MarEx 10

Special Edition–First Quarter 2002

Secretary Norman Mineta Department of Transportation U.S. Senator Bob Graham Senior Senator–Florida U.S. Senator John Breaux Senior Senator–Louisiana U.S. Congressman Clay Shaw 22nd District, Florida Admiral James Loy Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard Captain William Shubert Maritime Administration Top CEOs, Presidents and Executives of the Maritime Industry

Glen

Paine Executive Director

MITAGS/PMI

> Maritime Institute of Technology and Graduate Studies > Pacific Maritime Institute

photo courtesy USCG digital

Now, more than ever.

The Coast Guard’s mission — and its needs — are more critical than ever. All of the Coast Guard’s Deepwater assets must be recapitalized over the next 20-30 years. But huge increases in operational effectiveness must be realized as soon as possible.

advanced and effective ship and aircraft systems. Since 1997, this same stable team has focused on Deepwater’s challenges, making an enormous investment to ensure the program’s success, affordability, and timely delivery.

Integrated Coast Guard Systems (ICGS), a joint venture led by Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman Ship Systems’ Ingalls Operations, is already on board. We have a 30-year history of success working together to build and integrate some of the nation’s most

ICGS knows that time is short, resources finite, and margin for error zero. But our long experience managing complex programs of national consequence gives us a clear, confident vision of the Coast Guard’s future.

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The First True Business Journal for Maritime Executives Strategies & solutions through case studies, interviews and articles that address the most critical issues in the maritime industry today.

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The Maritime Executive is the only vehicle so sharply focused to deliver essential information from maritime decision-makers to other maritime decision-makers–an indispensible weapon in your arsenal for further business success.

Glen Paine

Gerhard Kurz

Thomas Crowley, Jr.

Michael Seymour

Richard Steinke

Donald Bollinger

Executive Director MITAGS/PMI Linthicum Heights, ML

President & CEO, P&O Nedlloyd New York City, NY

President & CEO, Seabulk International, Inc. Ft. Lauderdale, FL

Executive Director, Port of Long Beach Long Beach, CA

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Chairman, President & CEO, Crowley Maritime Corporation Oakland, CA

President & CEO, Bollinger Shipyards Lockport, LA

First Quarter 2002

Contents

Volume 10

CASE STUDY & INTERVIEW

Editor & Publisher Tony Munoz Senior Editor Joseph A. Keefe Art Direction/Production Evan Naylor Senior Copy Editor William Greenthal Editors Paul Smith Hugh Jardon Counsel Timothy C. Cronin

USCG photo

Contributing Authors Joseph A. Keefe Thomas B. Crowley Michael Seymour John McCowan Allen Walker Chris Wiernicki Clay Maitland Michael Sacco Steven Benz Kurt Nagle

Circulation TM Marketing

Subscriptions To order call toll free: 866 884 9034 The Maritime Executive (ISSN 1096-2751) is published by The Maritime Executive Corp., 2125 SE 10th Ave. Ste. 1019 Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33316

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Case Study: MITAGS/PMI Maritime Institute of Technology & Graduate Studies/ Pacific Maritime Institute

52

Interview: Glen Paine, Executive Director, MITAGS/PMI

S TAT E M E N T S & I N T E R V I E W S 20 23 26 29 30 32 39

Norman Mineta, Secretary of Transportation Senator Bill Graham, Florida Senator John Breaux, Louisiana Special Report: Field Hearing on Seaport & Passenger Security Representative Clay Shaw, 22nd District, Florida Admiral James M. Loy, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard Captain William Schubert, Administrator (MARAD)

58 62 66 70 72 74

Gerhard Kurz, President & CEO, Seabulk International, Inc. Tom Crowley, Chairman, President & CEO, Crowley Maritime Corp.

William O’Malley, Chairman, Tidewater Inc. Michael Seymour, President & CEO, P&O Nedlloyd, North America Charles Raymond, President, CSX Lines John McCowan, Chairman & CEO, Ralph Heim, President, Trailer Bridge

76 77 79

Phillip Allen, Executive Director, Port Everglades Richard Steinke, Executive Director, Port of Long Beach Richard Larabee, Executive Director, Port of NY/NJ

81 82

Donald “Boysie” Bollinger, Chairman, Bollinger Shipyards Allen Walker, President, Shipbuilders Council of America

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Captain Pete McIsaac, President, San Francisco Bar Pilots

85 86

Chris J. Wiernicki, President, ABS Consulting Clay Maitland, Managing Director, International Registries

88 90

Captain Timothy Brown, President Masters, Mates & Pilots Union Michael Sacco, President, Seafarers Union

92 95 97 99 101

Michael Crye, President, International Cruise Lines Council Steven Benz, President, Marine Spill Response Corp. (MSRC) Joe Cox, President, Chamber of Shipping Chris Koch, President & CEO, World Shipping Council Kurt J. Nagle, President, American Association of Port Authorities.

E-mail: tony@tmmarket.com Telephone: 866 884 9034 Fax: 954 524 9750 Annual subscription rate: U.S. and Territories $36; all others $48 U.S. Funds. © Copyright 2002 by The Maritime Executive Corporation. All rights reserved. No part of this may be reprinted in any way without written permission of publisher. The publisher reserves the right to sell subscriptions to those who have the purchasing power in the industry this publication serves.

Postmaster: Send address changes to The Maritime Executive, 2125 SE 10th Ave. Ste. 1019 Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33316 Printed in the U.S.A.

D E PA R T M E N T S 6 Editorial 9 12 15 18

Executive Achievement

Promotions, Honors

Washington Insider

Politics

USCG column

Update

Author’s Editorial

Lake Charles Pilots Revisited

103 U.S. Merchant Marine

Academy

Response to 9/11 104 Security Systems

Dragnet Security

104 Author’s Note

MTBE

Editorial: We Will Never Forget

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eptember 11th will live in infamy. It will always be remembered as the day when the United States, its people, and our Capitol were attacked by terrorists. It will also be remembered as a day when heroism and unselfishness filled our streets, as police, firemen, and ordinary civilians went to the aid of those who were under attack. It will be remembered as a time when patriotism was at its highest and the bells of freedom rang the loudest.

The terrorist attack that took place on September 11th was a vicious and cowardly act against all humanity. Not only did it kill innocent people, but it also attacked the very heart of civilization.

Yes, it took place on our soil. However, it was an attack against every society. Osama bin Laden and the Al-Qaida are not great warriors who met their enemies on the field of battle; they struck innocent civilians and then scurried away like vermin.

Today, we wage war against terrorism in Afghanistan, Somalia and Iraq, and yet, there are those countries that have already had

Americans now look over their shoulders and wonder if they or their loved ones will be struck down by terrorism. This is unthinkable in the United States, and yet, here we are strengthening our internal defenses against terrorism. their fill of this endeavor. The Israeli and Palestinians are in a vicious conflict on the streets of their cities, and strikes against civilians are a daily event.

In this country, homeland defense is our highest priority, and the way we move about our great land has changed forever.

Americans now look over their shoulders and wonder if they or their loved ones will be struck down by terrorism. This is unthinkable in the United States, and yet, here we are strengthening our internal defenses against terrorism.

The strengthening of our national defenses is most evident at our seaports and on our coastlines. In an economy in which global trade is its foundation, our seaports are our greatest vulnerability. More than ninety percent of all our international trade takes place in our seaports. It comes in ocean containers and in bulk ships.

The United States no longer has an international merchant marine fleet. Our last two great fleets were sold to foreign companies, when American President Lines was sold to the Singaporeans and SeaLand was sold to the Danes. Our government gave up subsidizing our U.S. merchant fleets a few administrations ago, and they could no longer compete on the open seas against fleets that were subsidized by their governments or against commercial fleets that sailed with minimum-wage seamen. Today, we must face those decisions, and ship pilots now board foreign vessels with armed sea-marshals.

Our Coast Guard, which has had to fight for every new dollar of funding, is now being tasked with patrolling our harbors and coastlines and with oversight of the newly legislated port vulner6

ability studies. Its limited assets of equipment and manpower have already been stretched beyond capacity.

Outside of the maritime industry, not many Americans understand the enormous contributions that the Coast Guard performs for this country on a daily basis in its task of boarding vessels for compliance inspections, overseeing environmental regulations, maintaining vigilance over fisheries, search and rescue, its drug interdiction, or its frontline defense against illegal immigration on the high seas. The United States Coast Guard is our frontline defender for homeland security, and it needs to be funded accordingly.

A few years ago, Senator Bob Graham and Representative Clay Shaw, who both represent Florida, were concerned with the flow of drugs and illegal immigrants that overwhelmed its ports. In 1998, Senator Graham was appointed by President Clinton to head up a committee to study the problem. The committee found that U.S. seaports were in great need of security. However, the federal government did nothing about the problem. The state of Florida dealt with the problem head on and spent millions of its own dollars to heighten security. In fact, the State of Florida legislation to enhance port security took effect on January 1st of this year.

In the aftermath of September 11th, and based upon the previous seaport security studies, Senator Bob Graham and Senator Ernest Hollings introduced S 1214, and Senator John Breaux and Senator John Kerry introduced S 1587. These two bills now make up the components of “The Port and Maritime Security Act of 2001,� which the Senate unanimously passed in December 2001.

Representatives Don Young and Clay Shaw are now the point men in Congress, and, hopefully, Congress will pass its seaport The Maritime Executive

Editorial security act during the first quarter of 2002.

Seaport security must be the first order of business in the Congress, because trucking and railroads, which are our internal modes of transportation, have a close association with our seaports and will also be affected.

Up and down the great rivers of this country, tugboats pushing hundreds of barges at a time move almost eighty per-

As the World Trade Center collapsed in a mass of burning rubble … it became apparent that some members of mankind have not evolved much from the pre-historic caves from whence we came. cent of all cargoes distributed in the heartland of America. Port security is an internal affair as well. Congress needs to forget about the riders and pork that accompany most bills and pass its version of the Senate act immediately. Terrorism is real and is now a part of American life, and all partisanship needs to be pushed aside because our economic well-being and American lives are at stake.

This edition of our publication is dedicated to port and maritime security. We have brought together many of our top government officials and some of the leading executives in the maritime industry who will share their views on maritime security and what needs to be done to enhance it.

This is a new world that we live in, and we must never forget that day when our country was attacked. As the World Trade Center collapsed in a mass of burning rubble and the black smoke hid the towering skyline of New York City, civilization hung its head and wept. For in spite of all the human advancements over the eons, it became apparent that some members of mankind have not evolved much from the pre-historic caves from whence we came.

When the Pentagon was attacked in the heart of our nation’s Capitol, the message screaming at us was that no matter where you live and no matter who you are, you are vulnerable to the attacks of terrorism. Further, just because our military strikes at its foreign targets doesn’t mean that terrorism won’t rear its ugly head again in this country. When it will strike and where it will strike can only be speculation, but rest assured that acts of terrorism are not over.

Our strongest defense against terrorism is information, and it must flow among government agencies and within the maritime First Quarter 2002

industry. This theme is most evident in the statements and interviews in this edition.

First, we would like to thank Secretary Norman Mineta, Senator John Breaux, Senator Bob Graham, Representative Clay Shaw, Admiral James Loy, Commandant of the Coast Guard, and Capt. William Schubert, Administrator of the Maritime Administration for their time and contributions.

We would also like to thank the many executives throughout the maritime industry that took time from their busy schedules to either write a statement or to be interviewed. Their names and companies can be found in our table of contents. These executives and their insights on maritime security should be a roadmap for all other industries in this country that are currently dealing with employee and corporate security.

Finally, as the government and the maritime industry address the many issues and the enormity of maritime security, one of the major components that will be essential in order to provide security will be the urgent need for trained personnel. This edition also features the Maritime Institute of Technology and Graduate Studies and its executive director, Glen Paine. The institute has been one of the leading maritime centers for professional mariners in the nation and offers many courses in chemical warfare and force protection. Additionally, the institute has recently enhanced its state-of-the-art, full mission simulator by purchasing a new systems platform from STN Atlas of Germany.

We will never forget September 11th. May this edition find you well in 2002.

Tony Munoz

Editor

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Executive Achievement Kenneth M. Rogers has been appointed Senior Vice President of Marketing of Seabulk Towing. Mr. Rogers will be responsible for the overall marketing program and coordination of customer initiatives for each of Seabulk Towing’s divisions including Port Everglades Towing, Port Canaveral Towing, Tampa Bay Towing, Mobile Bay Towing, Seabulk Towing-Port Arthur, and Seabulk ServicesLake Charles, as well as the offshore towing in the Gulf of Mexico and the Atlantic.

Gerhard E. Kurz, President and CEO of the parent company, Seabulk International, Inc., stated, “Towing is the Company’s original business, dating back to 1958, and we take great pride in our long-standing customer relationships, our high standard of equipment, and the quality of our people.”

Mr. Rogers is a graduate of the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy and began his career as a deck officer with Texaco, moving up the corporate ranks to senior positions with tanker fleet owner/operator OMI Corporation, Southern Ship Management, and most recently, the world’s largest cruise company, Carnival Corporation.

He is well known within the maritime industry and is a member of the Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers and the Propeller Club of the United States.

William J. Sember has been appointed Vice President Offshore Development for America Bureau of Shipping (ABS). Sember is currently serving as Vice President Technology & Business Development, ABS Europe.

He will relocate to ABS Worldwide Headquarters in Houston, Texas and assume the new responsibilities effective January 1, 2002.

During his 26-year career at ABS, Sember has held a succession of progressively senior positions after starting as a field surveyor. These include head of the Offshore Engineering Department and Vice President of Operations for the Eastern Region of ABS Europe. In addition, he has been actively involved with external organizations such as Offshore Mechanics and Artic Engineering (OAME), where he was chairman of the Houston Chapter, and the American Petroleum Institute (API), where he was Chairman of the Subcommittee on Floating 8

Systems. He has also held the position of chairman of the International Association of Classification Societies (IACS) Working Party on Drilling Units.

Sember is a graduate of the United States Merchant Marine Academy with a degree in Marine Engineering. He holds both a U.S. Coast Guard marine engineer’s license and a professional engineer’s license from the State of New York.

Vice Admiral John W. Craine, Jr. USN (Ret.) will serve as Interim President of the State University of New York (SUNY) Maritime College until June of 2002. Adm. Craine recently retired as the Chief of Naval Education and Training for the Navy where he was responsible for all training and educational programs for the Navy, including technical and flight training, and Naval ROTC programs.

Adm. Craine had recently served as a special advisor to Chancellor Robert L. King and other senior university officers on a number of special projects, including international programs and distance learning. The Chancellor noted that Adm. Craine will have the services of an experienced and capable administrative team.

As Chief of Naval Education and Training for the Navy, Adm. Craine was responsible for a network of Naval education and training programs in the United States and abroad, with an annual budget of $1.5 billion serving 400,000 officers and sailors at 168 training sites around the country. Craine oversaw 57 Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps units at colleges and universities throughout the United States, including the Maritime College. He flew 115 combat missions in Vietnam and was awarded the Navy Distinguished Services Medal and four Legion of Merit awards, along with many other honors.

Vice Admiral John R. Ryan will become the President of the State University of New York Maritime College (SUNY) in June, 2002. State University of New York Board Chair Thomas F. Egan, said, “Our choice of Vice Admiral Ryan reflects the Board’s desire to further strengthen the Maritime College and reaffirms our commitment to the outstanding educational programs of this nationally-recognized institution.”

Admiral Ryan graduated from the Naval Academy in June, 1967, and earned the designation of Naval Aviator in October, 1968. He distinguished himself as a line officer and effective leader, most recently serving as Commander, Maritime Surveillance and Reconnaissance Force, U.S. Sixth Fleet; Commander, Fleet Air Mediterranean; Commander, First Quarter 2002

Executive Achievement continued

Craig R. Thomas has joined the Maritime Institute of Technology and Graduate Studies (MITAGS) as its Academic Business Development Manager. Mr. Thomas will be responsible for marketing and sales, which includes obtaining new business, formation of marketing strategies, client contracts, and the measurement of sales and marketing activities.

Mr. Thomas was mostly recently with SeaRiver Maritime as its Ship Group Coordinator, where he was responsible for the operation, including policies, procedures, contracts, and expenses for its four tankers operating in the Alaskan North Slope trade. He was also the Marine Manager for Mobil Oil, Australia, where he managed its commercial and technical marine operations.

Mr. Thomas has a U.S., Liberian, and Marshal Island’s unlimited Master’s License. He graduated from SUNY Maritime College, where he earned a Bachelor of Science in Meteorology and Oceanography.

The Graham Company, one of the nation’s top 50 largest insurance brokers with an exclusive focus on property and casualty insurance, announced the appointment of Fred T. Pietropola to the position of Senior Average Adjuster and Maritime Consultant.

Mr. Pietropola joins The Graham Company from Marsh, Inc. (formerly Johnson & Higgins) where he served as a Senior Vice President, Marine and Energy Claims, in management positions on the East and West Coast for eleven years. Mr. Pietropola is one of the senior members of the Association of Average Adjusters of the United States, and one of the leading experts in the marine insurance industry. He has served several terms as Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Association of Average Adjusters of the United States, and has been a speaker at the Association’s Viewpoint Seminar.

