Religious Fundamentalism in Eight Muslim-Majority Countries

ReligiousFundamentalisminEight Muslim-MajorityCountries:Reconceptualization andAssessment

MANSOOR MOADDEL DepartmentofSociology UniversityofMaryland

STUART A.KARABENICK CombinedPrograminEducationandPsychology UniversityofMichigan

Tocapturethecommonfeaturesofdiversefundamentalistmovements,overcomeetymologicalvariability,and assesspredictors,religiousfundamentalismisconceptualizedasasetofbeliefsaboutandattitudestoward religion,expressedinadisciplinariandeity,literalism,exclusivity,andintolerance.Evidencefromrepresentative samplesofover23,000adultsinEgypt,Iraq,Jordan,Lebanon,Pakistan,SaudiArabia,Tunisia,andTurkey supportstheconclusionthatfundamentalismisstrongerincountrieswherereligiouslibertyislower,religion lessfractionalized,statestructurelessfragmented,regulationofreligiongreater,andthenationalcontextless globalized.Amongindividualswithincountries,fundamentalismislinkedtoreligiosity,confidenceinreligious institutions,beliefinreligiousmodernity,beliefinconspiracies,xenophobia,fatalism,weakerliberalvalues,trust infamilyandfriends,relianceonlessdiverseinformationsources,lowersocioeconomicstatus,andmembership inanethnicmajorityordominantreligion/sect.Wediscussimplicationsofthesefindingsforunderstanding fundamentalismandtheneedforfurtherresearch.

Keywords: fundamentalism,Islam,Christianity,Sunni,Shia,Muslim-majoritycountries.

INTRODUCTION

Theliteratureonreligiousfundamentalismhasconsiderablyexpandedinrecentdecades.Yet, threemajorchallengescontinuetohamperestablishingempiricalgeneralizationandtheoretical abstractionconcerningitspredictorsonthecountryandindividuallevels.First,themovementsso characterizedvaryhistorically,cross-nationally,andacrossreligions.Examplesofsuchvariability arenumerous,particularlyincontemporaryMuslim-majoritycountries:theSocietyoftheMuslim BrothersinArabcountries, Jama’atIslami inPakistan, FrontIslamiqueduSalut inAlgeria,the Taliban inAfghanistan,theNationalIslamicFrontintheSudan, Hamas intheGazaStrip, alShabaab inSomalia,and BokoHaram inNigeriainSunniIslam;the Fedayeen-eIslam andthe followersofAyatollahKhomeini,the Hezbollah inLebanon,andthe Houthis inYemeninShia Islam.Alsoincludedaresuchmyriadtransnationalterrorgroupsas al-Qaeda andtheIslamic StateinIraqandtheLevant(Ahmad1964;Almond,Appleby,andSivan2003;Kepel1985; Mitchell1993[1969];Roy1994;Sivan1985).

Acknowledgments: CommentsbyMarkChavesandanonymousreviewersfor JSSR aregratefullyacknowledged.This articleispartofalargercollaborativecomparativecross-nationalresearchproject,involvingMansoorMoaddel(PI), ArlandThornton(Co-PI),StuartKarabenick,LindaYoung-Demarco,JuliedeJong,JudyBaughn,andZeinaMneimneh, andwasfundedbytheOfficeofNavalResearch,AfricaCommandoftheU.S.ArmedForces,JackShandResearchGrant oftheSocietyfortheScientificStudyofReligion,AirForceOfficeofScientificResearch,UniversityofMaryland’s CenterforAdvancedStudyofLanguage,EasternMichiganUniversity,GottingenUniversity,andtheUniversityof Michigan.

CorrespondenceshouldbeaddressedtoMansoorMoaddel,DepartmentofSociology,UniversityofMaryland,College Park,MD20742—1315,USA.E-mail:moaddel@umd.edu

JournalfortheScientificStudyofReligion(2018)57(4):676–706 C 2018TheSocietyfortheScientificStudyofReligion

Complicatingthesubjectistheetymologicalvariabilityandambiguityofthetermitself. WhilefundamentalismistracedtosomeChristianchurchesin20th-centuryUnitedStates(Marsden1980;Smith1998;Wills1990)andleadssometoargueagainstitsusageinIslam(Esposito 1992),othershavearguedthattheconstructisstillpreferableoverthealternativestoidentify similartypesofmovementsinJudaism,Islam,andotherreligioustraditions(MartyandAppleby 1991;MoaddelandKarabenick2013).Weproposeaconceptualizationandoperationaldefinitionoffundamentalismthatismultidimensionalandthusgoesbeyondtheexistingapproaches inChristianity(Altemeyer2003;AltemeyerandHunsberger2004)andIslam(Moaddeland Karabenick2008,2013)andisgeneralizabletotheAbrahamicfaiths.

Finally,whilescholarshavemovedbeyondsinglecasestodetectgeneral“transnational, transcultural”patternsofreligiousfundamentalism(Almond,Appleby,andSivan2003;Antoun2008;EmersonandHartman2006:130;Lawrence1989;Munson1989;Riesebrodt1993), theirdefinitionsvarywidelyandaresometimesconstructedintermsthatoverlookitsreligious character;thatis,fundamentalismisconsidered(a)areactiontosecularization(Almond,Appleby,andSivan2003;Kaplan1992),(b)“anorientationtothemodernworld”(Antoun2008:2; Lawrence1989),(c)“astyleofpoliticalparticipation”(Lustick1988:5),(d)“anurbanmovement directedprimarilyagainstthedissolutionofpersonalistic,patriarchalnotionsoforder”(Riesebrodt1993:9),and(e)a“hierarchy,patriarchy,discipline,andseclusion”(Barzilai-Nahonand Barzilai2005:25).Aspectsofthesedefinitionsarealsooftenconflatedwithpropositionalstatementsconcerningthecausesoffundamentalism;forexample,thatfundamentalismisareaction tomodernization(Almond,Sivan,andAppleby1995;EmersonandHartman2006:134),oran urbanmovementtoprotectapatriarchalorder(Riesebrodt1993).

ReconceptualizingReligiousFundamentalism

Toovercometheselimitations,weproposethatfundamentalists,despitetheirdiversityand oftenirreconcilabledifferences—suchasthosefoundbetweenChristianandMuslimorShiaand Sunnivariants—sharecoreorientationstowardtheirownandother’sreligions(Altemeyer2003; AltemeyerandHunsberger2004;MoaddelandKarabenick2008,2013;SchwartzandLindley 2005;Summers2006).Weconceptualizethesecoreorientationsasadistinctivesetofbeliefsand attitudesthatrestsonadisciplinarianconceptionofthedeity,aliteralreadingofthescriptures, religiousexclusivity,andintolerance.FocusingontheAbrahamicfaiths,fundamentalistbeliefs andattitudesaredistinguishablefromthebasictenetsofthesefaithsthattheadherentsunquestionablyaccept.Thesetenetsin(ShiaandSunni)Islam,forexample,includethebeliefinthe onenessofGod,theProphecyofMuhammad,theQuranasthewordGod,andtheResurrection andDayofJudgment.InChristianity,theyarethebeliefinthetrinitariannotionofGodasFather, Son,andtheHolySpirit,JesusastheSonofGod,andtheVirginMary.MuslimorChristian fundamentalistscertainlybelieveinthetenetsoftheirownreligion.Butthebeliefthattheir religionisclosertoGodthanotherreligions,thatonlyMuslimsorChristianswillgotoheaven, thatGodseverelypunishespeopleeventhoughtheyhaveengagedinonlyaminorinfraction ofreligiouslaws,orthattheQuranortheBibleisliterallytrue—allconstitutefundamentalist beliefsbecausetheydisplaydistinctivereligiousorientationsratherthanassertingspecifictenets ofeitherfaith.

Fundamentalismalsodiffersfromreligiousconservatism(Belcher,Fandetti,andCole2004). Forsome,fundamentalismisasubsetofconservatism,suchasconservativeProtestants(WoodberryandSmith1998),andforothers,itissimilartoconservatism(GlassandJacobs2005; GlassandNath2006).However,aclearerconceptualizationandmoreprecisemeasurementof theterm,whicharenecessaryforabetterunderstandingofthesubject(WoodberryandSmith 1998),requireconsideringfundamentalismandconservatismasdistinctphenomena.Thelatter isprimarilyconcernedwithsocialissuesandpreservingthenormsassociatedwiththereligious traditionsuchasthosegoverninggenderrelationsandcommunalpractices(Davidman1991;

Grasmick,Wilcox,andBird1990;Hawley1994;Smith1998),whereasfundamentalismisa distinctiveorientationtowardone’sandothers’religionsuchasadherencetoliteralismorthe beliefintheexclusivityorsuperiorityofone’sreligiouscommunity.

Finally,ourconceptualizationisdeemedpreferabletothesingle-factorconceptionsoffundamentalism,primarilythosedefinedsolelyontext-basedinerrancyorintratextuality(e.g., Williamsonetal.2010).Thelatterexclusivelyfocusesonthescriptures,whichisonlyone facetofreligions.Rather,religionsaremultifaceted,consistingofbeliefsinsupernaturalforces orentitiesthatarecodifiedinthescriptures,embodiedinsaintsandreligiousleaders,grounded inorganizations,objectifiedinsymbolsandsartorialregimes,supportedbythecommunitiesof thefaithful(e.g.,theabodeofIslam,Christendom),enactedinperiodicrituals,andaffirmedor referredtoindailyconversations.Amultidimensionalconceptionofthetermthatconsidersthese multipleaspectsofreligionismorestableacrossindividualsandnationsthanfundamentalism assimplyinerrancy.Wethussuggestfourinterrelatedcomponentsthattogetherconstitutefundamentalistorientations.Thesearebeliefsin:(a)a disciplinariandeity—aGodwhorewardsthe faithfulandpunishesinHellthosewhofailtofollowHisinstructions;1 (b)the inerrancy ofthe scriptures—thebeliefinthescripturesasacomprehensivesystemofuniversaltruthandhistorical accuracy(e.g.,theChicagoStatementofBiblicalInerrancy1978)thatissuperiortoscience;(c) religious exclusivity—thebeliefthatone’sfaithisdecidedlysuperiortootherfaithsandthatonly thefaithfulmembersofone’sreligion“willenjoyreligiousrewardsandcompensators”(Sherkat 2014:24);and(d)religious intolerance2 —thatthefaithfulrestrictinteractionwiththefollowers ofotherfaiths,maintainreligiousboundariestokeepthefaithpure,andlimittherightsofother religions.Althoughthestrengthofthesecomponentsmayvaryamongindividualsandgroups,we proposethattheyarecoterminouswithoneanotherandformasinglefundamentalismconstruct.

