SK's Fear and Trembling

Article TheThoughtExperimentingQualitiesof Kierkegaard’s FearandTrembling

IngridMalm-Lindberg

DepartmentofTheology,UppsalaUniversity,Uppsala,Box511,75120,Sweden; ingrid.malm.lindberg@teol.uu.se

Received:4May2019;Accepted:18June2019;Published:19June2019

Abstract: Inthisarticle,IexaminethepossiblethoughtexperimentingqualitiesofSørenKierkegaard’s novel FearandTrembling andinwhichway(ifany)itcanbeexplanatory.Kierkegaard’spreferencefor pseudonyms,indirectcommunication,Socraticinterrogation,andperformativityareidentifiedas featuresthatprovidethenarrativewithitsthoughtexperimentingquality.Itisalsoproposedthat thisliteraryfictionfunctionsasaSocratic–theologicalthoughtexperimentduetoitsinfluencesfrom bothphilosophyandtheology.Inaddition,Isuggestthreefunctionallevelsofthefictionalnarrative that,indifferentways,influenceitspossibleexplanatoryforce.Asatheoreticalbackgroundforthe investigation,twoaccountsofliterarycognitivismareexplored:NoëlCarroll’sArgumentAccount andCatherineElgin’sExemplificationAccount.InrelationtoCarroll’sproposal,Iconcludethat FearandTrembling developsaphilosophicalargumentationthatisdependentonthereader’sown existentialcontribution.InrelationtoElgin’sthought,therelationbetweentruthandexplanatory forceisacknowledged.Attheendofthearticle,Iarguethatitismoreaccuratetoseetheexplanatory forceof FearandTrembling inrelationtoitsexploratoryfunction.

Keywords: thoughtexperiments;SørenKierkegaard;theology;philosophy;faith;Socraticmethod; explanations;literarycognitivism;NoëlCarroll;CatherineElgin

1.Introduction

TheaimofthisarticleistoexaminethepossiblethoughtexperimentingqualitiesofSøren Kierkegaard’snovel FearandTrembling (Kierkegaard 2013).Inaddition,Iintendtoexploreinwhat way(ifany)thisspecifickindofthoughtexperimentingcanbeconsideredtobeexplanatory.

Thetypicalphilosophicalorscientificthoughtexperimentisconstitutedbyashortfictional narrativethatprovidesevidenceinfavoroforagainstatheory,illustratesabstractstatesofaffairsor fulfillsspecificfunctionswithinatheory.Verymuchlikescientificmodels,suchminimalistfictions manipulateandconstrainthecircumstancesofanidealizedscenario,sothatselectedpatternsand propertiesstandout.Byvisualizingaproposedhypotheticalscenario,thethoughtexperimenting agentisabletointuitivelydrawcertainconclusionsaboutaparticulartargetarea.Thisactivityis, nonetheless,constrainedbythetheoreticalrequirementsandtheunderlyingbackgroundassumptions thateachdisciplineandproblemareasets.

Inphilosophy,oneofthemostwell-knownthoughtexperimentsis,forexample,HilaryPutnam’s presentationofa“twinworld”thatisalmostidenticaltoearth,exceptforlakesandoceansthatare filledwithXYZratherthanH2O.Asaresult,whenapersonlivingonearthusestheword“water”, itmeanssomethingelsethanwhenaninhabitantofthetwinworlddoesso.Accordingly,theaimof Putnam’sthoughtexperimentistogivesupporttothetheoryofsemanticexternalism,accordingto whichthemeaningofwordsandsentencesareinfluencedbyourexternalenvironment(Putnam 1973). Inscience,forinstance,wehavethethoughtexperiment“Schrödinger’scat”,theaimofwhichisto showthattheCopenhageninterpretationofquantummechanicsleadstoabsurditywhenappliedto

everydayobjects.Thescenarioincludesacat,aflaskofpoisonandaradioactivesourcethatareplaced inasealedbox.Ifaninternalmonitordetectsradioactivity,theflaskisshattered,releasingthepoison which,inturn,killsthecat.However,theimplicationoftheCopenhageninterpretationisthatthecat issimultaneouslybothdeadandalive(Schrödinger 1935).Intermsofmethodology,philosophicaland scientificthoughtexperiments,thus,resembleeachothertoagreatextent(usingafictionalnarrative toillustrateorprovideevidencefor/againstatheory).Theydiffer,nonetheless,whenitcomestothe underlyingbackgroundassumptionsandtheoreticalrequirementsthatconstrainthefictionalscenario.

Aswillbecomeevidentforthereader, FearandTrembling deviatesfromthethoughtexperimenting standardby,forexample,beingofagreaterlength,presentingamorecomplexanddetailedcourse ofevents,andsoforth.Consequently,itisoftenreadasacaseofliteraryfiction.Inrecentyears, philosopherssuchas Carroll (2002)and Elgin (2014)have,however,arguedthatsomeliteraryfictions areanalogoustothoughtexperimentsintermsofthecognitiveworktheydo.Inmyanalysisof Fear andTrembling,theproposalsputforwardbythesewriterswillserveasatheoreticalbackground.

Carroll’sapproachtowardsthoughtexperimentsandliteraryfictionsisgoingtobereferredtoas “TheArgumentAccount”.Accordingtothisapproach,literaryfictionscanfunctionlikephilosophical arguments.Similartophilosophicalthoughtexperiments,theymobilizeandexploitthereader’s antecedentconceptualknowledgesothatitisclarifiedandisbroughtoutintheopen.Inthisway, Carrollargues,literaryscenarioscanfunctionasextendedphilosophicalthoughtexperimentsthat instantiateandanalyzeabstractconcepts.

CatherineZ.Elgin’sviewofthoughtexperimentsandliteraryfictionwillbepresentedas“The ExemplificationAccount”.Accordingtoher,bothkindsofnarrativesexemplifypropertiesandpatterns ofthephenomenatheypertainto.Bysodoing,theygivethereaderepistemicaccesstothereal-world equivalentsofthefeaturesdisplayedinthefictionalworld.InElgin’sview,thoughtexperiments, literarynarrativesandscientificmodelsarefictionsofasimilarkind.Hence,althoughnotbeing literallytrue,theyarecognitivelyvaluablebyenablingustoaccessfeaturesthatotherwisewouldbe difficultorimpossibletodiscern.

CarrollandElginare,however,nottheonly—oreventhefirst—philosophersthathaveemphasized thespeculativesignificanceoffiction.Oneoftheirpredecessorsis,forinstance, Lardreau (1988),who proposesthatworksofsciencefictionarebasedonpostulationsofpossibleworlds.Hecomparesthis assumptiontoGottholdWilhelmLeibniz’spostulationofdistinctuniversesthatexistsimultaneously inthedivineintellect.AccordingtoLardreau,bothphilosophicalfictionsandsciencefictions,thus, exploretheconsequencesofcounterfactualscenarios.Althoughthisarticlefocusesontheaccountsof CarrollandElgin,itshould,however,beacknowledgedthatphilosopherssuchasLardreauarepartof therootsoftheirfindings.

Inthescopeofthisarticle,Iwillalsotakeintoaccountthetheologicalkindofthoughtexperimenting that,inrecentyears,hasbeendiscussedby Fehige (2009, 2012, 2014, 2019)inparticular.Whilethere aremanythoughtexperimentsthataddressreligiousthemeswithintheconstraintsofaphilosophical framework,itislesscommontorefertotheirtheologicalcounterparts.Suchtheologicalthought experimentsare,accordingtoFehige,characterizedbytheiremploymentof“intuitionsthatdependon revelation”(Fehige 2014,p.388).Onthisbasis,hearguesthattheBookofJobcanbeseenasathought experimentaboutdivineprovidence(Fehige 2019),andRevelation21:1–4asathoughtexperiment thatsupportsanapocalypticmodelofChristianhopethatstandsincontrasttotheexistingalternative eschatologicalmodel(Fehige 2012). Fisch (2019)argues,inturn,thatTalmudicliteraturemakesuseof counterfactualthoughtexperimentsasawaytoimaginehowJewishlawsandnormativechoicesmay becriticizedoutsidetheboundariesofthehalakhiccommunity.

