PIECE-BYPIECE
The Challenges of Building a Competitive Baseball Club in Boston by Lou Gorman
L
ou Gorman served as general manager of the Boston Red Sox from 1984–1993. Now an executive consultant with the team, he was kind enough to take time from his busy schedule so that he could share with Maple Street Press his insights into what it takes to build a winning baseball team in Boston. His unique perspectives—on working trades, negotiating with free agents, overcoming financial obstacles, and the evaluation of players and the overall roster—are fascinating and informative. Building a winning baseball team at the major league level is a difficult endeavor under any conditions, and Mr. Gorman knows this first hand: In my 45 years in professional baseball I have been involved in the creation and development of two major league expansion organizations: the Kansas City Royals and the Seattle Mariners. The challenge of starting a major league organization from the very bottom up and developing it into a competitive organization is enormous. The Tampa Bay Rays, after a series of devastating, 100-loss seasons, finally in the 11th year of their existence won an American League championship. The Seattle Mariners took 19 seasons to win a division title and have yet to win a league championship. They stand in testament to the challenges involved. However, the demand and challenge of developing and maintaining, season after season, a contending ball club here in Boston is one of the most challenging in all of professional sports. The tremendous pressure to win in Boston and to continually put a contending ball club on the field at Fenway Park is fueled by the remarkable fan support and passion of Red Sox Nation and a tremendous amount of constant media hype that saturates all of New England with Red Sox conversation and news year-round. The Red Sox are literally
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THE 2009 OLDE TOWNE TEAM a major part of the culture of living in New England, and into that environment you labor to build an organization and a ball club. It’s like no other environment in Major League Baseball today.
On how economic resources—for the Red Sox, and in baseball in general—have changed over time: The one major resource that the present organization brings into the mix, however, is economic resources in a greater degree, by far, than any Red Sox organization of the
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Dennis Eckersley had hesitations about leaving the Red Sox for the Cubs in 1984, but eventually relented. past had to work with. When the disappointing 1993 season was over, my total major league payroll was $39.9 million and as we began the 1994 season our total payroll was $41.2 million, as compared to the payroll of the 2008 Red Sox of $133.4 million. When Roger Clemens won the two most prestigious awards in baseball in 1986, the Cy Young Award and Most Valuable Player, his salary was $350,000. He held out during spring training of 1987 and we would eventually negotiate a two-year contract with his agents, the Hendricks Brothers, for approximately $850,000 and $1.2 million. At that time he was one of the highest paid players on the roster. The lesson that stands out here, however, is that the financial means of a ball club does, in fact, impact the ability to make certain deals and sign free agents (both amateur and professional). In my entire career I have never seen a major league ball club generate the amount of financial income that the present administration continues to do. It is exceptional. As we’ve seen with this past offseason, the effects of financial considerations on the everyday operations of baseball clubs are constantly evolving. Gorman details a fascinating example of the
Photo on previous page: Anne Haggerty Photography Photo on this page: Ronald C. Modra/Sports Imager y/Getty Images
By comparing and contrasting the challenges of his tenure as GM to those faced by the current organization, Gorman brings to light ways in which the game has evolved—like advanced player evaluation and analysis methods. His comments also demonstrate that some things haven’t changed—like the importance of scouting and building a deep organization, from top to bottom: As we look at the present ownership and administration and the tremendous success they have enjoyed in building the foundation for an organization that has already won two World Series in the past five seasons, and have built the foundation of an organization that has been a contender for nearly every season of their stewardship. It becomes essential to examine the process that has brought such success. In building any successful baseball organization, I have always passionately believed that it is absolutely essential to develop and build a strong and talented scouting staff and an equally talented player development system founded upon an organizational philosophy that influences every facet of the organization from the major league ball club on down to the rookie clubs. Theo Epstein and his entire baseball operations staff work within such an organizational philosophy that influences every decision that they make from signing free agent players, drafting and signing amateur free agents, to developing young talent within their minor league organization. They have done so very well. Like so many modern major league organizations and the younger general managers, they have introduced a great deal of emphasis of statistical analysis, or sabermetrics, in making player evaluations. They play a large role, along with the eyeball-to-eyeball scouting evaluation, in compiling a final player evaluation report. The present Red Sox baseball organization relies upon both the scouting evaluation and a great deal of sabermetric analysis in making final player judgments. In the past, statistical analyses were not as much in vogue as they are presently, but they were utilized, although the eyeball-to-eyeball scouting evaluations were always paramount. The success of so many great ball clubs and organizations in the past stand in testament to such great scouting staffs and that methodology.