Pietropola is also a member of the Association of Average The Maritime Executive

Adjusters of the UK – Foreign Member; the Association of Average Adjusters of Canada – Foreign Member; and the Maritime Law Association – Non-Lawyer Member.

At Graham, Pietropola will be responsible for handling the adjustment of various types of marine claims, including general average losses, hull losses and cargo losses. He will also be involved in business development in the wet marine practice area.

Pietropola will report directly to CEO Bill Graham. With the addition of Pietropola, The Graham Company’s in-house Marine Practice Group currently has 7 specialists.

“Fred’s addition to the Marine Practice Group significantly strengthens what is already a top-notch team at The Graham Company,” said CEO Bill Graham. “His experience and reputation in the insurance industry, and wet marine practice area specifically, are beyond reproach. We’re excited to have him aboard.”

Pietropola has more than 30 years of insurance experience exclusively serving the marine industry. He has held positions with Marsh, Inc. (formerly Johnson & Higgins), H.C. Knight & Co., and Mather & Co. He recently relocated to Philadelphia with his family.

Jim Williams has been appointed Manager of Financial Reporting for the Georgia Ports Authority. Mr. Williams joined GPA in 1995 as an assistant auditor and was later promoted to internal auditor. As GPA’s Manager of Financial Reporting, Williams will be responsible for the accurate and timely reporting of GPA’s financial records.

Mr. Williams earned both a Bachelors of Business Administration in Accounting and a Masters of Business Administration from Georgia Southern University. He currently serves as the President of the Coastal Chapter of the Institute of Internal Auditors.

Georgia’s public and private port sector activities directly or indirectly support 80,100 jobs, are responsible for $1.8 billion in personal incomes, produce billions of dollars in sales revenues to benefit the state’s economy, and generate $585 million in state and local tax receipts each year.

Michael Minnig has recently joined the structural engineering team of Elliot Bay Design.

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Maritime Air Forces, Mediterranean.

He was awarded the Navy Distinguished Service Medal, the Legion of Merit, and the Meritorious Service Medal, along with various other service awards.

LEADERSHIP

E X E C U T IV E A C HI E V E M E N T

Executive Achievement continued He holds a Bachelor of Science in Maritime Systems Engineering from Texas A&M at Galveston and a Masters of Science in Ocean Engineering from Virginia Tech. Before relocating to the Pacific Northwest, Mr. Minnig was employed by Northrup Grumman at its Ingalls Shipyard facility in Pascagoula, Mississippi.

PHOTO : (LEFT TO RIGHT) - Captain John Lawrence - HSE Team Leader, ABS Americas President Robert Kramek, ATC President Anil Mathur, Captain John Ripperger - Chief Operating Officer, Bruce Benn - Chief Commercial Officer.)

Alaska Tanker Company, LLC (ATC) based in Beaverton (Portland), Oregon has achieved “Safety, Quality and Environmental (SQE) Certification,” including Accredited International Standards Organization (ISO) 14001 Certification to the Environmental Management System Standard on November 21st, 2001. This accomplishment makes ATC the first U.S. flag seagoing Shipping Company to attain SQE and ISO 14001 Certification from the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS). This feat was achieved within 2 ? years of ATC’s inception.

The attainment of Certification to the International Safety Management (ISM) Code, as well as ISO 9001 (Quality Management System Standard) and ISO 14001, demonstrates the Company’s commitment to be a World-Class tanker operator.

Additionally, before year-end, ATC will also submit for compliance with Washington State’s “Exceptional Compliance Program” (known as ECOPRO).

ATC’s President Anil Mathur remarked upon receiving the SQE Certificate from ABS Americas President, Robert E. Kramek, “This Certificate symbolizes the quality of our work, and our continued focus on the most important safety and environmental protection aspects of our jobs.”

Founded in 1999, Alaska Tanker Company, LLC is a joint operating company of BP Shipping Company, USA, Keystone Alaska, LLC, and OSG Ship Management, Inc. It manages a fleet of 10 U. S. Flag tankers which operate mainly in the Alaska to U.S. West Coast trade.

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Dr. Michael Caynard, President of InterCorr International, received the R.L. Piehl Citation from NANCE International, the Corrosion Society. The citation is named in the honor of a noted leader in the field of corrosion engineering in refining operations, Robert L. Piehl, who was chief corrosion engineer for Chevron for many years prior to his death in the mid-1990s.

Dr. Caynard was cited for his “contributions to furthering materials and corrosion knowledge in refining” by the Specific Technology Group 34 of NACE and by Chevron Corporation.

STG 34 includes NACE members specializing in corrosion and materials issues related to petroleum refining and gas processing.

The Piehl Citation is presented as recognition of those who “bring enthusiasm and new ideas to NACE through conference papers, task group leadership, and participation in the exchange of information.”

Dr. Caynard currently serves as vice chairman of the NACE task group addressing environmental cracking in refineries (STG 34 Task Group 177) and is the author of more than 70 publications in the field of corrosion, materials, and fracture. In addition to his NACE activities, Dr. Caynard is also a member of ASME and ASM International. He received ASM International’s Young Member of the Year Award in 1996 and the A.B. Campbell Award for Young Authors from NACE in 1998.

Dr. Caynard holds both Bachelor and Master of Science Degrees in mechanical engineering from Texas A&M University and earned his Ph.D. from Texas A&M in engineering mechanics and materials. He is currently leading production of SmartCet Corrosion Meter technology for InterCorr, which provides real-time, online data directly compatible with plant process monitoring and control systems for use by plant operators and asset managers.

Pilot Users Group names Executive Director The Pilot Users Group of Louisiana, an organization of maritime interests throughout the state, has announced the hiring of Pete Martinez as Executive Director. PUGL was formed in 2000 to advance legislation that provides safe, reliable, cost-effective pilotage on the Mississippi and Calcasieu Rivers. Martinez will manage the group’s daily operations and coordinate communications and political efforts.

“Economic development is a very important issue in Louisiana, and pilotage should be part of that discussion. The current pilotage system and skyrocketing fees in our state make us less competitive than our neighbors on the Gulf Coast. As trade barriers First Quarter 2002

Executive Achievement continued

SNAME and ASME Join Forces to Host First Annual International Student Offshore Design Competition - ISODC-2002 The Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers (SNAME) and the Ocean, Offshore and Arctic Engineering Division (OOAE Div) of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Offshore (ASME) join forces to host the 2002 International Offshore Student Design Competition (ISODC-2002). The competition promotes interest and awareness for career opportunities in the Offshore Industry.

The cutoff date for registration is February 28, with the design submissions due June 28. Students work in teams of up to six individuals plus a faculty sponsor. Industry participates through a mentorship program, in which students can email company representatives with problems or questions. The competition aims at developing an appreciation for the offshore design process and encourages interdisciplinary teamwork and collaborative effort.

A panel of industry experts will select the top five project submissions to be finalists in the International Offshore Design Competition. The top five entries will qualify based on

Save the Date Notice (MAY 1, through MAY 2, 2002) The Mariners Recruitment and Retention Coalition will hold a conference on May 1, through May 2, 2002, at the Maritime Institute of Technology and Graduate Studies (MITAGS). The conference will complete the implementation of the "action plan" developed at an earlier conference held at Kings Point. The action plan covers the following topics: ■ System integration ■ Public Education and Awareness ■ Regulatory Burden The Maritime Executive

which will set pilot rates and oversee the hiring practices, regulations, and discipline of the pilot organizations that conduct business as four separate monopolies on the Mississippi and Calcasieu rivers.

“The legislation we are proposing calls for representation of all interested parties, pilots, the shipping industry, and the public, and would not only resolve the issue of rising costs, but would also take care of the historical problems of discipline and hiring practices within pilot ranks,” said Martinez.

Martinez says that he and other PUGL members will begin touring the state later this year to meet with governmental, business, and economic development leaders to garner support for their agenda. PUGL is also launching a web site this month to bring more awareness to the issue.

Martinez, a Baton Rouge native, comes to the group from the Louisiana Chemical Association. He is a graduate of the University of Mississippi and attended graduate school at LSU’s Manship School of Mass Communication. performance in these categories: ■ Utility, relevance, and general interest of the system designed to the Offshore Industry ■ Demonstrated grasp of the key design issues ■ System integration ■ Demonstrated teamwork ■ Quality of work in the technical summaries ■ Creativity of the design and in the design approach.

The winning team will be selected based on technical content and execution, documentation and presentation, demonstrated teamwork, and creativity. The top three teams will receive cash prizes and recognition plaques. Winners will be notified by September 15 and be recognized for their achievements in subsequent SNAME and ASME national events.

Contact: John Filson 281-249-4367 or via email: john.filson@cso-aker.com. To learn more about the competition, review the rules and, to enter by web, visit either the ASME OOAE Div web sites at: www.ooae.org or the SNAME web site at: www. sname.org/local_sections_students.htm.

■ STCW-95 ■ Criminal Liability ■ Maritime Policy, Tax Relief and Other Incentives ■ Lifestyle/Quality of Life ■ Recruitment and Career Paths

A preliminary agenda and invitations will be sent sometime in February of this year. For further information on the group, please visit the SOCP website at www.socp.org, or contact Ms. Andrea Dixon, Marketing Associate, at adixon@mitags.org.

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are lifted, we are poised to grow opportunities with Latin America and other expanding international markets. But, if we continue business and politics as usual, we are going to see that business sail on to Texas and Mississippi like the missed opportunities of the 1990s,” Martinez said.

During the 2001 Regular Legislative Session, PUGL supported HB1757, a pilotage reform bill sponsored by Rep. Ronnie Johns-Sulphur and Sen Craig Romero, New Iberia. The bill failed in the House Commerce Committee. Now, the group is seeking new legislation in the 2003 Regular Session, or possibly in a 2002 special session.

PUGL will ask the Legislature to create a statewide board,

Handicapping and Critiquing the Beltway Players and Their Politics

Washington Insider

ON THE HILL

By Joseph A. Keefe

And the Winner is...

When you’re hot, you’re hot. Certainly, it would be difficult to top the recent successes and potential downstream business that have fallen into the lap of arguably the nation’s largest defense contractor. In the wake of their highly publicized victory over the General Dynamics group in the quest for control of the Newport

ernment award in decades. And now, plans to further integrate Northrop Grumman’s Avondale and Ingalls shipyards into a centralized unit, with projects doled out by Northrop Grumman as it sees fit, provide even greater flexibility and potential efficiencies for this industry giant. So

…Northrop Grumman has not been sitting on its hands. A $76 million cost-plus-fixed fee contract for planning, design, and logistics support of US Naval submarines was recently awarded to Newport News, in addition to a $191 million contract for an extended dry-dock service of the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise.

News Shipyard, Northrop Grumman has not been sitting on its hands. A $76 million cost-plus-fixed fee contract for planning, design, and logistics support of US Naval submarines was recently awarded to Newport News, in addition to a $191 million contract for an extended dry-dock service of the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise.

Quietly, this firm, formerly doing business primarily in the aerospace arena, has emerged as the leading force in Naval and government marine contract awards. It doesn’t end there. Just around the corner lurks the impending, winner-take-all contract for the US Coast Guard’s high profile Deepwater effort, a $9+ billion prize to stretch over a period of ten years. With subsidiary shipyards and components that form portions of two of the three competing “teams” for this award, Northrop Grumman is uniquely, and, perhaps, best positioned to take the brass ring. Although its subsidiaries are supposedly “fire walled”, or prevented from engaging in collusion during the bid process, the parent company’s management has to be literally licking their chops at the prospect of landing at least a part of the most lucrative, far reaching and innovative gov-

much for firewalls.

The only piece of overtly bad news hanging over Northrop’s marine sector got just a little bit brighter as the MAREX was going to press. U.S. Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-MS) is reportedly behind a push to convince naval leaders to take over a cruise ship project in the Ingalls Shipbuilding yard at Pascagoula.

The building of the multipurpose passenger vessels had ground to a halt last October, after Chicago based American Classic Voyages Co., filed for Chapter 11 protection and reorganization. And, with the Federal taxpayers already facing the cost of $187 million for the default on the Title XI funding, Congress is proposing the option of the US Navy taking over one or both of the vessels for the purpose of providing mobile housing, medical, and / or command facilities. The first vessel is already about 40% complete.

Sources familiar with the current mindset in the Pentagon, however, say privately that it is “very unlikely” that the Navy will pursue this project. Still, stranger things have happened, and there was a time when conventional wisdom all but doomed the Northrop Grumman bid for control of Newport News. It’s also import12

ant to remember that, in theory, Congress controls the purse strings for the Pentagon, and not the other way around. While it’s also unlikely that the proposed acquisition would be forced upon the Navy, the possibility exists, and the power of the Senate’s Minority Leader should not be discounted.

It all adds up to a very good year for Northrop Grumman, with the potential for much greater rewards just around the corner.

Economies of Scale at the Port of Houston: Is Bigger Better?

A five year, reported $511 million project to widen and deepen the Houston Ship Channel has received Congressional approval and been sent on to the President. Local port officials tout the future ability of the channel to accommodate larger ships, improvements in channel navigation safety, and reductions in marine transportation costs as the prime movers for this heady effort. Congressman Tom Delay (R-TX) provided strong support for the funding and was instrumental in seeing the legislation safely through the halls of Congress.

The project, which began in 1998, calls for the widening of the ship channel from

400 to 530 feet, as well as the deepening of controlling depths to 45 feet, from the current levels of 40 feet. It is hoped that the project can be completed by December of 2003. And, according to spokeswoman Sarah Peterson of The Port of Houston Authority, the port will underwrite the cost of dredging up to the berths, from the point where the main channel dredging ends. It all sounds good, and the promise of reduced operating costs for shippers, refinery operators, and downstream consumers is alluring, and almost irresistible.

There are many unanswered questions, however. Current market conditions and existing physical infrastructure along the ship channel, however, may dictate that the “estimated annual savings of $80 million in petrochemical product transportation costs” may be unattainable, at least in the short term.

For sure, a parcel of foreign crude oil, arriving via VLCC, with 2.5 million barrels on board, will see real savings in transportation costs with the new controlling depths. At a 40 foot controlling depth, the eventual delivery of this parcel would require at least five shuttle tankers, one of which could be eliminated when the channel is deepened. A typical cost savings of $150,000 for this type of multiple delivery could be achieved, says one veteran charter broker. Not bad, especially if your primary source of crude oil feedstock is obtained from places such as Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, or even Sullom Voe. A twenty percent reduction in shuttle tanker costs would not be out of line under this scenario, especially for those oil companies that receive the bulk of their feedstock via VLCC offshore lightering.

For many refiners in the port of Houston, however, Venezuelan and Mexican crude oils are the weapon of choice. Aside from the two Mexican ports of Dos Bocas and Cayo Arcas (no controlling loading drafts), and to a lesser extent, the transshipment points in the Bahamas and St. Eustatius, the controlling depths at most Caribbean load ports are in the range of 39 to 40 feet. Under these conditions, the potential savings are negligible. The real winners, though, might include Shell Oil, whose Deer Park facility runs on a fair amount of Mexican Crude Oil, and is located within the range of expected dredging improvements. Once completed, the new ship channel depths could very well alter the economics models, as well as the ultimate pricing between crude oils in the Americas versus that which might be brought in from greater distances. In terms of the liner and container trades, savings in these markets are unlikely to be realized any time soon. The depressed nature of the container markets has most liner companies pulling back, not expanding, and draft will clearly not be an issue for half-empty container ships for the foreseeable future. Beyond this, outbound refined product tankers rarely push the envelope of the current channel depths, and chemical tankers, if they depart full, are rarely “full and down.”

Does this project represent Federal money that is well spent? It all depends on where you sit. Certainly, the offshore lightering companies will not be particularly happy at the prospect of a reduced workload. The real immediate value for the port, however, lies in the potential reduction in port congestion represented

The Maritime Executive

by the decrease in the number of shuttle tankers transiting the channel. This translates to a safer and more economical journey for other vessels, especially in light of the wider and deeper channel parameters. German mariners are probably going to have to stop referring to the Houston Ship Channel as “the veer-ditch.”

On the other hand, the berthing facilities for many terminals here are barely adequate for the current class and tonnage of vessels calling at Houston. With some of these berths built twenty, thirty, and even fifty years ago, for smaller vessels and different service, the question of whether the existing infrastructure will be adequate to handle the increased tonnage and drafts remains unanswered.

Houston has apparently done its homework with regard to anticipating future demands and providing the vehicle through which the port can maintain its competitive edge. It is now incumbent upon terminal operators and the port itself, to ensure that existing physical mooring facilities are adequate for the new tasks, and, if necessary, planning for upgrades if they are not.

Deepwater: Grasping for the Brass Ring The “Winner-take-all” sweepstakes for the US Coast Guard’s ambitious Deepwater Project award is finally coming down to the wire. Three industry teams, consisting of and led by Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and Science Applications International Corp. (SAIC), are competing for the lucrative contract. Best and final bids are due in March, with the final award announcements slated for late May or early June.

