KIERKEGAARDONTHEMETAPHYSICSOFHOPE
ROEFREMSTEDAL
NorwegianUniversityofScienceandTechnology,Trondheim,Norway
Thisarticledealswithhope–anditsimportance–byanalysingthelittle-knownanalysisof hopefoundinKierkegaard.Kierkegaardpresentshopeasessentialtomoralagency,arguingthat hopeshouldneverbegivenup,evenifitisnotsupportedbyexperience.Thisarticlegivesan interpretationofthestrongclaimsaboutthenecessityofhopefoundinKierkegaardwhichtries toreconstructsomeofKierkegaard’scentralclaims,arguingthatKierkegaardcanbeusedto sketchadistinctionbetweenjustifiedandunjustifiedhope.
I.INTRODUCTORYREMARKS
Whiletherehasbeenrenewedinterestinhopeinmanydisciplines,frommedicinetotheology, thisinterestislargelyabsentincontemporaryphilosophy.1 Ibelievethisfactexplainswhy scholarshaveoverlookedthecentralroleofhopeinKierkegaard.Thisarticleremediesthis omissionbyshowinghowKierkegaardanalysedhope.Ishowthat,inlinewithsomeofthe contemporaryresearchonhope,Kierkegaardarguesthathopeplaysacrucialroleinmoral agency.IalsoshowhowitmightbepossibletoapplysomeofKierkegaard’spointsto contemporaryresearchbysketchingadistinctionbetweenjustifiedandunjustifiedhopeand reinterpretingthewidespreaddistinctionbetweengeneralandspecifichopes.
Kierkegaardscholarshavediscussedreligiousfaithanddespairatlength;however,therehas beenlittleresearchdedicatedtoKierkegaard’sanalysisofhope.Thisissurprising,giventhe relevanceofhopeforunderstandingbothdespairandreligiousness(thelattertakeninawide sensethatencompassesfaith,hope,andlove).ThefactthatKierkegaardwroteabookon despair(Anti-Climacus’s SicknessuntoDeath),butdidnotwriteabookdevotedtohope, shouldnotbetakentomeanthathebelievedthelattertobeoflesserimportance.2 Onthe contrary, SicknessuntoDeath describesdespairashopelessness(SKS11:133f,cf.153;SUD18, cf.37f).3
However,Kierkegaard’sreflectionsonhopearescatteredthroughouthisdifferent writings–especiallytheupbuildingwritingsthatphilosophershavetendedtoignore.Although thispaperreliesmainlyonthewritingsKierkegaardpublishedunderhisownname(aswellas SicknessuntoDeath),Ibelievethesewritingstoalargeextentarecoincidentwiththepseudonymousworkswhenitcomestohope.Idonotdenythatthereareimportantpointsof differencebetweenthedifferentpseudonymsandKierkegaard,butmyfocusisontheimportant pointsinwhichthepseudonymousandself-publishedworkspresentessentiallythesameview, orsupplementoneanother.Myargumentrequiresonlythattherebesomeoverlaporagreement betweenthedifferentbooksinKierkegaard’sauthorship,notthatthepseudonymsshouldbe takentorepresentthesamevoiceorperspective.
KierkegaardappearstorelyonatraditionalChristianunderstandingforthegenericfeatures ofhope.Tohopeisto expectthegood,whereastofearistoexpectevil.Hopeisbasedonthe possibilityofprogresstowardsgoodinthefuture.Fearisbasedonthepossibilityofdeclineinto evilinthefuture(SKS9:249;WL249).4 AlthoughKierkegaarddoesnotsaysoexplicitly,it
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seemsclearthatwhatwehopeforshouldbepossibleyetuncertain(SKS10:117–24,cf. 11:153f;CD106–13;cf.SUD38f).5 Despitetheuncertainty,ahopefulattitudeischaracterised bytrustorconfidencethatthebestwillhappen.InKierkegaardianterms,hopeimpliesan expectationthatfreedomwilltranscendnecessity,thatideality(universalprinciplesandideals) canberealisedinactuality.6 Also,whatwehopeformustbedifficulttoattain(SKS10:117–24; CD106–13),sincethereishardlyanyneedforhopeifourgoalsareeasilyattainable.7
II.DIFFERENTTYPESOFHOPES
In UpbuildingDiscoursesinVariousSpirits,Kierkegaarddistinguishesbetween heavenly hope and earthly or temporal (Timelighedens)hope(SKS8:214ff;UD112ff).Thisdistinction appearstocoincidewiththedistinctionbetween Christian hopeand human or natural hopein ForSelf-Examination (SKS13:103f,99;FSE82f,77).Ifwearetouseterminologyfrom currenttheoriesofhope,Christian(heavenly)hopeisa general hopeonly,whereashuman (temporal)hopecanrefertobothgeneralandspecifichope.Generalhopemaybeseenasa generaltrustorconfidenceinthefuture,onethathindersdespairandparalysis.Specifichopes, ontheotherhand,haveparticulareventsorthingsasitsobjects(e.g.submittinganarticlebefore deadline).8
Kierkegaardismainlyinterestedingeneralhope.Kierkegaard’sprincipalassertionisthatit isonlyonChristiangroundsthatgeneralhopecanbeconsistentlysustained,whichimpliesthat human(temporal)hopesareunstableandlimited.Nevertheless,Kierkegaardseemstopresupposethathuman(temporal)hopecanaccountforspecifichopes.
