime. After all, Alexander was just like any other king, and his official biographer Callisthenes crafted the versions of history with which his king was happy. Consequently, the modern scholar’s task of extracting the truth from this plethora of fables is next to impossible. Still, Robin Lane Fox took up the gauntlet 45 years ago, and the result is one of the greatest biographies of Alexander ever written. Alexander the Great delves deep into not only the physical actions and spoken word of Alexander, but the psychology behind him. Despite a brief remark in the preface that the book is ‘a search, not a story’, Lane Fox goes further than any other scholar of antiquity in attempting to understand his subject as a human being, and the finished product brings Alexander to life in an epic of truly Homeric proportions. The book’s real connection with the Alexander who lived as opposed to the Alexander of legend makes for an extremely exciting read which even lovers of fiction might enjoy. Indeed, it contains everything a first-class novel should contain: life, death, deceit, war, love, and spirituality. Nevertheless, we must not forget that Lane Fox is an Oxford professor, and at times the book can be hard-going and perhaps a little too detailed for purely casual readers. Perhaps the category of ‘scholarly pop history’ should be opened up on the shelves at Waterstones, because this book would be perfectly placed there.

Review by Joseph Hearson

Review by Skye Demar

@TheMcrHistorian

ISSUE 31 | NOVEMBER 2018

The Spanish Holocaust: Institution and Extermination in Twentieth Century Spain PAUL PRESTON Six years after the release of Paul Preston’s book ‘The Spanish Civil War: Reaction, Revolution and Revenge’ (2006) - a discussion of the political causes and motivations of Spain’s 1936-1939 Guerra Civil - Preston returned to bookshelves with ‘The Spanish Holocaust: Institution and Extermination in Twentieth-Century Spain’ (2013). Preston has dedicated his career to the exploration of Spain’s turbulent history, writing many pieces on the subject. Whilst modern Spain is still struggling to come to terms with its dark past - its political system reeling at the consequences of the way democracy was so abruptly formed following the death of Francisco Franco in 1975 - Preston boldly brands Spain’s war as a ‘Holocaust’ in its own right. This is a title which he defends throughout the book

The Great Divergence: China, Europe and the Making of the Modern World KENNETH POMERANZ Explaining the ‘Great Divergence’ of Europe and China, as Pomeranz puts it, involves the consideration of many key factors: ecology, geography, demography, labour, markets, and colonisation to name a significant few. Therefore, analysing and presenting these fundamentally different areas of study, understandably and unfortunately, is unlikely to make easy reading. The Great Divergence however provides some useful ideas regarding the making of the modern world economy. The book’s content is predominantly focused on comparing England and the lower Yangtze delta in China between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, with sporadic reference to wider Europe and the rest of China, as well as Japan and India. Drawing on

Burning The Veil: The Algerian War and the ‘Emancipation’ of Muslim Women, 1954-62 NEIL MACMASTER Neil Macmaster describes a theatrical scene in Algiers, 1958. Amidst a bloody struggle for independence, Algerian and European women embrace in the streets. Muslim women ceremonially unveil. Burning the Veil explores the myriad agendas implied by the unveiling ceremony of 1958. Macmaster examines how the veil formed a symbolic fault-line during the Algerian War. The veil became a ‘visible marker of support or opposition to Islamic values’ (Macmaster), and shaped the opposing rhetoric of the colonial and anti-colonial war efforts. Through a series of selfserving ‘emancipation’ schemes aimed at women, France attempted to infiltrate the domestic space, gain the support of women and topple Algerian patriarchal systems of power. In response, the nationalist Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) sought to strengthen its traditional Islamic identity

Preston admits that solid statistics that demonstrate the scale of death and terror during the war itself, and the subsequent reign of the Nationalists, are inaccurate, incomplete, and often entirely amiss. Despite this, Preston is able to piece together the findings of historians, such as José Luis Ledesma, Josep Maria Solé i Sabaté, and Joan Vilarroyo i Font, in order to illustrate the extent of the systematic and ‘institutionalized’ horrors of the era. Preston expands upon the rationale behind his use of the term ‘Holocaust’ throughout the book by conjuring an image of the political climate in the 1930s and explaining in great depth the political and social causes that attributed to the war. Preston describes the ‘hatreds that smouldered’ between the various factions of the political spectrum: the amplification of anti-Semitic, Masonic, and Bolshevik sentiments in the right-wing press, the impact of the republican government’s agrarian, military and church reforms, and the alignment of the Catholic Church, amongst others.