Inthisarticle,Iamgoingtoarguethat FearandTrembling existssomewhereinbetweenphilosophy andtheologyand,bydisplayingfeaturesofbothcontexts,istobeviewedasahybridcaseof thoughtexperimenting.Furthermore,Iwillproposethatitsinterdisciplinarycharacter—aswell asKierkegaard’sownpreferenceforindirectcommunicationandperformativity—exercisesgreat influenceonthenovel’sabilitytoserveasa“laboratoryofthemind”.

2.“Experimentation”and“ThoughtExperimentation”

AnumberofwritershaveassociatedKierkegaard’sworkswiththoughtexperimenting (forexample, Gregersen 2014; Watts 2016).AlthoughKierkegaardhimselfgenerallydidnotuse theexactterm,nearsynonymssuchas“experiment”and“experimenting”appearfrequentlyinhis pseudonymousworks(1843–1846).Inwhatfollows,IwillgiveabriefintroductiontoKierkegaard’s useofthesetermsand,bysodoing,provideapointofdepartureformyexaminationofthepossible thoughtexperimentingqualitiesof FearandTrembling.

Eveniftheterm“thoughtexperiment”(orGedankenexperiment)isoftenattributedtotheAustrian physicistandphilosopher Mach (1897),HansChristianØrstedalreadyuseditin1811inhisessay ProlegomenontotheGeneralTheoryofNature (Ørsted 1920; Witt-Hansen 2003).ØrstedwasaDanish chemistandphysicistwhobelongedtothesameacademicworldandculturaleliteinCopenhagenas Kierkegaarddid.Althoughthereisnoindicationthattheyhadacloserelationtoeachother,itisclear thatthetwomenmetatvariousoccasions.In1841,whenKierkegaardsubmittedhismasterthesis TheConceptofIrony,Ørstedwas,infact,therectorofCopenhagenUniversity,andhisnamefeatures occasionallyinthenotebooksandjournalsoftheauthor(Troelsen 2009).

Insteadofusingthetermthoughtexperiments,Kierkegaardseems,however,tohavebeenmore pronetocharacterizehisownwritingsas“experiments”orcasesof“experimenting.”Moreprecisely, theyshould—accordingto Tang (2006)—beunderstoodas psychologicalexperiments “referringtoa schemeorplotconstructedforthepurposeofproducingcertainknowledgeaboutthemind”(Tang 2006,p.172).Thesubtitleto Repetitions (Kierkegaard 1983),publishedthesameyearas Fearand Trembling,is,thus,“AVentureinExperimentalPsychology”(“Etforsøgidenexperimenterande psychologie”)andin StagesonLife’sWay (Kierkegaard [1845] 1988),thesectionGuilty/NotGuiltyis simplyreferredtoas“APsychologicalExperiment.”Theaimofsuchoperationswas,accordingto Kierkegaard,toconstructimaginaryscenariosthatgeneratedinsightsintothehumanpsychethatwere unattainablebydirectempiricalobservation.Eveniftheseexperimentstooktheformofnovels,Tang argues,theywerenot—incontrasttomostliteratureofthisperiod—characterizedbypsychological realism.Inhisview,Kierkegaard’sconceptofexperimentationpointstothecultureofpsychological experimentationthatwasdevelopedinthe19thcentury.Duetoepistemologicalandethicaldifficulties, thedirectstudyofthemindwas,however,soonreplacedbyaphysiologicallyorientedexperimental psychology.Asaresponse,Tangargues,Kierkegaardcreatedanexistentialmethodofexperimental psychology.Bysodoing,theDanishauthorswitched“fromtheperspectiveoftheexperimentertothat oftheexperimentalsubject”(Tang 2006,p.177).

WhileTangdistinguishesbetweenpsychologicalexperiments(aplotthataimsatproducing knowledgeaboutthemind)andregularthoughtexperiments(“hypotheticalargumentation”),other commentatorsdonot. Watts (2016)refers,forinstance,toKierkegaard’sessay PhilosophicalFragments (Kierkegaard [1844] 1985)asathoughtexperimentthatexploreswhethertheessentialtruthof Christianityliesbeyondthelimitsofhumanunderstanding.Heproposesthat,here,Kierkegaard makesadistinctionbetweentwokindsofthinking:aesthetic–intellectualandethico–religiousthinking. Whiletheformerischaracterizedbyabstraction,thelatterisdistinguishedbyawayofthinkingthat involvesthereader’s“ownindividualexistence inconcreto”aswellasher“ethicalactuality”(Watts 2016,p.19).Climacus,thepseudonymousauthoroftheessay,claims—accordingtoWatts—thatit isonlythroughtheethico–religiousmodethatweareabletothinkaboutwhatisessentiallyhuman. Whatliesbeyondthelimitsoftheaestheticintellectualis,consequently,notbeyondthelimitsof thoughtbut,rather,another type ofthought.Atthesametime,WattsacknowledgesthatClimacus’s notionof“doublereflection”pointstotheinvolvementofbothabstractandconcretethinkinginthe ethico–religiousmode:

wemustbeclearthatClimacusinnowaydeniesthatethico–religiousthinking also involvesreflectionandabstractinquiry.Onthecontrary,thenotionof‘doublereflection’—one

ofhisfewtermsofart—isplainlyintendedtoencapsulatetheideathatwhatweneedisa kindofthinkingthatis both abstractandconcrete.

(Watts 2016,p.19)

Tang’sandWatt’saccountsserveastheoreticalbackgroundsformyexplorationof Fearand Trembling. InSection 4 ofthisarticle,asIdiscussitspossiblethoughtexperimentingqualities,Iwill returntotheirnotionsof“experiments”and“thoughtexperiments”,respectively.

3.AnOverviewof FearandTrembling

Inwhatfollows,anoverviewof FearandTrembling willbepresented,combinedwithcomments andreflectionsonthespecificcharacteristictraitsofthenarrative.

3.1.PseudonymityandIndirectCommunication

Atthecenterof FearandTrembling,wefindthebiblicalstoryabouthowAbraham’sfaithis testedbyGodandhowheisorderedtosacrificehissonIsaaconMountMoriah(Gen.22:1–18).The noveliswrittenunderthepseudonymofJohannesdeSilentio(JohnofSilence).Similartomanyof Kierkegaard’spseudonyms,hebecomesthepersonificationofideasandperspectives,ratherthan athree-dimensionalcharacter.Sinceitwascommonlyknownin1840sCopenhagenthatSøren Kierkegaardwastheactualwriterofthebook,thepseudonymisnotintendedtoobscuretheidentity oftheauthor.Rather,itsfunctionistocommunicateindirectlytothereadersandconfrontthem with“an‘unresolved’existentialproblem”(Boven 2018,p.116).Thatis,insteadofpresentingclear solutionstotheproblem,Kierkegaardcreatesasituationwherethereadersthemselveshavetochoose betweenmultipleviewpoints.Or,ashedescribedithimself:“SinceIamincompetentandextremely undependableinmen’seyes,Ispeakthetruthandtherebyplacetheminthecontradictionfromwhich theycanbeextricatedonlybyappropriatingthetruththemselves”(Kierkegaard [1967] 1978,JP.V:5646; Kierkegaard [1909] 1948,Pap.IVA87).Pseudonymousauthorshipis,consequently,atechniquethat Kierkegaardusestoreachhistargetaudiencethroughindirectcommunication.Incontrasttoamere objectivetransferenceofinformation,itischaracterizedbysubjectivityandanexistentialorientation.

JohannesdeSilentioreferstohisworkasacaseof“dialecticallyric.”Whiletheterm“dialectical”is generallyusedtodescribe“amethodofphilosophicalargumentthatinvolvessomesortofcontradictory processbetweenopposingsides”(Maybee 2016),ithas,throughouttheyears,beengivenvarious interpretations.TheHegelianversionpostulatesthatlogicandhistory—primarilytherealmsofideas andspirit—followadialecticalpattern.Throughthisprocess,agradualdevelopmenttakesplace: earlierandlessdevelopedstagesareabsorbedbylaterandmoreadvancedones.Hegel’stheorymay haveinfluencedJohannesdeSilentio’sdepictionofthedialecticalmovementofresignationandfaith. Inspiteofthis,itislikelythatthelabel“dialecticlyric”also(andperhapstoanevengreaterextent) referstotheSocraticversionofthedialecticalmethod.