Inthe Nachlaß,Kierkegaardpresentsadialecticalprogressionofhope:
(1)thefreshincentive[Tilskyndelse]ofyouthfulness;
(2)thesupportivecalculationofunderstanding;
(3)hopelessness;andthen
(4)Christianhope.(Pap.VIB53,13;JP1668)
Thefirsttypeofhopeappearstorefertoapre-reflexivehope,akindofimmediatetrustor confidence.Thispre-reflexivehopeseemstocorrespondtotheaesthetewholacksreflection (e.g.DonJuanin Either/Or)ortheinfantthatisnotyetcapableofdistinguishingbetweenitself anditssurroundings(cf.SKS17:117;BB:25;JP4398).Pre-reflexivehopedoesnotinvolve perceivingwhatonehopesforasuncertainordifficulttoattain,sincedoingsowouldrequire reflection.Ifpre-reflexivehopeistoqualifyasagenuineformofhope,thenhopecannotbe definedsubjectivelyasexpectingthegoodwhentheoutcomeisperceivedasuncertainor difficulttoattain.Rather,hopemustbedefinedasexpectingthegood,althoughtheoutcomeis objectively uncertain.
Thenexttypeofhopeisbasedoncalculationbyourunderstanding.ForKierkegaard,the facultyofunderstanding(Forstanden)referstoatypeofrationalitythatinvolvesacapacityfor calculationandmanipulation.Forinstance,understandingisdescribedasthe‘stockbroker [Vexel-Megler]offinitude’(SKS4:131,141;FT36,46),suggestingthatitisa pre-moral (or evenegoistic)typeofrationality.9 IncontrasttoChristianhope,thishopeispre-moraland appearstocorrespondtothe‘finitereasonableness[endeligForstandighed]’ofthereflective aesthete(cf.SKS7:483note;CUP531note10).Basically,thishopetakestheformofhopingfor happinessorhopingforrewards.Asopposedtopre-reflexivehope,thishopeappearstoinvolve therealisation,uponreflection,thatwhatoneiswishingforisuncertainanddifficulttoattain.
Kierkegaardholdsthatnatural(human)hopeisfoundineveryhumanbeing.Naturalhope seemstoinvolvehavingconfidenceinyourself,others,andtheworld.Naturalhoperesultsin –orleadsto–hopelessness(cf.SKS5:100f;EUD94f).Kierkegaard’sgroundsforsayingso donotseemtobethemereassertionthatnaturalhopedependsonstatesofaffairsintheworld thattoalargeextentarecontingent,unstable,anduncontrollable–forinstance,thatone’s healthfailsandonecannotdomuchaboutit(cf.SKS9:258;WL258f).Rather,one’sguilt(or sin)meansthatoneisinahopelesssituation,humanlyspeaking.Manmustdespairorgiveup (human)hope,sincehefailstorealisetheinfiniteethicalrequirement(SKS9:252,261;WL 252,262).11
In ChristianDiscourses,Kierkegaardgivesacomplementaryreasonastowhyhumanhope mustbeabandoned.Referringtothehopebelongingtoyouthfulness,andpresumablyearthly (human)hopeingeneral,hesaysthatmisfortune,hardshipanddistressleadtoalossofhope (SKS10:117–24;CD106–13).SinceKierkegaardexplicitlycontrastshardshipordistress (Trængsel)withsininthiscontext(SKS10:124;CD113),itisclearthatitisnot(merely)sin thatleadstohopelessness.Similarly, SicknessuntoDeath indicatesthathopelessnessisnot merelysomethingself-inflicted,butalsosomethingthatresultsfromanexperienceoflossor hardship.12 AlthoughKierkegaarddoesnotsaysoexplicitly,Itakeitthatthatthehardshiphe referstoincludesthefactthatvirtuedoesnotnecessarilyleadtohappinessoracommunityof thevirtuous.Ratherthanbeingalonephysically,thelatterinvolvesnotbeinglovedand recognisedbyone’sneighbours.
AlthoughKierkegaardhardlyoffersanyargumentastowhyhumanhopecannotprovidea basisforgeneralhope,Ibelievethatthiscentralclaimcanberationallyreconstructed ifwetake theobjectofgeneralhopetobethehighestgood,or,inotherterminology,theKingdomofGod. Unfortunately,Kierkegaardisnotexplicitaboutwhattheobjectofgeneralhopeis.Nevertheless,itisclearthatitinvolvesmoralgoodnessorvirtue,somethingthatismadepossibleby divinegrace.Becauseofthis,Kierkegaardclaimsthatwhatwehopeforinvolvesgrace,mercy, andtheforgivenessofsins.Furthermore,theobjectofhopeinvolveshappinessorbliss (Salighed)aswellasbeingpartofasocietybasedonlove(seesectionIV).Thus,theobjectof hopeappearstobeasocietywhosemembersarevirtuousandhappy,somethingwhichamounts tothehighestgoodortheKingdomofGod.13 Ifthisreconstructionissound,Kierkegaardagrees withKant,aswellaswithtraditionalChristiantheology,thattheproperobjectof(general)hope istheKingdomofGod.14
Wefindourselvesconfrontedbythreeproblemswhenwetrytorealisethehighestgood.This canbeelucidatedbyusingKantianterminologyandinterpretingthehighestgoodasamoral worldwherevirtueleadstohappiness.15 Thefirstproblemisthatmanisnotcompletely virtuous,eventhoughtheethicalrequirementhasanunconditionalnature.Giventhemoral rigorismadvocatedbyKantandKierkegaard,16 thismeansmanis evil.Seenthroughaphilosophicalperspective,orwithinimmanent(natural)religiousness,thismeansthatmanisinfinitelyguilty;withintheChristianperspective,withintranscendent(revealed)religiousness,it meansthatmanisinfinitelysinful.Theproblemofguiltisoftenpointedtointhesecondary literatureasanexplanationofwhyonecanhavea pre-religiousmotive forbecominga Christian.17 However,twootherproblemsarefrequentlyoverlooked–namely,thatevenifI werevirtuousIcouldstillendupbeingunhappy,andthatsincethehighestgoodtakestheform ofakingdomorsociety,itcannotberealisedbytheindividualonhisown.Thismeansthat,as ageneralhope,humanhopeisboundtocollapseforthefollowingreasons:First,manisevil; second,virtuedoesnotalwaysleadtohappinessinthisworld,andfinally;thehighestgoodis acommunity,kingdomorchurchthatcannotberealisedbytheindividualonhisownevenif theindividualweregoodandvirtuedidalwaysleadtohappiness.
