How to Save the Supreme Court: The Yale Law Journal

DANIEL EPPS & GANESH SITARAMAN

HowtoSavetheSupremeCourt

abstract. TheconsequencesofJusticeBrettKavanaugh’sSupremeCourtconfirmationare seismic JusticeKavanaugh,replacingJusticeAnthonyKennedy,completesanewconservativemajorityandrepresentsastunningRepublicanvictoryafterdecadesofincreasinglypartisanbattles overcontroloftheCourt TheresultisaSupremeCourtwhoseJusticesarelikelytovotealong partylinesmoreconsistentlythaneverbeforeinAmericanhistory.Thatdevelopmentgravely threatenstheCourt’slegitimacy.IfinthefutureroughlyhalfofAmericanslackconfidenceinthe SupremeCourt’sabilitytorenderimpartialjustice,theCourt’spowertosettleimportantquestions oflawwillbeinseriousjeopardy.Moreover,manyDemocratsarealreadycallingforchangeslike court-packingtopreventthenewconservativemajorityfromblockingprogressivereforms.Even ifjustified,suchmovescouldprovokefurtherescalationthatwouldleavetheCourt’simageand theruleoflawbadlydamaged.

Thecomingcrisiscanbestopped.ButsavingtheCourt’slegitimacyasaninstitutionabove politicswillrequirearadicalrethinkingofhowtheCourthasoperatedformorethantwocenturies.InthisFeature,weoutlineanewframeworkforSupremeCourtreform Specifically,weargue forreformsthatareplausiblyconstitutional(andthusimplementablebystatute)andthatarecapableofcreatingastableequilibriumevenifinitiallyimplementedusing“hardball”tactics Under thisframework,weevaluateexistingproposalsandoffertwoofourown:theSupremeCourtLotteryandtheBalancedBench.Whetherpolicymakersadoptthesepreciseproposalsornot,our frameworkcanguidetheirmuch-neededsearchforreform Wecansavewhatisgoodaboutthe Court—butonlyifwearewillingtotransformtheCourt.

authors. DanielEppsisAssociateProfessorofLaw,WashingtonUniversityinSt.Louis. GaneshSitaramanisChancellorFacultyFellow,ProfessorofLaw,andDirectoroftheProgramin LawandGovernment,VanderbiltLawSchool.Forhelpfulconversationsandcomments,weare gratefultoErwinChemerinsky,GarrettEpps,JohnInazu,PamKarlan,RonLevin,MarinLevy, AnneJosephO’Connell,NatePersily,DavePozen,RichardPrimus,SteveSachs,IlyaShapiro,Jed Shugerman,KateShaw,DavidSklansky,MarkTushnet,andtheeditorsoftheYaleLawJournal; toparticipantsinworkshopsatStanfordLawSchool,WashingtonUniversitySchoolofLaw,and YaleLawSchool;andtoparticipantsintheACS/SALTWorkshopatthe2019AALSAnnualMeeting.WewouldliketothankRhysJohnson,WillPugh,andAllisonWalterforhelpfulresearch assistance.TheproposalsdevelopedherewerefirstadvancedinDanielEpps&GaneshSitaraman, HowtoSavetheSupremeCourt,VOX(Sept.6,2018;updatedOct.10,2018),https://www.vox.com /the-big-idea/2018/9/6/17827786/kavanaugh-vote-supreme-court-packing [https://perma.cc /5ZM2-L2WK].

JusticeBrettKavanaugh’sconfirmationtoreplaceJusticeAnthonyKennedy ontheSupremeCourtwasaseismiceventforconstitutionallawandforthe American political system. The new conservative majority that Justice KavanaughcompletesrepresentedastunningvictoryfortheRepublicanPartyafter decadesofeffortbytheconservativelegalmovement—and,bythesametoken, asignificantdefeatforDemocratsandtheAmericanleft.ButalthoughRepublicanslookliketheshort-termwinners,theultimateloserhereisn’tjusttheir Democratic opponents. It’s the Supreme Court itself—and, eventually, the Americanpeopleasawhole.

RecenteventshavealreadytakenatollonperceptionsoftheCourt’slegitimacy.JusticeKavanaugh’s50-48confirmationvotewasoneoftheclosestin Americanhistory.1Thevotecameafteraprocessthatdeeplydividedthecountry, whenRepublicansstuckwiththeirnomineeafterseriousaccusationsofsexual misconduct—andevenafterJusticeKavanaughgavetestimonytotheSenateJudiciaryCommitteethatmanyviewedas“nakedlypartisan.”2PresidentTrump’s firstnominee,JusticeNeilGorsuch,joinedtheCourtonlyafterunprecedented tactics by Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell to stonewall President Obama’snominee,JudgeMerrickGarland,andleavetheseatopen.Butthese debacleswereonlythelatestinanincreasinglypoliticizedfightoverJustices.The predictableresultisaSupremeCourtwhoseJustices—onbothsides—aremore likelytovotealongpartylinesthaneverbeforeinAmericanhistory.Soon,Lee EpsteinandEricPosnerwarn,“itwillbecomeimpossibletoregardthe[C]ourt asanythingbutapartisaninstitution.”3

1. Onesenatorabstained,forafinalvoteof50-48-1.ChrisKeller,SenateVoteonKavanaughWas HistoricallyClose,L.A.TIMES(Oct.6,2018,5:35PM),https://www.latimes.com/nation/la -pol-scotus-confirmation-votes-over-the-years-20181005-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc /EB85-Q4JE].Theclosestmargininhistorywas24-23,inthe1881confirmationofJustice Matthews,underacloudofsuspectednepotism.SeeSheldonGilbert,ALookattheClosest CourtConfirmationEver,NAT’LCONST.CTR.:CONST.DAILY(Oct.6,2018),https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/a-look-at-the-closest-court-confirmation-ever [https://perma.cc/LT64 -Z75L].

2. ZackBeauchamp,TheSupremeCourt’sLegitimacyCrisisIsHere,VOX (Oct.6,2018,4:02 PMEDT),https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/10/6/17915854/brett-kavanaugh -senate-confirmed-supreme-court-legitimacy[https://perma.cc/3LNL-YZV7].

3. LeeEpstein&EricPosner,Opinion,IftheSupremeCourtIsNakedlyPolitical,CanItBeJust?, N.Y.TIMES(July9,2018),https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/09/opinion/supreme-court -nominee-trump.html[https://perma.cc/L497-C3VE].

ThatdevelopmentpresentsagravethreattotheCourt’slegitimacy—thatis, thedegreetowhichitisperceivedaslegitimatebytheAmericanpeople

4 If AmericanslosetheirfaithintheSupremeCourt’sabilitytorenderimpartialjustice,theCourtmightloseitspowertoresolveimportantquestionsinwaysthat allAmericanscanlivewith.Raisingthestakesevenhigher,manyDemocratsare alreadycallingforreprisalslikecourt-packing,5which,evenifjustified,could provokefurtherescalationthatwouldtarnishtheCourt’simageanddamagethe ruleoflaw.

Canthiscomingcrisisbestopped?Or,morestarkly:cantheSupremeCourt besaved?Wethinkso.ButpreservingtheCourt’slegitimacyasaninstitution abovepoliticswillrequireacompleterethinkingofhowtheCourtworksand howtheJusticesarechosen.TosavewhatisgoodabouttheCourt,wemust rejectandrethinkmuchofhowtheCourthasoperatedformorethantwocenturies

AndtheCourtis,wethink,worthsaving.Americandemocracycouldlikely stillfunctioniftheSupremeCourthadtoolittlecapitaltostanduptothepoliticalbranches.Buttherearegoodreasonstowanttohaveaninstitutionlikethe Courtthatcancheckthepoliticalprocessandholdustoourdeepestcommitments.Moreimportantly,intheUnitedStates,publicconfidenceintheSupreme Courtisimpossibletodisentanglefrompublicconfidenceintheveryideaoflaw itself,asanenterpriseseparatefrompolitics.Andademocracythatlosesitsconfidenceinlawmaynotlongsurvive.

4 Theterm“legitimacy,”whenappliedtotheSupremeCourt,canhaveseveralmeanings.RichardFallonhasdistinguishedbetween“sociological,moral,andlegalconceptsoflegitimacy.”

RICHARDH.FALLON,JR.,LAWANDLEGITIMACYINTHESUPREMECOURT21(2018).Ourfocus hereissquarelyonquestionsofsociologicallegitimacy,whichasdefinedbyFallon“involves prevailingpublicattitudestowardgovernments,institutions,ordecisions.Itdependsonwhat factuallyisthecaseabouthowpeoplethinkorrespond—notonwhattheirthinkingoughtto be.”Id.Yetquestionsofsociologicallegitimacymayhaveimportantimplicationsforother formsoflegallegitimacy.Forafascinatingargumentaboutthetensionbetweendifferent kindsoflegitimacy,seeTaraLeighGrove,TheSupremeCourt’sLegitimacyDilemma,132HARV L.REV.2240,2245(2019)(reviewingFALLON,supra,andarguingthat“inpoliticallycharged moments,theJusticesmayfeelpressuretosacrificethelegallegitimacyoftheirjudicialdecisionsinordertopreservethesociologicallegitimacyoftheCourtasawhole”).

5. See, e.g., Aaron Blake, Pack the Supreme Court? Why We May Be Getting Closer, WASH. POST(Oct.9,2018),https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2018/10/09/pack-supreme -court-why-we-may-be-getting-closer [https://perma.cc/2MS9-JPY4]; Michael Klarman, WhyDemocratsShouldPacktheSupremeCourt,TAKECAREBLOG(Oct.15,2018),https:// takecareblog.com/blog/why-democrats-should-pack-the-supreme-court [https://perma.cc /62LV-PBNH];IanSamuel,KavanaughWillBeontheUSSupremeCourtforLife.Here’sHow WeFightBack,GUARDIAN (Oct.9,2018,4:00PMEDT),https://www.theguardian.com /commentisfree/2018/oct/09/kavanaugh-us-supreme-court-fight-back-court-packing [https://perma.cc/5ZUG-LZE8].

InthisFeature,weofferaframeworkforthinkingaboutsavingtheSupreme Court.WeexplainhowonlySupremeCourtreforms—andonlytherightkinds ofreform—canpreservetheCourt’sroleasaneutralarbiterofimportantquestionsoflaw.WebegininPartIbydiscussingwhytheCourt’slegitimacyfaces significantperilinthenearterm.Severalfactors—suchasincreasedpolarization insociety,thedevelopmentofpolarizedschoolsoflegalinterpretationaligned withpoliticalaffiliations,andgreaterinterest-groupattentiontotheSupreme Courtnominationprocess—haveconspiredtocreateasysteminwhichtheCourt hasbecomeapoliticalfootball,andinwhicheachnomineecanbeexpectedto predictablyvotealongideologicallinesthattrackpartisanaffiliation.Justice Kennedy—eventhoughhewasmostlyareliableconservative—maywellbethe lastJusticetovoteagainsthispartisanaffiliationinsomeofthehighest-profile cases.Withhisreplacement,thenotionoftheCourtasaninstitutionabovethe politicalfraymightsoonvanish.

Next,inPartII,weconsiderwhatkindsofreformswouldbestprotectthe Court’sperceivedroleasalegitimate,nonpartisanarbiterofimportantlegal questions.Anysolutionmusthaveatleastthreecomponents.First,itmustbe constitutionallyplausible,evenifnotbulletproof.Second,itmustbecapableof implementation via statute, given the near impossibility of a constitutional amendmentinanageofseverepolarization.Finally,eventhoughoverwhelming bipartisansupportmightnotbepossibleatthetimeofreform,theproposal needstobestablegoingforward.Thatis,ithastobesomethingthatbothsides mightbeabletolivewithinthelongterm,leadingtoafairequilibrium.Unfortunately,someofthemostprominentreformproposalsdonotsatisfythesecriteria;andinsomecases,theywouldmaketheCourt’spoliticizationevenworse.

Mostimportantly,inPartIII,weoffertworeformsofourown.Wecallthese theSupremeCourtLotteryandtheBalancedBench.Weofferthesealternative approachesbecausepolicymakersmighthavedifferentviewsabouttheirviability,ifandwhenCongresstakesupSupremeCourtreform.Foreach,wediscuss theplananditsbenefitsandthenassessitsconstitutionality.Wethinkeither wouldbeanexcellentframeworkforreform.Thoughneitherwouldperfectly solvealltheproblemsweidentifywiththeSupremeCourt,bothwouldbea markedimprovementoverthestatusquo.

Whetherpolicymakersadoptthesepreciseproposalsornot,itisimperative thattheysearchforreformsalongtheselines.Doingnothingmeansthatthe Court’slegitimacywillcontinuetosufferintheeyesofthepublic TheCourt risksbeinggravelydamagedbyclashesbetweentheconservativemajorityand progressivepoliticians,ifandwhenDemocratsregainpowerinthepolitical branches.Butnakedlypoliticalreformslikecourt-packing—evenifajustified responsetoRepublicanescalation—maynotleadtoastableequilibriumand

couldendupdamagingtheruleoflaw.ThebestwaytosavetheCourtisto transformtheCourt.

i. the looming threat

Asmanyobservershavenoted,theSupremeCourtisfacinganunprecedentedlegitimacycrisisinthewakeofJusticeKennedy’sretirementandJustice Kavanaugh’sconfirmation.6CommentatorsidentifyseveralseriousdangersfacingtheCourtgoingforward.Firstistheseeminglyundeniablefactthatthe Courtwillbemorepolarizedalongpartylinesthanatanypointinrecenthistory. AsEpsteinandPosnerexplain,JusticeKennedywasthelastSupremeCourtappointeetovote“withanyregularity”againsttheideologyofthePresidentwho namedhimtotheCourt.7Everysubsequentappointeehashewnmorecloselyto partyideology;andJusticeKennedy’sreplacement,JusticeKavanaugh,isbyall accountsareliableconservativewhoisunlikelytobreakthisnewtrend.8Thus, “[f]orthefirsttimeinlivingmemory,the[C]ourtwillbeseenbythepublicas aparty-dominatedinstitution,onewhosevotesoncontroversialissuesareessentiallydeterminedbythepartyaffiliationofrecentpresidents.”9 Indeed,evenwhenDemocraticPresidentFranklinRooseveltproposedhis famouscourt-packingplaninthe1930s,hisantagonistsontheSupremeCourt werenotalloftheopposingparty Oneofthe“fourhorsemen,”JusticeJames McReynolds,hadbeenappointedbyDemocraticPresidentWoodrowWilson 10 Another,JusticePierceButler,wasalsoaDemocrat(althoughoneappointedby RepublicanPresidentWarrenG.Harding).11Moreover,fourofthefiveJustices whoultimately“brokethelogjam”infavorofPresidentRoosevelt’spolicieswere Republicans.12

6. SeeBeauchamp,supranote2.

7. Epstein&Posner,supranote3.

8 Id

9 Id

10. BERNARDSCHWARTZ,AHISTORYOFTHESUPREMECOURT214(1993).

11. SeeDavidR.Stras,PierceButler:ASupremeTechnician,62VAND.L.REV.695,712(2009) (explaininghowPresidentHardingchoseJusticeButlerbecausepoliticalexpediencycounseledinfavorofchoosingaCatholicDemocrat).Interestingly,JusticeButler’sselectionwas motivatedpartlybyconcernsaboutpubliclegitimacySeeHENRYL.ABRAHAM,JUSTICES,PRESIDENTSANDSENATORS149(5thed.2008)(notingthatChiefJusticeTaft“persuadedthepresidentthattheCourthadbecome‘tooRepublican’inthepubliceyeandthat,consequently, thenewappointeeoughttobeacongenialDemocrat”).

12. RichardPrimus,TheRepublicinLong-TermPerspective,117MICH.L.REV.ONLINE1,10(2018).

SimilarobservationscouldbemadeaboutotherpointsofparticularcontroversyintheCourt’shistory.Brownv.BoardofEducation13ignitedapoliticalfirestorm Southernpoliticiansengagedinacampaignof“massiveresistance”tothe Court’seffortstoforcedesegregation.14YetascontroversialasBrownandsubsequentdesegregationdecisionswere,itwashardtopainttheconflictasprimarilyapartisanclashbetweenDemocratsandRepublicans.Brownwaswrittenby ChiefJusticeWarren,aRepublicanappointee,andwasjoinedunanimouslyby theeightDemocratic-appointedJustices.Meanwhile,mostoftheSouthernoppositionwasledbyconservativeDemocraticpoliticians.

Sotoowithotherconflicts.Roev.Wade15generatedasignificantbacklash amongconservatives;butthedecisionwaswrittenbyaRepublican-appointed Justiceandjoinedbyfourmore ADemocratic-appointedJusticewasoneofthe twodissenters.CitizensUnitedv.FederalElectionCommission16 isperhapsthe mostpoliticallycontroversialdecisionofthelastdecade;butboththemajority andtheleaddissentwerewrittenbyRepublican-appointedJustices.

PerhapsthegreatestthreattotheCourt’slegitimacyinrecentyearswasBush v.Gore, 17whichinvolvedfiveRepublican-appointedJusticeseffectivelydeliveringacontestedpresidentialelectiontotheRepublicancandidate.Intheshort term,thedecisiongeneratedsharplypolarizedresponsesfromtheAmerican people.18Yet“theinitialpolarizationtowardtheCourtevaporatedwithinayear ofthedecision.”19Withinlessthanadecade,theCourtwasmorepopularamong DemocratsthanRepublicansinopinionpolls.20Socialscientistshaveexplained thepublic’squickacceptanceofBushv.Gorebysuggestingthat“becausethe Courtenjoyedsuchadeepreservoirofgoodwill,mostAmericanswerepredisposedtoviewtheCourt’sinvolvementasappropriate.”21Otherfactorslikely playedaroleaswell.VicePresidentAlGoreacceptedtheCourt’sdecisionas

13. 347U.S.483(1954).

14. SeeMichaelJ.Klarman,HowBrownChangedRaceRelations:TheBacklashThesis,81J.AM. HIST 81,82(1994).

15. 410U.S.113(1973).

16. 558U.S.310(2010).

17 531U.S.98(2000).

18 SeeJeffreyL.Yates&AndrewB.Whitford,ThePresidencyandtheSupremeCourtAfterBushv. Gore:ImplicationsforInstitutionalLegitimacyandEffectiveness,13STAN.L.&POL’YREV.101,112 (2002).

19 NathanielPersily,Foreword:TheLegacyofBushv.GoreinPublicOpinionandAmericanLaw, 23ST.THOMASL.REV.325,325(2011).

20 Seeid.

21 JamesL.Gibsonetal.,TheSupremeCourtandtheUSPresidentialElectionof2000:Wounds, Self-InflictedorOtherwise?,33BRIT.J.POL.SCI.535,555(2003).

final;22andintheyearsafterthedecision,theCourt—dueto“swing”votesby JusticesO’ConnorandKennedy—offeredupanumberofhigh-profiledecisions amenabletoDemocratsandprogressives 23Today,bycontrast,theRepublicanappointedmajorityappearsmorereliablyconservative,andDemocraticpoliticiansseemmuchmorewillingtochallengetheCourtaspartisan.

Thus,whiletheCourthascomeunderpoliticalassaultatthisandother pointsinhistory,wethinktheriseofaCourtpolarizedonpartylinesmakesthe presentmomentparticularlydangerous.Thereisuncertaintyastowhatexactly theriseofapartisanCourtportends,butitishardtoimaginethattheCourtwill continuetoenjoypublicconfidenceifhalfthecountryseesthemajorityofJusticesaspoliticalagentsworkingfortheotherteam.

ItmightnotbeanoverstatementtosaythatDredScottv.Sandford24andits surroundingpoliticspresentsthemostusefulanaloguetothepresentperiod. Whilewedonotcontendthatthecountryisheadedforcivilwar,DredScottprovideslessonsaboutwhatcanhappenwhenthecountryseestheSupremeCourt asbeholdentoonesideinacontentiouspublicdebate.Intherun-uptotheCivil War,thecountrywasbitterlydividedovertheissueofslaveryalongregional lines.InDredScott,AmericansperceivedtheCourtashandingonesidetotalvictoryinthathighlydivisiveconflict.Politicalrhetoricaroundthedecisionwas fiery;AbrahamLincolnfamouslychargedthatthedecisionwastheresultof“a conspiracytomakeslaverynational.”25

ThenationalriftthatDredScottwidenedwastheregionalconflictbetween thefreeNorthandslaveholdingSouth.Today,bycontrast,ourpoliticalsystem isincreasinglydividedonpartylines.26Andnow,theSupremeCourtisperfectly

22 See Text of Gore’s Concession Speech, N.Y. TIMES (Dec 13, 2000), https:// www.nytimes.com/2000/12/13/politics/text-of-goreacutes-concession-speech.html [https://perma.cc/UEW5-3VJG](“[W]hileIstronglydisagreewiththe[C]ourt’sdecision,I acceptit.Iacceptthefinalityofthisoutcome .”).

23. ExamplesincludeLawrencev.Texas,539U.S.558(2003);Grutterv.Bollinger,539U.S.306 (2003);andBoumedienev.Bush,553U.S.723(2008).

24 60U.S.(19How.)393(1857).

25. AbrahamLincoln,SixthDebatewithStephenA.Douglas,atQuincy,Illinois(Oct.13,1858), in3THECOLLECTEDWORKSOFABRAHAMLINCOLN245,282(RoyP.Baslered.,1953).