KierkegaardwasdeeplyinfluencedbySocratesandhismethodofinterrogation.Sincehe consideredhisownwritingstobecontinuouswiththeGreekphilosopher’slegacy,hestatedonone occasion:“TheonlyanalogyIhavebeforemeisSocrates;mytaskisaSocratictask,toauditthedefinition ofwhatitistobeaChristian”(Kierkegaard 1998,p.341).Kierkegaard,thus,envisionshimselfto haveamaieuticrole(gr.maieutikos,onewhoactsasamidwife)intheexistentialdevelopmentof thereaders,assistingthemtogivebirthtothemselvesasauthenticindividuals.Byaskingquestions (withoutprovidinganyanswer),theaimistoevokethereader’ssubjectiveandexistentialresponse.

Accordingto Boven (2018),Kierkegaard’smethodisthereforetobecharacterizedasa“theaterof ideas”,wherephilosophicalandexistentialproblemsareperformedratherthanrepresented.

Thecommunicationhasameaningfulcontent,butthiscontentisneitherfixednorpredefined. Itemergesonlyafterithasbeenactualizedbythereader.Thisusuallyinvolvesadecisionthatdiscloses theviewofthereaderratherthanthatofthecommunicator(Boven 2018,p.117).

Pons (2004)argues,inturn,thattheworksoftheDanishauthorcontainneitheradescriptionnora prescriptionofrealitybut,rather,“apossibilityofreality”thatonlythereaderhim/herselfcanactualize. Thepossibilityinquestiontherebyservesasadialectichorizon“whichkeepsdifferentmomentsof realityintension”anddemandsaconsciousexerciseoffreedomonthereader’spart(Pons 2004,p.69). AnothertechniquethatKierkegaardfrequentlyutilizesisirony:presentingeventsorcharacters whoseappearanceonthesurfacediffersradicallyfromwhatisactuallythecase.Oneexample, forinstance,isthefactthatanarrator,whosenameis“silence”giveslengthyspeechesabouta spiritualcapacityheadmiresbutdoesnotpossesshimself:“Socratessayswithawink,‘Iknownothing!’ (yetspeakson);Johannes desilentio sayswithawink,‘Iamsilent!’(yetwriteson)”(Mooney 2013, p.206).AnadditionalcharacteristictraitofJohannesdeSilentio’srecountishisemphasisonbeing adialecticianandapoet,ratherthanaphilosopher.Somecommentatorsargue,nonetheless,thata dialectician,inthiscontext,issynonymouswithaphilosopher.Mooneysuggests,forinstance,that “dialecticallyric”means“philosophicallyric”andclaims—onthebasisofthistranslation—that Fear andTrembling enablesustoreassesstheantitheticalrelationbetweenphilosophyandpoetry,dialectics andart(Mooney 1991,p.139).Thatis,insteadofhavingopposingfunctions,theymergewithone another.Otherwriters,suchas Humpál (2001),developaviewthat,onthecontrary,emphasizesthat “[t]hisdialecticoffaithhasmoreincommonwiththepoeticandtheironicthanwiththephilosophical” (Humpál 2001,p.500).Bypoeticallyevokingthe“fearandtrembling”thatisexperiencedbysomeone whoapproachestheparadoxoffaith,Humpálargues,theaimofJohannesdeSilentio’snarrationis, thus,toexceedthelimitsofreason.Therefore,whatirony,dialecticsandpoeticshaveincommon, inhisview,isthattheyprovidethereaderswithanintuitiveinsightintowhattheparadoxicalsphere offaithentails(butwithoutgivingthemabsoluteknowledgeofit).Atthisinitialstageofthearticle, Iamnotgoingtotakeaclearstandontheexactrelationbetween“philosophy”and“dialectics.”The underlyingassumptionofmyargumentationis,however,thatitisthelyricalcharacterofJohannesde Silentio’sdialecticsthatcreatesitspossiblethoughtexperimentingqualities.Theexactcharacterofthis thoughtexperiment—andinwhatway(ifany)itcanbeexplanatory—willbefurtherdiscussedin Section 4

3.2.FourAlternativeVersionsofAbraham’sResponsetoGod

Theinitialpassage,“Prelude”startswithafairytaleopening,“Onceuponatime.”Wehearabouta manwhorecallshowhe,asachild,heardthestoryofhowAbraham,althoughhewastemptedbyGod, “enduredtemptation,keptthefaith,andasecondtimereceivedagainasoncontrarytoexpectation” (Kierkegaard 2013,p.37).WhilethemanadmiresAbraham,heisunabletounderstandwhyhedid ashedid.Therefore,inanattempttoincreasehisappreciationofthestory,themanreflectsonfour alternativeversions.AlthoughAbraham,inallofthem,actsonthedivinedemand(tosacrificeIsaac), hisobedienceisaccompaniedwithanattitudethatturnsouttobedeficient.Inordertoemphasizeand problematizethenarratedevents,JohannesdeSilentiousesrepetition.Thefunctionofthealternative interpretationsofGenesis22is,accordingly,tomakethereaderawareofthedifficultyandcomplexity offaith.However,whilebeinginducedwiththeexperienceofhorrorandanguishattheeventat MountMoriah,wearealsoremindedofthefaithfulnessofrealAbraham.

Intheremainderofthebook,morethanadozenotherinterpretationsofthebiblicalstoryare presented.Accordingto Mooney (1991),themultiplicityofversionsservesasareminderofthefact thatJohannesdeSilentio’sambitionisnottoformulateasetofsimpledeclarativepropositionsorto giveasystematicportraitoffaith.

Rather,byconsideringskewedvariations,[Johannes]circlesfromtheoutside,asitwere,isolating thenarrativesymbolicspacewithinwhichaneffectiveinterpretationwillfall.Thisnarrowsthemargin oferror.Judgingfromthenumberofversionsthatmissthetarget,whateversenseisfinally retrieved fromthatspaceisnotlikelytobetransparent,orimmediatelyobviousorcapturableinaruleora slogan(Mooney 1991,p.29).

ThisaspectshouldbeviewedincontrasttotheHegeliansystemofthoughtthat,atthetime, hadbecomeincreasinglypopularatthetheologicalfacultyinCopenhagen.AccordingtoHegel, thewholeofrealitycouldbeexplainedbyadialecticalanalysisofhistory.Christianitywas,for example,explainedasapartoftherationalunfoldinganddevelopmentofhumanunderstanding andthenaturalworld.KierkegaardconsideredthistobeadistortionoftheChristianmessageand anoveremphasisonrationalthinkingasawaytounderstandthedoctrinesofChristianity.Atthe centerof FearandTrembling,we,thus,findthejuxtapositionofHegelagainstAbraham’sbehavior. Itcan,inparticular,beseeninthedistinctionbetweenthereligiousandtheethical.InHegel’sview, theethicalisbasedonthe“AbsoluteMind”whichistheuniversal,commongoodofallpeoplethat transcendsthepersonal.Religiousfaith—accordingtoKierkegaard—works,onthecontrary,onan individuallevel,inthedirectrelationshipwithGod.ThestoryofAbraham,consequently,functions asanexampleofasituationthatcannotbejustifiedbyethicalarguments.Fromapurelyethicaland universalperspective,whatAbrahamattemptedcannotbeviewedasanythingotherthanmurder. However,bysuspendinghisobligationtotheethical,hedarestomakealeapoffaithinordertofulfill ahigherdutytoGod.

3.3.TheExistentialContributionoftheReader

Inthenextsectionofthetext,“APanegyricuponAbraham”,thestoryofAbrahamandIsaacis repeatedbut,now,inamoreintensifiedway.Byrecapitulatingthepatriarch’searlierlife(themigration fromhishomeland,thedelayofthepromisedsonIsaac),thenarratorhighlightshisgreatnessand faithfulnesstoGod.Theaimofthissectionofthebookisnotonlytointroducetheconcernsthatwill beaddressedinthephilosophicalpartsofthebookbutalsotoevokethehorrorofthebiblicalnarrative andconfrontthereaderwiththedifficultyoffaith.

