Defining Mexico's Zapatista Army of National Liberation

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Defining Mexico’s Zapatista Army of National Liberation

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Defining Mexico’s Zapatista Army of National Liberation

https://www.e-ir.info/2012/10/22/defining-mexicos-zapatista-army-of-national-liberation/

A September 24 article published by e-International Relations entitled “The End of Ideologically-Motivated Violent Movements in Latin America?” analyzed whether political ideology has ceased to be a factor among the insurgent movements in Latin America. One organization that deserves a special analysis is Mexico’s Zapatista Army of National Liberation (Ejercito Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional – EZLN).[1]

A Brief Historical Overview

TheEZLN,abarely-armedindigenousguerrillagroup,becameahousehold-nameinMexicoaftertheirarmed uprisinginthestateofChiapasinJanuary1994.[2]Theirleaderisknownas SubComandanteMarcos,who effectivelygovernsagroupofvillagesinthesouthernstateofChiapas.Marcosoperatesunderavaguelydefinedtitle thathascreatedquestionsoverwhetherthereisa commander –anotherleaderaboveMarcos–whilehismysterious personahasgivenhimawiderangeofpopularity.IntheDeclarationoftheLacandonJungleof1993,whichthe EZLNreferstoasitsdeclarationofwar,theorganizationincludedthedefeatoftheMexicanFederation’sarmyas oneoftheirgoals.TheEZLNexpressedthedesiretoallowthenewlyliberatedpopulationtoelectfreelyand democraticallytheirownauthorities.Furthermore,viathedeclaration,theEZLNdemandedtheendofthelootingof naturalresourcesfoundintheareascontrolledbytheorganization.Theinsurgentgroupgoesontorequestthe supportoftheMexicanpeopleinthestruggleforwork,land,education,justice,democracy,andrespectfornative rights.

ThestatedgoaloftheMarxist-LeninistZapatistasistobringautonomouscontroltotheindigenouspeopleof Chiapas,thoughnotnecessarilytooverthrowtheMexicangovernment,whichdifferentiatesitfromotherLatin Americanguerrillagroups.InaJune2005communiqué(theSixthDeclarationoftheLacandonJungle),theEZLN stateditsdecisiontolistentotheMexicanpopulace,decidingtoceasefireandnolongerengageinattacksagainst theMexicanmilitaryorotheropposingsecurityforces.Despiteseemingtochooseapacifisticmeanstowards accomplishingtheirobjectives,theEZLNmaintains,inthatsamestatement,itswillingness–evenobligation–to resumeanarmedstruggleifnecessary.Italsoputsforththeirdesireforanewnationalconstitutionthatrecognizes the“rightsandlibertiesofthepeopleanddefendstheweakinfrontofthemighty.”Suchdeclarationsinfavorofthe poormassesarefairlycommonofinsurgentmovements.Forexample,aSeptemberdeclarationbytheColombian guerillamovementFARC,whichhaswagedadecades-oldwaragainsttheColombiangovernment,alsostatesits willingnesstoattainpeaceinthecountry,“establishatruedemocracy,”andcondemnsthe“powersthatbe”for destroying the country’s natural resources.

TheMexicangovernmenthascarriedoutasometimescontroversialtwo-prongedapproachconsistingofcrackdown operationsandnegotiationstodealwithMarcosandtheEZLN.OneofthebloodiestexampleswastheDecember 1997massacre,inwhich45membersoftheTzotzilindigenouscommunitywerekilled.Mexicanparamilitariesare accusedofhavingcarriedouttheattack,thoughaccountsdifferastowhetherthegovernmentand/ormilitaryknew aboutorauthorizedtheoperation.Meanwhile,operationsbytheEZLNhavebeenfairlylow-keyinrecentyears.In September2010,EZLNmembersblockedthePanamericanhighway(intheComitan-SanCristobalarea).An indigenousprotestersaidthatthemovewastoprotestthedeploymentofparamilitarytroopstotheregionand

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accusedthetroopsoftorture.EventhoughtheEZLNhaslostmomentumwhenitcomestobeinginthenational spotlight,itremainsaregionalpowerhousewithinareasinChiapas.Nevertheless,Zapatistasupportershavebeen frequentlyharassedbygroupsassociatedwiththegovernment.Forexample,inSeptember2012Zapatistavillagers wereexpelledfromtheZapatistacommunityknownasComandanteAbel,bymembersofaparamilitarygroup known as Paz y Justicia.

