Religion, Fundamentalism and Ethnicity by Jeff Haynes - 1991

Religion,FundamentalismandEthnicity

JeffHaynes

UNRISDDiscussionPaper65

May1995

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Contents

Preface4

Introduction:ReligionandModernization6

ATypologyofPoliticalReligion9

ReligiousMobilizationandPoliticalAction11

ReligionandEthnicity:CulturalistFormsofSolidarity17

Religious“Fundamentalism”andtheSearchfor

SocialIdentityandPoliticalExpression21

ReligiousSyncretismandPolitics25

Community-OrientedReligiousMovements29

SummaryandConclusion31

Bibliography33

Preface

Inrecentdecades,religionhashadconsiderableimpactuponpoliticsinmanyregionsof theworld.Thebeliefthatsocietieswouldinvariablysecularizeastheymodernizehasnot beenwellfounded.Technologicaldevelopmentandotheraspectsofmodernizationhave leftmanypeoplewithafeelingoflossratherthanachievement.Byundermining “traditional”valuesystemsandallocatingopportunitiesinhighlyunequalwayswithin andamongnations,modernizationcanproduceadeepsenseofalienationandstimulatea searchforanidentitythatwillgivelifesomepurposeandmeaning.Inaddition,therise ofaglobalconsumeristculturecanleadtoanawarenessofrelativedeprivationthat peoplebelievetheycandealwithmoreeffectivelyiftheypresenttheirclaimsasagroup. Oneresultofthesedevelopmentshasbeenawaveofpopularreligiosity,whichhashad far-reachingimplicationsforsocialintegration,politicalstabilityandinternational security.

Thispaperprovidesaglobalperspectiveontherelationbetweenreligion,politics, conflictandidentity.Usingawiderangeofcasesfromvariouspartsoftheworld,it examinesthecomplexwaysinwhichreligiousvalues,beliefsandnormsstimulateand affectpoliticaldevelopmentsandviceversa;thesocialconditionswhichgiveriseto religiousmovementsaswellashowsuchmovementsarepromotedandsustainedover time;therelationsbetweenreligiousleadersandfollowers;andthelinksbetweensocial mobilizationandthepursuitofparticularistobjectives.

Thepapercontendsthatthedefiningcharacteristicoftherelationshipofreligionand politicsinthe1990sistheincreasingdisaffectionanddissatisfactionwithestablished, hierarchicalandinstitutionalizedreligiousbodies.Contemporaryreligiousmovements seekinsteadtofindGodthroughpersonalsearchingratherthanthroughthemediationof institutions.Theyalsofocusontheroleofcommunitiesingeneratingpositivechangesto members’livesthroughtheapplicationofgroupeffort.Inthisregard,thepaperargues thatreligion’sinteractionwithpoliticalissuescarriesanimportantmessageofsocietal resurgenceandregeneration,whichmaychallengetheauthorityofpoliticalleadersand economicélites.

Thefirstpartofthepaperprovidesanoverviewoftherelationshipbetweenreligionand modernization.Itsurveysthecontradictoryeffectsofmodernizationonsocialvaluesin differentculturalandreligioussettings.Giventheunevenimpactofmodernizationin developingcountries,therelationshipbetweenreligionandpoliticshasalwaysbeena closeone.Politicalpowerisunderpinnedbyreligiousbeliefsandpractices,while politicalconcernspermeatetotheheartofthereligioussphere.Therefore,attemptsin manycountriestoseparatepoliticsfromreligionhavebeenlargelyunsuccessful, especiallyaseconomiccrisisandglobalrestructuringunderminepreviousarrangements forpromotingsocialandpoliticalcohesion.

Parttwodevelopsatypologyofreligiousmovementsinordertodemonstratethepolitical significanceofreligionasaglobalphenomenon.Fourtypesofmovementsare highlightedbasedonwhetherreligionisusedasavehicleofoppositionorasanideology ofcommunitydevelopment.Groupswhichlinkreligiontothepursuitofcommunity developmentarecategorizedascommunity-orientedwhileoppositionalmovementsare classifiedasculturalist,fundamentalist,andsyncretistic.Threatsfrompowerfuloutsider groupsorfromunwelcomesymptomsofmodernizationlargelysustaintheoppositional movements;communitymovementsontheotherhandderivetheir raisond’être from statefailuresinsocialwelfaredevelopment.

Theremainingpartsofthepaperprovidedetaileddiscussionsofthedynamicsofthese fourmovements.Culturalistmovementsemergewhenacommunity,sharingboth religiousandethnicaffinities,perceivesitselfasapowerlessandrepressedminority withinastatedominatedbyoutsiders.Culture(ofwhichreligionisanimportantpart)is mobilizedaspartofawiderstrategyaimedatachievingselfcontrol,autonomyorself government.CasesexaminedincludeexperiencesofSikhsinHinduIndia,thestruggles ofthepeoplesofSouthernSudanagainstArabizationandIslamization,TibetanBuddhist oppositiontotheChinesestateandtheAfrican-Americanmovementofself-development, theNationofIslam.

Syncretisticreligiousmovementsaresaidtobefoundpredominantlyamongcertainrural dwellersinpartsoftheThirdWorld,especiallyinAfrica.Theyinvolveafusionor blendingofreligionsandfeatureanumberofelementsfoundinmoretraditionalformsof religiousassociation,suchasancestorworshipandhealingpractices.Sometimesethnic differentiationmayformpartofsyncretism.Religiousandsocialbeliefssupplythebasic elementsforbuildinggroupsolidarityinthefaceofthreatsfromoutsideforces,suchas thestate,bigland-owners,transnationalenterprisesorforeigngovernments.Thepaper examinesseveralAfrican,LatinAmericanandCaribbeancaseswheresuchthreatshave givenrisetosyncretisticreligions,includingtheNapramasofnorth-easternMozambique, theLakwenaandLenshinamovementsinUgandaandZambia,thecultofOlivorismoin theDominicanRepublicandSenderoLuminosoinPeru.

Religiousfundamentalistmovementsaimtoreformsocietybychanginglaws,morality, socialnormsandpoliticalconfigurationsinaccordancewithreligioustenets,withthe goalofcreatingamoretraditionalsociety.Thepaperhighlightstwobroadcategoriesof fundamentalistgroups:thosebasedontheAbrahamic“religionsofthebook”and nationalist-orientedderivativesofHinduismandBuddhism.Forthefirsttype,scriptural revelationsrelatingtopolitical,moralandsocialissuesformthecorpusoffundamentalist demands.Theirpoliticalorientationsvaryconsiderably:somearedeeplyconservative (USProtestantevangelicals),somearereformistorrevolutionary(manyIslamistgroups), someareessentiallymoralistic(ProtestantevangelicalsinLatinAmerica),andsomeare xenophobicorracist(suchasthebannedKachandKahaneChaigroupsinIsrael).Inthe absenceofanyclearsetofscripturalnorms,HinduandBuddhistfundamentalismsare indistinguishablefrommovementswithaspirationsfornationalorculturalpurity.

Community-orientedmovementsoftenemergefromattemptstoimprovecommunity livelihood;thesetendtobepopularlydrivenandmayhaveeitherconservativeor reformistorientation,andarefoundtypically,butnotexclusively,inLatinAmerica. Especiallyprominentinthisregardarelocalcommunitygroups,mostlyRomanCatholic ininspiration,whichhavegrowninimportanceoverthelast25yearsinLatinAmerica, thePhilippinesandinpartsofAfrica.Manyderivetheirideasfromthetenetsofradical liberationtheology.Inaddition,therehasbeenastronggrowthinseveralLatinAmerican andAfricancountriesofpopularProtestantevangelicalchurches.Whatallthesegroups haveincommonisthatlocalself-helpgroupsareformedtoimprovequalitatively communities’livesatatimewhencentralandlocalgovernmentsareunabletosatisfy populardevelopmentalneeds.

JeffHaynesisSeniorLecturerintheDepartmentofPoliticsandGovernmentatLondon GuildhallUniversity.AtUNRISD,productionofthispaperwasco-ordinatedbyYusuf Bangura.

DharamGhai,Director May1995

Introduction:ReligionandModernization

OneofthemostresilientideasaboutsocietaldevelopmentaftertheSecondWorldWar wasthatnationswouldinevitablysecularizeastheymodernized.Theideaof modernizationwasstronglylinkedtourbanization,industrializationandtoan accompanyingrationalizationof“irrational”views,suchasreligiousbeliefsandethnic separatism.Lossofreligiousfaithandsecularizationdovetailedwiththeideathat technologicaldevelopmentandtheapplicationofsciencetoovercomeperennialsocial problemsofpoverty,environmentaldegradation,hungeranddiseasewouldresultinlongtermhumanprogress.

Butwiththedeclineinthebeliefintheefficacyoftechnologicaldevelopmenttocureall humanillscameawaveofpopularreligiositywithpoliticalramifications.Examples include:theIranianIslamicrevolutionof1978-1980;Christianfundamentalists’ involvementinpoliticalandsocialissuesintheUnitedStates;therecentgrowthof ProtestantevangelicalsectsinCentralandSouthAmericawhichhelpedtoelecttwo “bornagain”presidentsinGuatemala;internecineconflictbetweenHindusandMuslims inIndia,betweenBuddhistsandHindusinSriLanka,andbetweenMuslimsand ChristiansintheformerYugoslavia;theemergenceinIndiaofSikhseparatistsinPunjab andofMuslimmilitantsinJammu-Kashmir;religioussyncretisticgroupsinsub-Saharan Africaandelsewherewhoseaimwascommunityprotection;andtheimpactofJewish fundamentalistgroupsonIsrael’spoliticalconfigurations,especiallyinrelationtothe Palestinians.

Toanalyseandexplainthiswaveofapparentlyunconnecteddevelopmentsweneedto confrontattheoutsetanissueconsistentlyignoredinpoliticalanalysis:Howdoreligious values,normsandbeliefsstimulateandaffectpoliticaldevelopmentsandviceversa?For example,historicalanalysiswouldpointtothecloserelationshipovertimebetweenthe tophierarchyoftheRomanCatholicchurchandsuccessiveless-than-democratic governmentsinLatinAmerica,yetoverthelast20years(i.e.,duringperiodsof dictatorialrule)someChurchofficialsemergedaschampionsofdemocracy,vocalin opposingmilitarydictatorships.SeniormembersoftheRomanCatholichierarchy,onthe otherhand,retainedtheirroleswithintherulingtriumviratealongwithseniormilitary figuresandbiglandownersandcapitalists.Howdoweexplainthecontemporary divergenceofviewsbetweenseniorCatholicfiguresandmanypriestsonthegroundin LatinAmerica?AsimilarprocessoccurredamongfollowersofIslamthroughoutthe Muslimworld(i.e.,some50countriesstretchingfromMoroccotoIndonesia).Senior Islamicfiguresremainedclosetosecularrulers,whilepoliticalchallengestothe status quo wereledandco-ordinatedbylower-andmiddle-rankingMuslims.Asimilartypeof schismwasobservableinThailandandMyanmar(Burma)whereseniorBuddhistswere oftensupportiveofmilitary(-supported)régimes,whilejuniorfiguresattackedthemfor theircorruptionandpoliticalincompetence.Acommondenominatorintheseeventswas seniorreligiousfigures’closerelationshipswithsecularpoliticalandeconomicélites. Thoseclosesttothepeople,ontheotherhand—thoseinvolvedinreligiousissuesat communitylevel—foundthemselvesrespondingtopopularpressuresforchangewhich cutacrosshorizontalclassstratifications,verticalethnicorregionaldifferences,andthe urban-ruraldivide.Whatemergedwasaseriousriftbetweenrulersandruled,where religionwasoftenafocalpointfordemandsforchange.

Thispaperseekstoshedlightupontherelationshipbetweenreligion,politics,conflict andidentityinthecontemporaryperiod.Thefocuswillpredominantlybeonmassculture ratherthanélitepreferencesbecausenostatesaregovernedbyactualorclaimed theocraticrégimesapartfromahandfulintheMuslimworld(SaudiArabia,Iran,

Afghanistan,theSudan).Oppositiongroups,ontheotherhand,frequentlyinclude religiousfiguresamongtheirleaders.Insummary,theargumentspresentedare:a)that theeffectsassociatedwithmodernization—i.e.,socio-economicandpoliticalchange involvingurbanization,industrializationandcentralizationofgovernment—arecrucial toanunderstandingofthepoliticalroleofreligioninthecurrentera;b)thatreligion— farfromfadingfrompoliticalrelevance—hasonthecontraryassumedanimportant— althoughvariable—mobilizingroleinmanycultures;andc)thatthenatureofareligious vehiclewillnotonlybeaccountablebyreferencetostructuralandsystemicattributesand developments,butwillalsoreflecttheparticularcharacteristicsoftheculturewhich producesandusesit.

Inthispapertheterm“religion”isusedintwodistinct,yetrelated,ways.First,ina materialsenseitreferstoreligiousestablishments(i.e.institutionsandofficials)aswell astosocialgroupsandmovementswhose raisonsd’être aretobefoundwithinreligious concerns.ExamplesincludetheconservativeRomanCatholicorganization,OpusDei,the reformistIslamicSalvationFront(FIS)ofAlgeria,andtheHindu-chauvinistBharatiya JanataPartyofIndia.Second,inaspiritualsense,religionpertainstomodelsofsocial andindividualbehaviourthathelpbelieverstoorganizetheireverydaylives.Inthis sense,religionrelatestotheideaoftranscendence,i.e.,itrelatestosupernaturalrealities; withsacredness,i.e.,asasystemoflanguageandpracticethatorganizestheworldin termsofwhatisdeemedholy;andwithultimacy,i.e.,itrelatespeopletotheultimate conditionsofexistence.

Becauseoftheimportanceplacedhereontheexplanatoryvalueoftheroleof modernization,itmaybeappropriateattheoutsettosayalittleaboutit.Throughoutthe ThirdWorld,withtheimportantexceptionofpost-revolutionarystatessuchasChinaand Iran,thegeneraldirectionofsocialchangeisusuallyreferredtoaseither “modernization”of“Westernization”.Thatis,socialchangeisunderstoodtoleadto significantshiftsinthebehaviourandprevailingchoicesofsocialactors,withsuch particularistictraitsasethnicityorcastelosingimportanceinrelationtomoregeneralistic attributessuchasnationalism.Growthofformalorganizations(e.g.politicalparties)and procedures(e.g.“theruleoflaw”),itisclaimed,reducethecentralroleofclientelismand patronage.Inshort,somebelievethattheadventofsocialchangecorrespondingtoa presumedprocessofmodernizationwillleadtoageneraljettisoningofolder,traditional valuesandtheadoptionofother,initiallyalien,practices.Inmanyrespects,however,the adoptionofWesterntraitsinmanyThirdWorldstatesisratherskindeep:Westernsuits formenratherthantraditionaldress,thetrappingsofstatehood—flag,constitution, legislature,etc.—aWestern linguafranca,andsoon.Theimportantpointisthatsocial changewillnotbeeventhroughoutasociety;socialandpoliticalconflictsarehighly likelyowingtothepatchyadoptionofmodernpractices.Socialchangedestabilizes, creatingadichotomybetweenthosewhoseektobenefitfromwholesalechangeandthose whopreferthe statusquo.Newsocialstrataarisewhosepositionintheneworderis decidedlyambiguous.Examplesincluderecentrural-urbanmigrantsinMiddleEastern, African,LatinAmericanandotherThirdWorldsocietieswhofindthemselvesbetween twoworlds,oftenwithoutaneffectiveorappropriatesetofanchoringvalues.Suchpeople areparticularlyopentopoliticalappealsbasedonreligiousprecepts.

