On Eberhard Jungel's Heideggerian Ontology

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ReadingHeideggerthroughtheCross

OnEberhardJüngel’sHeideggerianOntology

AbstractThisarticleisconcernedwithhowaparticularconceptofontology switchedfromtheistictoatheistictotheisticagainduetotheinfluencesanddisciplesofMartinHeidegger.ItisagreedthatHeideggertookaspectsofChristian thought,namelyfromAugustineofHippo,MartinLuther,andSørenKierkegaard, strippingthemoftheirrelationtoGodandinsteadorientatingthemtonothingness.DespiteHeidegger’smethodologicalatheism,hisontologywastakenupby anumberoftheologianssuchasErnstFuchsandRudolfBultmann,whointheir turninfluencedEberhardJüngel,whointurnmentionedthedirectinfluencethat Heideggerhasonhisthought.WhilstJüngelacknowledgeshisdebtstoHeideggerintheareaofontology,JüngelalsoseekstoincorporatethehistoryofGod intoontology,wherethehistoryofGodasTrinityisdefinedbythepassivityof Christonthecross,andhowthateventredefinesevil’sworkinnothingness.This articleinitiallyexploreshowHeideggerformulatedhisaccountofontology,then exploreshowJüngelre-ChristianizedHeidegger’sontology;evaluatingwhatcan bedrawnfromtheseshiftsabouttherelationshipbetweenontologyandhistory.

Keywordsauthenticity;Heidegger,Martin;Jüngel,Eberhard;nothingness; ontology;theologyofthecross

ThisworkwasabletobecompletedthankstothesponsorshipoftheArtsandHumanitiesResearch Council,UK.

✍DeborahCasewell,King’sCollege,DepartmentofTheologyandReligiousStudies,VirginiaWoolfBuilding,22Kingsway,LondonWC2B6LE, UnitedKindgom ��deborah.casewell@kcl.ac.uk

©ForumPhilosophicum21(2016)no.1,95–114

Subm.2December2015Acc.5September2016 Issn1426-1898e-Issn2353-7043 Doi:10.5840/forphil20162116

DespiteHeidegger’sownhostilityandambivalencetotheologyandthe useofGod,hisworkbestridesphilosophyandtheologyinthetwentieth century.TheinfluencethatHeideggerhasontheologyhasbeendeeply studied,bothinhistimeandsince,andinaremarkablyecumenicalmove, histhoughthasbeentakenupbybothCatholicandProtestantthinkers. ThefocusofthisstudywillbeonaparticularstrandofProtestantengagementwithHeidegger,inparticularhowhisaccountofbeinginforms EberhardJüngel’scruciformtheology.¹ItwillarguethatHeidegger’saccountsofauthenticityandnothingnessaretakenfromChristianthought, butde-ChristianizedinhowtheyarenolongergroundedinGodbutinsteadgroundDasein.ThroughanexplorationofJüngel’sthought,itwill arguethatJüngel’saccountofhumanauthenticityandnothingnessare formulatedastheyareinresponsetoHeidegger’sontology.However,it shallbeshownthatHeideggerisnottheonlyinfluenceonJüngel’sontology,asitshallbeshownthatJüngel’sre-ChristianizationofHeidegger’s ontologyisirrevocablylinkedtothetimeinwhichhewaswriting;atime wherequestionsofhumansufferingandGod’sreactiontothatprompted atheologythatfocusedonthecross.TheeffectsthatJüngel’stheology ofthecrosshasonhisunderstandingofhumanpersonhoodwillbeexplored,andthetensionbetweenhumananddivinepersonhoodwillbe morefullyexplicated.

ThisarticlewillfirstexpoundtheChristianoriginsofHeidegger’saccountofbeing.ItshallthenexplorehowJüngelhimselftakesonandacknowledgestheinfluencesofHeideggerinhisownwork.Fromthere,the basisofJüngel’stheologyofthecrossshallbeillustrated,andtheimpact thatithasonhumanpersonhoodwillbeexplored.Finally,thelinkbetweentheologyandhistoricalcontextforbothHeideggerandJüngelwill beinvestigated,andconclusionsdrawn.

1.TheinfluenceofHeideggeronJüngelhasbeennoted.ThereisRolandDanielZimany’s explorationoftheimportanceofHeideggerforJüngelinVehicleforGod:TheMetaphorical TheologyofEberhardJüngel(Macon,GA:MercerUniversityPress,1994),whichfollows onfromhisdoctoralthesis“EberhardJüngel’sSynthesisofBarthandHeidegger”(unpublishedPhDdiss.,DukeUniversity,1980).Jüngel’suseofHeideggerisalsonotedbyMarkC. Mattesin“TowardsDivineRelationality:EberhardJüngel’sNewTrinitarian,PostmetaphysicalApproach”(unpublishedPhDdiss.,UniversityofChicago,1995)andbyArnold Neufeldt-Fastin“EberhardJüngel’sTheologicalAnthropologyinLightofhisChristology” (unpublishedPhDdiss.,UniversityofSt.Michael’sCollege,Toronto,1996).However,these studiestendtofocusonhowJüngelincorporatedthelaterHeidegger’saccountoflanguage inhistheology,ratherthanhowhisontologyisaninversionofHeidegger’s,andassuch, deeplyreliantnotonlyonthemovesthatHeideggermakesbutonhowHeideggerhimself wasinfluencedbyAugustine,Luther,andKierkegaard.

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Heidegger’sAccountofDaseinasChristianinOrigin

ThespecificallyChristianbasisforHeidegger’sthoughtisdetermined throughstudyofbothBeingandTimeandofhis1920–1921lectureseries, thePhenomenologyofReligiousLife.InthePhenomenologyofReligious Life,HeideggerlooksatearlyChristianwriterstofindoutthekindof existencethatChristianlifecallsoneto.Thisworkcontainsstrandsthat reappearinhislaterwork,suchasthelimitoftemporalityasthehorizonofhumanlifeandHeidegger’sunderstandingofthepowerofthe languageofaddressinhow“throughthecompletionoftheexplication, thatwhichisexplicatedbecomesapparentlyindependent,releasedfrom itsenactment.”²HeideggerfocuseslargelyonChristianfiguresinthese lectures,namelyonAugustine,SaintPaul,andLuther.Theselecturesare seentohaveshapedhisownwritinginBeingandTime,whereHeidegger makespositiveandfrequentreferencestoAugustine,aswellasmaking mentionofLutherandKierkegaard.Inwoodlaysouttheimportanceof thesethinkersandtheselecturesforHeidegger,inthat

Heidegger’saccountofresolutenessiscoloredbyhisstudyoftheconversionsofStPaul,StAugustine,andMartinLuther.Paulisinthesameworld afterseeingthelightontheroadtoDamascusashewasbefore,buteverythinglooksdifferent.ResolutenessconfersonDasein’sdecisionafateful necessitydespitethenullityofitsprojection:Luthersaysnot“perhapsthis iswhatIshoulddo”,but“hereIstand;Icannotdootherwise.”Inresoluteness Daseinpullsitselftogetheraswellasopensitselfup.³

HoweveritisinBeingandTimethatHeideggeroutlineshisowndistinctivethought.Heideggerwishestoapproachthequestionofbeinganew, tofindoutwhatitmeanstoexistratherthantoascertainwhatexistsin awaythatabstractsbeingfromeverydaylivedexperience.HesoughtinsteadtodetermineBeingfrombeings.Heseesthattherearethingswe canknowaboutbeingwithoutexaminingthenatureofbeing,⁴butBeing

2.MartinHeidegger,PhänomenologiedesReligiösenLebens,editedbyMatthiasJung, ThomasRegehlyandClaudiusStrube,vol.60ofGesamtausgabe(FrankfurtamMain:Klostermann,1995),85;translatedbyMatthiasFritschandJenniferAnnaGosetti-Ferenceias ThePhenomenologyofReligiousLife(Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress,2010),59. HereafterGesamtausgabewillbecitedasGA,followedbythevolumenumberandthe pagenumber;pagereferencesinbracesrefertotranslation.