First Quarter 2002

O N T H E HI L L

Washington Insider continued At a 40 foot controlling depth, the eventual delivery of this parcel would require at least five shuttle tankers, one of which could be eliminated when the channel is deepened. A typical cost savings of $150,000 for this type of multiple delivery could be achieved…

O N T H E HI L L

Washington Insider continued The Deepwater project involves the replacement of the greater portion of the Coast Guard’s aging offshore assets, the bulk of which are rapidly approaching block obsolescence. The plan goes far beyond simple replacement parameters,…

The stakes are simply huge for all the players, with at least $9.2 billion in contracts, and possibly more, to be doled out over the next ten years.

The Deepwater project involves the replacement of the greater portion of the Coast Guard’s aging offshore assets, the bulk of which are rapidly approaching block obsolescence. The plan goes far beyond simple replacement parameters, however. Current Coast Guard sea and air assets were, as a rule, acquired through “stovepipe procurement”, or one at a time. Many are ill designed for their current mission mix, and, in some cases, actually hinder the safe and economical completion of various tasks. Simply stated, the Deep-water Program will allow the selected vendor team to design an integrated system whereby each asset, whether shore, air, or sea-based, will be designed so as to be compatible in all conceivable manners, allowing greater flexibility for the USCG to perform their “66 mission” mix with greater operational efficiency. The current array of equipment available to the Coast Guard does 14

not allow much in the way of “multiple integration.” Further, the innovative plan is made even more difficult by the knowledge that there will not be sufficient funds in the budget to provide for a “onefor-one” replacement of each existing asset.

At this critical stage, it can be argued that the future of the entire US Coast Guard rides exclusively on the selection of the right vendor team for Deepwater.

Since the award involves a winner take all scenario, the cohesiveness of the individual components of the competing teams may very well be the linchpin upon which the success or the failure of the project lies. Boeing, for example, teams largely with Northrop Grumman’s Avondale Shipyard here in the United States. Early in the game, however, Raytheon had been slated to team with Boeing, but has since been eliminated from the mix. The SAIC effort boasts industry giants such as Sikorsky and Bath Iron Works, and could, in theory, call on the expertise of NASSCO, General Dynamics, and Electric Boat, if awarded the green light for the contract.

Now, sources at Coast Guard headquarters say that Raytheon is now part of the SAIC effort.

For its part, Lockheed Martin leans heavily on its joint venture arrangement already in place with Ingalls Shipyard, which they say will provide a “seamless” partnership for the Deepwater project, with most of the hard work done up front, not after the fact. In terms of team cohesiveness and stability, virtually all components of the Lockheed team have been in place since the very beginning, something that cannot necessarily be said for the others. The absence of a “joint venture” arrangement between Boeing and Northrop Grumman may prove to be a hindrance as they move forward in the bid process, and more than one industry insider voiced concern that Avondale may not, at this time, possess the technical sophistication necessary to produce what the Coast Guard needs in a timely fashion.

You need a scorecard just to keep up, and the downstream implications are growing by the day. For its part, the Coast Guard has been extremely tight lipped about the bidding and award process, and no clear leader appears to have emerged from the pack. This year, it’s going to be an exciting time to be in Washington for the Cherry Blossoms. As usual, the tough part is determining when the prize will emerge.

Stay tuned.

-MarEx Joseph Keefe writes the Washington Insider as a regular feature. He can be reached at jkeefe@maritime-executive. com".

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Coast Guard: Update IMAX Filming Rescue at Air Station in Elizabeth City-

Over the course of 10 years, about half-amillion people will have the chance to watch Coast Guard aviation on a “larger than life” scale on the big screen, while about the same number of people will actu-

signed the 2002 National Defense Authorization Act, which included the extra money, on Dec. 28, 2001.

Housing allowance rates have increased as well. In 2001, military members not living in government-provided quarters paid an average 15 percent of their housing

searching for drugs and illegal migrants, Allen said. Since then, Congress approved $209 million in supplemental funding for “more personnel, more intelligence gathering and more patrol vessels,” Allen said.

Search and rescue remains a top priority along with national security, and the Coast

Service members will see an average increase of 6.9 percent in their January pay.

It’s the largest pay increase in 20 years. ally need rescue on the same type of aircraft. The Smithsonian Institution and the National Air and Space Museum are currently teamed up with the Coast Guard to produce the final segment in an upcoming IMAX format film devoted to helicopters and vertical flight.

Film crews are currently rolling at the Coast Guard Air Station in Elizabeth city.

They are depicting the fictional story of a daring rescue of two sailors who were forced to abandon ship in heavy seas. The story will be dramatic and true-to-life, showing the Coast Guard’s response to such a situation.

“We relish every opportunity to bring public attention to the heroic deeds that our aircrews perform on a daily basis in service to country and humanity.” said Capt.

Thomas King, Chief of Aviation Forces for the Coast Guard, regarding his support and excitement for this project.

Once completed, the film will premiere at the National Air and Space Museum in Washington, D.C. and then be released to IMAX theatres nationwide. The film is scheduled to open in September of 2002.

Military Services Get Pay Raise: Service members will see an average increase of 6.9 percent in their January pay.

It’s the largest pay increase in 20 years.

Officers will received a 5 percent increase, and enlisted service members received a 6 percent increase.

President Bush, in February 2001, pledged an additional $1.4 billion to go toward pay raises for service members. He 16

costs out of their own pockets. DOD is working to ensure the Basic Allowance for Housing covers all of a member’s housing costs by 2005.

In 2002, for instance, members will pay 11.3 percent of their housing costs out of pocket on average. Housing allowances are tied to actual housing costs in a given geographic area, so some areas are getting larger rate increases than others.

Newark & Elizabeth Port Security: With its immense container ship ports at Newark and Elizabeth, and a seagoing petroleum and refining trade second only to Texas’, New Jersey’s port security is “a mission that no one agency can do on its own.” said Vice Adm. Thad Allen, commander of Coast Guard forces from Maine to Florida.

New Jersey is particularly vulnerable because of its 127 miles of seacoast, plus the Hudson and Delaware River estuaries at either end, with oil refineries, chemical plants, and nuclear power plants located along the waterways.

The Coast Guard has undergone a sharp — some of its supporters would call it savage — downsizing since 1993, when federal budget mandates forced the cutting of 4,000 positions and reduced the service to around 35,000 personnel, about the same staffing level as the late 1960s.

When the World Trade Center and Pentagon were struck on Sept. 11, the Coast Guard went into “drop-everything” mode, rushing ships and aircraft back from fisheries patrols and Caribbean missions

Guard will always respond to distress calls, Allen said. But, it needs “a bridge strategy” to keep up maritime security demands “without walking away from those other missions,” he said. With additional funding for new recruits, it would take “a couple of years” to bring the Coast Guard back to pre-1993 staffing levels, Allen said. Part of the Coast Guard’s strategy looks at how port security will operate in the years to come. You can only grow so fast as an agency,” Allen said. “Our Cape May boot camp is only so big, and you can only push so many people through in a year.”

Nearly one-third of America’s annual economic output is “generated by marine trade,” but the public doesn’t understand that shipping and ports are that important, Allen said. That became apparent while New York Harbor was shut down in mid-September, Allen noted. “We shut off the flow of home heating oil (by barge) up the Hudson River to Albany,” he said. “By the time the harbor reopened, they were down to something like 10 days’ supply in Albany.”

Senator Breaux Wants CG to use Tracking Devices: Congress should require every vessel entering this country to carry the equipment needed for the Coast Guard to track them in U.S. waters, and should set an almost immediate deadline, U.S. Sen. John Breaux said.

An international agreement calls for ships to have the global positioning equipment by 2007, so that vessel tracking systems can pinpoint their location, direction, and speed in ports and on U.S. waterways.

The Maritime Executive

Coast Guard continued “If the ship doesn’t have a transponder, you’re not getting reliable coverage, right?”

Breaux, D-La., asked Capt. Stephen Rochon, Captain of the port at New Orleans.

“That is correct unless the vessel is near one of the limited number of radars at strategic points along the river,” Rochon said. “I

“We’re not going to wait that long,” Breaux said. “There’s nothing to prevent Congress from requiring transponders, is there? … When a sea marshal boards, if a ship has no transponder, we can lease them one.” Breaux, lead author of a bill to bolster security at the nation’s seaports, is chair-

Casto said. “You can set up a security zone, but if you don’t have the resources to enforce it, there’s no sense in setting it up.”

Casto claims that since Sept. 11, he has requested another 1,000 people and 46 watercraft for his district, which covers all or part of 26 states, 1,200 miles of coastline,

“If the ship doesn’t have a transponder, you’re not getting reliable coverage, right?”

Breaux, D-La., asked Capt. Stephen Rochon, Captain of the port at New Orleans. think that’s absolutely unacceptable in today’s modern age,” Breaux replied during a hearing on changes needed in security devices, enforcement, and inspections to protect seaports from terrorists.

Rochon said that, although 2007 was the International Maritime Organization original deadline, the Coast Guard has been working since the Sept. 11 attacks to get that moved up to 2004.

man of the Commerce Committee’s Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and merchant marine.

Senator Breaux asked Rear Adm. Roy Casto, Commander of the Coast Guard’s Eighth District, why he didn’t assign boats to keep other vessels well away from potential targets such as tankers with explosive cargo and cruise ships with thousands of passengers. “Too few people and boats,”

and 10,300 miles of navigable, inland waterways. “That would be enough to enforce security zones during emergencies, but not full time,” he said. He said he could not even estimate how many more people and boats it would take for full-time enforcement. “No agency is ever going to have all the resources we need to do all this,” he said.

-MarEx

Editorial

THE BOTTOM LINE IN THE SPORTSMAN’S PARADISE The End of State Regulated Pilotage or the Beginning of Sanity in Red Stick?

by Joseph Keefe

I

n the Big Easy, the party never ends and the city never sleeps.

In Baton Rouge, however, just 66 miles up the interstate, a much different situation exists. The LA legislature and Public Services Commission (LPSC) have been asleep at the switch for years, but if the industries and businesses which rely on Louisiana’s navigable waterways have any say in the matter, the party for the state’s four river pilot organizations is about to end.

Louisiana’s ability to function as a desirable business address, as well as the future of state-controlled pilotage across America, hangs in the balance. And, with the prospect of Federal intervention here in Louisiana becoming more and more likely with each passing day, state pilot groups from New York to San Francisco are watching from the sidelines with a wary eye. The publicity and potential ramifications are neither welcome, nor do they bode well for a system that has made most state pilots, coast-to-coast, quietly rich beyond their wildest dreams. It didn’t have to be this way.

Louisiana’s river pilots are, by most accounts, competent and dedicated to the professional and safe navigation of their dangerous and challenging waterways. It would be unwise for most of us to tell them how to go about the business of their core mission. The machinations that involve establishment of rate structures, selection of qualified personnel, and monitoring of casualty review and discipline, are another matter altogether.

Here in Louisiana, the system is rife with nepotism, virtually unregulated price increases, brazen solicitation of state legislators and public service commissioners, and a documented record of failure to properly discipline or thoroughly vet river pilots. The very fine reporting by Kevin Darce and Jeffrey Meitrodt, of the TimesPicayune of New Orleans, laid the entire story open, bare to the bone. It was the tripling of the cost of pilotage in most Louisiana ports, however, over a period of just seven years, which brought the current conflict between industry and the pilots to a boil. Since then, investigative efforts have all but obscured this basic reality, lost in a sea of alleged malfeasance and proven inconsistencies.

Through it all, the pilots have flexed their considerable lobby muscle and financial power, garnering an impressive victory in the legislative arena, and steadfastly maintaining that the status quo

18

is good enough for Louisiana, its consumers, and port customers.

Now, finally, it is clear that this is just not the case.

The past twelve months have brought the entire mess into clear focus, partly as a function of an intense investigative effort by THE MARITIME EXECUTIVE and local Louisiana journalists, with exposure of the facts providing more than enough reason for serious reform. A new system of pilot oversight, in a similar form to that which is now employed by the Louisiana State Mineral Board, would be a good starting place. This body supervises and governs the leasing, and exploration of five to six million acres of Louisiana land (in addition to offshore tracts up to three miles offshore) to oil companies. Importantly, there are NO oil and gas personnel serving on the board. It works well, primarily because persons nominally impartial to the interests of all parties, backed by a staff of oil and gas experts, form the basis for each decision that is handed down.

Better yet, the Board is funded exclusively by the State.

What’s the difference between a State licensed pilot and a Federally licensed pilot? Answer: about two hundred thousand dollars. The joke is old, it’s painful, and no longer funny. It does illustrate well the inequities of providing service in either milieu, with Federal pilots banned from handling Registered traffic, which accounts for virtually 95% of all waterborne, deep draft commerce into US ports. Arguably, there is no difference between the qualifiThe Maritime Executive

cations of either pilot, although the typical Federal pilot will tell you it has a lot to do with the spelling of your last name. The unrestricted monopoly afforded to State Pilot associations everywhere is a sweet deal; absent competition, as well as the ultimate responsibility for blame when a casualty occurs. These “advisors” to the vessel’s Master enjoy average incomes, nationwide, of over $300,000 per year. In most places, they are well regulated, and externally monitored to ensure that the very things that occur routinely in Louisiana are not commonplace elsewhere.

It’s not too late. Discount, for a moment, the pilot’s claims that big business is out to “control” every aspect of pilotage oversight.

On the contrary, users of the navigable waterways in the state of Louisiana merely want to have a proportional voice in the matters that substantially affect their bottom line, corporate risk, and ability to conduct business in a climate in which the interests of all parties are served. And, yes it is about the money, too. It’s always about the money.

Changes to the way that Louisiana ensures safe and economical transportation on its navigable waterways are coming. This

much is assured. The state that boasts just one Fortune 500 Company which calls Louisiana home, and has only tourism as its other large income source, cannot afford to have the viability of its ports and marine commerce compromised. A massive overhaul of the system is required, and at a minimum, the bad publicity which haunts the State and its pilots must be dealt with, and soon.

The recent victories in State court by the Pilot User’s Groups are encouraging, but it must be understood that litigation cannot rewrite the law. Only legislation, written and passed, can do that.

It’s often said that “you are either part of the solution, or you’re part of the problem.” A real opportunity exists here; and the timing is crucial. The pilots would be wise to climb on board now, provide input, and ensure that they have a hand in shaping their new reality. Either way, the party is over, and it’s time to clean up the mess.

Joseph Keefe is the Senior Editor for The Maritime Executive. His investigative piece on the Lake Charles Pilots can be read, and downloaded, on-line at www.maritime-executive.com. Mr. Keefe can be reached at jkeefe@maritime-executive.com.

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-MarEx

Secretary Norman Mineta

G O V E R N M E N T

Interview with Secretary of Transportation Norman Mineta

Transportation, and you, on the unprecedented action of grounding over 4,500 airborne craft, within hours after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11th.

Today, your office is dealing with a two-headed serpent with respect to air and surface transportation.

With regard to maritime commerce and its ports and vessels, the Senate has recently passed bill S1214. Do you believe that this bill sufficiently addresses the issues and the processes of providing maritime security?

Secretary Mineta: S. 1214 would help us implement an upgraded nationwide strategy for maritime and port security to respond to the new environment we face in the wake of the September 11 attacks. It would help us build the kind of flexible security approach we need to adapt to the wide diversity among the nation’s ports, while establishing a framework for cooperation among all stakeholders – federal, state and local law enforcement, shippers, labor, carriers, terminal operators and port authorities.

I am especially grateful to the Members of Congress and their staffs who have worked so hard on this issue.

Senators Hollings and McCain adopted most of the recommended changes we submitted for S. 1214, and Congressman LoBiondo and Congresswoman Brown have already held hearings on this issue and have indicated their support in moving forward with a maritime and port security package. I’m looking forward to continuing to work with all of them to build a solution to this problem.

MX: Port security enhancements and upgrades will be funded, pursuant to S 1214, by both grants and loans.

Most maritime organizations operate on the slimmest of profit margins. What can government do to assist in shouldering the financial burden, as maritime industry enhances vessel, terminal and port security?

Secretary Mineta: S. 1214, as passed by the Senate, authorizes both grants and loan guarantees to assist organizations in making security upgrades. The Administration would prefer to see that financing lim20

Photo: Getty One

MX: First, let us compliment the Department of

ited to grants. We expressed that view to the Senate prior to their consideration of S. 1214, but unfortunately that change was not included in the version passed by the Senate.

I am keenly aware of the financial challenges faced by the maritime industry today – and of the new security responsibilities that are facing all the players in the world of transportation. We will be doing everything we can to minimize the financial and operational burdens of the new security requirements while making sure that our marine borders and the public safety around our ports is protected.

MX: Port assessment is one of the major components of the maritime security plan. Again, this oversight will fall on the Coast Guard, as do most tasks pertaining to maritime security. The other U.S. military services now operate under wartime appropriations. Should the Coast Guard be funded accordingly?

Secretary Mineta: The Coast Guard has in fact received $209M for Homeland Security indicatives for the first six months of FY02 under the DOD Emergency Supplemental.