Thissectionofthenovel,thus,startsbyrecountinghowAbraham,inspiteofvariouskindsof challengesandtests,neverdoubtsGod’spromise.Inasimilarway,whenGodcommandshimto sacrificeIsaac,hesimplysays“HereIam”andembarks,withoutsayingawordtoanyone,onhis journeytoMountMoriah.Interestingly,JohannesdeSilentio’sinsistenceonAbraham’ssilence deviatesfromtheactualbiblestory,whereafragmentedformofdialogue,infact,isincluded.This isanintentionalstrategyofthenarratorinordertoemphasizethecloserelationbetweenfaithand concealmentthathewillreturntolateroninthenovel.InspiteofAbraham’sinabilitytospeakabout hisordeals,bindingIsaacnonethelessexposesAbraham’sfaithfulnesstoGod.Thiseventshould therefore,accordingto Freidman (1987),beviewedinrelationtothetraditionalJewishconceptof binding(Akedah):“InbindingIsaac,AbrahamchoosestobindhimselftoGodbutthischoicemay onlyexpresstheacceptanceofapriorconditionofAbraham’sexistence,namely,thatheisalready boundtoGod”(Freidman 1987,p.261).

EvenifthenarratorstressestheincomprehensibilityofAbraham’sfaith,healmostobsessively repeatsthestoryofthesacrifice.JustlikethemaninthePrelude,he,thus,returnstotheeventand createsalternativeversionsofit.Intheserecounts,thedistinctlyhumanelementsofAbraham’strial areilluminated.Hence,wehearabouthowtheprotagonistexperiences“anxietyanddistress”ashe traveledtoMountMoriah.Inthewordsof Conway (2017):“Abrahamwasgreat,Johannesavers, notsimplybecauseheofferedhis‘best’tohisGod,butalsobecausehesuffereddeeplyintheprocess ofdoingso”(Conway 2017,p.135).

Anothersalientfeatureofthissectionisthestrongelementofundecidability.Themultiple andoftenincompatibleversionsofIsaac’ssacrificegivethestoryanambiguousandintentionally vaguecharacter.AtthecriticalmomentwhenAbrahamdrawshisknife,thenarrativeissuspended, disruptedandthenrepeatedagain.Thiscombinationofrepetitionandinterruptionserves,according to Kjaeldgaard (2002),asawayto“blockthenarrativeroadtocatharticrelief,toabsoluteknowledge andcertainty,bywayofonesinglepregnantmomentthatkeepsusforeverinthemiddleofthe narrativeunderthespellofindecision”(Kjaeldgaard 2002,p.321).Inthisway,thestorybecomes open-ended:givingfreereigntothereader’sownimaginationandresponsetotheethicalquestion

raised.AsimilarpointisraisedbyMooney,whoreferstothisaspectasKierkegaard’s“existential contribution”thatonlythereader’sownsubjectivitycancomplete:

His contributionistooffermeanexistentialspacedistinctfromsocialspace.IfIacceptthisoffer, IaccepttheopenspacewhereexistentialpossibilitiesarevividlyacknowledgedandthenI close that radicalopennessthroughdecisiveresolutionandaction.Kierkegaardcannotcompletetheprocess heinitiates.Hecanofferpossibilitiesbuthecannotdeterminewhichofthesewillbecomemine (Mooney 2018,p.63).

3.4.TheKnightofFaithandtheTragicHero

Inwhatfollows,JohannesdeSilentiodevelopsthreefiguresthatbecometheembodimentof theethicalandthereligiousattitudes:thetragichero,theknightofinfiniteresignation,andthe knightoffaith.Theactscommittedbythetragicheroarealwaysrelatedtoauniversalethicalcode. Consequently,whenfacingmoralconflicts,heresolvesthembyyieldingtogenerality.Theknightof infiniteresignationbelongstotheethicalsphereaswell.Heisanindividualwhogivesupwhathe holdsdearestandexperiencesthepainofloss.Whilethemovementofinfiniteresignationincludes manysacrifices,JohannesdeSilentiotellsus,thepainiscommunicableandcanbeunderstoodby others.Thesamemovementisalsomadebytheknightoffaith.However,incontrasttotheother knight,healsomovesbeyondthispoint,transcendstheethical,andmakesaleapoffaith.Abrahamis, consequently,theultimateknightoffaith.Also,incontrasttothetragicheroandtheknightofinfinite resignation,whoareuniversallyadmiredandweptfor,noonecanunderstandhim.

Inordertoillustratethedifferencebetweentheknightofinfiniteresignationandtheknightof faith,thenarratortellsastoryofayoungboywhofallsinlovewithaprincess,“andthewholecontent ofhislifeconsistsinthislove,andyetthesituationissuchthatitisimpossibleforittoberealized, impossibleforittobetranslatedfromidealityintoreality”(Kierkegaard 2013,p.85).Eveniftheknight ofinfiniteresignationgivesuptheideaofitsrealizationinthemundaneworld,thisdoesnotmean thathisdesirefortheprincessisgivenupalltogether.Byrecollectinghishurt-filledmemoriesofher, theknightofinfiniteresignation,onthecontrary,transformstheprincessintoanidealizedandstatic objectforhisunfulfilleddesires.Thisactbringshimacertainreconciliationwithlife,since“[h]islove forthatprincessbecameforhimtheexpressionforaneternallove ... whichnorealitycantakefrom him”(Kierkegaard 2013,p.89).Inasimilarway,theknightoffaithrenounceshislovefortheprincess andexperiencespain.However,incontrasttotheotherknight,hisstrategyisrepetitionratherthan recollection.Thatis,hemakesaleapoffaithandtruststhathewillgettheprincessbackbyvirtueof theabsurd,since“withGodallthingsarepossible”(Kierkegaard 2013,p.94).

3.5.FaithasSilentInwardness

Thecontrastbetweenthereligiousandtheethical,aswellasthetragicheroandthetwoknights, isfurtherelaboratedoninthethreeproblemsaroundwhichtheremainderofthebookcenters:(1) IsthereaTeleologicalSuspensionoftheEthical?(2)IsthereanAbsoluteDutytoGod?(3)Wasit EthicallyDefensibleforAbrahamtoConcealHisUndertakingfromSarah,Eliezer,andIsaac?Eachof themconcernsanethicalquestionthat,fromaHegelianperspective,couldbegivenadefiniteanswer. However,bydrawingoutthedialecticalconsequencesinherentinthestoryofAbraham,Johannesde Silentioshowsthatitcannotbeunderstoodintermsoftheuniversal.Heproposesinsteadthatthe actionsofthepatriarchshouldbeviewedasateleologicalsuspensionoftheethicalbyomissiontoa God-givenabsoluteduty.Thisisnotanobliterationofethics,but,rather,atransformationofitintoa newhigherform(basedontherelationshipwithGodratherthanonuniversalnorms).

Inthethirdproblem,whichisgivenmostattention,theauthorreturnstothefactthatAbrahamdid notdisclosehisundertakingtoanyone.Hewassilentabouthisordealsincenobodywouldunderstand him,wearetold.AsJohannesdeSilentioexplains,thisstandsincontrasttotheethicalanduniversal spherethatrequiresdisclosureandrejectshiddenness.FromaHegelianperspective,individuals shouldbeabletospeakabouttheirexperiencesbyutilizingtheuniversalresourcesoflanguage.

Furthermore,sincelanguageisapublicphenomenon,itshouldonlybeusedtoexpressexperiencesthat manyindividualsshare.Thenarrator,thus,writes“Thereliefofspeechisthatittranslatesmeintothe universal.”(Kierkegaard 2013,p.204).Forhim,faithis,onthecontrary,associatedwithinwardness, silence,andunspeakablemessages.Byactingasasingleindividual—relatingtotheAbsoluteina subjectivemanner—Abrahamisisolatedfromtheuniversalandunabletoexplainhisactions.Asan illustrationofthedistinctionofthedisclosed(theethical)andthehidden(thereligious),Johannes deSilentiopresentsuswithanumberofscenarios.OneofthemismodeledonastoryinAristoteles’ Poetics,whereabridegroomconsultstheoracleinDelphiandistoldthathewillsufferamisfortune broughtaboutbyhismarriage.Themanhasthreeoptions:Hecouldremainsilentandgetmarried away,besilentbutchosenottogetmarried,or—onthecontrary—speakout.Theproperresponse depends,accordingtoJohannesdeSilentio,“uponhowthismanstandsrelatedtotheutteranceof theaugurswhichisinonewayoranotherdecisiveforhislife”(Kierkegaard 2013,p.170).Ifthe life-changingannouncementtakesplaceinthepublicdomain,itisintelligibletoallpeopleandnota resultofasubjectiverelationtothedivine.InAbraham’scase,however,thesituationis,incontrast, determinedbyaprivateandincommunicablerelationtoGodaboutwhichheisunabletospeak.