26 Social-scienceresearchhasdemonstratedhow,overrecentdecades,Americanswhoidentify withthetwomajorpoliticalpartieshavebecomemuchmorepolarizedintheirviews.Some ofthemorerecentstudiesofthisshiftincludeMARCJ.HETHERINGTON&THOMASJ.RANDOLPH,WHYWASHINGTONWON’TWORK15-21(2015);LILLIANAMASON,UNCIVILAGREEMENT:HOWPOLITICSBECAMEOURIDENTITY 3-4(2018);andNOLANMCCARTY,KEITHT. POOLE&HOWARDROSENTHAL,POLARIZEDAMERICA:THEDANCEOFIDEOLOGYANDUNEQUAL RICHES12-13(2ded.2016).

polarizedonpartylinesaswell—forthefirsttime,allDemocrat-appointedJusticesarereliablyliberalandallRepublican-appointedJusticesarereliablyconservative.27Thereasonswhythisishappeningnowarecomplex,butasignificantpartofthestory,asNealDevinsandLawrenceBaumargue,istheriseof distinctandpolarizedgroupsoflegaleliteswithdifferentapproachestolegal interpretation.28

TheCourttodayraisesotherlegitimacyconcernsbeyondpartydomination. OnedistinctproblemistheSupremeCourt’slackofdemocraticpedigree.Of course,the“countermajoritariandifficulty”posedbytheCourthasbeenthesubjectofdecadesofdebateamongconstitutionaltheorists.29Today,though,the Courthasbecomeparticularlycountermajoritarian.Theproblemisnotjustthat theJusticesthemselvesareinsulatedfrompoliticsthroughlifetenure;itisalso thatthepoliticalactorsselectingthemsufferfromseriousdemocraticdeficits As MichaelTomaskynotes,thetwomostrecentadditionstotheCourtwereselected “byapresidentandaSenatewhorepresentthewillofaminorityoftheAmerican people.”30 In fact,only threeof the currentJustices (JusticesThomas,Sotomayor,andKagan)werenominatedbyaPresidentwhoenteredofficeafter winningthemajorityofthenationalpopularvote.31

Thesemoregeneralconcernsareexacerbatedbythecircumstancesofhow thetwonewestJusticesjoinedtheCourt.Asnoted,JusticeGorsuchonlywas abletobecomeaJusticeafterSenateRepublicans’unprecedentedblockadeof PresidentObama’snominee,JudgeGarland.TheCourtwasleftwitheightJusticesformorethanayearafterJusticeScalia’sdeath;andSenateRepublicans refusedtoevenholdahearingforJudgeGarland,despitehisincontrovertible 27

weretherecompetingideologicalblocsthatcoincidedwithpartylines”).

28 Seegenerallyid

29 See,e.g.,ALEXANDERM.BICKEL,THELEASTDANGEROUS

30. MichaelTomasky,Opinion,TheSupremeCourt’sLegitimacyCrisis,N.Y.TIMES(Oct.5,2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/05/opinion/supreme-courts-legitimacy-crisis.html [https://perma.cc/P4RY-8RL4](notingthatPresidentTrumplostthepopularvoteandthat thefiftySenatorswhoconfirmedJusticeKavanaugh“collectivelywonfewervotesintheirlast election”thantheSenatorswhoopposedhim)

31. Id.

qualifications,relativecentrism,andmajoritysupportamongtheAmericanpeople.32

Then,afterDonaldTrumpassumedofficeandthePresidencypassedinto Republicancontrol,theSenatemovedswiftlytoconsiderandconfirmJustice Gorsuch.AfterSenateDemocratsfilibusteredthenomination,SenateRepublicansinvokedtheso-called“nuclearoption,”changinglongstandingrulesto lowerthevotingthresholdforclotureonSupremeCourtnomineesfromsixty votestoasimplemajority33(whichSenateDemocratshadthemselvesexercised whentheywereinpowerfouryearsearlier,fornomineestothelowercourtsand executiveoffices).34TheSenate’shandlingofthevacancygeneratedsignificant outrageontheleft,withsomegoingsofarastoarguethatJusticeGorsuch shouldbeconsideredillegitimate 35

Theinescapableconclusionfromtheseeventsisthatthepartyaffiliationof SupremeCourtJusticesmatters—andthatpoliticianswillgotogreatlengthsto controltheCourt.Indeed,politicianstodayopenlyadmitthatrawpoweristhe nameofthegamewhenitcomestoSupremeCourtnominations.Recently,SenatorMcConnellmadeclearthatifanotherSupremeCourtvacancyoccurredin

32. See Supreme Court, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/4732/supreme-court.aspx [https://perma.cc/UE2T-R6BB](notingresultsofaMarch2016surveyshowing52%supportforGarland’sconfirmation,with29%opposedand19%havingnoopinion).

33. SeeMattFlegenheimer,SenateRepublicansDeploy‘NuclearOption’toClearPathforGorsuch, N.Y.TIMES(Apr 6,2017),https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/06/us/politics/neil-gorsuch -supreme-court-senate.html[https://perma.cc/267Z9MA2].

34 SeePaulKane,Reid,DemocratsTrigger‘Nuclear’Option;EliminateMostFilibustersonNominees, WASH POST (Nov 21,2013),https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/senate-poised-to -limit-filibusters-in-party-line -vote-that-would-alter-centuries-of-precedent /2013/11/21 /d065cfe8-52b6-11e3-9fe0-fd2ca728e67c_story.html[https://perma.cc/HK97-T98L]

35. See,e.g.,DavidFaris,HowDemocratsCanMakeRepublicansPayforJusticeGorsuch,THEWEEK (Mar. 20, 2017), https://theweek.com/articles/681352/how-democrats-make-republicans -pay-justice-gorsuch[https://perma.cc/R7V3-J9SU](“Gorsuch’sseatwasstolenbyacraven actofdemocraticsabotage,andhewillalwaysbesittinginachairreservedforthenominee ofaDemocraticpresident.Heisillegitimatetoday,andhewillbeillegitimate20yearsfrom now.”);LawrenceWeschler,HowtheUSSupremeCourtLostItsLegitimacy,NATION(Sept.17, 2018), https://www.thenation.com/article/how-the-us-supreme-court-lost-its-legitimacy [https://perma.cc/TQ9F-BGYF](“BetweenthekabukitheaterofGorsuch’sconfirmation hearingandthecircumstancesthatallowedforhisnominationinthefirstplace,histenureon theCourtwillalwayshaveanasterisknexttoit Foraslongashepresides,Gorsuch’swill needtobeconsidereda‘bastard’voteinallfuture5-4decisions.”).

2020,hewouldallowPresidentTrumptofilltheseat—thusshreddinganyconceivablyneutraljustificationforrefusingtopermitPresidentObamatoappoint aJusticeinanelectionyear36

OnemighthavehopedthatJusticeKavanaugh’sconfirmationprocesswould belessdamagingtoperceptionsofjudiciallegitimacythantheGarland/Gorsuch debaclehadbeen.Tobesure,thenominationwashigh-stakes;JusticeKennedy hadbeenthe“swing”Justiceformanyyears,andthechancetoreplacehimwith amorereliableconservativegaveRepublicansachancetoreshapethelaw.Yet Justice Kennedy’s seat couldn’t be considered “stolen.” Under pre-Garland norms,thevacancywasPresidentTrump’stofillbyright,giventhatitbecame openduringhispresidency.Manyexpectedaswift,relativelyuneventfulconfirmationprocess.37

Thatwasnottobe.DaysbeforetheSenateJudiciaryCommitteewastovote onthenomination,Dr.ChristineBlaseyFordcameforwardtoallegeasexual assaultbyJusticeKavanaughduringhighschool.38Moreallegationsemerged, capturingpublicattentionandforcingtheJudiciaryCommitteetodelayitsvote untilbothDr.FordandJusticeKavanaughcouldtestify.Atthathearing,Justice Kavanaughofferedtestimonythatshockedmany.39 Helambastedthe“two-

36. SeeTedBarrett,InReversalFrom2016,McConnellSaysHeWouldFillaPotentialSupremeCourt Vacancy in 2020, CNN (May 29, 2019, 7:01 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/28 /politics/mitch-mcconnell-supreme-court-2020[https://perma.cc/T8QJ-KZ3N].

37. Bret Stephens, Opinion, Just Confirm Kavanaugh, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/12/opinion/kavanaugh-supreme-court-confirm.html [https://perma.cc/397T-ZZA4](“Kavanaughwillalmostcertainlybeconfirmed....Republican moderates spoke[]approvinglyofhisnomination.”)

38 SeeEmmaBrown,CaliforniaProfessor,WriterofConfidentialBrettKavanaughLetter,SpeaksOut About Her Allegation of Sexual Assault, WASH. POST (Sept. 16, 2018), https:// www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/california-professor-writer-of-confidential-brett -kavanaugh-letter-speaks-out-about-her-allegation-of-sexual-assault/2018/09/16/46982194 -b846-11e8-94eb-3bd52dfe917b_story.html[https://perma.cc/K3EZ-ZLBU]

39 See,e.g.,BenjaminWittes,IKnowBrettKavanaugh,butIWouldn’tConfirmHim,ATLANTIC (Oct.2,2018),https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/10/why-i-wouldnt-confirm -brett-kavanaugh/571936 [https://perma.cc/452A-BZFT] (“The allegations against [Kavanaugh]shockedmeverydeeply,butnotquitesodeeplyasdidhispresentation.”);Richard Wolffe,BrettKavanaugh’sCredibilityHasNotSurvivedThisDevastatingHearing,THEGUARDIAN (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/sep/27/brett-kavanaugh-credibility-devastating-hearing[https://perma.cc/68Z7-GUS3](“Asafederalappeals court judge, Kavanaugh’s performance was jarringly unbalanced and at times unhinged.”).

weekeffort”surroundingtheallegationsas“acalculatedandorchestratedpoliticalhit,”aformof“[r]evengeonbehalfoftheClintons.”40HewentontoaddressDemocraticcommitteememberswithcontemptanddisrespect 41Observerscondemnedhisperformanceashighlyimproperforajudge,withmany sayingthathistestimonydisqualifiedhimfortheSupremeCourtregardlessof thetruthoftheunderlyingallegations.42Someevenallegedthatheliedunder oath.43Asaresult,itwillbehardformanyAmericanstoseeJusticeKavanaugh asfairandimpartial.

Giventhiscourseofevents,manybelievetheCourt’slegitimacynowfacesa dauntingchallenge.44Theseconcernsarebynomeanslimitedtotheliberalcommentariat,buthavebeenvoicedbymainstreampoliticalfigures.FormerAttorneyGeneralEricHolder,forexample,suggestedthat“[w]iththeconfirmation ofKavanaughandtheprocesswhichledtoit,(andthetreatmentof Garland), thelegitimacyoftheSupremeCourtcanjustifiablybequestioned.”45EvenasittingmemberoftheSupremeCourt,JusticeElenaKagan,recentlywarnedthatit was “adangeroustimefortheCourt”because“peopleincreasinglylookatus

40. Kavanaugh Hearing: Transcript, WASH. POST (Sept. 27, 2018), https:// www.washingtonpost.com/news/national/wp/2018/09/27/kavanaugh-hearing-transcript [https://perma.cc/F9X5-R2F7].

41 See,e.g.,id (“[D]oyoulikebeer,Senator,ornot?”)

42 See,e.g.,LaurenceH.Tribe,Opinion,AlltheWaysaJusticeKavanaughWouldHavetoRecuse Himself,N.Y.TIMES (Oct.1,2018),https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/01/opinion/justice -kavanaugh-recuse-himself.html [https://perma.cc/NV98-6JJY] (describing Justice Kavanaugh’s“intemperatepersonalattacks”and“hispartisantirades”as“display[ing]astrikinglyinjudicioustemperament”);Wittes,supranote39.

43 See,e.g.,JamesRoche,IWasBrettKavanaugh’sCollegeRoommate,SLATE (Oct.3,2018), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/10/brett-kavanaugh-college-roommate-jamie -roche.html[https://perma.cc/76TW-2B43](“BrettKavanaughstoodupunderoathandlied abouthisdrinking .”).

44. See,e.g.,BruceAckerman,Opinion,TrustintheJusticesoftheSupremeCourtIsWaning.Here Are Three Ways to Fortify the Court, L.A. TIMES (Dec 20, 2018, 3:15 AM), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-ackerman-supreme-court-reconstruction -20181220-story.html [https://perma.cc/8Y4W-TXQQ]; Erwin Chemerinsky, Opinion, Court’s Legitimacy Is in Question, HERALD & REV (Oct. 2, 2018), https://herald-review.com/opinion/columnists/erwin-chemerinsky-court-s-legitimacy-is-in-question/article _d90aec75-ffe0-51c7-8cc0-3d9f5c19982b.html [https://perma.cc/YX9X-LXN7]; see also Grove,supranote4,at2240(notingthat“itisstrikinghowmanycommentators...have recentlyquestionedthelegitimacyoftheUnitedStatesSupremeCourt”).

45 Eric Holder (@EricHolder), TWITTER (Oct. 6, 2018, 1:10 PM), https://twitter.com /EricHolder/status/1048666766677876738[https://perma.cc/2ZGR-QRHC].

andsay‘thisisjustanextensionofthepoliticalprocess.’”46Indeed,pollingdata providessomeevidencethatmuchofthepublicseestheJusticesaspoliticalactors—andalsothatthisperceptionworsenedinthewakeoftheKavanaughconfirmation.47ArecentanalysisofperceptionsoftheCourt’slegitimacyconcluded thattheCourtasoflate2018wasin“aweakerpositionnowthanatnearlyany pointinmodernhistory.”48

Andofcourse,wehaven’tevendiscussedthelegitimacyconcernsthatwill beraisedbytheactualdecisionstheSupremeCourtwillrenderinthecoming years.Thereisgoodreasontoexpectthenewconservativemajoritytoassertits powerinhigh-profile,controversialcases.Mostobviousisthepossibility thoughnotthecertainty—thattheCourtwilloverturnRoev.Wade49andthereby permitstatelegislaturestocriminalizeabortion(apossibilitythatanumberof statelegislaturesseemtobeeagerlyanticipating) 50Manypeoplethroughout

46. IanMillhiser,KaganWarnsThattheSupremeCourt’sLegitimacyIsinDanger,THINKPROGRESS (Sept.17,2018,8:00AM),https://thinkprogress.org/justice-kagan-warns-that-the-supreme -courts-legitimacy-is-in-danger-2de1192d5636[https://perma.cc/9XNA-72UT].

47. OnenationalpollaskedAmericans:“Ingeneral,doyouthinkthattheSupremeCourtis mainlymotivatedbypoliticsormainlymotivatedbythelaw?”InJuly2018,50%ofrespondentsanswered“mainlypolitics.”PressRelease,QuinnipiacUniv.Poll,U.S.VoterSupportfor AbortionIsHigh,QuinnipiacUniversityNationalPollFinds;94PercentBackUniversalGun BackgroundChecks3(May22,2019),https://poll.qu.edu/images/polling/us/us05222019 _usch361.pdf[https://perma.cc/NFS9-E9U2].ByMay2019,aftertheKavanaughconfirmationbattle,thatnumber(whichalreadyseemsquitehigh)hadrisento55% Seeid.

48. AmeliaThomson-DeVeaux&OliverRoeder,IsTheSupremeCourtFacingaLegitimacyCrisis?, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Oct. 1, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/is-the -supreme-court-facing-a-legitimacy-crisis[https://perma.cc/R6X4-HCTW].

49. 410U.S.113(1973).

50 Inrecentmonths,anumberofstateshavepassed,orconsideredpassing,measuresthatappear impossibletoreconcilewithRoeanditsprogeny.Mostnotably,Alabamapassedalawbanning abortionentirely,exceptwhennecessarytosavethemother’slife—makingnoexceptionsfor rapeorincest.SeeEmilyWax-Thibodeaux&ChipBrownlee,AlabamaSenatePassesNation’s MostRestrictiveAbortionBan,WhichMakesNoExceptionsforVictimsofRapeandIncest,WASH. POST (May 14, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/alabama-senate-passes -nations-most-restrictive -abortion-law-which-makes -no-exceptions-for-victims-of-rape -and-incest/2019/05/14/e3022376-7665-11e9-b3f5-5673edf2d127_story.html [https:// perma.cc/5VYD-55GZ]. Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, and Ohio all recently passedmeasuresbanningabortionsataveryearlypointinpregnancy.SeeTaraLaw,HereAre theDetailsoftheAbortionLegislationinAlabama,Georgia,LouisianaandElsewhere,TIME(July 2, 2019, 5:21 PM ET), https://time.com/5591166/state-abortion-laws-explained [https:// perma.cc/5K9D-UGE3].Texasrecentlyconsidered,thoughdidnotpass,abillthatcouldhave exposedwomenanddoctorsinvolvedinabortionstothedeathpenaltySeeJuliaJacobs,Failed TexasBillWouldHaveMadeDeathPenaltyPossibleinAbortionCases,N.Y.TIMES(Apr.10, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/10/us/texas-abortion-death-penalty.html [https://perma.cc/9QKC-FGJA].Theselaws’supportersoftenexplicitlystatethatthelaws’

Americansocietyobjecttoabortion,andcommentatorsacrossthepoliticalspectrumhavecriticizedtheCourt’sworkinRoeonvariousgrounds.51Nonetheless, manyAmericanshavecometotakeRoeandtherightitrecognizedforgranted; andsometwo-thirdswishtoseeitpreserved,accordingtopolling.52Itsexplicit rejectionbytheCourtwouldbeanavulsivechange—onethatwouldgenerate massiveoutrageamongmuchofthecountry(evenifitelatedothers).Sucha developmentwouldmaketheCourtevenmoreofapoliticalfocalpointthanit isnow.

EveniftheCourtdeclinestorevisitRoe,thereislittledoubtthattheJustices willwadeintomanyotherdivisiveareasoverthecomingyears:theintersection ofgayrightsandreligiousliberty,therightsofcorporations,theconstitutionalityofaffirmative-actionprograms,thescopeofpresidentialpower,challengesto federallegislationundertheCommerceClause,thornyissuesoffreespeech,and more Thereisgoodreasontoexpectthat,inatleastsomeinstances,theCourt purposeistoprovoketheSupremeCourtintooverturning,oratleastcuttingback,ontheRoe right.See,e.g.,Wax-Thibodeaux&Brownlee,supra(“Thosewhobackedthenew[Alabama] lawsaidtheydon’texpectittotakeeffect,insteadintendingitspassagetobepartofabroader strategy by antiabortion activists to persuade the U.S. Supreme Court to reconsider [Roe] .”).

51 See,e.g.,RobertM.Byrn,AnAmericanTragedy:TheSupremeCourtonAbortion,41FORDHAM L.REV.807,809(1973)(“Roev.Wadeisintheworsttraditionofatragicjudicialaberration thatperiodicallywoundsAmericanjurisprudenceand,intheprocess,irreparablyharmsuntoldnumbersofhumanbeings.”);JohnHartEly,TheWagesofCryingWolf:ACommenton Roev.Wade,82YALEL.J.920,947(1973)(arguingthatRoewas“averybaddecision.... becauseitisnotconstitutionallawandgivesalmostnosenseofanobligationtotrytobe”); RuthBaderGinsburg,SomeThoughtsonAutonomyandEqualityinRelationtoRoev.Wade,63 N.C.L.REV 375,381(1985)(arguingthat“Roeventuredtoofarinthechangeitordered”); GeraldGunther,Commentary—SomeReflectionsontheJudicialRole:Distinctions,Roots,andProspects,1979WASH U.L.Q.817,819(“Ihavenotyetfoundasatisfyingrationaletojustify Roe onthebasisofmodesofconstitutionalinterpretationIconsiderlegitimate.”);JohnT. NoonanJr.,TheRootandBranchofRoev.Wade,63NEB.L.REV.668,679(1984)(arguing thatinRoeanditsprogenytheCourthasfailedto“perceivetherealityoftheextraordinary beautyofeachhumanbeingputtodeathinthenameoftheabortionlibertyandconcealed fromlegalrecognitionbyajurisprudencethatsubstitutesajudge’sfiatforthetruth”).

52 InadheringtothecoreofRoe’sholding,thejointopinioninPlannedParenthoodv.Casey,505 U.S.833(1992),stressedthat“peoplehaveorganizedintimaterelationshipsandmadechoices thatdefinetheirviewsofthemselvesandtheirplacesinsociety,inrelianceontheavailability ofabortion”inlightofRoe.Id.at856.Onerecentopinionpollfoundthatsixty-sevenpercent ofAmericanssaidtheydidnotwantRoetobeoverturned SeePressRelease,HenryJ.Kaiser FamilyFoundation,Poll:Two-ThirdsofAmericansDon’tWanttheSupremeCourttoOverturn Roe v. Wade (June 29, 2018), https://www.kff.org/health-reform/press-release/poll -two-thirds-of-americans-dont-want-the-supreme-court-to-overturn-roe-v-wade [https:// perma.cc/49M8-EJWS].

willoptnotforThayeriandeference53topoliticaldecision-makers,butwillinsteadaggressivelyimposeitswill.LastTerm’sdecisionin

Janusv.AmericanFederationofState,County,andMunicipalEmployees, 54whichdealtacripplingblow topublic-sectorunions,mayprovideablueprintforhowanemboldenedmajoritymightadvanceconservativeinterestsusingaggressivenewdoctrines—includingthe“weaponiz[ed]”FirstAmendment,asJusticeKaganputitindissent.55

Tobesure,itiseasytooverstatethelikelypaceandscopeoflegalchange. AmongtheconservativeJustices,ChiefJusticeRobertshasdisplayedinstitutionalistleaningsthatseeminsomecasestopushbackagainsthisideologicalconservatism.56HefamouslyvotedtoupholdtheindividualmandateoftheAffordable Care Act against a constitutional challenge in National Federation of IndependentBusinessv.Sebelius57 underthetaxingpower—insomeaccounts, switchinghisvoteafterinitiallysidingwithhisconservativecolleaguestooverturnthelawonCommerceClausegrounds.58HisdecisionmaybepartlyexplainedbyadesiretoavoidexhaustingtheCourt’spoliticalcapitalbystriking downaDemocraticPresident’ssignaturelegislativeaccomplishment.59Evenif

53. SeeJamesB.Thayer,TheOriginandScopeoftheAmericanDoctrineofConstitutionalLaw,7 HARV L.REV 129(1893).

54 138S.Ct.2448(2018).

55. Id.at2501(Kagan,J.,dissenting).

56. See,e.g.,HenryGass,WhyChiefJusticeRobertsIsMovingtotheCenteroftheCourt,CHRISTIAN SCI MONITOR(Mar 26,2019),https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2019/0326/Why -Chief-Justice-Roberts-is-moving-to-the-center-of-the-court [https://perma.cc/VA5BSVR2](arguingthatChiefJusticeRoberts“hasbeenconsistentlyconservative”onimportant issues,butthathealso“hasoscillatedinafewrecentcases,andappearsmoremindfulofthe [C]ourt’sinstitutionalroleinAmericandemocracy”);MichaelO’Donnell,JohnRoberts’sBiggest Test Is Yet to Come, ATLANTIC (Mar 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine /archive/2019/03/john-roberts-biography-review/580453 [https://perma.cc/Z8BS-29US] (“Morethan13yearsintohistenureas[C]hief[J]ustice,Robertsremainsaseriousmanand apersonofbrilliancewhostruggles,underincreasingcriticismfromallsides,tobalancehis loyaltytoaninstitutionwithhiscommitmenttoanideology.”)