KierkegaardgoesbeyondthisKantiantraditionnotonlybyseeingvirtueasdependenton grace,butalsobyspeakingfromtheperspectiveofrevealedfaith.Fromthisperspective,human hopebreaksdownbecauseofsin(ratherthanguilt).InKierkegaard’stheory,revelation–which makessin-consciousnesspossible–introducessomethingnewthatcannotbereducedtomerely humanorphilosophicalcategories.Sincerevealedfaithissupposedtohaveitsownstandards, Christianhopeisnotmerelyananswertopre-Christianorphilosophicalproblems.
III.HOPEAGAINSTHOPE
FollowingPaul,KierkegaardunderstandsChristianhopeas‘hopeagainsthope’(cf.SKS5:247, 427;21:99,116;NB7:47,7:75;EUD249;TD52;JP4855,4370).Kierkegaardinterpretsthis ashopein‘thenightofhopelessness,’thatis,hopewhenthereisnohumanhope(SKS13:102f; FSE82f).Manmustdie(afdø)totheworldandloosealltrust(Tillid)orhopeinhuman assistancebeforethereisthehopeofChristianfaith.18 Christianhopeispresentedasagiftof theHolySpirit(SKS13:102–4,cf.5:100f;FSE81–3;cf.EUD94f).Thatis,whenthereisno hopefromthepre-Christianperspective,theHolySpiritoffersnewhope.Ratherthaninvolving miraclesorwonders,Christianhopereliesondivinegrace,inparticulartheforgivenessofsins (cf.SKS9:261,252;WL262,252).Presumably,thepointisthatforgivenessmakespossiblenot onlysalvationbutalsotherealisationoftheKingdomofGod.
Kierkegaardstressesthathopingagainsthopeisataskthatinvolveshopingfordivine assistanceagainstunderstanding(Forstanden)(SKS21:116f;NB7:75;JP4370).Religious hopetranscendsunderstandingandisatoddswithhopethatisbasedoncalculationand probability(cf.SKS4:113;FT16f).Hopeagainsthopemeanstoperceiveone’spowerlessness (fornemmeAfmagten)withoutgivingupone’senthusiasm(Begeistringen)(SKS5:427;TD52). Hopethatgoesagainsthopesavestheoneindespair(denFortvivlede)bymeansofan ‘open-heartedcourage’(Frimodighed)thatonlycomprehends(forstaaer)themercy(Barmhjertighed)ofGod(SKS5:247;EUD249).
Kierkegaardclaimsthatthehopeofeternityisplantedin(nedlagti)man–itishiddeninhis innermostbeing(ihansInderste)(SKS10:121;CD110).Yet,inordertodiscoverthesolution theweightofhardship(Trængsel)hastopressdownupononeheavilyenough(SKS10:122;CD 111)–thatis,onehastodespair.Eternity’shopemustbeextractedinthesamewaythata confessionisextractedfromahardenedcriminal,thatis,bymeansoftherack(ved Pinebænken)(SKS10:123;CD112).Hardshipcontributestothelossofearthlyhope,but makesitpossibleformantoprocure(forhverve)thehopeofeternity(SKS10:121f;cf.8:214ff; CD110f;cf.UD112ff).Thisimpliesthatmancannotdecidetohopebyanactofwillunless hehaslostallhopeinhumanassistanceandisoffereddivineassistance.Becauseofthis, ChristianhopeisdescribedasagiftoftheHolySpirit(SKS13:102–4,cf.5:100f;FSE81–3; cf.EUD94f).ItisonlywheneverythingcomestoastandstillduetohopelessnessthatChristian hopebecomesapossibility(Pap.VIB53,13;JP1668).
ThoughChristianhopeisdistinctfromnaturalhope,KierkegaardclaimsthatChristianhope istobefoundinman’snature,inhisinnermostbeing.Ratherthanbeingunnatural,Christian hope breaks withthehopeofnaturalman,theso-callednaturalhope.Rather,Christianhope revealsman’sinnermostbeing;ChristianhoperevealsthatmanismadeintheimageofGod.
ImplicitinKierkegaard’stheoryaretwodistinctnotionsofhopelessness.Thefirstisthe hopelessnessthatbelongstohopeagainsthope,resultingfromnaturalhope’sinabilitytorealise thehighestgood.Thisisnothopelessnessinthestrictestsense,sinceitstillallowsforChristian hope.19 However,hopelessnessinthestrictsensegoesbeyondthisbydenyinganypossibilityof
hope. UpbuildingDiscoursesinVariousSpirits describesthistypeofhopelessnessasthe lack ofatask,sayingthatwithoutataskitisaself-contradiction(Selvmodsigelse)towork, presumablybecausethereisnothingtoworkfor(SKS8:373;UD277).