Thesefeatureswerepresentinsuchhistoricallyspecificformsoffundamentalismasthe movementsfortherehabilitationofIslamthatfollowedtheteachingsofMuhammadIbnAbdul Wahhab(1703–1787)inArabiaandShahWaliallah(1703–1762)inIndia.Firmlybelievingthat impurityhadcreptintothefaith,thesemovementsadvocatedareturntothefundamentalsof IslampracticedbythefirstgenerationofMuslims,revitalizedthenotionoftheonenessofGod toattacktheprerogativeoftherulingelite,anddemandedtheformationofanIslamicstatein ordertoprotectthepurityoftheIslamiccommunityfromtheinfluenceofothercultures,which forShahWaliallahismeantthefolkwaysandmoresoftheHindus,andfortheWahhabis,the OttomansandtheShia(Ahmad1967;Hourani1983;Malik1980;Moaddel2005).

ThesereligiousorientationswererevivedbyHasanal-Banna(1906–1949),thefounderof theSocietyoftheMuslimBrothersinEgypt,andAbulAlaMaududi(1903–1979),thefounder of JamaatiIslami inIndiaandPakistan.ForBanna,“theprovisionofIslamanditsteachingsare allinclusive,encompassingtheaffairsofthepeopleinthisworldandthehereafter....Islamisa faithandaritual,anation...andanationality,areligionandastate,spiritanddeed,holytextand

1 Onthefaceofit,thiscomponentappliestoonlytheistic(Abrahamic)religions.Nonetheless,giventhefundamentalists’ preoccupationwithGod’sretributions—rewardsandpunishments—aparallelmaybeestablishedbetweenfundamentalismsintheisticandatheisticreligionsoftheEast,likeBuddhism,Hinduism,andJainism.Theconceptofkarmaused invariedwaysinthesereligionsalsorevolvesonrewardsandpunishments.Wethusproposethatinthesamewaythat fundamentalistsintheAbrahamicfaithsmaybeconcernedoverhowtheiractionsinthislifewouldbringaboutGod’s retributionsonjudgmentday,fundamentalistsinEasternreligionsmayalsoworryabouthowtheirmisdeedsinthislife wouldresultinmisfortuneinthenextandhowstrictadherencetotheteachingsoftheirreligionsmayalleviatesuch sufferings(BBC2018;Bronkhorst2011;Faure2009;Paine1997).

2 Werealizethatamultidimensionalconceptionoffundamentalismthatistoocloselyrelatedtoitshistoricalcontext(i.e., tooconcreteandspecific)anditscomponentsthatvaryindependentlyofoneanothermaybelessstablethanasingle dimension,asshowninthedebateoverthechurch-secttypology(Johnson1963).Themultidimensionalconception employedhereisgeneralandabstract,anditscomponentssignificantlycorrelatewithoneanotheracrossthecountries (seebelow).

sword”(Mitchell[1969]1993:232).Hisfollowersweremobilizedtorepelwhattheyconsidered anassaultonIslambysecularintellectualsandChristianmissionaries(Banna1978;Lia1998). Likewise,Maududi’sfundamentalismopposedfirstthenationaliststandofMuslimtheologians inIndiaandlaterthePakistanmovementforindependence,claimingthatMuslimswerenota nationalentitybuta jamaat governedbytheimmutableandeverlastingdivinelaw.Advancing aliteralist exegesisoftheQuran,hearguedthatGodwasnotonlythecreator,butalsotheonly absoluterulerandlegislatorforhumansociety(Ahmad1967).Maududi“didnotstandforthe politicalfreedomorself-determinationofMuslims,butfortheruleofIslam,forapurelyIslamic, traditionalist-fundamentalisttheocracy”(Ahmad1967:224).

InShiaIslam, Fedayeen-eIslam, formedinIranin1944,wasamongthesect’sfirstexpressionsofcontemporaryfundamentalism.Warningthatthesocietyhadstrayedfromtherightpath, theycalledforastrictapplicationofthesharia:prohibitionsofalcohol,tobacco,opium,films, gambling,andwearingofforeignclothing;enforcementofamputationofhandsofthievesand theveilingofwomen;andeliminatingnon-Islamicsubjectsfromschoolcurricula.Theyalso demandedrestrictingtheactivitiesofChristians,Jews,andZoroastrians,andtotallybanningthe Bahais(Abrahamian1982;Kazemi2012).AnothermanifestationofShiafundamentalismwas the Hojjatieh Society(formedin1953)tocombatthespreadoftheBahaifaith.LikefundamentalistChristians,itdisplayedamillenarianismpenchant,andsimilartotheMuslimBrothers, itemployedamodernorganizationalandsartorialstyle(Sadri[2004]2012).AftertheIranian Revolution,thefundamentalistswerecloselyassociatedwiththebeliefinclericalabsolutismand Shiasectarianism.Finally, Osulgarayan (translatedasPrincipalists)(Sanandaji2009)became thenomdeguerreofagroupoffundamentalistparliamentarianswhowantedtodistinguish themselvesfromthereformists.

Despitetheirdifferences,thesemovementsweresimilarinorientations—believinginatotal submissiontothesharia,Islamasacompletesystemoftruth,andreligiousexclusivityand intolerance.Wemeasuretheseorientations,examinethefactorslinkedtocross-nationaland individualvariationinfundamentalism,anddiscusstheimplicationsofthisstudyforabroader understandingofthesubject.

TheoreticalDevelopment

Fundamentalismvariesamongindividuals;somestronglybelieveinadisciplinariandeity, theinerrancyofthescripture,religiousexclusivity,andsuperiorityoftheirfaithoverotherfaiths. Othersmanifestthesebeliefstoalesserextent,andsome,suchasatheists,notatall.Partof thisvariationmaybeduetofactorsoperatingatbroadersociopoliticalandculturalcontextsthat affecteveryone,includingglobalization,statestructuresandpolicies,andthereligiousprofileof thecountry;andanotherpartrelatedtovariationinindividualattributesandattitudes.Wespecify andassessthesefactorsinordertouncoverandexplainthepatternofvariationinreligious fundamentalismnotonlyamongindividualsbutalsocross-nationally.

ExplainingCross-NationalVariationinFundamentalism

WedrawonMoaddel’s(2005)episodic-discoursemodeltoexplaincross-nationalvariation inreligiousfundamentalism.Moaddelcontrastsmodernismandfundamentalismasopposing orientationsofMuslimintellectualstowardsignificantissues.Amongtheseissuesaretherole ofrationalreasoninginIslam,seculargovernment,thesocialstatusofwomen,andWestern culture.Islamicmodernistsfollowedrational exegesisoftheQuran,supportedconstitutional government,reinterpretedreligiousteachingsongendertofavorwomen,andconsideredWestern cultureprogressive.Islamicfundamentalists,bycontrast,followedaliteralreadingoftheQuran, supportedtheunityofreligionandpoliticsinanIslamicgovernment,favoredmalesupremacy andpatriarchy,andconsideredtheWestasculturallydecadent.

Moaddel(2005)contendsthatthesediverseorientationswereafunctionofvariationin(a) culturalcontextfrompluralistictomonolithicand(b)stateinterventioninculturefromlow tohigh.HethenproposesthatMuslimintellectualleadersdevelopedmodernistorientationsin EgyptandIndiainthesecondhalfofthe19thcenturybecausetheyencounteredapluralityof discoursesadvancedbyfollowersoftheEnlightenment,Westernizersandthink-tanksconnected tocolonialadministration,themissionaries,andtheulama—allcompetingfortheintellectual controlofthesociety,whilestateinterventioninculturewaslimited.Theriseoffundamentalism in20th-centuryAlgeria,Egypt,Iran,andSyria,ontheotherhand,wasareactiontothemonolithic seculardiscourseimposedfromabovebytheauthoritarianideologicalstate(Moaddel2005).

Fundamentalismdefinedasdisciplinariandeity,literalism,andreligiousexclusivityand intolerancereflectsadistinctivereligiousorientationthatisdifferentfromthedefinitionofthe termasorientationstowardsociopoliticalandculturalissues.Thelatterareindicatorsofthe liberalism-conservatismcontinuumandconsideredaspredictorsoffundamentalism.However, someofthekeyelementsofMoaddel’smodelarerelevantforexplainingcross-nationalvariation ofthephenomenon.First,weproposethat pluralistic contexts,inclusiveofbothsecularand religiousoptionsforseekersofspirituality,weakenfundamentalismbecausethesecontextsare likelytoofferarichermenuofoptionstosatisfyawiderrangeofspiritualneeds(Montgomery 2003).Asaresult,fewerofthese“spiritualshoppers”(Wuthnow2005)wouldbewillingtoadopt fundamentalism.Furthermore,apluralisticcontextexposesthepublictoagreaternumberof perspectivesonlife,security,andhappiness,reinforcingviewsconcerningthevariedwaysthat metaphysicalentitiesmaybeworshiped.Peoplearethuslesslikelytofollowadisciplinarian deityandaliteral,exclusivist,andintolerantreadingofreligion(BergerandLuckman1969). Religiousmonopolies,ontheotherhand,maycontributetoreligiousfundamentalismthrough mobilizingresources,thesanctioningofreligiousbehavior,punishingreligiousnonobservance, andexploitingsectarianrivalries(Blau,Land,andRedding1992;Blau,Redding,andLand1993; Breault1989;Handy1991;EllisonandSherkat1995).