the 1936 Paracuellos Massacres at the hands of the Republican left, the right-wing General Quiepo de Llano’s purge of Cadiz, and the mass destruction of Guernica by the German Condor Legion, owing to Spain’s Axis accomplices. The book presents a clear and concise analysis of the factors which attributed to the violence of the Guerra Civil. Its brutal depiction of events demonstrates the magnitude of the atrocities which ensued, and blatantly disregards the silence upheld by contemporary Spain. Preston’s knowledge of the topic is unequivocal, as he breaks down each aspect of his book in fine detail. Perhaps the greatest attribute of the book, however, is its undeniable relevance to today. The consequences of the Civil War and subsequent Francoist regime have left an open wound across Spanish society which the country has still yet to address.

Review by Elysia Heitmar

The violence and terror of the war are depicted in explicit detail throughout the book, as Preston recounts the atrocities of both sides. This includes: empirical evidence, Pomeranz argues that in some aspects, Europe and China were quite similar, both with access to natural resources, farm land, labour, and the new world. To present his analysis of the two regions, Pomeranz uses his self-developed procedure, the ‘reciprocal comparative method’, to provide fresh perspective on the debate. This results in an outcome different to that of the ‘eurocentric narrative’ that he believes has dominated the debate in recent years. Notably, Pomeranz remarks that while both Europe and China had colonies overseas, Europe’s trading endeavours abroad were militarily protected, and its approach was far more expansive, syndicated, and strategic than that of China, whose trading activities were often far less large-scale, and were unprotected. Critically Pomeranz states that the major difference to be seen now is ecological, not technological or cultural. He cites that through Europe’s greater exploitation of land, both territorial and abroad, as well as England’s ‘geographical luck’, it was able to develop economically far quicker than China, despite demographic and labour restrictions.

and envelop existing women’s movements into a united front against the coloniser. The veil was shaped into a politically potent symbol in the war of ideas for Algeria’s future. Macmaster delicately maps how the effects of colonial schemes ripple through the history of women’s rights in Algeria, shaping the FLN’s entrenchment on issues of ownership, hindering pre-war feminist movements, and contributing to the stagnation of women’s rights after independence.

This is the limit of Pomeranz’s work, however. Disappointingly, Pomeranz solely focuses on England and the Yangtze delta, as opposed to examining Europe and China as a whole, as the book title suggests. The book runs dry with a heavy focus on the often-discussed Marxist approach, and was recently refuted in Dunchesne’s ‘Uniqueness of Western Civilisation’. Furthermore, Pomeranz does not introduce any new primary research, and so the book offers little new information, only a reciprocal perspective of the then-current historical debate. Oddly, he often refers to logic as justification for arguments, typically stating, ‘if this is true for China, that’s why this did or didn’t happen in Europe’, which again highlights the lack of primary evidence behind his arguments. Interestingly, Pomeranz admits in the acknowledgements section that the book ‘took him way beyond his area of training’, which raises questions about the accuracy of the book. My overall impression is that the book is a commentary. It is not constructive and definitely not conversational.

Review by George Bates

Burning the Veil is a dense and illuminating study which raises questions about how we remember that unveiling ceremony of 1958. Beyond the war, Macmaster’s insights can help us to re-evaluate the causes behind stagnation in Algerian women’s rights in the latter half of the twentieth century, and the potency of the veil in French politics. Most importantly perhaps, Burning the Veil speaks to the agency of the women at the heart of this historical phenomenon.