The (Missing) Narco Link

AcriticalissueinananalysisoftheZapatistasistheirlink,orlackthereof,totheMexicandrugcartels.Around2010, Chiapas,wheretheZapatistasgenerallyoperate,wasconsideredunderthecontroloftheSinaloaFederation. Nowadays,territorieswithinthatstatehasbeenclassifiedbyintelligenceanalystsatSTRATFORaseitherunderthe controloftheZetascarteloras“disputedterritory.”TheaforementionedSTRATFORmapshouldbetakenwitha grainofsalt,particularlywhenitcomestofullyunderstandinghowvasttheZeta’sinfluenceis.Nevertheless,itdoes providegeneralideaoftheircurrentareaofoperations,giventhevastarrayofcriminalenterpriseswhichtheyare involvedin,fromdrugtraffickingtohumantrafficking.ThepossibilityofZetasinfluenceinsouthernMexicoisnot surprising.Itisclearthatthecartelhasbeenexpandingtothesouthernareasofthecountryandhaseven establishedapresenceacrosstheborderinneighboringGuatemala.Aspreviouslymentioned,itmakessenseforthe Zetastobeinvolvedinthesouthernborderareasofthecountryasthiscartelhasbecomeheavilyinvolvedinhuman trafficking originating in Central America all the way to the Mexican-U.S. border.

Towhatextent,ifany,dotheZapatistashaverelationswithdrugcartelsliketheZetas?Accordingtoaplethoraof declarationsandinterviewswithMarcos,theEZLN’s raisond’être sinceitsfoundationwastofightforthepoor, oppressedindigenouscommunitiesofSouthMexico.Assumingthatthisistrue,itwouldmakesensethattheywould opposethecartelsandtrytostopthenarco-violencethathasspreadthroughoutsomuchofthecountry.A2012 reportby AlJazeera helpsputthesituationinperspective.Accordingtothenewsagency’svirtualmapfrom 2007-2010,therewere304violentdeathsinChiapas.Incomparison,thestateofGuerrero,experienced2,727 deathsduetonarco-violence.Itisimportanttorememberthatthisdatashouldnotberegardedasdefinitive; disappearancesarenotoftenreported,newgravesareconstantlybeingfoundanditisdebatablewhetheramurder shouldbeattributedtoacartelortosomeotherkindofviolence(especiallyconsideringthehighnumberofunsolved murdersinMexico).Inaninterviewwiththeauthor,ananalystthathasdonesignificantworkonMexicoexplained that“forexample,Oaxacahasveryhighlevelsofpoliticalviolencethathavenothingtodowiththecartels.”[3]Hence the Al Jazeera map merely provides an analytical starting point.

IsthelackofmajorviolenceinChiapas,ascomparedtoGuerrero,duetothepresenceoftheZapatistas?Orcanit beexplainedforotherreasons,suchasalackofconfrontationbetweentwocartelsvyingforterritorialexpansion? ThestateofGuerreroisanimportantdrugplaza.Hence,thereissomesenseforthehighlevelsofviolencethere.On theotherhand,Chiapasismoreisolatedduetoitsgeographyandclosedcommunities,whichmaymakethestate, arguably,lessappealingforthecartels.Anothertheorywouldbethatlowlevelsofviolencecansimplybedueto successfulgovernmentalsecurityoperationsandapresenceofMexico’smilitaryandpoliceforces,thoughthatis debatable.

OnMay2011,anestimated20,000EZLNmembersinChiapastookpartinanationalprotesttodemandanendto PresidentFelipeCalderon’smilitarysolutiontothecartels.Aroundthattime,Marcosdeclaredthatthewarbetween thecartelsandthegovernmentwouldendinthousandsofdeathsandadestroyed,uninhabitednation.Healso statedthatthesolewinnerinthiswarwastheAmericanmilitaryindustry.Fromwhathasbeenmadepublic,the ZapatistaleaderhasnottakenapositionregardingtheongoingbattlebetweenthedrugcartelsandMexicanmilitary. Althoughonecouldassume,aspreviouslyargued,thattheZapatistasshouldbefightingagainsttheexpansionofthe cartelswhilenotnecessarilyworkingwiththeMexicansecurityforces.Unfortunately,thelackofavailable information prevents us from giving a more complete assessment of the reality in Chiapas.

Morerecently,accordingtooneanalyst,theZapatistashavelargelyrefrainedfromillegalactivityand,instead,have becomemoreofagrassrootssocialmovementinrecentyears.Ananalysisin InsightCrime alsoarguesthatby turningawayfromarmedstruggle,thegrouphasalsobeenaffordedacertainamountofpoliticallegitimacy.Unlike

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theirguerrillacousinsinColombiaandPeru,theZapatistashavewidespreadsupportbothfromtheMexicanleftand on the global stage, where they are known as a spearhead of the anti-globalization movement.