MX: The bill provides for $68M in authorizations for non-intrusive detection equipment for U.S. Customs at seaports. Additionally, U.S. Customs would receive another $145M for 1,200 new personnel and support equipment. Customs seems to benefit more from this The Maritime Executive

G O V E R N M E N T

First Quarter 2002

Secretary Norman Mineta

bill than does the Coast Guard. Why? Secretary Mineta: While, the Administration requested $203M to fund Coast Guard initiatives for the first half of FY02, Congress actually appropriated more than the requested amount and the CG was funded at $209M. As we begin to assess our operational needs to sustain a heightened level of homeland security, we will work to articulate these needs for future appropriations.

MX: Section 117 of S 1214 establishes that the Coast Guard will provide maritime safety and security teams to respond to terrorist activity, criminal activity or other threats to seaports. The bill also provides that $8M be authorized for each domestic port security team. There 361 ports in this nation. Does this mean that billions will be funded over the six year cycle of the bill?

Secretary Mineta: A team is not required for each of the nation’s ports. Rather the deployable domestic maritime safety and security team strategically placed and in concert with other CG units will provide the appropriate level of security.

MX: The international shipping community in this country handles over 18 million TEU containers a year, with the imported volume being around 11 million TEU containers. This is an average of 30,000 TEU containers per day. With hundreds of ships calling on our nation’s ports every day and less than 2% of all con-

tainerized cargoes being checked, what can be done to ensure a higher level of security within this segment of the industry?

Secretary Mineta: A week following the attacks, I established the “National Infrastructure Security Committee” or “NISC” to study security in the surface modes of transportation. Since that time, the NISC efforts have been focused around the activities of six direct action groups or “DAGs”- maritime, hazardous materials, pipelines, surface (highway and motor carrier), transit, and rail. These groups have been comprised of DOT and transportation industry experts. The various DAGs have produced recommendations regarding the security of transportation infrastructure, improved security protocols and processes, and developed specific recommendations for further actions, which are currently underway.

Among these important new initiatives is a Container Working Group, which has several subgroups that are formulating a strategy for increasing the security of freight movements and cargo containers in particular. This is necessarily an intermodal initiative, looking at every aspect of container movement whether by ship, rail, or truck. This Container Working Group is working closely with the Customs Service, other appropriate federal agencies, and the intermodal transportation industry. The intention of

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Secretary Norman Mineta

G O V E R N M E N T

the Department is to implement short term actions that will improve container security and, at the same time, develop longer term additional security solutions involving technology and best business practices.

MX: It is said that U.S. Flag vessels need less scrutiny than do foreign flag operators. The Coast Guard maintains a matrix that designates “high risk” vessels. Are there certain types of ships transporting certain cargoes, no matter what the flag, that should be boarded and/or have their hulls scanned?

Secretary Mineta: Our Captains of the Port give special scrutiny to certain vessels designated as high interest vessels, for security purposes. All high interest vessels that are designated as such due to their cargoes, regardless of their nationality, are subject to increased boardings. The designation of a ship as an high interest vessel due to its crew and passenger composition will vary from vessel to vessel and trip to trip.

However, a U.S. flag vessel could require less scrutiny than a foreign vessel in that the U.S. vessel crew will be largely or entirely composed of U.S. citizens about whom we have more information available.

MX: Looking at the complexity of maritime security, which requires securing of all ports, petroleum tankers, container ships, cruise lines and the integrated intermodal system. Is it realistic to manage and secure our 631 361 ports, 95,000 miles of coastline, over 1,000 harbor channels, 25,000 miles of inland and intercoastal waterways and more than 3,700 terminals that handle passengers and cargo?

Secretary Mineta: The complexity and vulnerability of the Marine Transportation System makes it an attractive target for terrorists. Our maritime security 22

response to this threat must strike a balance between the competing needs of economic globalization, which emphasizes the rapid and efficient movement of cargo, and security that minimizes the risk and consequences of a terrorist attack. Since it is not practical for the Coast Guard to stand watch over the entire coastline, every harbor, and all critical maritime infrastructures, we will continue to utilize an effective risk-based concept of operations to fulfill our maritime security obligations. The Coast Guard’s strategy for protecting maritime assets and marine infrastructure combines deterrence and a strong and active presence in U.S. territorial waters, with the ability to preemptively respond to a threat.

The Coast Guard will conduct in-depth Port Vulnerability Assessments at the nation’s most significant military and economically strategic ports. At all other ports, Captains of the Port and other Port Security Committee members will conduct Port Vulnerability Assessment utilizing a self-assessment methodology. As a precursor to this effort, our Captains of the Port recently completed an initial assessment of all 361 U.S. ports using a risk based decision-making tool, which identified and prioritized critical infrastructure.

The Coast Guard is in the process of working with other maritime stakeholders to determine if increased security regulations are also needed to deter acts of terrorism within the ports.

In order to achieve a maritime security environment that effectively differentiates between benign and threatening activities, we must have an awareness of all vessels - with their cargo and crew - that operate to and from U.S. ports, or transit our coastal waters. The essence of this maritime domain awareness is the timely possession of information and intelligence, and the ability to conduct surveillance and reconnaissance of all vessels, cargo, and people that operate in the maritime domain well before the potential threat enters our maritime boundaries. Maritime domain awareness will require multi-agency cooperation at all levels of government (local, state, and federal), as well as strong partnerships with the private sector, to allow for the timely collection, processing and dissemination of -MarEx information.

The Maritime Executive

G O V E R N M E N T

MX: Senator Graham, you have been working on port

security issues since long before 9-11-01; in fact, since 1998 we understand. Why were you, at that point, uncomfortable with port security issues?

Senator Graham: In early 1998 – in response to the almost daily reports of crime and narcotics trafficking at Florida seaports, and following my workday with the Customs Service at Port Manatee on October 14, 1997 – I began an investigation of the security situation at seaports throughout the nation. At that time, and perhaps even more so today, I was very concerned that our seaports, unlike our airports, lacked the advanced security procedures and equipment that are necessary to prevent acts of terrorism, cargo theft, and drug trafficking.

Based on this investigation, I asked President Bill Clinton to establish a federal commission to evaluate both the nature and extent of crime and the overall state of security at seaports and to develop recommendations for improvement.

In response to my request, President Clinton established the Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports on April 27, 1999. In October, 2000, the Commission issued its final report, which outlined many of the common security problems discovered in U.S. seaports. Our legislation addresses its findings.

MX: Currently, it is obvious that our seaports lack the security and oversight necessary to protect commerce, vessel operations, and populations of citizens that work and live near these complexes. The Senate wasted no time in passing “The Port and Maritime Security Act of 2001.” Do you believe that the House of Representatives will acknowledge port security as one of the major components of national security and move quickly to pass similar legislation?

Senator Graham: I am very optimistic that, with First Quarter 2002

Photo: James Clark

Senator Bob Graham

Interview with Senator Bob Graham, Senior Senator Florida

the strong leadership of Representatives Clay Shaw and John Dinkle, two of the most respected members of the House, that the Congress will move swiftly in passing its legislation. This will be an excellent test for the House to act before there is another terrorist attack in the country.

In the days immediately after September 11th, the Congress was focused on the airlines, our airports, and, a few days later, on Anthrax. These three areas were proven to be susceptible to terrorism. Fortunately, no American seaport was attacked, nor was an ocean container used as a terrorist device for destruction. By passing this legislation, the Congress will demonstrate that it can act quickly before a terrorist attack and reduce its severity.

MX: Is the legislation that was passed by the Senate the full measurement for seaport security that you had hoped it would be?

Senator Graham: Understanding that we are in a rapidly changing period of American history, since September 11th, the legislation that the Senate passed represented the best thoughts of some of the most knowledgeable Americans as to what were the vulnerabilities of seaports and containers and what steps needed to be taken to protect them from illegal or destructive activities.

Because of the work that was done during the Clinton Administration, we were fortunate enough to be in a very advanced position to react to September 11th and to seaport security. I believe that, due to the professionalism and knowledge of how to go about providing security, that this legislation will move quickly through the House and into the Rose Garden.

MX: The Coast Guard has been charged with the task of maritime security. Section 105 of your bill authorizes $50M beginning next year and through 2006 for Port Security Vulnerability Assessments and direct funding

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for the Coast Guard. With 361 ports in our nation, is it reasonable to assume that the Captain of the port for each port is to be responsible to provide the Secretary of Transportation and the Commandant of the Coast Guard with a clear and concise plan, instead of putting the onus on the port authorities?

Senator Graham: Our bill requires the Department of Transportation, in consultation with the appropriate public and private sector officials and organizations, to develop standards and procedures for conducting initial security evaluations and port vulnerability assessments. Each initial security evaluation would be available for review and comment by the local ports.

We will have security experts assess waterfront and port security, and provide those assessments to the individuals in charge of making security plans.

Assessment information will be invaluable in helping the industry use the best information in order to complete effective security plans MX: It is a frightening new world that we live in since 9-11-01. The Coast Guard, our fifth service, has been the stepchild of our armed forces. Do you support the buildup of the USCG in terms of new ships, equipment, manpower, and training?

Senator Graham: Yes, I fully support the Coast Guard and believe that we need to provide them with the necessary resources to carry out their mission.

During consideration of the fiscal year 2002 Transportation Appropriations bill, I offered an amendment that would have increased their budget.

Congress recently passed the Fiscal Year 2002 Defense Appropriations bill and included $209 million for the Coast Guard for emergency operating expenses to respond to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States.

MX: S.1214, Section 111, provides for Professional 24

Photo: James Clark

Senator Bob Graham

G O V E R N M E N T

Training Procedures and Standards to be established by the Secretary of Transportation. It is our understanding that $5.5M will be authorized for 2002 to study training curricula and program elements. Given the fact that there are maritime training organizations, such as the Maritime Institute of Technology and Graduate Studies in Linthicum Heights, Maryland, which already trains MARAD seafarers in Force Protection, Small Arms and Biological Warfare, wouldn’t its ability to train sea-marshals and other security professionals in sixmonths be a more effective use of authorizations?

Senator Graham: Section 110 of our bill would require the Department of Transportation (DOT) to employ existing federal and contract resources to train and certify maritime security professionals. DOT would be required to consult with the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, the United States Merchant Marine Academy’s Global Maritime and Transportation School, the Maritime Security Council, the International Association of Airport and Seaport Police, the National Cargo Security Council, and any other federal, state, or local government or law enforcement agency or private organization or individual with pertinent expertise.

The section would authorize $5.5 million for Fiscal Year 2002; $3 million annually for Fiscal Year 2003 and Fiscal Year 2004, and $2.5 million annually for Fiscal Year 2005 and Fiscal Year 2006. The section would also make directly available, subject to appropriation, $2.5 million for Fiscal Year 2003 and Fiscal Year 2004 and $3 million for Fiscal Year 2005 and Fiscal Year 2006.

MX: The bill amends the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 to establish new Title XIV loans and authorizations for port infrastructure improvements. What exactly does infrastructure improvements mean in terms of security?

Senator Graham: Our bill gives seaport authorities the resources to help secure their ports. Funding will be focused on building infrastructure at our seaports, including gates and fencing, security-related lighting systems, remote surveillance systems, concealed video systems, and other security equipment. The bill will directly fund and authorize $390 million in grants to local port security projects. Specifically, the bill provides grants for security projects, of which the federal government will pay up to 75 percent. Projects under $25,000 would not have a matching requirement, and the Secretary may approve federal contributions above 75 percent to a project the Secretary deems to have high merit.

MX: The bill provides for $68M in authorizations for non-intrusive and detection equipment for U.S. The Maritime Executive

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Photo: James Clark

PHOTO JAMES CLARK

Customs at seaports. Additionally, U.S. Customs would receive another $145M for 1,200 new personnel and support equipment. Customs seems to benefit more from this bill than does the Coast Guard. Why? Also, Section 119 of the bill establishes that the Coast Guard will provide domestic safety and security teams to respond to terrorist activity, criminal activity, or other threats to seaports. The bill also provides that $8M be authorized for each domestic port security team. There are 361 ports in this nation. Is this what it seems?

Senator Graham: Section 202 of our bill authorizes $13 million for Fiscal Years 2002 through 2006 for the Coast Guard to assign Coast Guard personnel as Sea Marshals. This section would authorize the Coast Guard to board vessels to deter, prevent, or respond to acts of terrorism or otherwise provide for the safety and security of the port and maritime environment.

Both the Coast Guard and Customs play an important role in securing our ports.

U.S. Customs officers must be able to screen more than just 2 percent of the cargo coming into our seaports. Investing in new screening technologies will help human screeners inspect more cargo and to detect the most dangerous shipments. To increase the amount of cargo screened, the bill authorizes $145 million for FY02 for additional Customs personnel, and to help Customs update their computer systems consistent with the requirements of this bill. Especially important is that the bill directly funds and authorizes $168 million to purchase non-intrusive screening and detection equipment for the U.S. Customs Service.

While we cannot expect to screen every marine container entering into the United States, we need to provide some expectation of inspection, or create some level of deterrence to dissuade smugglers from using the intermodal system to smuggle cargo.

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Senator Bob Graham

MX: There are 361 port complexes in the United States.

Many of them are located near major cities with heavy populations, and these ports present special security problems because of their open environments. In light of the fact that most ports are called on by foreign vessels, is it reasonable for each ship to have its hull scanned prior to entering into each and every port? Is there a more effective way to manage foreign vessel traffic?

Senator Graham: There are 361 port complexes in the United States. Our bill will require that we know more in advance about the cargo and crew members coming into the United States. The more we know about a ship’s cargo, and where it originated, the better our Customs agents and other law enforcement officers can target the most suspicious containers and passengers. Even with more screening equipment, we are still going to have an inadequate number of inspections. So, targeting the highest risk cargo will be crucial.

The bill also requires ships to electronically send their cargo manifests to the port before gaining clearance to enter. Specifically, the legislation requires carriers, including non-vessel-owning common carriers, to provide by electronic transmission, cargo manifest information in advance of port entry or clearance.

MX: Finally, S 1214 calls for $1,143B over the next four years. Will the bill comprehensively cover most aspects of maritime security, as you perceive it?

Senator Graham: It takes money to make sure the international borders at our seaports are fully staffed with Customs, law enforcement, and Immigration personnel. It takes money to make sure that they have modern security equipment, including the latest scanners to check cargo for the most dangerous materials. And, it takes money to build the physical infrastructure of a secure port.

Our bill will provide $219 million over four years directly to these important national security functions.

Cargo ships currently pay a tax on the gross registered tonnage the ship can carry. That tax rate, in current law, is scheduled to decline beginning in 2003. Our bill will simply extend the existing tax rate — which has been imposed since 1986 — until 2006. All those revenues will be directed to help beef up security. These tax revenues will have to be appropriated, but they can only be spent on the programs authorized by this seaport security bill.

However, the funds provided directly by the tonnage tax extension are insufficient to cover all of the port security needs. So, the bill includes additional authorizations of $965.5 million.

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Senatorr John Breaux

G O V E R N M E N T

Senator Breaux: Response to Questions Submitted by The Maritime Executive

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Photo: James Clark

MX: The Coast Guard has been charged with the task of maritime security. S 1214 Section 105 authorizes $50M beginning next year and through 2006 for Port Security Vulnerability Assessments and direct funding for the Coast Guard. With 361 ports in our nation, is it reasonable to assume that the Captain of the port for each port is to be responsible to provide the Secretary of Transpor-tation and the Commandant of the Coast Guard with a clear and concise plan, instead of putting the onus on the port authorities?

Senator Breaux: Clearly, the Captain of the Port will be the authority in charge for maritime security for our waterways, waterfront facilities, and adjacent facilities connected to the operation of waterfront facilities. However, the effort with respect to security will have to be coordinated among a number of interests. S. 1214 will require the Coast Guard to assess the vulnerabilities of our major ports and inform the relevant parties of the results of the assessments, and will require the Coast Guard to issue regulations on what will be required of port authorities with respect to security plans. Ultimately, it will be up to ports to actually formulate their own security plans and systems, and the Coast Guard will approve or disapprove of the plans.

Similarly, on an ongoing basis, the Coast Guard will coordinate security meetings between federal, state, local law enforcement, and the private sector security in order to facilitate a more effective law enforcement effort.

MX: It is a frightening new world that we live in since 9-11.

The Coast Guard, our fifth service, has been the stepchild of our arm forces. Do you support the buildup of the USCG in terms of new ships, equipment, manpower, and training?

Senator Breaux: The Coast Guard is an agency that always steps up to the plate and embraces new challenges and issues, from environmental protection and navigational safety to port security. Unfortunately, Congress has not kept pace with the Coast Guard’s responsibilities and has not provided them the assets they need. I am very concerned that we are stretching them to a breaking point because of the lack of resources. They do more for less than perhaps any other agency in the federal government, and I am very supportive of helping them get the resources they need.

MX: Your bill, S 1587, establishes a Sea Marshal program.

S1214, Section 111, provides for Professional Training

Procedures and Standards to be established by the Secretary of Transportation. It is our understanding that $5.5M will be authorized for 2002 to study training curricula and program elements. Given the fact that there are maritime training organizations, such as the Maritime Institute of Technology and Graduate Studies in Linthicum Heights, Maryland which already trains MARAD seafarers in Force Protection, Small Arms, and Biological Warfare, wouldn’t its ability to train sea-marshals and other security professionals in six-months be a more effective use of authorizations?