Kierkegaardclaimsthatonlysomeonewithoutguiltorsincanbeinatrulyhopeless situation,oneinwhichthereisnothingtodo,wherenotevensufferingorpatiencepresentsa task(SKS8:372f;UD276f).Presumably,thisshouldbetakentomeanthatinsuchasituation thereisnoneedtobetteroneselfortoseekassistance.Onthisview,the questionofwhether thereisChristianhopeboilsdowntowhetheroneisguiltyorasinner.Furthermore,Kierkegaard’sthesisthateverybodyisguiltyandasinnercanbeseenasanattempttojustifytheclaim thatnobodyisreallyinahopelesssituation.Kierkegaardthinksthatifsomebodywerewithout sinbeforeGod,thesituationwouldbehopelessforallofus:
IfiteverhappenedtoahumanbeinginrelationtoGodthatthefaultlaywithGod,therewould benotask;ifthiseverhappenedtoasinglehumanbeing,therewouldbenotaskfortheentire humanrace.Itwouldnotbeonlyinthisparticularcasethattherewasnotask;no,ifGodjust onesingletimehaddemonstratedthathewasnotloveinthesmallestorgreatest,hadleftthe sufferer[enLidende]withoutatask–thenforallhumankindthereisnolongeranytask,then itisfoolishnessandfutilityandsoul-deadeningperniciouslaboriousnesstobelieve,aselfcontradictiontowork,andanagonytolive[daerdetTantogForfængelighedogAandsfortærelsensondeMøieattroe,ogSelvmodsigelseatarbeide,ogenQvalatleve][...]ifGod foronesinglemomenthasdeniedhislove,thenalltasksaredeadandreducedto[gjorttil] nothing,andhopelessnessistheonlythingthereis.(SKS8:373;UD277)
Clearly,Kierkegaardbelievesthisisnotthecase,sinceweareallundersin.
AlthoughChristianhopetranscendscalculationandempiricalevidence,specifichopeneed notdoso.IbelieveKierkegaard’stheoryimpliesthatspecifichopeshouldbegivenupwhenthe prospectforitsfulfilmentispoor.Hislittle-knowndistinctionbetweenthehighestgoodand lessergoods(SKS10:230–5;CD222–8)suggeststhatitisonlythehighestgoodthatisan unconditionalpurpose.Othergoodsshouldbeforsakeniftheyconflictwiththehighestgood (notablybybeingimmoral),orifcontingentstatesofaffairshindertheirrealisation.Thus, Kierkegaard’sanalysissuggeststhatalthoughthehopeforthehighestgoodshouldnevertobe givenup,hopesaboutattainingothergoods(e.g.publishinganarticle)mayhavetobe abandoned.20 Unlikegeneralhope,specifichopesdonotconcernsomethingfundamentalor essentialtobeinghuman.
Whilewemayassesswhetheraspecifichope(e.g.thehopeofpublishinganarticle)canbe well-founded,basedonempiricalresearch(doIhavetimetofinishthearticle,etc.),thisisnot thecasewithhopeforthehighestgood(theobjectofgeneralhope).Thereasonisthatfor Kierkegaardthehighestgoodappearstobesomethingtranscendent,somethingweneverattain fullyinthislife.Theobjectsofspecifichope,ontheotherhand,aretypicallycontingentends thatitispossibletoattaininthisworld.Iftheobjectofgeneralhopeweresomethingwecould attaininthisworld,however,thiswouldmeanthatoursituationcouldbehopeless–inthesense oflackingataskorlackingprospects.Thisseemstoimplythatgeneralhopecanonlybe maintainedconsistentlyifitsobjectissomethingtranscendent.Thispointishintedatby Kierkegaard’sethicist,whosaysthatsomeonewhomerelyhopesforhissilverwedding anniversarywouldbeincapableofcelebratingitwhenthedayarrives(SKS3:141;EO2143). Also,bothClimacusandKierkegaardapproveofPaul’sstatementthathewhohashopesonly forthislifeisthemostmiserableofall(UD228;CUP389note;SKS8:329,7:355note).The upshotisthattheobjectofgeneralhopemustbesomethingtranscendent.Thisisseenclearly inKierkegaard’s(aswellasClimacus’s)conceptionofthehighestgoodaseternalbliss
(Salighed).21 Althoughthisdoesnotimpedethis-worldlyhope,itmeansthatthehighestgood, ourabsolutetelos(Climacus),cannotbefullyreachedinthislife.
Kierkegaardtakesmoralagencyaspresupposinghopeabouttherealisationofthehighest good,ahopethatisfoundedontheHolySpirit.Ratherthansomethingconditionedby experience,hopeisaconditionofthepossibilityforagency,22 sinceitmakesitpossibletoact withouthavingsufficientknowledge–topursueprojectswithuncertainoutcomesandtopursue endsthatcanonlybeattainedwithdifficulty.Undertheseconditions,theroleofhopeistoopen thepossibilitiesofthefuture.