Theauthoritariansecularstateisanotheraspectofthesocialcontextthatmayshapefundamentalism.Twofeaturesofthestatearerelevantforunderstandingtherelationofreligious fundamentalismwithregimes.Oneisthestate’s regulation ofreligion.Fundamentalismmay ariseasareactiontosuchinterventions.Bylaunchingculturalprogramstopromotesecularinstitutions,suchasfosteringnationalidentityasasubstituteforreligiousidentity,orinstitutinglaws thatruncontrarytoreligiousbeliefs,asecularstatemaycontributetotheperceptionamongthe faithfulthattheirreligionisundersiege,corevaluesoffended,andreligiousfreedomobstructed. Thisperceptionofbesiegedspiritualitymayactivatereligiousawarenessthatpromptsindividualstogrow“hypersensitiveeventotheslightesthintoftheologicalcorruptionwithintheirown ranks”(Smith1998:8),usereligiouscategoriestoframeissues,andadoptalarmistattitudesand conspiratorialperspectives(MoaddelandKarabenick2013).WhiledifferentconceptionsofGod maycoexistinasociety(FroeseandBader2010),theperceivedurgencytoriseindefenseof “Hisdominion”andcombattheall-powerfulsecularstatemaypopularizeamongthepublican authoritarianconceptionofadeitywhohandsomelyrewardsthefaithfulandseverelypunishes theunbelievers.AsAlmond,Appleby,andSivan(2003:19–20)stated,fundamentalists“fashion theirownprogramsandideologiesinanawkwardmimesisofthe[state].”

Fundamentalismmayalsobeinfluencedbythe structure ofanauthoritarianstate.The premisethatstatestructuresshapereligiousoutcomeshasalongpedigreeinthesociologyof religion.Forexample,thesuccessofProtestantismin16th-centuryEuropeislinkedtovariation inthestructureofpoliticalsovereignty(Swanson1967)orstateautonomy(Wuthnow1985). Here,wearguethatconsequentialfortheriseoffundamentalismistheextenttowhichthe structureofpowerrelationisunifiedorfragmented.Anauthoritarianstateunderaunifiedelite wouldbemoreeffectiveinimposingamonolithicreligiononthesubjectpopulation,which wouldlimittheavailablesecularoralternativereligiousoptionsfortheseekersofspirituality.An authoritarianstatethatiscontrolledbyafragmentedelite,ontheotherhand,tendstoexperience

intereliterivalriesandacrimoniousdebates(Moaddel2016).Suchinternaldisputeswouldnot onlydiminishthestate’sabilitytoimposereligiousuniformityonsociety,butalsogeneratethe socialspacethatpermitsthegrowthofanalternativereligiousorsecularmovement(Wuthnow 1985).

Insum,anauthoritarianstatewithaunifiedstructurestrengthensandafragmentedstructure weakensfundamentalism.TheIslamicRepublicofIranandtheKingdomofSaudiArabiaprovide contrastingexamples.Whilebothregimesareremarkablysimilarinreligioussectarianism, repressiveness,andoilastheirsourcesofrevenue,therulingeliteisfragmentedinIranbut unifiedinSaudiArabia.TheriseofliberalismandreligiousreformisminIran(Kamrava2008; Moaddel2009;Rajaee2007)andfundamentalisminSaudiArabia(Champion2003;Dekmejian 1994;Moaddel2006;Okruhlik2002)appearstocorrespondtothedifferenceinthestructureof powerrelationbetweenthetworegimes.

Finally, globalization mayweakenfundamentalismbycontributingtothediversificationof culture.Thedevelopmentofdigitalcommunicationtechnologyandthemeansofmasstransportationreducetheconstraintsofgeographyonsocialinteractions(Waters1995),intensifying “worldwidesocialrelations”(Giddens1990:64)andexpandingintercontinentalnetworksofeconomic,political,andculturalinterdependenceamongnations(Frankel2000;KeohaneandNye 2000;Sassen2001).Thesedevelopmentsglobalizeeconomicactivitiesandenhancethediffusionofculturesandcivilizationalosmoses,facilitatingaccesstodiverseinformationsources, underminingreligiousmonopolies,andthusweakeningfundamentalism.

Alternatively,fundamentalismmayevenbeanoutcomeofglobalizationby(a)intensifying theclashofcivilizations(Huntington1996);(b)breakingdowntheprotectiveshieldsofsmall communitiesasaresultoftheeffortstoeliminatebarrierstotheworldmarkets,employingsimilar organizationalstructures(Stohl2005),andenforcingahomogeneousculturalpattern(Ritzer 1993),whichtriggersthefeelingofalienationandinsecurity(Giddens1991;Kinnvall2004);and (c)expandinginequalitythroughtheincorporationoftheindigenouseconomiesintotheglobal hierarchyofasymmetricalexchangerelationsoftheworldcapitalistsystem(Wallerstein2000).

IndividualVariationinReligiousFundamentalism

Toexplaincross-nationalvariationinfundamentalism,wefocusonreligiousfreedomand fractionalization,stateregulationofreligion,fragmentationofstateauthoritarianstructure,and globalization.Ontheindividuallevel,weconsiderthepotentialinfluenceof(a)religiosity,trust inreligiousinstitutions,andreligiousmodernity;(b)liberalvalues;(c)hostilitytowardoutsiders; (d)fatalism;(e)informationsources;and(f)demographics.

First,itisevidentthatwithoutreligion,religiousfundamentalismmaynotexist(Ammerman1987;BlaydesandLinzer2008;KellstedtandSmidt1991;Lapidus1992;Lewis1993; Peshkin1988).Higher religiosity maythusbelinkedtostrongerfundamentalism.Moreover, peoplewithgreater confidenceinreligiousinstitutions aremorelikelytoself-restricttosuch institutionsforinformationandguidance,developastrongermonolithicviewofreligion,andare thusmorestronglyfundamentalist.Finally,individualswhobelievethatreligiousbeliefsfoster development—espousing religiousmodernity—maydevelopastrongerattitudeagainstsecular change,haveamoreholisticviewofreligion,andastrongerfundamentalistorientation.Second, fundamentalismisalsolinkedtotheconservativeandpatriarchalvaluesaswellassubmission toreligiousrule(Almond,Appleby,andSivan2003;Antoun2008;Kaplan1992;Lawrence 1989;Moaddel2005;Riesebrodt1993).Asacorollaryofthisargument,weproposethatindividualswhosupportthe liberalvalues ofexpressiveindividualism,genderequality,andsecular politicsaremorelikelytoexpressdoubtaboutthetruthofreligionandlesslikelytoespouse fundamentalism.

Third,asshownbysocialscienceresearch,hostilitytowardoutsiders,or xenophobia,andthe beliefin conspiracies arelinkedtoright-wingsolidarityandreligiousfundamentalism(Bermanis, Canetti-Nisim,andPedahzur2010;Choueiri2010;Euben1999;Inglehart,Moaddel,andTessler

2006;Koopmans2014;MaehrandKarabenick2005;Pipes1996;Zeidan2001).Wefurthertest thesehypothesesbyassessingtheirrelationshipswithfundamentalismacrosstheeightcountries. Likewise,fourth,thebeliefinobediencetoadisciplinarianGodandthenecessityofsurrendering unconditionallytoHimmayalsobestrongeramong fatalistic individuals,whoconsidertheir fateasfirmlyestablishedandthatthereislittleonecandotochangeit(Booth1991;Brinkand Mencher2014;Cohen-Mor2001;Ellerbe1995;Ford1962;Mercier1995;Quinney1964).

Fifth,individualswhorelymoreonfamilyandfriends(Ellison1995;Sherkat1995)as asourceofinformationconcerningreligionarelesslikelytoavailthemselvesofotherand morediversesources,andmorelikelytoespousestrongerfundamentalism.Ontheotherhand, thosewhorelyondiversesourcesofinformationaremorelikelytobeexposedtoavarietyof perspectivesonreligion.Asaresult,theytendtodevelopageneralawarenessoftheexistenceofa pluralityofbeliefsystemsandalternativevenuesforspiritualsatisfaction,andasaconsequence, arelesslikelytoespousereligiousfundamentalism.

Finally,amongdemographics,socialclass,ethnicandreligiousidentity,andurban-rural residencemayallbelinkedtofundamentalism.Wearguethathighereducationandincomeare likelytoweakenfundamentalism;educationissaidtolowercognitivebarrierstoenlightenment. Theeducatedaremoreskilledinanalyzingissues,assessingalternativeperspectives,andmaking senseoftheworldautonomouslythanthoselesseducated(KruegerandMale ˇ ckov ´ a2003;SchussmanandSoule2005).Theyarethuslesslikelytoespousealiteralist,exclusivist,andintolerant viewofreligion,comparedtothosewithlowerlevelsofeducation.Also,individualswithhigher incomesarelesslikelytoharborfundamentalistbeliefsgiventheirgreateraccesstomorediverse culturalperspectivesandnetworks.Lower-incomeindividuals,ontheotherhand,aremorelikely tosupportfundamentalism(Almond,Appleby,andSivan2003;Ayubi1991;BlaydesandLinzer 2008;Gaskins,Golder,andSiegel2013;Mehmet1990).Experiencingahigherlevelofstatus insecurity(Caudill1963;Coreno2002;Shapiro1978;Weber1964;Weller1965),theyaremore likelytosupportthecommunitarianismofreligiousfundamentalism(DavisandRobinson2006).