3.MichaelInwood,Heidegger(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1997),73.

4.“OnecandeterminethenatureofentitiesintheirBeingwithoutnecessarilyhaving theexplicitconceptofthemeaningofBeingatone’sdisposal”MartinHeidegger,Being

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isalwaysgroundedinanentity,⁵andisnotsomethingbeyondhumanity orentitiesthatisconstantandwaitingtobediscovered.Todescribethis kindofexistenceHeideggerintroducestheconceptofDaseinasaword forthemodeofexistenceofhumans;existencethatisdeeplycontextual.

Inordertopositthisnewunderstandingofbeing,Heideggerseesthat hemustfirstdestroythehistoryofontology.HeideggersawthatDescartes’formulationofthecogitoergosumdestabilized,ratherthanstabilized,Being.⁶Insteadofdoingwhathesawpreviousmetaphysicsdid, whereitseparatedBeingfromeveryday,livedexistencetherebymaking itinaccessible,⁷HeideggergoesbacktotheGreekphilosophyindefining aslivingBeingthathasthecapacityfordiscourse,andforHeideggerdiscourseletssomethingbeseen.Aslanguageinvolveslisteningitisthus relational.⁸HeideggerunderstoodthatearlyGreekphilosophyletbeing beandletitrevealitselfinamomentofclearingratherthandetermining itfromoutsideofhumanexistence.Instead,theyletbeingexpressitself asitselfwithintheactofexistence.

Heideggerseesthat“theessenceofDaseinliesinitsexistence.”⁹HeideggerseesthattheexistenceofDaseinisthatofbeingfacedwithmyriad possibilitiesandchoosingthem,and“becauseDaseinisineachcaseessentiallyitsownpossibility,itcan,initsveryBeing,‘choose’itselfand winitself;itcanalsoloseitselfandneverwinitself;oronly“seem”todo so”(SZ,42[68]).Daseinisthusprimarilycategorizedbypossibility.Due tothemyriadpossibilitiesthatabeingintheworldfaces,DaseinexperiencesSorge,care,orconcernaboutitsBeing-in-the-world.AsDasein isBeing-in-the-world,itcannotescapetheworld,whichispopulatedby andTime,trans.byJohnMacquarrieandEdwardRobinson(NewYork:Harper,1962),8 [p.27oftranslation].HereafterreferredtoasSZ.Germanedition:SeinundZeit,11ᵗʰed. (Tübingen:Niemeyer,1967).

5.“BeingisalwaystheBeingofanentity”(SZ9[29]).

6.“Withthe‘cogitosum’Descarteshadclaimedthathewasputtingphilosophyona newandfirmfooting.Butwhatheleftundeterminedwhenhebeganinthis‘radical’way, wasthekindofBeingwhichbelongstotherescogitans,or—moreprecisely—themeaning oftheBeingofthe‘sum’ ”(SZ,24[46]).TheitalicsarepresentintheMacquarrieedition andIhavethusretainedthemhere.

7.Heideggerfindsthat“Descartesnotonlyevadestheontologicalquestionofsubstantialityaltogether;healsoemphasizesexplicitlythatsubstanceassuch—thatistosay,its substantiality—isinandforitselfinaccessiblefromtheoutset”(SZ,94[126]).

8.“Listeningto...isDasein’sexistentialwayofBeing-openasBeing-withforOthers. Indeed,hearingconstitutestheprimaryandauthenticwayinwhichDaseinisopenforits ownmostpotentiality-for-Being—asinhearingthevoiceofafriendwhomeveryDasein carrieswithit.Daseinhears,becauseitunderstands”(SZ,163[206]).

9.SZ,42[67].TheitalicsarepresentintheMacquarrieandRobinsontext.

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otherDaseinswithwhichtorelate,andthusexistenceisnecessarilysubjecttothisconcern.

Thisoutward-lookingconcerncangotoofaras“whenDaseinisabsorbedintheworldofitsconcern—thatis,atthesametime,initsBeingwithtowardsOthers—itisnotitself”(SZ,125[163]).Distractedbythese caresandconcerns,Daseinistakeninbythe“they,”whoseektopreventDaseinfromrealizingitstrueselfbydistractingDaseinbycalling ittowardsaverageness,andinauthenticexistence.Thetendencytowards averagenessisexacerbatedinthatDaseinisthrownintotheworldandhas tofinditsownwayintheworld.Daseinthustendstowardssurrenderingtotheworld,andletstheworldmattertoittotheextentthatDasein evadesandforgetsitsownexistence.Talkcanalsobesubvertedbythe “they,”andturnedintoidletalk(Gerede),where“idletalkisthepossibility ofunderstandingeverythingwithoutpreviouslymakingthethingone’s own”(SZ,169[213]).ThisclosesupDasein’sbeing-in-the-world.

Whatoccursisfalling:Beingisconsumedbycareanddistractedbythe “they”andthusDaseiniscarriedalongbytheworldandmakesnochoices foritself.¹⁰Itischaracterizedbyambiguity(Zweideutigkeit),idletalk,and curiosity.ThisalienationclosesoffDaseinfromitsauthenticityandthose possibilities,forcingitintoinauthenticity.TheSelfthenbecomesthe They-self.Daseindoesnotwanttohaveauthenticitybecauseitiseasier tofollowthe“they.”Fallennessandinauthenticityarehighlightedinhow theyevadeDasein’srelationtodeath,ourownmostpossibility.Fromthis accountofhowfallennesscanoccur,thereisanimplicitcriticismof religion,wheretheanswersaregivenbyanothertotheindividual.

Daseincanachieveauthenticitybecauseitisalwayscalledtoauthenticitybyitself,andtheprocessofbeingauthenticisthroughindividuation.¹¹Theknowledgethatdeathisone’sownmostpossibilityandthus non-relational,andanticipation,whichismanifestinusbyfacingour deathproperly,individualizesDaseinand“allowsit,inthisindividualizationofitself,tobecomecertainofthetotalityofitspotentiality-for-Being”

10.“Daseinletsitselfbecarriedalong[mitnehmen]solelybythelooksoftheworld;in thiskindofBeing,itconcernsitselfwithbecomingridofitselfasBeing-in-the-worldand ridofitsBeingalongsidethatwhich,intheclosesteverydaymanner,isready-to-hand” (SZ,172[216]).