Senator Breaux: I had occasion to participate in a Sea Marshal’s boarding in the Port of New Orleans during my Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine Subcommittee hearings on the Gulf Coast, and was very impressed with the program. I was happy that we were able to include it in the Senate passed port security bill, and think that it is vital to be able to have Coast Guard law enforcement board certain high interest vessels prior to them entering into port. I also think that the Sea Marshal’s program has merit in times of heightened national security alert, or in certain areas where you may have more environmental concerns, or where population density is very heavy and vessels could pose risk to the surrounding populations.

I am supportive of any training that can make that program stronger, including any of the training that is provided to merchant mariners. I would also note that S. 1214, does include a provision that would require the Department of Transportation (“DOT”) to evaluate the feasibility of utilizing U.S. documented merchant mariners to supplement Coast Guard law enforcement on Sea Marshal boardings.

The Maritime Administrator, Captain Bill Schubert, has The Maritime Executive

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MX: The Coast Guard has been tasked with domestic safety and

security teams to respond to terrorist activity, criminal activity or other threats to seaports. There are 361 ports in this nation. Is this what it seems? Will the Coast Guard act in a fighting force manner and will that service receive additional personnel to address these force measures?

Senator Breaux: Traditionally, domestic safety and security units, otherwise referred to as port security units, have supported and safeguarded military operations abroad. Currently, the Coast Guard is exploring how these units might be utilized to protect the home front. While it shows some promise, it would be difficult to garner all of the necessary assets that would be required to implement domestic safety security units in every area of the nation, however; the concept shows promise in certain high priority areas and situations.

MX: There are 361 port complexes in the United States. Many of them are located near major cities with heavy populations, and these ports present special security problems because of their open environments. In light of the fact that most ports are called on by foreign vessels, is it reasonable for each ship to have its hull scanned prior to entering into each and every port? Is there a more effective way to manage foreign vessel traffic?

Senator Breaux: This issue is really a resource issue.

Similar to port security and safety units, the use of hull scans might have merit in certain areas and to defend against certain threats. It would probably not be feasible to deploy it in every port or region. For instance, it might be a great tool to protect against threats to our naval vessels, and could be an important tool to protect naval fleet sites.

MX: S. 1587 calls for transparency and security of vessel registration procedures. ABS, Intertanko, and OCIMF have been strong proponents of this initiative. Unfortunately, major ship owner associations have not been motivated to strengthen class requirements. Will your bill change this lack of cooperation and initiate transparency within the shipping industry?

Senator Breaux: I am very concerned about the quality of information that we receive from foreign maritime sources, and also the lack of our ability as a nation to probe further behind that information to determine whether it is accurate. In the future, we are going to require more maritime information in advance of arrival; however, if the information is unreliable or over vague, or if it cannot be verified for purposes of security, it is almost more of a hindrance than a benefit.

First Quarter 2002

Senatorr John Breaux

mentioned to me that this might be a good way of ensuring that Coast Guard personnel, that might not be as aware of merchant vessel operations, could be strengthened by including merchant marine personnel to increase the awareness of boarding parties to vessel irregularities.

Examples of poor information in maritime transport abound; for instance, the Coast Guard caught more than 1,000 mariners operating with fraudulent licensing under Panamanian flag. Security experts trying to track down a fleet of vessels owned or operated by Osama Bin Laden declared that tracking ownership of theses vessels has been more difficult than tracking international banking records.

The Coast Guard and Customs are going to mandate advance information on cargo manifests, but, as most anyone in maritime trade knows, cargo is often described very generically under terms such as FAK (“freight of all kinds”). This is just not right, and I am going to be pushing this issue. As you point out, reputable owners have nothing to fear from a proper and reliable system of maritime information MX: It has been said that terrorists seek out soft targets. Do you believe that all vessel crews should be trained in force protection measures?

Senator Breaux: I think that there may be some merit in force protection for crews, but I also think that maritime security is primarily a function for the Coast Guard, and in some cases the Navy. Anytime the private sector is put in a position of performing law enforcement, you experience greater risks; after all, these individuals have been hired to drive ships, not fight off security threats. I also think that it might be more advantageous to train crewmembers to identify security threats in advance and to work with law enforcement to bring that threat under control.

MX: Over the years, the shipping industry has minimized its crews for obvious revenue retention purposes. Should additional personnel be added to crews for the sole purpose of security, and what type of specialized training should that personnel have in terms of force protection?

Senator Breaux: Again, I think that this is a resource issue, and there might be instances where force protection and the presence of trained security forces would be very important. However, I think you have to be careful to identify bona fide risks in order to avoid unnecessary costs to protect against slight risks.

S.1214 does have provision for maritime security training using the coordinated resources of DOT and the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (“FLETC”). I think that this program could be utilized to help MX: International shipping is a multi-national system with various types of cargoes and vessel operators. It has been said that U.S. Flag operators need less scrutiny than do foreign flag operators. Do you believe that vessels, no matter what the flag state, be randomly should boarded for inspection and have its hulls scanned?

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Senatorr John Breaux

G O V E R N M E N T

Senator Breaux: In general, U.S.-flag operators are already subject to scrutiny by the federal government. For instance, U.S. mariners are required to have criminal background checks. I would not, however, make distinctions on the level of scrutiny that is applicable to any vessel, other than to recognize existing security practices already applicable to U.S.-flag vessels. Security is only as strong as its weakest link.

MX: There are 361 port complexes in the United States. Many of them are located near major cities with heavy populations, and these ports present special security problems because of their open environments. Should every port have a closed-door policy and enhance its security using local law enforcement and the National Guard?

Senator Breaux: We need to balance the competing considerations of the unique and open characteristics of ports, with the need to restrict access to certain security sensitive areas or areas of information. I think that as a nation we are going to have to shift slightly away from policies of openness given the new reality of the higher need for security.

MX: The international shipping community in this country handles over 18 million containers a year, with the imported volume being around 11 million containers. This is an average of 30,000 containers per day. With hundreds of ships calling our nation’s ports every day, what can the port authorities do to prevent a terrorist attack coming from an enclosed and locked container?

Senator Breaux: Port Authorities and steamship lines are going to have to work with the government to get better cargo information. We currently inspect less than 2% of containerized cargo. We need to do better. Conversely, we cannot inspect every container, or even come close to doing that, because of the adverse ramifications to trade. We can, however, inspect more containers by employing more funding to get better non-intrusive screening equipment. We should also work with shippers and foreign ports to attempt to weed out those shippers and ports that are not reputable, and allow for us to focus inspection resources on higher risk cargoes, shippers, and foreign ports that do not employ adequate oversight of export cargoes.

MX: The cruise line industry is an $18 billion a year industry and employs over 275,000 Americans. The International Council of Cruise lines insists that its member liners have security plans in place that are already examined each year by the Coast Guard. These plans state that, similar to airport passengers, cruise passengers are required to present identification, and that all luggage and carry-ons are x-rayed, hand searched or searched by dogs. The cruise lines are now using metal detectors for embarking and disembarking. This part of the maritime industry seems to have its act together. Is there 28

more that can be done?

Senator Breaux: I was impressed with the system that

cruise lines employ to secure their vessels, and I commend them on their efforts. In some respects they are doing better than our airlines. Two areas where I think that they could work to further improve are in the area of ensuring that foreign ports employ the levels of security that the cruise lines and U.S. passenger ports employ. While many of theses cruise ships carry their own security technology with them, not all do, and we need to make sure that foreign port destinations are not utilized to circumvent the level of U.S. based security. Also, I would like them to ensure that their crewmembers are not a risk. As I mentioned earlier, the potential that foreign crewmembers could operate under a false document because Panama, or Liberia, is not doing and adequate job of checking mariners’ background is a problem. This is not just a problem for cruise ships, but the entire maritime world.

MX: Looking at the complexity of maritime security which requires securing all ports, petroleum tankers, container ships, cruise lines and the integrated intermodal system, is it realistic to secure our 631 ports, 95,000 miles of coastline, over 1,000 harbor channels, 25,000 miles of inland and intercostal waterways, and more than 3,700 terminals that handle passengers and cargo?

Senator Breaux: Not only is it realistic, it is imperative, in my opinion, the maritime transportation industry may pose to be the most vulnerable of all transportation modes. Anyone, who has traveled down the Houston Ship Channel can attest to that. We must, however, be able to tailor our security policy acknowledging that we do not have unlimited resources, to address the most important risks with the highest levels of commitment while still improving all security at all ports and maritime facilities.

MX: The United States is the largest consumer of petroleum in the world. We consume approximately 18 million barrels a day, and a barrel of oil is 42 gallons. So, as a nation, we consume approximate 756 million gallons of oil per day. Of our daily consumption, approximate 8 million barrels of oil per day is imported and arrives on ships. Because of the very nature of the cargo, should all tankers be hull scanned and stopped for inspection?

Senator Breaux: As I mentioned previously, hull scanning may be a tool in our arsenal of maritime security, however, it can be costly, and should be employed in places of greater risk. Clearly, petroleum products and petrochemicals do pose greater threat to the marine environment and surrounding areas, but to require scanning of all hulls may be over kill.

-MarEx The Maritime Executive

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Field Hearing On Seaport Security & Passenger Security Port Everglades, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, January 9, 2002 On any given day on Capitol Hill, as many twenty congressional hearings can take place at one time. At these hearings, numerous policy experts are called upon to enlighten our elected officials as to new ideas for improving the safety, security, and prosperity of our country.

Senator John Breaux and his congressional staff went on the road to hear new voices with fresh ideas regarding port and maritime security. Their first stop was Port Everglades, Florida on January 9th, then New Orleans, Louisiana on January 10th, and Houston, Texas on January 11th.

Today, maritime and port security is now at the forefront of homeland defense planning and strategies. Senator Breaux conducted these field hearings to assist his Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine to learn more about the challenges facing local citizens, local government, and local businesses, as they try to improve the quality of life in their communities.

The security of our nation’s sea and river ports has rarely been the focus of our national security plans. Our country invests millions of dollars to protect our airports and our land borders, but invests very little to make sure that the goods and people arriving at our ports do not jeopardize our national security.

Currently, there is no unified federal plan for overseeing security at the international borders of our seaports. Right now, the responsibility of building secure seaports rests with the states, its port authorities, and the private sector. It has been a poor model for national security when we were fighting drugs and international smuggling, and it is totally inadequate after September 11th as we face the threat of terrorism.

Senator Bob Graham, Florida was not at the Port Everglades Field Hearing; however, he has been a leader in the charge of improving security at our seaports. Furthermore, the state of Florida has been a great leader in this area, investing its own state resources to address seaport security when the federal government failed to step in.

Senator Breaux, Senator Hollings, and Senator Graham introduced a seaport security bill in the summer of 2000. They re-introduced the legislation again in the current Congress, and it passed out of the Commerce Committee last August by a unanimous vote.

However, seaport security was still a low profile issue- until the terrorist’s attacks of September 11th. Suddenly, the vulnerabilities we face at our seaports were brought into sharp focus. Senator Breaux immediately convened a subcommittee hearing on the issue, during which they heard some truly horrific scenarios about the potential use of our seaports by terrorists. He and the other commitFirst Quarter 2002

Senatorr John Breaux

Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee Subcommittee of Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine Chair - Senator John Breaux- Louisiana

tee members dramatically expanded the legislation to address these new threats of terrorism. The Bush Administration endorsed the bill, and it passed through the Senate by unanimous consent in Dec., 2001.

Some of our passenger cruise lines and shipping companies may worry that these new procedures requiring more security and customs checks may slow the processing of passengers and the flow of international commerce. However, new technology is the key to speeding these passengers and cargo clearances processes, while at the same time making the entire system more secure. As Congress did in the airline security bill, our government can strike a balance between increased security and the convenience of our open country and economy.

While the Port and Maritime Security Act of 2001 unanimously passed the Senate, Senator Breaux and Representative Clay Shaw, 22nd District of Florida are focusing their attention in getting this legislation through the House of Representatives. Our Government needs to keep the spotlight on this issue of national security and to learn all it can about potential terrorist threats.

Senator Breaux went into the field to listen to new ideas that could be incorporated into the seaport legislation, which will eventually reach a House conference committee, which would draft a final version of the bill.

In Port Everglades, Representative Clay Shaw and the executive directors of Port Everglades and the Port of Miami, along with witnesses from local law enforcement and representatives of the cruise lines, discussed seaport and passenger security. South Florida is the largest cruise line center in the country. Senator Breaux took a tour of the passenger complex in Port Everglades to review passenger screening.

In his remarks before a packed auditorium, Breaux made it clear that he felt that the cruise line industry had done a remarkable job in responding to passenger security. He acknowledged that enhanced security standards were high and that passengers could feel extremely safe while on a cruise. South Florida handled 5,442,668 cruise line passengers arriving on 13,455 passenger ships in 2001.

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Interview with U.S. Representative Clay Shaw, 22nd District, Florida

Photo: James Clark

Rep. Clay Shaw

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MX: The Port and Maritime Security Act moved quick-

ly through the Senate. Senator John Breaux – Louisiana has said that you will be a key individual in moving the bill through the House. Why would there be any resistance to the bill in the House? rep. Shaw: I don’t anticipate that there will be any resistance in the House. I filed the same bill that passed the Senate unanimously in the last Congress. I filed that bill in the closing days of the session. Congress passed a lot of legislation that the Senate did not even take up. I believe that this maritime security bill will pass in the first quarter of the year, and that there will most likely be many enhancements to its structure and appropriations.

MX: Congressman, you represent the 22nd District of Florida, which is home to the Port of Miami, Port Everglades, and Palm Beach. These ports are the center of gravity for the cruise line industry in the United States. They managed 5.7 million passengers and over 16 thousand cruise line calls in 2000. Should marine port security be federalized? rep. Shaw: If I look at Port Everglades and what has happened to the cruise line industry, it appears that the private sector is doing a better job that anyone thought. As a matter of fact, by x-raying all of the luggage and doing its extensive passenger searches, the cruise lines have demonstrated that they are competent. I don’t believe that the federal government can do a better job than private industry.

When people say that the federal government should be taking over management of various services, I 30

always like to use the analogy that it would be like the U.S. Postal Service taking over Federal Express. Who do you think will do the better job? I think it’s clear.

MX: You have made it clear that you fully support the USCG. The Congressional appropriation for 2002 will be $209 million in emergency operational expenses.

Considering the magnitude of maritime security in conjunction with the Coast Guard’s traditional tasks, are these new emergency appropriations sufficient for its maritime security needs? rep. Shaw: I have been in Congress for over twenty-one years, and I have never seen the Coast Guard funded to the extent that they should have been. The quiet presence of the Coast Guard is very comforting.

They do an extremely tremendous job managing America’s waterways. They are one of our finest governmental organizations and its personnel need to be commended for the job they did securing our country’s coastlines and waterways after September 11th.

MX: The state of Florida had initiated port security long before 9-11-01; in fact, the state had pending legislation that became effective on January 1, 2002. Why were you, at that point, uncomfortable with port security issues? rep. Shaw: I realized a long time ago that we needed to do a better job securing our ports. I initiated many security items that would be beneficial to port security prior to 9-11. Now, in terms of the State of Florida The Maritime Executive

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My largest concern about ships, foreign or otherwise, is the type of cargo they carry.

Container ships are less of a concern than are ships with cargoes that could be deemed to be hazardous. The Coast Guard has experts in this area, and I believe that they will be the agency which will determine what is high-risk and what isn’t.

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what isn’t.

MX: It has been said that,

Rep. Clay Shaw

funding those initiatives today, I believe that we must wait to see how the federal government proceeds in its legislation. We have a great flow of commerce and immigration through this state, and the enhancements that the federal government will provide on top of what the state has done will provide a significant level of security.

MX: Maritime industry executives have stated that the federal government, via the Coast Guard, should employ existing boat assets owned by private companies to patrol ports and waterways. Armed sea-marshals could be put on these boats to keep private watercraft a few hundred yards away from commercial vessels lying at berth in port facilities. Is this a feasible measure for maritime security? rep. Shaw: Obviously, it would help. However, putting private vessels out there to patrol our country’s waterways doesn’t send the message out to pleasure craft to stay away from commercial ships. I believe that it is something the Coast Guard is going to have to address, when it reviews the components of maritime security.

MX: There are 361 port complexes in the United States.

Many of them are located near major cities with heavy populations, and these ports present special security problems because of their open environments. Our nation’s ports are called upon by thousands of foreign vessels each year. Is it reasonable to scan the hulls and board them to inspect cargo and crews of high-risk ships designated by the Coast Guard? rep. Shaw: My largest concern about ships, foreign or otherwise, is the type of cargo they carry. Container ships are less of a concern than are ships with cargoes that could be deemed to be hazardous.

We are getting much better in identifying various ships and its manifested cargo. The Coast Guard has experts in this area, and I believe that they will be the agency which will determine what is high-risk and

because our nation currently supports U.S. Flag operators via the Jones Act, immediate threats to the maritime environment were avoided. Do you support the continuation of the Jones Act? rep. Shaw: I think that we have to constantly look at the Jones Act and its benefits to our presence within the maritime industry. We need a strong merchant marine, and, as long as there are definable benefits; yes, I do support its continuation.