57 567U.S.519(2012).

58. SeeJOANBISKUPIC,THECHIEF:THELIFEANDTURBULENTTIMESOFCHIEFJUSTICEJOHNROBERTS232-40(2019);JoanBiskupic,TheInsideStoryofHowJohnRobertsNegotiatedtoSave Obamacare,CNN(Mar 25,2019,4:35PMET),https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/21/politics /john-roberts-obamacare-the-chief/index.html[https://perma.cc/AH8Z-V4JC].

59 Tobesure,insideaccountsdonotmakeclearthatChiefJusticeRobertsactuallychangedhis viewsonanylegalquestions InBiskupic’saccount,theJusticesdidactuallyvoteonthetaxing powerissueinitiallyinthecase.SeeBISKUPIC,supranote58,at234.ForanargumentthatChief JusticeRobertsmaynothaveactuallychangedhisvote,seeMarkTushnet,“TheChief”—What ItActuallyTellsUsAboutJohnRoberts’sVoteintheInitialACACase,BALKINIZATION(Mar.30,

thisisnotthebestaccountofwhatactuallyhappenedinNFIB,thestoryisplausiblebecausetheChiefJusticeseemstocareabouttheCourt’sinstitutionalperception.AnditispossiblethattheChiefJustice’sinstitutionalismcouldcause himtoavoid,oratleastdelay,themostradicalchangestheCourtcouldpursue. Thatsaid,theChiefJusticehasnotshiedawayfrombroad,aggressiverulingsin somehighlyideologicalcases—suchasJanus,mentionedabove,orShelbyCounty v.Holder, 60whichrenderedSection5oftheVotingRightsActinoperable.Thus, whileChiefJusticeRobertsmightnotmoveasaggressivelyassomeofhiscolleagues,thereisnoreasontoassumehewillultimatelystandinthewayofthe Court’srightwardshift.

InaworldwherethepublichadgreatconfidenceintheSupremeCourt’s fairnessandimpartiality,manyAmericansmightacceptcontroversialdecisions eveniftheydidnotagreewiththeresults.Indeed,social-scienceresearchhas foundsomeevidenceforthepropositionthattheSupremeCourtismoreeffectivethanotherinstitutionsatlegitimizingunpopulardecisions.61Yetinaworld wheremuchofthepublichaslostfaithintheideathattheJusticesarefairand impartial—andincreasinglyseethemaspoliticiansinrobes—itisdoubtfulthat thepublicwillacceptunpopulardecisions.Thoughthepointiscontested,there issupportfortheviewthattheSupremeCourt’slegitimacyisstronglytiedup withperceptionsofhowtheCourtmakesdecisions—particularly,whetherthe publicbelievestheCourtusesfairproceduresandisimpartialinitsdecisionmaking.62Moreover,iftheCourt’smostsalientdecisionsarealmostuniversally victoriesforoneparty,theCourt’slegitimacymaybeaffectedmuchmorethan ifitscontroversialrulingssometimesfavoredtheotherparty.63Thatisespecially 2019), https://www.balkin.blogspot.com/2019/03/the-chief-what-it-actually-tells-us.html [https://perma.cc/6TEX-8F46].

60. 133S.Ct.2612(2013).

61 SeeJamesL.Gibson,UnderstandingsofJustice:InstitutionalLegitimacy,ProceduralJustice,and PoliticalTolerance,23LAW&SOC’YREV.469,480-81(1989)(finding,basedonresponsesto surveys,“someevidenceoftheCourt’scapacitytoengendercompliancewithunpopularpoliticaldecisions”)

62. SeeTomR.Tyler&KennethRasinski,ProceduralJustice,InstitutionalLegitimacy,andtheAcceptanceofUnpopularU.S.SupremeCourtDecisions:AReplytoGibson,25LAW&SOC’YREV 621,627(1991)(concludingthatthe“legitimacyoftheU.S.SupremeCourtisbasedonthe beliefthatitmakesdecisionsinfairways,notonagreementwithitsdecisions”).Forlegitimacypurposes,ofcourse,whatmattersisnotwhethertheCourtisactuallyimpartialorusing fairprocedures,butwhetherthepublicperceivesthattobethecase.

63 Cf JamesL.Gibson&MichaelJ.Nelson,TheLegitimacyoftheUSSupremeCourt:Conventional WisdomsandRecentChallengesThereto,10ANN REV L.&SOC SCI 201,209(2014)(noting that“[l]ackofpolarization[inperceptionsofSupremeCourtlegitimacy]mayalsoreflectthe factthattheSupremeCourtiscurrentlymakingabout50%ofitsdecisionsinaconservative directionand50%inaliberaldirection”).

sowherethemosthigh-profilecasesarelikelytobedecidedalongpartylines, withRepublican-appointedJusticesinthemajorityandDemocratic-appointed Justicesindissent.

The Court’s legitimacy also faces threats from potential Democratic responsestoRepublicans’aggressivetactics.Facingtheprospectthattheconservativemajoritycouldblockprogressivelegislativeefforts,manyontheleftarealreadytryingtoidentifystrategiesthatwouldreducetheCourt’spowerordisrupt Republicancontrolofitsdecision-making.

Perhapsmostprominently,court-packingisunderseriousdiscussionafter beingseenasbeyondthepalefordecades.64AlthoughCongresshasenlarged anddecreasedtheCourt’ssizeatvariouspointsinhistory,oftenfornakedlypoliticalreasons,65theCourt’smembershiphasbeensetatnineforoveracentury. Famously,PresidentRooseveltadvancedaplantoaddJusticestotheCourtafter facingprominentlossesforhisNewDealagendaatthehandsofa5-4conservativemajority.Althoughthethreatofcourt-packingalonemayhavebeensufficienttodetertheCourtfromstrikingdownmoreNewDealprograms,President Roosevelt’splanwasdefeated.66Thatdefeatwaspoliticallycostly;asRichard Pildeshasobserved,“FDR’slegislativeassaultontheCourtdestroyedhispoliticalcoalition,inCongressandnationally,andendedhisabilitytoenactmajor domesticpolicylegislation,despitehishugeelectoraltriumphin1936.”67Inthe nearcenturysince,court-packinghasbeentreatedasapoliticalthirdrail—makingtheCourt’scurrentsizelooklikeanentrenched,quasiconstitutionalnorm.68

64 See,e.g.,Blake,supranote5;Klarman,supranote5;Samuel,supranote5

65 In1863,inthemidstoftheCivilWar,CongressexpandedthesizeoftheCourtfromnineto tenJustices,amovethathelpedshoreupsupportforRepublican,pro-Unioninterestsonthe Court Timothy Huebner, The First Court-packing Plan, SCOTUSBLOG (July 3, 2013), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/07/the-first-court-packing-plan [https://perma.cc /G7SR-W2ZB].Then,duringthepresidencyofAndrewJohnson,Congressreducedthe Court’smembershiptoseven—preventingPresidentJohnsonfromappointinganyJustices— beforeexpandingitbacktonineafterheleftoffice.Id.ThesizeoftheCourthasremainedat ninesincethen Id

66. Forafascinatinghistoryofthisepisode,seeJEFFSHESOL,SUPREMEPOWER:FRANKLINROOSEVELTVS.THESUPREMECOURT(2010).

67 RichardH.Pildes,IstheSupremeCourta“Majoritarian”Institution?,2010SUP CT REV 103, 132.

68. SeeCurtisA.Bradley&NeilS.Siegel,HistoricalGloss,ConstitutionalConventions,andtheJudicialSeparationofPowers,105GEO L.J.255,276-78(2017);TaraLeighGrove,TheOrigins(and Fragility)ofJudicialIndependence,71VAND.L.REV.465,505(2018).

Now,progressivesarequestioningthatconventionalwisdom,arguingthataddingseatstotheCourtwouldbeajustifiedresponsetoSenateRepublicans’theft ofaSupremeCourtseatfromPresidentObama 69

Alternativestocourt-packingarealsounderactivediscussion.SamuelMoyn hasarguedthattheleftshould“standupforreformsthatwilltakethelastword from [the Court].”70 He points to jurisdiction-stripping statutes as well as “[o]therchangesincustomsandprecedent”thatcould“weakenjudicialsupremacy, ”andpushtheCourtto“evolveintoanadvisorybody,especiallywhenthe [J]usticesdisagree.”71MarkTushnethasbeenadvancingargumentsforabolishingjudicialreviewforanumberofyears,72andhisproposalsarereceivingrenewedinterest.73

Theideaofcourt-packingisnomereacademicfantasy.AnumberofDemocraticpresidentialcandidateshaveindicatedsupportforexpandingtheCourt’s size,74orforotherreforms.75ThereisnoguaranteethatDemocratswillobtain thenecessarycontroloverCongressandthePresidencytomakethempossible. Butthefactthatpeoplearediscussingsuchideastellsushowseriousthesituationis.TheCourt’slegitimacywillbequestionedinthecomingyears—perhaps

69. See,e.g.,Klarman,supranote5;seealsoinfraSectionIII.B.3.

70 SamuelMoyn,ResistingtheJuristocracy,BOS REV (Oct.5,2018),http://bostonreview.net /law-justice/samuel-moyn-resisting-juristocracy[https://perma.cc/E4M6-6EP2].

71. Id.

72 SeeMARKTUSHNET,TAKINGTHECONSTITUTIONAWAYFROMTHECOURTS154-76(2000).

73 SeeSeanIlling,TheCaseforAbolishingtheSupremeCourt,VOX(Oct.12,2018,8:10AMEDT), https://www.vox.com/2018/10/12/17950896/supreme-court-brett-kavanaugh-constitution [https://perma.cc/U6GM-N9QN].

74 SeeBurgessEverett&MarianneLevine,2020DemsWarmtoExpandingSupremeCourt,POLITICO (Mar. 18, 2019, 5:04 AM EDT), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/03/18/2020 -democrats-supreme-court-1223625[https://perma.cc/BWG3-M495].

75. Somecandidateshaveendorsedaneighteen-yeartermlimitproposal.See,e.g.,VotingRights, BETOFORAM.,https://betoorourke.com/votingrights[https://perma.cc/HD23-D7UC].One candidatethusfarhasendorsedoneoftheproposalsadvancedinthisarticle.SeeJoshLederman,InsidePeteButtigieg’sPlantoOverhaultheSupremeCourt,NBCNEWS(June3,2019,6:03 AMEDT),https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2020-election/inside-pete-buttigieg-s-plan -overhaul-supreme-court-n1012491 [https://perma.cc/Z97M-22J7] (discussing Buttigieg’s supportoftheBalancedBench) Anotherhassuggestedreformsthataccordwiththeother proposal SeeJustinWise,BernieSandersSaysHeWouldMoveto‘Rotate’SupremeCourtJustices ifElected,THEHILL (June27,2019,10:45PM),https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign /450800-bernie-sanders-says-he-would-move-to-rotate-supreme-court-justices-if[https:// perma.cc/WAP2-U3FA](mentioningaplanakintotheSupremeCourtLottery).

asneverbefore Indeed,eventhosewhothinkthethreatmightbeoverblown stillbelievethatcomingchallengestotheCourtneedtobetakenseriously.76

ii. why save the court?

ThereisclearcauseforconcernabouttheloomingthreattotheSupreme Court’slegitimacy.ASupremeCourtthatisviewedasillegitimatebyasignificantportionoftheAmericanpeoplewillbelessabletosettleimportantquestions, andparticularlylessabletoexercisethepowerofjudicialreview Ofcourse,for manyonthelefttoday,thatmayseemlikeadesirablegoal Thosewhofavor Moyn’scritiqueof“juristocracy,”forexample,orwhoaredrawntoTushnet’s argumentsagainstjudicialreview,would likely welcomedevelopments that wouldweakentheCourt’sabilitytostanduptotheotherbranchesofgovernment.

Ononelevel,wehavesympathyforsomeofthesecritiques.Judicialreview isinescapablyantidemocratic.77Andwhileithasservedimportantpurposesat keymomentsinAmericanhistory,itisalsoapowerthattheCourthasabused. Ataminimum,mostobserverswouldagreetheJusticeshavesometimestaken onresponsibilityforresolvingthornyquestionsthatwouldhavebeenbetterleft toelectedofficials—evenifthereislittleconsensusaboutwhichusesofjudicial reviewprovethepoint.78

76. SeeIlyaSomin,IstheSupremeCourtGoingtoSufferaCrisisofLegitimacy?,VOLOKHCONSPIRACY (Oct. 10, 2018, 5:00 PM), https://reason.com/volokh/2018/10/10/is-the-supreme-court -going-to-suffer-a-c[https://perma.cc/UJ72-LNNR](arguingthatpredictionsofalegitimacycrisis“maywellbeoverblown,astheyoftenhavebeeninthepast”butthat“[t]hedeep angerofmuchoftheleftcouldleadtoastrongerassaultontheCourtthanhasoccurredina longtime”).

77 ThiscritiqueismostfamouslyassociatedwithAlexanderBickel.SeeBICKEL,supranote29 SinceBickelposedthe“countermajoritariandifficulty,”constitutionaltheoristshavegoneto greatlengthstotrytoreconcilejudicialreviewwithmajorityrule.See,e.g.,JOHNHARTELY, DEMOCRACYANDDISTRUST:ATHEORYOFJUDICIALREVIEW(1980)(offeringatheoryof“representationreinforcement”underwhichjudicialreviewprotectsandenablesdemocraticgovernance);BruceA.Ackerman,TheStorrsLectures:DiscoveringtheConstitution,93YALEL.J. 1013,1014(1984)(notingthatthecountermajoritariandifficultyis“thestartingpointforcontemporaryanalysisofjudicialreview”);ErwinChemerinsky,Foreword:TheVanishingConstitution,103HARV L.REV 43,71(1989)(“MostconstitutionalscholarsforthepastquartercenturyhaveacceptedBickel’sdefinitionoftheproblemandhaveseenthetaskofconstitutionaltheoryasdefiningarolefortheCourtthatisconsistentwithmajoritarianprinciples.”).

78 LiberalsmightpointtoTheCivilRightsCases,109U.S.3(1883);Lochnerv.NewYork,198U.S. 45(1905);and,morerecently,CitizensUnitedv.FEC,558U.S.310(2010);andShelbyCounty v.Holder,570U.S.529(2013).ConservativesmightpointtocaseslikeRoev.Wade,410U.S. 113(1973);Reynoldsv.Sims,377U.S.533(1964);Mirandav.Arizona,384U.S.436(1966);and

Nonetheless,wehavedeepreservationsaboutthelong-termconsequences ofapowerlessSupremeCourt.First,iftheSupremeCourtsuddenlybecameunabletoexercisejudicialreview,theAmericanconstitutionalsystemwouldlook significantlydifferent.SuchadevelopmentwouldnotspelltheendofAmerican democracy.Indeed,countrieslikeEngland,theNetherlands,andCanadaeither lackwrittenconstitutions,donotpermitcourtstoenforcetheirwrittenconstitutionsthroughjudicialreview,orhavemechanismsbywhichthelegislaturecan (atleastintheory)reenactlawsthatthecourtshavestruckdown.79Theseexamplessuggestthatitispossibletohaveawell-functioningdemocracythatrespectsindividualrightswithoutgivingcourtsthefinalwordovertheconstitutionality of legislation.Moreover,theSupremeCourtitself barelyexercised judicialreviewoffederalstatutesduringthenation’searlyyears,doingsoonly twicebeforetheCivilWar.80

Butevenifotherdemocraciesfunctionwellwithoutjudicialreview,itdoesn’t followthatourownsystemwouldfunctionequallywelliftheCourt’spowerto checkthepoliticalbrancheswereabolishedorsignificantlycurtailed.Whatever itsmerits,judicialreviewhasbeenalongstandingandintegralpartoftheAmericanconstitutionalsystem.Noonecanknowwhatwouldhappenifitdisappearedtomorrow.Perhapsthepoliticalbrancheswould,moreorless,safeguard basicrights,thewaylegislaturesdoinotherdemocracies.Butperhapspolitical actorshavebecomesoaccustomedtobeingreinedinbycourtsthat,oncesetfree, theywouldtrampleimportantrights.Onthispoint,itbearsnotethatinsome ofthecaseswheretheSupremeCourtisthoughttohaveerredmostgrievously, itisbecausetheCourtfailedtoexercisethepowerofjudicialreviewanddefend individualrightsfrompoliticalactors.81

Ultimately,however,theimplicationsforjudicialreviewaresecondaryconcernswhenitcomestotheSupremeCourt’slegitimacy.Thelargerproblemis this:theSupremeCourtplaysasignificantroleinthepublicimaginationasa

Obergefellv.Hodges,135S.Ct.2584(2015) Therearesomeexampleswhichcouldcommand agreementacrossthepoliticalspectrum—mostobviously,DredScottv.Sandford,60U.S.(19 How.)393(1857).ForanargumentthatDredScottmayhavebeencorrectlydecidedasapurely legal(butcertainlynotamoral)matter,seeMARKA.GRABER,DREDSCOTTANDTHEPROBLEM OFCONSTITUTIONALEVIL(2006).

79 Foradiscussion,seeMarkTushnet,DialogicJudicialReview,61ARK L.REV 205(2009);and MarkTushnet,AlternativeFormsofJudicialReview,101MICH.L.REV.2781(2003).

80. ThecaseswereMarburyv.Madison,5U.S.(1Cranch.)137(1803);andDredScott,60U.S.(19 How.)393

81 AsJamalGreenehasobserved,theconstitutional“anticanon”includesPlessyv.Ferguson,163 U.S.537(1896);andKorematsuv.UnitedStates,323U.S.214(1944)—twocaseswherethe Courtdeclinedtostopthegovernmentfromengaginginracialdiscrimination.SeeJamal Greene,TheAnticanon,125HARV.L.REV.378,387(2011).

citadelofjustice.FormanyAmericans,giventheSupremeCourt’ssalience,faith intheCourtmaybedeeplyintertwinedwithfeelingsabouttheveryideaoflaw.82

InaworldwheretheSupremeCourtiswidelyseenasjustanotherpoliticalinstitution,howwillpeoplethinkaboutlawitself?Ourfearisthatinsuchaworld, theveryideaoflawasanenterpriseseparatefrompoliticswillevaporate.

Theruleoflawisacriticalelementofahealthydemocracy.Ifiterodes,our fearsfordemocracybecomemoreconcrete.Canademocraticsocietylongsurviveifthecitizenrylosesfaithinlaw?Willthenotionoftheruleoflawsurvive ifpeoplestopbelievingthatjudgesaredoingsomethingotherthanexercising politicalwillwhendecidingcases?Willpoliticalactorsceasetogivecredenceto theresultsofanylegalproceedingthatdoesnotvalidatetheirpreexistingbeliefs? Wedonotknowtheanswerstothesequestions.Butwearenoteagertorunthe experimentrequiredtoanswerthem Instead,wethinkitisimperativetosave theSupremeCourtasaninstitutionabovethepoliticalfray

SavingtheCourt,however,willrequirechangingtheCourt.Ourcurrentsystemisdeeplyflawed,andeventssince2016haveonlyexposedproblemsthat werelonglurkingbelowthesurface.TheconsequencesofindividualSupreme Courtappointmentsaresosignificantthatpoliticalactorswillnaturallyfightfor themtoothandnail.Theseflawswerelessapparentinanagewhentheleading politicalpartieswerelesspolarized.Butnow,givenextremeideologicalsorting, politiciansofbothpartiesrealizethestakesofSupremeCourtappointmentsand arefirmlycommittedtostaffingtheCourtwithideologicalcomrades.83

AnumberofobserverswillnodoubtarguethatthesolutiontothislegitimacycrisisistosimplyrejectthechallengeandtreattheCourtaslegitimate.Yet thingsarenotsosimple.ThenewSupremeCourtmajorityisarguablythemost reliablyconservativeinhistory,andthereisreasontobelieveitwillstrikedown lawsthatprogressivesfavorusingdoctrinaltheoriesthatareatleastopentoseriousquestion—astheCourthasalreadydoneincaseslikeShelbyCounty84and Janus. 85

AndgiventhatDemocratshaveareasonableargumentthattheconservativemajoritywasearnedusingunderhandedtactics,86itisnotclearwhy theyshouldfeelcompelledtolettheCourtblocktheirfavoredpoliciesforagenerationormoreindeferencetotheCourt’sinstitutionallegitimacy.Instead, giventhesehighstakes,itseemstousinevitablethattheCourt’slegitimacywill

82. Cf.RichardJ.Pierce,Jr.,ReconcilingChevronandStareDecisis,85GEO.L.J.2225,2242(1997) (notingthattheSupremeCourtis“themostsalientsymboloftheruleoflawinoursociety”).

83 Seesupranotes32-36andaccompanyingtext

84. ShelbyCty.v.Holder,570U.S.529(2013).

85. Janusv.Am.Fed’nofState,Cty.,&Mun.Emps.,138S.Ct.2448(2018).

86 Seeid

how to save the supreme court

bechallengedhead-on Toavoidthatcollision,weneedtochangecourse radically.

ThenexttwoPartsexplainwhatwethinkthatcoursechangeshould—and shouldnot—looklike.Beforedoingso,though,wemuststressonepoint.Atthis moment,SupremeCourtreformunquestionablyfeelsmostpressingtothoseon theideologicalleft,givenconservativecontroloftheCourt.Bythesametoken, conservativesmightfeelnourgency,giventhemajorvictoriestheyanticipatethe Courthandingdown.Wethink,however,thatwhoeverbenefitsimmediately, therightkindofSupremeCourtreformisultimatelyinbothsides’long-term interests.PreservingaSupremeCourtthatisnotmerelyapartisaninstitutionis moreimportantthanwinningonpolicyissuesintheshortterm.

iii. how (not) to save the court

SavingwhatisgoodabouttheCourtwillrequiresignificantreformtohow theCourtoperatesandhowtheJusticesareselected.Butnotjustanyreformwill do.InthisPart,wefirstdevelopaframeworkforsuccessfulSupremeCourtreform.Wethendiscusshowpreviousreformproposalsfallshortandcouldeven exacerbatetheproblemsreformshouldseektoresolve.