TheSicknessuntoDeath canbereadasanattempttoshowthathewhodespairinglywants togetridofhimself,onthegroundsthateverythingappearshopeless,infactpresupposeshope. Aswithotherprojects,theprojectofgettingridofoneself,whatAnti-Climacusreferstoas‘the last[sidste]hope’(SKS11:133f;SUD1823),presupposeshope.Ifthereisnohope,thenone cannotevengetridofoneself.Ifonewantstogetridofoneself,thenonemust hope thatone iscapableofcarryingoutthisonelastproject.Itisthereforeinconsistenttowanttogetridof oneselfonthegroundsthatone’ssituationiscompletelyhopeless.Thelasthopetendstodeny hopeingeneral,yetitpresupposesaspecifichope,thatis,thatonewillmanagetogetridof oneself.Anti-Climacus’spositionappearstobethattherecannotbeanyspecifichopewithout somegeneralhope.Despairmakesonepassiveandunfree,andtherebyunderminestheability torealiseprojects,includingtheprojectoftakingone’slife(withorwithoutassistance).
Thisisofcoursenottoclaimthatsuicideisimpossible.Rather,itistoclaimthatcommitting suicide,onthegroundsthateverythingishopeless,involvesaconceptualinconsistency. WhereasKantsaysthatimmoralactsinvolveinconsistencyorcontradictions,Kierkegaardsays thatevilinvolvesdespairordouble-mindedness,thatonehastwowillsthatareinconsistentwith oneanother.Accordingto‘PurityofHeart,’willingonethingnecessarilyinvolveswillingthe goodunconditionally(cf.SKS8:139f;UD24).Commentatorshaverightfullyseenthisasa somewhatKantianelementinKierkegaard.24
ForKierkegaard,beinghopefuldoesnotamounttoacceptingone’spresentsituationasit is.25 Rather,itmeansacceptingone’scircumstancesandenduringthembecausethisisseenas leadingtoreconciliationinthefuture.Thus,thehopefulpersonviewsthepresentsituationas unacceptable(asitisactually)andacceptable(asitispotentially)atthesametime.Accepting existencemerelyasitiswouldmeanthatonesuccumbstotheevilandinjusticeintheworld. Hope,bycontrast,involvesaprotestthatmakesitpossibletotrytoovercomeevilandinjustice bymakingprogresstowardsthehighestgood.
IV.HOPEANDNEIGHBOURLOVE
IntraditionalChristianthought,theobjectofhopeproperisconsideredtobethehighestgood ortheKingdomofGod.26 AlthoughKierkegaardisnotexplicitonthispoint,healsoappearsto identifythehighestgoodwiththeKingdomofGod.27 Thissuggeststhathopeproperhasthe KingdomofGodasitsobject.Nevertheless, WorksofLove pointstoahopethatisopposedto this,ahopethatinvolveshopingformyselfwhilegivinguponothersbyviewingthemas hopeless(cf.SKS9:253–6;WL254–6).However,hopingonlyformyselfinvolvesconceiving ofhopeandthegoodassomethingprivatethatdoesnotconcernone’srelationshiptoothers,as ifImighthaveafutureonmyownwithoutothers.Kierkegaardarguesthatbyhopinginthis wayIfailtoappreciatetheextenttowhichIamdependentonothers.Ifthereisnohopefor others,thentherecannotbeanyhopeformeeither,sinceIamdependentonothers.28 Iftheyare trappedinhopelessness,thismustalsoholdtrueforme,althoughImaynotrealiseit(SKS 9:253–6;WL254–6).InthissenseIcanbeindespairwithoutknowingit.
Sotrulyhopingforoneselfinvolveshopingforothers,hopingforsociety(SKS9:253f,248; cf.5:127;WL253f,248;cf.EUD122).Kierkegaardstressesthathopedependsonlovingour neighbour.Neighbourlovetakesuponitselftheworkofhope,thetaskofhopingforothers:
[L]oveis[...]themiddleterm[Mellembestemmelsen]:withoutlove,nohopeforoneself;with love,hopeforallothers–andtothedegreeonehopesforoneself,tothesamedegreeone hopesforothers,sincetothesamedegreeoneisloving.(SKS9:259;WL260)
A Mellembestemmelse isatermordeterminationthatconnectstwodifferentconcepts;in thiscasehopeforoneselfisconnectedwithhopeforothers.Byconnectingoneselfwith others,theobjectofhopeistransformedintosomethinguniversal,arguablytheKingdomof God.
Kierkegaardalsoclaimsthatloveis‘builtup’(opbygges)andnourishedbythehopefor eternity(SKS9:248;WL248).Thus,notonlydoes(general)hopedependon(neighbour)love, butalsoloveitselfisstrengthenedbyhope.29 OnaKantianreading,thefirstclaimisthat justifiedhopepresupposespracticallove(virtue),whereasthelatterclaimisthatloveis cultivatedandstrengthenedbyhope,presumablybecausehopepreventsusfromgivingupon love.
Kierkegaardclaimsthatahopethatexcludesneighbourloveisfalseorunjustified(SKS 9:248,253f,WL248,253f).Thisindicatesthat,forKierkegaard,neighbourlovecanbeusedto distinguishbetweenageneralhopethatisauthenticorjustifiableandonethatisnot.Kierkegaardsuggeststhatwhereasthelatterischaracterisedbygivinguponothers,byevaluating themashopeless,theformerischaracterisedbyalwayshopingforothers.30 AlthoughImaygive uponmyneighbourasamathematician(ifheissuch),Ioughtnevertogiveuponhimasa humanbeing,asaperson.