MX: There has been a move within the industry to have transparency in vessel registration, documentation, and structural class procedures.

ABS, Intertanko, and OCIMF have been strong proponents of this initiative. Unfortunately, major ship owner associations have not been motivated to strengthen vessel class. Do you envision legislation changing this lack of cooperation, and will it initiate transparency within the shipping industry? rep. Shaw: Clearly, if transparency would provide a more cohesive and better understanding of individual ships that operate within the United States, and on a broader sense, throughout the world, then the ability for all concerned to be given the proper information makes sense.

There should be congressional hearings on the matter to establish the benefits to industry and the government. If transparency provides a more comprehensive understanding of a vessel and its status, in terms of registry and its structural inspections, this is important information that will allow the Coast Guard to know the history of a vessel operating in our waterways.

Substandard vessels are a major concern to our efforts in environmental protection. We don’t need ships sinking and polluting our seas, like the Erika did off the coast of France. However, I do know that the U.S. Coast Guard inspects all ships operating in our waterways routinely, and if transparency is another safeguard, then let’s look into it.

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Admiral James M. Loy

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Riding Point with Jim Loy A New World, A New Battle, and A New Coast Guard

by Joseph A. Keefe Executive Interview: Admiral James M. Loy, Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard The last time the Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard provided the MAREX with an hour or so of his typical eighteen-hour day was in the winter of 2000.

During that meeting, a candid discussion of the Coast Guard’s achievements, past shortcomings, present condition, and future goals shed new light on perhaps the most obscure branch of the United States armed services. The menu of services provided by the least adequately funded sector of the US government was depicted, within that interview, to be simply staggering in terms of depth and variety. That was then, and this is now.

In a world in which the numbers “9/11” have evolved into arguably the most significant line of demarcation in American history since the beginning of World War II, the manner in which Americans conduct themselves and their daily lives is now at issue.

Amidst all of this furor emerges a newly high profile player in the war on terror, and in the cause of Homeland Defense. Without downplaying the grotesque and horrible nature of the September 11th terrorist attacks, it must now be understood that these targets were largely symbolic choices. It could have been much, much worse.

Weighing “9/11” versus the total incapacitation of an economy via a planned, catastrophic event larger by a factor of ten, is frightening. Further, while most of us will eventually regain a reasonable sense of security in the wake of the quick fix band-aids now being applied to the airline industry, the continued risks on other fronts cannot be ignored. Nowhere is this more apparent than on the waterfront of the world’s most developed and industrial island nation, where, at this very 32

moment, a hundred or more floating bombs are currently enroute to and from our nation’s biggest ports and refining complexes. Stepping directly in the path of harm is the United States Coast Guard, tasked with perhaps the oldest of its many jobs, the complexity and span of which just got a lot more difficult. Hard questions are now being asked at the highest levels. What’s it going to take; who’s going to pay for it, and how? The question of who’s going to do the job, of course, has already been answered. The fruits of this labor will be primarily measured, however, in terms of the money and resources allocated to the task. The ability of those tasked with defending the nation’s shorelines and ports to adapt to a highly fluid and changing scenario will be the real benchmark however. During our interview, the Coast Guard’s chief executive had several things to say about both subjects.

Pivotal Opportunities While no one, much less Admiral Loy and the Coast Guard, would wish for such a defining event, September 11 was and is, according to Loy, “a pivotal opportunity for the organization,” and “one which we have to be stand up and counted, to prove our mettle and capabilities.” Further, he maintains “on September 11, the military, multi-missioned, and maritime functions of the Coast Guard were never clearer.” He is also quick to admit that this was probably not the case, at least for some observers, on the day before September 11th.

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Flexible by Design/Nimble by Necessity At a job interview, the prospective candidate gets just one chance for a lasting, positive, first impression.

By Loy’s reckoning, the Coast Guard’s account of itself on September 11 was “enormously positive.” The flexible, adaptable, and nimble nature of the organization was put on full display for all to see, with high marks given on a day in which there were no shortages of real heroes in all walks of life. More importantly, he maintains that Coast Guard response and redirection of assets and missions occurred, not in a matter of days or weeks, but immediately. Nowhere was this more apparent than in the high profile security patrols being performed at such places as nuclear plants and/ or industrial waterfront scenarios. In the days following the attacks, priorities were continually evaluated, and assets were redirected as necessary. The discontinuation of a waterborne patrol of a nuclear plant, when it became apparent that the local contractor had finally been able to surge and fill the breach, was all it took to threaten the “comfort zone of the general public.”

This type of scenario, notably prominent at a Hudson River nuclear facility, began to play itself out nationwide. Suddenly, the multi-missioned capabilities of the Coast Guard took on a new, and somewhat unaccustomed face: High Profile.

Buried sometimes in the layers of bureaucracy known as the Department of Transportation, the First Quarter 2002

Admiral James M. Loy

Indeed, on the 10th of September, approximately 18% of the Coast Guard’s efforts and budget were being spent on drug interdiction, another 17% on fisheries related activities, and a similar focus of attention directed in another five or six directions. In the space of thirty minutes on the morning of the terrorist attacks, however, Loy ordered what he describes as “an immediate left turn for the entire Coast Guard into a focus on port security.” The simple reason that it was able to carry this out generally as planned is a direct reflection of the multi-missioned platforms (ships, planes, and people) utilized on a daily basis in the myriads of tasks performed for the many facets of government, which Loy describes as “their customers.”

The long answer as to why the Coast Guard was able to surge and change direction to suit the needs of the nation on that day is part and parcel of why, finally, it is uniquely positioned to emerge from the shadows of the nation’s better known armed services, and take its place as the key linchpin to U.S. security for the foreseeable future.

quiet, subtle structure of the Coast Guard turns out to be one of its greatest strengths. Taking advantage of Secretary of Transportation Norman Mineta’s unique authority, the call-up of approximately 2,800 personnel, primarily in the form of port security forces, was virtually instantaneous, and underscored the nimble tools available to Loy during the nation’s worst crisis since Pearl Harbor. Typically, this action is undertaken in response to disasters, such as hurricanes and floods.

Not surprisingly then, the recall of approximately 30% of the Coast Guard’s total reserve pool came without fanfare, and with very little in the way of press coverage. The stark contrast between the options available to the Coast Guard, and those dictated for the other four uniformed services constrained by DOD and Presidential approval handicaps, is telling. Call-up of necessary personnel by the latter organizations was, by comparison, slow and certainly inadequate for the needs of the initial “panic” surge.

In the days and weeks that followed September 11, hard decisions - some of which involved daily changes in priorities - had to be made. The complete shift of virtually all fishery assets and at least 75% of anti-drug efforts into the port security domain had provided meaningful port security, and, just as importantly, a heightened public confidence that the job was getting done. The need to return and fill the voids left in the other missions of national security, however, was only too obvious. Loy correctly points out that the documented connections between drug money and criminal cartels ultimately has led to the funding of many terrorist activities, not the least of which was, and is, Osama Bin Laden. In essence then, the need to keep up and even to increase the pressure on the anti-drug mission is merely one aspect of, and a crucial part of, homeland security.

You can’t have one without the other. The hard truth of the matter is that if the resources to carry out both tasks on September 11 did not exist then, it is all but certain that this also is the case as the new calendar year kicks into high gear.

If the picture as to how to best protect America and Americans from the greatest dangers of the 21st century got a little clearer in the days and weeks which followed September 11th, then the crucial role(s) played by the Coast Guard, as well as what allowed them to do so within this structure, also took on new form and meaning. How well the Congress and the Executive branch understand these realities remains an unanswered question.

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Education: Define the Threat/ Understand the Danger The total destruction of perhaps the two most prominent symbols of American prosperity, coupled with an attack at the very heart of the U.S. defense machine, was dramatic and certainly planned by the terrorists to be just that. While the effects of both calamities will be felt here at home for many years to come, these events pale in comparison to what could have been. Imagine for a moment the downstream effect of the detonation of a loaded oil tanker proceeding on the Houston Ship Channel, only hundreds of feet from one of the largest petro-refining complexes in the world. In the blink of an eye, the ship channel is closed, seven large refineries are destroyed and/or idled, and the very economic underpinnings of the country are suddenly in upheaval.

Loy points to the “95,000 miles of US coastline, 3.5 million square miles of exclusive economic zones, and 361 ports” which foster the import and export of 95% of America’s transport commerce. Beyond the petroleum and refining industries, it is also estimated that 11 million containers cross the docks every year through America’s ports. The discovery of a potential terrorist in a sealed container in Italy, bound for North America, underscores the potential for any number of self-contained threats to enter the country at any time, virtually undetected.

The enormity of deciding which containers to open and inspect is simply staggering. To try to open every one would literally bring the nation’s business to its knees. It simply is not possible, Loy maintains, to effectively protect every inch of this territory with the resources available to the Coast Guard today. Yet, the task of protecting America’s ports and waterways will be a key, if not the most important key to the new war on terror, and the cause of Homeland Defense.

Loy insists that if one lesson should have been learned from September 11, it was that America tends to be too focused on “Consequence Management”, as opposed to fighting the root of the problem before it occurs. He uses FEMA as a prime example of a terrific organization which does not prevent or even respond to a crisis, but, rather, is in the business of “consequence management” in a particular situation. A fundamental change in the way America goes about the business of protecting its infrastructure and people has to come about, he says. A great deal more attention has to be spent finding out what’s coming, as opposed to reacting to it once it’s here. Loy advises that this effort actually 34

began about a year ago, with support growing from within the National Security Council. “A risk based decision process” is the key, he advises, stemming from the pool of data and intelligence coming from a wide range of sources from within the Federal government.

In terms of the maritime threat to U.S. security, Loy aims to position the Coast Guard as the lead force within this new collaborative effort. His justification for such a plan structure makes a great deal of sense.

Getting Specific: New Tasks and New Tools A new world and a new war require new thinking.

As a direct consequence of the September 11 attacks, the Commandant outlined the Coast Guard’s “five new goals to be undertaken as an organization.” It is around these goals and tasks that Loy hopes to position the new Coast Guard as the logical and best choice to contain and defeat the new threat. To his way of thinking, the Coast Guard now has five new priorities: Public Confidence: Instilling a sense of confidence in the American public that the Coast Guard “has its act together and is leading a collaborative effort of many, many players raising the security profile of our ports and waterways.”

Control of the movement of high-risk vessels, as identified by USCG data and intelligence sources, and determination of the potential risk of that vessel becoming a target and/or a weapon. Loy draws parallels between the use of commercial jetliners as weapons on September 11.

Presence: Increase in visibility of Coast Guard personnel, assets, and activity of the ports and waterways of the nation. This task, Loy insists, is enormously important, both “for its deterrence value and response capabilities.” He adds, “This is all about boats, head count, crews, and training.”

Critical Infrastructure: Protection of Coast Guard assets, personnel, and prioritization of the importance and risks to other commercial and public property, with particular focus on those crucial aspects of the national transportation system. The process, for example, involves initial surge of Coast Guard protection for a commercial industrial plant, then determining who is actually responsible for providing protection, and ensuring that the required contractor is brought into play (and up to speed), before departing for the next crisis or emergency.

Outreach to Other Participants: Loy is candid and unapologetic when he explains that “the Coast Guard The Maritime Executive

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cannot be expected, and never will be able to do all the port security necessary to protect the ports and waterways of America.” He goes on to explain that “We are very dependent on the collaborative efforts of others.”

This collaborative effort extends to the state and private levels, but is primarily comprised of 25 different Federal agencies, notably the Department of Defense, U.S. Customs, INS, the U.S. Naval Command. He continues to insist that “We need to be the collaborative leader with regard to ensuring the maritime security of the nation.”

Innovation and new ideas will be critical components as the battle unfolds, and the new Homeland Defense structure takes shape. No one, perhaps, is more aware of this than the Commandant, who admits to “leaving his individual Captains of the Ports to stew in their own juices for the first couple of weeks.” The premise for this tactic was that bright young Captains and Commanders, if left to their own devices, would yield some pretty good ideas. In fact, Loy reports, they have done just that. The inception of the fledgling Sea Marshall Program is a direct outgrowth of this type of thinking.

Elsewhere, the status of the Coast Guard’s six Port Security Units (PSU) as reserve forces, in the wake of September 11, is now being reconsidered. It is likely that some or all of these units will now become part of the active duty Coast Guard, in no small part due to their smooth and lightning fast deployment during the initial stages of the crisis. The potential to increase the number of these individual units, each comprised of 120 men and their equipment, is also on the table. Most accounts of the PSU sent to Boston indicated high marks for that crew, whose men and equipment were on the ground and in the water within twenty-four hours of receiving the orders to deploy. Loy reported that four others were sent to San Diego, New York, Puget Sound, and the Persian Gulf. A sixth unit was reportedly just returning from deployment overseas.

These high profile, and apparently well-coordinated groups, appear to be slated for an integral role in the Coast Guard’s future overall response plans, and within the USCG Maritime Safety and Security Teams. Loy eventually hopes to have a total of 8 to 12 of these teams, which, when not on crisis deployments, could be performing other duties such as port vulnerability assessments, or perhaps act as Sea Marshals, Current SOP for these PSU’s is for them to be up and running, anywhere in the world, within 96 hours of receipt of deployment orders.

Out west, the Sea Marshall program is up and running in San Francisco. Pilot boats, carrying primarily Petty Officer reservists, meet “high interest” vessels at the Sea Buoy, with the purpose of checking cargo manifests, verifying the accuracy of crew lists, and a host of other documentation concerns. The pre-arrival notifications given by arriving merchant ships provide the basis for the beginnings of a risk assessment for each arriving vessel.

Each vessel’s “intelligence profile” will dictate the level of USCG personnel necessary, and the actions required by that group as they board. This can and does take the form of armed boarding parties, deployed in such key on-board spaces as the steering gear, engine room, bridge, and cargo control room for the entirety of the vessel’s inbound voyage. The Sea Marshall plan has the added advantage of precluding the need for the expense generated by patrol boat escorts in certain situations, but Loy cautions “there may be instances where we deem it necessary to employ both.” Along these lines, Loy insists that this decision process depends on the “differentiation of each vessel as a potential target or weapon”.

Improved intelligence, obviously, will be a key facet of this new program. Pre-arrival notifications from all vessels are now required at 96 hours, up from the pre-September 11th 24-hour requirement. The increased time frame now available to Coast Guard personnel will help to provide better risk assessments, and, hopefully, save money by deploying assets only where they will do the most good. Both are worthy goals.

Finally, Loy draws direct parallels to the “rogue airliners” which served as the weapon platforms for the terrorists on September 11, and correctly points out that the same potential exists for a vessel hijacked at 35

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sea. As a minimum, the verification of the Ship’s Master to be exactly who he says he is will be the first step in preventing this sort of thing from becoming a reality on the waterfront.

Without a doubt, the key component of Loy’s effort to reinvent the Coast Guard is the Deepwater Program, whereby the replacement and elimination of the “block obsolescence” of its deepwater assets has been proposed. More than just a replacement of aging equipment, this endeavor involves the “system integration” of shore based assets, ships, and airborne equipment into a cohesive, more versatile unit. Beyond this effort, the concept of hull “modularity”, whereby the Coast Guard, U.S. Navy, and, potentially, foreign buyers, could use a single platform design which can be modified for different missions, provides the potential for huge cost savings in downstream ship building costs. The integrated platform, while obviously serving the US Coast Guard’s multi-missioned agenda, also provides huge economies of scale for the ship builder and the taxpayers that pay the bills.

The New Partnership: Collation / Collaboration / Cooperation The key word is partnership, and Loy cautions those who would sit back on their hands and wait for the cavalry to arrive that, “This is an all hands evolution.” Having said that, the Coast Guard is well underway in its efforts to pool information and intelligence from a wide range of sources. From U.S. Customs comes a wealth of data on cargo; from INS the ability to track people and personnel, and, from the Coast Guard itself, arguably the most complete and sophisticated database on vehicles and waterborne platforms available in the world today. The (better) pooling of this combined information will be at the heart of present and future efforts to safeguard the nation’s water36

ways. A physical manifestation of this new cooperation showed itself immediately in the days following September 11. Loy describes the arrangement of his Intelligence Coordination Center, sitting side by side with their Naval Intelligence counterparts in Washington, but separated by a physical bulkhead.

Today, he deadpans, “That bulkhead no longer exists.”

There is a necessary role for those at the state and local levels, and, perhaps, more importantly, the private sector. Indeed, the history of waterfront development in these United States, dating back 250 years, is not one of Federal land and money. The greater majority of these terminals and facilities were built using private resources, sometimes on municipal lands. Hence, the structure of these industries today almost totally involves private or port authority ownership. Loy advises that current SOP will call on these operators, who stand to make a profit from their own endeavors, to design, resource, and exercise their own security systems and plans. The responsibility of periodic oversight will remain with the Coast Guard, which will ensure that private and municipal security is adequate, and, where it is not, stepping into the breach until it is.

A House in Order?