A.DesiderataforReform

Thereformthatweenvisionwouldhavemultiple,overlappinggoals.Atthe outset,however,weshouldclearlydefinetheproblem.Asweseeit,akeyproblemwithhowtheSupremeCourtworkstodayisthatitsdesignmakesitpossible forpoliticalpartiestocapturecontrolovertheinstitutionusingbare-knuckle tactics,leadingtotheapocalypticconfirmationbattleswehaveseeninrecent years.SuchconflictswerenotforeseenattheFounding—perhapsbecausenoone envisionedjusthowpowerfultheCourtwouldbecome,butcertainlybecause theFoundersdidnotanticipatehowpoliticalpartieswouldshapeappointments totheCourt.87Evenwellaftertheriseofpoliticalparties,theproblemswiththe Court’sstructurewerenotfullyapparentbecausejudicialideologydidnotconsistentlytrackpartyaffiliation.Today,however,withtheriseofpolarizedschools

87 SeeABRAHAM,supranote11,at20(“[T]heFoundingFathers didnotforeseetherolepoliticalpartieswouldsooncometoplayintheappointmentprocess.”);BRUCEACKERMAN,THE FAILUREOFTHEFOUNDINGFATHERS(2005);seealsoDarylJ.Levinson&RichardH.Pildes, SeparationofParties,NotPowers,119HARV L.REV 2311,2313(2006)(arguingthat“[t]he Framershadnotanticipatedthenatureofthedemocraticcompetitionthatwouldemergein governmentandintheelectorate”becausetheydidnotforeseetherolepoliticalpartieswould play).

oflegalinterpretation,polarizedelitecommunitiesoflawyers,andapolarized politicalculture,partydominationoftheCourthasbecomeanattainablegoal andthusonethatpoliticianswillfighthardtoachieve.Andthat,inturn,increasinglydistortsourpolitics,asvotersmakedecisionsinpresidentialelectionsin ordertoshapethecompositionoftheSupremeCourt.88

Reformthatwouldchangethisdynamichasseveralcomponents.First,it wouldbedesignedtopreservetheCourtasaninstitutionthatisnotpartisan— or,attheveryleast,asaninstitutionthatislesspartisanthanotherbranches. Thatmeansstructuringthesystemsothatpartisanpoliticiansarelessableto capturetheCourtbystackingitwithideologicalfellowtravelers.Itisprecisely becausetheCourtisabletobecapturedthatbattlesforcontrolhavebecomeso damagingandtoxicasourpoliticshavebecomemorepolarized

Second(andrelatedtothatgoal),reformwouldsignificantlyreducethepoliticalstakesofnominatingindividualJustices,toavoidspectacleslikethoseof recentyears.ThatalsomeanssignificantlylesseningtheimportanceofindividualJustices.Inourcurrentsystem,fartoomuchturnsonessentiallyrandom events.AnyoneJustice’sdeathorretirementcanhavemassiveconsequencesfor thelawandthusforAmericansociety,dependingonwhenthevacancyoccurs andwhichpartycontrolstheSenate.Thisisnotasensiblewaytorunaconstitutionaldemocracy.Whateverone’sviewsonabortion,freespeech,gaymarriage, orthepowersofCongress,importantgovernmentaldecisionsonthesematters shouldnotdependonthehealthofindividualoctogenarians.Noonewoulddesignsuchasystemfromscratch,andanygoodsetofreformswouldendeavorto maketheCourtlesssensitivetothechoicesandhealthofindividualJustices.A positivebyproductofthisreformisthatitwouldreducethecultofpersonality aroundtheJustices,whichmaycurrentlybepushingthemtobecomeevenmore partisan.89

Third,abettersystemwouldpreservesomeabilityfortheJusticestostrike downlawswhilealsonudgingtheminthedirectionofdeferencetothepolitical branches.Inourview,someroleforjudicialreviewisimportant,sothatthe Courtcanholdthenationtoitsdeepestcommitmentsandcheckitsworstinjustices.ButtherearegoodargumentsthatJusticesonbothsidesoftheideological

88. SeeJaneCoaston,PollingDataShowsRepublicansTurnedoutforTrumpin2016Becauseofthe Supreme Court, VOX (June 29, 2018, 10:00 AM EDT), https://www.vox.com/2018/6/29 /17511088/scotus-2016-election-poll-trump-republicans-kennedy-retire [https://perma.cc /8YZF-NEPX](“OneofthemostunderappreciatedreasonsthatDonaldTrumpwonthe2016 electionwasvotersmotivatedbyavacancyontheSupremeCourt.Oneinfivevoterstold CNNinanexitpollthattheSupremeCourtwasonereasontheyhadcastaballot.”).

89 SeeSuzannaSherry,OurKardashianCourt(andHowtoFixIt)(July24,2019)(unpublished manuscript),https://ssrn.com/abstract=3425998.

dividehavebecometooeagertoexercisethispowerinrecentdecades.90Asensiblereformwouldprovideathumbonthescaleinthedirectionofdeference.

Thesearethegoalswehavedesignedourproposedreformstosatisfy.But sensiblereformswouldsatisfyotherpracticalcriteriaaswell.Anysignificant changetothewaytheSupremeCourtworkswillcreateimmediatewinnersand losers.GiventhatRepublicansarecurrentlyenjoyingthebenefitsofaconservativeSupremeCourt,theyareunlikelytosupporteffortstosignificantlyreform theCourt.Forthisreason,anyreformproposalshouldbecapableofimplementationviastatute,ratherthanconstitutionalamendment,intheeventthatDemocratsareabletocapturecontrolofCongressandtheWhiteHouse.Thatlimitationissignificantbutnecessary.Giventhepolarizationofsociety,thestakesof controlovertheSupremeCourt,andtherelativedistributionofpartisanaffiliationwithinandacrosstheUnitedStates,itisveryhardtoimaginethataconstitutionalamendmentchangingthestructureoftheSupremeCourtcouldpassin thenearterm.91

Relatedtothatpoint,anystatutoryreformproposalshouldalsobeplausibly constitutional.Notobviouslyorundebatablyconstitutional,butatleastplausiblyso.Indeed,fortherightkindofreform,wearewillingtoacceptconstitutionalargumentsthatarelessthanbulletproof.Thereis,tobesure,asignificant riskthattheSupremeCourtitselfwouldstrikedownreformonconstitutional grounds,andforthatreasononemightthinkonlytheconstitutionallysoundest proposalsshouldbeputforward.TheconservativemajorityontheCourtwould likelybeskepticalofreformsthatwouldreducetheCourt’spower,especiallyif sucheffortslackedbipartisansupport.Yetthisargumentignoresthefactthatif theSupremeCourtrejectsmoderatereform,moreseriousthreatstoitspower andlegitimacywillbelurkinginthebackground—jurisdiction-stripping,courtpacking,andperhapsevenoutrightdefianceofCourtjudgmentsbythepolitical branches.Suchthreatscouldbeimplicitorexplicit.Forexample,areformstatutemightcontainaseverabilityclausestatingthattheCourtwouldbepacked withfivenewJustices,orthatitsjurisdictionwouldberemoved,intheevent thatthereformproposalwerestruckdown.Undersuchcircumstances,the Courtmightblinkbeforestrikingdownareformmeasureasunconstitutional.92

90 See,e.g.,TUSHNET,supranote72

91 Werecognizethatevenastatutoryproposalmaybedifficulttopasspolitically,butitremains fareasierthanaconstitutionalamendment.Fordiscussion,seeAdrianVermeule,Political ConstraintsonSupremeCourtReform,90MINN L.REV 1154(2006).

92 ThisanalysispresupposesthatthecurrentSupremeCourtwouldhearaconstitutionalchallengetoareformmeasure,butthatisnotobvious;ifthereformwereputintoplace,andnew Justicesseated,itisunclearexactlywhichCourt—thecurrentorreformed—wouldhearthe challenge.

Inaddition,itisnotobviousthattheCourtwouldacceptsupposedly“rock-solid” constitutionalarguments.OnestrengthofthecaseforCourtexpansion,forexample,isitsconstitutionality;buttherearecommentatorswhobelieveevenit wouldbeunconstitutional.93 TheCourt’sconservativesmightsidewiththe skeptics,giventhedesiretoretaintheirmajority.

Finally,theresultingsystemmustbeatleastpotentiallystable—itmustbe anarrangementthatbothpoliticalpartiescouldlivewithgoingforward.This mightseeminconsistentwithwhatwehavesaidthusfar:thatreformwould needtobeenactedviastatute,largelyalongpartylines,andpotentiallyusing aggressivetacticsinordertodissuadetheSupremeCourtfromdeclaringitunconstitutional.Howcouldsuchareformleadtoanykindofstableequilibrium goingforward?

Here,wecandistinguishbetweenmeansandends.AsDavidPozenhasexplained,itispossibletoimagine“hardball”tactics(definedasconductthat“violatesorstrainsconstitutionalconventionsforpartisanends”orthat“attempts toshiftsettledunderstandingsoftheConstitutioninanunusuallyaggressiveor self-entrenchingmanner”)toaccomplishwhathecallsanti-hardballgoals.94 “Anti-hardballpolicies”inPozen’saccount“forestallorforeclosetit-for-tatcyclesandlowerthetemperatureofpoliticaldisputes.”95Evenifaggressivehardballtacticsareused,itisatleastpossibletoimaginethemcreatingasystemthat hasnoobviousideologicalvalencegoingforwardandwhichbothsidescould livewith.Necessarily,though,suchreformsmustreflect“‘good-government’ rulesthatbothsideswouldprefertoadopt,iftheyhadtowritetherulesunder aveilofignorance.”96Properlydesignedreformscouldsatisfythiscriterion— eveniftheywereinitiallyadoptedbyhardball,party-linetactics.

B. HowExistingProposalsShapeUp

Onthecriteriaidentifiedabove,priorproposalstoreformtheSupreme Courtorthenominationprocessfallshort.ThisSectionconsidersseveralin turn.

93 Foradiscussion,seeinfraSectionIII.B.3

94 David Pozen, Hardball and/as Anti-Hardball, BALKINIZATION (Oct. 11, 2018), https:// balkin.blogspot.com/2018/10/hardball-andas-anti-hardball.html [https://perma.cc/UKE5 -RCM9].

95 Id

96. Id.

1 TermLimits

Perhapsthemostpopularreformproposalinvolvessettingtermlimitsfor SupremeCourtJustices.Inthebest-knownvariation,Justiceswouldservean eighteen-yearterm.97

Firstproposedinastudentnote,98theplanismostfamouslyassociatedwith RogerCramtonandPaulCarrington.99 Underthisproposal,everyPresident wouldmaketwoappointmentstotheCourtduringeachfour-yearpresidential term.Theplanwouldmakeappointmentsmorepredictable,removingthepressuretostacktheCourtwithyoungerandyoungerJustices.

Thisisawell-intentionedproposal.Butitdoesnotsatisfyourcriteriafor reform—mostimportantlybecauseitisunlikelytodepoliticizetheCourtorturn downthetemperatureofthenominationsprocess.Indeed,ifanything,itwill makethepoliticizationoftheCourtevenworsebyincreasingtheCourt’sprominenceineveryelectioncycle.

Aninitialproblem,though,isthatitmaynotbepossibletoimplementterm limitsviastatutealone.Constitutionalscholars—evensomewhowishtoeliminatelifetimetenure—havearguedthattheclauseinArticleIIIgivingJusticesa termfor“goodbehavior”indicatesalifetimeappointment.100Whilethereare argumentsthat“goodbehavior”cancoexistwithaterm-of-yearsappointment, theyrestoncomparativelyweakgrounds.101Forthesereasons,theplan’sorigi-

97 SeeStevenG.Calabresi&JamesLindgren,TermLimitsfortheSupremeCourt:LifeTenureReconsidered,29HARV.J.L.&PUB.POL’Y769(2006);RogerC.Cramton,ReformingtheSupreme Court,95CALIF L.REV 1313,1323-24(2007);RogerC.Cramton&PaulD.Carrington,The SupremeCourtRenewalAct:AReturntoBasicPrinciples,inREFORMINGTHECOURT:TERM LIMITSFORSUPREMECOURTJUSTICES467(RogerC.Cramton&PaulD.Carringtoneds., 2006);JamesE.DiTullio&JohnB.Schochet,Note,SavingthisHonorableCourt:AProposalto ReplaceLifeTenureontheSupremeCourtwithStaggered,NonrenewableEighteen-YearTerms,90 VA L.REV 1093(2004);seealsoLindaGreenhouse,NewFocusontheEffectsofLifeTenure,N.Y. TIMES(Sept.10,2007),https://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/10/washington/10scotus.html [https://perma.cc/H2Q8-8KHJ]

98 SeeDiTullio&Schochet,supranote97

99. SeeCramton&Carrington,supranote97.

100.SeeCalabresi&Lindgren,supranote97,at824;SaikrishnaPrakash&StevenD.Smith,How toRemoveaFederalJudge,116YALEL.J.72,90(2006)(“[B]ytheendoftheeighteenthcentury, asimplegrantofgood-behaviortenuremightalsobeconsidered‘tenureforlife’or‘lifetenure.’”);DavidR.Stras&RyanW.Scott,RetainingLifeTenure:TheCaseforaGoldenParachute, 83WASH U.L.Q.1397,1404-08(2005).

101. Stras&Scott,supranote100,at1405(addressingthisargument).

nalproponents,JamesDiTullioandJohnSchochet,explicitlyframedtheirproposalasrequiringaconstitutionalamendment.102ThatpathwouldneedsignificantRepublicansupport,whichseemshighlyunlikelyfortheforeseeablefuture.

CramtonandCarrington,though,offeraversionoftheplanthattheycontendcouldbeimplementedviastatute.Intheirproposal,Congresswouldpass astatutegivingeachPresidentoneSupremeCourtappointmentaftereachfederalelection.Justiceswhoservedlongerthaneighteenyearswouldnotlosetheir commissions,butwouldinsteadeffectivelyserveinasenior-statusrole,sitting onlywhenoneoftheninemostjuniorJustices(i.e.,thoseappointedwithinthe lasteighteenyears)wasunabletoparticipateinacase.103Thisversionofthe proposalstrikesusasmoreconstitutionallyplausible(i.e.,capableofimplementationbystatute)thanatrueterm-limitrequirement,thoughsomewouldcertainlyargueitdoesnotpassmuster

Constitutionalissuesaside,however,thedeeperproblemisthattheproposal wouldlikelymaketheSupremeCourtmorepolitical.Theproposalguarantees thattheSupremeCourtwillbeacampaignissueineverypresidentialelection becausevoterswouldknowwithcertaintythatthenextPresidentwouldgetto shapetheCourtwithtwonominees.Itwouldalsobeacampaignissueinevery midtermelection,solongascontroloftheSenateiswithinstrikingdistancefor eitherparty.Giventhestakes,partisansandtheirdeep-pocketedallieswould makeCourtappointmentsanespeciallysalientissueinbattlegroundSenate races.Andevenwiththisplan,activistsonbothsideswouldstilljockeytomake sureonlythepurestideologueswereappointed.

Then,onceonthebench,theJusticesthemselvesmightbecomemorepolitical.Aterm-limitedJusticemightseetheCourtastheperfectjumping-offpoint forapresidentialrun,decidecasesinhopesofretiringintoalucrativelobbying gig,orplaytothepublictosecureafutureonFoxNewsorMSNBC.104AsDavid StrasandRyanScottargue,“fixed,nonrenewableterms...introduceincentives forSupremeCourtJusticestocastvotesinawaythatimprovestheirprospects

102 DiTullio&Schochet,supranote97,at1097(“Endinglifetenurewouldrequireaconstitutional amendment.”).

103 Cramton&Carrington,supranote97,at471

104 CramtonandCarrington’sproposalwouldnotsolvethisproblem,becauseevenifeffectively term-limitedJusticeswereentitledtoremainontheCourt,theymightwellchoosenotto.

forfutureemploymentoutsidethejudiciary.”105Thisisamajor,underappreciateddrawbacktotheeighteen-year-termproposal.106

2. Panels

Anotherproposal,fromTraceyGeorgeandChrisGuthrie,istoexpandthe SupremeCourttothesizeofacourtofappeals,andthenhaveJusticeshearcases inpanelswiththeopportunityforenbancreview.107 GeorgeandGuthrie’s statedaimistoexpandtheCourt’sdocketinordertosolvetheproblemofit hearingtoofewcases.108ThisproposalcouldpotentiallytampdownthepoliticizationoftheCourt,inthattheCourtwouldhavemanymoreJusticesandpanelswouldberandomlyselected.

Oneproblem,though,isthatCourtappointments—particularlyinthetransitionperiodtothissystem—wouldremainhighlypoliticized.Moreover,there isariskthattheCourtwouldsimplyvotetotakeallthepoliticallychargedcases enbanc Ifso,theproposalwouldprovidenobenefitsintermsofreducedpoliticization.Indeed,thereisachancetheCourtcouldbecomemorepoliticalaswell: aCourtthatisabletotakeonalargerdocketwouldhavemoreopportunitiesfor ideologicalactivism.

3. Court-Packing

Therehasbeenasurprisingdegreeofinterestinexpandingthesizeofthe CourttoincludeadditionalJustices.Oneofthevirtuesofthisproposalisthatit isalmostcertainlyimplementablebystatute,asthesizeoftheSupremeCourtis notspecifiedintheConstitutionandhasalwaysbeensetbystatute.Congress haschangedthesizeoftheCourtatvarioustimes,sometimesfornakedlypartisanreasons.

109

105 Stras&Scott,supranote100,at1425

106 Theonlypossiblesolution(onesuggestedtousbyRichardPrimus)wouldbetointroducea legalrequirementforbiddingretiredJusticesfrombeingemployed,orotherwiseearningincome,inanyotherposition,ingovernmentorintheprivatesector,aftertheirjudicialservice. Suchabroadprohibitionwouldraiseanumberofissueswecannotaddresshere.

107. TraceyE.George&ChrisGuthrie,RemakingtheUnitedStatesSupremeCourtintheCourts’of AppealsImage,58DUKEL.J.1439,1442(2009).

108.Id.

109.SeeAKHILREEDAMAR,AMERICA’SUNWRITTENCONSTITUTION:THEPRECEDENTSANDPRINCIPLESWELIVEBY353-55(2012);RICHARDH.FALLON,JR ETAL.,HARTANDWECHSLER’STHE FEDERALCOURTSANDTHEFEDERALSYSTEM318(7thed.2015).

TheCourt’ssizehas,however,remainedatninememberssince1870

110 PresidentRoosevelt’sfailedattempttoexpandtheCourtinthe1930shasled manytoconcludethattheCourt’ssizeisnowasettledconstitutionalnorm

111 Forexample,RichardPrimus(respondingtoaproposalforRepublicanstopack thelowercourtsfornakedlypoliticalreasons)112arguesthatsuchmeasuresare “notconstitutionalinthesmall-csenseoftheterm”becausethey“depart[]from long-settlednormsandunderstandingsabouthowAmericangovernmentis conducted.”113

Yet,fromanotherperspective,court-packingcouldbetheappropriateresponsebyDemocratstoRepublicans’violationofnorms.MichaelKlarmanrecentlyarguedthecaseforcourt-packing,stressingnotonlythecircumstancesof thelasttwonominations,butalsothefactthatRepublicansaresystemically“abrogat[ing]abasicprincipleofdemocracy—whenyouloseinpolitics,sometimes youhavetojustadmitdefeat.”114Instead,Klarmanargues,theyarechanging therulesofpolitics—fromvotersuppressiontorestrictingthepowersofDemocraticgovernors.115KlarmanthuscontendsthatDemocratsshouldnot“unilateral[ly]disarm[],”butinsteadneedtopackthecourtsinordertorestoreand protectthebasicinfrastructureofdemocracy.116

Atfirstglance,court-packingplansappeartobethekindofreformthat mightleadtogreaterpoliticizationanddelegitimizationoftheCourt.IfDemocratspacktheCourt,theargumentgoes,Republicanswillreturnthefavorwhen theyarenextinpowerandpacktheCourtfurtherinresponse.Onthisapproach, court-packingispoliticallyinflammatoryandunstable.YetasTushnethasob-

110 AMAR,supranote109,at353

111 BradleyandSiegel,forexample,suggestthatcourt-packingmightviolateanormderived fromhistoricalpractice.SeeBradley&Siegel,supranote68;Grove,supranote68.Others thinkthatcourt-packingviolatesaseparation-of-powersconvention.DavidE.Pozen,SelfHelpandtheSeparationofPowers,124YALEL.J.2,34(2014).Some,however,arenotconvinced: AmarconcludesthatchangingtheCourt’ssizewouldbeconstitutionalifdoneforgood-governmentreasons.AMAR,supranote109,at353-55

112. SeeMemorandumfromStevenG.Calabresi&ShamsHirjitotheSenateandHouseofRepresentatives(Nov7,2017),https://thinkprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/calabresi -court-packing-memo.pdf[https://perma.cc/M4FR-UT3R]

113. RichardPrimus,Rulebooks,Playgrounds,andEndgames:AConstitutionalAnalysisoftheCalabresi-Hirji Judgeship Proposal, HARV L. REV BLOG (Nov 24, 2017), https://blog .harvardlawreview.org/rulebooks-playgrounds-and-endgames-a-constitutional-analysis-of -the-calabresi-hirji-judgeship-proposal[https://perma.cc/3YLS-XEV2].

114 Klarman,supranote5

115 Id

116. Id.

served,“therearenumerousdifficultieswiththisinformalgame-theoreticargument.”117Itisdifficulttodeterminewhatthedifferent“rounds”ofthegameare, and“[w]henroundsofplayareseparatedbylongperiodsoftime,theactual peoplewhoplayagainsteachothercanbequitedifferent....”118Moreconcretely,wecanimagineconditionsunderwhichcourt-packingcouldleadtoa stable equilibrium, without an ever-escalating cycle of political retaliation. ThroughoutAmericanhistory,therehavebeenmomentsinwhichmajorupheavalshaverealignedpolitics(andconstitutionalpolitics)toanewequilibrium.119IfDemocratsengagedincourt-packingandwereabletoholdpowerfor longenoughtoimplementpoliciestorevivebasicprinciplesofdemocracy—such asvoter-accessandanti-gerrymanderingreforms—perhapsthispolarizedera wouldgivewaytoanewprogressiveequilibrium.