4.AnalysisofFearandTrembling

Inthispartofthearticle,Iintendtofocusonthreequestions:

(1) Inwhatway(ifany)does FearandTrembling displaythoughtexperimentingqualities?

(2) IfKierkegaard’snarrative,infact,canbesaidtohavesuchqualities,thentowhatcategoryof thoughtexperimentsdoesitbelong?

Basedonmyresponsetothesequestions,asuggestionwillbegivenon FearandTrembling’s thoughtexperimentingstatusandcategorization.Then,asafollowup,Iwillturntothepossible explanatoryfunctionsthatthoughtexperimentsingeneral—and FearandTrembling inparticular—may have.Theconcretequestionbeing:

(3) Inwhatways(ifany)doesthethoughtexperimentationof FearandTrembling havean explanatoryfunction?

4.1.ThePossibleThoughtExperimentingQualityofFearandTrembling

Asapointofdepartureformyanalysis,IacknowledgethatKierkegaard’sbookspansovera philosophicalaswellasatheologicaldiscourse.Inthefirstcase,thedevelopmentofanarrative wherecharactersandeventsembodycriticalargumentsagainstcertainaspectsofHegel’sphilosophy. However,whilecriticizingsomeelementsoftheGermanphilosopher’saccount,thenarrator’sown argumentationfrequentlyborrowsfromtheHegelianframeworkaswell.Thedepictionofthetwo movementsofresignationandfaithdepends,forexample,onadialecticthatismuchliketheone employedbyHegel.Consequently,insteadofanabsoluteopposition,Kierkegaard’swritingsdisplaya combinationofHegelianaswellasanti-Hegelianviews.Hence,ifweconsider FearandTrembling tobe aphilosophicalthoughtexperiment,weendupwithquiteanintriguingsituation.Morespecifically, athoughtexperimentthatprovidesevidenceagainstsomeelementsofHegel’sphilosophy,while otherpartsofhisphilosophicalsystembelongtoitsunderlyingbackgroundassumptions.Inaddition, therearealsootherphilosophicaltraditionsthatimpingeonthethoughtexperimentingprocesses. Oneofthemoredecisiveoftheseis,Iargue,theSocraticmodeofopen-endedinterrogation.Instead ofbringingpurelytheoreticalcontenttothethoughtexperimentingsituation,thisaccountexercises influenceonthebasisofitsspecificmethodofinquiry.

Accordingly,whilebothHegel’sandSocrates’legacyaffectthenarrative,theydosoindifferent waysandinrelationtodistinctaspectsoftheepistemicprocess.Inthefollowing,Iwill,however,argue that,ofthesetwo,itistheSocratictraditionthatexercisesmostinfluenceonthethoughtexperimenting characterof FearandTrembling.Bycombininganarrativescenario(inwhichdifferentcharacters embodyvariousphilosophicalandtheologicalconcepts)withaSocraticmaieutictechniqueanda

performativeinvitationtothereader,Kierkegaard’snovel,thus,becomesanimaginative“laboratory ofthemind”or,asRobinsonputsit,a“funhouseofexistentialactivity”that,ateveryturn,provides opportunitiesforself-explorationandself-assessment(Robinson 2018,p.75):

Suchafunhouseisnotasimplematteroffunandgamesbutmorelikeafairytalethatuses thecomic,thecharming,theseductive,orthemagicalinordertodrawthereaderintotheanxiety, thesuffering,theterror,andthedeaththatdoghumanexistence(Robinson 2018,p.75).

Consequently,eventhoughKierkegaard’scritiqueofHegelconstitutesonelevelofthenarrative, aperhapsevenmoresalientlevelistheonetheauthorleavesopenforthereader’sownexistential explorationandself-searching.Onthebasisofthesecharacteristics,Ithereforearguethat Fearand Trembling canbelabeledaSocratickindofthoughtexperimenting.

Myproposalisaccordingly,andincontrastto(Tang (2006)—seeSection 2)),thatmanyof Kierkegaard’swritings,infact,canbeseenascasesofthoughtexperimenting.Thispositionis, however,foundedonacertainassumptionabouttheparticularcharacterofthethoughtexperimenting activitythatKierkegaard’sexistentialperspectiveprescribes.Thatis,itdoesnotinviteustoan entirely“hypotheticalargumentation”butdependsonourownpersonalinvestmentand“existential contribution”tothepresentedscenario.As Watts (2016)suggests,thisisnotanactivitythatisbeyond thoughtbut,rather,involvesanother type ofthinkingthanwhattheabstract,aesthetic–logicalmodeis abletorepresent.AlthoughWatt’sargumentationprimarilyconcerns PhilosophicalFragments,here, itistakentobevalidfor FearandTrembling aswell.Thatis,inmyview,thisessaycanbeconceived ofasathoughtexperimentthatinvolvesbothabstractandconcretethinking(earlierreferredtoas “doublereflection”).Furthermore,Iarguethattheboundarybetweentheaesthetic–logicalandthe ethico–religiousmodes(proposedbyWatts)shouldbeconceivedofasfluidratherthanstatic.Asa consequence,theSocraticcharacterof FearandTrembling influencesandhasadecisiveimpacton bothkindsofthinking.Inthefollowing,althoughIwillnotbeusingtheterms“ethico–religious” and“aesthetic–logical,”theinterrelationbetweenthephilosophicalandthetheologicalaspectsof Kierkegaard’snovelis,nonetheless,goingtobeemphasized.

Beforewecontinue,itis,forthisreason,necessarytoquestionwhether FearandTrembling,infact, shouldbereferredtoasapurely philosophical thoughtexperiment.Whilereligiousmattersmayvery wellbetheobjectforphilosophicalthoughtexperimenting(employingphilosophicalbackground assumptionsandstrategiesforjustification),theycouldalsobedealtwithbytheologicalequivalents. Suchtheologicalthoughtexperimentsare,accordingtoFehige,characterizedbytheiremploymentof “intuitionsthatdependonrevelation”(Fehige 2014,p.388).Fehigesuggeststhatthistypeofthought experimenting,forexample,canbefoundinrelationtotheproblemoftheodicy: thewell-known problemoftheodicycanbeconceivedofasathoughtexperimentofrevealedtheologyandnotonlyas aphilosophicalargumenttosupportatheism.Giventheundeniableexistenceofgodandofevilinthe creation,theproblemariseshowthecreatorofeverythingcanbegoodandomnipotent(Fehige 2009, p.265).

AlthoughKierkegaardwascriticaloftheHegel-inspiredformofChristianitythat,inhistime, wasprevalentintheEvangelicalLutheranChurchofDenmark,Iarguethathisthoughtexperimenting stillfitswithinFehige’sdefinition.Thatis,whilerejectingtheideathattheparadoxoffaithcan becomprehendedobjectively,heemphasizedfaithassubjectivetruthandinwardness.Rather thanseeing FearandTrembling asanentirelySocratickindofthoughtexperimenting,I,hence, arguethatKierkegaard’snarrativeneedsahybridcategorythatcoversbothitsphilosophicaland theologicalundertakings.Onthisbasis,Isuggestthat FearandTrembling maybeconceivedofasa Socratic–theologicalthoughtexperiment.Sincethisnovel(becauseofitsexistentialorientation)is moreconcernedwiththehumanattitudetoGodthanwithGodassuch,itmaybemoreaccurateto characterizeitasacaseoftheologicalanthropologythanoftheologyproper.

4.2.TheRelationbetweenThoughtExperimentingandLiteraryFictions

InordertomakeaninformedjudgmentonthethoughtexperimentingqualitiesofKierkegaard’s narrative,wemustalsotakeintoaccountitsresemblancetoliteraryfiction.Agoodwaytostartisto questionwhether“literaryfiction”infactistheproperlabelfor FearandTrembling,orwhetheritis moreaccuratetoseeitasaphilosophicaltextconcealedinliteraryclothing.Althoughthedifference betweenthetwoalternativesseemstobemodest,whichonewechoosemayhaveimplicationsfor howweviewtheepistemicworkitachieves.