Thisleavesuswiththequestionofwhetheritismeaningfultogiveupononeselfwhilestill hopingforothers.Ifthismeansthatonerejectsanypossibilityofattainingthegoodforoneself, Kierkegaardwouldseemtodenythisbyclaimingthatwithouthopeinthepossibilityofthe good,oneisspirituallydeadorcastintotheabyss(SKS9:256;WL257).
Theanalysispresentedin WorksofLove concludesthatgeneralhopemustinvolvetrusting andlovingallhumanbeings,evenifthisisnotbasedonevidence.31 Onemustbelieveinlove inordertoseelove(SKS9:23f;WL16)–itisonlythepersonoflovethatcanseeothersas lovingpersons.32 Onthisaccount,itisimpossibletodecidewhetherothersareloving,good,and trustworthypersonsfromadetachedor‘objective’perspective.Kierkegaard’sapproachisthat theproblemoftrustingothersandhopingforthemcannotbesolvedtheoreticallyordescriptivelybecauseoftheintersubjectivenatureoflove.ThisismorereminiscentofHegel’s dialecticsofrecognitionthanofKant.
V.CLOSINGREMARKS
Althoughithasnotreceivedmuchattention,hopeplaysanimportantrolewithinthetheoryof Kierkegaard.Inparticular,Kierkegaard’sanalysisofhopecanhelpusgetabetterunderstanding ofhowheinterpretsdespairaswellasmoralagencyandreligiousness.Kierkegaardtakesmoral agencyaspresupposinghope,andgroundshopeinreligiousnessratherthanempiricalevidence. Itisarguedthat,forKierkegaard,neighbourlovecanbeusedtodistinguishbetweenageneral hopethatisjustifiableandonethatisnot.Kierkegaardsuggeststhatwhereasunjustifiedhope ischaracterisedbygivinguponothers,byevaluatingthemashopeless,justifiedhopeis characterisedbyalwayshopingforothers.33
BB = JournalBB(inSKS17)
CD = ChristianDiscourses
ABBREVIATIONS
CUP = ConcludingUnscientificPostscript,vol.1
EE = JournalEE(inSKS18)
EO2 = Either/Or,PartII
EUD = EighteenUpbuildingDiscourses
FSE = ForSelf-Examination
JP = SørenKierkegaard’sJournalsandPapers,vols.1–6(Bloomington,Indiana:Indiana UniversityPress1967–1978;referencesaretonumberingofpassages)
NB = Journal(s)NB(inSKS20–26)
Pap = SørenKierkegaardsPapirer (2nd.ed.,Copenhagen,Gyldendal1968–78).
SKS = SørenKierkegaardsSkrifter (Copenhagen:Gad1997ff)
SUD = SicknessUntoDeath
TD = ThreeDiscoursesonImaginedOccasions
UD = UpbuildingDiscoursesinVariousSpirits
WL = WorksofLove
WiththeexceptionofJP,thetranslationsarefrom Kierkegaard’sWritings (Princeton:Princeton UniversityPress1979–97)
Notes
1SeeP.Pettit,‘HopeandItsPlaceinMind’, TheANNALSoftheAmericanAcademyofPoliticalandSocial Science March(2004),pp.152–65,p.152;V.McGeer,‘TheArtofGoodHope’, TheANNALSoftheAmerican AcademyofPoliticalandSocialScience March(2004),pp.100–27,p.101;cf.P.Tillich,‘TheRighttoHope’, ChristianCentury (1990),pp.1064–67,http://www.religion-online.org/showarticle.asp?title=62(accessed 30/9/2008);B.V.Nunn,‘GettingClearWhatHopeIs’inJ.Eliott(ed.), InterdisciplinaryPerspectivesonHope (NewYork:Nova2005),pp.63–77,p.64.AsearchinPubMed,PsycINFO,andPhilosopher’sIndexshowthat ‘whileMedicinehasexperiencedasharpincreaseinthenumberofhopereferences,withamodestrisewithin Psychology,withinPhilosophynumbershaveremainedrelativelylow,onlyoncefeaturingmorethan20articles inanyfive-yearperiod.’J.Eliott,‘WhatHaveWeDoneWithHope?ABriefHistory’inEliott, Interdisciplinary PerspectivesonHope,pp.1–45,p.29(quoted),cf.pp.35f.
2Rather,thissayssomethingaboutKierkegaard’s vianegativa approach.Cf.ArneGrøn, Subjektivitetog negativitet:Kierkegaard (Copenhagen:Gyldendal1997),pp.74–78,ch.3.
3Grøn, Subjektivitetognegativitet,p.151;cf.GeneFendt, ForWhatMayIHope?:ThinkingwithKantand Kierkegaard (NewYork:PeterLang1990),p.141.
4Cf.R.C.Roberts,‘TheVirtueofHopein EighteenUpbuildingDiscourses’inR.L.Perkins(ed.), Eighteen UpbuildingDiscourses (Macon,Georgia:MercerUniversityPress2003),pp.181–203(InternationalKierkegaardCommentary,vol.5).Nevertheless,itismeaningfultosay‘Ihopeyoudidwellatyourexamyesterday’. Thissuggeststhat(specific)hopescanrefertoapasteventwhoseoutcomeisuncertain.Cf.J.K.Muyskens, The SufficiencyofHope (Philadelphia:TempleUniversityPress1979),pp.15f;Spinoza, Ethics,IIID12(Definition 12ofPartIII).However,ratherthanbeingconcernedwithspecifichopessuchtheaboveexample,Kierkegaard isconcernedwithgeneralhope.
5Seealsothesepassagesdealingwithreligiousnessingeneral(ratherthanmerelyreligioushope):SKS 7:36;5:263f,267;CUP29;EUD268,272.