Thatsaid,itiscertainlyconceivablethatnosuchnewequilibriumwould emerge,andinsteadeachpartywouldexpandtheCourtwheneverithadunified controlofthepoliticalbranches.Ifcourt-packingproducedthatresult,itwould almostcertainlydelegitimizetheCourt—andpossiblytheentireenterpriseof law.Thus,whilecourt-packing’sgreatstrengthisthatitisalmostcertainlyconstitutional,itcouldworsenourpredicament.Moreover,evenifsuccessful,the battletopacktheCourt,ifrestingonpurelypartisangrounds,couldprovea pyrrhicvictory.Asnoted,PresidentRoosevelt’sfailedcourt-packingplanessentiallydestroyedhisabilitytopassprogressivelegislationafterward.120Whileany attempttoreformtheSupremeCourtwillrequiresignificantpoliticalcapital, nakedlypartisancourt-packingmightbeespeciallycostly.

4. Jurisdiction-Stripping

AnotherpossiblereformtocurbtheSupremeCourt’spowerisjurisdictionstripping.Moyn,forexample,hassuggestedthatafutureDemocratic-controlled

117 MarkTushnet,,45PEPP L.REV 481,500(2018).

118. Id.at500-01.

119. TheclassicaccountcomesfromBruceAckerman.BRUCEACKERMAN,WETHEPEOPLE:FOUNDATIONS(1991);BRUCEACKERMAN,WETHEPEOPLE:TRANSFORMATIONS(2000).Drawing onhisideaofconstitutionaltime,JackBalkinhasarguedthatPresidentTrumprepresentsthe endofoneeraofpoliticsandthataneweracouldbeonthehorizon JackBalkin,WhatKind of President Will Trump Become, Part II—Donald Trump and the Politics of Disjunction, BALKINIZATION (Nov 14, 2016), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2016/11/what-kind-of -president-will-trump.html[https://perma.cc/2HTR-ACJ5].

120. Seesupranotes66-67andaccompanyingtext.

Congressshouldseekto“barthejudiciaryfromconsideringcasesoncertaintopics suchasabortionoraffirmativeaction.”121 This approachcouldproduce short-termbenefitsforoneside,bypreventingthecourtsfromstrikingdown lawsinareaswhereaDemocratic-controlledCongressprefersthestatusquo.122 Congresscouldalsointroducespecificjurisdiction-strippingprovisionsaspart ofpolicyreforms.Congressmight,say,insulateahealth-care-reformbillfrom judicialchallengebyincludingaprovisionstrippingthefederalcourtsofjurisdictionoverconstitutionalchallengestothenewlaw.

Yetjurisdiction-strippingposesanumberofproblems.First,itseemsunlikelytocreateastableequilibrium.AsGregoryKogerargues,thisstrategy “wouldlegitimizesimilaractionsbytheotherpartywhenthepoliticalpendulum swings ARepublicanCongresscould,forexample,passalawbanningabortion thatexcludedconstitutionalchallengestothebillfromtheCourt’sjurisdiction.”123 SuchescalationmightultimatelyresultinaCourtwithlittleformal powerorpubliclegitimacy.

Moreover,jurisdiction-strippingproposalsalsolackwhatisoftenthoughtof astheleadingadvantageofcourt-packing:astrongclaimtoconstitutionality. Indeed,theconstitutionalityofjurisdiction-strippingproposalsremainsoneof themostsignificantunansweredquestionsinthefieldoffederalcourts.124Ajurisdiction-strippingbillcouldthusprovokeanunprecedentedshowdownbetweenthepoliticalbranchesandthejudiciary,wherethecourtswouldgetto weighinonwhethertheirjurisdictionhadpermissiblybeenstripped.Atleastin termsofpublicopinion,thejudiciarymightwellhavetheupperhandinsucha conflict.GiventheSupremeCourt’sperceivedroleasaprotectorofrightsin

121. Moyn,supranote70.

122 Itisnotclearhowlimitingthejudiciary’sabilitytohearcasesinvolvingabortionwouldbein Democrats’interest,giventhatunderthestatusquocourtsstepintoprotectabortionrights fromstatelaws Jurisdiction-strippingseemslikeamoreeffectivestrategywhenappliedto subjectareaswherecourtsthreatentolimitprogressivegovernmentaction(suchasaffirmative action).

123 GregoryKoger,HowaDemocraticCongressCanPushBackAgainsttheSupremeCourt,VOX (Nov. 12, 2018, 9:30 AM EDT), https://www.vox.com/mischiefs-of-faction/2018/11/12 /18080622/democratic-congress-against-supreme-court[https://perma.cc/KTM8-JMCN].

124 See,e.g,RichardH.Fallon,Jr.,Jurisdiction-StrippingReconsidered,96VA L.REV 1043,1045 (2010)(“Forbetterorforworse,manyofthemostmootedofthosequestions[aboutjurisdiction-strippingproposals]remainunanswered.”);BrianT.Fitzpatrick,TheConstitutionality ofFederalJurisdiction-StrippingLegislationandtheHistoryofStateJudicialSelectionandTenure, 98VA.L.REV839,839-40(2012)(“[T]hereisone[question]inparticularthathaspuzzled scholarsunlikeanyother:whetherCongresscanwithholdallfederaljurisdiction inacase raisingafederalconstitutionalclaim.”).

Americansociety,manyAmericansmightfeeluneasyaboutalawthatsoughtto shutthecourthousedoorsentirelyforanimportantclassofcases.

5. Senate-BasedReform

OnefinalsetofproposalsrevolvesaroundtheSenate.ChangestotheSenate’srules,aswellastonormsforhownominationsarehandled,couldavoidthe damagingpartisanbattlesofrecentyears,someargue.Onecommonproposalis torestorethefilibusterforSupremeCourtnomineesinthewakeofSenateRepublicans’useofthe“nuclearoption”in2017.Thiswould,supposedly,“encouragebipartisanconsensusand...prod[P]residentstonominatebroadlyacceptablecandidates.”125SenateDemocratsthemselveshavesuggestedrestoring thefilibusterforSupremeCourtnomineesiftheyreturnedtopower.126

Theappealofsuchproposalsiseasytounderstand.Thenominationprocess hassignificantlydeterioratedinrecentyearsandreachedanewlowpointin 2017—afterSenateRepublicans eliminated thefilibusterforSupremeCourt nominationsandenabledPresidentTrumptopicktwocommittedconservatives. PerhapsrestoringthefilibusteristhekeytogettingPresidentstopickmoderates whocouldearnbroadsupport.

YetSenate-basedreformpresentsanumberofproblems.First,suchreform wouldbedifficulttomakepermanent.Onewritersuggestedreimplementinga sixty-votethresholdbasedsolelyonanagreementbyagroupofmoderatesenators,127butsuchahandshakeagreementwouldnotbeguaranteedtolastpast thenextelection.TheSenatecouldvotetochangeitsownrulestoreinstatethe

125. Editorial,BrettKavanaughWillBeOurNextSupremeCourtJusticeforAlltheWrongReasons, L.A.TIMES (Sept.7,2018),https://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-kavanaugh -hearings-20180907-story.html [https://perma.cc/28ZK-XSGS]; see also Jennifer Rubin, Opinion, How to Fix theSupremeCourt Without Packing It, WASH POST (July 5, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com /blogs/right-turn/wp/2018/07 /05/the-case-against -court-packing[https://perma.cc/BNW3-47L3](“Pollsshowvotersoverwhelminglywantto usea60-voteminimum—onethatforcesanominationofsomeonewithwidespreadorat leastwider-spreadacceptance.”).

126. SeeJordainCarney,DemSenatorSaysHisPartyWillRestore60-VoteSupremeCourtFilibuster, THE HILL (Apr 10, 2017, 3:57 PM EDT), https://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/senate /328161-dem-senator-democrats-will-restore-60-vote-supreme-court-filibuster [https:// perma.cc/WEA2-9XJ9];SamStein&AmandaTerkel,DemocratsContemplateHowtoForfeit TheirPoweruponRegainingtheSenate,HUFFPOST (Apr.10,2017,4:42PMET),https:// www.huffpost.com/entry/democrats-discuss-restoring-filibuster_n_58ebdfa3e4b0ca64d91848e4[https://perma.cc/X2LF-N37B].

127. SeeRubin,supranote125.

filibuster,butthenextSenatecouldjustchangetherulesbackoncemore PerhapsCongresscouldpassastatuterequiringtheSenatetouseasupermajority votingruletoenddebateonSupremeCourtnominations.Astatutewouldbe hardertochange,giventhatdoingsowouldrequireassentofbothHousesof Congress;butitwouldraiseseriousconstitutionalconcerns.128

Moreover,evenifrestoringthefilibusteractuallycausedPresidentstoselect moderatenominees,additionalchangeswouldbeneededtofixabrokenprocess. JudgeGarlandwasexactlythekindofmoderatecandidatewhoinnormalcircumstancesmighthavebeenexpectedtoearnsupportfromenoughsenatorsto overcomeafilibuster.129 ButSenateRepublicanswouldnotevengivehima hearing.Thus,restoringthefilibusterwouldalsohavetobeaccompaniedby somekindofrulechangeentitlingnomineestoactualconsideration.130 Even thatmightnotbesufficient,however,tofixtheproblemofpartisanescalation; SenateRepublicanspresumablywouldhavevoteddownJudgeGarlandevenif theyhadheldahearing.

Morefundamentally,proposalsforrestoringthefilibustermistakeasymptomforthedisease.Theeliminationofthefilibusterisnotthesourceofwhatis wrongwiththeSupremeCourtnominationsprocess.Instead,deeperproblems ledtothedemiseofthefilibuster:theincreasingpolarizationoftheparties,the breakdownofnormsandtheuseofconstitutionalhardball,thehighstakesof individualappointments,andsoon.Simplybringingthefilibusterback,ormakingotherchangestoSenaterules,doesnothingtoaddresstheunderlyingproblem.

Insum,noneoftheproposalscurrentlyonoffersatisfythedesideratafor reformwehaveidentified.InthenextPart,weoffertwoproposalsthatwould satisfyourcriteria.

128. Fortheleadingtreatmentoftheissues,seeAaron-AndrewP.Bruhl,UsingStatutestoSetLegislativeRules:Entrenchment,SeparationofPowers,andtheRulesofProceedingsClause,19J.L.& POL.345(2003).

129 SeeRonElving,WhatHappenedwithMerrickGarlandin2016andWhyItMattersNow,NAT’L PUB RADIO(June28,2018),https://www.npr.org/2018/06/29/624467256/what-happened -with-merrick-garland-in-2016-and-why-it-matters-now [https://perma.cc/Z5HU-3PBT] (“Widelyregardedasamoderate,GarlandhadbeenpraisedinthepastbymanyRepublicans.”).

130. Cf.MatthewC.Stephenson,CanthePresidentAppointPrincipalExecutiveOfficersWithouta SenateConfirmationVote?,122YALEL.J.940(2013)(arguingthatSenateinactiononexecutivebranchnomineescouldbetreatedasconsent,entitlingthenomineetotakeofficewithouta confirmationvote).

how to save the supreme court

iv. saving the court: two proposals

ComprehensivereformisthekeytosavingtheSupremeCourt.Weoffertwo distinctproposalstoillustratehowreformmightbeaccomplished.InSection IV.A,weproposethe“SupremeCourtLottery,”aplaninwhichtheCourtwould sitinpanelsselectedatrandomfromalargepoolofpotentialJusticeswhowould alsoserveasjudgesontheU.S.courtsofappeals.InSectionIV.B,wepropose the“BalancedBench,”inwhichtheSupremeCourtwouldbecomposedofan equalnumberofDemocratic-andRepublican-selectedJustices,plusadditional Justicesdrawnfromthecircuitcourtsonwhomthe“partisan”Justiceswould havetoagreeunanimously.Whileneitherproposaleliminateseveryproblemwe haveidentified,eitherwouldbeamajorimprovementoverthestatusquo.Significantly,andunlikemanyotherproposals,ourtwosetsofreformsmeetthe criteriawehaveoutlined:theysecuretheCourt’sroleasaninstitutionthatisnot merelypartisan;theylowerthetemperatureofparticularnominations;andthey expanddeferencetothepoliticalbranchesofgovernment.

A.TheSupremeCourtLottery

1. ThePlanandItsBenefits

WecallourfirstproposaltheSupremeCourtLottery.Underthisreform, everyjudgeonthefederalcourtsofappealswouldalsobeappointedasanAssociateJusticeoftheSupremeCourt.TheSupremeCourtwouldhearcasesasa panelofnine,randomlyselectedfromalltheJustices.Onceselected,theJustices wouldresearchandpreparecasesfromtheirhomechambersbeforetravelingto Washingtontohearoralargumentsfortwoweeks,afterwhichanothersetof judgeswouldreplacethem 131Thepanelmemberswouldthenreturntotheir homechamberstocompletetheiropinions Bylaw,eachpanelwouldbeprohibitedfromhavingmorethanfiveJusticesnominatedbyaPresidentofasingle politicalparty(thatis,nomorethanfiveRepublicansorDemocratsatatime).

131. OurproposalissimilartothatofferedinJohnO.McGinnis,JusticeWithoutJustices,16CONST. COMMENT 541(1999).McGinniscallshisproposal“SupremeCourtriding,”anditdiffers fromoursinafewimportantways.First,McGinnisimaginesabolishingtheofficeofSupreme CourtJusticeoverall(aproposalthatrequiresaconstitutionalamendment).Id at541 We insteadproposeexpandingthenumberofAssociateJustices,areformthatwethinkisconstitutionalbecauseitissimplydecidingthesizeoftheCourt Second,McGinnissuggeststhat thetermofservicefor“riding”besixmonthstooneyear Id Weproposetwoweeks,tofurtheramplifythebenefitsofashortrotationontheCourt.Finally,weproposeasupermajority requirementandnotethatnomorethanfiveJusticesonanypanelcanhavebeennominated byaPresidentofasinglepoliticalparty.

Inaddition,onlya6-3supermajority132oftheCourt,ratherthanasimplemajority,couldholdafederalstatute(andpossiblystatestatutes,133dependingon howoneweighsfederalismvalues)unconstitutional.134

Thisreformwouldhavesignificantbenefits.First,itwouldsignificantlydepoliticizetheappointmentsprocessbymakingconfirmationsmorenumerous andlessconsequential.NewJusticeswouldprimarilyserveonthecourtsofappeals,withonlyoccasionalelevationtoaSupremeCourtpanel.Morebroadly, contentiousissuesofpublicimportancewouldnolongerdependonunexpected deaths,andJusticeswouldnolongerhavetheabilitytoshapeconstitutionallaw foragenerationbystrategicallytimingtheirretirement.Thiswouldalsofreeup thePresidentandCongresstodotheworkofgoverninginsteadofoccasionally puttingthatworkasideforprotractedconfirmationbattles.

TheSupremeCourtLotterywould,however,makeappointmentstothefederalcourtsofappealsmoresignificant,asthesejudgeswouldconstitutethe“minorleagues”fortheSupremeCourt.Butwethinktheconcernthatourreform wouldoverlypoliticizethoseappointmentsisrelativelylimited.Appointments tothefederalcourtsofappealsarealreadypolarized,withSenateRepublicans

132 Asupermajorityrulewouldreducethelikelihoodofoneparticularlyunrepresentativepanel madeupoffiveideologicalextremistsgettingtosetpolicyfortheentirecountry.Evenwitha 6-3supermajorityrequirement,however,thereisstillsomechanceofskewedpanels Butour prohibitiononmorethanfivejudgeshavingbeenappointedbyaPresidentofasinglepolitical partyshouldmitigatethisconcernevenwithanine-Justicepanel,becausebipartisansupport wouldbeaprerequisiteforoverturningastatute.Forthoseparticularlyworriedaboutthis problem,thesupermajorityrequirementcouldbeincreasedto7-2orpanelsizecouldbeincreasedto,say,fifteen,withaneleven-oreventwelve-Justicesupermajorityrequiredtodeclareastatuteunconstitutional.Forthoseconcernedaboutadoptingapartisan-balancerequirement,thatcomponentcouldberemoved,thoughitwouldincreasetheriskofinstability fromideologicalpanels

133. Wedonotexpressafirmviewonwhetherthesupermajorityrequirementshouldapplyto decisionsdeclaringstatestatutesunconstitutional Giventhatfederalstatutesnecessarilyapplytothewholecountry,therearegreaterdangersinmakingittooeasyforaskewedpanelto declareafederalstatuteunconstitutional.WealsothinkthattheCourtshouldbemoredeferentialtothepoliticalbranchesofgovernment,particularlywhenissuesdividealongapartisan axis.Withrespecttostatelaws,thislatterconcernislessapplicable;thoughatthesametime, acentralpropositionofourconstitutionalsystemisthesupremacyoffederalconstitutional lawoverstatestatutes.

134. Thislastchangewouldalsorequireestablishingthatifalowercourtstrikesdownafederal statute,theSupremeCourtwouldhavetohearthecase Itwouldtakea6-3voteforthestatute tobedeemedunconstitutional,regardlessofthelowercourt’sdecision.Thiswouldsolvethe problemofafederalcourtofappealsstrikingdownastatuteandtheSupremeCourtneeding onlyabaremajoritytoaffirmthatrulingwhenitwouldotherwiseneeda6-3margintooverturnthestatuteitself.Withoutthischange,theproposalwouldperverselyaggrandizethe poweroflowercourts Foradiscussion,seeJedHandelsmanShugerman,ASix-ThreeRule: RevivingConsensusandDeferenceontheSupremeCourt,37GA.L.REV.893,957(2003).

currentlyworkingathighspeedtofillvacancieswithyoung,ideologicalappointees 135Thisispreciselybecausetheyunderstandtheimportanceofthecourtsof appeals.Bothsides,weexpect,wouldengageinthisbehavior.Nonetheless,the lowersalienceandhighervolumeoftheseappointments,inadditiontotheprohibitionofmorethanfiveJusticesnominatedbyaPresidentofasinglepolitical party,meanstheyarelesslikelytobecomecentraltopublicdebate.Thiswould beapositivedevelopment,asitwouldmakethecourtslessofapoliticalfootball inelectionsandpreventthecreationofcultsofpersonalityaroundtheJustices. Instead,theCourtwouldbewhatitshouldbe—arelativelyanonymousgroup ofskilled,thoughtfuljurists.136

Second,weexpectthisapproachwouldalsodecreasetheideologicalandidiosyncraticnatureofCourtdecisions.NoJusticewouldbeabletoadvancean ideologicalagendaoverdecadesofservice,andnoJusticewouldbethesingle swingvoteroveraperiodofyears(andthustargetedbythelion’sshareofadvocacy).137Inaddition,itwouldbeverydifficultforaJusticetobetooactivist onanygivencasebecausethenextpanel—arrivingtwoweekslater—mighthave adifferentcompositionandtakeadifferenttack.ThiswouldpushJusticesto moreminimalistic,narrow,deferentialdecisions.138

Caseswouldalsobechosenbehindaveilofignorance.Whileservingtheir twoweeks,theJusticeswouldconsiderpetitionsforSupremeCourtreview.But withsuchshorttermsofservice,theJusticescouldnotpickcaseswithanagenda inmind;anotherslateofJusticeswouldhearthem.139Activistlawyerswould notbeabletogamethesystembybringingcasesbasedontheirpredictionof

135 SeeCharlieSavage,TrumpIsRapidlyReshapingtheJudiciary.Here’sHow.,N.Y.TIMES(Nov 11,2017),https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/11/us/politics/trump-judiciary-appeals-courts -conservatives.html [https://perma.cc/Z625-93G8]; cf Joseph Fiskin & David E. Pozen, AsymmetricConstitutionalHardball,118COLUM.L.REV.915(2018)(notingthatpolarizationis largelyaRepublicanphenomenononissuesofconstitutionalhardball).

136 Cf McGinnis,supranote131,at542(“Vestedforlifewiththeawesomepowertomakefinal decisionswithwide-rangingconsequencesforthenation,SupremeCourtJusticesgenerally cannothelpbutcometoseethemselvesasstatesmenratherthanashumblearbitratorsoflegal disputes.”)

137. SeeIlyaShapiro,JusticeKennedy:TheOnceandFutureSwingVote,CATO(Nov.13,2016), https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/justice-kennedy-once-future-swing-vote [https://perma.cc/Q3PT-5J7R].

138. SeeMcGinnis,supranote131,at544(“SupremeCourtriderswouldhavebeenlessableto instantiatetheirpoliticalvisionandwouldthereforebemorelikelytofollowprecedent Moreover,becausetheriderswouldhavecomefrominferiorcourts,whichoperateunderthethreat ofreversal,theywouldhavehadmorepracticeinfollowingprecedent.”).

139 Seeid.at545;seealsoAdrianVermeule,VeilofIgnoranceRulesinConstitutionalLaw,111YALE L.J.399,424(2001)(notingbrieflyMcGinnis’sproposal).

whichwaytheCourtwouldlikelydecidetheissue.TheCourt’sdecisionswould likely be less aggressive in overturning congressional judgments and more tightlylinkedtoprecedent.

Thereissomechancethatrandomlyselectingappellatejudgesmightleadto radicalswingsbetweendifferentpanels,butwethinkavarietyoffactorsmitigate thisconcern.First,assumingaroughlyevensplitbetweenliberalandconservativejudgesonthecourtsofappeals,the6-3supermajorityrequirement—combinedwiththelimitationonpartisancompositionofpanels—preventsalottery fromgeneratingwildswingsbetweenideologicalmajorities.Second,becausewe expectadecreaseinstrategiclitigationduetocasesbeingchosenfrombehinda veilofignorance,wethinkthattheCourtwouldhearfewerideologicallymotivatedcasesdesignedtochangethelaw.Third,webelievethejudgesthemselves wouldbeacheckonradicalswings Mostofthepanel’sworkwouldtakeplace fromajudge’shomechambersratherthaninWashington,sothecultureofordinaryappellatedecision-makingwouldinfusethejudge’swork.Ajudgewho spendsherlifeonthecourtofappealsmaydevelophabitsofnarrowerdecisionmaking,andmaybelesslikelytoenvisionherselfasthegrandmakerofconstitutionallaw.140Equallyimportant,judgeswhospendtheirlivesonthecourtsof appealswillchafeataSupremeCourtwhosejurisprudenceswingswildlyback andforth.Seekingclarityinordertodecidefuturecases,judgesselectedfora SupremeCourtpanelcouldverywellvaluenarrowdecisionsandstaredecisis morethanourcurrentJusticesdo.