Review by Nancy Hughes

Macmaster’s approach resists reducing women, and the veil, to homogeneous symbols. It is easy to see the tension over women’s rights as a war between, in the words of journalist Fadila Ahmed, ‘the two jailors’ of Algerian women, colonialism and tradition. In his introduction Macmaster acknowledges how the veil was envisioned as a line in the sand between coloniser and colonised. The progression of his research then traces a zigzag through that line, consulting differing reports from women in guerrilla forces, the isolated rural south, and the westernised cities. Where primary sources from Algerian Muslim women are lacking, Macmaster is careful never to speak for the women he writes about. Reading his study of police reports, photographs and ethnographic studies, there is never a suggestion that these partial perspectives can offer neat conclusions when asking how the emancipation schemes impacted Algerian Muslim women during the war.

www.manchesterhistorian.com

ISSUE 31 | NOVEMBER 2018

A Fiery and Furious People: A History of Violence in England JAMES SHARPE James Sharpe’s latest is a fascinating but frustrating read. The scope of the work is enormous—an attempt, Sharpe informs us in his preface, to show ‘the longterm history of violence in England between the late middle ages and the present day.’ But the term ‘survey’ should perhaps have been used in place of ‘history.’ For, while the work is comprehensive and impeccably researched, it lacks any sense of a main historical thesis: why, a reader will wonder, are the English violent; what do the types of violence in which they engage say about their culture; how has English violence compared, historically, with that of the Continent or the US? Sharpe does not omit speculation entirely, especially once he reaches his academic wheelhouse of the Early Modern era (the previous, perfunctory section on the Middle Ages is an unsatisfying litany of ‘interesting’ cases that go unexplored). Indeed, his connecting of the Reformation’s focus on personal religious (and thus moral) responsibility with the decline of street violence is compelling, as is his take on the rise and fall of the duel as a reflection of England’s interest in, and then rejection of, European customs. But he fails to bind these insights into a clear analysis of Englishness or, in fact, violence. The closest he comes to an overarching theory is to lean heavily on Norbert Elias’s concept of the Civilising Process, even while forced to acknowledge its failure to explain phenomena like the sharp increase of violent crime in the 1960s.

The Green Flag: A History of Irish Nationalism ROBERT KEE For a country so close to our own shores, there is very little we are taught about in schools about the Emerald Isle. Beyond the campaign to Repeal the 8th, the Troubles our parents and grandparents lived through and the border issue we may face post Brexit – Ireland and her history are somewhat an abstract concept to a generation that did not live through the period of her struggles to attain nationhood. It is very easy to forget that Emmet’s Rebellion was only one of a string of Irish revolutionary flops, but it is his name that is besmirched the most –, probably due to how the rebellion on 23rd July 1803 was pathetic to the point of farce. Forgetting the fuses for the grenades, the weapons depot being set on fire a week before the rebellion was due to take place, only 80 people showing up to said rebellion – and yet despite this, Robert Emmet is still beloved by the Irish today as a nationalist who was secure enough in his convictions to lay down his life for independence. Kee reconciles these two images of the martyr and the miserable failure and creates a sympathetic account of this event. He highlights Emmet’s scholarship on advancements in weaponry, his oratory skills that were even able to move the most

The structure of the book is equally problematic. It is arranged in three ostensibly chronological parts, covering the Middle Ages, ‘The Tudors to the Victorians,’ and ‘The Modern Age.’ As any historian could tell you, the dividing line between ‘eras’ is inherently porous, especially when looking at social and cultural change. The combination of chronologic sections with thematic chapters leads to seemingly arbitrary choices: the end of capital punishment, for example, is discussed in part two, though it was not formally abolished until 1965; the chapter on serial killers, found in the Modern Age section, spends its first half on Victorian murderers Mary Ann Cotton, William Palmer, and Jack the Ripper. It makes for a confusing read, as one bounces back and forth over hundreds of years, sometimes within the same chapter, but more importantly it obscures the through-lines of Sharpe’s insights. The impacts of his interrogation into changing concepts of masculinity (in every period, men have overwhelmingly been the perpetrators of violence), or his theories on why criminal violence has moved from the public to domestic sphere, are thus diffused, with gaps of hundreds of pages coming between one point and the next. This is a shame. For while Sharpe’s book (and especially its ‘Further Reading’ section) may prove a useful tool for students studying the history of crime, one cannot help but feel that the author has missed the opportunity to tell us something fundamental about the ‘fiery and furious’ English people.