Generally,religionisanimportantsourceofbasicvalueorientations.Itmayhavea powerfulimpactuponpoliticswithinastateorregion,especiallyinthecontextof ethnicity,cultureorfundamentalism.Ethnicityrelatestothesharedcharacteristicsofa racialorculturalgroup.Religiousbeliefmayreinforceethnicconsciousnessandinterethnicconflict,especiallyintheThirdWorld(butnotonlythere:thinkofNorthern IrelandortheformerYugoslavia).Religiousfundamentalism,ontheotherhand,connotes a“setofstrategies,bywhichbeleagueredbelieversattempttopreservetheirdistinctive

identityasapeopleorgroup”inresponsetoarealorimaginedattackfromthosewho apparentlythreatentodrawthemintoa“syncretistic,areligious,orirreligiouscultural milieu”(MartyandScottAppleby,1993:3).Sometimessuchdefensivenessmaydevelop intoapoliticaloffensivewhichseekstoaltertheprevailingsocial,politicaland,on occasions,economicrealitiesofstate-societyrelations.

Religionrelatestopoliticsinwayswhicharethemselveslinkedtotheparticularhistorical anddevelopmentaltrajectoriesofindividualsocieties,whethertraditionalormodern.In traditionalsocietiestherelationshipbetweenreligionandpoliticsisalwaysacloseone. Politicalpowerisunderpinnedbyreligiousbeliefsandpractices,whilepoliticalconcerns permeatetotheheartofthereligioussphere.Rulersarenotonlypoliticalheads:theyare alsoreligiousleaders,whosewell-beingiscloselylinkedtotheirpeople’shealthand welfare.

Modernizationoftenleadstoahighdegreeofsecularizationandapracticalalthoughnot necessarilysymbolicseparationofpoliticsandreligionatthestatelevel.Theprocessis not,however,alwayscompleteorclear-cut.Forexample,QueenElizabethIIofthe UnitedKingdomisaconstitutionalrulerwhoisalsoformallytheheadoftheChurchof England.Inpractice,sheismuchlesspoliticallypowerfulthanmoststatepresidents; fromareligiouspointofviewherroleispracticallymoribund,yetsymbolicallyitstill hassomeimportance.KingHassanIIofMorocco,ontheotherhand,isimbuedwitha highdegreeofreligiousauthoritywhichramifiesintopoliticalstanding.Hisreligious authorityderivesfromhisroleas AlAmiralMumineen:CommanderoftheFaithful. ManyMoroccansbelievethatheisadirectdescendentoftheProphetMuhammad.King Hassanuseshispopularreligiousstandingtooffsetchallengestohispositionfroma growingIslamist(i.e.,seekingIslamicizationofsocietybypoliticalmeans)threat.He builtoneoftheworld’slargestmosques,whichopenedinAugust1993,asawayof demonstratinghispiety.

TheSaudimonarch,KingFahd,alsohasasignificantreligioustitle:“Protectorofthe HolyPlaces”—MeccaandMedina.Yet,heprotectsthemastheheadofamodernstate ratherthanasleaderofareligiouscommunityalone.ForKingFahd,theroleofreligion (inaninstitutionalsense)intheupholdingofhispowerislimited:thereisnoelected assembly,nowrittenconstitution,andnoadvisorybodyofreligio-legalscholars(ulama) togivetheking’sauthorityanIslamicgloss.InSaudiArabia,thereisnopublicscrutiny ofdecision-makingandpoliticalprocessesatall.Fahdrulesbywayofhisownabsolutist politicalandtribalauthorityratherthanbecauseofhisreligiouscredentials,althoughthe latterareusefulinbolsteringhisposition.

Somewhereinthemiddleofthetwoextremes—avirtualabsenceofreligiousauthority (QueenElizabeth)andahighdegreeofit(KingsFahdandHassan)—isKingBhumipol AdulyadejofThailand.TheravadaBuddhismisthestatereligionaccordingtothe constitutionof1968.KingBhumipolmustprofessanddefendtheBuddhist dharma (the moralandphysicalorderofthestate)andthecommunityofmonks(sangha).Heis, however,inthepositionofneedingtoreacha modusvivendi withthemilitarybecauseof itstraditionalroleaspowerbroker.

Monarchicalsystems,oftenwithaconnotationoftraditionalformsofrule,areofcourse relativelyrareinthelatetwentiethcentury.Muchmorecommonarepoliticalsystems whoseleadingbodieshaveauthorityderivedfrompoliticians’abilitytowinandholdon topower.Thecurrentnormisfornationalpoliticalleadersandgovernmentstobe formallyunconnectedwithoneparticularsetofreligiousbeliefs.Yetoverthelastquarter centuryorso,religion—inbothmaterialandspiritualsenses—appearstohaveenjoyed aglobalrenaissance.Sometimesthiswasinthefaceofofficialattemptstodiminishits

stature,asintheformerEasternEuropeancommunistcountrieswheretheobjectofthe statewassocialengineering—thecreationofideologicallynewpeople;sometimesit wasanapparentlysurprisingdevelopmentinthefaceofmodernizationandsocioeconomicchange,asinWesternEuropeandNorthAmerica.

ATypologyofPoliticalReligion

Attemptstosalvagethesecularizationmodelhaveinterpretedevidenceof burgeoningreligiosityinmanycontemporarypoliticaleventstomeanthatwe arewitnessingmerelya fundamentalist,antimodernistbacklashagainst science,industrializationandliberalWesternvalues ...Religiousfervouris oftendismissedas ethnichostility ...,typicallyexplainedawayasanisolated exceptiontounremittingtrendsofsecularizationandseldomrecognizedas partofalargerglobalphenomenon(Sahliyeh,1990:19;emphasesadded).

Thequotationsuggeststwoareaswherereligionisofparticularimportancein understandingpoliticalandsocialdevelopments:ethnicityissuesand“religious fundamentalism”.Yetthisisonlypartofthestory:wealsoneedtobeawareofthe politicalimportanceofreligioussyncretismandofcommunity-orientedreligiousgroups (whosepositionmaybebolsteredbyanationalreligioushierarchy’sinstitutionalvoiceof oppositionduringdictatorship),inordertounderstandfullywhathasbeenhappeningin recenttimesinthesphereofinteractionbetweenreligionandpolitics.

Fourbroadtypesofreligion-inspiredentities—“culturalist”,“syncretistic”, “fundamentalist”,“community-oriented”—haveanimpactuponpolitics. Culturalist groups emergewhenacommunity,sharingbothreligiousandethnicaffinities,perceives itselfasapowerlessandrepressedminoritywithinastatedominatedbyoutsiders.The mobilizationoftheoppositiongroup’sculture(ofwhichreligionisanimportantpart)is directedtowardsachievingself-control,autonomyorself-government.Examplesinclude SikhsinIndia,southernSudaneseChristianpeoples(suchastheDinkaandtheNuer fightingbothIslamizationandArabization),TibetanVajrayanaBuddhistsinChina, MuslimPalestinianslivinginIsrael’soccupiedterritories,BosnianMuslimsinformer Yugoslavia,radicalMuslimsinBritain,andfollowersoftheAmericanradical,Louis Farrakhan,andhisorganization,theNationofIslam.Ineachcase,thereligionfollowed bytheethnicminorityprovidespartoftheideologicalbasisforactionagainst representativesofadominantculturewhomtheminorityperceivesaimstoundermineor toeliminatetheirindividuality.

Asecondtypeofreligiousentity,foundpredominantlyamongcertainruraldwellersin partsoftheThirdWorld,especiallysub-SaharanAfrica,arereligious syncretistic groups,i.e.,thoseinvolvingafusionorblendingofreligions.Theytypicallyfeaturea numberofelementsfoundinmoretraditionalformsofreligiousassociation,suchas ancestorworship,healingandshamanisticpractices.Sometimesethnicdifferentiation formsanaspectofsyncretism.Asyncretisticcommunityusesbothreligiousandsocial beliefstobuildgroupsolidarityinthefaceofathreatfromoutsideforces—often,but notinvariably,thestate.ExamplesincludethecultofOlivorismointheDominican Republicand,accordingtosome,SenderoLuminosoinPeru,whoseideology,avariant ofMaoism,alsoutilizesaspectsofindigenous(i.e.,pre-Christian)cultural-religious beliefstoattractpeasantsinAyacucho;theNapramasofnorth-easternMozambiquewho combinetraditionalandRomanCatholicbeliefs,andweretemporarilysuccessfulin defeatingtheSouthAfrican-supportedguerrillamovement,theMozambiqueNational Resistance(RENAMO)intheearly1990s;andthetwo“Alices”—Lakwenaand Lenshina—wholedsyncretisticmovementsinUgandaandZambiarespectively,

involvingafusionofmainstreamChristianfaithandtraditionalbeliefs,againsttheir governmentsinpursuitofregionalautonomy.

Third, religiousfundamentalists,feelingtheirwayoflifeunderthreat,aimtoreform societyinaccordancewithreligioustenets—tochangethelaws,morality,socialnorms andsometimesthepoliticalconfigurationsoftheircountry.Theyseektocreatea traditionallyoriented,lessmodern(ized)society.Fundamentaliststendtolivein populationcentres—orareatleastcloselylinkedwitheachotherbyelectronicmedia. Fundamentalistsfightagainstgovernmentsbecausethelatter’sjurisdictionencompasses areaswhichtheformerholdasintegraltothebuildingofanappropriatesociety, includingeducation,employmentpolicy(ofmenratherthanwomen)andthenatureof society’smoralclimate.Fundamentalistsstruggleagainstboth“nominal”co-religionists whomtheyperceiveaslaxintheirreligiousdutiesandagainstmembersofopposing religionswhomtheyperceiveasevil,evensatanic.Examplesoffundamentalistgroups aretobefoundamongfollowersofChristianity,Islam,andJudaism—theAbrahamic “religionsofthebook”—and,somewouldargue,amongHindusandBuddhistsaswell.

Finally, community-oriented groupsutilizeaspectsoftheirreligiousfaithtoinspire themselvesprimarilytowardself-helpimprovementsintheirlives:thismayormaynot involveovertconflictwithgovernment.Especiallyprominentinthiscategoryarelocal communitygroups,mostlyRomanCatholicininspiration,whichhavemushroomedover thelast25yearsinLatinAmerica,thePhilippinesandinpartsofsub-SaharanAfrica. Many—butnotall—derivetheirideasfromthetenetsofradicalliberationtheology.In addition,duetotheoppressionassociatedwiththedictatorshipswhichwerecommonin LatinAmericauntilrecently,nationalreligioushierarchies—suchastheCatholicchurch inChile—mayemergeasahighlysignificantsourceofoppositionwhichiscapableof offeringadegreeofsustainedresistance,seekingtoprotectlocalcommunitiesfromthe depredationsofoppressivegovernment.

Thesefourbroadcategoriesarenotmutuallyexclusive.Forexample,some fundamentalistgroupsmayalsobecommunityoriented,whileanumberofculturalist groupsmayalsobesyncretistic.Thepurposeofdifferentiatingbetweentheminwhatis inevitablyasomewhatidealfashionistoseektoidentifythenatureoftheirrelationship withotherreligiousorethnicgroupsandwithgovernment.Byseparatingthefourtypes ofreligiousgroupsitispossibletoarriveatsomeconclusionsrelatingtothewayin whicheachcopeswiththestressesandstrainsofmodernization,aswellastheirpotential forconflictwithothers.Thetableonthefollowingpagesetsoutinschematicformthe relationshipswhicheachhaswithgovernment

Objective

TypesofReligiousGroupsandPoliticalInteraction

CulturalistSyncretistFundamentalist

Tousecultural separatenessto seektoachieve autonomyin relationto centralizedstate. Examples:Sikhs, Tibetans

Toachievehigher politicalstanding withinnational cultureofdiverse groups.Examples: Napramas,Holy SpiritMovement

Perceptions ofstateand society

Perceptionof roleof government

Roleinpolitical process

Aggregationof diversegroupswith statestructure dominatedbyone particulargroup

Societycomprises diversegroups withoneorafew oftendominating atstatelevel

Toprotectselfproclaimedgroups ofthe“religiously pure”against governmental attemptstobelittle religion.Examples: GushEmunim, Hamas,Islamic SalvationFront (FIS)

Societyis dichotomized between“believers” and“non-believers”. Stateaimsto extenditspower atthecostof believers’

CommunityOriented

Todirectcommunityactivities forenhancement oflocalgroups’ self-interest. Examples:Basic Christian Communities

Citizen participation

Topreventthefull floweringof diversity

Mayusevehicleof politicalpartyif government permits;nonconstitutional meansmayalso beemployed

Activeparticipation ofgroupmembers willbeencouraged bygroupleadersin seekingpolitical goals

Seenashostileor indifferent Regardedas seekingto undermine religion’srole insociety

Willoftenremain outsideanyformal politicalprocess pursuinggoals throughdirect action,negotiation andlobbying

Individualinterests seenassynonymouswithcommunitygoals

Mayfightelections ifpermitted.In addition,awide rangeofmeansof gainingpolitical endsmaybe employed

Individualinterests seenassubordinatetothe interestsofthe religiousentity

Societycomprises diverseinterests. Localgroupsneed tobeaidedsothat self-interestcanbe protectedand furthered

Seenashostileor indifferenttoplight oflocalcommunities

Formallyuninvolvedalthough activistsmayally themselveswith mostprogressive politicalparties

Popularparticipationessential tooffsetélite dominanceof politicsandsociety

Tacticsto achieve objectives

Anymeans necessary consideredconstitutionalor non-constitutionalincludingterrorism

Defensive mobilizationof communityinterests whichmaybecome moreaggressive

Dependingonthe ideologyofthe fundamentalist groupmosttactics wouldberegarded aslegitimate

ReligiousMobilizationandPoliticalAction

Lobbyingofpolitical élites,andas widespreadas possiblepopular mobilization

Eachofthefourcategoriesofreligiousmovementidentifiedabovehastwofactorsin common.First,leadersofeachutilizereligiouspreceptstopresentamessageofhopeand aprogrammeofactiontoputativefollowers,whichmayhaveapoliticalimpact.Second, suchreligiousmovementstendtobeinherentlyoppositionalincharacter;theirleaders

capitalizeuponpre-existingdissatisfactionwiththe statusquo inordertofocusanddirect organizedsocietaloppositiontothe statusquo.Itisimportanttonote,however,thatnot allofthefourgroupstargetthegoverningrégimeinanovertlypoliticizedmanner. Fundamentalistandculturalistgroupshaveastheir raisond’être aninherentantipathyto government;community-orientedandsyncretisticgroups,ontheotherhand,tendtobe morediffuseincharacter,oftenrurally-basedandmoreconcernedwithself-helpissues thanwithemphasizingstraightforwardoppositiontogovernmentpolicies.Thissectionof thepaperexaminestherelationshipbetweenreligiousleadersandfollowers,inthe contextofthefouridentifiedcategories,inordertosuggesthowsupportisgainedand maintainedfortheobjectiveofsocietal,politicalandreligiouschange.