Mostimportantly,however,theSupremeCourtLotteryapproachmeetsthe desiderataforreform ItwouldpreservetheCourtasaninstitutionthatisn’t definedbypartisanship,inpartbyreducingthestakesofindividualnominations totheCourt.Anditwouldgiveanudgeofdeferencetothepoliticalbranches. Thatcombination,wethink,offersastrongcasefortheLotteryapproach.

140 AnumberofscholarshavenotedthatthereareculturalpathologiestoserviceontheSupreme Court.See,e.g.,McGinnis,supranote131,at542(observingthatjudgeswhospendtheircareersprimarilyonthecourtsofappeals“would[be]morelikelytotreatconstitutionalissues andothermomentousdecisionsmoreliketheotherquotidianmattersthattheywereaccustomedtoresolvingintheircourts”);Sherry,supranote89(notingthatJusticeshavebecome “celebrities”whoplaytotheirfanbases) Weagreewiththeseobservationsandthinkthatthe Court’scultureisfundamentallydifferentfromthatofthecourtsofappeals,andthatprimary serviceonthelatterwouldshapetheJustices’actionsduringtheiroccasionalserviceonthe SupremeCourt Atthesametime,therearetradeoffsinshiftingtowardthecultureofcourt ofappealsjudges.Courtofappealsjudgesmight,forexample,bemoredeferentialtoamici, parties,andtheSolicitorGeneralthanarethecurrentSupremeCourtJustices Theyalso wouldhavelessexpertiseinconstitutionalcasesspecifically.

WethinktheSupremeCourtLotterycouldbeimplementedbystatute,withoutaconstitutionalamendment.ItisgenerallyuncontestedthatCongresshas thepowertochangethesizeoftheSupremeCourtandtosetitsbasicprocedures.Congresshasutilizedthosepowers,too.Ithasgrownandshrunkthe Courtoverthecenturies,141 andithasdefinedmanybasicprovisionsofthe Court’soperation.Forexample,statuteshavegrantedpowerstotheChiefJustice,requiredJusticesto“ridecircuit”formorethanacentury,andorganizedthe Courtinavarietyofotherways.142

Ourreformworksfromthatconstitutionalbaseline.Theproposalformally expandsthesizeoftheCourttosome180judges,143thenprovidesforhowthe Courtwouldhearcases.ThePresidentwouldstillnominateeveryJustice,and theSenatewouldstillconfirmthem.TheJusticeswouldserveforlife,assuming goodbehavior,asiscurrentpractice.ThesittingSupremeCourtJusticeswould notlosetheirpositionsortheirlifetimeappointments;theywouldsimplyenter thelottery,likealltheotherAssociateJustices.144Iftheywanted,theycouldalso beappointedtothefederalcourtsofappeals,astheotherAssociateJustices wouldbe.AndthecurrentChiefJusticewouldretainhislifetimepositionand additionalduties,includinghisconstitutionally-prescribedroletopresideover theSenateinanimpeachmenttrialofthePresident.145

Still,theproposalraisesavarietyofconstitutionalquestions,especiallyfor thoseworkingwithinthehighlyformalisticmethodologyfavoredbythecurrent conservativemajority.Whilewethinkwehavesolidresponses,westressagain

141. See,e.g.,MichaelStokesPaulsen,CheckingtheCourt,10N.Y.U.J.L.&LIBERTY18,64(2016) (“NothingintheConstitutionspecifiesthesizeofthemembershipoftheSupremeCourt ThesizeanddetailsoftheSupremeCourt’smembershipareuptoCongress....”).Indeed, theproofofthepointisthatthemostnotableargumentsagainstalteringthesizeoftheCourt statethatthereis“astrongnorm”or“convention”againstreformsfor“‘packing’theSupreme Court”bychangingitssize,notthatanychangeismanifestlyunconstitutional.Grove,supra note68,at505

142 See,e.g.,50U.S.C.§1803(a)(1)(2018)(vestingtheChiefJusticewithauthoritytodesignate membersoftheFISACourt);JudiciaryActof1789,ch.20,§4,1Stat.73,74-75(providingfor circuitriding).

143. Thereare179authorizedfederalcourtofappealsjudgeships.SeeJudicialVacancies,U.S.CTS. (Apr. 4, 2019), http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies [https:// perma.cc/9VHF-33L5].

144. NotethatthisproposaldoesnotrunafoulofargumentsthattheConstitutionmandateslife tenureforfederaljudges ForadiscussionofArticleIII’sGoodBehaviorClause,seePrakash &Smith,supranote100

145. U.S.CONST.art.I,§3.

thatourgoalisplausibility Giventhatthesereformswouldlikelybeadvanced againstacomplexpoliticalbackdropofpopularsentimentdirectedagainstthe Court—andthethreatofmoreradicalreform—slam-dunkconstitutionalargumentsmaynotbenecessary.

a. DualAppointments

Somemightarguethatitisunconstitutionalforajudgetoeffectivelyhave twoappointments—asafederalcourtofappealsjudgeandasanAssociateJustice ontheSupremeCourt.ArticleIIIoftheConstitutioncontemplatestheexistence ofaSupremeCourtandadditionalinferiorcourts.TheAppointmentsClause alsorecognizesthatthePresidentcanappointJusticesoftheSupremeCourt, treatingthatasadistinctpositionfromother,inferior,appointments.

Thisargument,however,isnotpersuasive.Unlikeotherproposalsthatdo awaywiththeCourt,JusticesintheSupremeCourtLotterywouldbeappointed andconfirmedtotheirpositionontheSupremeCourt,infullaccordancewith theAppointmentsClause 146Moreimportantly,thetextoftheConstitutiondoes nothaveanybaronjudgesservingintwojudicialpositions,ortwocommissionedpositionsofanykind,atthesametime.Infact,theConstitutionisnaturallyreadtoallowit.ArticleIspecificallybansmembersofCongressfromservinginanotherroleundertheConstitution.147 Thus,asStevenCalabresiand JoanLarsenhavenoted,“theConstitutioncontainsanexpresslegislativeIncompatibilityClausebutnocomparableprovisionexiststobarjointserviceinthe judicialandexecutivedepartments.”148TheFramersoftheConstitutionunder-

146 Foradiscussion,seeCalabresi&Lindgren,supranote97,at859-63 Allnewjudgeswouldof coursebeappointedtobothpositionsspecifically,andforthosewhoareparticularlyconcernedonthisfront,thePresidentcouldrenominateandsecureconfirmationofallexisting courtofappealsjudgesasAssociateJustices.Whiledoingsomightseempoliticallycomplicated,itwouldrequireonlyamajorityvoteintheSenate—and,ofcourse,thehypothetical concernalreadyassumesthattheSenatewouldhavevotedinfavorofthereformstatute.

147. U.S.CONST.art.I,§6(“[N]oPersonholdinganyOfficeundertheUnitedStates,shallbea MemberofeitherHouseduringhisContinuanceinOffice.”).Thereare,infact,twoother similarclauses.ArticleI,§9prohibitsholding“anyOffice”whilealso“accept[ing]any [other]office”fromforeignstates,andArticleII,§1prohibits“Senator[s]orRepresentative[s],orPerson[s]holdinganOfficeofTrustorProfit [frombeing]appointedanElector.”TheomissioninArticleIIIisthusparticularlynotable.

148 StevenG.Calabresi&JoanL.Larsen,OnePerson,OneOffice:SeparationofPowersorSeparation ofPersonnel?,79CORNELLL.REV 1045,1122(1994).TheFoundinggenerationwasalsoaware ofthisomission.TheVirginiaRatifyingConventionurgedtheFirstCongresstoadoptan amendmentstating:“TheJudgesofthefederalCourtshallbeincapableofholdinganyother Office,orofreceivingtheProfitsofanyotherOffice,orEmolumentundertheUnitedStates

stoodthepossibilityofconflictsarisingfromholdingmultipleposts TheyaccountedforitinonepartoftheConstitution,butchosenottoprovidesucha barforJusticesontheSupremeCourt.

Inaddition,historicalandcontemporarypracticesuggeststhatjudgescan havemultiplerolesatonce.Foremost,theJudiciaryActof1789createdfederal circuitcourts,butnotcircuitjudgeships.Instead,itrequiredSupremeCourtJusticesto“ridecircuit,”actingasjudgesonthenascentfederalcourts.149Thefirst CongressthusdirectedSupremeCourtJusticestoeffectivelyserveontwocourts atonce.Thispracticewasupheldinthe1803caseStuartv.Laird, 150eventhough theJusticeshadnotbeenseparatelyappointedtothelowerfederalcourts,andit persistedthroughoutthenineteenthcentury.151

Inaddition,somejudgeshavehadmultiplecommissionssimultaneously. ChiefJusticeJohnMarshallwas,foratime,simultaneouslycommissionedas SecretaryofStateandChiefJustice.152JudgeClariaHornBoomcurrentlyserves asafederaldistrictjudgeforboththeEasternandWesternDistrictsofKentucky.153SupremeCourtJusticeshavealsotakenonadditionalroles,apparently withoutconcern.ChiefJusticeJohnJaywasdispatchedtonegotiateapeace treatywithBritainin1794.154JusticeRobertJacksontookaleaveofabsencefrom

oranyofthem.”Id at1125(quotingPAPERSOFGEORGEMASON:1787-1972,at1057(Robert Rutlanded.,1970)).Itwasnotadopted.Id.

149 JudiciaryActof1789,ch 20,§4,1Stat 73,74-75(“[T]hebeforementioneddistricts shall bedividedintothreecircuits,and thereshallbeheldannuallyineachdistrictofsaidcircuits,twocourts,whichshallbecalledCircuitCourts,andshallconsistofanytwojusticesof theSupremeCourt,andthedistrictjudgeofsuchdistricts,anytwoofwhomshallconstitute aquorum....”).SeegenerallyJoshuaGlick,Comment,OntheRoad:TheSupremeCourtand theHistoryofCircuitRiding,24CARDOZOL.REV 1753(2003)(discussingthehistoryofSupremeCourtJusticesridingcircuit).

150. 5U.S.(1Cranch)299,309(1803).

151 SeeGlick,supranote149,at1754

152 TheSenateconfirmedMarshall’sappointmentasChiefJusticeonJanuary27,1801,yethedid notresignhispositionasSecretaryofStateuntilMarch4ofthatyear.See2ALBERTJ.BEVERIDGE,THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 558-59(1916); 1 CHARLES WARREN,THE SUPREME COURTINUNITEDSTATESHISTORY178,184-85,200-01(1922).

153. See Roll Call Vote 115th Congress 2nd Session, U.S. SENATE (Apr. 10, 2018), https:// www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=115 &session=2&vote=00065[https://perma.cc/CAX8-LBFQ].

154. See4THEDOCUMENTARYHISTORYOFTHESUPREMECOURTOFTHEUNITEDSTATES,17891800,at243-45(MaevaMarcusetal.eds.,1992)(discussingthecontroversyoverJusticeJay’s appointment).

theCourttoserveasChiefProsecutoratNurembergafterWorldWarII.155 ChiefJusticeEarlWarrenchairedthecommissiontaskedwithinvestigatingthe assassinationofPresidentKennedy.156Otherexamplesabound 157

Judgesalsoserveonseparatelyconstitutedcourtsfromthosetowhichthey wereinitiallyconfirmed.Somefederaldistrictcourtjudgesserveaseven-year termontheForeignIntelligenceSurveillanceCourt,whilesimultaneouslyfulfillingtheirdistrictcourtduties.158JudgesserveontheU.S.SentencingCommission,apracticeupheldbytheSupremeCourt.159And,asdiscussedinmore detailbelow,judgesandJusticessitbydesignationoninferiorcourts,lateral courts(i.e.,adifferentcircuitordistrict),andsuperiorcourts.160Whileeachof theseexamplesdiffersfromholdingadualappointment,theysuggestthatasa matterofhistoricalandcontemporarypractice,judgeshavehadmultipleroles simultaneously.Americanshaveacceptedthatvariationaslegitimate,andoften desirable.

b. TheVestingClauseand“OneSupremeCourt”

ArticleIIIoftheConstitutionveststhejudicialpowerin“oneSupreme Court.”SomecontendthatthisprovisionmandatesthattheSupremeCourtbe comprisedofasinglesetofpersonsratherthanarotatinggroupofJustices.161

155. SeeBrianR.Gallini,NurembergLivesOn:HowJusticeJackson’sInternationalExperienceContinuestoShapeDomesticCriminalProcedure,46LOY U.CHI L.J.1,20(2014);seealsoid.at34 n.254(notingthatsomeofJusticeJackson’scolleaguesobjectedtohisappointment).

156 SeeCalabresi&Larsen,supranote148,at1137

157 SeeJonathanLippman,TheJudgeandExtrajudicialConduct:Challenges,LessonsLearned,anda Proposed Framework for Assessing the Propriety of Pursuing Activities Beyond the Bench, 33 CARDOZOL.REV 1341,1343(2012)(enumeratingexamples).

158 50U.S.C.§1803(2018).

159. SeeMistrettav.UnitedStates,488U.S.361(1989).

160.Forexample,retiredSupremeCourtJusticessitonthecourtsofappeals.Cramton,supranote 97,at1327 Forabriefdiscussionof“upwarddesignation,”seeStras&Scott,supranote100, at1417-19.Forabroaddiscussionofjudgesonothercourts,seeMarinK.Levy,VisitingJudges, 107CALIF L.REV 67(2019).

161 See,e.g,STEPHENM.SHAPIROETAL.,SUPREMECOURTPRACTICE§11(10thed 2013)(arguing that“thefactthattheConstitutionveststhejudicialpower‘inonlyoneSupremeCourt... doesnotpermitSupremeCourtactionbycommittees,panels,orsections’”(quotingWilliam J.Brennan,Jr.,StateCourtDecisionsandtheSupremeCourt,31PA.B.ASS’NQ.393,406(1960) (alterationinoriginal))).TheauthorscitealetterfromChiefJusticeHughesandarticlesby JusticesHarlan,Brennan,andFieldtosupporttheideathattheCourtcannothearcasesasa panel.Id.Theyalsoarguethattherejectionofan1890proposalforcreatingpanelswithinthe SupremeCourtsupportsthisposition.Id Butitisnotclearwhythatinferenceisreasonable. First,inferencesfromlegislativeinactionshouldbedisfavored.Second,the1890momentwas

Butthisargumentsuffersfromseriousinfirmities.First,ArticleIII’sVesting Clausewaspartlydraftedanddesignedtoaddressavarietyofconcernsonthe balancebetweenfederalismandnationalism ThegovernmentoftheArticlesof Confederationdidnothaveanationaljudiciary;theVestingClauseestablished clearlythatthenewgovernmentwould.162Inaddition,duringthedebatesatthe ConstitutionalConvention,muchofthediscussionoverthecreationofthefederalcourtswasaboutwhethertherewouldbeanylowerfederalcourts.Some membersoftheConventionpreferredestablishinglowerfederalcourtsinthe Constitution,whileothersfearedthatlowerfederalcourtswouldtakepower fromthestates.ThecompromisewastoestablishaSupremeCourtandpermit (butnotrequire)Congresstocreatelowerfederalcourts.163Thedraftinghistory oftheVestingClausewastiedtothesedebatesmorethantosometheoretical senseofoneness.

Moreover,asKlarmanhasshown,thedebateovertheCourtwastiedtothe broaderquestionof“enforcingfederalsupremacy.”164TheConventionrejected theoptionofafederalvetooverstatelawsinfavoroftheSupremacyClauseand thecreationofaSupremeCourt.165 InFederalistNo.22,AlexanderHamilton pointedoutthatoneofthecorebenefitsofasingleinstitution—whichwould stillapplyifpersonnelfluctuated—isfinalityamidafederalsystemofmultiple courts:

Toavoidtheconfusionwhichwouldunavoidablyresultfromthecontradictorydecisionsofanumberofindependentjudicatories,allnations

oneofradicalchangeinanyevent.TheideaofpanelswithintheCourt,withfullCourtreview, hadbeenconsideredatleastasearlyas1869,gainedthesupportofanumberofprominent commentatorsandelectedofficials,andwasoneleadingoptiononthetable.Theotheroption, whichwasultimatelychosen,wasthecreationofintermediatecourts,whichbroughtthe eventualendofthecentury-longtraditionofcircuitriding.Forabriefdiscussionofthisproposal,seeTraceyE.George&ChrisGuthrie,“TheThrees”:Re-ImaginingSupremeCourtDecisionmaking,61VAND L.REV 1825(2008).Oncircuitriding,seeGlick,supranote149

162. SeeTHEFEDERALISTNO.22,at150(AlexanderHamilton)(ClintonRossitered.,1961)(“A circumstancewhichcrownsthedefectsoftheConfederationremainsyettobementioned— thewantofajudiciarypower.”).

163. MICHAELJ.KLARMAN,THEFRAMERS’COUP:THEMAKINGOFTHEUNITEDSTATESCONSTITUTION164-67(2016).

164 Id at164

165. Id.

havefounditnecessarytoestablishonecourtparamounttotherest,possessingageneralsuperintendenceandauthorizedtosettleanddeclarein thelastresortauniformruleofciviljustice 166

Second,theVestingClauseargumentmistakenlyassumesthatasingularinstitution—whichtheSupremeCourtwouldcontinuetobeunderthisproposal cannotbecomposedofmultiplepeopleinrotation.Thereisadifferencebetween havingasingleinstitution,whichtheVestingClauseclearlyrequires,andhaving thatinstitutionwithfixedratherthanvariablemembership.Singularinstitutions—includingthecurrentCourt—alwayshaveafluctuatingmembership.At present,Justicesrecusethemselvesfromcases,quorumrequirementscontemplatethatfewerthanafullcomplementofJusticeswillhearcases,andintertemporally,theCourtasaninstitutionchangesitspersonnelwithregularityInstitutionscanbesingular,eveniftheirmembershipfluctuates.Textually,the ClauseitselfdoesnotspecifythenumberofJustices,northatCourtmembership befixedratherthanrotational.WhencombinedwithCongress’spowerinthe Necessary and ProperClauseto “carry[] into Execution” “all other Powers vested”inthefederalgovernment,167theArticleIIIVestingClausegivesCongressauthoritytomakerulesforthecreation,composition,andtermsofthejudiciary—including the Supreme Court.168 This includes deciding that the Court’smembershipshouldrotate.

c. SupermajorityVotingRequirements

Therealsoareanumberofplausibleconstitutionalchallengestoasupermajorityvotingrequirementforstrikingdownfederal(andpossiblystate)statutes. OnesetofargumentsisthatArticleIIIimplicitlyeitherrequiresmajorityruleor

166 THEFEDERALISTNO 22,supranote162,at150;seealsoTHEFEDERALISTNO 80,at476(AlexanderHamilton)(ClintonRossitered.,1961)(“Themerenecessityofuniformityintheinterpretationofthenationallawsdecidesthequestion Thirteenindependentcourtsoffinal jurisdictionoverthesamecauses,arisinguponthesamelaws,isahydraingovernmentfrom whichnothingbutcontradictionandconfusioncanproceed.”)

167 U.S.CONST art.I,§8,cl 18

168.TheclassicarticleonthegeneralclaimofthescopeoftheNecessaryandProperClauseis WilliamW.VanAlstyne,TheRoleofCongressinDeterminingIncidentalPowersofthePresident andoftheFederalCourts:ACommentontheHorizontalEffectoftheSweepingClause,40LAW& CONTEMP.PROBS.102(1976).Formorerecenttakes,seeJohnF.Manning,TheSupremeCourt, 2013Term—Foreword:TheMeansofConstitutionalPower,128HARV L.REV 1(2014);andJohn Mikhail,TheNecessaryandProperClauses,102GEO.L.J.1045(2014).

givestheCourtthepowertodecidehowtoresolveitsowncases.169Bothsuffer fromanabsenceoftextualsupport.170Asecondsetofargumentsisstructural: thatsupermajorityruleswouldaggrandizecongressionalpoweroreffectivelydeterminetheoutcomesofcases.171Thesearguments,too,areunmooredfromany textualprovisionsandareeffectivelyaversionof“free-formstructural”constitutionalarguments.172Itisworthnoting,moreover,thatwhatevernormative strengthsuchargumentshave,thereareprominentconstitutionalthinkerswho havequestionedthecaseforsimple-majoritydecisionsattheSupremeCourton normativegroundsandnotedthatvalueslikeexpertise,respectforconstitutionalstructure,andfairnesscutinfavorofsupermajorityrequirements.173

Theconstitutionalcaseforsettingsupermajorityrequirementsstartsfrom thepremisethatCongresshasthepowertostructurethejudiciary.Thesource ofthispowerisacombinationoftheNecessaryandProperClause,whichgives Congressthepowerto“makeallLawswhichshallbenecessaryandproperfor carryingintoExecution...allotherPowersvestedbythisConstitution,”174and theExceptionsClause,whichstatesthattheSupremeCourthasjurisdiction “with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.”175FromtheJudiciaryActof1789onward,Congresshasexercisedthese powers.TheFirstCongressnotonlyestablishedthesizeoftheSupremeCourt, butalsorequiredthat“anyfourof[theJustices]shallbeaquorum.”176Interms ofpotentiallydictatingjudicialoutcomes,asupermajorityrequirementisnotso differentfromaquorumrequirement.BotharerestrictionsonhowmanyJusticesareneededforajudicialdeterminationtobebinding.

SupermajorityrequirementsalsohavealonghistorywithindebatesoverreformingtheSupremeCourt.Theywereproposedatleastasearlyasthe1820s,

169 Foranoverviewofthesechallenges,seeEvanH.Caminker,ThayerianDeferencetoCongress andSupremeCourtSupermajorityRule:LessonsfromthePast,78IND L.J.73,77n.12(2003).

170. Forexample,theremightbeanargumentthatArticleIgivesCongressthepowertostructure itsownrulesandoperationsandthatthisapproachshouldbeappliedtoArticleIIIaswell. Buttheoppositeargument—thattheConstitutioncontemplatessuchaprovisionbutexcludes itfromArticleIII—seemsatleastequallypersuasive.