Review by Marina Juul Filisky

severe judge at his Speech at the Docks, as well as his practical idealism for his vision for Ireland. This vision would later be echoed by another failed revolutionary, Padraig Pearse, in the Easter Rising of 1916; his significance was often overlooked in favour of emphasising the pitifulness of his Rebellion and his leadership. Robert Kee’s “The Green Flag” offers a precise (although not very concise) narrative of Ireland’s journey to achieve nationhood, offering a synthesis between the Irish revolutionary nationalists and their supposedly more mellow constitutional counterparts. His writing style is gripping, fluid and accessible even to those who are not familiar with the subject. However, the structure of the book also allows that for those who may be more familiar with the characters and heroes of Ireland’s nationalist struggle to dip into specific moments without losing a sense of fluidity or momentum. Kee’s greatest strength however is his ability to create sympathetic and three-dimensional characters out of those often sidelined as being incompetent or malicious. He writes with a vividness that brings the violence and conflict of the period to the present and despite being an Englishman, is able to embodies the dreams and ambitions of these nationalists and champions of Ireland. Kee’s greatest strength throughout the book “Green Flag” is his ability to create sympathetic and three-dimensional characters out of those often sidelined as being incompetent or malicious.

Review by Valentina Vettore

Interested in writing a book review for The Manchester Historian? Contact our team with any queries via:

manchesterhistorian@gmail.com @TheMcrHistorian

Battle Cry of Freedom: The American Civil War JAMES McPHERSON In the Pulitzer Prize-winning Battle Cry of Freedom, James McPherson has written arguably the best single-volume account of the American Civil War. The book’s length – over 850 pages – is tempered by the fact that it is fantastically well-written. McPherson’s writing style is lucid and there is a great flow to the narrative which consistently drives the account forward. The great triumph of this work is that McPherson manages to fit a level of detail that you would usually see only in multiple volumes into a single book. Although a considerable portion of Battle Cry of Freedom is devoted to the battles of the American Civil War itself, this is not where the book’s focus lies. Rather, McPherson integrates the underlying social, political, and economic factors pertinent to the causes and course of the war into the military events, forming a web of historical analysis, primary sources and relevant scholarship. The book is split into three main sections. The first six chapters – roughly 200 pages – focus solely on pre-1860 America. These chapters provide the political, social, and economic backstory to America that is vital to understanding the motives behind the events leading up to the Civil War. The next three chapters examine the events directly leading to the declaration of war, and the final 500 pages are an epic account of the conflicts, battles and politics of the Civil War itself. McPherson’s account is biased towards the North and Abraham Lincoln. This weakens much of his analysis and means that Battle Cry of Freedom might be most useful from a purely factual standpoint. For example, he is scathing of the Confederate prison for Union soldiers at Andersonville, where nearly 30% of prisoners died from malnutrition, exposure, and disease. While McPherson is right to be critical of the treatment of Union prisoners, in doing so he neglects to mention similar atrocities in Northern prisoner of war camps. At Camp Douglas in Chicago, around 20% of Confederate soldiers held there died from exposure and malnutrition. This figure is lower than that at Andersonville, but, unlike in the South, the North was not facing a catastrophic supplies shortage. Rather, they made a conscious decision to reduce the rations for prisoners. This is just one example of McPherson’s failure to criticise the North for the same atrocities that he scathes the Confederacy and this discrepancy detracts from his analysis of the events of the war. Nevertheless, Battle Cry of Freedom is an unparalleled epic that details the causes and events of the American Civil War like no other single-volume account of this critical period of American history.