Thecharacterandimpactoffundamentalistdoctrinesislocatedwithinanexusofmoral andsocialissuesrevolvingaroundstate-societyinteractions.Themainprogenitorof recentfundamentalistmovementshasbeenaperceptiononthepartofbothleadersand followersthattheirrulersareperforminginadequatelyand,often,corruptly.Religious fundamentalismisoften(butnotalways:BuddhistandHindu“fundamentalism”are exceptions)stronglyrelatedtoacriticalreadingofreligioustexts,andtherelatingof “God’swords”tobelievers’perceptionofreality.Thesignificanceofthisfromapolitical perspectiveisthatitsuppliesalreadyrestivepeopleswithaready“manifesto”ofsocial changeleadingtoamoredesirablegoal,whichtheirleadersusebothtoberatetheir secularrulersandtoproposeaprogrammeforradicalreformofthe statusquo

Itisrelativelyeasyforfundamentalistleaderstogainthesupportofthosewhofeelthatin somewaythedevelopmentofsocietyisnotgoingaccordingtoeitherGod’swillora community’sinterests.Yetfundamentalismappealstodifferentgroupsfordifferent reasonsatdifferenttimes.TheissueofcontemporaryChristianfundamentalisminthe UnitedStatesandIslamicfundamentalisminBritainhasalreadybeenalludedto:inboth cases,dissatisfactionwiththewaythatsocietyappearstobedevelopingisattherootof thefundamentalistappeal.Althoughitisimpossibletodealadequatelywithallaspectsof religiousfundamentalisminthespaceavailableinthecurrentpaper,afewremarksmust sufficetoexplicatethegeneraloutlinesofthepoliticalrelationshipbetweenleadersand led,andoftheimpactoftheirprogrammesuponstate-societyrelations.

Ofgreatestpoliticalimportamongfundamentalistgroupsarethoseembeddedinan Islamiccontext.Somepropose(orpractise)armedstruggletowrestpowerfrom government,somebelieveinincrementalchangethroughtheballotbox,othersseekto achievetheirgoalsbywayofacombinationofextra-parliamentarystruggle,societal proselytizationandgovernmentallobbying.Despitedifferencesintactics,Islamic fundamentalistgroupssharetwobroadideas:thatpoliticsandreligionareinseparable andthat sharia lawmustbeappliedtoallMuslims—whethervoluntarilyorbyforce. ManyIslamicfundamentalistsbelievethatMuslimsasagrouparethefocalpointofa conspiracyinvolvingZionistsandimperialistswhoseaimjointlyistowrestMuslimlands andresources(especiallyoil).Americantransnationalcorporations’controloverMiddle Easternoil,andIsrael’sdenialoffullrightsforits(largelyMuslim)ArabPalestinian constituency,providegristtothemillofIslamicfundamentalists’claimsofconspiracyto belittleanddepriveMuslims.

MilitantIslamicgroupsrecruitmostoftheirmembersfromarangeofprofessionsand backgrounds;theytendtocomefromlower-middleormiddleclassbackgroundsandare tobefoundpredominantlyamongteachers,universitystudentsandgraduates(especially fromscientificandtechnicalbackgrounds),militaryandpoliceofficers,andshopkeepers. Manyliveinurbanareaswitharecenthistoryofaruralpast.Theargumentsandappeals oftheleadersarecouchedintheologicallanguage,butthechiefconcernsoffollowersare probablymoreprosaic:socialandeconomicgoalspredicateduponfundamentalpolitical

change.Inotherwords,bolsteringandstrengtheningtheovertlytheologicalandreligious terminologyarearangeofbasicpoliticalissuesandsocio-economicgrievanceswhich accountforthewidespreadpoliticalsupportintheMiddleEastandelsewhereforIslamic groups’programmesandpolicies.Islamicfundamentalistgroupsseekparticipationin whatareessentiallyclosedpoliticalandeconomicsystemsdominatedbyanoften cohesivepoliticalandeconomicélite,includingtheupperechelonsofthemilitary (Bromley,1994).

IslamicmovementsinseveralMiddleEasterncountries,includingEgypt,Jordan,Algeria andTunisia,haveregisteredelectoralsuccessesinrecenttimes.Islamistsinthese countries(withtheexception,controversially,ofAlgeria)haverecentlygainedseatsin legislatures,whichhasalsohelpedtosustainpublicsupportfortheirmovements’aims andobjectives.Theeffectsofthishavebeentwofold:ontheonehand,pressureiskeptup againstthegoverningélites—whichmayleadtofurtherconcessions—while,onthe otherhand,Islamistvictorieshelpbothtosustainthesupportoftheexistingfollowers whilemakingitmoreplausibleforotherstoaddtheirweighttothefundamentalist campaignforchange.Practicalstepstoincreasesocietalinfluenceincludethestagingof demonstrationswhichmayhaveanumberoftargets:theubiquitousInternational MonetaryFund-supportedeconomicstructuraladjustmentprogrammes;Israel’streatment ofthePalestinians;thefailuretoimplement(orimplementquicklyenough)the incorporationof sharia lawintothelegalsystem;andtheclaimedcorruptionofpolitical officeholders.

Islamicfundamentalistcampaignsaredirectedagainstboth“lax”co-religionistsanda governingélite.Culturalistcampaigns,ontheotherhand,seektofurtheroneparticular culturalorethnicgroupinrelationtoeitherstatepowerorthatofothergroupswithinthe state.Thedrivingforceforsuchmovementsisastrivingforgreaterautonomyanda largersliceofthe“nationalcake”inrelationtoothergroupswhichareperceivedtobe enjoyingmorethantheirfairshare.Indiahasbecomethelocusofanumberofculturalist challengestothe statusquo.Duringthe1980s,politicizationofcommunaltensions expandedintoruralareaswheretheyhadbeenmoreorlessunknownbefore;theybecame especiallypronouncedinthesouthofthecountryandinJammu-Kashmir.Movestowards separationandautonomywithinIndiansocietywereaccompaniedbyanincreasein communalviolence.Developingfromisolatedincidentsinvolvingonlylimitednumbers ofcombatants,overthelastfewyearsincreasinglyserious,large-scaleclasheshave eruptedbetweencommunalgroups.Inthe1980s,suchcommunalviolencecameto characterizerelationsbetweenSikhsandHindus,throughterroristactsonthepartof Sikhsand,intheaftermathofIndiraGandhi’sassassinationin1984,Hindudestructionof SikhlifeandpropertyinmanynorthernIndiancities.PoliticalsupportinPunjab,theSikh homelandwhichSikhmilitantscall“Khalistan”becamepolarizedamongpartiesand groupsonthebasisofreligion,ascentralgovernmentssuccessivelydemonstrated extremereluctancetoconcedeSikhdemandsforgreaterautonomyanddecentralization ofpowerwithinthefederalsystem.

Syncretisticreligiousmovementsarecommonlyfoundinsub-SaharanAfrica.Duringthe colonialera,suchmovementsflourishedintheruralareasinthecontextofwidespread dissatisfactionwithaspectsofcolonialrule.Onoccasion,erstwhilefoes—suchasthe ShonaandtheNdebeleincolonialRhodesia(Zimbabwe)—combinedtoresistBritish colonialism.Religiousidentificationwasanimportantfacetofsuchorganization.Spirit mediumsused“medicines”toenhance“warriors”martialefforts.Theycreatedanational networkofshrinestoprovideanagencyforthetransmissionandco-ordinationof informationandactivities,astructurewhichwasre-establishedduringtheindependence warofthe1970s.Theuseofmedicinealsohelpedgalvanizetheanti-colonialMaji-Maji rebellionof1905-1907inGermancontrolledTanganyika.Thedivinerandprophet,

Kinjikitili,gavehisfollowersmedicinewhichwassupposedtorendertheminvulnerable tobullets.Heanointedlocalleaderswiththe maji (“water”)whichhelpedtocreate solidarityamongabout20differentethnicgroupsandencouragedthemtofighttogether inacommonanti-Europeancause.InnorthernUganda,thecultofYakanamongstthe Lugbara,whichalsocentredontheuseofmagicmedicine,galvanizedtheLugbarain theirshortwaragainstEuropeansin1919(Allen,1991:379-380).Thelistofsuchreligiopoliticalmovementscouldbeextended;thepointhoweverisalreadyhopefullyclear: manycultsarose,ledbyprophets,stimulatedbycolonialismandthesocialchangesto whichitled.Theyemployedlocalreligiousbeliefsasabasisforanti-Europeanprotest andopposition.

Aftercolonialism,similarcultscontinuedtoappear:clearlytheirexistencecouldnotonly beexplainedbythestressesandstrainsoccasionedbycolonialrule.Thebeliefs associatedwiththefollowersofsyncretisticleaders,suchasAliceLenshinaandJoseph KonyinZambiainthe1950sand1960s,andtheviolencethesebeliefsengendered, shouldbelocatedwithinageneralbackgroundofupheavalwhichoccurredasaresultof theendofcolonialrule(Allen,1991:379).Theycanbeexplainedasaresponseto extremesocialtrauma,amanifestationofcollectivedespairatanunwelcomepolitical outcome.Ascolonialismwaxedandwaned,thespreadofbothChristianityandIslam throughoutsub-SaharanAfricacontinuedapace.LenshinaandKonyskilfullyfashioned anideologyofresistancewhichusedablendofbothpre-ChristianandChristianreligious beliefstocreateapotentmobilizationalforce.Whattheseexamplessuggestisthatin manyruralareasofAfricathreatenedbycrisisandtheproblemofprofoundsocial instability—providedthereisasufficientdegreeofcommunalsolidarity—prophet-led resistance,whethertoacolonialorpost-colonialstateorrebelattack,willsucceedin organizingcommunitiesinself-defence.Giventhelackofclearclassdifferentiationin manyruralAfricansocieties,theappealofreligioussyncretistideologieshasawide currency.Oppressedanddefeatedpeoplesturnedtothemetaphysicalinpursuitoftheir struggleagainstoutsidecontrol.Whatseemsclearisthatsuchmovementswerenot merelyareactioneithertocolonialismortodiscretepost-colonialpoliticaldevelopments. Rather,theywereconcernedwithcultural,regional,ethnic,politicalandeconomic tensionswhichexistedbeforecolonialism(andwhichthelatterhelpedtopoliticize),and whichresurfacedinthepost-colonialepochwhenonegroupsoughttoachievehegemony overothers.Groupsthatresortedtoreligioussymbolismaspoliticalideologywere generallythosewhichnotonlyfeltthattheyhadbeenmistreatedorabandonedby government,buthadalsotraditionallybeenmarginalizedbybothcolonialandpostcolonialpoliticalandeconomicstructuresandprocesses.

Theremainingcategoryofreligiousexpressionisthecommunity-orientedgroupsfound mosttypically,butnotexclusively,amongtheCatholicpopulationofLatinAmerica.In recenttimes,thespreadofProtestantismintheregionhasfacilitatedthegrowthof evangelicalcommunitygroupswhichfunctionasconduitsofsolidarityandmobilization. TheoriginsoftheCatholicBasicChristianCommunities(BCCs)canbetracedback further,tothemovestowardspopularcommunitydevelopmentwhichdevelopedfromthe early1960s,encouragedbyradicalizedclergyatthegrassroots.Suchpriestsorganized theirfollowersforself-helpandspiritualpurposes,guidedbyavisionoftheChristian promiseofredemptionwhichdirectlylinkedthetemporalspherewiththespiritual. LinkedtoPauloFreire’scontemporaneousliteracycampaigns,socialchangeinthe presentwasseenasintegraltopeople’slong-rangespiritualredemption.

Concretely,thismeantthefullparticipationofordinarypeopleintheshapingoftheirown lives.Profounddependenceandpassivityhadtobereplacedbyfullparticipationandselfdeterminationintheeconomicandpoliticalspheres.Toachievethesegoals,radical priestsbecamespokesmenforabroadpoliticalprogrammewithtwomainaims:

participatorydemocracyandpracticaldevelopmenttodeliverdesirablesocialgoods, includingelectricity,schools,healthposts,cleanwater,roadsandlatrines.BCCs occasionallyproducedleadersformassmovements,suchastradeunionsandthe BrazilianLabourParty,whichwereimportantintheprocessofpopularmobilizationthat ultimatelyhelpedtounderminethecredibilityandviabilityofthecountry’smilitary dictatorship,forcingittohandoverpowertoelectedciviliansin1985(Medhurst, 1989:25).

ThecontributionthattheBCCsmadetothedemocratictransitioninLatinAmericainthe 1970sand1980shasbeenthesubjectofconsiderabledebate.Differentperspectivesmay besummedupasfollows:first,thoseonthesecularleft-wing,perhapsexhibitinga doctrinalunwillingnesstobelievethatanythingprogressivecanresultfromreligiouslyinspiredinitiatives,tendtodismissthegroupsaslargelyineffectualagentsofsocial change.AsecondanalyticalfocusseestheBCCsashavingaprimarilysecularimpactin theelectoralsphere,asnucleiofsupportforprogressivepoliticalparties.Third,forthose attractedtothetheologyofliberation,BCCsrepresenttheseedsofanew,morejustand fraternalsociety,helpingtotransformsocietiesfromthebottomupthroughavarietyof liberatingpractices.Afinalinterpretationseestheirroleinmorecomplexandabstract terms:thegroups’primarycontributiontodemocratizationshouldbeseenintheirability toforgeaspiritofTocquevillianenlightenedself-interestamongparticipants,forginga citizenryawareofitspoliticalrightsandduties(Roelofs,1988:559).BCCsthusrepresent anumberofdiscerniblesocio-politicalorientationswhichdifferdependingonthewider state-societycontext.