11.“Daseinisauthenticallyitselfonlytotheextentthat,asconcernfulBeing-alongside andsolicitousBeing-with,itprojectsitselfuponitsownmostpotentiality-for-Beingrather thanuponthepossibilityofthethey-self.Theentitywhichanticipatesitsnon-relational possibility,isthusforcedbythatveryanticipationintothepossibilityoftakingoverfrom itselfitsownmostBeing,anddoingsoofitsownaccord”(SZ,263[308]).

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(SZ,266[310]).Thisanticipationcreatestheaforementionedclearing(Aufklarung)and

anticipationrevealstoDaseinitslostnessinthethey-self,andbringsitface tofacewiththepossibilityofbeingitself,primarilyunsupportedbyconcernfulsolicitude,butofbeingitself,ratherinanimpassionedfreedom towardsdeath—afreedomwhichhasbeenreleasedfromtheIllusions ofthe“they,”andwhichisfactical,certainofitself,andanxious.

(SZ,266[311])¹²

Itindividualizes,itrevealstheself,andindoingsofreesit,andnowthe authenticselfisnowresoluteisthefaceofdeath.

ThekeyforHeidegger’saccountofbeingisthattheindividualachieves authenticitythroughanorientationtowardstheirowndeath,whichfrees themfromthedistractionsofotherswhowishtocloudDaseinandturnit awayfromauthenticity.ThisisreversalofaChristianaccountofbeingin thatitbecomesabouttheselfchangingtheself,andtheconsciencethat callstotheself,ratherthanthedivineaddressingthehumanorthrough theinterruptionofthedivineevent,suchasthosefoundintheconversion eventsofSaintPaul,Augustine,andLuther.Certainlytheimportanceof choiceandhowiteitherleadstoauthenticorinauthenticexistenceoccurs inbothLutherandKierkegaard,whoholdthatwearefacedwiththerealityofGod,whichcausesustochooseeitherGodortheworld,anddoes notallowustonotmakeachoice.¹³

12.Heideggeritalicizestheentirepassageinoriginal,givingadditionalemphasisto “freedomtowardsdeath”throughso-called“Sperrsatz,”orwideletterspacing.Onlythe latterkindofemphasisisreproducedinthequotation.

13.StephenMulhallnotesthesubversionofKierkegaardinHeidegger’sunderstandingofauthenticity,thathumanityhasbeengiventhechoicebetweentheworldandGod, whichcannotbeescapedornotmade,asitisourownmostpossibility.ForHeidegger, insteadofrelyingonGodforknowledgeofone’strueselfandidentity,itbecomesabout humanaction,andthus“byacceptingtheKierkegaardianconjunctionbetweenauthenticityandwholeness,butarguingthatthisconjunctioncanbeproperlyforgedbyrelatingto one’smortality,HeideggerineffectarguesthatthetheologicalterminusofClimacus’sargumentisavoidable.”StephenMulhall,HeideggerandBeingandTime(London:Routledge, 1996),124.TheargumentthatMulhallmentionshereisfoundinConcludingUnscientific PostscripttoPhilosophicalFragments(vol.1,ed.andtrans.HowardV.HongandEdnaH. Hong,Kierkegaard’sWritings12,Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress1992)whereKierkegaardisadamantthatfaithalwaysrequiresadecision,andthedecisiontowardsGodis theonlyonethatgrantsauthenticity.SeealsoClareCarlisle,“KierkegaardandHeidegger,” inTheOxfordHandbooktoKierkegaard,ed.JohnLippittandGeorgePattison(Oxford,UK: OxfordUniversityPress,2013),421–39,doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199601301.013.0023.

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Incontrasttothesesourcesofhisownthought,Heideggerlaysouthis hostilitytoandhisreversalofaChristianaccountofexistencefurther inIntroductiontoMetaphysics.TherehewritesthataChristiancannotexplorethequestionofbeing,ofwhythereissomethingratherthannothing, astheyhavetheanswerinthedoctrineofCreation.Heidegger,inhisrejectionofonto-theology,commentsfurtherthat“a‘Christianphilosophy’ isaroundsquareandamisunderstanding.”¹⁴InsteadofGod,inHeidegger’saccount,beingisorientedthroughitsrelationtonothingness,being isthatwhichisnotnothingness,whicharisesfromnothingness,andwill returntonothingness.InsteadofGodorientatingandgivingbeing,for Heideggeritisnothingnessthatisthehorizonofbeing.

However,despitethishostilitytowardstheology,Heideggerwasfamiliarwithandinfluentialonanumberoftheologians,suchashiscolleague atMarburg,RudolfBultmann.JüngelrelatesthatitwasatBultmann’sand Fuch’surgingthathecametostudyandknowHeidegger.¹⁵Heidegger’s influenceonBultmann,Fuchs,andEbelingcomesthroughthepossibilitiesfortheologythattheyseeheofferswithhisreworkingofbeing.The focusonlivedexperience,theimportanceofthecallthatbringsusback toauthenticity,andanaccountofhumanlifeasdefinedbypossibilities andchoicesprovidedameansthroughwhichtoreintroduceandstressthe radical,life-changingnatureoftheaddressthatGodmakestohumanity. Heidegger’sunderstandingofaddressandalsooflanguageasavehicle orthehouseofbeingprovedinfluentialontheology,enablinganewaccountofhermeneuticsintheology.¹⁶Arejectionofontotheologyenabled Heideggertoclaimtheprimacyofpossibility.¹⁷Instead,Daseinisitspos-

14.MartinHeidegger,IntroductiontoMetaphysics,trans.GregoryFriedandRichardPolt (NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,2000),8;GA40,9.

15.“[F]riendlyprovidenceplacednoteworthyteachersofverydifferentorientationsin thestudent’spath....[I]wasbeingexhortedtostudythetextsofHeideggerbytheNew TestamentscholarErnstFuchs,whoputmeintouchwithhisteacherRudolfBultmann. Inan‘illegal’semesterspentoutsideoftheGDR—movingbackandforthbetweenZurich, BaselandFreiburg—Ifinallyheardthemasterhimself.Atthetime,Heideggerwas“onthe waytolanguage”(unterwegszurSprache).TowardtheendofhislifeIhadaconversation withHeideggerabouttherelationbetweenthoughtandlanguage,andIaskedwhetherit wasn’tthedestinyofthoughttobeonthewaytoGod(unterwegszuGott).Heanswered: ‘God—thatisthemostworthyobjectofthought.Butthat’swherelanguagebreaksdown.’ ” EberhardJüngel,“TowardtheHeartoftheMatter,”trans.PaulE.Capetz,ChristianCentury 108,no.7(1991):228–33,alsoavailableonlineatReligionOnline,accessedNovember22, 2016,http://www.religion-online.org/showarticle.asp?title=441.