The Coast Guard Looks Inward As Jim Loy works to form and build the right Coast Guard, capable of answering the call for duty in a post-September 11 world, it’s only fair to ask him whether the pre-September 11 Coast Guard was succeeding in its own right. A somewhat harsh and critical article published in the Wall Street Journal on November 23 illuminated a number of documented weaknesses and recent failures, but also hinted at the prime underlying root cause of these maladies: lack of funding and inexperience on the part of USCG personnel. A follow-up call to Loy’s press aide elicited the response that, while the article was generally factual in nature, it also served to show how the compilation and discussion of a small number of casualties and miscues, to the exclusion of a host of other successes, in this case obscured an otherwise solid record, and was not an accurate portrayal of today’s Coast Guard. However, the piece also illustrated the difficulties faced by an underfunded organization tasked with any number of duties which is also expected to perform flawlessly while doing so.

In the context of national security concerns, it was recently reported and alleged that upwards of 1,000 Panamanian officers licenses had been obtained fraudThe Maritime Executive

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Matching Funding to the Increased Role Loy wisely chooses his words carefully when asked direct questions regarding funding for the new mission.

He prefaces all discussions regarding future funding with real praise for those who approved the previous First Quarter 2002

Secretary Norman Mineta talks with Admiral James M. Loy, Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard.

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ulently. As such, the question as to whether the identities and qualifications of those personnel as a group (or any other flag of convenience) could be entirely trusted, and whether or not this constitutes a security threat, has not yet been entirely satisfied. As the main clearinghouse and provider of the oversight function for seamen’s documentation in this country, the Coast Guard would naturally be concerned over this development. However, early last year, the failure of the U.S. Coast Guard’s own licensing and documentation mechanism was also put on display for all to see, and only recently have the final investigations and recommendations put to rest any fears that the U.S. part of equation could also pose a security threat.

Admiral Loy is adamant in his position that this aspect of the Coast Guard mission is tight, and being watched very closely. As the MAREX went to press, it was disclosed that more than two-thirds of 650 suspicious licenses issued from its San Juan offices had been either confiscated or validated. The balance of these documents were being vigorously pursued, and indictments against two individuals in Puerto Rico with regard to a fraud scheme involving sales of phony merchant mariner documents had been handed down.

Looking forward, Admiral Loy’s focus, time and time again, is drawn back to the notion that if there is one weakness which can be improved upon, both inside the Coast Guard and throughout the entire Homeland Security effort, then this is directly related to “insufficient awareness of people.” This extends, Loy contends, to front line Coast Guard personnel, terrorists, and marine license candidates alike. The list is endless.

If Pacific commander Vice Admiral Riutta’s assessment (of personnel readiness) that “The status quo is unsafe” is true, then one need to look no farther to understand this than the reality that the Coast Guard performs all of its functions while guarding 95,000 miles of coast line, while using a force smaller than the New York City police department. Yes, the long hours demanded of a shorthanded and, sometimes, inexperienced force can take its toll. As the task of securing adequate funding for the new mission looms in the window, Admiral Loy works tirelessly to ensure that those controlling the purse strings will sit up and take notice.

budget. “We are in a very transitional process with regard to that. We got certainly got adequate money at the tail end of FY-01, between the 11th of September and the 30th. An upsurge in money was made available to pay the reservists who were brought up on active duty, as well as longer hours and greater fuel costs.” In the initial stages of the crisis, in fact, he maintains that “we were cared for very well.” He concedes that these stopgap measures will ultimately not be enough, and it is his responsibility to actively lobby the Secretary of Transportation, the OMB, Congress, and the President to fund the new maritime security mission, as well as the Coast Guard’s subset within that mission.

Currently, 2,200 of the original 2,800 reservists who were called up are still on active duty - and this is an ongoing bill, which has to be considered and paid. The real challenge, says Loy, “is to gain the active duty growth through the budget process, to allow the reservists to go back to their private lives, and resume their roles as poised, surge capability.” At this time, those reservists represent the “new normal,” a Loy calls it. Hence, dealing with the realities of the post 9/11 world involves, without question, more resources. Loy advises that the new budget process is all about “head count, patrol boats, and whatever else is necessary to accomplish the new mission.” Putting a quantitative number on this requirement is problematic, especially when the new maritime security bill still contains unanswered questions. In general terms, Loy argues, the new budget “must reflect the difference in what we were dedicating to port security on the 10th (September), and what has become the new normalcy.” In the meantime, the administration has provided

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an additional 203 million dollars to the Coast Guard for the next six months.

Getting the needed funds will require getting the attention of those who decide who gets the money. To this end, Loy has personally briefed Governor Ridge on two occasions, and, immediately following our interview, planned for visits to the Pentagon, the Joint Forces Command in Norfolk, and, finally, hopefully armed with the approval of these two entities a meeting with Secretary Mineta, and with Governor Ridge again. Loy goes on to explain that the documentation of recent Presidential Decisions includes: (1.) the new organizational structure of the Homeland Defense plan, and (2.) the Establishment of the Terrorist Tracking Task Force. These edicts were followed with a virtual order from the President to OMB to provide funding. It is Loy’s goal to make Homeland Security directive number 3 the creation of a Maritime Security plan, complete with the same Presidential notations and provisos for funding. It all sounds good, but Loy also knows that there is a tremendous amount of work to be done before that becomes a reality.

A Changing of the Guard: New Heroes Step Up to the Plate…

If Ronald Reagan is the undisputed “great communicator” of American Presidents, then Admiral James M. Loy will probably be remembered as the guy who, for many, took the mystery out of the Coast Guard, and flipped the switch to illuminate the inequities of performing the perhaps the toughest mission assigned to any of the five uniformed services, without the benefit of adequate funding or well deserved fanfare.

However, with his mandatory retirement lurking just around the corner, and the Change of Command ceremony scheduled for May 30th of this year, time is indeed running short. For his part, however, Loy is confident that the next wave of leadership for the Coast Guard is up to the task, and he is fully cognizant of the need to continually sell the importance of the mission to the general public and to those in charge of dispensing the funds to make it happen. In this regard, Loy will be an exceedingly tough act to follow.

The Commandant was asked to look back at the initial phases of the 9/11 crisis, and, without downplaying the role of the Coast Guard team as a whole, to pick out a few areas where individual efforts showed the Coast Guard in its best light. The role of Captain Larry Hereth and his command team in San Francisco was immediately singled out for bringing to fruition the idea and

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execution of the Sea Marshall Program. This particular event, says Loy, provided an efficient and effective solution to the problem as to how best to control high-risk vessels entering the port of San Francisco; efficient by saving money through elimination of the need for patrol boat escorts in some cases, and effective by allowing the complete control of certain ships through the boarding process. Also mentioned was collaborative effort of Admiral George Naccara in the port of Boston, who fostered the “enormously difficult task of navigating the political turmoil involved with restoring local confidence in the ability of Coast Guard personnel to adequately assure the protection of LNG ships in the New England area.” This, by all accounts, was no small effort, especially in light of the absolute requirement for adequate LNG supplies dictated by the Department of Energy for New England in the oncoming winter months. No less impressive was the coordination by USCG VTS personnel in New York, in conjunction with a largely commercial and private sector effort, in the evacuation of upwards of one million people via water on September 11.

A mere three blocks from Ground Zero in New York City stands Trinity Church, and, within the graveyard there, sits the final resting place of Alexander Hamilton, who, of course, is considered the founding father of today’s US Coast Guard. As the magnitude of the destruction unfolded at the World Trade Centers on September 11, this small and sometimes overlooked monument was inundated by the trash, smoke, and debris that billowed outwards in all directions. As the people of America witnessed the changing of their lives forever, a small detail of Coast Guard enlisted personnel quietly descended on the graveyard, and began to methodically clean, scrub, and restore the headstone and surrounding areas. The six-hour effort, eventually assisted by others working at Ground Zero, resulted in a gleaming jewel in an area that was otherwise scarred by debris, dust, and destruction. As his tenure as Commandant comes to a close, Loy draws parallels to the enduring efforts of the US Coast Guard, as well as hope for the future of the service in the words inscribed on the tomb, now clearly visible again for all to see: The Patriot of incorruptible Integrity The Soldier of Approved Valor The Statesman of Consummate Wisdom Whose Talents and Virtues will be admired Long after this Marble shall have -MarEx mouldered into dust.

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MX: Sir, congratulations on your recent appointment

to Administrator of the Maritime Administration. What role do you see MARAD playing in the important governmental task of maritime security?

Capt. Schubert: Thank you. It is an honor to be called to serve our president and nation during these challenging times. Secretary Mineta has highlighted the critical need to ensure the security of our maritime transportation system as a priority of our nation’s homeland security and larger battle against terrorism.

The Maritime Administration (MARAD) is the advocacy agency within the federal government for the U.S. maritime industry. As such, MARAD’s primary role will be to represent the interests of labor and industry in developing enhanced port and maritime security. Depending on the outcome of legislative initiatives, MARAD may also play a key role in providing training and funding for port security.

I would like to take this opportunity to also mention that MARAD is currently exploring the possibility of offering opportunities to the graduating midshipmen at the United State Merchant Marine Academy and state maritime academies within the newly created Transportation Security Administration or TSA. The TSA is not only tasked with providing security and protection to our airline industry, but also for our nation’s entire intermodal transportation network. As such, the TSA will require significant manpower resources that specialize in maritime and intermodal transportation, and who have a familiarity with port operations. I sincerely believe that a secondary mission of Kings Point and the state schools could be to provide the necessary manpower resources from the graduates who may be unable to find permanent employment at sea to fulfill their commitment.

In addition to building the Transportation Security Agency, an agency larger that the FBI, DEA and Border First Quarter 2002

Captain William Schubert

Interview with Captain William Schubert, Administrator The Maritime Administration (MARAD)

Patrol combined, Secretary Mineta created the National Infrastructure Security Committee (NISC) just days after September 11. The Maritime Administrator officially represents MARAD on the NISC, which serves as an internal working group within the DOT. It is charged with focusing on intermodal security issues, ensuring coordination of the Department’s security work across all the modes, and developing responses to meet the challenges of the new security environment. Within the NISC, Direct Action Groups, such as the Maritime Direct Action Group (M-DAG), have formed in order to look at specific modes of transportation. We have met with industry experts and stakeholders in order to make recommendations for action on legislative, regulatory, and diplomatic initiatives.

MX: Desert Storm demonstrated to our nation that we were not prepared to quickly respond with our Ready Reserve Fleet, as a few ships had to be towed to the Middle East and some ships were crewed by mariners in their sixties. Again, this nation has been called to arms. The state of the U.S. Merchant Marine is appalling. Do you support rebuilding of the professional mariner ranks and the U.S. merchant fleets?

Capt. Schubert: The Ready Reserve Force, or RRF, is significantly more ready now than it was before Operation Desert Shield. The Maritime Administration (MARAD) has significantly improved the material condition of the RRF through the use of regularly 39

Captain William Schubert

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scheduled, full-power sea trials tied to vessel regulatory or safety renewals, increased maintenance funding, and placement of reduced operating status (ROS) crews aboard high-priority ships (assigned 4 or 5 day readiness). These improvements to overall RRF readiness cannot be fully realized without an adequate supply of qualified merchant mariners available to crew these sealift assets.

Maintaining an adequate supply of trained, qualified mariners, supported by a viable U.S.-flag commercial industry, is one of MARAD’s primary readiness challenges. We are working with the various maritime academies, the Coast Guard, the Navy, the U.S. Transportation Command, and the Military Sealift Command to ensure an adequate supply of qualified mariners in the future, especially after the Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping 1995 (STCW95) requirements become effective later this year. As we support the longstanding professionalism of both merchant marine officers and unlicensed U.S. mariners, MARAD will continue to work with industry representatives to identify and implement measures that will expand and improve the U.S. merchant fleet and the Nation’s merchant mariner workforce. .

MX: The war against terrorism will undoubtedly expand from its concentration in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Has the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement been invoked in our current conflict? Has the government notified members of VISA that, should the war continue, their ships will be called into the program?

Capt. Schubert: The VISA program has not yet been activated, but MARAD and U.S. Transportation Command remain on alert and in contact with the program’s participants on sealift operations in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11.

MX: It has been said that because our nation currently supports U.S. Flag operators via the Jones Act, immediate threats to the maritime environment were avoided.

Do you support the continuation of the Jones Act? Capt. Schubert: The President has publicly stated that the Jones Act should be maintained, and I enthusiastically support the President’s position on this issue.

Like domestic rail and truck carriers, domestic vessel operators incur “U.S. costs” to operate under the same legal structure affecting tax, labor, immigration and naturalization, and the protection of public safety and the environment — as do all other American businesses. Many foreign-flag carriers can operate at lower cost than US-flag shipping companies in foreign trade,

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because the former can operate under lower international safety and wage standards, and reduced or negligible tax burdens. However, if foreign-based shipping companies seeking to do business in the United States were required to comply with the same laws as American companies, then the cost differential between U.S. and foreign waterborne carriage would likely disappear. This is true for all domestic modes of transportation — air, rail, truck, pipeline, or water. Moreover, most major maritime countries maintain some form of cabotage policies.

MX: With the advent of the “Sea-Marshal” or “ShipRider” program, there will be a demand for trained personnel. The 2001 Mariner Survey, performed by DOT, states that there are approximately 104,000 qualified merchant mariners who could serve on ocean going vessels. First, do you believe that there really are that many qualified mariners? Secondly, do you think that professional mariners, whether active or inactive, should be offered the first opportunity to fill sea-marshal positions?

Capt. Schubert: In the coming months, the Maritime Administration will be initiating a more comprehensive study to determine the effects of STCW implementation and acquire more detailed information on the availability of qualified seamen. From this study, MARAD will initiate any new policies that may be required to ensure that sufficient mariners are able to crew both commercial and reserve vessels in times of war or national emergency. I believe that licensed mariners, whether active or inactive, would be excellent candidates to fill sea-marshal positions. I have recently held discussions with The Commandant of the USCG to discuss this issue and to offer assistance in recruiting qualified mariners for the Sea Marshall program. In addition, we are also studying the possibility of offering opportunities to the graduating midshipmen at the United State Merchant Marine Academy and state maritime academies within the newly created Transporta-tion Security Administration or TSA. It is anticipated that the TSA will require significant manpower with a “working” familiarity of the maritime industry.

MX: Senator Bob Graham sponsored S 1214, which appropriates $5.5 million in 2002 and $27.5 million over the funding cycle of the bill. Members of the legislature have continually mentioned the Merchant Marine Academy at Kings Point, even though there are numerous professional mariner-training centers around the country that are already capable of ramping up and producing personnel within six months. Shouldn’t these The Maritime Executive

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Captain William Schubert

funds be directed towards professional training centers?

Capt. Schubert: The current version of S. 1214 would require the Secretary of Transportation to develop a curriculum to allow for the training and certification of maritime security professionals. In developing the curriculum, the Secretary is authorized to consult with a number of entities that have maritime security expertise. The Global Maritime and Transportation School (GMATS) at the United States Merchant Marine Academy is one of the entities the Secretary is authorized to consult.

GMATS is a separate institution from the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy, but is located on the grounds of the Academy. The School offers leading edge education and training programs that benefit professionals from the maritime and transportation industry as well as military and government professionals. As a non-appropriated fund instrumentality of the Maritime Administration, GMATS is a self-sustaining institution that operates without any of the funds appropriated to the Maritime Administration. Because of the high quality of programs offered at GMATS, both the private sector and the government, including the Army and the Navy, regularly contract with GMATS to provide their maritime and transportation training needs.

In your question you note, “There are a number of professional mariner-related training centers located around the country.” The training referenced in S 1214 is not training for mariners, but training for security professionals, law enforcement officials, and other personnel connected with the intermodal movement of goods and people. The Global Maritime and Transportation School at USMMA is the Department of Transportation’s resource for this type of training.

The School has a long history of providing maritime security training and presently enjoys close working relationships with industry groups and associations connected with maritime security.

In fact, various groups in the transportation industry have expressed great interest in utilizing GMATS to augment current maritime security training programs in order to meet the requirements set forth in S 1214.

Since GMATS is already an established school that offers instruction in maritime security, there are minimal requirements for the School to increase its resources for the purpose of maritime security training. The School already enjoys a close working relationship with the Maritime Administration, the new Transportation Security Administration, and the Department of

Transportation. For these reasons, I believe the Secretary’s authority, under S. 1214, to consult with GMATS should not be diminished in any way. Furthermore, I strongly believe that it is critical to ensure that the maritime security trainees receive appropriate instruction in maritime operations, and that there is no better institution than GMATS to provide this training.

MX: It is said that U.S. Flag vessels need less scrutiny than do foreign flag operators. The Coast Guard maintains a matrix that designates “high risk” vessels. Are there certain types of ships transporting certain cargoes, no matter what the flag, that should be boarded and/or have their hulls scanned?

Capt. Schubert: US-flag vessels are required to meet USCG standards which are higher than typical world standards, and the USCG keeps extensive records on US-flag vessels. US-flag vessels also have US citizen crews and officers licensed by the USCG who also meet high education and training standards. Further, many of them have been or are members of the US Navy Reserve. Patriotism in the US merchant marine is very high. The Department of Transportation, working in concert with other US government agencies, maintains an extensive intelligence network. The USCG and US Customs certainly keep a very close eye on some specific cargoes and vessels which might be targets, regardless of flag.