Aswasmentionedintheintroduction, Carroll (2002)and Elgin (2014)belongtoagroupof philosophersthatstresstheresemblancebetweenthoughtexperimentsandsome(butnotall)literary fictions.BothCarrollandElginadvocate—althoughindifferentways—literarycognitivism,whichisthe thesisthat“literaryfictioncanbeasourceofknowledgeinawaythatdependscruciallyonitsbeing fictional”(Green 2010,p.352).Suchknowledgeclaimshave,accordingtoDavies,beenpresentedinat leastfourwaysinrecentphilosophicaldiscussion(Davies 2010,pp.56–57).Oneofthemistoargue thatfictionscancontributewithfactualinformationabouttheworld(forexample,amongabundleof fictivesentences,theremayalsobetruestatements.)Anotherstrategyistoclaimthatfictivenarratives providetheirreaderswith“anunderstandingofgeneralprinciplesoperativeintherealworld”(Davies 2010,p.57).Byexemplifyingtheseprinciples(ineitheranimplicitoranexplicitway),theygenerate insightsintotheirreal-worldequivalents.Thethirdproposedwaybywhichafictionalnarrativecan serveasasourceofknowledge,Daviesargues,istodevelopthereader’scategoricalcomprehension.

Inpresentingafictionalworld,anarrativemayfurnishthereaderwithnewcategoriesorkinds whoseapplicationtotherealworldilluminatescertainmattersoffact.Forexample,workslike 1984 or TheTrial provideuswithconceptualframeworkstocriticallyexaminethewaysinwhichsocio-political structurescanexercisecontroloverthelifeoftheindividual.Whatwecantherebyacquire,itisclaimed, arenewandinsightfulwaysofclassifyingandcategorizingthingsandsituations(Davies 2010,p.57).

AccordingtothefourthandlastofDavies’presentedcategories,fictionsprimarilygenerate affectiveknowledgeandanempathiccomprehensionof“whatitwouldbelike”tobeinaparticular setofcircumstances.Inthefollowing,asIexaminehowNoëlCarrollandCatherineElginmotivate andargueforliterarycognitivism,IwillconsiderwhethertheirapproachesconformtoanyofDavies’ suggestedcategories.Inordertospecifytheexactnatureoftheiraccounts,Ialsointendtomakeuseof DavidEgan’sdistinctionbetweenthreewaystocharacterizetherelationbetweenthoughtexperiments andliteraryfictions(Egan 2016).The claimofapplicability is,accordingtoEgan,themostmoderate one.Itsimplyacknowledgesthatliteraryfictionscanbeappliedinthoughtexperimenting—which, forexample,isthecasewhenphilosophers,insteadofcreatingthoughtexperimentsoftheirown, borrowthemfromtheliterature.AccordingtoCarroll,thisisamethodthatphilosophersfrequentlyuse. EncounteringtheSocraticdoctrinethatapersonwhoknowsthegoodcannotchoosetodoevil, thephilosophermayrespondbydrawingattentiontotheliterarycasesofMilton’sSatan,whodeclares, “Evilbethoumygood,”aswellastoShakespeare’sIagoandMelville’sClaggart.Thereader,usingher conceptionofwhatishumanlypossible,recognizesthatsuchpersonalitytypescouldobtainandthen goontotaketheseliteraryinventionsascounterexamplestotheSocraticposition(Carroll 2002,p.9).

Inthe claimofcognitivism,theanalogybetweenthenarrativetypesismuchstronger,sinceit statesthat“wecandefendthecognitivevalueofthoughtexperimentsbydrawinganalogouslyon thecognitivevalueofthoughtexperiments”(Egan 2016,p.148).Theunderlyingassumptionis, consequently,thatbothkindsofnarrativesperformthesame(or,atleast,similar)typeofcognitive work.Evenmorefar-reaching,however,is theidentityclaim that,accordingtoEgan’scharacterization, statesthatliteraryfiction,infact, is aspecifickindofthoughtexperiment.

Inwhatfollows,Carroll’sandElgin’sproposalswillbepresented.ThepossibleinsightsIgain fromthisexplorationisthengoingtobeusedasabackgroundformyreflectiononKierkegaard’s thoughtexperimenting.

4.3.TheArgumentAccountofNoëlCarroll

Accordingto Carroll (2002),literaryfictions,likephilosophicalthoughtexperiments,canfunction likeargumentsthatmobilizeconceptualknowledgethatwealreadypossess.Byoperatingonthe reader’santecedentconceptualknowledge,theyexploitthereader’sabilitytoapplyconceptssothat thatknowledgeisclarifiedandbroughtoutintheopen.Inthisway,literaryscenarioscanfunction asextendedphilosophicalthoughtexperimentsthatinstantiateandanalyzeabstractconcepts.They may,forexample,enableconceptualdiscrimination,dispelvagueness,testnewwaysofsettingupa problemoraquestion,illuminatethecriteriathatleadustoapplytheconcept,andsoforth.

Asaconsequence,someliteraryfictions—accordingtoCarroll—canserveas“wheelsofvirtue”, promotingandguidingthereader’sreflectionontheconceptofvirtueandtheconditionsunder whichitisapplied.HetakesE.M.Forster’snovel Howard’sEnd tobeanexampleofthis.Here,the castofcharactersbearstructuredandpolarizedrelationsofcomparisonandcontrasttoeachother. Bypromptingustoapplyconceptsofviceandvirtuetothecharactersinquestion,thenarrative,thus, sharpensourabilitytorecognizetheabstractconceptthattheleadingfiguresinstantiate,Carrollargues. Sincethistypeofliterarythoughtexperimentsreliesontheconceptualknowledgethattheaudience alreadypossess,theyare,insomesenses,rhetorical.Atthesametime,“theyarerhetoricalinaway thatisnotdivorcedfromargumentation”(Carroll 2002,p.14).Thatis,whilethenarrativessetup argumentsandpointstopossibleconclusions,theargumentationitselfiscompletedinthemindof thereader.

Inthisrespect,theyaredoublyeducative:notonlydotheyaffordknowledgeofconcepts,butthey guidethereaderthroughtheprocessofconductingagrammaticalinvestigationofthevirtuesby arrayinginastructuredwayimaginedexamplesthatpointtowardpertinentdistinctions(Carroll 2002, p.14).

Hence,althoughtheaimoftheimaginativescenariosisnottomakeempiricaldiscoveriesof theworld,theyreorganizeandrefocustheaudience’sconceptualknowledgeinnovelways.Carroll formulateshisaccountasaresponsetoepistemicargumentsthatdenythatliteratureandartcan functionasgenuinesourcesofknowledge.Accordingtowhathereferstoasthe no-evidenceargument, artworkdonotcontributetoknowledge,sincetheydonot,ingeneral,provideanyjustificationof thebeliefstheyadvance.Theso-called no-argumentargument denies,inturn,thatartlacksthekind ofargumentationandanalysisthatarerequiredtojustifyknowledgeclaims.Carroll’sstrategyis, accordingly,toarguethatliteraryfictionsandphilosophicalthoughtexperimentsonlycontributewith conceptualknowledgeandthereforedonotrequireempiricaljustification.Ofthetwoobjectionsraised againstliterarycognitivism,itisprimarilytheno-argumentargumentthatCarrolladdresses.Interms oftheno-evidenceargument, Davies (2010)rightlypointsoutthatCarroll’sresponse“onlyappliesif thecognitivist’sclaimsarerestrictedtoconceptualknowledge”(Davies 2010,p.62).

AnothercritiqueofCarroll’sapproachisraisedby Egan (2016),whoarguesthatanabsolute parallelingofthoughtexperimentsandliteraryfictionsismisleading.Whilethepurposeofthought experimentsisexhaustedbytheroleitplaysinaphilosophicalargumentation,Eganemphasizesthat literaryworks,onthecontrary,havemultiplefunctions.

Wereadliteraturewithadegreeofopenness:weremainalertandattentivetothewaysthe textmightsurpriseus,provokeunexpectedthoughts,insights,feelings,andsoon.Noneofthisis required,orevenexpected,whenwereadthoughtexperiments.Readingathoughtexperimentmight provokethoughts,insights,orfeelingsbeyondwhatisneededfortheargumentathand,butthese additionalresponsesareaccidentaloutcomesratherthancentraltotheexperienceofreadingathought experiment(Egan 2016,p.143).

ArelatedcritiquethatEganraisesisagainstwhathereferstoasCarroll’s“allegoricalreading” ofliteraryfictions.Whenapproachingatextinsuchamanner,thereader“treat[s]eachelementin thestoryasasymbolicrepresentationofsomeaspectoftheabstractproblemunderconsideration” (Egan 2016,p.144).Ratherthanhavingavalueofitsown,thecharactersinthenarrativearenow evaluatedintermsoftheirinstantiationofanaloguesattheabstractlevel.Thisisdifferentfromliterary

reading,which—Eganargues—draws“meaningfromtheconnections between elementsattheconcrete levelratherthanfindingmeaningonlyattheallegoricallevel”(Egan 2016,p.144).