6Forsimilarclaimsinterpretedwithindifferentframeworks,seeMcGeer‘TheArtofGoodHope’,pp. 104f,109;P.Shade, HabitsofHope:APragmaticTheory (Nashville:VanderbiltUniversityPress2001),pp.6f.
7Cf.Muyskens, TheSufficiencyofHope,pp.15–17.
8Thisisastandarddistinctioninmedicalresearchandnursingstudies.Iwouldliketoclaimthatthis distinctionoughttobeclarifiedandelaboratedonratherthandismissed,inparticularsincethisdistinctioncan helpusassesswhetherhopesarejustifiable.Itiscommonplace,especiallyinempiricallyorientedliterature
foundinmedicalandnursingstudies,todemandthathopemustberealistic.However,thereisverylittle agreementastowhichhopesarerealisticandthereforejustified.Cf.J.Kylmä&K.Vehviläinen-Julkunen, ‘Hopeinnursingresearch:ameta-analysisoftheontologicalandepistemologicalfoundationsofresearchon Hope’ JournalofAdvancedNursing 25(1997),pp.364–71;T.Rustøen,‘Håpogsmerterhoskreftpasienter–etuutforsketområde’inSteinKaasa(ed.), Festskrift.Seksjonlindrendebehandlinggjennom10år (NTNU/St. OlavsHospital:Trondheim2004),pp.84–93.Regardingthedistinctionbetweengeneralandspecific/particular hopes:Rustøen‘Håpogsmerterhoskreftpasienter’;T.Morita,J.Tsunoda,S.Inoue,etal.,‘AnExploratory FactorAnalysisofExistentialSufferinginJapaneseTerminallyIllCancerPatients’ Psycho-Oncology 9(2000), pp.164–68;H.M.Chochinov,‘Dying,Dignity,andNewHorizonsinPalliativeEnd-of-LifeCare’ ACancer JournalforClinicians 56(2006),pp.84–103;J.C.Jacobsen,L.C.Vanderwerker,S.D.Block,etal.,‘Depression anddemoralizationasdistinctsyndromes:Preliminarydatafromacohortofadvancedcancerpatients’ Indian JournalofPalliativeCare 12(2006),pp.8–15.
9AlthoughitisthepseudonymJohannesdesilentiowhosaysit,thisappearstobeapointwhichistruein ageneralsenseandwhichcanthereforebeattributedtoKierkegaardhimself.Cf.MeroldWestphal, Kierkegaard’sCritiqueofReasonandSociety (UniversityPark,Pennsylvania:ThePennsylvaniaStateUniversity Press1991),p.89includingnote17.
10TheHongstranslate‘Forstandighet’as‘commonsense’.
11RegardingKierkegaard’sthesisabouttheuniversalityofguiltandsin,seeMichelleKosch, Freedomand ReasoninKant,Schelling,andKierkegaard (Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress2006),esp.pp.162f;Roe Fremstedal,‘OriginalSinandRadicalEvil:KierkegaardandKant’,Forthcomingin KantianReview.
12SeeGrøn, Subjektivitetognegativitet,pp.143–53.
13RegardingtheconceptofthehighestgoodinKierkegaardandClimacus,seeC.S.Evans, Kierkegaard’s Fragments and Postscript(NewYork:Humanity1999),pp.142–47;J.D.Glenn,Jr.,‘“AHighestGood...An EternalHappiness”:TheHumanTelosinKierkegaard’s ConcludingUnscientificPostscript’inR.L.Perkins (ed.), ConcludingUnscientificPostscriptto‘PhilosophicalFragments’ (Macon,Georgia:MercerUniversity Press1997),pp.247–62(InternationalKierkegaardCommentary,vol.12);RoeFremstedal,‘TheConcept oftheHighestGoodinKierkegaardandKant’ InternationalJournalforPhilosophyofReligion 69(2011), pp.155–71.
14RegardingChristiantheology,seeH.-G.Link,‘Hoffnung’inJ.Ritter(ed.), HistoricheWörterbuchder Philosophie (Darmstadt:WissenschaftlicheBuchgesellschaft1974),vol.3,pp.1157–66,1160;cf.J.Moltman, TheologyofHope (London:SCMPress2002),pp.202–09,pp.309–16.RegardingKant,seeP.J.Rossi,‘Kant’s DoctrineofHope:Reason’sInterestandtheThingsofFaith’ TheNewScholasticism 56(1982),pp.228–38; Rossi, TogetherTowardsHope (NotreDameandLondon:UniversityofNotreDamePress1983).
15MoltmanntriestoshowthatalthoughtheChristiantraditionstressesman’ssinfulnessandguilt,thisisnot theonlyissueatstake.Moltmanntriestoshowthattheremustbejusticeforvictims,andthatthisconcernis found,atleastimplicitly,intheChristiantradition(J.Moltmann, IntheEnd–theBeginning (London:SCM 2004),pp.53–61).Thiscertainlyseemsplausibleifweincludethediscussionovertheodicy.Elsewhere, MoltmannalsostressesthatwemusthopefortheKingdomofGod(TheologyofHope,pp.206f,309ff).