16.“ThisnewcorrelationofhermeneutictothelaterHeidegger’sunderstandingoflanguageprovidesthepotentialityforanewcorrelationbetweenGod’swordandman’sunderstanding.”JamesRobinson,“TheGermanDiscussionoftheLaterHeidegger,”inThe

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sibility,Daseinisanentitythathastodecidethequestionofitsbeing. ThiswastransmutedthroughBultmann,who,asCaputonotes,tookthat

Thetaskoftheology,armednowwiththeHeideggeriananalyticofexistence,istodeconstructanddemythologizethecanonicalGospelsinorder toretrievetheirkerygma,theliving-existentialChristianmessage,oneof existentialconversion(metanoia),ofbecomingauthenticinthefaceofour finitudeandguilt,ataskthatfaceseveryhumanbeing.¹⁸

Heidegger’sparticularrelianceonanduseoftheologicallanguagehas beennoted.However,whetherhesuccessfullydisentanglesthemisanotherquestion.WithregardstotheemphasisonDaseinsavingitselfin HeideggerincontrasttoKierkegaard,Pattisonnotesthatthereis,hesees, acentralpassivityinHeideggerdespitetheemphasisonactionandindividualizationas“heretoo,byamysteriousphilosophicalalchemy,the ultimatepassivityofhavingtodiehasbeentransformedintotheultimate activityofasupremelyheroicbutalsoperhapsself-deceivinggesture.”¹⁹

InHeidegger’saccount,Pattisonseesthatauthenticitywillalwayselude us,asthewhole“ofourexistenceisdestabilizedatitsdeepestrootsby thepossibilityofadeaththatcouldcomeatanymomentorthatmight notarriveatthemomentwhenwefeelourselvesreadyforit,leavingus suspendedinmeaninglessexistence.”²⁰

ItcanthusbeseenthatHeidegger’saccountofauthenticityandthe processbywhichitisachievedhasatheologicalorigin.Moreover,Heidegger’sturnawayfromChristianityinvolvedseeingthecalltowardsauthenticitynotascomingfromGod,butfromourselves,anditistowards thepossibilityofourowndeaththatwemustorientourselves,ratherthan towardsGod.Heidegger’saccountofauthenticityinvolvesaturnaway fromGodandtowardsourownmortality,riddingontologyofaneedto

LaterHeideggerandTheology,vol.1ofNewFrontiersinTheology,ed.JamesM.Robinson andJohnB.CobbJr.(London:HarperandRow,1963),53.

17.Heidegger’sunderstandingofDasein“violatesAristotle’sontologyintworespects. First,itisnotasubstancewithanessentialnatureandwithpropertiesor‘accidents.’Second,Dasein’spotentialityorpossibilityispriortoitsactuality:Daseinisnotadefinite actualthing,butthepossibilityofvariouswaysofbeing.”Inwood,Heidegger,19.

18.JohnD.Caputo,“HeideggerandTheology,”inCambridgeCompaniontoHeidegger, ed.CharlesB.Guignon(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1993),275.

19.GeorgePattison,HeideggeronDeath:ACriticalTheologicalEssay(Burlington:Ashgate,2013),58.

20.Pattison,HeideggeronDeath,59.

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baseitselfinsomethingoutsideofhumanity,andindividualizingbeingso thatitisthroughaturntotheselfthatthebestlifeisfound.

Jüngel’sTheologyoftheCross

ContrarytoHeidegger,Jüngel’sstartingpointistheeventofthecross. Thiswasnot,atthetime,aparticularneworradicalmove.HisbookGod astheMysteryoftheWorldappearedin1977afteranumberofworks hadbeenpublishedinGermanyonthedeathofGod.²¹AsHeideggerdid beforehim,Jüngelunderstandsthatprevioustheologyandmetaphysics havecreatedanaccountofGodthatisproblematicanddoesnotaccount forthetruthofGod’sexistence.Jüngelthusengagesinaprogramofdestruction,andfromthathereconstructstheconceptofGodbasedonhow GodrevealedGodselfonthecross.

InordertobeabletothinkandspeakofGodanewJüngelfindsitnecessarytounderstandpreviousphilosophicalandtheologicalthoughtonGod andseehowitwentwrong.JüngeldoesnotrejectwholesaleallthefindingsofthemetaphysicaltraditionasheisclearthatGodisunconditioned, astheconceptthat“GodcomesfromGodmeans,negativelyformulated, thatGodstandsundernoconditionsofanykind.”²²LikeHeidegger,JüngelseesDescartesasinstrumentaltothefailingsofmetaphysics,although whereasHeideggerfocusesonwhatDescartesdidtobeing,JüngelinsteadlooksatwhatDescartesdidtotheconceptofGod.Jüngelseesthat “DescartessecuredtheexistenceofGodinsuchawaythatitnecessarily hadtoleadtothedestructionoftheconceptofGodandofthemetaphysicallygroundedcertaintyofGod”(GMW,111).Jüngelarguesthat whilstDescarteswastryingtomakebeliefinGodreasonable,indoing soDescarteslinkedtheconceptofGodanddoubttogether,ashewrites that“Descartes’proofsofGodallareconnectedtoanideaofGodwhichI discoverinmyconsciousnessasaformofit”(GMW,120).Inordertose-

21.ThedeathofGodmovement,whichinGermanywasheadedupbyErnstKäsemann, JürgenMoltmann,andDorotheeSölle,wasaworldwideone,althoughJüngelrestrictshis analysisofittoGermany.IntheAnglophoneworldittookverydifferentforms.There wasadeathofGodmovementinAmerica,ledbyThomasAltizerandWilliamHamilton. IntheUKthefocuswasonprocesstheologyratherthanthedeathofGod,asdeveloped byA.N.Whitehead,CharlesHartshorne,andJohnCobb.JüngelfocusesontheGerman discussion,characterizedbytheuseofBonhoefferandHegelforanunderstandingofGod’s relationtosufferingandtheworld.

22.EberhardJüngel,GodastheMysteryoftheWorld:OntheFoundationoftheTheology oftheCrucifiedOneintheDisputeBetweenTheismandAtheism,trans.DarrellL.Guder (London:Bloomsbury,2014),35.HereaftercitedasGMW

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curecertaintyagainstdoubtingourexistence,Godbecomesaguarantor, for“doubtofthehumanegoassuchisnotstrongenoughtoproducethe securingofthecontinuityofhumanexistencewhichhewants.Heneeds Godasacomradeinarms”(GMW,122).DuetotheeffortsofDescartes “themere‘rationaldistinction’betweentheessenceandexistenceofGod wasalreadycaughtupinthedependenceofhumanthought,whichmakes thatdistinction,onthedivinethoughtwhichfromitsveryoriginisin agreementwithitself”(GMW,108).