Typically,BCCsaresmall,face-to-facegroupsof15to20families(20-40people), frequentlybondedbyphysicalproximityandpoverty.Theymeetperiodically,perhaps onceafortnightoronceamonth.BecauseofaseriousshortageofCatholicreligious professionalsonthegroundinLatinAmerica,priests’effortshavebeenfocusedon gettingthebasiccommunitiestooperateontheirown.Inpractice,thishasmeantthat BCCsdemonstrateawiderdiversityinbothreligiousbeliefsandrolesandpracticesthan manyaccountssuggest.Evenso,BCCshavethreecommonfunctions.First,biblestudy isusuallywhatbringsthecommunitiesintoexistence.Thebiblemayofcoursebe interpretedfromeitherafundamentalistperspectiveorfromareformistviewpoint.In otherwords,thebiblecanbeusedasajustificationeithertoattackthe statusquo orto supportit;biblestudy perse isfreeofideology.Sessionsmaylastanhourorsoand involvethereadingofselectedpassagesandtheunrehearseddiscussionofthembasedon personalexperienceandreflection.Thesediscussionsareoftencombinedwithequally unrehearsedprayerandsomeliturgicalexperimentation,andperhapsacommunalmeal. Second,communalactionisubiquitous,oftencomprisinggroupprojectswitheducational orhealthpurposes,toimprovethelocalenvironment.AthirdcommonaimoftheBCCs, aswehavealreadynoted,istochangepeople’sself-consciousness.Sometimes,asin Chile,thereislittleneedtodeveloppeople’sself-consciousnessoreventousebiblestudy asameansofachievingpoliticization.Itwasunfortunatelyonlytoocleartomanypoor peoplethattheexerciseofpowerinthecountrywasforthebenefitofasmallproportion ofthetotalpopulation.

ThepoliticalorientationofBCCsisobviouslylinkedtothetypesofpeoplewhojoin them,andtheirprecisefunctionsvaryaccordingtothenatureoftherégimeunderwhich theymustoperate.InChile,forexample,anincreasinglypoliticallyrepressiveand economicallystringentseriesofmeasures(whoseneteffectwasseriouslytodisadvantage thepoor)ledtoaradicalizationofthelocalBCCs.Manybecamevehiclesforthosewho wishedtochangesocietytoempowerthepoor,thosewhowereunrepresented—orat leastseriouslyunder-represented—inthepowerhierarchy.Duringtheauthoritarianrule ofGeneralAugustusPinochet’sjunta(1973-1990)membersoflocalBCCsangered

elementsinthegovernmentanditssupporters.Verbalattacksbegantoappearinthe government-controlledmediaby1977,chargingthattheChileanBCCs’umbrellagroup, theVicariadelaSolidaridad(VicariateofSolidarity),harbouredcommunistsympathizers andreceivedforeignmoneytosupportpoliticaldissidentsinChile.Asaresult,local BCCmemberswereharassed.Foreignpriestswerefrequentlyperceivedaspolitically undesirablebyPinochet’srégime:between1973and1979,nearly400foreignpriests wereexpelledfromChile,precipitatinganetdeclineofover10percentinthetotal clergy(Smith,1982:343).

ThemostdynamicperiodinmanyBCCs’existencewasduringthelongperiodsof militaryruleinLatinAmericainthe1970sandearly1980s.AccordingtoRudolfo CardenalinhisassessmentofBCCsinElSalvador:

TheprimaryfactorinthebaseChristiancommunitieswasthecharacteristic awarenessofhavingovercomethealienatingaspectsoftraditionalpopular religiosity.Theyrejectednotwhatwaspopular,butrathertheseparationof religiousvaluesfromtherealanddistressingproblemsoflifewhich, furthermore,theydiscoveredopposedpopularChristianreligiosity (1990:245).

Inotherwords,inElSalvadorduringmilitaryrule,BCCsbecamevehiclesofliberation theologyintheabsenceofalternativemeansofmobilization.InconservativeColombia, ontheotherhand,Catholicbishopsvigorouslyattackeddemocratizationwithinthe churches,reservingspecialfireforliberationtheology,the“popularChurch”and autonomousBCCs(Levine,1990:26).Socialist-orientedNicaraguaduringthe1980swas thehomeofnumerousBCCs,mostofwhichwereweddedtoaradicalvisionofa Christian-socialistfuture.Afewotherswerepoliticallyopposedtotherégime. Nevertheless,theSandinistassawtheBCCsaspoliticalalliesand,asaresult,encouraged them(Serra,1985:151-74).

AprimarybenefitoftheBCCsshouldbeseeninthecontributionthattheymaketothe establishmentofasenseofcitizenship—primarilyamonglower-classparticipants— ratherthannecessarilyintheirimpactuponthenationalpoliticalscene perse.Atthe sametime,theyarealmostinvariablyvehiclesforconscientization:thepoor,byfarthe largestparticipantsintheBCCs,longenvelopedinthepatron-clientmentalitythathas traditionallydefinedclassrelationsinCatholicsocietiesare,forthefirsttime,cooperatingtocreateaworldoftheirownmaking.Inworkingtogetherwithpastoralagents topresslocalofficialsforinfrastructuralimprovementssuchassewers,streetlightsand landreform,forexample,theyarelearningthatsometimesthebestwaytoachievetheir goalsisnotbyappealingasindividualstopowerfulfiguresandbureaucraticauthorities, butbyworkingtogetherforthecommunityasawhole.Inananalysisfocusingon22 BCCslocatedinBrazil’slargeanddynamicArchdioceseofSãoPaulo,Hewittshows themtobemaintaininganeffectivepresenceontheBrazilianpoliticalscene(1990:13952).Nevertheless,hisdatasuggestthattheroleofthegroupsischanginginsuchaway thattheBCCs perse mayfadeas bonafide agentsofsocialandpoliticaltransformation. Suchachangeisattributable,inpart,totherejuvenationofdemocraticpoliticsinBrazil, whichhasledtopeople’sattentionsbeingfocusedonotheravenuestosocio-political change.Yetsuchaconclusionmaybeopentodoubt:thegrowthofcommunityProtestant evangelicalgroupsinLatinAmericaevokedbelowmaybe,inpart,aresultofthe ineffectivenessoflegitimateavenuestopoliticalandeconomicchangewhichthereintroductionofdemocraticsystemsledpeopletoexpect.

WhatisclearisthatChristiancommunitygroupscannoteasilybepigeon-holed ideologicallyinauniformmanner:sociallyprogressivegroupsexistsidebysidewith thoseofaconservativeorientation.SomeofthemostpoliticallyradicaloftheBCCswere

tobefoundinChileduringtheperiodofthePinochet-leddictatorship.Theyservedas solidarityorganizations,providingahavenformanywhohadlosttheirjobsbecauseof oppositiontothejunta.InSãoPaulo,Brazilontheotherhand,BCCsshowedatendency tobecomevehiclesformiddleclasspoliticalactivity,especiallybeforethereturnto democracyinBrazilin1985.SincethereturntodemocraticpoliticsinLatinAmerica, therehasbeenastronggrowthinseveralcountriesofpopularProtestantevangelical churches.CriticschargethatthesegroupsarenomorethanAmerican“Trojanhorses”: theyarethemostrecentexamplesofanincreasinglydeterminedattemptonthepartofthe UnitedStatestosubmergeLatinAmericanculturebeneathalayerofalien,born-again Christianpropaganda.Thescopeofthepresentpaperdoesnotallowafulldiscussionof thepopularevangelicalchurchesinLatinAmerica;nomorethanafewpointsconcerning theseaimsandorientationswillthushavetosuffice.

First,thereisnoevidencethatsuchchurchesarefundedandguidedfromabroad;infact, quitethecontrary:churchmemberssupporttheworkofthechurchbyregularpayments fromoftenmeagreincomes.Second,theironicalresultofre-democratizationwastobring ithometomanypeoplethattheformalprocessofelectingpoliticalrepresentativesdid notnecessarilyresultinclearimprovementstotheirownlives.Underthese circumstances,thecreationofchurchgroupswhichwouldfunctionascommunitysolidaritygroupsfulfilledmanypeople’sreligiousand,increasingly,materialneeds. Popularevangelicalchurchministerscomefromthesameclassandcultureastheir congregations;Catholicchurchreligiousprofessionals,ontheotherhand,areoften viewedasculturallydifferent,representativesofaclasswhichcanneverknowthehopes, fearsandaspirationsofpoorpeople.Finally,manyconvertstoProtestantismcomenot fromgroupswhoparticipatedinBCCs,butratherfromthelargemajorityofpeoplewho viewedthemselvesasculturallypartoftheCatholicchurchbutwho,inreality,were neveractiveintheChurch’scongregation.Whatthisrepresentsisnotsomuchan “invasionoftheUSsects”;rather,asBerrymannotes,the“Protestantcomingofage markstheendofCatholicreligioushegemony”inLatinAmerica(1994:10). UnderstandablyopposedtothisdevelopmentistheCatholichierarchywhichfindsit expedienttopaintthegrowthofProtestantismasaUnitedStates-controlledimperialistic move.

Inexaminingthecharacteristicsofthesocialconditionswhichgiverisetoreligiopoliticalmovements,thissectionofthepaperhassoughttoestablishhowsuch movementsarepromotedandsustainedovertime,andtoidentifythelinksbetween mobilizationandthepursuitofparticularistobjectives.Thenextfoursectionsseekto deepentheanalysisbyfocusingonthegeographicalspreadofreligio-political movementsinthecontextsofmodernizationandstate-societyrelations.

ReligionandEthnicity:CulturalistFormsofSolidarity

Politicalcultureisanimportantvariableinanalysisofculturalistgroups,asitsuggests underlyingbeliefs,valuesandopinionswhichapeopleholdsdear.Forsomegroups, ethnicidentityiscloselylinkedwithreligion.Itmaybepracticallyimpossibletoseparate outdefiningcharacteristicsofagroup’sculturalcompositionwhenreligiousbeliefisan integralpartofethnicity,asbotharehighlyimportantcomponentsofapeople’sselfidentity.Forexample,itwouldbeverydifficultindeedtoisolatethedifferentcultural components—religiousandnon-religious—ofwhatitmeanstobeaSikh,aJew,a Tibetan,aSomali,anEastTimorese,ora“loyalist”(i.e.,Protestant)or“nationalist”(i.e., RomanCatholic)Ulstermanorwoman.

Itisimportanttonote,however,thatnotallethnicgroupsarealsocollectivelyfollowers ofoneparticularregion.Forexample,theYorubaofsouth-westNigeriaaredivided roughlyequallybetweenfollowersofIslamandadherentsofvariousChristianities, includingRomanCatholicismandevangelicalProtestantism.Yorubagroupself-identity istiedcloselytoidentificationwithcertaingeographicallyspecificareas;religious differentiationisamorerecentaccretion,traceableinparttotheimpactofcolonialism.It doesnotdefine“Yoruba-ness”inrelationtootherethnicgroups.TheIboofeastern Nigeria,ontheotherhand,arepredominantlyChristian;veryfewareMuslim.Whilethis religiousorientationwaslargelyaresultofEuropeancolonialism,Christianitybecamean integralfacetofIboidentityinrelationtopredominantlyMuslimgroupswhomostly resideinthenorthofthecountry.ManyIboscameintocontact(andconflict)with northernMuslimsasaresultoftheirmigrationtothenorthinpursuitofeconomic rewards.Inthecivilwarbetween1967-1970,theIbosecessionistsusedhatredofIslamas partoftheirrallyingpropaganda.Theysoughttodepictthenorthofthecountryas exclusivelyMuslim,whenthetrueproportionwasintheregionof60-70percentofthe population.Inthecivilwar,Christianmiddlebeltpeoples(Tiv,Idoma,Igalla,Southern Zariaandothers)formedthebulkofthefederalinfantry,whileYorubas(bothMuslim andChristian)tookmanypostsinthefederaltechnicalservices.

Overthelast30yearstherehavebeenmanyexamplesofethnicconflictinboth industrializedanddevelopingareas.Untiltheearly1970sscholarsarguedthatethnic conflictwouldwitherawayassocietiesmodernized.Whenthismanifestlyfailedtooccur, academictheorieswereturnedontheirheadtopositaradicallydifferentinterpretationof ethnicityinnationalpolitics.These“conflictualmodernization”ideassuggestedthat growinginter-ethnicsocialandeconomicactivity,ratherthanincreasingthelikelihoodof co-operationbetweenethnicgroups,wouldrathermakeconflictmorelikely(Newman, 1991).Inotherwords,economicmodernizationwasasufficientconditionforthe emergenceofethnicpoliticalconflict.Inthe1970s,ethno-regionalparties,suchasthe PartiQuebecoisinQuebec,theScottishNationalPartyinScotland,PlaidCymruin Wales,andvariousBelgianandSpanishmanifestations,indicatedunequivocallythe growingimportanceofsub-nationalpoliticalpartiesinindustrializedcountries.Inthe 1990s,theexistenceofpoliticalconflictsbetweenculturalistgroupsinEasternEurope, especiallytheerstwhileSovietUnionandformerYugoslavia,underlinedthepotentials forconflictinmulti-ethnicstates.EthnicstrifeinChristianArmeniaandMuslim Azerbaijanandthethree-waystrugglebetween(Christian)Serbs,(Christian)Croats,and MuslimsinBosniaandHerzegovinahavealsoinvolvedreligiousissues.Each constituencyhashaditsinternationalsupport—whiletheMuslimshavebeensupported byMiddleEasternMuslimstatesandIslamistgroups,theChristianArmenians,Serbsand CroatshavereceivedbackingfromRussia,GermanyandGreece.

Itwasnotonlyreligiousconflictsbetweenactualorputativestateswhichfocused internationalattention.TheassassinationofPrimeMinisterIndiraGandhiofIndiain October1984followed“OperationBluestar”,anassaultbyIndiansecurityagentsandthe armytoendtheoccupationoftheGoldenTemple,Amritsar,bytheSikhextremist, JernailSinghBhindranwaleandalargenumberofhisfollowers.Intheprocessmorethan 2,000peoplewerekilled.ThiscatastrophiceventfocusedattentiononSikhdesignsfor anindependentstate,Khalistan.Overtime,Sikhunityfracturedamonganumberof competinggroups,rangingalongaspectrumfrom“extremist”,usingterrorisminpursuit ofpoliticalaims,to“moderates”,whosechieftacticwasnegotiation.AlthoughtheSikhs failedintheshort-termtogaintheirstate,theirexemplaryoppositiontowhatthey perceivedas“Hinduization”ofIndiahelpedtostimulateotherreligio-ethnicseparatist movementsinthecountry.Someofthese,likeMuslimradicalsinthestateofJammuKashmir,usedappealstoreligioussolidaritytofocusoppositiontothecentral government.