Review by Oliver Lee

ISSUE 31 | NOVEMBER 2018

History Society Update 2018/2019 HistSoc Committee:

UoM Hist Soc Facebook

It’s been a busy few weeks in the History Society. Our Fresher’s Events were both a big success. The bar crawl was a lot of fun, great to see lots of people from all different year groups and courses! The pizza and chill night was also a big success, so thank you to everyone who came along to those events and helped make them possible. But the fun and excitement at the History Society never stops and we have more events coming up over the coming weeks. The staff/student quiz will be returning, which should be a

lot of fun. We are also planning a trip to see ‘Six’ at the Lowry in Salford, a historical musical based on the lives of Henry VIII’s Six Wives, which should be great! More events will be coming up next year, so please check the History Society Facebook page for more information. The trip this year is to historic Krakow. If you haven’t done so already, definitely book your place, as it is going to be brilliant! There is so much to do in a fascinating and cultural city, such as the Wawel Castle and the Salt Mines. A trip to Auschwitz also

President - Tori Williams Vice-President - Martha Norman-Long Treasurer - Daniel Bayes Social Sec - Nieve Elliott Trip Sec - Caitlin Moore Social Media Sec -Cariad Hughes Academic Officer - Albert Jennings Careers Officer - Bria Cotton

provides a sobering look at the horror of Nazi occupation. Again, check the Facebook page for more details on what will be a great trip!

For all the information on the trip and upcoming events, check the Facebook page and good luck with the rest of the semester!

Follow Our Social Media: Join the ‘University of Manchester History Society’ group on Facebook and add ‘UoM HistSoc’ as a friend!

UoM Hist Soc Facebook

Image Credits & Special Thanks Front Cover (top left, clockwise)

Front Cover (continued)

Alexander the Great Mosaic, Wikipedia.org

Roman Battle via RealmofHistory.com

Reichstag Fire, Archives.gov

Japanese Statue, Estoicismodario.blogspot.com

Roman Soldier, Warlordgames.com

Napoleonic Wars Battle, Wikipedia.org

Easter Rising 1916, OspreyPublishing.com

Madres de Plaza de Mayo, Desinformenos.org

Indian Partition, NewYorker.com

Vietnam Suffering, TheAtlantic.com Opium War (Ship), FEE.org

French POWs, Reddit.com

Article Backgrounds

African American Soldiers, NewsDogMedia.co.uk

Page 15 - ‘The Lost Children’, TheEpochTimes.com

Porfirio Díaz, ElMaestroCompentente.blogspot.com Dada Art, Artspace.com

Page 7 - Dada Movement Art, WallStreetJournal.com Page 22 - Hadrian’s Wall, Pinterest.com

Special Thanks for this Issue

• We would like to thank Tim Carney for his

significant contribution towards the designing of the front cover for this edition of the magazine. • We would also like to thank the staff at The University of Manchester’s Graphic Support Workshop for their professional advice and assistance throughout the design process.

• Thank you to our staff-student liaison within

the History Department, Dr. Vernon, for providing oversight of the magazine ahead of publication.

www.manchesterhistorian.com

Call for Papers

Deadline November 17, 11:59pm Encounters is a peer-reviewed academic journal for University of Manchester students. We are seeking submissions which focus on topics involving politics, society, or culture in the past. We welcome submissions from all course levels (undergraduate and post-graduate). • Acceptable submissions types: essays, articles, book reviews. • Please submit a completed submission form and a copy of your submission (as a word document, not a .pdf please) to the journal email - encounters.uom@gmail.com - Submission forms located on our website here: https://encountersinthepast.wordpress.com/resources/ • Please submit only work which has already been marked or which has been completed independently of academic coursework. • Students may not submit work longer than 8,000 words. Bibliography and footnotes excluded. • PGR/Masters students may not submit dissertation/thesis chapters to this journal. For questions and concerns, please contact us at encounters.uom@gmail.com

The Manchester Historian

Interested in contributing to The Manchester Historian? â&#x20AC;˘ Develop your journalistic skills and see your own work published as either an article or book review writer. â&#x20AC;˘ Interested in learning and developing new skills in the areas of Design, Copy-Editing, Marketing or Online? Our teams are always keen to hire enthusiastic and dedicated individuals. Experience is preferable but not at all required! Photography opportunities also available. For more information on joining the magazine, email us at:

manchesterhistorian@gmail.com Interested in advertising your society or business in the magazine? Email us at the above email address, RE: Advertisement Query.

The Manchester Historian

@TheMcrHistorian

@ManchesterHistorian www.manchesterhistorian.com