4.4.TheExemplificationAccountofCatherineZ.Elgin

ForCatherineZ.Elgin,thoughtexperimentshaveaslightlydifferentfunctionthantheone Carrollproposes.Ratherthanplayingaroleinphilosophicalargumentation,shearguesthatthought experimentsexemplifypropertiesandpatternsofthephenomenatheypertainto.Thesamecognitive functionis,accordingtoher,performedbyliteraryfictions.Inbothkindsofnarratives,exemplification givesthereaderepistemicaccesstothereal-worldequivalentsofthefeaturesdisplayedinthefictional world.Inthelastcase,theauthor“abstractsindividualelementsinstantiatedinfact,findsordevises anappropriatepattern,andembodiesthatpatterninfiction”(Elgin 2014,p.232).Thegeneralprinciple ofElgin’sapproachis,accordingly,thattheconsequencesthereadersdrawoutfromtheeventsand featuresofthefictionalworld,mayalsohelpthemtoconfigurethingsintheworldoutsideofthefiction. Althoughphilosopherssometimesdisagreeonwhatconclusionstodrawfromathought experimentingscenario,Elginpointsoutthattheinterpretationsofstereotypicalthoughtexperiments “aresupposedtobeunivocal,atleastuntiltherelevantbackgroundassumptionschange”(Elgin 2014, p.239).Forliteraryfictions,univocalinterpretationis,onthecontrary,notthecommonstandard. Here,narrativescan,onthecontrary,bearamultitudeofcorrectinterpretationswithoutthisbeing consideredtobeaweakness.InElgin’sview,itisrather becauseof (ratherthaninspiteof)their multilayerednaturethatliteraryfictionscanenhanceourunderstanding.Atthesametime,instead ofmakingasharpdistinctionbetweenthetwotypesofnarrative,shemaintainsthattheydosimilar kindsofcognitivework.

Whetherornotwecallworksoffictionthoughtexperiments,Ihaveurgedthatfictions,thought experiments,andstandardexperimentsfunctioninmuchthesameway.Bydistancingthemselvesfrom thefacts,byresortingtoartifices,bybracketingavarietyofthingsknowntobetrue,allthreeexemplify featurestheysharewiththefacts.Sincethesefeaturesmaybedifficultorimpossibletodiscerninour everydayencounterswiththings,actions,thoughtexperiments,andstandardexperimentsadvance ourunderstandingoftheworldandofourselves(Elgin 2014,p.240).

AlthoughElginsometimesreferstophilosophicalthoughtexperimenting,herprimaryfocusseems tobethecomparisonbetweenscientificthoughtexperimentsandliteraryfiction.Asaconsequence, shearguesthatthesetypesofnarrativescancontributetoconceptualknowledgeaswellasknowledge aboutempiricalstatesofreality.Onthisbasis,itmaybearguedthatElgin’saccountfitsparticularly wellwiththekindofcomprehensionthatDaviesdescribesasan“understandingofgeneralprinciples operativeintherealworld”(Davies’ssecondcategory).Thatis,byexemplifyingandinstantiating theseprinciples,thefictionalnarrativesprovideinsightintohowtheyoperateinanoutsideworld. Dependingontheexactcharacteroftheexemplificationinquestion,thisstrategycan,consequently, giveraisetovariousformsofknowledge,Elginproposes.InrelationtoEgan’scategorizations, itappearsasifheraccountreflectsclaimsofapplicabilityaswellascognitivism.Inthelastcase,both thoughtexperimentsandliteraryfictiongaintheircognitivevaluebyhavingthecapacitytoinstantiate featuresoftheworldoutsideofthefictionalworld.Itislessclear,however,whetherornotElginalso proposesthatliteraryfictionsinfact are thoughtexperiments(anidentityclaim).However,fromwhat onemayinferfromquotationsastheonecitedabove,itseemsthatherprimaryconcernistheshared cognitivefunctionofbothnarratives—ratherthantheirexactinterrelation.

WhatparticularlystandsoutinElgin’sExemplificationAccountisthatithasmoreresemblances withscientificmodellingthanwiththedevelopmentofphilosophicalarguments.Elgin’sviewof thoughtexperimentingshould,consequently,beseenagainstthebackgroundofherearlierwritings about“felicitousfalsehood”inscientificmodelling(Elgin 2007; Elgin 2017).Byhighlightingselected propertiesofatargetarea,Elginargues,modelsaffordepistemicaccesstotheirreal-worldequivalents andcan,therefore,fromascientificperspective,be“trueenough”.Forthisreason,shefocusesmore ontheconceptofunderstandingthanontheconceptofknowledge.Incontrasttophilosopherslike

Pritchard (2014)and Grimm (2014),whoclaimthatitisimpossibletohaveanaccurateunderstanding ofrealitywithouthavinganytruebeliefs,Elgin,thus,statesthatunderstandingcanbeacognitive successwithoutbeingfactive.Theliterarycognitivismthatsheadvocateshas,consequently,more todowithconsiderationsbeing“cognitivelyacceptable”(totheextentthattheycanfigureinan understandingoftheworld)ratherthanbeing,inallaspects,true.Asanillustration,sherefersto commercialsamplescardsthatinstantiatethecolorsofpaint.Besidescolor,thesecardsincludea numberofotherpropertiesthatareconsideredirrelevanttotheirfunction.(Theyconsist,forexample, ofsequencesofcoloredrectangleswithanameornumberassociatedwitheachcolor,haveacertain size,weremanufacturedataparticulardate,andsoforth.)Accordingly,thesecardsarenotpatches ofrealpaintbutshould,rather,beviewedasfictionsthatgiveusaccesstothecolortheyrepresent (Elgin 2007,p.39–40).InElgin’sview,scientificmodels—aswellasthoughtexperimentsandliterary narratives—arefictionsofasimilarkind.Hence,althoughnotbeingliterallytrue,theyarecognitively valuablesincetheygiveusepistemicaccessto—andcreativelyreconfigure—certainfeaturesofreality thatotherwisewouldbedifficultorimpossibletodiscern.

However, Davies (2010)questionswhythecontentthatareaderextractsfromthefiction(andthen testbyprojectingitontotheworld)shouldbeseenasasourceofknowledgeratherthanasasource ofhypotheses(Davies 2010,p.63).SinceElginpreferstotalkaboutunderstandingratherthan knowledge,Davies’critiquedoesnotsomuchchallengeasclarifyherposition.Thatis,asIinterpret heraccount,exemplificationcanbecomparedtoakindofmodelingthat,inturn,enablesthereaderto hypothesizeaboutreality.Furthermore,althoughtheexamplesarefictionalandincludeaspectsthat arenottrue,featuresofrealitycanstillbedetectedthatcontributetoheroverallunderstandingofit. Duringthisprocess,thereal-worldtestingofthehypothesesnecessitatesacontinuousreassessment andreconfigurationoftheexemplificationinquestion.

4.5.FearandTremblinginLightofCarroll’sandElgin’sAccount

Kierkegaard’s FearandTrembling is,asearliernoted,ahybridcaseinmanyaspects.Onthe onehand,itscombinesphilosophicalandtheologicalelementsinsuchawaythatit,asIpreviously suggested,canbereferredtoasaSocratic–theologicalthoughtexperiment.Ontheotherhand,ithasa narrativecharacterthat,justaswell,couldbedescribedasacaseofliteraryfiction.Onecouldtherefore, inlightofNoëlCarroll’saccount,arguethatitisliterarythoughtexperimentthatdevelopsanargument againstcertainaspectsofHegelianphilosophy(inparticular,theideathatfaithisbeyondreason).This claimgainssupportfromthefactthattheentireworkispurposelydesignedtoprovokethereadersto exploreandchallengetheirownassumptionsabouttheconceptoffaith,butsincethisisanexistential undertaking,Kierkegaardargues,itcannotstopwithapurelyphilosophicalreconfigurationofan abstractconcept.Inordertograspthecoreoftheconcept,theaudiencehastoactualizeit“inthe flesh”—asalivedreality.