16SeeChristophSchulte, RadikalBöse.DieKarrieredesBösenvonKantbisNietzsche (Munich:Wilhelm Fink1991),pp.279f;R.M.Green, KierkegaardandKant:theHiddenDebt (Albany,NewYork:State UniversityofNewYorkPress1992),pp.150ff,221;Green,‘TheLimitsoftheEthicalinKierkegaard’s The ConceptofAnxiety andKant’s ReligionwithintheLimitsofReasonAlone’inR.L.Perkins(ed.), TheConcept ofAnxiety (Macon,Georgia:MercerUniversityPress1985),pp.63–87,pp.70f(InternationalKierkegaard Commentary,vol.8);Green,‘TheLeapofFaith:Kierkegaard’sDepttoKant’ Philosophy&Theology 3(1989), pp.385–411,p.395;Fremstedal,‘OriginalSinandRadicalEvil:KierkegaardandKant’.Cf.Kant, Religion WithintheBoundariesofBareReason,inKant, ReligionandRationalTheology (Cambridge:Cambridge UniversityPress1996),6:22–25;Kant, LecturesonEthics (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress1997), 27:302;NB24:112;SKS24:390;7:383;JP998;CUP420f.
17E.g.PoulLübcke,‘Kierkegaard’sConceptofRevelation’inG.Linde,R.Purkarthofer,H.Schulz,and P.Steinacker(eds.), TheologiezwischenPragmatismusundExistenzdenken (Marburg:N.G.Elwert2006),pp. 405–14,pp.411f.
18Foraninterpretationoftherelationbetweenfaithandhope,seeRoeFremstedal, KierkegaardandKant onAnthropologyandReligion:Evil,Faith,andHope (Trondheim:NTNU2010),ch4.
19Kierkegaardidentifiesthishopelessnessnotonlywithdespairbutalsowiththemedievalconceptof acedia (SKS18:44;EE:117,117a;JP739f),aconceptthatisnotoriouslyhardtotranslate.Theethicisttakesup theoldtheologicaldoctrinethatsees acedia asacardinalsinbutgoesbeyondtraditionbyseeingitassin instar omnium,astherootandquintessenceofallsins(SKS3:183;EO2189).Thus,Kierkegaardcanbesaidto
radicaliseanduniversalisethemedievaldoctrineof acedia.SeeMichaelTheunissen, VorentwürfevonModerne. AntikeMelancholieunddieAcediadesMittelalters (Berlin:deGruyter1996),esp.44–48.AlthoughKierkegaard’sconceptofdespaircomesclosetowhatistodaycalleddepression(EO2translates Tungsind ‘depression’),itdoesnotnecessarilyinvolve anhedonia likedepressiondoes.Forthisreasonitactuallycomescloser tothedemoralizationsyndrome,existentialsuffering,andexistentialdistressthandepression.SeeRoeFremstedal,‘Demoraliseringssyndromet,eksistensielllidelseogfortvilelse’ Omsorg.Nordisktidsskriftforpalliativ medisin 23(2006),pp.57–63.
20Cf.Roberts,‘TheVirtueofHope’,pp.192f,200f.
21SeeEvans, Kierkegaard’s Fragments and Postscript,pp.142–47;Glenn,‘“AHighestGood...An EternalHappiness”’;Fremstedal,‘TheConceptoftheHighestGoodinKierkegaardandKant’.
22AsimilarpointabouthopeismadeinMoltmann, TheologyofHope,pp.3f.
23TheHongsrender‘sidsteHaab’‘ultimatehope’.
24E.g.AlastairHannay, Kierkegaard (London:Routledge1993),pp.225–27;GeorgePattison, ThePhilosophyofKierkegaard (Montreal&Kingston:McGill-Queen’sUniversityPress2005),pp.99–102.
25Similarpointsabouthope(butnotaboutKierkegaard)aremadeinGabrielMarcel,‘Sketchofa PhenomenologyandaMetaphysicofHope’inhis HomoViator (London:VictorGollanczLtd1951),pp.29–67, pp.38f;Moltmann, IntheEnd,p.153.
26SeeLink,‘Hoffnung’,p.1160;cf.J.Moltmann, TheologyofHope,pp.202–209,pp.309–316.
27Glenn,‘“AHighestGood...AnEternalHappiness”’,pp.261f;Fremstedal,‘TheConceptoftheHighest GoodinKierkegaardandKant’,pp.168f.
28Regardingthisdependency,cf.Grøn,‘Kærlighedensgerningeroganerkendelsensdialektik’ Dansk TeologiskTidsskrift 4(1991),pp.261–70.
29Thetypeoflovethathopedependsonis commanded love.Kierkegaardwrites:‘Onlywhenitisaduty tolove,onlythenislove[...]eternallyandhappilysecuredagainstdespair.’(SKS9:36;WL29)
30AsimilarconclusionisreachedinRoberts,‘TheVirtueofHope’,p.195.
31AtthispointKierkegaard’sviewsconvergewithmuchoftherecentliteratureontrustandsomeofthe recentliteratureonhope.Regardingrecentliteratureontrust:V.McGeer,‘Trust,HopeandEmpowerment’ AustralasianJournalofPhilosophy 86(2)(2008),pp.237–54;regardingrecentliteratureonhope:Pettit,‘Hope andItsPlaceinMind’,pp.163–65.
32Cf.Grøn,‘Kærlighedensgerningeroganerkendelsensdialektik’;PiaSøltoft, Svimmelhedensetik (Copenhagen:Gad2000),ch.8.
33Thankstothefollowingforcommentinguponearlierversionsofthisarticle:AnthonyAumann,Jamie Turnbull,SethLloydNorrisThomas,LarsJohanMaterstvedt,BjørnK.Myskja,KjellEyvindJohansenandan anonymousreferee.
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