Inequalityintermsofethnicityandreligionorreligioussectmayalsohaveramificationsfor fundamentalism.Paralleltotheviewthatrelatesprejudicebythemembersofthedominantethnic grouptotheirperceptionofthreatfromothergroups(Blumer1958;BoboandHutchings1996; Quillian1995),weassesswhethermembersofthedominantethnicgrouparealsomorestrongly fundamentalistthanareethnicminorities.Likewise,weexpectfundamentalismtobehigher amongmembersofthedominantreligionorreligioussectbecauseoftheirclaimedownershipof religionandtheperceptionthatreligiousminoritieshavedeviatedfromthetruepathandtherefore poseathreattotheirreligion.Fundamentalismamongreligiousminorities,ontheotherhand, shouldbeweakerbecausetakingamoremoderatereligiousstandwouldbeaccommodating towardthedominantreligionandthusreducereligioustensions.

Peoplelivinginruralareas,withlimitedaccesstoamorediversifiedreligiousenvironment, maydisplaystrongerfundamentalismthanthoseinurbanareas.Finally,toruleoutthepossibility ofspuriousfunctionsofemployment,age,gender,andmaritalstatus,westatisticallycontrolfor thesevariables.

METHOD

SampleandSurveyProcedure

Usingamultistageprobabilitysamplingdesign,face-to-faceinterviewswereconducted ofanationallyrepresentativesampleof3,143adult(age18+)Egyptians,3,000Iraqis,3,008 Jordanians,3,034Lebanese,3,523Pakistanis,1,635Saudis,3,070Tunisians,and3,019Turkish in2011–2016.Theyadduptoover23,000completedinterviews,representing400millionor

Table1:Datacollectionoverview

SampleSizeSurveyDatesResponseRate(%)DataCollectionInstitutionorFirm

Egypt3,143June–Aug201193ERTC,Cairo

Iraq3,000Jan–Feb201188IIACSS,Baghdad

Jordan3,008Apr–May201680UofJordan,Amman

Lebanon3,034Mar–July201161ICOD&Am.U.,Beirut

Pakistan3,523May–Sept201183UofAgriculture,Faisalabad

KSA1,635Jan–Feb201173PARK,Jeddah

Tunisia3,070Mar–May201378ELKAConsulting,Tunis

Turkey3,019Apr–June201362FREKANS,Istanbul

KSA = KingdomofSaudiArabia.

Table2:Respondents’demographiccharacteristics(%)

SampleCharacteristicsPakistanEgyptKSAIraqJordanLebanonTunisiaTurkey

Meanage3539343642354441

Male5148505350594544

Universityeducation417171317281713

Married7671647074506369

Religion:

Sunni90.096924097239986

Shi’a8.6–83133–2

Allawi 4

Muslim(nosectspecified)8–293–7 Druze6––

Christian1.44– <1327––

KSA = KingdomofSaudiArabia.

26percentofthe1.6billionworldMuslimpopulationsin2010.3 EgyptandLebanonhavesizable Christianpopulations.Ateamofinvestigatorsdevelopedthequestionnaireincollaborationwith researchersfromtheeightcountries.4 Toensureconsistencyofmeaningacrossthecountries,the questionnairewastranslatedfromEnglishintoArabic,Kurdish,Pashto,Urdu,andTurkish,back translatedintoEnglishbysomeonewhohadnotseentheoriginalversion,andcomparedwiththe originalEnglishversion.Table1showsthesamplesize,fieldworkdate,responserate,andthe organizationthatcarriedoutthesurveyineachcountry,andTable2providestherespondents’ demographics.

Measurement

ReligiousFundamentalism

Adheringtothestipulationthatamultidimensionalconceptionoffundamentalismmore effectivelycapturesthediversemannerinwhichthesubjectmaybemanifestedvis- ` a-vissundry aspectsofreligion,weoperationalizedthefourcomponentsintermsofaseriesofitemsthat

3 Seehttp://www.prb.org/Publications/Articles/2011/muslim-population-growth.aspx.

4 Foracopyofthedataandthequestionnaire,seehttps://mevs.org/data/survey-summary/1004.

wereintendedtograspthemultiplemeaningslinkedtoeachofthecomponents: deity, inerrancy, exclusivity,and intolerance.Initially,ourresearchteamdevelopedatotalof25itemswitha Likert-scaleresponseformat(codedas“stronglyagree” = 4,“agree” = 3,“disagree” = 2,and “stronglydisagree” = 1).MuslimrespondentswereaskedabouttheQuran,Islam,andMuslims, whileChristianrespondentsabouttheBible,Christianity,andChristians.Althoughwewerenot allowedtousesomeoftheitemsinEgypt,nomorethanoneoftheexcludeditemsinEgypt, identifiedwith*below,wasinthesamecomponent,withtheremainingitemsdeemedsufficient toprovidestableestimatesofeachcomponent.

Sixitemsmeasuredthebeliefsandattitudesthataremanifestedbyadisciplinariandeity. TheserevolveonGod’srewardsinheaven,(fearof)punishment,andSatan’sscheme.Fouritems measuringinerrancy(orliteralism)highlightedthebeliefinthecomprehensivenessandaccuracy ofthereligioustruthanditssuperiorityoverman-madelawsandscience.Therewerealsothree reversalitemsthatmodifiedtheseclaims.Themeasuresofexclusivityincludedfouritems— stressingthatonlyone’sfaithistruthfulandcomprehensive,andonlythroughwhichsalvationis attainable—andonereversal.Finally,fiveitemsmeasuredintoleranceofotherfaithsandcriticism ofone’sreligionandtworeversals.

Afterincorporatinginputfromresearchersinfiveoftheeightcountries(wheresurveysfirst conductedin2011),the25itemswereextensivelypretestedinthesecountriesin2010.Wethen conductedaseriesofexploratory(EFA)andconfirmatory(CFA)factoranalysesoftheitems relatedtoeachofthefourcomponentstoarriveatfoursetsoffouritems(atotalof16items). Weexaminedthesesetstoconstructasinglescalewiththedesiredgoalofcreatingabalanced contributionofthefourcomponents.EFAsdeterminedthateachsetoffouritemscombining thesamplesfromallcountriesyieldedasinglefactorforeachcomponentwitheigenvalues > 1(accountingforpercentofthevariance)asfollows:Deity = 2.12(53percent),Inerrancy = 1.61(40percent),Exclusivity = 1.78(45percent),andIntolerance = 1.89(47percent).Thefour itemsineachcomponentwerethenaveragedtoyieldmeansacrosstheentiresample:Deity = 3.39,Inerrancy = 3.41,Exclusivity = 3.35,Intolerance = 2.60.AnEFAofthefourcomponent meansyieldedasinglefactorwitheigenvalue > 1(2.50)thatexplained62.58percentofthe variance.

Wealsoassessedwhethertheentire16itemswouldprovideareliablescale.Internalconsistencyestimates(Cronbach’s α )acrossallcountriescombinedincludingEgyptwithallbutthe excludeditems = .82,andusingallitemswhenexcludingEgypt = .86.Afurtherreliabilitycheck conductedattheitemlevelforeachcountryresultedin α levelsthatwerealsointheacceptable range:Tunisia = .88,Lebanon = .88,Iraq = .84,Turkey = .80,SaudiArabia = .75,Jordan = .74,Pakistan = .72,andEgypt = .65.Wethenaveragedthefourcomponentstocreateasingle fundamentalismscorewiththeintendedbalanceofthefouritemsforeachcomponent,whichare asfollows(theexcludeditemsarereportedinthefootnotes):

Deity5

AnyinfractionofreligiousinstructionwillbringaboutGod’sseverepunishment. OnlythefearofGodkeepspeopleontherightpath.* SatanisbehindanyattempttounderminethebeliefinGod. Peoplestayontherightpathonlybecausetheyexpecttoberewardedinheaven.

5 Theexcludeditemswere:(1)“Allahrequireshisslavestorepent(tobbah)”and(2)“Allahisthesourceofeverything good.”

Inerrancy6

TheQuran(Bible)istruefrombeginningtoend.

TheQuran(Bible)hascorrectlypredictedallthemajoreventsinhumanhistory.*

InthepresenceoftheQuran(Bible),thereisnoneedforman-madelaws. Wheneverthereisaconflictbetweenreligionandscience,religionisalwaysright.

Exclusivity7

OnlyIslam(Christianity)providescomprehensivetruthaboutGod.

OnlyIslam(Christianity)givesacompleteandunfailingguidetohumansalvation.

OnlyMuslims(Christians)aregoingtoheaven. Islam(Christianity)istheonlytruereligion.*

Intolerance8

Ourchildrenshouldnotbeallowedtolearnaboutotherreligions. Thefollowersofotherreligionsshouldnothavethesamerightsasmine.

CriticismofIslam(Christianity)shouldnotbetolerated.

CriticismofMuslim(Christian)religiousleadersshouldnotbetolerated.

PredictorsofFundamentalism:NationalContext

ReligiousPluralism

Twoindicatorsmeasuredthisconstruct.(a)Areligious-libertyindexasanaverageofreligious freedom(1 = high,7 = low)andreligiouspersecution(1 = low,10 = high)providedbythe AssociationforReligionDataArchives(ARDA).9 Thisaverageisrecodedsothathighervalue indicatesmorereligiousliberty.And(b)a religious-fractionalizationindex constructedfromthe distributionofthesampledatabyreligion/sectthatisreportedinTable2,usingthisformula:

Religiousfractionalizationindex = 1 p 2 i , where pi istheproportionofreligionorsect i inthesample.Highervaluesindicategreater religiousdiversity.10

6 Theexcludeditemswerethreereversals:(1)theQuran’s(Bible’s[forChristianrespondents])descriptionofpast historicaleventsisnotalwaysaccurate;(2)theQuran(theBible[forChristianrespondents])containsgeneralfacts, butsomeofitsstoriesneedtobeinterpreted;and(3)differentinterpretationsoftheQuran(theBible[forChristian respondents])areequallyvalid.ThefirsttwoquestionsweredisallowedinEgypt.Inothercountries,thefirstquestion wasnegativelylinkedtofundamentalism,buttheothertwoprovedtobeconceptuallyvague.