Jüngelthentracesthejourneyoftheselfthroughtoadestructivesubjectivity.Jüngelseethatthethinkingselfthenbecomesthesubjectofall existence,andwhenGodisconceivedof,Godisconceivedofasabove humanity,onlywithGodselfandyetisonlyknownthroughone’sown thought.Thispositioncreatesproblemsthatareevincedinlaterthought asJüngelseesthiscontradictionplayedoutinFichte,wherehestatesthat Godshouldnotbethoughtofasitisimpossible,²³whereFeuerbachassertsthatonlywhenyourthoughtisGodisyourthoughttrulythought,²⁴ andinhowNietzscheexclaimswhetheryoucouldconceiveofaGod.²⁵

AsaresultofthisaporiaconcerningthenatureofGodandinorder tobeabletospeakandthinkofGodcorrectlyagain,Jüngelwishesto destroywhattheyinsiston,whichisthemetaphysicalconceptofGodas apresuppositionforthepossibilityofthinkingGod.²⁶Jüngelseesthatit isimpossibletothinkGodanewwithoutcreatingablankslateasallour

23.“FichteconteststhethinkabilityofGod,forthesakeofthegloryofGod.Butitis thegloryofahighestbeingmetaphysicallyunderstood.Feuerbachassertstheconceptual necessityofGodforthesakeofthedignityofhumanthought.Butitisthedignityofman identifyinghimselfwiththehighestbeing,metaphysicallyunderstood.NietzschequestionsthethinkabilityofGod,forthesakeofthepraiseandjustificationofallmortality. ButitisthepraiseandjustificationofamortalityfromwhichGod,metaphysicallyconceivedasthehighestbeing,mustbeandremainedremoved,becauseallmortalityisby definitionexcludedfromthemetaphysicallyconceivedhighestbeing”(GMW,128).

24.“Themysterycontainedintheword‘God’shouldprofitmaninsuchawaythateverythingimpliedbytheword‘God’shouldbeassertedofman....Withconstantreference totheessenceoftheChristianfaith,thisexpositionistobecompletedwiththerigorous intentiontodemonstratethatwhattheologyassertstobethecontrastingrelationshipbetweenGodandmanisreallythemeredivisionofmanwithinhimself.Theresultistobe thatman,nowcomingtohimselfoutofthatdichotomization,canbeassertedtobethat beingwhichrightfullyandsolelymeritsbeingcalleddivine”(GMW,142).

25.FromNietzsche’sunderstandingofmetaphysicsinThusSpakeZarathustra(trans. ThomasCommon,TheCompleteWorksofFriedrichNietzsche,ed.OscarLevy,vol.11,Edinburgh:Foulis,1909,100)Jüngelseesthat“Nietzsche’sconsequencewasthemostconsequentbecauseitbegantotakeleaveoftheresults.Inthisleave-takingitbecomes completelycertainthatthelastcertaintyofmodernmetaphysicsisthatofthefactual inconceivabilityofGod.Atheismcouldnowbecomeaforegoneconclusion”(GMW,152).

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termshavealoadedhistorybehindthemandthathistory,whentakenas Nietzschedoes,toitslogicalconclusionentailsandnecessitatesatheism assuchaGodcannotbeconceivedof.²⁷Jüngelthuswishestothinkboth Godandthoughtanewfromapresentsituationofinevitableatheism, wherebeliefinGodiseithernon-existentorthereisafalsebeliefinthe wrongsortofGod.

InordertodothisJüngelfocusesontherevelationofChristashesees, followingthethoughtofKarlBarth,thattheonlysourceofChristian theologyisintheunityofGodandhumanityintheincarnationofthe personofChrist.²⁸Jüngelseesthatthisismostclearlyrevealedandknown intheeventofthecross,for“faithinthecrucifiedGodforcesustocontest theviewthatGodisabsolutelyinvulnerableessence”(GMW,123)asit isaninversionoftheCartesianconfidence.²⁹Whathappensisthat“Godis transformedintothehumanlyconceivableonlywhenheceasestobethat infinitywhichassuperegoisopposedtofiniteman.Accordingtothelogic

26.“Allthreethinkersarepresupposing,inonewayoranother,themetaphysicalconceptofGod”(GMW,128).

27.WhilstJüngelwishestofollowAugustine’suseofwordsassignshere,andthus “whattheword’God’providesforourthinkingisthenbasicallyimpossibletothink through,cannotbegraspedbythinking,andthuscanonlybegraspedassomething incomprehensible”(GMW,8).HefurtherfollowsAugustine’sstatementinSermon117 thatifyoucancomprehendit,itisnotGod.Therefore,thereisaproblemofhowweare bothabletothinkGodandtothinkofGod,whichresultsinaprobleminhowwecan speakofGod.Despitethesedangersandlimitations,Jüngeldoesnotwanttogodown therouteofapophatictheology,for“ifGodisthinkableonlyastheUnthinkable,must notthenourthinkingultimatelyresignwhenitturnstoGod?”(GMW,8).Jüngelthinks that“suchresignationwouldaffectnotonlythought.Ithaspracticalconsequences.How shouldtheChristianfaithactifitisnolongerabletothinkGodandthusnolonger understanditselfasfaith?”(GMW,9).Therefore,whilstJüngelisnotopentoanapophatic theology,heisstillinsistentonthemysteryofGod,as“thethinkabilityofsomethingis notnecessarilyidenticalwithitsknowability.”(GMW,103).

28.“Christiantheologyaroseastheexplicationandself-criticismoffaithinJesusof Nazareth.TobelieveinJesusmeanstounderstandhimasthatpersonthroughwhomand inwhomGodhasbecomedefinitivelyaccessible....Therefore,thateventinwhichone comestothethinkingofGodisalsotobeunderstoodasaneventinwhichGodbringsus tohimself”(GMW,155).

29.“ItwasthedefeatoftheabilitytodoubtwhichmadeCartesianmanpowerful.Would onenotsuspectthat,conversely,theGodunderstoodasthehighestpowerwouldbethe onewhowastotallydefective?Thehighestpowercouldultimatelybefoundinactual weakness”(GMW,123).WhilstthisreachesitsapexinDescartesJüngelputsthistheologicalandphilosophicaltrainofthoughtfurtherbackthanDescartestoAnselm’sontological argument,where“thethoughtofGod,alwayspresupposedinametaphysicwhichunderstandsGodas‘thatwhichnothinggreatercanbeconceived,’causesgiddinessbecauseit forcesthoughttocompareitselftoaheighttowhichitisforbiddentoclimb”(GMW,149).

ReadingHeideggerthroughtheCross 105

ofthepresupposedconceptofGod,hethenceasestobeGodinanysense atall”(GMW,149).

ToooftenthesufferinganddeathofGodisseenasantitheticaltothe beingofGod,asGodisnotallowedtochangeorsuffer,butforJüngel God’sbeingdoesnotcontradictitselfinthecrucifiedmanJesus,butharmonizeswithitself.However,thisisnottosaythatthedeathofGodis easyortrivial;“thepropositionthatGodisdeadisadarkstatement.And itwillremaindarkaslongasitisnotunderstoodintermsofitsorigin” (GMW,45).ThewayinwhichJüngelistolightenthisstatementisby consideringits“metaphysicalandgenuinelyChristianorigin”(GMW,47).

Therefore,despitetheinitialinconceivabilityofthisGod,Jüngelinsists thatthereshouldbeonlyonethingweareboundbyintermsoftalkabout God,andthathasbeenrevealedtousastheCrucifiedOne.³⁰Thedeathof ChristispossibleduetoChrist’shumanityandtherefore“talkaboutGod whichisorientedtothecrucifiedmanJesusmustunderstandGod’sdeity onthebasisofhishumanityrevealedinJesus”(GMW,14).