ThedefensivenatureoftheJammuandKashmiriMuslimorSikhmobilizingideologyis acommonfeatureofculturalgroupswhoperceivethemselvesunderthreatfromhostile forces.Inthisrespect,theemergenceofputativeunitarystatesintheThirdWorldasa resultofdecolonizationaftertheSecondWorldWariscloselylinkedtotheprocessof modernizationwhichimplies,amongotherthings,thedevelopmentofstrongly centralizedgovernment,oftenalongthelinesbequeathedbyformercolonial administrations.Sincethen,astheexamplesincludedhererelatingtoIndia,China,Sudan andTibetdemonstrate,thedevelopmentofacentralizedgovernment,oftendominatedby ethnic,cultural,religiousorotherparticularisticgroups,oftenexacerbatespreviously latenttensionsintoovertconflict.Modernization—implyingurbanization,perhaps industrialization,andaboveallthedevelopmentofasingular“nation”toreplaceformer congeriesofgroupsinhabitingapolity—isregardedasathreattoculturalistand religiousdifferentiation.

IntheSudan,southernSudaneseChristianpeoples,includingtheDinkaandtheNuer, havefoughtalongcivilwaragainstnorthernSudaneseMuslims—aidedbyIran—who wishtoestablishanIslamicstatethroughoutthecountry.EventhoughnorthernSudanese leadersclaimedthatIslamic(i.e., sharia)lawwouldnotbeintroducedinnon-Muslim areasofthecountry,itbecameclearthattheiraim,involvingforcedconversionof ChristiansandpaganstoIslam,waseventuallyto“Arabize”theentirecountryinaform of“ethniccleansing”.Obviously,culturallyandoftenreligiouslydistinctsouthern Sudanesewouldregardsuchanobjectiveastantamounttoanassaultupontheirwayof life,eventheirverysurvival.

Itisnotonlythecasethatreligiousandculturalconflictaroseasaresultof decolonization;modernization—asaseriesofprocessesofeconomic,socialandcultural change—affectsallcommunitiesinthecurrenteratoaquantifiabledegree.Chinawas ofcourseneverformallycolonizedbyEuropeanpowers.Nevertheless,thedevelopment ofaChineseunitarystatewasbynomeanswelladvancedbythetimeofthetriumphof theCommunistsinthecivilwaragainstNationalistforcesin1949.Oneoftheforemost aimsofthenewChinesegovernmentwastoextenditswritthroughoutallthelands claimedtobeintegralpartsofthecountry—includingthosewithdistinctiveculturaland religiousattributes.InTibet,thewestern-mostoutpostoftheChinesestate,aBuddhist theocracyhaddevelopedoverthecenturieswhilecentralcontrolwassundered.Tibetwas ruledbyareligio-politicalfigure—theDalaiLama,endlesslyreincarnatedtoensure continuityofrule—untiltheChineseinvasionin1952.Afteraperiodofrelative equanimitywhichextendedintothe1960s,VajrayanaBuddhistmonksledincreasingly stiffresistancetoenforcedculturalchangeatthehandsofthedominantHanChinese.The lattersoughttoturnTibetintoaprovinceofChina,aprocessofenforcedmodernization whichresultedinaseriousdiminutionofTibetancultureinvolvinganinfluxofsettlers fromoutsidethearea.Seriousoutbreaksofanti-Chineseresistanceoccurredduringthe 1980sandearly1990s.Tibet,hometolessthan10millionpeople,contributedmore politicalprisonersthantherestofChina’sprovincescombined.Morethan100Tibetans werearrestedanddetainedin1993forpoliticalreasonsrelatingtoculturalautonomy. Politicalunrestalsoincreasedinother“nationalminority”areasofthecountry.Whatthe authoritiesreferredtoas“gangfighting”(almostcertainlywithareligiousandculturalist component)brokeoutin1993intheremote,largelyMuslim,NingxiaHuiAutonomous Region(AsiaWatch,1994).

Attemptsforciblytoengineermassculturaland/orreligionschangealsocharacterized IndonesianaggressioninEastTimor.Onceagaintheaimwastomodernizeanewly acquiredportionofterritory,todiminishtheculturalandreligiousdistinctivenessofan areainthepursuitofaunitarystate.(ThefactthattheunitarystatewasIndonesia— itselfoneofthemostethnicallyfragmented,culturallydiverseandreligiouslyvariegated

Religion,FundamentalismandEthnicity:AGlobalPerspective

ofcountries—underlinedtheimportancetotheleadersof“new”statesofthegoalof modernization—perceivedasessentialinanincreasinglycompetitiveinternational economicsystem.)Invadedin1975,followingthedesultoryendofPortuguese colonialismandashort-livedcivilwarwonbythemainliberationmovement,Fretilin (FrenteRevolucionariodeTimorLesteIndependente),Indonesiaspentthenext20years tryingtocrushalow-profileresistancemovementaswellastochangeEastTimorfroma culturallydistinctnationtoaprovinceofIndonesiaconformingtothatcountry’sreligious (Islamic)andlinguistic(Indonesian)norms.Ratherthanengenderingmassconversionto Indonesia’sdominantreligion,Islam,militaryeffortsresultedintheEastTimorese moving enmasse toRomanCatholicism:in1975therewere250,000Catholicsinthe country,by1994therewerenearly700,000—almostthreetimesasmany—with Portugueseironicallythelanguageofrevolt.

ItshouldnotbeassumedfromtheaboveexamplesthatitisonlyintheThirdWorldthat ethnicsolidaritytakesareligiousandculturalistform.Apartfromthetragicexampleof BosniaandHerzegovina,wherereligiousconflictengenderedthechilleuphemism “ethniccleansing”,therewereradicalculturalistgroupsamongdisadvantagedblack AmericansandwithinBritain’sculturallydistinctMuslimcommunities.IntheBritish case,theendemicracismofBritishsocietyledtothegrowthofsuchorganizationsasthe YoungMuslims,AlMuntadaalIslami,MuslimWelfareHouse,andHizbutTahrir (LiberationParty)whoseactivistspreachedseparationfromwesternsocietyandhatredof Jews.IntheUnitedStates,LouisFarrakhan’sNationofIslam,basedinChicago,emerged inthe1980sasanimportantfocusofalienatedAfrican-Americans.Preachingavirulent mixtureofanti-Semitism,anti-corruption,pro-community,self-helpandblack separatism,FarrakhansoughttofocusAfrican-Americans’frustrations.Estimatesofthe numberofmembersoftheNationofIslamrangebetween10,000-30,000,withupto 500,000additional“sympathizers”(Fletcher,1994).Farrakhan’sideaisforblackpeople toworktogetherincommonpursuitofgroupself-interestandsolidarity.TheNationof Islamorganizeswelfareagenciesandanumberofsuccessfulbusinessesinpursuitofthe goalofblackemancipation.

TherelationshipofIslamasasetofreligiouspreceptstotherationaleoftheNationof Islamisperhapsrathertenuous.Thegroup’sideologyreflectsadissatisfactionwith mainstreamwhite-dominatedAmericancultureratherthanreflectingadherencetothe ideaofbuildinganIslamicstate.Thechoiceofanameredolentofreligioussymbolism —theNationofIslam—reflectstheemergenceoffundamentalistIslamintheThird Worldasapotentsymbolofanti-Westernismandanti-Americanism.

Themainargumentofthissectionhasbeenthatgroupswhichperceivethemselvestobe distinctinsomeculturalorreligiouswaymay,undercertaincircumstances,riseup againstthosegroupswhichareperceivedasoppressors.Frequentlysuchaprocessis exacerbatedbytheapparentdominanceofthemachineryofstatebyonespecificgroup —inIndia,bytheHindus;inSudan,bythenorthernArabMuslims;inTibet,bytheHan Chinese;andsoon.ThedevelopmentismostcommontotheThirdWorldwherethe processofbuildingaunitarystateisstillcontinuing,althoughrecentdevelopments,in BosniaandHerzegovinaforexample,suggestthatitisnotthe,asitwere,“ThirdWorldness”ofstateswhichisthechiefcauseofreligious,ethnicandculturalrivalrybut rathertheincompletenatureofstateformationandmodernizationwhichshouldbe regardedasthechiefcause.Inmorehistoricallycentralizedstates—suchasBritainand theUnitedStates—groupswhichperceivethemselvesasignoredor,worse,threatened bythestatewillseektohighlighttheirculturalandreligioussingularitiesinorderto increasesolidarityamongthem.Theprocessofmodernizationisonceagaina contributingfactorinthatthedevelopmentofindustrialized,urbanizedpolitiesisseenby manyasanathema.

Religious“Fundamentalism”andtheSearchfor SocialIdentityandPoliticalExpression

ItwaswidelybelievedaftertheSecondWorldWarthatmodernizationwouldinevitably andnaturallyleadtothegrowthofsecularsocieties,asapparentlyhadhappenedin WesternEuropeovertheperiodsincethesixteenthcentury.Thiswasaccompaniedbythe ideathattechnologicaldevelopmentandtheapplicationofsciencetoovercomeperennial socialproblemsofpoverty,environmentaldegradation,hungeranddiseasewouldresult inlong-term,sustainedprogressforall.Yetwhatbecameclearwasthattechnological developmentandotheraspectsofmodernizationleftmanypeoplewithafeelingofloss ratherthanachievement,eveniftheypersonallybenefitedfromchange.Others,of course,didnotbenefitfromthepresumedfruitsofmodernizationanddevelopment.The resultofwhatmightbetermedalienationwasawaveofpopularreligiositywithpolitical ramifications.

Religiousfundamentalismisbynomeansalwayspolitically(asopposedtosocially) conservative.RadicalIslamistgroupsseekanoverthrowofthecurrentsocio-economic andpoliticalorder,eitherbytheuseofviolenttactics,byincrementalreformorby electoralvictory.ChristianfundamentalistsintheUnitedStatesandJudaist fundamentalistsinIsrael,ontheotherhand,arecloselylinkedtoconservativepolitical forceswhoseektorollbackwhattheyperceiveasanunwelcomeliberalizationand relaxationofsocialandmoralmores.

Theterm“fundamentalism”hasbeencommonlyemployedsincethe1970sbythemass mediato“describeandexplainahostofapparentlydisparatereligiousandpolitical developmentsinvariouspartsoftheworld”(Caplan,1987:1).Thelabel“fundamentalist” wasfirstappliedtoconservativeevangelicalsinsidethemainstreamProtestant denominationsintheearlyyearsofthetwentiethcentury.Asagenericterm,however,it isnowappliedadditionallytoamultitudeofgroupsoutsidethecorpusofChristianity, andespeciallytoJudaistandIslamistentities.

Thetermreligious“fundamentalism”,accordingtosomeaccounts,canonlybeproperly appliedtotheAbrahamic“religionsofthebook”.Islam,Judaism,andChristianity.Each takesasitsdefiningdogmawhatarebelievedtobeGod’sownwordsaswritteninaholy book.Inotherwords,singularscripturalrevelationsarecentraltoeachfundamentalist dogma.NeitherHinduismnorBuddhismhavecentraltenetsofpolitical,socialandmoral importconvenientlyaccessible.Thisisnottosuggestthattherearenotmovementswithin bothHinduismandBuddhismwhichmaybelabelled“fundamentalist”,butthesearenot definedbytheirabsolutistinsistenceupontheveracityofGod’srevealedwill;ratherthey aredefinedbytheirdesiretorecaptureanationalidentitywhichhasbeen(perhaps irredeemably)lostbydintofculturaldilutionormixing(Ram-Prasad,1993:288).

Ofperhapsmostgeneralpoliticalsalienceinthemodernerahavebeenthosegroups associatedwithIslamicfundamentalism.ModernIslamicresurgencedatesfromtheinterwarperiodwhenoneoftheramificationsofthepoliticalupheavalsassociatedwiththe FirstWorldWarwasthegrantingofsovereignstatehoodtoanumberofMiddleEastern polities.ThepointofcontentionatthattimewashowfarthesepredominantlyMuslim statesshouldemploythetenetsof sharia lawintheirlegalsystems.Thisexampleofa desiretoIslamicizepolitieshasanumberofprecedents:successiveanti-imperialist,antipaganandanti-Western/Christianmovements(jihads)haveeruptedperiodicallysincethe latenineteenthcentury,especiallyinpartsofWestAfricaandEastAsia,wherethe conflictbetweentraditionandmodernization,andbetweenIslamandChristianity,was mostacute.

Contemporaryreligiousmilitancy(“fundamentalism”)isrootedinthefailedpromiseof modernity,invariablyreactiveagainstunwelcomemanifestationsofmodernization,such aspoverty,marginalization,insecurityandsoon.Thecurrenteraistomanypeopleone whereGodwasindangerofbeingsupersededbyagospeloftechnicalprogress accompanyingsocio-economicchangesredolentofmodernization.Thepaceofchange thiscentury,sincetheSecondWorldWarespecially,hasbeenveryswift:traditional habits,beliefsandcultureseverywhereareunderconsiderablepressuretoadapt.Inan increasinglymaterialisticworld,one’sindividualworthtendstobemeasuredaccording tostandardsofwealthandstatus,andpowerisoftenafunctionofmaterialstanding. Religiousattributesareoftenignoredorbelittled.Culturalandeconomicchangeandan accompanyinglossofreligiouspotencyarethefertileseedbedforthegrowthofreligious militancy.Thesebroaddevelopmentsaccountingeneraltermsforthegrowthofreligious fundamentalisminrecenttimes.

Thisisnottosuggestthatreligiousfundamentalismwasnecessarilyunimportantinthe past;thegrowthofChristianfundamentalismintheUnitedStatesoverthelasteightyor ninetyyearsortheemergenceofsuccessivewavesofIslamicreformoverthelastfew centuriesinpartsofWestAfricaandelsewherewouldbeliethatargument.WhatIam proposingisthatthenumber,rangeandovertlypoliticizedgoalsofthedifferenttypesof fundamentalistmovementsshouldbeunderstoodinrelationtothegeneralprocessof modernizationandthemorespecificaccretionofpowerwhichthemodernstateseeksto achieve.Whatwasoncetherealmofreligionandreligiousleaders,inanumberofsocial andmoralareas,hasincreasinglybecomethedomainofgovernment.Whathashappened isthatthoseinsomewaydissatisfiedwiththeeffectsofmodernizationhavebecome receptivetotheargumentsofreligiousfigureswhohaveseentheirownpowerand influencediminishovertimeinrelationtotheriseofthesecularstateandtheofficial downgradingofreligion.InmanyThirdWorldurbancentrestheexistenceofextensive shantytownstestifiestothevastnumbersofpeoplewhoclingtothemarginsofthe moderneconomyinatenuousfashion.Suchpeoplemaybe,butarenotnecessarily,the naturalconstituencyoffundamentalistgroups.IntheUnitedStates,forexample, Christianfundamentalistsmaywellbefoundamongthemostaffluent,successful membersofthesociety.Clearly,itwouldbeabsurdtoarguethat“alienation”explainsthe existenceofsuchgroupsintheUnitedStates.Thepositionmaybequitedifferentin ThirdWorldurbansocieties,wheretraditionalcommunaltiesaresunderedandnew occupational,communityandoftenreligiousonescreated.Urbanreligiousmovements haveformedthemajorityof“fundamentalist”movementsinbothThirdWorldandnonThirdWorldcontexts;itistheywhichhavechieflyinteracted,jousted(andattimes, competed)withgovernment.Itistheywhichhavesettheagendaofreligiousdiscoursein apolitical,socialandoftenmoralcontext.