CanitbetrulysaidthattheZapatistas,fromthelowest-rankingmembersto Subcomandante Marcoshimselfarenot involvedindrugtrafficking?TheaforementionedMexicospecialistinterviewedbytheauthorarguesthatZapatista communitiesarebetterabletowithstandthespreadofthecartelspreciselybecausetheyare communities thatare underlesseconomicstrainthanotherpartsofthecountry.Theanalystsuspectsthecartelssteerclearofthatregion becausetheyhavenoreasontopenetratethosecommunitiesandthechallengesofdoingsoarehigher.;Leaving asidethisspeculation,thetruthisthatgreaterin-depthresearchandanalysisfromthefieldisneededtobetter understand the relationship between this movement and the drug cartels.

Asbothadisclaimerandanacknowledgementofthepossiblescarcityofinformation,inpreparationforthisanalysis, thisauthorwasunabletofindmediareportsregardingconfrontationsbetweenEZLNandcartels.Thisdoesnot necessarilymeanthatsuchincidentshavenotoccurred,butratherthattheymayhavegoneunreported.Giventhe territorialoverlapbetweentheEZLNandacartelliketheZetas,whichisknownforitsviciousattacks(suchasthe Monterreymassacreinwhich43individualswerekilled)itisdifficulttofindcredibilityintheideathatconfrontations between both groups have not occurred at some point.

Analyzing an Unclear Movement

Theaforementioned InsightCrime reportbringsupacriticalaspectofhowtheZapatistasareregardedbycertain analysts.TheanalysisindirectlycomparestheEZLNtonarco-insurgentmovementssuchastheColombianFARC, ELN,andPeru’sShiningPath,statingthattheEZLNisanentitythatis“incongruous”withtherest.Arguably,the ZapatistasdonotbelonginthesamecategoryasgroupsastheFARC.Amajorreasonforthisisthenatureofthese movements’statedobjectives.WhiletheFARCorShiningPathhadasanultimategoalofcarryingoutaregime changeandinstallingthemselvesasthenewgovernmentsinColombiaandPerurespectively,theZapatistas’goal wastopromotetherightsandprotectionoftheindigenouscommunitiesthattheyrepresented.Inaddition,whilethe EZLNhassomeCommunisttraitsinitsideology,ShiningPathisregardedashavingaMaoisttendency.[4]Such ideologicaldifferencesmaynotmattersomuchinthePost-ColdWarera,buttheyareimportantandshouldbe highlighted in order to properly analyze a violent movement.

ThereisnotenoughinformationavailabletomakeaproperassessmentoftherelationshipbetweentheEZLNand Mexicancartels,particularlytheZetas,whichhaveinfluenceinterritoriesclosetowheretheEZLNoperates.Ifall EZLNmembersaretrulycommittedtotheZapatistas’goals,thegroupwouldbeacohesiveunitthatfightstokeep theinfluenceandviolenceofthecartelsoutoftheirregions.Realistically,however,thisiswishfulthinkingatbest. Individualsaresusceptibletocorruptionandtheongoingcartelvs.governmentwarinMexicohasprovidedplentyof examplesofcorruptioncasesatalllevelsoftheMexicangovernmentandcivilsociety.Withoutmoretransparency fromtheZapatistas,itisdifficulttoassesswhetheritsmembers,particularlyitsleaders,havebeenimmunetothe cartels, whether via bribes or coercion.

Finally,giventheZapatistas’objectives, modusoperandi andtactics,isitcorrecttolabelsuchagroupasaviolent extremistmovementliketheColombianFARCorPeru’sShiningPath?Termssuchasterrorists,guerrillas,and insurgentstendtobeusedinterchangeablywhenitcomestolabelingorganizedviolentcriminalmovements.With suchgeneral,uniformterminology,itiseasytomisswhatdifferencesdoexistbetweenthem.[5]Withoutgoingintoa discussionofwhataterroristis,wecantentativelyutilizeaU.S.definition,whichdefinesaterroristasanentitythat resortsto“premeditated,politicallymotivatedviolenceperpetratedagainstnoncombatanttargetsbysub-national groupsorclandestineagents.”UnliketheShiningPath,forexample,theEZLNdidnotsystematicallykillinnocent civiliansviamassacres,nordidtheyresorttotacticssuchascarbombstoaccomplishobjectivesinthewaragainst thegovernment.Forexample,theShiningPath’sfirstknownoperationwasthemassmurderof69civiliansin1983–anactionwhichdefinedthemtothePeruvianpublic.AcriticalreasonwhytheZapatistasbecamepopularbothwithin Mexicoandabroadwaspreciselybecausetheydidnotresorttosuchwantonbrutality.Nevertheless,whether justifiedornot,theEZLNisamovementthathasrisenagainsttheMexicangovernmentandhas,attimes,resorted to violence.[6]