Moreover,JüngelhasatraditionalLutheranunderstandingoftheperson andworkofChrist,wherethemainworkofChrististhatofthejustificationofsinners,achievedthroughthesubstitutionarysacrificeofChrist onthecross.ThisheritagemeansthatJüngelalsohasanaccountofthe communicatioidiomatuminthepersonofChrist,wherethehumanityof Christisdistinctfromthehumanityofotherhumans.ForJüngel,Jesus’s humanityisthemediumforthepresenceofGodintheworld.Godcanonly befoundinChrist,andthisisknownfromtheexistenceofthehistorical Jesus.³¹WhilstthereisthisunityinChristbetweenhumanityandGod, thepersonofChriststillpreservesthedistinctionbetweenGodandhumanityinordertopreventthedivinizationofhumanity.³²Theincarnation

30.“WhenweattempttothinkofGodastheonewhocommunicatesandexpresses himselfinthepersonJesus,thenwemustalwaysrememberthatthismanwascrucified, thathewaskilledinthenameofGod’slaw.ForresponsibleChristianusageoftheword ‘God,’theCrucifiedOneisvirtuallytherealdefinitionofwhatismeanwiththewordGod.’ ChristiantheologyisthereforefundamentallytheologyoftheCrucifiedOne”(GMW,13).

31.ThisviewisclearlyespousedinhowJüngelviewsChristastheonlytruesacrament, inthatitisonlyinChristthatGodismetandcommunicated.(EberhardJüngel,Wasist einSakrament(Freiburg:Herder,1971),53–4).

32.“ThehumanityofGodcorrespondsnottothedivinityofhumanity,butonlytothe humanityofhumanity,who,asitisandfromhim,cannotcorrespondinthemselvesto thepossibilityofthemediationofGod”Jüngel,WasisteinSakrament,58.ThisisemphasizedbyMcCormack:seeBruceL.McCormack,“ParticipationinGod,Yes;Deification, No:TwoModernProtestantResponsestoanAncientQuestion,”inOrthodoxandModern: StudiesintheTheologyofKarlBarth(GrandRapids:BakerAcademic,2008),235–60.

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necessitatesthis,because“Godbecamehuman,inordertodistinguishso strictlybetweenGodandhumanitythattheymightbeabletobetogether withoutrestriction.”³³Thisagainensuresthatitisonlythroughtheaction ofChrist,notthatofhumanity,thatweareunitedwithGod.

Jüngelseesthatthisisachievedas

whatcharacterizedJesus’self-relationshipwasthisuniqueopennessforthis divineactivity,whichcorrespondstotheGodwhoismoreintimatetome thanIamtomyself,intheperformanceofhisownhumanexistence.He reliedsototallyonGodthathecouldnotreallybeapersonwithoutGod’s existenceturnedtowardhim.AndbecauseofhistotaldependenceofGod hewasable,asonewhowaswithoutpretensioninregardtohimself,tobe completelythereforothers.³⁴

ThepassivityanddependencethatChristshowsiskeygoingforwardstoa discussionofJüngel’saccountoftheologicalanthropology.Thispassivity anddependenceisunderstoodasthesupremeactofselflessness,andthis supremeactofselflessnessasthedeathonthecross.Thus,Jüngelseesthat “GoddefineshimselfwhenheidentifieshimselfwiththedeadJesus.”³⁵

AsthedeathofChristonthecrossisthefullandcompleterevelationof God,thisobedienceandpassivitycharacterizesChristasthesecondpersonoftheTrinityaswell.Jüngelseesthat“theJesuswhoexiststotallyfrom theFathermadeitpossibletobelieveinGodastheFather,theGodwho identifieswithJesusinhisdeathmakesitpossibletobelieveinGodthe Son”(GMW,368).ThisenablesJüngeltobeabletosaythatatheology ofthecrossisnotabstractrevelation,buttheconcreterevelationofthe beingofGodbothasChristandTrinity.ForJüngeltheexampleofJesus

33.EberhardJüngel,“TheDogmaticSignificanceoftheHistoricalJesus,”inTheological Essays2,trans.ArnoldNeufeldt-FastandJ.B.Webster(Edinburgh:T&TClark,1995),118.

34.GMW,358.Torranceseesthatthishypostaticunionenablesanunderstandingof thedeathofGodinJüngel,thusenablinghistheologyofthecrossas“itisnolongerto restsatisfiedwithatraditionaltheologiagloriae,withoutavoidingthescandalofthefact thatinbecomingfleshforustheSonofGodbecamecursedunderthelawandthatinhis deaththeloveofGodidentifieditselfwiththecrucified.Canonebothdenythefactthat Jesusdied‘asGod’andaffirmthatGodgiveshimselfinself-communicationtoman?The doctrineofthehypostaticunionholdsthoseinseparablytogether,”ThomasF.Torrance, TrinitarianPerspectives:TowardsDoctrinalAgreement(Edinburgh:T&TClark,1994),83.

35.GMW,364.“GodhasthenidentifiedhimselfwiththeJesuswhomadehimselfsin forusasoursubstitute.Wehaverecognizedthisidentificationofdivinelifewiththedead Jesusastheeventofdivinelove.Assuch,itistheturningpointoftheworld,becauseGod hasinterposedhimselfinthemidstoffatalGod-forsakennessinordertocreateanew relationshipwithGod”(GMW,367).

ReadingHeideggerthroughtheCross 107

isthepatternforhumanlifeinJüngel,andthushumanityiscalledto bepassive,tobedependent,andtorelyonGod,notourselves.Aswe shallexploreinthefollowingsection,trueauthenticityandthechoice thathumanitymustmakeistobepassive,likeChristwas,inrelationto God,andtochoosethatpassivityoverandagainstchoosingourselves.

Jüngel’sAccountofHumanBeing

HavingexploredbothHeidegger’saccountofbeingandJüngel’saccount ofthebeingofGod,thereareanumberofmovesthatbothofthethinkers make.Heidegger’sthoughtandtheprocessthatHeideggerfollowsare keyforJüngelinthatHeideggerprovidesameansbywhichtodestroy previousaccountsofthebeingofGodinordertobuildanewaccountof Godbasedontherevelationofthecross.Furthermore,Jüngelalsoutilizes Heidegger’sunderstandingofhumanexistence.Heideggerunderstands Daseintoberelational;apersonisaprocessofbeingrelatedtoothers andthatwhichisoutsideitself,asDaseinderivesfromcontextualizedrelationships.HoweverJüngeldiffersfromHeideggersubstantiallyinhow humanityachievesauthenticity.InHeideggeritisthroughindividuating thatoneachievesauthenticity,throughtakingcontrolofone’sownbeingandchoosingforoneself;whereasinJüngelauthenticityisrealized throughrelinquishinganyclaimsofindividualityandfreedomtochoose one’sowndestiny.Instead,inJüngel’saccount,whatcreatestruehuman existenceissurrendertoGodandtoGod’sactioninus.WhilstJüngel seesthatHeidegger’saccountofhumanityisaccurate,Jüngelseesthat itisonlyaccurateindescribingthesinfulnatureofhumanity.InJüngel, thereisadriveforself-actualizationinhumanity,butwhilstforHeidegger self-actualizationleadstoauthenticity,forJüngelthatsamemovementis themovethatnothingnessasevilworksinhumanity.