Piece-By-Piece
Photo: Ronald C. Modra/Sports Imager y/Getty Images
financial hurdles that had to be cleared in order to complete a trade for Bill Buckner: During the 1984 season as I served as the Red Sox’ general manager, Mike Easler was playing first base. Easler was an outstanding offensive player, but defensively at first base he was struggling badly and hurting our ball club. I began to search through our scouting reports and the rosters of other major league clubs in an attempt to find a first baseman that could handle the position defensively. As I searched through other major league rosters in the National League, the Chicago Cubs had the veteran Bill Buckner being moved aside by a young prospect named Leon Durham, whom the Cubs were extremely high on. I called Cubs General Manager Dallas Green, and indicated that we were interested in acquiring Bill Buckner if something could be worked out. Green indicated he was in need of pitching. Because of a limited payroll budget we were not going to re-sign starting pitcher Dennis Eckersley. Our scouting reports indicated that Buckner was a Gold Glove-caliber first baseman and still a solid offensive asset. I thought he was the answer to our needs. I called Green and indicated to him that we were willing to part with Eckersley for Buckner, but I had checked Eckersley’s contract and he had five or six clubs he would not accept a trade to and one of them was the Cubs. Green
Bill Buckner arrived in Boston and immediately became the starting first baseman, driving in 100 runs in ‘85 and ‘86.
responded that Buckner also had restrictive clauses in his contract that precluded a trade to the Red Sox. Obviously we now had a dilemma. We notified the commissioner’s office that we had a deal in place but needed 72 hours to work out some details to finalize the deal and received permission for that window to negotiate with the respective players. Dallas Green and the Cubs were able to get Eckersley to void his no-trade clause to them by providing a moving clause that paid him $100,000. As I dealt with Buckner, he had got wind of what the Cubs gave Eckersley and asked for a similar amount before agreeing to void his restrictive clause to join the Red Sox. Within the economic constraints that I was working under, I was not able to agree to pay him the money. As the hours dwindled down I had made no progress in providing Buckner with any monetary compensation. I kept trying to sell him on the fact that he would be our starting first baseman the day he arrived in Fenway Park instead of being a backup in Chicago. I was aware of his tremendous competitive nature and I was appealing to it in the hope I could persuade him to agree to come to Boston without any monetary consideration involved. Finally, with only a few hours left before our 72 hour grace period had expired, Dallas Green called to ask what progress I was making with Buckner. I told him that I could not provide any monetary considerations to Buckner whatsoever, but that we sincerely wanted to consummate the trade. An hour later Green called back and indicated they would trade us Buckner and $50,000 to make the trade if we would include a prospect in addition to Eckersley. I immediately called Buckner and told him I would agree to pay him $50,000 to come to Boston. He agreed and the deal was done, with Mike Brumley going to the Cubs along with Eckersley, and Bill Buckner was a member of the Red Sox. But, in this case we had to pay with prospects what we couldn’t pay with dollars. Major league clubs today—the Red Sox most certainly included—understand the value of prospects and a well-developed farm system. Young players provide depth, replacements for when rostered players go down to injury, are traded, or fail to perform. Prospects are also valuable as trade chips when the time comes to add an impact player or a seasoned veteran. Prospects are exciting because they can potentially turn into superstars—or pumpkins at the stroke of midnight. But pennants fly forever, and sometimes you have to take a risk and go for it all. Gorman explains how he traded from a deep system of young players in 1988 in an attempt to upgrade the pitching staff from very good to great: At our organizational meeting before the trading deadline in 1988, our entire baseball operations staff and major league manager and coaches did a complete evaluation of
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our major league ball club. Everyone expressed their opinion of our needs, and of the depth of our talent in the minor league system. In the final analysis it was readily apparent that if we could add a quality starting pitcher to our present major league rotation we had a chance to challenge once again for the division and league titles and a trip back to the World Series. Our starting rotation at the time had two-time Cy Young Award winner Roger Clemens, a solid number two starter in Bruce Hurst, and Dennis “Oil Can” Boyd, who was having some health issues but had pitched well of late. We also had Lee Smith, a potential Hall of Fame candidate in the bullpen as our stopper. One more quality starting pitcher would give us one of the better starting rotations in the American League. As I began to make contact with other ball clubs to determine what might be available in the form of starting pitchers I made a call to an old friend of many years Roland Hemond, the general manager of the Baltimore Orioles. He indicated to me that he would give some consideration to trading Mike Boddicker in the right situation. We began to exchange names. I felt Boddicker, combined with Clemens, Hurst, and Boyd, was a formidable starting rotation that would make us a real contender. Hemond began to express an interest in our
young center fielder Brady Anderson. Anderson had opened the season with the major league team, but had recently been returned to Pawtucket. He was a solid defensive outfielder who might hit for a decent average, but had little power. At the time we had Ellis Burks in center field, with Dwight Evans and Mike Greenwell playing right and left, with Todd Benzinger at first. Burks was an excellent defensive outfielder, with all around great tools: arm, speed, and range. He was also a better hitter with more power than Anderson. I told Hemond we’d consider moving Anderson for Boddicker. Hemond then came back and said he’d make the trade if we would also include a young right-handed pitcher in our farm system named Curt Schilling. We had signed Schilling out of Yavapai Junior College in Arizona, and he had pitched about two seasons in our system. He was a big, strong, 21-year-old with an excellent fastball and a very good makeup. Our consensus of judgment was that Schilling was potentially five seasons away from pitching effectively at the major league level. My decision now came down to the fact that I could trade Anderson but replace him easily in our lineup and improve our ball club and I would be trading a prospect in Curt Schilling, who we thought was a ways from helping us at the big league level, for Boddicker, who potentially could take us back to the World Series now. So I made the trade. Brady Anderson played center field the rest of the year for the Orioles, and would be a regular for them through the 2001 season. Schilling also made a few appearances for the Orioles in 1988, but he would spend most of the next two and a half seasons going up and down from the big leagues to their Triple A team in Rochester. At the end of the 1990 season the Orioles traded Curt to Houston in a package for first baseman Glenn Davis. Schilling pitched out of the Houston bullpen in 1991 before they would trade him at the end of that season to the Philadelphia Phillies straight-up for Jason Grimsley. In Philadelphia he was placed in the starting rotation in May of the 1992 season and remained there the rest of the way. In 1993, almost five years after we had traded him, he won 16 games and established himself as an outstanding major league pitcher. He would come back to the Red Sox when Theo Epstein was able to trade for him and sign him to a new contract before the 2004 season. Obviously he would go on to play a dramatic role in helping the club win its first World Series in 86 years. From a personal standpoint I was thrilled to have him back and proud of what he accomplished in his career for we had scouted him, drafted him, and signed him in the first place.