SincethebeginningofIslamover1,300yearsago,religiouscriticsofthe statusquo have periodicallyemergedinoppositiontowhattheyperceiveasunjustrule.Contemporary Islamicfundamentalistsarethemostrecentexample,characterizingthemselvesasthe “just”involvedinstruggleagainstthe“unjust”.Thedichotomybetween“just”and “unjust”inthepromotionofsocialchangethroughoutIslamichistoryparallelsthe tensionintheWestbetween“state”and“civilsociety”.Inotherwords,“just”and “unjust”,aswith“state”and“civilsociety”,aremutuallyexclusiveconceptswherea strengtheningofonenecessarilyimpliesaweakeningoftheother.Theimplicationisthat the“unjust”inhabitthestatewhilethe“just”lookinfromtheoutside,achingtoreform thecorrupt,anti-democraticsystem.TheIslamic“just”strivetoachievetheirgoalofa formofdirectdemocracyundertheauspicesof sharia law.Theruleruseshiswisdomto settledisputesbroughtbeforehimbyhisloyalsubjects.TheIslamicconceptof shura (consultation)doesnotbyanymeansnecessarilyimplypopularsovereignty—thatis withGodalone;“ratheritisameansofobtainingunanimityfromthecommunityof

believers,whichallowsfornolegitimateminorityposition”(Dorr,1993:151-152).The goalofthe“just”isanIslamically-basedsociety;Islamicfundamentalistgroupsarethe vehicletoachievethisend.TosomeMuslims,liberaldemocracyisfatallyflawedand compromised,aconceptofrelevanceonlytosecular,Western(ized)societieswhichoften appeartomanyMuslimsasunacceptablymorallydeficient.AsayoungAlgerian graduateoftheIslamicScienceInstituteofAlgiersaverred:“Themodernworldisgoing throughamajormoralcrisiswhichcanbeveryconfusingtoyoungpeople.Justlookat whatishappeninginRussia.PersonallyIhavefoundmanyoftheanswersandsolutions inIslam”(quotedinIbrahim,1992).

TheglobalMuslimcommunity,the umma,isagoodexampleofatransnationalcivil society(theRomanCatholicchurchisanother),whichcontainstheseedsofboth dominationanddissent.Sharedbeliefs,relatingespeciallytoculture,sentimentsand identity,linkMuslims.Generally,internationalmanifestationsofIslamicresurgence appearedafterthehumblingdefeatofArabMuslimsbyIsraeliJewsintheSixDayWar ofJune1967.Sincethen,acombinationofpoorgovernment,growingunemploymentand generalizedsocialcrisistogetherhaveproducedIslamicfundamentalistmovements throughouttheMuslimworld.Thesedevelopmentshavealsobeentheresultofafailed modernization:Politicalrulershavegenerallybeencontenttogainrentsaccruedfrom theircontrolofthesaleofoilresourcesforhardcurrency.Littlehasbeendonetodevelop democraticpolities,plansuccessfullyforthefuture,orseekmeanstoreduceun-and underemploymentamongtheirpeople.Therehasbeenaskewedmodernization: urbanizationandthedevelopmentofstrong,centralizedstateshasproceededatthesame timeaspeoplehavebecomeincreasinglydissatisfiedwiththewaythattheirrulersrule.

InDecember1991Algeriaheldafirstroundoflegislativeelections—whichwerewon convincinglybytheIslamicSalvationFront(FIS)—whichmostindependentobservers characterizedasamongthefreesteverheldinNorthAfricaortheArabMiddleEast.The followingJanuary,however,Algeria’sarmedforcesseizedpowertopreventthesecond roundofelectionswhichwouldalmostcertainlyhavegiventheFISamandatetoform thenextgovernment.TheassumptionwasthatiftheFISachievedpoweritwould summarilyclosedownAlgeria’snewlyrefresheddemocraticinstitutionsandpolitical system.Suchanassumptionwasnotnecessarilywarranted.Islamistgroups,whetherin Algeriaorelsewhere,havemultiplegoalsinvolvingsocial,political,andeconomic changetowardsanIslamicsociety.Forexample,inAlgeria,FIS’smainreligio-political rival,Hamas,aspirestochangesocietyinanIslamistdirectionbyaprocessof incrementalismovertime.Inaddition,theFIShasboth“moderate”and“radical”wings. The“moderate”factionbelievesingradualevolutiontowardsanIslamicstate,ratherlike Hamas;whilethe“radicals”favouritscreationassoonaspossiblebyanymeans necessary.Amongthemost“radical”ofIslamistgroupsisEgypt’sal-Gama’aalIslamiya,whoseprogrammeofactioninvolvesmurderingforeigntourists,suppliersofa significantproportionofEgypt’sforeignexchange,aswellasstaterepresentatives,in ordertostimulatebotheconomicandpoliticalcrisiswhichwouldfacilitatethegainingof powerbyIslamists.

Christianity,usuallyregardedinthemodernerainmuchoftheWestasnon-politicalor apolitical,becamealegitimatevehiclethereforpoliticalideasandplatformsinthe1960s. (Lesslegitimatemanifestationsofwhatpurportedtobereligiously-inspiredgroups,such astheKuKluxKlan,arosefromthetimeoftheAmericanCivilWar[1861-1865]but theywerehardlyapartofthepoliticalmainstreamexceptinareasofthesouthernUnited StateswherewhiteProtestant[“WASP”]hostilitytoJews,CatholicsandBlack AmericanssurfacedaftertheFirstWorldWar.)Thereareanestimated60million followersofconservativeevangelisticChristianityintheUnitedStatesoutofatotal populationofabout250million.Suchpeopleprovidedthecoresupportforthe

“televangelist”PatRobertson’sunsuccessful1988presidentialcampaign,andforPat Buchanan’sin1992.ThegrowthofevangelisticChristianityhasalsobeenclearly manifestedinLatinAmerica,wherehundredsofthousandsconvertfromRoman Catholicismeachyear.TheChristianfundamentalistviewoftheBibleislikethatofthe IslamicviewoftheKoran:itisthelocusoftheessenceoftradition.Christian fundamentalists,liketheirMuslimcounterparts,wishtoreturntothefundamentalsof theirtraditionwhichtheyregardasrevealedintheirholybook.IntheUnitedStates, Christianfundamentalistsarepoliticallyactiveinattemptingtouphold“traditional values”.Theyareagainstmanifestationsofwhattheyseeasover-liberalism:abortion-ondemand;theabsenceofprayerinschools;andformsofscienceteachingwhichadopta rationalistperspective.InLatinAmerica,ontheotherhand,thediminutioninthe numbersofRomanCatholicsinfavourofburgeoningProtestantevangelisticsectswas notsymptomaticofpoliticalconservatism.Rather,itreflectedthefailureofthetraditional RomanCatholicculturetorespondtothecombinedpressuresofmodernization, Americanizationandurbanization.TheChurchfailedtosatisfygrowingpopulations enmeshedeverdeeperinstultifyingpovertyandpoliticalinconsequence.TheProtestant sectsofferedanewformofcommunity,newandsatisfyingreligiousservices,andthe possibility,once“bornagain”,ofstartingafresh.Suchwasthesymbolofhopewhichthe ProtestantsectsrepresentedthatinGuatemalatworecentpresidents—GeneralEfrain RiosMottandJorgeSerranoElias—bothactivelystressedtheirstateofbeing“born again”assymptomaticofthenewenergyandhopewhichtheywouldbringtothe country’spoliticalandeconomicdevelopment.

Thethird“religionofthebook”,Judaism,alsohasitsreligiousfundamentalists. Politicallyspeaking,themostsignificantgroupsarethosewhichusereligiousideologyin theirconflictswithArabs.Forexample,GushEmunim,amilitant,conservativereligious movement,wasfoundedafterthe1978CampDavidagreementbetweenIsraelandEgypt whichresultedinthehandingbackoftheSinaideserttothelattercountry.GushEmunim andothergroups—suchasthelateRabbiMeirKahane’sorganization,Kach—argued onreligiousgroundsagainstgivingbackterritorytoEgypt.Thebiblicalentity,Eretz Israel,theyargued,wassignificantlylargerthantoday’sIsraelistate.Tohandbackany territorytoArabs,non-Jews,wastantamounttogoingagainstGod’swillasrevealedin theBible.SimmeringreligiousoppositiontothepeaceplanwiththePalestineLiberation Organization,involvinggivingautonomytotheGazaStripandtoanareaaroundJericho, reachedtragiclevelsinFebruary1994whenareligiouszealot,BaruchGoldstein,who hadlinkswithmilitantsofbothKach(“Thus”)andKahaneChai(“KahaneLives”), murderedatleast30people(thenumberrisestoabout50ifassociatedPalestiniandeaths atthehandsofIsraelisecurityservicesasaresultofstreetprotestsagainsttheGoldstein killingsaretakenintoaccount)duringadawnattackonamosqueintheoccupiedWest BanktownofHebron.AfterthemassacrebothKachandKahaneChaiwerebannedby theIsraeligovernment,asignofitscommitmenttocrushreligiousextremistgroups whichsystematicallyusedviolencetogaintheirends.

HinduandBuddhist“fundamentalisms”(implyingculturalchauvinismratherthanclose adherencetoreligioustexts)arelinkedinextricablytonationalistgoals,ratherthantothe revealedwordsofGodasasetofsocio-politicalaspirationsandgoals.Contemporary Hinduradicalismisbynomeans suigeneris.MahatmaGandhi,thegreatIndian nationalist,acommittedHindu,wasassassinatedbyaHinduextremistin1948forthe “crime”ofappearingtocondonethecreationofabifurcatedhomelandforIndia’s Muslims,EastandWestPakistan.Morerecently,Hindu-Muslimsuspicionwas exacerbatedbythedramaticincidentatthemosqueatAyodhyainUttarPradeshwhich wasbuilt,accordingtosomeHindus,onthebirthplaceofthegodofwar,Rama.Militant HindushavelongsoughttobuildaHindutempleinplaceofthemosque.Aslongagoas 1950,themosquewascloseddownbytheIndiangovernment.In1992itwasdestroyed

Religion,FundamentalismandEthnicity:AGlobalPerspective JeffHaynes•UNRISDDiscussionPaper65

byHindufanatics.PrimeMinisterIndiraGandhipaidwithherlifein1984byappealing toHindumilitancytotakeonSikhmilitancyinthePunjab.Herson,PrimeMinisterRajiv GandhiwasprobablyassassinatedbyaTamilHinduin1991becauseofhissending IndiantroopstotrytoresolvethecivilconflictinSriLankabetweenTamilHindusand BuddhistSinhalese.

InThailand,anewBuddhistmovement,SantiAsoke,madeaunilateraldeclarationof independencefromtheorthodoxThai sangha (bodyofmonks)in1975.Oneofitsmost prominentfollowers,aformergovernorinBangkok,Major-GeneralChamlongSrimaung, formedapoliticalpartyinthelate1980s,thePalangThamParty: tham meansboth “moral”and“dhamma”:theteachingsofBuddhism.SomehaveperceivedPalangTham’s ultimategoalasthecreationofaradicalBuddhiststateinThailand(McCargo,1992). Whatthiswouldentail,itappears,isacorruption-freepoliticalenvironmentwiththerole ofthemilitarydown-playedandwithstateideologyrelatingtotheidealsoftheBuddha. Despitesomepoliticalsuccesses,involvingthewinningof14parliamentaryseatsinthe 1988elections,PalangTham’smessageof“Buddhistfundamentalism”failedtoexcite thevoters.Inanothercontext—thecivilwarinSriLankainvolvingBuddhistSinhalese andTamilHindus—BuddhismbecametheiconofSinhalesechauvinism.Ethnic, linguistic,economicandpoliticalfrictionswereexpressedinreligiousform,involvinga lionisingofSriLanka’sBuddhisthistoryinrelationtotheHinducultureofimmigrant Tamils.

Insum,religiousfundamentalismmaybedividedintotwocategories:thatwhichpertains to“religionsofthebook”,wherescripturalrevelationsrelatingtopolitical,moraland socialissuesformthecorpusoffundamentalistdemands.Sometimesthisactsasa de facto programmeofpoliticalaction(aswiththeIslamists);sometimesitformsan essentiallymoralisticblueprintforsocialchange(ProtestantevangelicalsinLatin America).HinduandBuddhist“fundamentalism”comprisethesecondcategory.The absenceofadefinitivesetofscripturalnormsandgoalsallowsreligiousdogmato assumenationalistdimensionsinwhichreligiousrevivalismpertainstothere-birthof nationalidentityandvigourdeniedinthepastbyunwelcomeculturaldilution.

ReligiousSyncretismandPolitics

Allreligionsaremoreorlesssyncretistic.The“pure”religionofthefaith’sfounder, whetherJesusChrist,GautamaBuddha,Moses,orMuhammad,graduallyevolvesasa resultoftimepassingandasafunctionofthegeographicaldistancethatittravels. Interactionbetweentheoriginaldoctrineandthedifferingsocial,politicalandeconomic realitiesitencountersovertimeandspaceresultsinareligionwithsomecharacteristics differentfromthe“pure”foundations.Forthisreasondifferentinterpretationsofreligious doctrine(suchasbetweenShi’aandSunniMuslimsorbetweenRomanCatholicand ProtestantChristians)mayinstilinseparategroups—ostensiblyfollowingthesame religiousguidance—conflictingversionsofreceivedspiritualteachings.Threeexamples helpbringthisoutmoreclearly.First,thelocalChristianityofGalilee—theteachingsof Jesus,asocialradical—becamethereligionofthecity-stateofRome,whichbyimperial extensionanddemographicexpansionbecametheChristianityofNorthAfrica,Western Europeand,later,theAmericas,thePacificrimandthePacificislands.Second, Muhammad’sdivinelyinspiredteachingsinvolvednotonlythedisseminationofasacred messagebutalso,moreprosaicly,thepoliticalstandingoftheQuarayshlineagein Mecca.Hisreligiousteachingslaterspreadandintheprocessadaptedtolocalconditions asIslamevolvedfromtheArabicworldtoAfricaandtoAsia.Finally,thephilosophyof PrinceGautama(theBuddha),mouldedbythesocial,politicalandeconomicconditions

ofnorthernIndiaof2,500yearsago,underwentchangeduringitsspreadtoTibet, Myanmar,Nepal,SriLanka,Thailand,Mongolia,Japan,theKoreas,Cambodia,Viet Nam,Chinaandbeyond.Whattheseexamplessuggestisthatwhateverthereligion,the founder’spuredoctrinewillbechangedbothbytimeandbyexpansiontonewcultural areas.Themore“successful”areligionis,intermsofnumbersofconverts,themoreits originalpreceptswillbetransformed.