7 Theexcludeditemwasareversalquestion:“AllreligionsareequallyacceptabletoAllah.”

8 Theexcludeditemswereonedirectmeasure—Non-Muslims(Non-Christians[forChristianrespondents])shouldbe prohibitedfrompracticingtheirreligionin(StudySiteCountry)—andtworeversalquestions:(1)thefollowersofall religionsshouldhaveequalrightstopracticetheirreligionin(StudySiteCountry)and(2)Non-Muslims(Non-Christians [forChristianrespondents])shouldbefreetobuildtheirplacesofworshipin(StudySiteCountry).

9 RogerFinke,ChristopherBader,andAndrewWhitehead,www.thearda.com/internationalData/.

10 AdoptedfromtheHerfindahlethnicconcentrationformula(citedinPosner2004:849).

StateStructureFragmentation

Weconstructeda fragmentationratio asthesquarerootofameasureoffractionalizedelite11 dividedbypoliticalandcivillibertiesindex:12

Fragmentationratio = √Fractionalizedelite Politicalrights & civillibertiesindex .

StateInterventioninReligion

A government-regulation-of-religionindex (GRRI)13 wasavailablefor2003–2008(averaged) andrangesbetween0(noregulation)and10(highregulation).

Globalization

Weusedtwomeasuresofglobalization.Oneis economicglobalization14 asanaverageof standardizedmeasuresof internationaltrade—thesumofimportandexportaspercentageof GDP—and foreigncapitalpenetration (FCP).FCPismeasuredas:

FCP = Foreigndirectinvestment

√ (Domesticcapitalpenetration × labor )

InternetPenetration

ThiswasmeasuredasthepercentageofthepopulationthathadaccesstotheInternet.

Tomakethesemeasuresmorestable,thethree-yearaverageofthedataontrade,foreign capitalpenetration,andInternetaccesswereconstructedwheredatawereavailablefor2009–2011,2010–2012,and2012–2014,dependingonwhetherthecountrysurveywascompletedin 2011,2013,or2016,respectively.

PredictorsofFundamentalism:Individual-LevelVariables

ReligiosityIndex

Thisindexwasconstructedbyaveragingthreevariables:(a)frequencyofprayer—ranging from(1)never,(2)onceayear,(2)onceortwiceamonth,(3)onceortwiceaweek,(4)oncea day,(5)twotofourtimesadayto(6)fivetimesdaily;(b)self-describedasreligious—ranging from1,notatallreligious,to10,veryreligious;and(c)theimportanceofGodinlife,ranging fromnone(1)toutmostimportant(10).15

11 http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/data/

12 https://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world#.vi6jtcvf9u1

13 Seehttp://www.thearda.com.

14 ForGDP,seehttp://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ne.trd.gnfs.zs;fordifferentmeasuretoconstructFCIP, seehttp://data.worldbank.org/indicator/bx.klt.dinv.wd.gd.zs,http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/bx.klt.dinv.cd.wd, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/sl.tlf.totl.in,http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ne.gdi.totl.cd;andfortheInternet, seehttp://data.worldbank.org/indicator/it.net.user.p2.

15 Mosqueattendanceisexcludedfromthisindexbecausethemeasurecarriesgenderbias;acrossthesecountries,women areoftendiscouragedfromattendingmosques.

ConfidenceinReligiousInstitutions

Thisconstructwasmeasuredbyonesurveyquestion:“Pleasetellmewhetheryouhave(4)a greatdealofconfidenceinreligiousinstitutions,(3)quitealotofconfidence,(2)notverymuch confidence,or(1)noneatall?”

ReligiousModernityIndex

Thisindexwasconstructedastheaverageofresponsestothreequestionsaboutthebelief thatreligiousbeliefsfosterdevelopment:“Woulditmakeyourcountry(1)alotlessdeveloped, (2)lessdeveloped,(3)moredeveloped,or(4)alotmoredeveloped,if(a)faithinAllahincreases, (b)theinfluenceofreligiononpoliticsincreases,and(c)thebeliefinthetruthoftheQuran [Bible(forChristians)]increases?”

Conspiracy

Onequestionprobedrespondentsaboutwhetherthey“(4)stronglyagree,(3)agree,(2) disagree,or(1)stronglydisagreethatthereareconspiraciesagainstMuslims(orChristiansfor Christianrespondents).”

Xenophobia

Thisindexwastheaverageofresponsestoaseriesofquestionsonwhetherrespondentswould liketohaveasneighborsFrench,British,Americans,Iranians,KuwaitisinIraqsurvey/Indians inPakistan/Iraqisinothercountries,TurkishinIraqandSaudiArabia/Saudisinothercountries, JordaniansinIraq/AfghanisinPakistan/PakistanisinSaudiArabia/Syriansinothercountries. Theresponseswerecodedas2forthosementioning“wouldnotlike”and1forthosementioning “wouldlike”tohavethemasneighbors.

Fatalism

Respondentswereaskedtochooseanumberbetween1and10,where1 = “peopleshape theirfatethemselves”and10“everythinginlifeisdeterminedbyfate.”

Liberalism

Aliberalismindexwascreatedbyaveragingfourcomponentsoftheconstruct.

Expressive-individualismindex wastheaverageofthreeindicators:basisformarriage,a woman’srighttodressasshewishes,andchildqualities.Responsetothebasisformarriagewas codedas4forloveand1forparentalapproval.Woman’srighttodresswascodedasfollows inresponsetothequestion:“Doyou(4)stronglyagree,(3)agree,(2)disagree,or(1)strongly disagreethatitisuptoawomantodressasshewishes?”Forchildqualities,respondentswere askedtoselectfivefromalistof10favorablequalitiesforchildrentohave.Thosewhoselected “independence”or“imagination”werecodedas“1,”andthosewhodid not select“religious faith”or“obedience”werealsocodedas“1”(0 = otherwise).Thisaveragewasadjustedtorange between1and4.

Agender-equalityindex wasconstructedbyaveragingresponsesto:“Doyou(1)strongly agree,(2)agree,(3)disagree,or(4)stronglydisagree”that:(a)“itisacceptableforamantohave morethanonewife,”(b)“awifemustalwaysobeyherhusband,”(c)“menmakebetterpolitical leaders,”(d)“universityeducationismoreimportantforboys,”and(e)“whenjobsarescarce, menshouldhavemorerightstoajob.”Thisindexvariesbetween1and4.

Secularpoliticians measuredthesupportforsecularpoliticiansincontrasttothosewhoare religious.Itaveragedthreeindicators:“Doyou(1)stronglyagree,(2)agree,(3)disagree,or(4) stronglydisagreethat:(a)itwouldbebetterforyourcountryifmorepeoplewithstrongreligious beliefsheldpublicofficeand(b)religiousleadersshouldnotinterfereinpolitics?”Theanswers tothisquestionwererecodedsothathighervaluesindicatedstrongeragreement.

Asecularpolitics indexwasconstructedbyaveragingresponsestothreequestionsasfollows.

“Doyou(4)stronglyagree,(3)agree,(2)disagree,or(1)stronglydisagreethatyourcountrywould beabetterplaceifreligionandpoliticswereseparated.”“Woulditbe(1)verygood,(2)fairly good,(3)fairlybad,or(4)verybadforyourcountrytohaveanIslamicgovernment[Christian governmentforChristianrespondents],wherereligiousauthoritieshaveabsolutepower.”And “Isit(1)veryimportant,(2)important,(3)somewhatimportant,(4)leastimportant,or(5)not atallimportantforagoodgovernmenttoimplementonlythesharia(forMuslims)orthelaws inspiredonlybyChristianvalues(forChristians)?”Answerstothisquestionwereadjustedto rangebetween1and4.Theaverageofthefourcomponentsmadealiberalismindex,where highervaluesindicatedstrongerliberalorientationsandweakerconservatism.

SourcesofInformation

Twoindicesassessedrespondents’sourcesofinformation.Onewastheextenttowhichthe respondents trustedfamilyorfriends assourcesofinformationaboutreligion,consistingofthe averageofresponsestotwoquestions:“Howmuchdoyoutrustwhat(a)familymembersor(b) friendstellyouabouttheroleofreligioninpolitics:(4)agreatdeal,(3)some,(2)notverymuch, or(1)noneatall?”Thesecond,a plurality-of-information-sourcesindex,wasbasedonaveraging howmuchrespondentsrelyon(a)theradio,(b)foreign(satellite)TV,(c)newspapers,(d)the Internet,and(e)mobileasasourceofinformation,rangingfrom(1)notatall,(2)notverymuch, (3)some,to(4)agreatdeal.

Demographics

Asocioeconomic-statusindexwascreatedbyaveragingeducationcodedinninecategories rangingfromnoformaleducation(1)touniversitydegree(9),andhouseholdincomecodedas (1)forthelowestdecileand(10)forthehighest.16 Employment, gender, maritalstatus,and ruralarea wereincludedasdummyvariables:employed( = 1,0 = otherwise),male( = 1,0 = female),andmarried( = 1,0 = otherwise),andageasreportedbyrespondents.

Codedas rural werethoseareaswithpopulationsof10,000orless( = 1)and0withmore than10,000.ForSaudiArabia,informationwasavailableonlyforthesizeoftownsbelow500,000 (codedas1)andmorethan500,000(codedas0).Otherdummyvariableswerealsocreatedto specify religiousidentity:Christian,Druze,Shia,Muslims(sectunidentified),andothers.Sunni wasusedasthereferencecategory;and ethnicity:Arab(vs.non-ArabforLebanon,vs.Kurd forIraq,andvs.BerberforTunisia);Jordanian(vs.PalestinianforJordan);Turk(vs.Kurdfor Turkey);andPunjabi(vs.Pathani,Sindhi,Kashmiri,andothersforPakistan)wereusedasthe referencecategories.