171 SeeCaminker,supranote169,at77n.12

172 Manning,supranote168,at32;seealsoid.at48-67(criticizingtheuseoffree-formstructural constitutionalarguments).

173 See,e.g.,Shugerman,supranote134;JeremyWaldron,FivetoFour:WhyDoBareMajorities RuleonCourts?,123YALEL.J.1692(2014).

174. U.S.CONST.art.I,§8,cl.18.

175 U.S.CONST art III, §2, cl 2 For an extensive discussion making this argument, see Shugerman,supranote134,at972-81

176. JudiciaryActof1789,ch.20,§1,1Stat.73,73.

withanothersixtyproposalsbeingofferedbetweenthenandtheearly1980s.177 Andsomestates,includingNebraskaandNorthDakota,haveadoptedsupermajorityrequirements 178 Thefactthattheseprovisionshavebeendiscussed overalmosttwocenturiescertainlydoesnotestablishtheirconstitutionality,but itisworthnotingthatmanyhavethoughtsuchproposalswouldbeconstitutionalifadopted.179

d. HistoricalPractice

Anotherpossiblecounterargumentisthatreformsalongtheselinesshould beseenasunconstitutional,orviolativeofsomekindofunwrittenconvention, duetothelongstandinghistoricalpracticeofhavingasinglesetofSupreme CourtJusticesratherthanapanelsystem.180BoththeSupremeCourtandcommentators haverecognized thathistorical practicecan inform constitutional meaning.181Atthesametime,however,takinghistoricalpracticetoofarpreventsdemocraticexperimentation.Adherentstothehistorical-practiceschool canfallintothetrapofarguingthatCongressalwayslegislatestoitsmaximal authoritiesandthatitalwaysexploresandimplementseverypossiblestrategy.182 Inourconstitutionalsystem,CongresshasbeengrantedsignificantpowersunderArticleI,andthereisnoprovisionanywhereintheConstitutionthatsuggeststhatCongresslosesthosepowersifitchoosesnottoexercisethemfora periodoftime.Indeed,theideathatCongress’sArticleIpowersdisappearif CongresschoosesnottousethemfliesinthefaceofbothArticleI’sVesting Clauseandtheseparationofpowers,whichgivelegislativepowerstoCongress whetherornottheyareexercisedatanygivenmoment

177. Caminker,supranote169,at88.

178 NEB CONST artV,§2(requiringfiveofthesevenjusticestoholdalawunconstitutional); N.D.CONST art.VI,§4(requiringfourofthefivejusticestoholdalawunconstitutional); seealsoCaminker,supranote169,at91-94.

179 SeeCaminker,supranote169,at88-94(discussingproposalsandjustificationsthroughout history).

180.Cf.Pozen,supranote111,at34(suggestingthatcourt-packingviolates“theconventionofjudicialsupremacyoverconstitutionalinterpretation”).SeegenerallyBradley&Siegel,supra note68(consideringargumentsfortheimpermissibilityofcourt-packingbasedonhistorical practice).

181 SeeWilliamBaude,ConstitutionalLiquidation,71STAN L.REV 1(2019)(articulatingatheory ofhowpost-Foundingpracticecananswerconstitutionalquestions);CurtisA.Bradley&TrevorW.Morrison,HistoricalGlossandtheSeparationofPowers,126HARV L.REV 411(2012) (addressingtheproperroleofhistoricalpracticeinthecontextoftheseparationofpowers anddiscussingSupremeCourtcasesthatusehistoricalpractice).

182 SeeLeahM.Litman,DebunkingAntinovelty,66DUKEL.J.1407(2017).

B. TheBalancedBench

1. ThePlanandItsBenefits

Oursecondproposal,theBalancedBench,looksquitedifferentfromtheSupremeCourtLotterybutaddressessimilarconcerns Theproposalhasseveral components First,theSupremeCourtwouldstartwithtenJustices.Fivewould beaffiliatedwiththeDemocraticParty,andfivewiththeRepublicanParty.These tenJusticeswouldthenselectfiveadditionalJusticeschosenfromcurrentcircuit (orpossiblydistrict)courtjudges.Thecatch?Thetenpartisan-affiliatedJustices wouldneedtoselecttheadditionalfiveJusticesunanimously(oratleastbya strongsupermajorityrequirement).TheseadditionalJusticeswouldbechosen twoyearsinadvance,forone-yearterms.AndiftheJusticesfailedtoagreeona slateofadditionalcolleagues,theSupremeCourtwouldlackaquorumand couldnothearanycasesforthatyear.

Theideabehindthisproposalisthatitprovidesamechanismtorestorethe notionthatSupremeCourtJusticesaredecidingquestionsoflaw,inwaysthat don’tinvariablylineupwiththeirpoliticalpreferencesinthebiggestcases.That wasoncetrue—evenduringperiodsofthemostseriouspoliticalconflictoverthe SupremeCourt,theJusticeswerenotstrictlyfollowingpartylines.Asnoted above,183duringtheinfamouscourt-packingdramainthe1930s,theJustices werecloselydividedalongideologicallinesbutnotpartylines.

Today,however,itseemslikeaquaintnotionthatPresidentswouldever chooseSupremeCourtJusticeswhowouldvoteagainsttheirparty’sinterestsin bigcases.TheRepublicansmadethismistake(ifitisamistake)inrecentdecades,whichledthemtovowtoappoint“nomoreSouters.”184Democrats,despitehavinghadfarfeweropportunitiestoappointJusticesinrecentdecades, havedoneareasonablygoodjobofidentifyingideologicallyreliablenominees GiventhatbothsidesseemtorealizethestakesofSupremeCourtnominations, itishardtoimaginethattherewillbemanymoreJusticeslikeJusticeKennedy, whowouldsometimesvote“againstparty”inthebiggestcases.

ThisproposalbringsbackthepossibilityofaSupremeCourtthatisnot whollypartisan.Thepermanent,partisan-affiliatedJusticeswouldhavetoagree oncolleagueswhohaveareputationforfairness,independence,andcentrism, andwhohaveviewsthatdonotstrictlytrackpartisanaffiliation:inshort,the kindofjudgeswhohaveaminimalchanceofbeingappointedtotheSupreme Courttoday.ThepermanentJusticeswouldpicksuchcolleaguesnotforpublic-

183. Seesupranotes10-12andaccompanyingtext.

184. See,e.g.,NoMoreSouters,WALL ST.J.(July19,2005,12:01AM),https://www.wsj.com /articles/SB112173866457289093[https://perma.cc/JR43-SWUJ]

regardingreasons,butoutofself-interest.AssumingthatthoseJusticeswant theirownviewstoprevailontheCourt,theywouldhaveanincentivetoveto committedpartisansontheotherside Buteachsidemightbewillingtocompromise(really,togamble)onotherjudgeswhoseemopen-mindedandpersuadable.

RequiringunanimityamongthepermanentJustices—oratleastastrongsupermajority185—iskeytotheselectionmechanism.EvenifoneortwooftheJusticesendedupvotingagainstideological“type,”requiringallormostofthemto agreewouldhelpensurethatcommittedpartisansarenotselectedforthefinal fiveslotsontheCourt.WerecognizethattheJusticesmightnotpickindependent-mindedJusticesforallfiveofthevisitingslots.Perhapsthetwosideswould compromiseonacoupleofmoreideologicallyreliableJustices Butrequiringthe permanentJusticestopickanoddnumberofJusticesmeansthat,atthevery least,theywouldlikelywanttopickonemoderate(oratleastideologicallyunpredictable)Justicewhosevotecouldbreakties.186Ourhope,though,isthat theywouldpickmorethanone.187

ThepermanentJusticeswouldselecttheirvisitingcolleagueswithtwoyears ofleadtime.ThiswouldreducetheriskoftheJusticesbrokeringdealsduring

185 Asupermajorityrequirement,ratherthanaunanimityrule,wouldreducetheriskofapersistentholdoutwhorefusedtoselectanyJustices,thusmakingtheCourtunabletosit Although onemighthopethatthepermanentJusticeswouldhavesomeincentivesnottomakethe Courtpowerless,thatcannotbetakenforgranted SeegenerallyDarylJ.Levinson,EmpireBuildingGovernmentinConstitutionalLaw,118HARV.L.REV.915(2005)(arguingthatpolitical actorsdonotinevitablyseektomaximizethepoweroftheirowninstitutions).Insomeinstances,oneormoreofthepermanentJusticesmightconcludethatmaintainingthestatus quobyrenderingtheCourtpowerlesswouldbepreferabletoselectinganyvisitingJustices. Butthereareotherconsiderationscuttingintheoppositedirection.Givenasymmetricpolarizationinthepoliticalandconstitutionalprocess,itispossiblethattheDemocraticJustices mightsystematicallybemorelikelytocompromiseonchoicesbytheirRepublicancounterparts.SeeFishkin&Pozen,supranote135,at940-42(summarizingpolitical-sciencefindings onasymmetricpolarization) Withthatbackdrop,thecaseforunanimitylooksstronger:it wouldonlytakeoneJusticetoensurethatallarechoosingfairlyStill,weidentifytheoption ofasupermajorityrequirementforthosewhoareparticularlyconcernedaboutputtingeffectivevetopowerinanyoneJustice.

186.Thatoutcomemightseemtorecreatethedynamicsofrecentdecades,withwell-known “swing”JusticeslikeJusticesPowell,O’Connor,andKennedyatthecenteroftheCourt.Yet theBalancedBenchwouldstillcreateanimprovementoverthestatusquo.Forone,anyswing JusticeamongthevisitingJusticeswouldonlybeontheCourtforayear,thusmakingitimpossibleforthatJusticetohaveasweepingimpactonAmericanlawandarelatedcultofpersonality.Moreover,thelargersizeoftheCourtmakesitsomewhatlesslikelythatanyone JusticewouldbetheswingJusticeonmostissues

187 SeesupraSectionIII.A(outliningonereformcriterionaslesseningtheimportanceofindividualJustices).

theselectionprocesstopickcolleaguesbasedontheirexpectationsaboutindividualcasesorissues Forexample,knowingthatagaymarriagecasewasonthe docket,perhapstheDemocraticJusticeswouldacceptagenerallyconservative judgewhohadareputationforvotinginmoreliberaldirectionsonimportant socialissues(like,say,JusticeKennedy).EvenassumingthepermanentJustices hadsuchgranularinformationabouttheirpotentialcolleagues,wethinkdelayingthestartdateofthenewJusticeswouldreducethisrisk.

Oncechosen,theindependentJusticeswouldserveforone-year,nonrenewableterms.Althoughtheprospectofrenewalmightserveasapowerfulincentive forcentrism,wethinkthethreatofnonrenewalwouldunderminetheJustices’ independenceanddamagetheinternaldynamicsofSupremeCourtdecisionmaking Moreover,wethinktherearegoodreasonstohavesomeJusticeswith shortertenures.Asdiscussedabove,themodernCourt,withitsninelife-tenured members,istoodominatedbycultsofpersonality(thinkofthe“Notorious RBG”)andtoofocusedonparticularJustices’idiosyncraticviews(thinkofthe emphasison“Kennedybriefs”inrecentyears).188Addingsomelesswell-known, shorter-term Justices to theCourtwould significantly reducethis problem. TheseJusticesalsocouldintroduceahelpfulperspectivetothebench,withtheir greaterdiversityofeducational,professional,andgeographicbackgrounds,and theirin-the-trenchesexperienceonthelowercourts.189TotheextentthatlongtermserviceontheSupremeCourtchangesone’sperspective,190theseJustices alsowouldnotbeaffectedbythatbias.

Finally, the visiting Justices—and the explicit partisan-balance requirements—wouldsignificantlyreducethestakesofSupremeCourtnominations

188 Seeid.ForanexampleofthecultofpersonalitysurroundingJusticeGinsburg,seeIRINCARMON&SHANAKNIZHNIK,NOTORIOUSRBG:THELIFEANDTIMESOFRUTHBADERGINSBURG (2015).OnKennedybriefs,seeShapiro,supranote137(notingthattheSupremeCourtBar writesbriefs“thatcitehisgreatesthits”inordertotargetJusticeKennedy’svote).Suzanna SherryhasrecentlyarguedthattheproblemwiththeCourtisthefactthatJusticeshavebecomecelebritieswho“playtotheirfanbase.”Hersolutionistoprohibitconcurrences,dissents,andsignedopinions.OpinionswouldsimplystandfortheCourt,withoutevenreferencetothenumberofJusticeswhovotedforthedecision.Sherry,supranote89,at1

189.Cf.StevenG.Calabresi&DavidC.Presser,ReintroducingCircuitRiding:ATimelyProposal,90 MINN.L.REV.1386,1412-15(2006)(arguingthatSupremeCourtJusticesshouldbeonce againrequiredtoridecircuitinordertogetthemmoreexposedto“Americangrassrootsopinion”andtheworkofthelowercourts).

190 TherearemanyreasonswhylongserviceontheCourtmightdistortaJustice’sperspective. Onemechanismthatanumberofcommentatorshaveidentifiedistheso-called“Greenhouse effect,”bywhichSupremeCourtJusticesshifttheirideologyovertimeinresponsetocriticism andpraisefromthemedia Foradiscussion,seeLawrenceBaum&NealDevins,Whythe SupremeCourtCaresAboutElites,NottheAmericanPeople,98GEO.L.J.1515,1574-79(2010).

Becauseeachpoliticalpartywouldholdasetnumberofseats,andbecauseadditionalJusticeswouldjointheCourtnomatterwhat,thefateofissueslikeabortionwouldneverturnonanyoneconfirmationbattle Thisproposalmightexacerbate the politicization of lower-court nominations because the visiting Justiceswouldbedrawnfromthelowercourts.Butasdiscussedabove,thatphenomenonisalreadyhappeningonitsownandislesscauseforalarm.191Moreover,giventheneedforindependent-mindedJusticeswhocouldtemporarilyjoin theSupremeCourt,thesystemmightactuallyincentivizePresidentstoappoint somemoderatesonthelowercourts.

Inordertoreplicatesomeoftheveil-of-ignorancebenefitsprovidedbythe firstproposalwithrespecttothecase-selectionprocess,theCourt’sinternalprocessescouldminimizethevisitingJustices’abilitytopicktheirowncases.For example,thevisitingJusticescouldjointheCourtimmediatelyafterthe“long conference,”inwhichtheCourtvotesonasignificantnumberofcertioraripetitionsthathavebuiltupoverthesummer.

ACourtdesignedasweproposewould,wehope,issuerulingsinbigcases thatwouldnotbepredictablebasedsolelyonpartyaffiliation.Thoserulings wouldhaveagreaterchanceofbeingseenaslegitimatebythepublic.Thus,this planhasachanceofsavingtheimageoftheSupremeCourtasaninstitution abovepolitics—andofpreservingtheimageoflawasadistinctenterprise.

GivenourinterestindivorcingtheCourtfrompartisanpolitics,itisafair questionwhywewouldwanttoexplicitlybuildinpartisanaffiliationtotheselectionofJustices.Firstofall,someonehastoselectthevisitingJustices.Ifwe couldidentifysomeactoringovernmentwhocouldbereliablytrustedtoalways selectJusticeswithoutregardtopartisanaffiliation,wecouldsimplyputthat personontheSupremeCourt.Givenourinabilitytoidentifysuchaperson, however,thebestsolutionistodesignasystemthatcreatesincentivesforpartisangovernmentactorstoselectfornonpartisan(or,perhapsmoreaccurately,less partisan)Justices.

Butthereareotherargumentsforbuildinginsomeformofpartisanbalance. Indeed,EricSegallhasarguedfortheinstitutionofaCourtpermanentlyand evenlydividedalongpartisanandideologicallines.192Hecontendsthatsucha Courtwouldproducenarrower,moreconsensus-baseddecisions;would“re-

191. SeesupraSectionIV.A.1(notingalsothatthegreaternumberandlowerpresscoverageofcircuit-courtnominationsmakeindividualnominationslesscrucial)

192 EricJ.Segall,EightJusticesAreEnough:AProposaltoImprovetheUnitedStatesSupremeCourt, 45PEPP.L.REV.547(2018).

ducetheopportunitiesforfiveormoreJusticestoimposerigidideologicalagendasoverlongperiodsoftime;”andwouldeliminatetheproblemoftheCourt’s ideologyturningonunpredictabledeathsorstrategicallytimedretirements.193

Indeed,ourbriefexperimentwithaCourtevenlydividedalongpartisanand ideologicallinesshowedthattherewassomethingtoSegall’sidea.Whilethe CourtwasunderstaffedformorethanayearafterJusticeScalia’sdeath,theJusticesgenerallystrovetoreachconsensuswherepossible,oftendecidingcaseson narrowergrounds.Infact,theOctober2016Term—inwhichtheCourtwas downaJusticeforalmosttheentireTerm—displayedthemostconsensusamong theJusticesinmorethanseventyyears.194Thatsaid,theexperimentalsorevealeddownsidesofthearrangement.WheretheJusticeswereunabletoreach agreement—inthemostideologicalcaseswiththehigheststakes—theCourtwas leftpowerlesstomakelaw,andthecourtsofappealseffectivelybecametheSupremeCourt.195 Forthisreason,aproposalforapermanent,equallydivided Courtwouldneedtobeaccompaniedbyasetofotherwide-rangingreforms, suchasdifferentrulesabouttheconsequencesofadeadlock.196

193. Id.at550.

194 SeeAdamLiptak,ACautiousSupremeCourtSetsaModernRecordforConsensus,N.Y.TIMES (June 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/27/us/politics/supreme-court-term -consensus.html[https://perma.cc/26ME-HWVK]

195 ThishappenedinTexasv.UnitedStates,809F.3d134(5thCir 2015),aff’dbyanequallydivided court,136S.Ct.2271(2016)(mem.)(percuriam),regardingtheconstitutionalityofPresident Obama’sDeferredActionforParentsofAmericansandLawfulPermanentResidents(DAPA) program—whichgrantedtemporaryworkauthorizationstocertainundocumentedimmigrantswhoweretheparentsofU.S.citizensorlegalpermanentresidents.There,theJustices’ evensplitallowedtheFifthCircuit’senjoinmentoftheprogramtostand Asimilarresultwith theoppositeideologicalvalenceoccurredinFriedrichsv.CaliforniaTeachersAss’n,No.1357095,2014WL10076847(9thCir.Nov.18,2014),aff’dbyanequallydividedcourt,136S.Ct. 1083(2016)(mem.)(percuriam),whichinvolvedaconstitutionalchallengetorulesrequiring nonunionmemberstopayforcollective-bargainingexpensesbyunionsdesignatedastheexclusivebargainingrepresentative.TheNinthCircuit,relyingonSupremeCourtprecedent, hadrejectedthechallenge.TheSupremeCourtsplit4-4,leavingtheNinthCircuit’srulingin place.Twoyearslater,whenJusticeGorsuchhadjoinedtheCourt,theJusticesoverturned precedentanddeclaredsucharrangementsunconstitutional.Janusv.Am.Fed’nofState,Cty., &Mun.Emps.,138S.Ct.2448(2018).

196 Whereascurrentlawgiveslowercourtsthepowertosetthestatusquo—anequallydivided Courtresultsinautomaticaffirmanceofthejudgmentbelow—onecouldimaginesettingdifferentdefaultrules.Forexample,thelawmightprovidethatanequallydividedCourthasthe effectofoverturninganyjudgmentthatstrikesdownanactofCongress,asawaytobuildin slightlymoredeference.AnothervariantmightprovidethatiftheSupremeCourtcannot reachasupermajority,theactofCongressstands,regardlessofthelowercourtdecision Dependingonthedesignoftheserules,aproposalforapermanenteight-memberCourtmight needtobeaccompaniedbylimitsontheabilityoflowercourtstoissueso-called“nationwide” or“universal”injunctions,astheyletindividualcircuitseffectivelysetthelawfortheentire

Butevenifimplementedappropriately,anevenlydividedCourtwouldnot solveoneofthemostsignificantproblemswehopetoaddress:thewidespread perceptionthattheSupremeCourtissimplyonemorepoliticalinstitution, wherevotesinthebiggestcasesturnonpartyaffiliation.Indeed,adoptingexplicitpartisan-balancerequirementswithoutmakingadditionalchangeswould onlyexacerbatethisperception.Forthisreason,havingthepermanentJustices selectadditionalJusticestojointheCourtiscriticaltotheproposal’ssuccess.

WhilehavingJusticeschoosetheircolleaguesmightinitiallyseemstrange, thisproposalresemblesthewaycivilarbitrationoftenworks.Undermanybilateralarbitrationagreements,thetwosideseachselectonearbitrator.Thetwo party-chosenarbitratorsthenagreecollectivelyonathird,neutralarbitrator.Indeed,suchprovisionsdatebacktoatleastthelateeighteenthcentury.197Their continuedandwidespreaduselikelyreflectstheviewthatthismethodiseffective atprocuringunbiasedandfairdecision-makers—or,perhapsbetterstated,decision-makerswhowillappearunbiasedandfairtobothsides.

Commercialarbitrationhasmanydisanalogieswithdemocraticpolitics,to besure.Evenso,thereareimportantreasonstocareaboutdesigningprocedures thattheeventualloserscanlivewith.Aconcernforappearanceisanimportant reasonwhywethinkitisnecessarytoincorporatepartisan-affiliatedJusticesinto thedecision-makingprocess.Theirpresenceensuresthatbothsides’bestargumentswillbeairedandconsidered.Thus,theywillhelpensurethatthelosing sidefeelsthatthedecision-makingprocesswasfair,evenifitdidnotyieldits desiredoutcome 198TheresultwouldbeaCourtthatdidnotalwaysvotealong strictlypartisanlines,butalsooneinwhichbothsides’interestswerewellrepresentedindecision-making.WethinksuchaCourtwouldhaveanexcellent chanceofpreservingpubliclegitimacy.

Oneotherobjectionconcernsourproposal’semphasisonpartisanbalance. WhyshouldtheCourt’sdesignevenlybalancethetwoparties(andthustheir

country.Forarecentdiscussionofnationwideinjunctions,seeSamuelL.Bray,MultipleChancellors:ReformingtheNationalInjunction,131HARV.L.REV.417(2017).

197 SeeBrianWinn&EarlDavis,ArbitrationofReinsuranceDisputes:IsThereaBetterWay?,DISP RESOL.J.,Aug.-Oct.2004,at22(notinga1793insurancecontractwhichprovidedthat“ifany DisputeshouldariserelatingtotheLossonthisPolicy;itshallbereferredtotwoindifferent Persons,onetobechosenbytheAssured,theotherbytheAssurer,whoshallhavefullPower toadjustthesame;butincasetheycannotagree,thensuchtwopersonsshallchooseathird; andanytwoofthemagreeing,shallbeobligatorytobothparties”).