ArabandlaterEuropeanimperialismregardeddisseminationofreligiousbeliefsas integraltopoliticalandculturaldomination.Innorthandsub-SaharanAfrica,there evolvedmoreorlesssyncretisticversionsofIslam—meldingtraditionalreligiousbeliefs withIslamicnorms—calledsufism.OneofthefeaturesofthecontemporaryIslamic reformisminAfricahasbeenthesystematicunderminingandbelittlingofsufistbeliefs byArabizedIslamicélites(ledbymembersofthecorpusofreligio-legalscholars,the ulama)andtheirsecularpoliticalalliesin,forexample,Morocco,Algeria,Nigeria,Niger, Mali,MauritaniaandLibya.AwayfromNorthAfricaandthefringesoftheSahara desert,thespreadofChristianitywasmadepossiblebyEuropeancolonialism,amajor socio-politicalandeconomicforceforacenturybeginningaround1860.Because conversiontoChristianitywasseenbymanyAfricansasanecessarysteptoacquirethe materialadvantageswhichtheEuropeansenjoyed—principallyeducation,scientificand medicalaid,andjobsinthemodernsector—manyethnicgroupsconverted enmasse Centresofmissionaryactivityofferedthesedesirablegoodsasinducementtoconvert. Thusconversionwasoftenpredominantlyaninstrumentalstep,ratherthaninvolving spiritualtransformationfromtraditionaltoEuropeanreligiousbeliefs.Whenthe EuropeansbegantodismantletheirstructuresofcolonialdominationinAfricaafterthe SecondWorldWar,someoftheethnicgroupswhichhadformallyconvertedto Christianitywithoutseveringtheirtieswithtraditionalbeliefsfoundthemselvesin positionsofrelativedisadvantageinthenewpoliticalarrangementswhichmarkedthe post-colonialera.

Itwasprincipallyincertainruralareasthatentiregroupsofpeople—whobelievedin theirallegedcommonorigins,i.e.,“tribes”—had“semi-converted”corporatelyto ChristianityduringEuropeancolonialism.Theysometimesfoundthemselvesvictimized orignoredinpost-colonialpoliticalarrangements.TheLumpaChurchofnorthern Zambia,theHolySpiritChurchamongtheAcholiofnorthernUganda,theNapramasled byManualAntonioinnorth-eastMozambique,theOvimbunduChurchofChristinthe BushinsouthernAngola,andDiniyaMsambwaamongtheBukusuofwesternKenyaare allexamplesofsyncretisticreligiousentities,rootedpartiallyinChristianbeliefs,which foundmostoftheiradherentsamongdiscreteethnicgroupsorwithinspecificregionsin thepost-colonialperiodinoppositiontogoverningrégimes.

ItiswrongtoassumethatruralAfricans(orotherThirdWorldpeople,forthatmatter)are politicallyquiescent.Duringthecolonialera,anti-colonialreligio-politicalmovements flourishedintheruralareas.Afterindependence,anti-régimemovementsappearedfor similarreasons;clearlytheirexistencecouldnotbeexplainedbythesocialstressesand strainslinkedtocolonialrulealone.Beliefsassociatedwithsyncretisticreligionsshould belocatedwithinageneralbackgroundofupheavalwhichoccurredasaresultofthe circumstancesofcolonialrule.Theycanbeexplainedasaresponsetoextremesocial trauma,orasamanifestationofcollectivedespairatanunwelcomepoliticaloutcome— suchasmoreorlessauthoritarianrulebyoutsiders.

AliceLenshina’sLumpaChurchwasestablishedamongthenorthernBembapeopleof Zambiaaroundthetimeofindependencein1964.Intheabsenceofoppositionpolitical parties—thepost-colonialUnitedNationalIndependencePartygovernmentbanned

theminthenameofunity—itfunctionedasa defacto vehicleofoppositiontotherule ofagovernmentwhichtheBembalargelyregardedasrulebyoutsiders.

Morerecently,the25,000strongNapramas(“spiritwarriors”)militiawasformedin1990 amongtheMakuapeopleoftheZambesiaandNampulaprovincesofnorth-eastern Mozambique.TheNapramaswereledbyayoungman,ManualAntonio,untilhisdeath atthehandsofRENAMO(MozambiqueNationalResistance)guerrillasin1992.Antonio claimedtohavediedattheageof12yearsandthenbeenresurrectedinordertoendthe civilwarbetweenRENAMOandthegovernment.Antonio“vaccinated”hisfollowers againstRENAMObulletsbyuseoftheashofasacredbush,whichledthemtooften foolhardyfeatsofcourageinthefaceofRENAMOfirepower.ManyRENAMOsoldiers camefromtheNdau-speakingpeopleofcentralMozambique.Initially,manyranfrom theNapramas,believingthattheywereimbuedwithimmensespiritualpower.Later,asa resultoftheirown“vaccination”bytheirspiritmediumsagainsttheNapramas,they begantoconfrontthemmorereadily.Antonio’skillinginearly1992ledtotheswift collapseofthe“spiritwarriors”militia.

AnotherexampleofAfricansyncretisticpolitico-religiousgroupsistheHolySpirit movementofAliceLakwenainUganda.WhilestrongestamongtheAcholi,itsappeal alsospannedtheLangoandTesopeoples.Inthemid-1980s,troopsledbyLakwenaand magicallyprotectedby“medicine”,engagedthedominantNationalResistanceArmy (NRA)inaseriesofbattles.ManyofLakwena’sfollowerswereformerAcholisoldiers oftheex-PrimeMinisterMiltonObote’sUgandaNationalLiberationArmy.Inabidto gaintheupperhandagainsttheNRA,Obote’sdefeatedtroopsdesperatelysoughta religiousmessiahwhomightbeabletodispense“magicmedicine”toaidthemintheir fighting.Eventually,Lakwena’sfollowerswereheavilydefeatedbytheNRA.Lakwena fledtoKenyawhereshelivedforseveralyears.ShelaterreturnedtoUganda,apparently nolongerpossessed,wheresheekedoutalivingasapettytrader.

WhatthesethreeexamplesofAfricansyncretisticreligio-politicalmovementshavein commonisthateachhadaroleasmediatorbetweenlocalcommunitiesandthestateor otherpowerduringaperiodofrapidandunevensocio-politicaltransformation.During thecolonialperiod,religio-politicalmovementswereregardedwithahighdegreeof suspicionbycolonialadministrators;someviewedthemasalliesofIslam,othersas revolutionarygroupsusingreligionasamask.Inthepost-colonialperiod,official comprehensionofsuchmovementsdidnotadvancemuch:AseniorfigureintheNational ResistanceMovement,thepoliticalwingoftheNRAandcurrentlyingovernment,called AliceLakwena:a“lunaticprostituteofGulutown[herhomearea]turnedwitch” (Behrend,1991:162).Whatseemsclear,however,isthatmovementssuchasLakwena’s arenotaberrationsledbymaladjustedindividuals.Rather,theyforminresponseto unwelcomesocio-politicaldevelopmentsduringtimesofrapidchange.Manyhavebeen concernedwithcultural,regional,ethnic,politicalandeconomictensionswhichexisted beforecolonialism,andwhichresurfacedintheindependenceerawhenoneethnicor regionalgroupsoughttoachievehegemonyoverothers.Peopleswhoresorttoreligious symbolismaspoliticalideologyofresistancearegenerallythosewhohavenotonlybeen mistreatedorabandonedbygovernment,buthavealsotraditionallybeenmarginalizedby bothcolonialandpost-colonialpoliticalandeconomicstructuresandprocesses.Although themovementsdescribedabovehavebeeninresponsetotheformationofthepostcolonialstate,theiroppositionhasbeenintheformofaculturalmetaphorwhichhas clearhistoricalroots.

Issuesofdominationandhegemonyalsohelpedforgetheideologicalrationaleforother anti-centregroupsinpartsofLatinAmerica.Inthiscontext,bothSenderoLuminoso (“ShiningPath”)ofPeruandtheOlivorismocultoftheDominicanRepublicmerit

mention.Senderofirstappearedin1980,coincidingwiththereformationofdemocracyin Peru,amilitarydictatorshipsince1968.ItwasfoundedbyAbimayelGuzman,a universityprofessor,whodisappearedfrompublicviewin1974untilhisarrestbystate authoritiesin1992.SenderoLuminoso’sleadershipandmostcommittedcadres,itis generallyagreed,areprincipallymotivatedideologicallybyalocalvariantofMaoism. ThereislessconsensusaboutthenatureofSendero’sappealtoruralpeople,whoare unlikelynecessarilytobemotivatedbyclear-cutclassissuesalone.AsDegregori (1993:51)notes,themaincoreofSendero’soriginalsupportwaslocatedwithintheranks ofthe“petit-bourgeoisie(sic)provincial mestizo intellectuals”.Suchpeoplewere animatedbytheappealofMarxism-Leninism-Maoism,yetthe“furtherwegofromthe leadership,themorethemotivationsandmodesofaction(ofSendero’ssupporters) varies”(Degregori1993:53-54).PeasantfollowersofSenderomayhavebeengalvanized morebyaformofpseudo-religioussyncretisticideologywhichineffectmeldedMaoism withaformofAndeanmillenarianism.

ManyamongPeru’sIndianpopulation,nominallyRomanCatholic,retainstrongbeliefs groundedinthepre-Christianfolkreligionsofthelocale.Thepoliticalandreligious cleavageinPeruviansocietycutsthroughtheCatholicchurch,dividingtheIndiansfrom the mestizos andthelight-skinnedélite.Ayacucho,oneofthepoorestareasofPeru,was thebirthplaceofSenderoLuminoso,whereSendero’sideologicalappealwasorientedto localconditionsandperspectives:thereamixtureofrevolutionarycommunism, mysticismandanti-Spanishnationalismfoundastrongresonanceamongmanylocal people(Dietz,1990).ExhibitingtheeclecticismwhichcharacterizesAfrica’ssyncretistic ruralreligiousmovementsinitsappealtopoorruraldwellers,SenderoLuminososought tosynthesizeaMaoistvariantofMarxism-Leninismwiththetraditionalimageofa mythicIndianpastinordertoforgeanideologyofoppositionamongPeru’s disadvantagedIndianpopulation.OpiniondiffersastowhetherSendero’scontinuing presenceamongtheinhabitantsofAyacuchoisduetofearorsupportfromthelocal people.WhileafullaccountofSendero’sideology,developmentandaimsisbeyondthe scopeofthispaper,itspresenceinAyacucho(evenaftertheimprisonmentofGuzman)is testamenttotheunequaldistributionofpowerinPeruandtotheabidingsignificanceof syncretisticandtraditionalreligiousbeliefstomanypoliticallypowerlesspeople.

WhereasSendero’smotivationisoneofrevolutionarycommunismwhich,forsome, includesamillenariandimension,OlivorismointheDominicanRepublicisaclass-based movementwhichusesthememoryofacharismaticindividual,OlivorioMateo,toforge anemblematicsyncretismwhichmeldselementsofChristianityandoflocalfolkreligion intoanimportantvehicleofoppositiontothedominantpolitico-economicéliteinthe country(LundahlandLundius,1991).

OlivorioMateoachievedfameintheSanJuanvalleyin1908whenitemergedthathe hadapparentlyinexplicablepowersofhealing.Hequicklybuiltupacoreoffollowers whowerepersecutedbytheauthoritiesbecausetheywereregardedasdecidedly “unprogressive”atatimewhenthecountry’smodernizers—businessmen,lawandorder authorities—wereattemptingtodevelopthecountryeconomically.Mateo’smessageof salvationincludedtherevolutionaryideathatlandandfoodshouldbeapportionedto peopleinaccordancewiththeirneedsratherthantheirabilitytopay.Followingthe AmericanoccupationoftheDominicanRepublicin1916,OlivorioMateowas increasinglyhoundedbecauseofwhatheappearedtorepresent:achampionofthe“little man”againsttheforcesofcapitalism,occupationandrepression.Sixyearslater—in 1922—hewasshotdeadinanambush.ThismighthaveledtotheendofOlivorismo, yetoverthenextdecadesthecultcontinuedtosurviveintheSanJuanvalley,asymbolof popularoppositiontothedirectionofsocio-economicdevelopmentwhereincreasing levelsofwealthandpowerwereinfewerandfewerhands.By1971,71percentofthe

valley’sarablelandwasownedbyjust21percentofthefarms(LundahlandLundius, 1991:229).Impoverishedpeasants,ontheotherhand,continuedtheirbeliefinthe redemptivevaluesofOlivorismo,hopingandprayingthatonedaytheirchampionwould returntoliberatethemfromoppression.ThecontinuingappealofOlivorismo—akindof syncretisticredemptiveideologyofhope—topoorpeopleoftheSanJuanvalley suggeststhatanideologyofliberationismostlikelytobesuccessfulwhereitappealsto people’sculturalroots.

Community-OrientedReligiousMovements

Anotablefeatureofthedevelopmentofreligiouspraxisoverthelastthreedecadeshas beentheemergenceofapopularlydriven,communityreligiosity.Especiallyvisible amongpoorThirdWorldRomanCatholics,amongEasternEuropeanChristiansbefore thefallofcommunism,andwithinurbanIslamiccommunitiesinanumberofcountries, thedevelopmentofsetsofcommunity-orientedreligiousbeliefshasbeenamobilizing ideologyofoppositionanddevelopmentofself-expression.Christian(especiallyRoman Catholic)liberationtheologyisoftenassociatedwithsociallyprogressiveideas,while “fundamentalist”Islamisoftenperceivedasathoroughlyconservative,evenatavistic, ideology.Infacttheyhavemuchincommon:adisaffectionwiththeestablished, hierarchical,institutionalizedreligiousbodies;adesiretofindGodthroughpersonal searchingratherthanthroughthemediationofinstitutions;andafocusoncommunities’ abilitytomakebeneficialchangestomembers’livesthroughtheapplicationofgroup effort.