Hypotheses

Basedonouranalyticalframeworkandthesemeasures,wepredictedthatfundamentalism wouldbestrongerincountriescharacterizedby:

16 ForJordan,botheducationandincomehadsevencategories.Inordertoretainthemaximumnumberofcases,one indicatorwasusedasameasureofSESwhentheotherwasmissing.

Table3:Descriptivestatisticsoffundamentalismintheeightcountries

EgyptPakistanKSAIraqJordanTunisiaTurkeyLebanonTotal

Mean3.44a 3.42ab 3.39b 3.27c 3.26c 3.18d 2.97e 2.80f 3.21

SD .33.32.41.41.34.46.55.59.49

N 3,1423,5231,5062,9913,0083,0652,9943,02423,253

Note: F7,23245 = 793.00, p < .000001. η 2 = .19,whichisalargeeffectsize = >.14accordingtoCohen(1977). Posthoc Scheff ´ epairedcomparisons:meanswithdifferentsuperscriptsaresignificantlydifferentat p < .001.KSA = Kingdom ofSaudiArabia.

H1:Weakerreligiouslibertyanddiversity,

H2:Lowerstatestructure’sfragmentationratio,andhighergovernmentregulationofreligion,and

H3:Weakereconomicorculturalglobalization.

Ontheindividuallevel,fundamentalismwaspredictedtobeassociatedwith:

H1:Higherreligiosity,highertrustinreligiousinstitution,andstrongerbeliefinreligious modernity,

H2:Higherxenophobia,strongerbeliefinconspiracy,andhigherfatalism,

H3:Weakerliberaloutlooks(higherconservatism),

H4:Greatertrustinfamilyandfriendsasasourceofinformationaboutthepoliticalroleof religion,andlowerrelianceondiverseinformationsources,and

H5:Lowersocioeconomicstatus,ruralliving,andmembershipinthedominantsector ethnicity

AnalyticApproach17

ANOVAwasusedtoassessthedegreeofintercountryvarianceinfundamentalism,and correlationcoefficientstoexaminetheassociationsbetweenthecountry-levelvariablesandthe aggregatedleveloffundamentalism.Individual-levelanalysesweretreatedseparatelyforeach country,usingordinaryleastsquares(OLS)regressionmodelstoestimatetherelationshipsbetweenindividualcharacteristicsandfundamentalism.Weemployedhierarchicalregressionto provideadditionalinformationaboutthecontributionofdifferentsetsofvariablestofundamentalism.Theabsenceofsomeofthevariablesinseveralcountriesprecludedconductinga regressionanalysisusingpooleddataacrossallcountries.

RESULTS

Between-CountryAnalysis

AsshowninTable3,theleveloffundamentalismishigh(Mean = 3.21ona1-to4-pt. scale)summedacrossallcountries.Resultsofaone-wayANOVAshowedstatisticallysignificant variance(F7,23245 = 793.00, p < .000001)amongthecountries,whichisnotsurprisingbecause ofthelargesamplesize(n > 23,000)andthusthehighpowertodetectsmalldifferences. Nevertheless,thesedifferencescanbeconsideredsubstantialaccordingtoeffectsizeestimates

17 Employinghierarchicallinearmodeling(HLM)wouldhavebeenideal.Thiswasnotpossible,however,duetothe smallnumberofcountries(seeRaudenbushandBryk2002).

(Cohen1977).Sinceeffectsizesfor η 2 greaterthan.14areconsideredlarge,thevalueof η 2 = .19inthepresentcaseprovidesjustificationthatbetween-countryvarianceinfundamentalism canbeconsideredstatisticallyrelativelylargeoverandabovethestatisticalsignificancethat isafunctionoftheveryhighpower. Posthoc Scheff ´ epaired-comparisonsignificancetests(at p < .0001)wereconductedtodeterminewhichcountriesdiffered.Theseareindicatedbymeans withdifferentsuperscriptsinTable3.Accordingly,fundamentalismwashighestinEgyptand Pakistan,followedbySaudiArabia,thenIraqandJordan,andsuccessivelylower,respectively, inTunisia,Turkey,andfinallylowestinLebanon.

Table4presentsthemeasuresofthecountry-levelconstructs—religiouspluralism,thestate’s structureandintervention,andglobalization.Thetablealsoshowsthecorrelationsbetweenthese measuresandthecountries’meanleveloffundamentalism.

PluralisticVersusMonolithicReligiousContext

Thetwovariablesmeasuringtheextenttowhichthereligiouscontextismonolithicor pluralistic—religious-libertyindexandreligious-fractionalizationindex—arebothnegatively connectedtofundamentalism(r = –.62and–.65,respectively).Theselinkagesthussupportour interpretationthatreligiousdiversityandreligiouslibertyprovidefavorableconditionsforindividualstofreelypursuetheirreligiouspreferencesandthereforeweakenoverallfundamentalism onthenationallevel.

FragmentationofStateStructureandRegulationofReligion

Fragmentationratioisalsonegativelylinkedtofundamentalism(r = –.66).Itindicateselite rivalries,whichtendtogeneratethespacefortheriseofdiscursivediversitywithinsocietyand thusweakenfundamentalism.Thegovernmentregulationofreligionindex,ontheotherhand,is positivelylinkedtofundamentalism(r = .81),supportingourhypothesisthatthemorethegovernmentintervenesinreligion,thehigherthelikelihoodoftheriseofreligiousfundamentalism.

Globalization

BotheconomicglobalizationandInternetpenetrationarenegativelylinkedtofundamentalism(r = –.55,and–.52,respectively).Thesefindingsruncontrarytothenotionthatglobalization fostersfundamentalism.Globalization’seffectonfundamentalism,however,appearstobeweaker thanthatofreligiousdiversity,statestructure,orregulationofreligion.

Individual-LevelAnalysis

Table5presentsdescriptivestatisticsforindividual-levelvariables.Tables6–10provide resultsofhierarchicallinearregressionmodels(standardizedregressionestimates—β ),which beginwithabaselineofdemographics(Model1—Table6),thensuccessivelythevarianceand increasedvarianceaccountedforbyaddingcategoriesofvariablesdesignatedasreligiousand ethnicidentity(Model2—Table7),religion(Model3—Table8),perceptionsandvalues(Model 4—Table9),andsourcesofinformation(Model5—Table10).Inviewofthelargenumberof variables,wetestedthemodelsforpossiblemulticolinearity,whichwasfoundtobenegligible. Mostofthevariableshadvarianceinflationfactors(VIF)lessthan2.0andnoneexceedingoreven closeto5.0,abovewhichthereisreasonforconcern.Takingthemodelsinturn,demographics aloneaccountedforbetween2percent(Iraq)and10percent(Turkey)ofthevariance(Model1). Religiousandethnicminoritiesaccountedforbetween.6percent(Egypt)and21percent(KSA) additionalvariance,aftercontrollingfordemographics(Model2),religionvariablesforanother4 percent(Jordan)and26percent(Lebanon)aftercontrollingfordemographicsandreligious/ethnic minorities(Model3),andperceptionandvaluesfurtheraddbetween3percent(SaudiArabia)and 14percent(Tunisia)tothevariance(Model4),andfinally,sourcesofinformationaddbetween

Table4:Nationalaggregatereligiousfundamentalismandmeasuresofnationalcontext

VariablesPakistanEgyptKSAIraqTunisiaJordanTurkeyLebanonr * withFundamentalism

Fundamentalism3.423.443.333.273.183.262.972.80

1.Religiouspluralism

A.Religiousliberty3.53.541565.56.5–.62 b

B.Religiousfractionalization.18.08.15.50.02.06.21.81–.65 b

2.Statestructure&intervention

A.Fragmentationratio.34.26.21.28.35.23.47.37–.66 b

B.Gov.regulationofrelig.index8.88.39.866.28.65.24.9.81 c

3.Globalization

A.Economicglobalization ** 2.37 1.561.22 .76.471.56 1.232.67–.55 a

a)Internationaltrade32.6749.6784.6773.67102.67118.0054.3397.00

b)Foreigncapitalpenetration1.434.2322.564.005.3217.935.9334.38

B.Internet8.1722.4042.172.8739.1046.6742.6741.93–.52 a

:TheseareallconsideredlargeeffectsizesaccordingtoCohen(1977).

Note

* Pearsoncorrelationcoefficients.

** Linearcombinationofstandardizedinternationaltradeandforeigncapitalpenetration.

a p < .01.

b p < .05.

c p < .1. KSA = KingdomofSaudiArabia.

Table5:Aggregateindividualvariabledescriptivestatisticsforeachcountry:mean(SD)

Variable (Response

Range)PakistanEgyptKSAJordanIraqTunisiaTurkeyLebanon Demographics

Socioeconomic status 4.014.405.613.103.625.244.075.87

(1–10)(1.58)(1.96)(1.63)(.86)(1.65)(1.51)(1.81)(1.85)

Employed.48.44.37.29.43.38.34.61

(0–1)(.50)(.50)(.48)(.45)(.49)(.49)(.48)(.49)

Male.51.48.50.50.53.44.44.59

(0–1)(.50)(.50)(.50)(.50)(.50)(.50)(.50)(.49)

Notmarried.21.19.32.21.24.27.21.42

(0–1)(.41)(.39)(.47)(.41)(.43)(.45)(.41)(.49)

Age3539344236444135

(18–80)(12.02)(14.74)(13.39)(15.65)(13.00)(17.03)(16.13)(12.83)

Rural.53.20.18.52.29.82.59

(0–1)(.50)(.40)(.38)(.50)(.45)(.39)(.49)

Religion

Religiosityindex7.137.557.347.667.487.027.036.40

(0–10)(.95)(.83)(1.01)(.96)(.98)(1.32)(1.40)(1.80) Confidenceinrel.

inst.