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Conclusions

TheEZLNremainsafascinatingcaseofaviolentmovementthatappearedinthepost-ColdWareraLatinAmerica, withsomeleftistaspectstoitsideologyandwithgoalsthatdonotincluderegimechange.Furthermore,fromwhatis known,theyhaveneitherengagedinanall-outwaragainstMexicansecurityforcesnorhavetheycarriedoutattacks againstciviliannon-combatantsThefactthatsomeZapatistacommunitieshavebeenharassedforparamilitary groupscallsintoquestiontheirleveloforganizationandwhethertheypossesanyweaponswithwhichtodefend themselves.Nevertheless,positivecharacterizationsofa“peaceful”Zapatistamovementastheoneissuedbythe aforementioned InsightCrime analysisdemandgreaterresearchregardingthereasonswhythismovementhasnot beenviolentinrecentyears..Inspiteofanychangesordrawdowns,moreresearchandtransparencyisnecessaryto understandthegroup’scurrentstatus,anditsties,orlackthereof,withthecountry’sdrugcartels,particularlythe Zetas.

AcriticalissueworthyoffurtherdebateandanalysisiswhethertheZapatistasshouldberegardedassomekindof blueprintforfutureviolentmovementsinLatinAmerica.Willviolentgroupsappearthatmayhavesomegeneral politicalideology, mostlikelywithleftisttendencies, butwithspecificdemandsaroundaspecificpopulationbutdoes notincluderegimechange?Inotherwords,willweseetheriseof localist violentmovementsinthefutureas comparedto grandiose onesthatstriveforregimechange?TheZapatistasarearguablythefirstgroupthathas emergedwithsuchapattern,anditisdebatablewhetherthesametypesofconditionsthatfomentedtheirapparition anddurabilitycanbeduplicatedinotherregionalstates.Nevertheless,LatinAmericaisknownforbeingaregion home to historical grievances, and, unfortunately, home to a cycle of violence that tends to perpetuate itself.

W.AlexSanchez isaResearchFellowattheCouncilonHemisphericAffairs(COHA)wherehefocuseson geopolitics,militaryandcybersecurityissues.HeregularlyappearsindifferentmediaoutletslikeAlJazeera, VOXXI,BBC,ElComercio(Peru),NewInternationalist,amongothers.Hisanalyseshaveappearedinnumerous refereedjournalsincludingSmallWarsandInsurgencies,DefenceStudies,theJournalofSlavicMilitaryStudies, European Security, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism and Cuban Affairs. Alex can be followed on Twitter here.

[1] For a good summary of the EZLN’s history, see: Arsenault, Chris. “Zapatistas: The War with no Breath?” Al Jazeera. Features. January 1, 2011. Available: http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/01/20111183946608868.html

[2] For a good analysis of the 1994 uprising when it occurred, see: Wager, Stephen J. and Schulz, Donald E. “The Awakening: The Zapatista Revolt and Its Implication for the Civil-Military Relations in Mexico.” Strategic Studies Institute.United States Army War College. December 30, 1994. Available: http://1.usa.gov/RZle9Z

[3] Email interview with the author. September 27, 2012.

[4] For a good analysis of Shining Path’s political ideology, see: Starn, Orin. “Maoism in the Andes: The Communist Party of Peru-Shining Path and the Refusal of History.” J. of Latin American Studies. 27. P. 399-421. Available: http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/peru/shiningpath.pdf

[5] Some academic articles that discuss the definition of terrorism and other terms include: Bosco, David. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.Jan/Feb2006, Vol. 62 Issue 1, p44-51. Also see:

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Schmid, Alex. Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law. Spring2004, Vol. 36 Issue 2/3, p103-147. Also see: Grob-Fitzgibbon, Benjamin. Peace & Change. Apr2005, Vol. 30 Issue 2, p231-246. Also see: Saul, Ben. Chinese Journal of International Law.2005, Vol. 4 Issue 1, p141-166.

[6] For a good analysis regarding Zapatismo ideology vs. Mexican politics see: Stephen, Lynn. “Pro-Zapatista and Pro-Pri: Resolving the Contradictions of Zapatismo in Rural Oaxaca.” Latin American Research Review. 32.2. 1997.

About the author:

Alejandro Sanchez Nieto is a researcher who focuses on geopolitics, military and cyber security issues in the Western Hemisphere. He is a regular contributor for IHS Jane’s Defense Weekly, the Center for International Maritime Security, Blouin News, and Living in Peru, among others. His analyses have appeared in numerous refereed journals including Small Wars and Insurgencies, Defence Studies, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, European Security, Perspectivas and Studies in Conflict and Terrorism. His Twitter is @W_Alex_Sanchez.

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