Theemergenceofcommunity-orientedreligiousmovementswasparticularlyassociated withtheprofoundsocialandeconomicchangesassociatedwithmodernization.For example,theproportionofChristiansintheRepublicofKoreagrewfromaboutoneper centofthepopulationaftertheSecondWorldWartoaboutaquarterbythe1980s (Huntington,1991:73).Christianconvertswereprimarily“young,urbanandmiddle class.Forthemillionswhopouredintothecities,andformanywhostayedbehindinthe alteredcountryside,thequiescentBuddhismofKorea’sagrarianagelostitsappeal. Christianitywithitsmessageofpersonalsalvationandindividualdestinyofferedasurer comfortinatimeofconfusionandchange”(Huntington,1991:73-74).Opposition politicianssuchasKimDaeJungandKimYoungSam,togetherwithchurchfigureslike Rev.MoonIkHwanandCardinalKimSouHwan,ledattacksagainstrepressivemilitary governmentbeginninginthe1970s.Bytheearly1980schurchactivistswereinthe forefrontofthegrowingoppositiontomilitaryrule.

Asecondreligiousdevelopmentwhichresultedintheemergenceofcommunity-oriented religiousmovementsinvolvedaseriesofchangesinthepoliticalalignmentandpopular involvementofsomeofficialsoftheRomanCatholicChurch.Threedevelopmentswere significant:theSecondVaticanCouncil(Vatican2;whichmetfrom1959-1965)withits stressonamorerestrictedspiritualguidanceprogrammeandageneralliturgicalsobriety; thedevelopmentoflocaltheologiesofliberation;andachallengetotheChurchfrom Protestantevangelicalchurches,especiallyinSouthAmericaandsub-SaharanAfrica (Haynes,1993;forthcoming).TheChurchfounditselfdraggedintopoliticalcontroversy becauseoftwoissues:humanrightsandfreedomofworship.Thepushfrombelowfrom younger,radicalizedpriestsengenderedadegreeofoppositiontogovernmental authoritarianismandnegationofhumanrightsfromseniorechelonsoftheChurch hierarchy.NowherewasthisdevelopmentmoreapparentthaninEasternEuropeduring the1980sasthecontradictionsofcommunistrulebecameincreasinglyclear.Duetothe repressionandtotalitariantacticsofthecommunistrégimeinPolandwhich,likeits

counterpartintheSovietUnion,soughttocrushorganizedreligion,theredevelopeda theologyofresistance,agrassrootspoliticizationoftheCatholicchurch.Young, combativepriestsstronglyidentifiedwithsociety’saspirationstowardstheachievement ofbasicpoliticalandsocialfreedoms,andtooktheleadingroleinthecreationand consolidationofrepresentativesocialmovements.ThevisitofthePopetoPolandin1979 coincidedwiththeemergenceofCatholicgrassrootsorganizations,whoseactivists receivedagreatfilliptotheireffortstowardsfundamentalsocialandpoliticalreforms. TheformationoftheSolidaritymovementin1980wasstronglyinfluencedbythePope’s visit;tradeunionmilitantsbecamethefocalpointforoppositionasthePolishChurch,led byCardinalJosefGlemp,playedacautiousroleofmediatorbetweengovernmentand opposition,ratherthanthrowingitscorporateweightbehindthereformists(Huntington, 1991:82).

IntheGermanDemocraticRepublic(GDR;formerEastGermany),“autonomousgroups playedaveryunevenroleinthesuddenchangesthatoccurredin1989”(Sadowski, 1993:187).Acombinationofactivists’emigrationtotheWestandapolicyofexpulsion bytherégimeofsuchpeoplediminishedtheabilityofoppositiongroupstoestablisha networkofautonomousgroups.Nevertheless,theEvangelicalChurchintheheavily ProtestantGDRdidcometoplaya“majororganizationalroleinthemassivechanges” thatoccurredinsocietyin1989and1990.Duringtheinitialperiodofmobilizationand masspublicdemonstrationsthatprecededthedownfalloftheleaderoftheGDR,Erich Honecker,anumberofProtestantchurchesinLeipzig,alreadyrenownedfortheir championingofhumanrightsandpeaceissues,activelyinvolvedthemselvesinthe organizationofpublicprotests.Churchesthroughoutthecountrybecametheprincipal forumforoppositionmeetings.Thepoliticalinfluenceofgrassrootspriestswasfurther exemplifiedfollowingtheparliamentaryelectionsofMarch1990whichresultedinthe electionof14clergymentothe400-stronglegislature.Fourservingorformerpriests weremembersoftheshort-livedLothardeMaizieregovernment.

Itwasanessentiallybiblicalradicalism,oftenmeldedwithfacetsofMarxism-Leninism, whichstimulatedanumberofCatholicprieststochampiontheconcernsofthepoorin LatinAmericafromthe1960s.BasicChristianCommunities(BCCs;Spanish: communidadeseclesialesdebase;French: communautésecclésialesvivantes)represented themostconcretesignofthesignificanceofliberationtheology.BCCsproliferatedin manyLatinAmericancountries(especiallyBrazil,Chile,Peru,andHaiti)andelsewhere intheThirdWorld,suchasthePhilippinesandinpartsofAfrica.WhattheseandnonCatholiccountries—e.g.Kenya,Ghana,BurkinaFaso,Nigeria,IndiaandIndonesia— hadincommonwasthatlocalself-helpgroupsformedtoimprovequalitatively communities’livesatatimewhencentralandlocalgovernmentwasunabletosatisfy popular(andrapidlygrowing,demographically-driven)developmentalneeds.Ineffect,it wasnotnecessarilyCatholicism perse whichformedthecoreoftheideologyofthe BCCs;aswithothernon-Catholicgroupsitwasthepalpableinabilityoftheauthoritiesto dealwithentrenchedsocio-economicproblemswhichledcommunitiestoattempttodeal withproblemsthemselvesutilizingtheirownculturalreferents.

InbothHaitiandthePhilippines,BCC-stylecommunitygroupsgrewswiftlyinthe contextofrepressivedictatorships.Manywerefoundedinthe1970s,andcarriedouta widerangeoflocalcommunityactionprogrammes.InHaitilocalgroupsformedtohelp poor,ruralHaitianstoimprovetheirlivingconditionsby,forexample,developingsmallscaledevelopmentprojects.BeyondthecontroloflocalconservativeCatholicbishops,as inLatinAmerica,theywereorganizedandsupportedbythemoremilitantlocalpriests.

Religion,FundamentalismandEthnicity:AGlobalPerspective JeffHaynes•UNRISDDiscussionPaper65

Liberationtheologyandtheemergenceof religiousradicalisminLatinAmerica

FirstarticulatedinBrazilintheearly1960s,liberationtheologybecameawidespreadfeatureof socio-politicaldivisionandstrugglewithintheCatholicThirdWorld.Liberationtheologyisan intenselypoliticalphenomenon,aresponsetotheappallingsocialandpoliticalconditionswidely foundthroughouttheThirdWorld.Centraltotheconceptisthenotionofdependenceand underdevelopment;theuseofaclassstruggleperspectivetoexplainsocialconflictandjustify politicalaction;andtheexerciseofapoliticalroletoachievebothreligiousandpoliticalgoals.

LiberationtheologyconcernssplittheCatholicChurchinLatinAmericaandelsewhere,perhaps irrevocably.ContentionsbetweentheVaticanandErnestoCardenal(aprominentmemberof Nicaragua’sSandinistagovernmentuntilitselectoraldefeatinFebruary1990)andtheBrazilian LeonardoBoff(whoresignedfromthepriesthoodinJuly1992)symbolizedtheriftbetween progressivetheologiansandthePope.Inaddition,liberationtheologywasregardedbypowerful conservatives,withingovernmentsandwithout,assomethingtofear.Prominentliberation theologianswereassassinated,includingtheBrazilianCamiloTorresin1965,andArchbishop RomeroofElSalvador,gunneddowninhisownchurchin1980.ThemurderofsixJesuit priestsin1989inElSalvadorbymembersofthemilitaryunderlinedthepoliticalandsocial divisionsinherentinLatinAmericansocieties.Tounderstandwhyliberationtheologydeveloped inLatinAmericainthe1960s,weneedfirsttoexaminetheculturallegacyofSpainand Portugal.

LatinAmericawas(andstillislargely)Catholic.Thiswasadirectresultofthefirstwaveof EuropeanimperialexpansionledbySpainandPortugalbeginninginthefifteenthcentury.In contrast,theChristianchurchesinbothAfricaandAsiaderivemostlyfromthesecondwaveof Europeanexpansioninthenineteenthcentury.Thislaterevangelicalwaveinvolvedagreater degreeofdifferentiationbetweenimperialistic(political)andmissionary(religious)penetration thanwasthecasewiththeearlierimperialism.TheimportantsocialandpoliticalresultinLatin AmericawasthatinSpanishandPortuguesecoloniesRomanCatholicismcreatedaworldview markedbyaparticularperspectiveonordinarypeople.Thelateremphasisonliberationcentred ontheclaimthatitwasfirstnecessarytobe“humanized”(i.e.releasedfromdegradationand poverty)beforebecomingareligiousChristian.Sincesuchaprocessinvolvedthe comprehensionoftheconditionswhichhistoricallycreatedthephenomenonof“themanwhois notaman”(tousethephraseofliberationtheologian,GustavoGutierrez)thatprocesscould notbesimplyoneofspiritualization,buthadalsotoinvolveasocio-political“conscientization”. Reflectingprevailingsocialconditions,liberationtheologywasamanifestationofnewreligious valuesandactivitywhichnotsurprisinglystimulatedfrictionbothwithinandbetweensocieties andtheChurchhierarchy.

SummaryandConclusion

Overthelast20yearsorsoreligionhashadconsiderableimpactuponpoliticsinmany regionsoftheworld.Confidencethatthegrowthandspreadofurbanization,education, economicdevelopment,scientificrationalityandsocialmobilitywouldcombineto diminishsignificantlythesocio-politicalpositionofreligionwasnotwellfounded.Two broadtrendshavebeenobservable:religionusedasavehicleofoppositionorasan ideologyofcommunityself-interest.Inthefirstcategoryaretheculturalist, fundamentalistand,inpart,thesyncretistic,religiousentities.Threatsemanatingeither frompowerfuloutsidergroupsorfromunwelcomesymptomsofmodernization (breakdownofmoralbehaviour,over-liberalizationineducationandsocialhabits) galvanizereligiousreactions.Second,thefailureofgovernmentstopushthroughtheir programmesofsocialimprovementhasledtothefoundingoflocalcommunitygroups thathavedevelopedareligiousideologyofsolidarityanddevelopmentoftenwithout muchhelpfromreligiousprofessionals.

Thedevelopmentsdescribedabovesuggestthatoneofthemostresilientideasabout societaldevelopmentaftertheSecondWorldWar—thatnationswouldinevitably secularizeastheymodernized—wasmisplaced.Itwasunderstoodthatmodernization—

includingrationalizationof“irrational”viewssuchasreligion—wouldleadtothe developmentofanewkindofsociety.Butithasbecomeclearthattechnological developmentandotheraspectsofmodernizationhaveleftmanypeoplewithafeelingof lossratherthanachievement.Oneresulthasbeenawaveofpopularreligiositywhichhas oftenhadpoliticalramifications.

Toanalyseandexplainwhathasbecomeavirtuallyglobaldevelopment,thispaperhas lookedatdifferentmanifestationsofburgeoningreligiosity.Religionhasbeenof particularimportanceinunderstandingpoliticalandsocialdevelopmentsinrelationto issuesofethnicityandtothegrowthofreligiousfundamentalisms.Theseessentially oppositionalmanifestationshavebeencomplementedbytheemergenceofboth community-orientedreligiousgroupsandofreligioussyncretism.Whileithasbeen suggestedthatsyncretismisacommonfactorinvirtuallyallorganizedreligions,the growthofreligioussyncretismintheThirdWorldinthepost-colonialerawasrelatedto failuresofcentralgovernmentstooverseelocalcommunities’protection,economic developmentandsocialcohesion.

Whensuchalossoffaithincentralgovernmentwaswritlarge—i.e.,whenitgalvanized largeportionsofdiscreteculturalistgroups—religionhasoftenbecomeamaintenetof anti-centreopposition.Hopesofethnicco-operationhaveattimesgivenwaytofearsof endemicethnicconflict,asoneofthefeaturesofthemodernerahasbeentheapparent fracturingofthestatesystemwhichappearedsoliduntilthedemiseoftheColdWarled toaplethoraofinter-nationconflictswithinstates.

Religiousfundamentalismmaybedividedintotwocategories:“religionsofthebook” andnationalist-orientedderivativesofHinduismandBuddhism.Scripturalrevelations relatingtopolitical,moralandsocialissuesformthecorpusoffundamentalistdemands. Sometimesthesearedeeplyconservative(AmericanProtestantevangelicals),sometimes theyarereformistorrevolutionary(manyIslamistgroups),sometimestheyofferan essentiallymoralisticblueprintforsocialchange(ProtestantevangelicalsinLatin America),andsometimestheyarexenophobic,racist,andreactionary(Jewishgroups, nowbanned,suchasKachandKahaneChai).HinduandBuddhist“fundamentalisms”,in theabsenceofadefinitivesetofscripturalnormsandhencegoals,assumenationalist dimensionswhenreligiousrevivalismpertainstothere-birthofnationalidentityand vigourdeniedinthepast,zealotsconsider,byunwelcomeculturaldilution.

Anotablefeatureofthedevelopmentofreligiouspraxissincetheearly1960shasbeen theemergenceofpopularlydriven,communityreligiosity,whichhasbeeneither conservativeorreformistinthrust.Religiousprofessionalsofsuchgroupswererespected butwerenotassumedtohavethefinalwordonreligiouspraxis.Thedevelopmentofsets ofcommunity-orientedreligiousbeliefshelpedtodevelopmobilizingideologiesof oppositionandself-expression.Thegroupsexaminedinthispaperhaveincommona disaffectionanddissatisfactionwithestablished,hierarchical,institutionalizedreligious bodies;adesiretofindGodthroughpersonalsearchingratherthanthroughthemediation ofinstitutions;andafocusoncommunities’abilitytomakebeneficialchangesto members’livesthroughtheapplicationofgroupeffort.Thisdesireto“goitalone”,notto bebeholdento“superior”bodies,marksabovealltherelationshipofreligionandpolitics inthe1990s.Thedemiseofcommunismasamobilizingideologyleavestheideological cupboardratherbare.Religioninallitsflexibilityoffersanalternativetothoseforwhom modernizationhaseitherfailedorisinsomewayunattractive.Itsinteractionwith politicalissuesoverthemedium-termislikelytobeofespecialimportance,carryinga seriousandseminalmessageofsocietalresurgenceandregenerationinrelationtoboth politicalleadersandeconomicélites.

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