(1–4)(.81)(.67)(.78)(.60)(.78)(.86)(1.01)(.90) Religious modernity

(1–4)(.37)(.52)(.56)(.57)(.65)(.73) Perception&values

(1–4)(.65)(.89)(.81)(.74)(1.00)(.92)(.79)(.98) Xenophobia1.661.721.521.661.421.461.46

(1–2)(.34)(.30)(.35)(.31)(.35)(.45).37

Fatalism6.297.415.257.316.107.655.145.77

(1–10)(1.96)(2.80)(2.69)(3.09)(2.35)(2.86)(2.87)(2.66)

Liberalismindex1.982.082.242.152.232.482.632.72

(1–4)(.45)(.42)(.42)(.40)(.39)(.53)(.48)(.49) Sourcesofinformation

Family/friends3.123.213.243.302.99

(1–4)(.50)(.78)(.70)(.58)(.68) Pluralityofinfo sources 2.511.582.501.871.871.941.632.23

(1–4)(.53)(.54)(.69)(.66)(.64)(.67)(.62)(.70)

KSA = KingdomofSaudiArabia.

Table6:Hierarchicallinearregressionestimates(β )predictionoffundamentalism—Model1

VariablePakistanEgyptKSAJordanIraqTunisiaTurkeyLebanon

townforKSA)

p < .05.

p < .01.

p < .001.

p < .0001.

KSA = KingdomofSaudiArabia.

.1percent(Tunisia)and3percent(SaudiArabia),controllingforallothervariablesets,allofwhich arestatisticallysignificantincreases(Model5).Itshouldbenoted,ofcourse,thattheincreases dependontheorderinwhichthevariablesareentered.Allvariablescombinedaccountedfor between13percent(Egypt)and51percent(Lebanon)ofthetotalvariance.Althoughregression estimatesvaryacrossmodels,afunctionofwhichvariablesareinthemodel,sincemostestimates arerelativelystableandhavesimilarlevelsofstatisticalsignificance,wefocusonthefinalmodel (Model5)todiscusstheresults.

Demographics

Mostnotably,fundamentalismislowerforthosewithhighersocioeconomicstatus,whichis consistentacrosstheeightcountries.Thestrengthofthisrelationship,however,variesbetween countries,fromthestandardizedregressionmagnitudesof–.126inTunisiato–.035inLebanon. Thelinkbetweenruralresidenceandfundamentalismislessconsistentacrosstheeightcountries. Peoplelivinginruralareasaresignificantlymorefundamentalistthanthoseinurbanareasin Egypt,Turkey,andLebanon(β = .086,.049,and.102,respectively);buttheoppositeisthecase inPakistanandIraq(β = –.044and–.042,respectively).Thereisnourban-ruraldifferencein TunisiaorJordan.DataforSaudiArabiawereavailableonlyforthesizeoftownsbetweenthose belowandoverpopulationsof500,000.Inthiscase,ouranalysisshowsthatpeopleresiding inareaswithlessthan500,000weremorestronglyfundamentalistthanthoseresidinginareas withpopulationsgreaterthan500,000(β = .310).ItshouldbenotedthatSESandresidence resultsareindependenteffectssinceeachcontrolsfortheotherregressionestimateandcanbe consideredadditive.Inotherwords,especiallyhighlevelsoffundamentalismwerepresentfor personsresidinginruralareaswhoinadditionhavelowerSES.

ReligiousandEthnicIdentity

Aswehypothesized,membersofreligiousminoritieswereconsistentlylessfundamentalist thanthoseinthemajority.MinorityShiawerelessfundamentalistcomparedtoSunnisinPakistan,

Table7:Hierarchicallinearregressionestimates( β )predictionoffundamentalism—Model2

Table8:Hierarchicallinearregressionestimates(β )predictionoffundamentalism—Model3

VariablePakistanEgyptKSAJordanIraqTunisiaTurkeyLebanon

Table9:Hierarchicallinearregressionestimates( β )predictionoffundamentalism—Model4

Table9( Continued )

Table10:Hierarchicallinearregressionestimates( β )predictionoffundamentalism—Model5

Table10( Continued )

especiallyinSaudiArabia,Iraq,Turkey(mostlyAlaviShia),andLebanon(β = –.038,–.561, –.115,–.037,and–.160,respectively),DruzeandotherreligiousminoritiestoSunnisinLebanon (β = –.108and–.119,respectively),andChristianscomparedtoSunnisinPakistan,Jordan, andLebanon(β = –.084,–.154,and–.111,respectively).Therewasnosignificantdifference betweenSunniMuslimsandChristiansinEgypt.Whenonlydemographicsandreligionvariables (Tables7and8)arecontrolled,ChristianswerelessfundamentalistthanSunniMuslimsin Egypt.Thosewhoidentifiedthemselvesas onlyMuslim werelessfundamentalistinIraq(β = –.233),althoughmoresoinTurkey(β = .051),butnotsignificantlydifferentfromSunnisin PakistanandLebanon.Thoseidentifiedwithmuchsmallergroupsornoreligiousidentitywere lessfundamentalistinPakistanandLebanon(β = –.133,–.109,respectively).

Fundamentalismisloweramongmembersofethnicminoritiesandthanthoseinthemajority, butaboutthesameinonlytwocases.InPakistan,fundamentalismisweakeramongSindhis, Pathans,andOthersthanPunjabis(β = –.076,–.050,and–.100,respectively),butnotsignificantly differentbetweenPunjabisandKashmiris.LessfundamentalistwerealsoBerbersandOthers inTunisiaandOthersinLebanonthanArabs(β = –.054,–.039,and–.032,respectively), PalestiniansthanJordaniansinJordan(β = –.059),andKurdsthanTurksinTurkey(β = –.036).

ButIraqiKurdswerenotsignificantlydifferentfromIraqiArabs.Toexplainthetwoexceptional cases,wepostulatethatwhereethnicminoritiesarepredominantlyconcentratedinaregionof thecountryandenjoysubstantialautonomyfromthecentralgovernment—likeIraqiKurdsor PakistaniKashmiris—theyexhibitnosignificantdifferenceinfundamentalismfromthosein ethnicmajority.Ontheotherhand,ethnicminoritiesarelessfundamentalistwheretheyare relativelymoredispersedamong,andthusinteractmoreoftenwith,theethnicmajority(e.g., BerbersinTunisia,Sindhis,Pathans,andOthersinPakistan,OthersinLebanon,Palestiniansin Jordan,KurdsinTurkey).Thisarea,however,requiresfurtherempiricalresearch.

Religion

ExceptinEgyptwherereligiosityhasnosignificantlinktofundamentalism,allother religious-relatedvariablesarerelatedtofundamentalism.18 Religiosityispositivelylinkedto fundamentalismintheothersevencountries(β sbetween.051forJordanand.231forLebanon), andtotrustinreligiousinstitutionsacrossallthecountries(β sbetween.032forPakistanand .133forTunisia).Thesefindingsconfirmedsimilarresultsfromothercontextsreportedinthe literature(e.g.,Ammerman1987;BlaydesandLinzer2008;KellstedtandSmidt1991;Moaddel andKarabenick2008,2013;Peshkin1988).Finally,thebeliefinreligiousmodernityissignificantlylinkedtofundamentalismacrosssixcountrieswheredataonthisconstructwereavailable (β sbetween.080forEgyptand.286forLebanon),supportingtheconnectionbetweenthebelief thatreligiousbeliefsfosterdevelopmentandfundamentalism.Thisfindingsuggeststhat,while fundamentalismmaybeareactiontosecularmodernity(Antoun2008;Lawrence1989;Almond, Appleby,andSivan2003;Kaplan1992;Riesebrodt1993),itisnotagainstdevelopment,reflecting adherencetoreligiousmodernity.AsIranianMuslimintellectualAliShariati(Shariati1969:23; Hanson1983)stated,“Europeabandonedreligionandmadeprogress,[while]weabandonedreligionandwentbackward.”Thislinkagemayalsoexplainwhyfundamentalisminsuchcontexts asPakistanunderGeneralZiaal-HaqqorTurkeyunderRecepTayyipErdo ˘ gan(Gumuscuand Sert2009;Hussain1999;Mohiuddin2007;Talbot1998)displayedstrongsupportforeconomic development.Altogether,therobustnessofthesethreepredictorsacrossthecountriessupports

18 OnereasonforalackofsignificantrelationshipbetweenreligiosityandfundamentalismamongEgyptiansisthatthese variableshavelowvariability.Thestandarddeviationsforreligiosityandfundamentalismwere.83and.33,respectively, bothlowestacrosstheeightcountries,whilethemeanfundamentalismwashighestandreligiositywasthesecondhighest amongEgyptians(Tables3and5).

theviewthatthismultifactormeasureofreligion,asconceivedhere,isanimportantcontributor tothestudyofreligiousfundamentalism.