198 Cf ChiaraGiorgetti,WhoDecidesWhoDecidesinInternationalInvestmentArbitration?,35 U.PA.J.INT’LL.431,443(2014)(“Fortheparties[toanarbitration],havingasayindeciding theircase[bychoosingoneofthearbitrators]isbothappealingandreassuring,andstrengthenstheirsupporttotheentireprocess.”).

respectivejudicialideologies)nomatterwhat,insteadofallowingformorevariabilitybasedontheresultsofthepoliticalprocess?Wehaveacoupleresponses. First,asacomparativematter,wethinkourproposalwouldbeanimprovement overthestatusquo.Overthelasthalf-century,Democratshavecontrolledthe Presidencyfortwentyoutoffiftyyears,buthaveappointedonlyfourJustices; Republicanshaveappointed fourteen (fifteen if youcountmovingWilliam RehnquistfromAssociateJusticetoChiefJustice).199Thatskewhasbeenthe resultofdeaths,strategicallytimedretirements,andotherfactors.TheBalanced Benchwouldmakeeachparty’spowerovertheCourtmoreregularandpredictable,andmaketheCourt’smembershipmuchlesscontestedinelectoralpolitics.

Ourproposalwouldnot,however,takeintoconsiderationalongstringof politicalvictories DemocratscontrolledthePresidencyfrom1933to1949;duringthistime,PresidentsFranklinRooseveltandHarryTrumanappointedthirteenJusticestotheCourt.UndertheBalancedBench,theCourt’spartisancompositionwouldhavelookedexactlythesameatthebeginningoftheirtenureas itdidattheend.WoulditbefairtohaveanevenlydividedSupremeCourtafter somanyyearsofcontrolbyoneparty?

Weofferafewpointsinresponse.First,regardlessofwhichpartywinspresidentialelections,itisstillpossiblethatthecountryasawholemightbecloseto-evenlydividedalongpartisanlines.Ifso,apartisan-balancerequirement wouldbemoredemocraticthanitmightappear.Indeed,givenalltheforcesthat shapetheresultsofpresidentialelections,itisfarfromclearwhythepartyidentificationofthePresidentaloneisthebestproxyforthedemocraticpreferences ofthecountrywhenitcomestotheSupremeCourt.Second,totheextentthere isconcernaboutunfairness,lower-courtjudgeswouldbeselectedbypresidents undertheordinaryprocedures;inaRoosevelt-Trumanscenario,thepoolfrom whichthevisitingJusticesareselectedwouldskewconsiderablytowardthe Democraticside.

Moreover,ourproposalisfocusedonpublicperception,andanevenlydividedCourthasthebestchanceofsolvingacrisisthathasbitterlydividedthe country.Whilesuchaproposalmightseeminconsistentwithbasicdemocratic principles,thereisalongtraditionofdeviatingfromsimplemajoritarianismin designinghowpowerwillbedistributedingovernmentalinstitutions.Inour ownconstitutionalsystem,theSenateandElectoralCollegewerenecessarycompromisestosatisfysmallerstatesduringthedraftingoftheConstitution.200 Manyothercountrieshaveadoptedformsof“consociationalism,”inwhichthe

199 SupremeCourtNominations,Present-1789,U.S.SENATE,https://www.senate.gov/pagelayout /reference/nominations/Nominations.shtml[https://perma.cc/FDW9-RPBX].

200.SeeKLARMAN,supranote163,at182-205,230-32.

constitutionisexplicitlydesignedtosharepoweramongreligious,regional,or ethnicinterestsinordertoprotectminoritygroupsandtocreatestability201DividingpowerontheSupremeCourtalongpartylineswouldbeawaytoimplementthisstrategyinordertokeep“redAmerica”and“blueAmerica”fromtearingeachotherapart.

Finally,totheextentthatcriticsmighthaveconcernoverthisproposal’s seemingtendencytopermittheminoritytogovernthemajority(withthehelp ofthevisitingJustices),onesolutionwouldbetopairthisreformwiththesupermajorityvotingroleconsideredabove.

2. TheConstitutionalityoftheBalancedBench

AswiththeSupremeCourtLottery,thisproposalwouldbesubjecttosome significantconstitutionalobjections.Again,wethinkthereareplausibleresponses.Someoftheobjectionsoverlapwithconstitutionalargumentsagainst theSupremeCourtLottery—inparticular,theargumentthatitwouldbeimpermissibleforjudgestoservebothascircuitcourtjudgesandasSupremeCourt Justices202—sowedonotrepeatthemhere

a. AppointmentsClauseChallenges

TheAppointmentsClauseprovidesthatthePresident

shallnominate,andbyandwiththeAdviceandConsentoftheSenate, shallappoint...JudgesofthesupremeCourt,andallotherOfficersof theUnitedStates,whoseAppointmentsarenothereinotherwiseprovidedfor,andwhichshallbeestablishedbyLaw:buttheCongressmay byLawvesttheAppointmentofsuchinferiorOfficers,astheythink proper,inthePresidentalone,intheCourtsofLaw,orintheHeadsof Departments 203

Underourproposal,someoftheJusticeswouldbeselectedbyotherJustices,an arrangementthatispermissiblefor“inferiorOfficers”butnotforso-called “principal”officers—andexplicitlynotfor“JudgesofthesupremeCourt.”UnderastraightforwardreadingoftheClause,thisproposalthusseemsunconstitutional.

201 SeeARENDLIJPHART,DEMOCRACYINPLURALSOCIETIES:ACOMPARATIVEEXPLORATION(1977).

202 SeesupraSectionIV.A.2.a

203.U.S.CONST.art.II,§2,cl.2.

Asithappens,however,existinglawandpracticepermitsignificantflexibilityinthemovementofArticleIIIjudgeswithinthefederaljudiciary.District judgesregularlysitbydesignationoncircuitcourts;circuitjudgesregularlysit bydesignationondistrictcourtsorothercircuits;204andretiredSupremeCourt Justicesregularlysitbydesignationoncourtsofappeals.205JusticeSouter,for example,oftensitswiththeFirstCircuit,onwhichhebrieflyservedasajudge beforejoiningtheSupremeCourt.206WhenjudgessitbydesignationondifferentArticleIIIcourts,theyarenotnewlynominatedbythePresidentandconfirmedbytheSenate.Instead,theyaredesignatedbythechiefjudgeofthecircuit inwhichtheyarevisiting,orinsomeinstancestheChiefJustice.207Theirinitial President-and-Senateappointmentseemstobesufficient.208

Ourproposalfunctionssimilarly,lettingSupremeCourtJusticesinvitelower courtjudgestositwiththemforlimitedperiods Ifthereisaproblemwithour proposal,thenthereareseriousproblemswiththesewidespreadpracticesinthe lowercourts.Somehave,tobesure,criticizedthestatusquo.StrasandScott,

204.SeeMarinK.Levy,JudgingJusticeonAppeal,123YALEL.J.2386,2415(2014)(notingtheregularityoftheparticipationofvisitingjudgesinthecourtsofappeals).Foranin-depthanalysis oftheuseofvisitingjudges,seeLevy,supranote160.

205.SeeE.JonA.Gryskiewicz,TheSemi-RetirementofSeniorSupremeCourtJustices:Examining TheirServiceontheCourtsofAppeals,11SETONHALLCIR REV 285,287(2015)(“Elevenofthe thirty-eight[JusticeswhobecameeligibletoretirefromtheSupremeCourtandsitbydesignationonlowercourts]havedoneso.”).

206 MichelleOlson,JusticeSouter:WorkinginReverse,byChoice,APP DAILY(Feb 27,2013,8:22 AM), http://www.appellatedaily.blogspot.com/2013/02/justice-souter-working-in-reverse -by.html[https://perma.cc/NP8C-5GJ2].

207 See28U.S.C.§291(a)(2018)(“TheChiefJusticeoftheUnitedStatesmay,inthepublicinterest,designateandassigntemporarilyanycircuitjudgetoactascircuitjudgeinanother circuituponrequestbythechiefjudgeorcircuitjusticeofsuchcircuit.”);id.§291(b)(“The chiefjudgeofacircuitorthecircuitjusticemay,inthepublicinterest,designateandassign temporarilyanycircuitjudgewithinthecircuit,includingajudgedesignatedandassignedto temporarydutytherein,toholdadistrictcourtinanydistrictwithinthecircuit.”);id §292(a) (“Thechiefjudgeofacircuitmaydesignateandassignoneormoredistrictjudgeswithinthe circuittosituponthecourtofappealsoradivisionthereofwheneverthebusinessofthatcourt sorequires.”).Designationsalsorequiretheconsentofthechiefjudgeofthevisitingjudge’s homecircuit.Seeid.§295(“Nodesignationandassignmentofacircuitordistrictjudgein activeserviceshallbemadewithouttheconsentofthechiefjudgeorjudicialcouncilofthe circuitfromwhichthejudgeistobedesignatedandassigned.”).

208 Althoughtheconstitutionaltextdoesnotmakeitexplicit,ithaslongbeenthoughtthatlowercourtjudgesarealsoprincipalofficersrequiringpresidentialnominationandSenateconfirmation SeeWeissv.UnitedStates,510U.S.163,191n.7(1994)(Souter,J.,concurring)(observingthat“fromtheearlydaysoftheRepublic‘[t]hepracticalconstructionhasuniformly beenthat[judgesoftheinferiorcourts]arenot...inferiorofficers,’andIdoubtmanytoday woulddisagree”(quoting3JOSEPHSTORY,COMMENTARIESONTHECONSTITUTIONOFTHE UNITEDSTATES456n.1(1833)(alterationsinoriginal)).

forexample,arguethatseniorjudges—whoregularlysitbydesignationonother courts—violatetheAppointmentsClause,andmustinsteadbeseparatelyappointedandconfirmedtothedistinctofficeof“seniorjudge.”209Thusfar,such argumentsseemtohavefallenondeafearsinboththejudiciaryandCongress.

Thereisevenprecedentforacourtbeingentirelycomprisedofjudgeschosen byaSupremeCourtJustice.UndertheForeignIntelligenceSurveillanceActof 1978,theChiefJusticeoftheUnitedStatesdesignates:

11districtcourtjudgesfromatleastsevenoftheUnitedStatesjudicial circuitsofwhomnofewerthan3shallresidewithin20milesoftheDistrictofColumbiawhoshallconstituteacourtwhichshallhavejurisdictiontohearapplicationsforandgrantordersapprovingelectronicsurveillanceanywherewithintheUnitedStates....210

The judges of this court—the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC)—areArticleIIIjudges,buttheyarenotformallynominatedbythePresidentorconfirmedbytheSenatetoserveintheirdualrolesasFISCjudges.AppointmentbytheChiefJusticeisapparentlysufficient.TheChiefJusticehas similarpowertochoosethreejudgestoconstituteanappellatecourtthatreviews thedecisionsoftheFISC.211

WethinkitwouldbesimilarlypermissiblefortheJusticestochooseadditionalArticleIIIjudgestovisittheSupremeCourt.WealsonotethattheAppointmentsClausechallengecouldfurtherbereducedbyadoptingthestrategy endorsedinourfirstproposal—formallyappointallcircuitjudgesasSupreme CourtJustices.Thatapproachwouldeliminatetheobjectionthattheadditional JusticesneededtobenominatedandconfirmedasJusticesoftheSupremeCourt.

b. Partisan-BalanceRequirements

Anotherobjectioncouldberaisedtoourproposal’sexplicitinclusionofpartisan-balancerequirements.WouldrequiringthatthePresidentappointJustices ofparticularpartiesunconstitutionallylimitherappointmentpowerorotherwiseviolatetheConstitution?Ifso,awiderangeofwell-establishedpractices

209.DavidR.Stras&RyanW.Scott,AreSeniorJudgesUnconstitutional?,92CORNELLL.REV.453, 516-18(2007).

210 50U.S.C.§1803(a)(1)(2018).

211 Id §1803(b)(“TheChiefJusticeshallpubliclydesignatethreejudges,oneofwhomshallbe publiclydesignatedasthepresidingjudge,fromtheUnitedStatesdistrictcourtsorcourtsof appealswhotogethershallcompriseacourtofreviewwhichshallhavejurisdictiontoreview thedenialofanyapplicationmadeunderthischapter.”).

wouldbecalledintoquestion Similarrequirementsfirstappearedinthenineteenthcentury.212Therearenowdozensofagencieswithsomeformofpartisanbalancerequirement 213Presidentshavelargelyacquiescedtosuchrequirements formanydecades,andthecourtshaveneverheldthattheyareunconstitutional.214

Typicalpartisan-balancerequirementsdonotexplicitlystatethatparticular seatsbelongtoDemocratsorRepublicans,butinsteadstatethatnomorethana setnumberofmemberscancomefromthesamepoliticalparty—effectivelyforcingthePresidenttochoosemembersoftheotherparty(orindependents)for theremainingpositions.BrianFeinsteinandDanielHemelarguethatsuchrequirementshavemore“bite”todaythantheyoncedid,asincreasingpartisan polarizationhasmeantthatcross-partyappointeesaremorelikelytohaveideologiesthatstronglydivergefromtheirappointingPresident’s.215Whileinearlier periodsitwaseasierforPresidentstofindmoremoderateoppositepartymemberstoappoint,thatislesstruetoday.

WhenitcomestoappointingSupremeCourtJustices,itisnotclearthata merelimitonthenumberofsame-partyappointeesontheCourtwouldbesufficient.Giventhestakes,onemightexpectsomenumberofqualifiedbuthighly ideologicaljudicialnomineestosimplychangetheirpartyallegiancetoindependent(orsay,Libertarian)inordertoimprovetheirchancesofbeingselected. Arelatedpieceofgamesmanshipoccurredintheearly2000sontheU.S.CommissiononCivilRights,“whentwoRepublicanmembersoftheCommission changedtheirregistrationtoindependent.TheirswitchesallowedPresident GeorgeW.BushtonametwoadditionalRepublicanstothecommission,bringingthenumberofRepublicanorrecentlyRepublicanmembersofthepanelto six[outofeightmembers].”216

Forthisreason,itmightbenecessarytoimposefurtherconstraintsonpresidentialdecision-making.Onecouldimaginedraftingthestatutetoexplicitly specifythatparticularseatsmustbefilledbymembersofparticularparties.That mightnotbeenoughtopreventgamesmanship,however,assomepotential nomineesmightjustofficiallyjointheopposingpartyinordertomaintaineligibility.Federaljudgesorcandidatesforjudgeshipsoftenalsorefusepartymembershipinordertoretaintheperceptionofneutrality;requiringmembership

212 BrianD.Feinstein&DanielHemel,PartisanBalancewithBite,118COLUM L.REV 9,17(2018).

213. SeeRonaldJ.Krotoszynskietal.,PartisanBalanceRequirementsintheAgeofNewFormalism, 90NOTREDAMEL.REV.941,1009-15tbl.1(2015).

214 SeeFeinstein&Hemel,supranote212,at21-22

215 Seeid at14

216. Id.at21.

wouldunderminethatnorm Moreover,thisapproachmightevenraiseconstitutionalconcerns Recently,theThirdCircuitstruckdownaDelawareconstitutionalprovisionwhichrequiredpartisanbalanceinthestatecourtsystem.217 ThecourtfoundthattheprovisionviolatedtheFirstAmendmentbecauseitprecludedstateresidentswhowerenotmembersofthetwomajorpoliticalparties frombecomingcandidatesforjudicialoffice,therebylimitingtheirassociational freedom.218WhiletheThirdCircuit’sdecisionisnotself-evidentlycorrect,it suggeststhatasystemthatexplicitlymandatedmembershipinparticularparties wouldbeproblematic.

Thereare,however,othersolutionsthatmightaccomplishthesamegoal withoutrequiringthatthenomineesthemselvesbepartymembers.Oneoption wouldbetorequirethePresidenttochoosenomineesforsomeoftheseatsfrom alistpreparedbySenateleadershipoftheoppositepartyorbysomekindof bipartisancommission Sucharestrictiononpresidentialpowerwouldnodoubt besubjecttochallenge,buttherearesomeanalogiesinexistingpractice.Under DistrictofColumbialaw,thePresidentmustselectjudicialnomineestotheD.C. courtsystemfromalistpreparedbythemultimemberDistrictofColumbiaJudicialNominationCommission.219Despitesignificantgroundsforpossibleconstitutionalobjection,220Presidentsofbothpartieshavegenerallyabidedbythis system’srequirementsratherthanpickingalegalfight.221

217 Adamsv.GovernorofDel.,914F.3d827(3dCir2019).Therelevantconstitutionalprovision governingtheDelawareSupremeCourtdictatedthat“threeofthefiveJusticesoftheSupreme Courtinofficeatthesametime,shallbeofonemajorpoliticalparty,andtwoofsaidJustices shallbeoftheothermajorpoliticalparty.”DEL CONST art.IV,§3 ForanargumentanticipatingtheThirdCircuit’sdecision,seeJoelEdanFriedlander,IsDelaware’s“OtherMajorPoliticalParty”ReallyEntitledtoHalfofDelaware’sJudiciary?,58ARIZ L.REV 1139,1139(2016).

218 Adams,914F.3dat843

219. D.C.CODEANN.§1-204.33(West2001).

220.ThemostobviousobjectionconcernstheAppointmentsClause.BylimitingthePresident’s powertonominatewhomevershewishestoafederaloffice,suchalawmightimpermissibly encroachontheseparationofpowers.See,e.g.,Note,CongressionalRestrictionsonthePresident’s AppointmentPowerandtheRoleofLongstandingPracticeinConstitutionalInterpretation,120 HARV.L.REV.1914,1919(2007)(suggestingthat“thereisstrongevidencethattheoriginal understandingoftheAppointmentsClausegrantsthePresidentplenaryappointmentpower contingentonlyonSenateconfirmation”).

221. PresidentTrumprecentlyselectedanomineefortheD.C.CourtofAppeals,JoshuaDeahl, fromalistpreparedbytheCommission SeeJNCRecommendsCandidatesforDCCourtofAppealsVacancy,JUD NOMINATIONCOMMISSION(May10,2017),https://jnc.dc.gov/release/jnc -recommends-candidates-dc-court-appeals-vacancy [https://perma.cc/GY2X-L5EP]; Seven NominationsSenttotheSenate,WHITEHOUSE(May2,2019),https://www.whitehouse.gov /presidential-actions/seven-nominations-sent-senate-2[https://perma.cc/NP4H-ZZ7A].

Thestakesarehigherhere,andthusthereissurelyagreaterchancethatthese kindsofrestrictionswouldbechallenged.Theexampleproves,however,thatit isatleastpossibletoreachasettlementthatbothsidescanlivewitheveninthe faceofsomeconstitutionalobjections.Moreover,despitetheoccasionalgamesmanshipdiscussedabove,thepartisan-balancerequirementsusedbyfederal agenciesseemtobelargelyhonoredbyPresidentsofbothparties—eventhough therulescouldbemanipulatedmorefrequently.Bothsidescanabidebyasystem thatbenefitsthemequallyovertime,ratherthanfightingtoothandnailinthe shortterm.Itisourhopethatsuchasettlementispossiblehere,ifbothsides couldbeconvincedthatthissystemisbetterthantheopenpartisanwarfareinto whichourcurrentsystemisdegenerating.

Indeed,themostconstitutionallypracticalsolutionwouldbeonethatdid notdependonformallyenshriningpartisanbalance,butwhichdependedsolely oninformalagreementsandunwrittennormsamongpartyleaders.Imagine,for example,asysteminwhichtheSenateMajorityandMinorityLeadersinformally hadtoagreeonwhichnomineeswouldbeacceptableforthetenpermanentseats. OneexampleispresentedbytheFederalElectionCommission(FEC),whose statutemandatesthatnomorethanthreeofitssixcommissionersmaycome fromthesamepoliticalparty.222Inpractice,“themajorityandminorityparty leadersinbothchambersofCongresstaketurnssendingtothePresidentthe namesofcandidatesthattheywantappointedtotheFEC.”223Thisexamplesuggeststhepossibilityofsomeinformalagreementaboutthepartisanbreakdown ofJustices.Ofcourse,theFECitselfmaynotpresentagoodmodeltoemulate, asitisaninstitutionthathasbeensubjecttofiercepartisancontestationand dysfunctioninrecentyears.224Asthisexampleshows,informalnormscanbreak downinthefaceofpartisanconflict.Recentexperiencesuggeststhatiscertainly truewhenitcomestotheSupremeCourtnominationsprocess.

conclusion

TheSupremeCourtmaysoonfaceaprofoundlegitimacycrisis.InthisFeature,wehaveofferedtwodifferentproposalsthatcouldsavetheSupremeCourt fromthatfate.Neitherisperfect;eachwouldfailtoaddresssomeoftheproblemswiththewaytheSupremeCourtcurrentlyoperates.Weareconfident,

222 52U.S.C.§30106(2018)(“Nomorethan3membersoftheCommissionappointedunder thisparagraphmaybeaffiliatedwiththesamepoliticalparty.”)

223. JaminB.Raskin,“AComplicatedandIndirectEncroachment”:IstheFederalElectionCommission UnconstitutionallyComposed?,52ADMIN L.REV 609,615(2000).

224 See,e.g,DanielI.Weiner,FixingtheFEC:AnAgendaforReform,BRENNANCTR FORJUST 36 (2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/2019 04_FECV _Final.pdf[https://perma.cc/VA22-X9AM](discussingpartisangridlockattheFEC)

however,thateitherproposalwouldbeanimprovementoverthestatusquo— especiallygivenhowweexpectouralready-brokensystemtodeteriorateeven furtherinthenearterm Theseproposalshavethepotentialtohelpcleanupthe toxicconfirmationprocessandreducethetemperatureofSupremeCourtpolitics.Andtheyhaveachanceofpreventingaprofoundlegitimacycrisisthatcould underminepublicconfidenceintheenterpriseoflaw.

Eitherproposalcouldbetakenasablueprintforreformonitsown,orcomponentsofeachcouldbecombinedinsomewayasamodelforchange.But whetherourparticularproposalsareadopted,inwholeorinpart,islessimportantthanrecognizingtheneedforsomekindofreformtotheCourt’sstructure—andthegoalsthatreformmustmeettobesuccessfulandstable.Reform thatdoesn’taddressthecorelegitimacychallengestheCourtfaceswill,likethe statusquo,becomeincreasinglyuntenable RadicallychangingtheSupreme CourtisnecessaryifwehopetopreservewhatisgoodabouttheCourt.