Jüngel,asafollowerofHeideggerandhisChristianinterpreters,places astrongemphasisontheimportanceoflanguage;seeingitasconstituted bytheactsofspeakingandoflistening,byaddress.³⁶Jüngelunderstands GodasaGodwhospeaks,andunderstandshumanityasconstitutedby theactofGodaddressingus.Thisactofspeakingandthelinkedactof listeningare,inJüngel,thepivotonwhichtherelationshipbetweenGod

36.“Jüngelhasderivedhisunderstandingoftruthastherevelationand‘letting-be’of whatis.Moreimportantly,fromhimhealsogetshisunderstandingofthevalueoflanguageforrevealingtheultimate.WhenJüngelclaimsthattheparablesreflectJesus’own (God-determined)Being,heisapplyingHeidegger’sexplanationofhowBeingexpresses itselfinlanguage.”Zimany,“EberhardJüngel’sSynthesisofBarthandHeidegger,”53.

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andhumanityturns.Theimportanceoftheuseofspeechislinkedwith anaccountofhumananddivinedetermination,wherespeechistheway inwhichGodcommunicatesGodselfandindoingsodeterminesGodself astheonewhospeaks.

Therefore,inrelationtoGod,humanitylistens,andhumanityreceives. Theroleofhumanbeingisnottospeakfirst,buttolisten,andthenlivethe messagethattheyreceive.HumanityreceivesfromGodthegiftoffaith, andfaithisseenbyJüngelasmorethanapossibilityforthought,³⁷buta capacitygivenbyGod.AsfaithisagiftfromGodJüngelseesthatthereis anintrinsicpassivityinfaith,as“infaith,thehumanpersonreliestotally upontheactofGod,orrather,uponGod’screativeword-act.”³⁸Faithis therenouncingofpossessionandclaimstoanything,asurrender.³⁹Jüngel emphasizesthesenseofsurrenderratherthanentitlement⁴⁰infaithasthe freedomtodecideforoneselfinvolvesanunderstandingoffreedomthat Jüngeldoesnotaccept.InsteadJüngelseesthat

realfreedomdoesnotevenconsistinfreedomfromthedeterminationof thewillbytheoutwardconditionsoflifetowhichdecisionandactionare subject;ratherisitinfreedomfromourselves—fromourselvesaswearein everynowaspeoplewhocomeoutoftheirpastandaredeterminedbyit.⁴¹

FaithprovidesthisfreedomfromourselvesinourrelianceinGod,and indiscoveringGodwediscoverourselvesanew.⁴²Freedomisthusbeing

37.“[I]ntrinsictothedefinitionoftheologyisthatithasasitsobjectthatpossibility whichcomestohumanexistencefrombeyonditselfalone,notonlyasapossibilityfor thought,butratherasarealcapacity.”Jüngel,“ ‘Youtalklikeabook...’Towardsan understandingofthePhilosophicalFragmentsofJ.Climacus,editedbySörenKierkegaard (1813–1855),”inTheologicalEssays2,32.ThisuseofKierkegaardisafurtherexampleof JüngelrechristianizingHeidegger’saccountofbeing.

38.EberhardJüngel,“OnBecomingTrulyHuman:TheSignificanceoftheReformation DistinctionbetweenPersonandWorksfortheSelf-understandingofModernHumanity,” TheologicalEssays2,231.

39.“Thehumanpersonshouldhaveorpossesssomething,butnorpossesshim-orherself.Intheirownregard,humanpersonsare,rather,withoutpossession.Muchmoredoes oneforsakeoneselfinfaith,insofarasinfaithonegoesbeyondoneselfandgroundsoneselfinGod.Andinloveonegivesoneselftoothers,thusforsakingoneselfoncemorein anotherway.”Jüngel,“OnBecomingTrulyHuman,”234.

40.“FaithisfrequentlyunderstoodasbeingahumandecisionforGod,wherebythehumanSelfmakesitsownfundamentaldecisionaboutitself.”EberhardJüngel,Justification: TheHeartoftheChristianFaith,trans.JeffreyF.Cayzer(Edinburgh:T&TClark,2001), 238.HereaftercitedasJustif

41.Justif,240.JüngelattributesthisideatoBultmann.

ReadingHeideggerthroughtheCross 109

freedtosayYestoGod,⁴³freedtobepassiveandobedienttoGodas“itis theactofsayingYestomyownnegationandaffirmationbyGod”(Justif, 242).Faithisfreedomfromambivalence,whichJüngelseesasintrinsic toournatures.Duetothistyrannyofchoice“itisgoodforusnothave controloverourpersonhood.Wehavebeenremovedfromourselvesfor ourowngood”(Justif,249).InJüngel’saccount,sinisthedesiretobe inchargeofourowndestinyandofourownorigin,towanttobethe judging,determining,differentiatingfactorintheworld,inshort,toactualizeourselvesandfindauthenticitylikeHeideggerdoes.Jüngelseesthis self-determinationandself-actualizationassinasitisonlyGodwhocan determineus,onlymutuallydependentrelationsthatactualizeus.

ThistiesintoJüngel’saccountofjustification,inthatwhatJüngel’sdoctrineofjustificationshowsusisthathumanityisexcludedinanyway fromdefiningitselfbyitsownworks,andthattherighteousnessofGod mustbeseenasgiven,⁴⁴notearned,andthusinregardstojustificationwe arealsopassivereceivers.⁴⁵Duetothis,JüngelisemphaticthatjustificationisthecenteroftheChristianfaith.

Thusitcanbeshown,leadingfromJüngel’saccountofChristonthe cross,andthroughhisaccountofhumanityaschoosingtobeinapassiverelationshiptoGod,thatJüngelinvertsHeidegger’sstressonselfactualization,seeingthatassin.Moreover,inJüngel’sdiscussionofnothingness,nothingnessisthatwhichlureshumanityintothisdriveforselfactualization.⁴⁶Thuscenteringone’sbeingonnothingnessdoesnotlead

42.“Faithisaself-discoverythatbeginsatthesametimeaswediscoverGod.Itisthe discoveryofaself-renewalthataffectsthewholeperson.Thosewhodiscoverthemselves asnewpersonscannotmakethemselvesintonewpersons;norcantheydecidetoexistas such”(Justif,241).

43.“ThatYeswhichwearetoseeasbeingfaithisthediscoveringunderstandingof thedivinedecisionabouthumanbeings,whichisnowbeingmadebyhumanbeings.By expressingourentireexistenceinthisheartfeltYestoGod’sjudgment,weareadmitting thatthefirstthingwasforourheartstobeconquered,thatweneededfirstofalltobeset freetospeakthisaffirmativeYes.Thusfaithistheself-discoveryandexperienceoftheSelf thathasbeensetfreeuntofreedom”(Justif,241).