Mike Boddicker won 39 games for the Red Sox from 1988–1990 and helped the team win two division crowns.
Today, with many websites and blogs covering trade rumors and free agent signings, the nuts-and-bolts mechanics of negotiations
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Photo: Rick Stewart/Getty Images
THE 2009 OLDE TOWNE TEAM
Photo: Otto Greule Jr/Getty Images
Piece-By-Piece with players are readily available to fans. Such was not the case in the 1980s, but here, Gorman shares his perspective on how contract talks with Bruce Hurst failed, contributing to the crumbling of a plan for a dominant rotation of Clemens, Hurst, Boddicker, and Boyd: Unfortunately, Bruce Hurst would leave us as a free agent after the 1988 season (Boddicker’s first in Boston) to sign a multi-year contract with the San Diego Padres. We tried hard to re-sign Hurst after all we had invested to put Boddicker together with him and Clemens. At the Winter Meetings that offseason we were negotiating with Hurst and his agents. They were between the Padres and us, and brought back San Diego’s financial offer for us to match. I matched it, and thought Hurst would be returning to Boston. The agent then asked us to insert a clause in the contract stipulating that if there was a work stoppage (which there was a threat of in 1989), Hurst would still be paid. I told them I could not do that, because if we did it for one, we would have to do it for Clemens and the rest of the team. The Padres agreed to put that clause in the contract, and Hurst signed with them. There has been a lot of discussion, both at the time and over the years, about the reason that Hurst left for San Diego, and the truth is it was that clause and that clause alone. Years later at a reunion for the 1986 pennant-winning team Bruce would tell me that leaving the Red Sox was the biggest mistake he ever made. Mike Boddicker would go on to win some 39 games in two-plus seasons with us, and gave us exactly what we had hoped he could contribute. Clemens would continue to be great in 1989 and 1990. Oil Can would experience more arm troubles and missed the rest of the 1988 season and most of the 1989 season before leaving for Montreal in 1990. So, despite the great performance from Boddicker, we never really got to see those four pitchers in a rotation together, and never were able to find out what a full season of Clemens, Hurst, and Boddicker would have provided to the Red Sox. What I had hoped would have been one of the better starting rotations in the league for years to come dissolved quickly with Hurst leaving and Oil Can’s health troubles. It became Clemens and Boddicker and we had to patch the rest together from there. We won a division crown in 1990, but it wasn’t enough to make us a serious contender, and with little other pitching depth in our farm system I went in search of pitching like Frank Viola, Greg Harris, Danny Darwin, Matt Young, and so on. But with Hurst leaving Boston after 1988, and Boddicker as well after 1990, that dream rotation was not to be. Gorman was GM of the Sox until 1994, and despite putting together some very competitive teams, didn’t get to see the Sox win
Bruce Hurst left the Red Sox following the 1988 season breaking up what could have been a special rotation. it all under his watch. He, therefore, appreciates the challenges Boston presents, and gives credit to the current front office for winning, and sustaining that success in this unique environment: The challenges of putting together a major league baseball team are tremendous, and a tremendous amount of credit should be given to Theo and the current administration for what they have accomplished in the last seven years. They have done a remarkable job in marketing, promotions, and in all facets. Yet it is still a demanding challenge to remain highly competitive in the pressure-packed environment of Boston and New England. The demand to win and remain competitive season in and season out never ends. The fanatical and passionate fandom of Red Sox baseball expect it and live for it. They will not settle for less. MSP Lou Gorman has been a lifetime baseball front office executive, who helped build two expansion clubs, the Kansas City Royals and the Seattle Mariners, as well as the New York Mets, before finally getting the opportunity to work for his favorite childhood team, the Boston Red Sox. Gorman continues to live in Boston and work for the Red Sox front office.
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