PerceptionsandValues

TheperceptionthatthereareconspiraciesagainstMuslimsispositivelylinkedtofundamentalismineverycountryexceptTunisia(β sarebetween.054inTurkeyand.292inIraq).In Tunisia,thesizeofthecorrelationcoefficientbetweenthebeliefinconspiracyandfundamentalismismuchsmallerthanthesizeofitscoefficientwithliberalism(r = .082vs.–.126,respectively, bothsignificant).Inallothercountries,bycontrast,thesizeofthecorrelationcoefficientbetween thebeliefinconspiracyandfundamentalismiseitherlargerthanthesizeofitscoefficientwith liberalismorclosetoit.Asaresult,thelinkbetweenthebeliefinconspiracyandfundamentalism isinsignificantwhentheliberalismindexisintheregressionequationbutsignificantwhenit isremovedfromtheequation.Xenophobiaispositivelylinkedtofundamentalisminfiveofthe sevencountries:Pakistan,Egypt,Jordan,Tunisia,andLebanon(β = .033,.037,.082,.114,and .096,respectively).Whenreligiosity,trustinreligiousinstitutions,andtheliberalismindexare removed,itslinkwithfundamentalismissignificantinTurkey.AmongIraqis,ontheotherhand, thequestionofxenophobiaisabitcomplicated.BecauseofintenseinterethnicandsectarianrivalriesbetweenKurds,Shia,andSunnis,attitudestowardneighboringcountriesvaryconsiderably acrossthesethreegroups(forexample,ShiahavestrongerfavorableattitudestowardIranand KuwaitthaneitherKurdsorSunnis).Thus,themeasureisnotasstableasitisinothercountries andmaynotbeappropriatetouseforIraq.Questionsrelatedtoxenophobiawerenotpermitted inSaudiArabia.

Suspicionofoutsiders,asmeasuredbythebeliefinconspiraciesandxenophobia,when consideredinconjunctionwithmembershipinthedominantreligionindicatesthesignificanceof sectarianrivalriesinshapingfundamentalism.Thisfindingisnotonlyconsistentwiththeliterature (Blau,Land,andRedding1992;Blau,Redding,andLand1993;Breault1989;Handy1991),but alsopointstoaconnectionbetweenreligiousfundamentalismandnationalchauvinism.Fatalism isconsistentlyandpositivelylinkedtofundamentalismacrossallcountries(β sarebetween.043 forEgyptand.173inTunisia).Asexpected,theliberalismindexismarkedlyinverselylinked tofundamentalismacrossallofthecountries,from–.150inKSAandIraqto–.326inPakistan. Alternatively,conservatismispositivelylinkedtofundamentalism.

SourcesofInformation

Regressionestimatesshowedthatfundamentalismispositivelylinkedtotrustingfamily andfriendsonwhattheytellrespondentsabouttheroleofreligioninpoliticsamongPakistanis, Egyptians,Saudis,andLebanese(β = .032,.070,.115,and.057,respectively),butnot significantlyamongIraqis.Thisrelationshipisconsistentwithfindingsintheliteratureonthe roleoffamilyinshapingpeople’sreligiouspreferences(Ellison1995).Thisquestionwasnot includedinthesurveysintheotherthreecountries.Relianceonthepluralityofinformation sources,ontheotherhand,isconsistentlynegativelylinkedtofundamentalismacrossallthe countries(β srangebetween–.162forSaudiArabiaand–.035forTurkey),exceptamongIraqis, wherethisrelationshipispositive(β = .057).Wepostulatethattheintensificationofsectarian rivalriesinIraqmighthavecontributedtothesectarianismofthemedia—whereeachgroup preferredtorelyontheirsectariansourcesofinformation.Asaresult,relianceonthesesources tendedtoreinforce,ratherthanweaken,fundamentalism.

Insum,ouranalysisattheindividuallevelshowsthatahigherleveloffundamentalism islinkedto(a)religionindifferentways—religiosity,confidenceinreligiousinstitutions,and religiousmodernity;(b)strongerxenophobiaandbeliefsinconspiracy;(c)higherfatalismand weakerliberaloutlooks;(d)ahighertrustinfamilyandfriendsasinformationsourcesabout religionandlessrelianceondiversesourcesofinformation;and(e)lowersocioeconomicstatus andmembershipinanethnicmajority,ordominantreligionorsect.

DISCUSSIONAND CONCLUSIONS

Thisstudywasdesignedtoadvancethesocial-scientificstudyoffundamentalisminseveral respects.First,toaddressthechallengestothestudyofthesubjectposedby(a)thediversity offundamentalistmovements,(b)thecontroversyovertheconceptintheIslamiccontext,and (c)thevariabilityofitsoperationaldefinitionsintheliterature,weconceptualizedthetermasa setofcorebeliefsaboutandattitudestowardreligionthatrestsonadisciplinarianconception ofthedeity,literalism,religiousexclusivityandintolerance.Ourconceptualizationthuscaptures thecommonfeaturesunderpinningthediversityoffundamentalistmovementsinChristianity andIslam.WhetherShia,Sunni,orChristianfundamentalists,theyaremorelikelytoadhereto adisciplinariandeity,believeintheliteraltruthofthescriptures,espouseanexclusivistview oftheirreligiouscommunity,andbeintolerantofotherreligionsthanpeoplewhoarenot.Our analysesofthedatafromcross-nationallycomparablerepresentativesamplesofrespondentsin Egypt,Iraq,Jordan,Lebanon,Pakistan,SaudiArabia,Tunisia,andTurkeysupportedcombining thesecomponentstoformasinglefundamentalismscale.Astableyardstickwasthuscreatedto comparefundamentalismacrossreligions,religioussects,andnations.

Second,ouranalysisshowedthataggregatefundamentalismwashigherincountrieswhere religiouslibertyordiversitywasmorerestricted,stateregulationofreligiongreaterandauthoritarianstructurelessfragmented,andthenationalcontextlessglobalized.Third,onthemicro (individual)level,ouranalysisalsoindicatedthatfundamentalismwasstrongeramongindividualswhowereofalowersocioeconomicstatus,membersofthedominantreligion/sectorethnic majority,morereligious,expressgreaterconfidenceinreligiousinstitutions,strongerbelievers inreligiousmodernity,lessliberal(moreconservative),strongerbelieversinconspiracy,more xenophobic,morefatalistic,moretrustingofwhatfamilyandfriendstellthemaboutthepolitical roleofreligion,andrelylessondiversesourcesofinformation.Theminorexceptionstothis generalpatternwerenoted,explained,andconsiderednotaseriousdeviationfromthisgeneral pattern.

Thesefindingshaveramificationsforourunderstandingoffundamentalismonahigher levelofempiricalgeneralizationandtheoreticalabstractionthanintheexistingliterature.Given ourcross-sectionaldata,itwouldbehardtoassesstheextenttowhichfundamentalismisa reactiontochangesineachofthesevencountriesthatwouldwarrantcausalconclusions,such asresponsestochangesinsocioeconomicstatusorstateintervention,forexample.Itscrossnationalvariation,however,providessuggestiveconsistentevidence.Generally,fundamentalism onthemacro(country)levelishigherwherefreedomtoengageinreligionisrestrictedby(a) statestructureandpolicies,and(b)religiousmonopoly.Itisweakenedundertheconditionsof (a)religiousliberty,and(b)culturaldiversityprovidedbyglobalization.Onthislevel,thekey variablesrelatedtocross-nationalvariationinaggregatefundamentalismrevolveonreligious unfreedomandmonopoly.Onthe(micro)individuallevel,weshowedthatfundamentalismdoes notappeartobeareactiontomodernityperse.Infact,itisstronglylinkedtoareligiousconception ofmodernityquadevelopment,wherereligiousbeliefisbelievedtofosterdevelopment.However, althoughfundamentalismhasmultipledeterminants,itsstrengthrelatestoreligion(religiosity, religiousmodernity,andtrustinreligiousinstitutions),personalinefficacy(subjectively[fatalism] andobjectively[lowersocioeconomicstatus]),illiberalvalues,outgrouphostility(xenophobia, conspiracy,religiousorethnicdomination),andmonolithicinformationsource.

Asnotedabove,wefullyrecognizethatwhilewehaveadvancedpossibleexplanationsofthe subject,ourcross-sectionaldataprecludedefinitivecausalclaims,whichwouldrequirecollecting dataatmultiplepointsintime.Eventhoughfundamentalismistreatedstatisticallyasadependent variable,wedonotruleoutreciprocalcausationsorthatthedirectionofcausalitycouldbejustthe oppositeofwhatourmodelhasspecified.Fromourperspective,thespecifiedfactorsarestatistical predictorsoffundamentalismandourmodelisonewayofinterpretingthepatternofrelationship betweenthevariables.Nonetheless,thesesocietalconditionsandpersonalcharacteristicsthat

arelinkedtothemeasureoftheconstructasorientationstowardreligionratherthanreligious beliefsthemselvesadvancethesocial-scientificstudyoffundamentalisminanempiricallymore generalizableandtheoreticallymoreabstractmanner.

Withthatfoundation,wesuggestthatfutureresearchmoveinseveraldirections.Oneis toapplytheanalyticalframeworkemployedheretostudyJewishfundamentalismandexamine whetherthesameorasimilarsetofvariablespredictsfundamentalistorientationsamongJews, particularlyinIsrael.Wealsosuggestapplyingourmeasurementoftheconstructtoexamine fundamentalisminsuchatheisticornontheisticreligionsasBrahmanism,Buddhism,andJainism. Forsure,thedisciplinarianconceptionofthedeity,oneofthecomponentsoffundamentalism, maynotbedirectlyapplicabletoEasternreligions.However,giventhatourindicatorsofthis componentrevolveonthenotionofrewardandpunishmentfromGod,asimilarsetofmeasures maybeformulatedthatfocusonaretributiveconceptionofkarmathatstressesontheseverity ofpunishmentinthenextlifefrommisdeedsinthislife.Finally,anotherlineofresearchis togobeyondreligionanddevelopparallelmeasuresthattapintofundamentalisminother beliefsystems,includingsecularfundamentalismsuchastheliteralism,group-centrism,and intolerancedisplayedamongthefollowersofdifferentsecularideologies.Thislineofresearch mayproducethenecessaryempiricalevidenceinordertoconstructamoregeneralconception offundamentalismthatincludesbothreligiousandsecularvariants.Wehopethatthepresent researchprovidedthefoundationforabroaderunderstandingoftheconceptanditsassessment.

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