44.Insteadthereisimputation,asbecause“theimputationofextraneousrighteousness (imputatioalienataeiustitiae)canonlyberightlygraspedwhenitisseenasGodgranting divinerighteousnessinsuchawayastoeffectivelychangethebeingofhumans”(Justif, 211).Yettheredoesseemtobesomeontologicalchangehere.

45.“WhatisexcludedisanyviewoftherighteousnessofGodasbeinginanyway earnedandpossessed.Similarlyoutofthequestionisanyunderstandingofjustification asaprocessbywhichweareinvolvedotherthanbyhearingandbelieving”(Justif,206–7).

46.Nothingness,accordingtoJüngel,isthe“absolutelyimpossible,theincapacityto become.Fromnothingness,nothingisderived.Butthatisnotall!Beyondthatwemust

110 DeborahCasewell

toauthenticity,likeitdoesinHeidegger,butinsteadleadsfurtherinto sinandawayfromtrueauthentichumanexistence,thatofpassivityand dependenceonGod.

Conclusion

Jüngel’suseofHeideggeristwofold.First,Jüngeldrawshisaccountof humanbeingfromHeidegger,bothinhisunderstandingofhowlanguage isanintegralaspectofhumanlife,andinhowheunderstandshuman beingashavingadesiretoactualizeitself,tofindauthenticityinitself.

Second,JüngelseesHeidegger’saccountofhumanbeingasessentially sinful,asacounter-exampletowhattruehumanlifeshouldbe.Insteadof thehumanneedingtoactualizetheself,Jüngelseesthatonlydependence onGodcancreateauthentichumanlifeashumanityiscalledtoparticipate inGod’sTrinitarianlife.

ThisinversionofHeidegger’saccountofbeingfromthepositivetothe negativeisinpartpossibleduetotheparticularhistoricalcontextofJüngel’sthought.Jüngelwaswritingatatimewhentherewasarenewed interestintheco-existenceandcoherenceofGodandevilandsuffering. Thetragediesandhorrorsofthewar,andespeciallyHeidegger’slinkto Naziideologyunderminedthegoodnessandreliabilityofhumannature andhumanchoosing,andledtoatimeofparticularemphasesintheology, wheresufferingbecamepartofGod’snature,asitseemedimpossibleto talkofgoodnesswhentheworldwassteepedinblood.Furthermore,talk ofatriumphantviewofhumannature,ofthehumanoverpoweringand conqueringandfindingthemselves,wasatbestnaïveinpost-warGermany,andatworstwillfulignorant.⁴⁷

saythatbecausenothingisderivedfromnothingness,nothingnessis,inrelationtobeing anditspossibilities,anegativelyvirulentemptinesswithoutaplaceinbeing,adestructive undertow,anegativeontologicalwhirlpool,a‘nihilatingnothing’(nihilnihilans)”(GMW, 216).Jüngelseesthatatendingtowardsnothingnessappearstohavecapturedourhearts morethancreatingpossibilities.Therefore,inordertolimitthegrowthofnothingnessinthe worldGodneededtoinvolveGodselfinnothingness.Thisisdonethroughthecrucifixion, whereinJüngel’sthought“talkaboutthedeathofGodimpliesthen,initstruetheological meaning,thatGodistheonewhoinvolveshimselfinnothingness”(GMW,218).

47.“AtheologywhichdidnotspeakofGodinthesightoftheonewhowasabandoned andcrucifiedwouldhavehadnothingtosaytousthen”JürgenMoltmann,TheCrucified God:TheCrossofChristastheFoundationandCriticismofChristianTheology,trans.R.A. WilsonandJohnBowden(London:SCM,2001),1.Hewritesfurther“whatdoesitmeanto recalltheGodwhowascrucifiedinasocietywhoseofficialcreedisoptimism,andwhich isknee-deepinblood?”Moltmann,TheCrucifiedGod,4.

ReadingHeideggerthroughtheCross 111

Thestaurocentrismofpost-wartheologyenabledaviewofGodthatdid notdenythehorrorsthattheworldhadgonethrough,wheresuffering wasabletotouchGod,andGodwasabletoexperienceandempathize withwhathadhappened.Humansufferingwasthennotalone,notin vain,andnottrivialized.WhilstJüngelislessradicalinhisaccountof thesufferingofGodthanhiscontemporariesbothinGermanyandin Anglophonetheology,healsocannotignorehishistoricalcontext.Itis thispessimismabouthumanactionthatenablesJüngeltodevelopfrom histheologyofthecrossapassiveaccountofhumanaction.Fromthe exampleofChristonthecross,humanactivityshouldbecomepassivity. Insteadoffindingauthenticityinknowingourselves,weinsteadfindit inknowingothersthroughtherelationshipsthatGodasTrinity,whichis revealedonthecross,andthiscanonlybedonethroughthesurrenderof ourdesiretoactualizeourselves.

Therefore,itisduetohisparticularhistoricalcontextthatJüngelisable toinvertHeidegger’saccountofbeingfromself-actualizationtoparticipation.However,thisinversionofHeideggeristruerthanHeidegger’s own,asthroughJüngel’semphasisonhumanitybeingactualizedbyGod andbyparticipationinGod,JüngelbringsHeidegger’saccountofbeingbacktoitssources,backtotheemphasesthatSaintPaul,Augustine, Luther,andKierkegaardhadofchoosingGod,andchoosingdependence onGod.However,itisonlybecauseofJüngel’shistoricalcontext,andthe limitsofhumanactionandtheintrinsicgoodnessofhumanchoice,that thisaccountofbeingcouldbepromulgated.Thishistoricalconnection hasitslimits,asacommonthreadthatrunsthroughthecontemporarycommentariesandcritiquesofJüngel’stheologyisthathisaccount ofhumanactionislackingandthatitdoesnotspeaktotheproblems andstressesofcontemporarytheology.⁴⁸Jüngel,havingbeenabletoreChristianizeHeidegger’sthoughtduetohisownhistoricalcontext,isnow jettisonedandadriftonthesameseaofhistoryastheologycontinueson, chartingnewcourses.

48.Jüngel’saccountofthepassivenatureofhumanityisnotedbymostcommentators, andisseenastheprimefaultofhisanthropology.Thispassivityisnotrestrictedtoaction,butisalsoatworkinJüngel’sunderstandingoflanguage.JohnWebsterseesthat Jüngel’saccountofjustification“introducesanemphasisonmanasthepassiverecipient oftheworkofGod.”JohnWebster,“EberhardJüngelontheLanguageofFaith,”Modern Theology1,no.4(1985):268.ThisisechoedbyIvorJ.Davidsonin“TheCrucifiedOne,”by PaulJ.DeHartin“OntheContrary:ThomisticSecondThoughtsonAnalogyandTrinity inEberhardJüngel,”andbyGeorgeHunsingerin“AReformedTheologyofJustification,” allfoundinIndicativeofGrace—ImperativeofFreedom:EssaysinHonourofEberhardJüngel inHis80tʰYear,ed.R.DavidNelson(London:T & TClark,2014).

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