JohannesdeSilentioconsequentlyusestheSocratictechniqueofinterrogationasawaytodisclose thatfaithcannotbeacquiredbyobjectivephilosophicalreasoning.Asaresult,thetextmaybesaid todevelopaphilosophicalargumentbutdoessoinawaythatleavestheargumentationdependent onthereader’sownexistentialcontribution.Inthisway,thereadingof FearandTrembling acquires certainresemblancestothesubjectiveengagementthatisrequiredwhenreadingliteraryfictions. OnKierkegaard’spart,hedeliberatelychoosesanarrativeformatthatevokesthereader’ssubjectivity and,hence,parallelstheexistentialsituationheaimsatdepicting.Therefore—evenifIagreewithEgan thatliteraryfictions,ingeneral,cannotbereducedtophilosophicalarguments—Ialsosuggestthat therearesomeexceptionstothisrule.Iarguethat FearandTrembling isanexampleofthis.Here,the argumentationisdeliberatelylaidoutinsuchamannerthatthetext(a)acquiresliteraryqualitiesand(b) emphasizesasubjective—ratherthananobjective—standardofjustification.Thiskindofjustification is“rootedinitspersonaldisclosurevaluealone”(Clayton 1989,p.4).Inthiscase,itisadirectreflection ofKierkegaard’sowncharacterizationofhowtheparadoxicalnatureoftheChristeventleadsto “anobjectiveuncertaintyheldfastinanappropriationprocessofthemostpassionateinwardness”

(Kierkegaard [1846] 1941,p.182).Atthesametime,thistypeofjustificationdisqualifiesKierkegaard’s fictionfrombeingthestandardtypeofphilosophicalargumentation.Instead,itbecomesatheological thoughtexperimentwhoseintuitionsdependonrevelation.Evenso,thenarrativemaintainsthoseof itsphilosophicalfeaturesthatcanbeharmonizedwithitsoveralltheologicalapproach.

Thetheologicalnatureof FearandTrembling,inturn,influencesthetypeofexplanatoryworkit canbesaidtoperform.Nonetheless,inordertoavoidmixingthingsup,Iproposethatwedistinguish betweenthreefunctionallevelsofthetextthat,indifferentways,influenceitspossibleexplanatory force.Onthefirstlevel,thenarratordevelopsanargumentaboutthesubjectivenatureoffaith.This argumentationisembodiedinafictionalnarrativethatenablesthereadertoexploretheconceptof faith.Althoughtheargumentandits“fictionalvehicle”areaunit,theyalsohavedifferentfunctions. Onthisbasis,Isuggestthatthefictionalnarrativebelongstoasecondlevel,which—accordingly—is therepresentationlevelonwhichtheexecutionofthethoughtexperimenttakesplace.Furthermore, sincetheargumentonthefirstlevelcanonlybesubjectivelyjustifiedinrelationtothelivedreality ofthereader,athird,existentiallevelisrequired.Onthislevel,theexplanationsofferedatthefirst andsecondlevelaretestedagainstthereaders’ownlifeexperiences.Iarguethatitis,accordingly, intheinteractionbetweenthesethreelevelsthatthespecificthoughtexperimentingcharacterof Fear andTrembling isestablished.Hence,inordertoexaminethenarrative’spossibleexplanatoryfunction, oneneedstoinvestigateitbothasaunitandasacombinationofseparatefunctionallevels.

Whenreading FearandTrembling inlightofNoëlCarroll’sandCatherineZ.Elgin’saccount,itis primarilythefirstandsecondlevelthatcomeintofocus.SinceIhavealreadyaddressedthelevel ofargumentation,Inowintendtodiscussthesecond,thoughtexperimentinglevel.Here,oneof thefundamentalquestionsconcernsthemodeofrepresentationthatthefictionalnarrativeutilizes. AccordingtoCarroll,characterssuchastheknightofinfiniteresignation,thetragichero,andeven JohannesdeSilentiohimselfserveassymbolsforspecificabstractconcepts.Asconcepts,theyare relatedtohowweperceiveandcategorizeanentityoranevent.Asaresult,differentindividuals canconceptualizeentitiesandeventsindifferentways.WhatCarrollclaimsis,consequently,that philosophicalthoughtexperimentsandliterarythoughtexperimentsoperateontheconceptsthatthe readersalreadypossess,bringingthemoutintheopenandenablingthemtoreassessandreconfigure them.However,accordingtoElgin,itismoreaccuratetorefertofictionsasexemplificationsoffeatures intherealworld.Thatis,eventhoughthetragicheroisafictionalcharacter,hecanstillexemplify propertiesandpatternsinaworldoutsidethenarrative.Thus,inthecomparisonbetweenCarroll’s andElgin’sapproaches,thedistinctionbetween“concept”and“example”becomescrucial.Whatis, forinstance,theexactdifferencebetweenseeingathoughtexperiment,suchasPlutarch’sstoryabout theshipofTheseus,asanexplorationofthe concept ofidentity,or,onthecontrary,asan exemplification ofmetaphysicalproperties?Itistemptingtosaythatexemplificationpresupposesamuchmore far-reachingscopeintermsofitspresupposedreal-worldaccess.Thatis,thepromiseinherentinthe term“exemplification”isnotonlytowidenourconceptualizationsofreality,but—infact—togive accesstoactualreality.However,suchapledgeneedstobeviewedagainstthebackgroundofElgin’s quitemodesttruthclaims.Onheraccount,eveniftheaimofthetotalnetworkistodepictrealityas accuratelyaspossible,notallpartsofithavetobeabsolutelytrue.Elgin’sproposal,thus,illuminates otheraspectsof FearandTrembling thanthosewegainaccesstobyapplyingCarroll’saccounttoit. Inparticular,itproblematizesthequestionoftruthandwhatroleitplaysincognitiveadvancement. ForKierkegaard,itisperhapsmoreaquestionofexistentialadvancementandof whatkind oftruth actualizessuchamovement.

4.6.ABriefNoticeontheExplanatory(Exploratory)FunctionofFearandTrembling

Inthisarticle,IhavearguedthatKierkegaard’s FearandTrembling isaSocratic–theologicalthought experimentthatengagesthereaderinaprocessofspiritualandexistentialdiscernment.Itisahybrid caseofthoughtexperimentingthatdisplaysSocratic,theological,andexistentialfeatures.Assuch, itenablesustocomparethecognitivefunctionsthatdifferentkindsofthoughtexperimentsperform.

Itmay,however,bearguedthatKierkegaard’snovelcanbespirituallyandexistentiallyilluminating withouthavingtobeframedinthoughtexperimentingterms.Inthisarticle,myintentionhas, nonetheless,beentoexaminetheinterdisciplinaryuseoffictionalnarrativesasawaytoexplainand exploredifferentdimensionsofreality.Thepurposeofaddressingtheresemblancebetweenliterary fictionsandthoughtexperimenting,has,consequently,beentofind(aswellastoproblematize)a commonnarrativedeterminator.Forthisreason,IpresentedtheaccountsofNoëlCarrollandCatherine Elgin,whoboth(althoughindifferentways)developtheoriesabouttheresemblancebetweenthe epistemicrole(s)thatthoughtexperimentsandsome(butnotall)literaryfictionsmayplay.

Asathoughtexperiment, FearandTrembling,thus,doesnotsomuch“explain”anobjectivereality ashelpthereaderstoformtheirownanswertothequestionsposed.Theexplanatoryfunctionis, consequently,dependentonthereaders’ownexistentialcontribution.Giventhis,Iproposethatitis moreaccuratetoseetheexplanatoryforceof FearandTrembling inrelationtoits exploratory function. Ontheperformativestagethatthenovelsetsup,thereaderscanimaginativelyplayoutandtest theproblemsthatJohannesdeSilentiohasconfrontedthemwith.Thefulleffectofthisinstantiation nonethelessrequiresthatthesolutionsbecomethereaders’livedandsubjectivelychosenreality.In oneofhisarticles,Kierkegaard,consequently,writes:“InrespecttoGod,the how is what”(Kierkegaard [1967] 1978,JP2:1405; Kierkegaard [1909] 1948,Pap.X2A644).Inthisview,theonlywaytograsp faith’sparadoxical“what”istobeimmersedinitssubjectivelyexperienced“how”.

Funding: Thisresearchreceivednoexternalfunding.

ConflictsofInterest: Theauthordeclaresnoconflictofinterest.

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