MX: Looking at the complexity of maritime security, which requires securing of all ports, petroleum tankers, container ships, cruise lines, and the integrated intermodal system, is it realistic to manage and secure our 631 ports, 95,000 miles of coastline, over 1,000 harbor channels, 25,000 miles of inland and intercoastal waterways, and more than 3,700 terminals that handle passengers and cargo?

Capt. Schubert: I agree that the task of addressing the marine and landside aspects of maritime security is a very complex undertaking. However, the American people will demand no less than safe and secure borders which includes our ports and intercoastal waterways. In the post 9/11 environment, there has been unprecedented cooperation among the federal agencies to solve this complex problem.

I sincerely believe that the Administration’s highly coordinated government approach will eventually succeed in providing security throughout our marine transportation system.

-MarEx

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The Maritime Institute of Technology Pacific Maritime Institute

>A Tradition of Leadership:

“ There is nothing that training cannot do. Nothing is above its reach or below it. It can turn bad morals to good, good morals to bad; it can destroy principles, it can recreate them; it can debase angels to men and lift men to angels. And it can do any of these miracles in a year –

”

even six months.

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– Mark Twain

The Maritime Executive

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& Graduate Studies/

I L L U S T R A T I O N : E v an N aylo r

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P h otog r ap h y: L i sa M asson and L ee kl i ma

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MITAGS / PMI

The September 11 tragedy has government agencies scrambling to meet the new national security challenge. MITAGS responded immediately by ramping up its small arms, chemical biological, and anti-terrorism training for professional mariners, and by offering its resources to the Maritime Administration and U.S. Coast Guard.

Paine told us that MITAGS has the infrastructure in place to immediately train mariners into sea-marshals. It’s a frightening new world out there, but, once again, MITAGS is ready to lead the way.

A History of Excellence In the late 1960’s, the sole regulatory requirement for mariner continuing education consisted of a radar skills refresher course. During this same period, the industry was experiencing (and continues today) major changes such as containerization and other new technologies.

Although the mariners had the appropriate USCG license, they might not have all of the necessary skills to operate the capital-intensive vessels.

To meet that challenge, The Master, Mates and Pilots (MM&P) and its contracted ship operating companies established a non-profit trust fund called MATES (which stands for ‘Maritime Advancement Training, Education & Safety). Its charter required consensus between the company and union trustees for all major policy decisions, and would not be a place for “politicking.” Its sole agenda would be the advancement of professional mariners and the maritime industry.

To ensure the success of its mission, the companies agreed to pay a small contribution for each “man-day” of work by seafarers they employ directly into this Trust Fund. In exchange, eligible seafarers were able to take company required training at no charge. The companies were also able to rationalize their training costs. No matter how many programs their seafarers took, the man-day contribution remained the same. The true worth of this concept has been highlighted by the STCW-95 requirements – eligible seafarers have been able to obtain all of their training, without the employer incurring additional charges.

The MATES Program went on to establish the Maritime Institute of Technology and Graduate Studies (MITAGS) on February 8th, 1972. Soon afterwards, the program acquired the Maritime Administration’s radar school in the Pacific Northwest (now known as the 44

Pacific Maritime Institute or PMI). MITAGS has grown until it now includes 300,000 square feet of facilities, eight simulators, a full service hotel, eighty acres strategically located near the Baltimore /Washington International Airport (BWI), and a subsidiary location in Seattle, Washington.

In the late seventies and early eighties, the shipping industry was going through a major transition, as ship-owners became ship-managers, and the traditional company support for training declined. This dramatic reversal of the time honored practice of mentoring new officers would eventually lead the world community to adopt a much more stringent training regime. We know it today as the 1995 Amendments to the 1978 Standards of Training, Certification, and Watchkeeping Code (STCW-95).

While this trend caused other training organizations to shut down or dramatically reduce services, MITAGS continued to work with its trust companies, pilots, and other clients to develop training programs that would supplement what they had learned at sea. To maintain funding of these new programs without overly burdening the trust companies, MITAGS began to open up its facilities and programs to outside organizations. This allowed the Institute to maintain a level of service to its trust companies and eligible seafarers, without dramatically increasing the man-day contributions.

During this period, MITAGS pioneered the use of electronic simulation for practical assessment (long before STCW-95). It also instituted many new and innovative training programs in subjects areas such as The Maritime Executive

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medical, ship control systems for deck officers, license advancement, fire fighting, computers, shipboard management, and heavy weather avoidance. Whenever a new program was instituted, the school always asked whether the training is necessary, practical, and whether the lessons learned can be applied in the real world.

Leadership Is Action, Not Position.

Glen Paine came on the scene as Executive Director of the Institute at the first milestone in the implementation of the STCW-95 Code in August, 1998. Although MITAGS had been teaching similar programs, the Coast Guard was requiring schools to rewrite their curriculum to a new standard.

Rewriting its curriculum (129 programs) was a major undertaking, as much of the information was either in an instructor’s head or on documents scattered throughout the various departments. Paine used this opportunity to revise the curriculum, computerize it, and install it on campus-wide networks. As an added benefit, the network provided a much more efficient method of maintaining its quality standards system (QSS).

Paine was also dealing with a two-headed serpent.

He had to fulfill the commitment to revise the programs, and implement an ambitious plan to tackle over $7,000,000 in deferred capital replacement projects.

From plumbing to furniture, the infrastructure was in desperate need of attention.

Paine was also cognizant that he needed to generate the necessary cash for renovations, and that the trust companies were not in a position to bankroll the entire effort. Additional funding sources had to be found. He found them in the assets of the Institute itself. With 150,000 square feet of building space built specifically for adult education and training, a 232-room hotel, a 500-seat dining room, and eighty acres of land within five minutes of Baltimore Washington International Airport (BWI), the expansion of the conference center First Quarter 2002

was an obvious choice. He brought in Hotel with 232 rooms, experts to oversee the renovations and singles and or doubles, and amenities including weight to train the hotel staff for the conferroom, olympic size pool ence industry. and tennis courts The conference activities complemented the academic activities. It funded the majority of the infrastructure renovations, and allowed the Trust and tuition contributions to be focused on maritime training activities. The students also had the use of hotel and dining facilities that met the stringent standards of the International Association of Conference Centers.

Interestingly, MITAGS is now the largest, dedicated conference center in the Baltimore area, with over fifty thousand attendees each year.

Investing for Academic Excellence MITAGS develops its programs by following these principles: 1. Understand the needs of the companies and mariners.

Focus on cause, not the symptoms.

2. Develop a well reasoned curriculum based on achievable training objectives in the time allotted.

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MITAGS / PMI 3. Train your staff before they train others.

4. Apply the appropriate simulation tools (computer lab, part task, and full mission) to maximize learning and to ensure that assessments are both valid and reliable.

Paine acknowledged that, although steps were being followed, the school was falling behind in its investments in simulation technology. Both companies and students had come to expect the very best when taking courses at MITAGS. Paine directed various project teams to build on the replacement projects started by his predecessors and to determine the school future simulation needs. Over the next three years, equipment purchases for MITAGS/PMI included: 1. Blind pilotage simulators for ECDIS, AIS, VTS, ARPA, Portable Piloting Units, and Convoy Operations training using the Norcontrol Polaris® Ship Simulator 2. Computer labs to handle Transas® electronic charting, ABS-Safenet®, Oceans® weather satellite software, and local area network training and repair 3. Live Sailor® and Transas® GMDSS equipment 4. Automatic defibrillators (AED) for medical training 5. Conversion of classroom presentations to power-point 6. STN ATLAS ANS 5000® full mission, ship handling simulator including joystick controls, tractor, Azipod, water jets, ECDIS, integrated bridge, and underway replenishment training/research capabilities.

Full-Mission Ship Simulator

Top to bottom: ECDIS course, GMDSS, Survival at Sea training, Medical Person in Charge.

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The ship simulator project team recommended the STN ATLAS ANS 5000® to upgrade full-mission ship simulator #2. The system has advanced visual graphics and ship/port underwater topography modeling capabilities – all essential features for training state pilots, masters, and deck officers in shiphandling and bridge management training.

Additionally, the robust operating system is backed by a superb 95% up-time guarantee (another essential item when training groups with tight schedules).

The combination of the upgrade, coupled with the existing infrastructure, staff, and curriculum, was impressive. The one draw back was the cost. Even though MITAGS already had the building, bridge, and screen, the upgrade was estimated at a staggering $2,500,000. This was simply too much for MITAGS and Trust Companies to lift alone.

A partnership with other stakeholders would be needed to turn this into reality.

Paine began searching for grants and outside funding sources. With the assistance of the MM&P and the International Longshoremen’s Association (ILA), he was successful in securing a grant from the ITF Seafarers’ Trust based out of the United Kingdom. With this grant, Paine knew that he had a shot at building the finest simulator in the world.

Simultaneously, he sought additional industry partners. He knew that Polar Tankers, formerly ARCO Shipping, was in the process of building its state-of-the-art Millennium Tankers, which were featured in the ARCO edition of the Maritime Executive in 1997.

These tankers have some of the most technologically advanced bridge systems in the world, and would require a unique level of training over a long period of time.

The MITAGS team approached Polar Tankers and demonstrated the STN ATLAS ANS5000® ship simulator dynamic features. They concurred that the ANS5000 was the one of the best system they had ever seen in their many years of simulation training experience.

With Polar support, the upgrade became a reality. It is said that a business deal comes together when parties have complementary needs; the MATES Trust companies gained access to the latest in simulation technology, and Polar had a platform to replicate its Millennium class tanker Raytheon-Anshutz integrated bridge and Kamewa joystick systems.

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Raytheon-Anchutz® integrated bridge system with Kamewa® joystick steering on SHS #2.

Community Involvement Given the sheer enormity and fluidity of the STCW95 Code, companies and mariners would need substantial assistance in complying with the Code. Paine understood that MITAGS would have to commit substantial resources to assist in this effort.

The Global Maritime Distress Safety System (GMDSS) was an early example of the issues associated with the implementation of STCW-95 Code. Right from the beginning, MITAGS advocated meaningful GMDSS training curriculum standards. MITAGS understood that, in a distress situation, a mariner’s best opportunity for survival would be a complete hands-on knowledge of GMDSS procedures.

Another example was the recent FCC/USCG decision to adopt the same “question pool” for exams. This eliminated the somewhat bizarre situation in which the FCC answers contradict the ones developed by the USCG. MITAGS and other training institutions expertise helped make this happen.

MITAGS is also a charter member of the Ship Operators Cooperative Program (SOCP), a program that was initiated by the Maritime Administration (MARAD).

This organization works on various issues confronting the maritime industry. As SOCP operates without government funding, each member must commit to a substantial initiation fee and dues. The organization works on a wide range of topics, including STCW, ballast water 48

management, dry-docking, fuel oil analysis, and maritime security. In the fall of 2001, MITAGS was recognized for its active participation in the various working groups, including the SMART® Card working group that is receiving a great deal of attention these days.

Paine also saw the need to summarize and to condense the thousands of pages of STCW-95 directives issued by the Coast Guard. MITAGS developed monthly updates and checklists for students, companies, and trade organizations free of charge, to assist them in understanding the Code. MITAGS also volunteered to co-chair the STCW-95 Problem Solving Working Group. Established in May of 2001at the Mariners Recruitment and Retention Conference, the group seeks to resolve common problems related to the implementation of the Code. As part of this process, MITAGS provided a model to show industry how the methodology of training mariners for original / upgrade of licenses will change after February 1, 2002.

Another new service is a free license expiration notice service. Mariners taking courses at MITAGS provide the Registrar with up to ten dates they desire to track. The Registrar then sends a reminder six months prior to the document’s expiration.

New Partnerships for Success Along with the required STCW-95 curriculum, MITAGS works with its trust companies, state pilots The Maritime Executive

MI TAG S / PMI

associations, military organizations, and other clients in solving industry safety and operational issues. Each new program is carefully structured to meet the full expectations of all stakeholders. The following are some examples of custom programs that met specific company / industry sector needs.

After several highly publicized shipboard fires, Carnival Cruise Lines® wanted to develop a new approach to this type of training. They chose MITAGS because of its leadership in developing well-defined programs that meet company and regulatory agreements. The pilot programs included onboard training in fire control (Advanced Fire Fighting or AFF), and the development of a new Rapid Response Investigative Team (RRIT) to reach an incipient fire within two minutes of an alarm.

MITAGS was also tapped to provide the training for the historic partnership between the United States Coast Guard and the Louisiana State Pilotage Associations to operate the Vessel Traffic System on the Mississippi River. This innovative program included training and operation of VTS system, portable piloting units, automatic identification system, (AIS) and command and control procedures. Recently, MITAGS hosted an international seminar on this topic that included representation from most of the European pilotage organizations.

MITAGS also partnered with Patriot Holdings, MM&P, MEBA, and the Calhoun Engineering School to develop the military training programs needed for the Bob Hope Class LMSRs operated by Patriot for the Military Sealift Command (MSC) and the U.S. Army.

These ships required new skill sets at MITAGS in the areas of force protection, small arms, chemical and biological defense, military communications, and other programs. The lesson learned from these programs is First Quarter 2002

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now being offered to the industry as examples of what companies and mariners can do to better secure their assets against terrorist attacks.

As with any new program, MITAGS looked beyond the minimum requirements and sought to establish the model curriculum. MITAGS hired Jack Lynch, a retired U.S. Navy Seal, to set up and teach the small arms, force protection, and anti-terrorism courses. We had an opportunity to sit in on a class taught by Lynch and came away with a great appreciation of the necessary training it takes to defend oneself. We also sat down with Lynch to discuss many of his views on security, and that interview can be read in this edition of the Maritime Executive.

Another first was MITAGS gaining formal certification as meeting the U.S. Navy Standards in Instructional Management, Curriculum Management, Evaluation Management, and Student Management. The MITAGS Non-Traditional Training Site (NTTS) Certification means that the institute is an external source for U.S. Navy training. MITAGS’ certification success was attributable to a sound foundation already established through its rigorous adherence to U.S. Coast Guard and Det Norske Veritas standards.

MITAGS/PMI provides model curriculum for the deep sea, state pilots, cruise, military, and the near coastal industries. They also give back to the community through active participation in trade working groups.

The MATES Program is a model of what can be accomplished when industry stakeholders look past their parochial interests and work for the good of the maritime community.

Left: Kamewa® controls.

Right: SHS projection theater with 360 degree screen, 40 feet high, and 80 feet in diameter provides a highly accurate simulation of visual depth system.

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Interview with Jack Lynch, MITAGS instructor for Force Protection and Anti-Terrorism.

MX: As government officials move forward to provide homeland security for its citizens, what do you believe needs to be done to provide a safer environment for this country?

Lynch: I believe security across the board needs to be our common goal. We are all in this together; therefore, we must all take an active roll. Today, there are too many organizations doing the same thing without coordinating their efforts with other companies or government agencies. Homeland Defense is a shared responsibility, and it has a dual task. First, we must share security intelligence with law enforcement, and they should share their intelligence with our community and business leaders.

This will allow everyone to react in an expeditious and timely manner. Secondly, I would like to see our states mirror the federal efforts in terms of incorporating state level agencies, such as by creating an agency for StateHomeland Defense. Additionally, we should create the same types of agencies within our cities and our communities. Furthermore, we need to empower the people of this country to take an active roll. This will allow the whole system to work in harmony. In a recent speech by President Bush, he said, “My fellow Americans, it is everyone’s responsibility for this country’s security and defense- now, let’s work together and roll!”

MX: In December, the Senate passed “The Port and Maritime Security Act of 2001.” This legislation requires that each port in the nation perform a risk analysis and then secure each port based upon its vulnerability. Is it reasonable to suggest that our government will subsidize port authorities in order to secure the marine environment?

Lynch: I think that it is essential that teams who will analyze port vulnerability have both security and anti-terrorism experts. The experts should have maritime intervention experience. I’m not talking about pseudo-experts that have sat behind a desk for the last 20 years dictating 50

policy and managing personnel. The teams must have individuals that have operated in wartime or in areas of conflict. These experts need to think like terrorists and work through every possible scenario concerning force protection.

Port security will also require the utilization of all of our technological capabilities to eradicate the possibility of failure. There needs to be a good risk analysis and a good risk management plan. Remember, port security is only as good as the people who manage the system. These people with oversight must be constantly trained and fed information, because security is about information.

MX: The Coast Guard is reviewing cargo manifests, and is requiring 96-hour notification to review crew lists to identify known terrorists. The San Francisco Bar Pilots are boarding vessels with armed U.S. marshals. Do you think that the San Francisco plan is sufficient, and do you believe that all pilots should do the same?

Lynch: Being an ex-Navy Seal, I think it’s important to remember that when you put an individual in a situation of personal vulnerability that they should have the right to defend themselves. The Coast Guard and various ports will dictate what is and what is not a “high priority” vessel. For instance, if a liquid gas ship were The Maritime Executive

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Terrorists seek out soft-targets; make ships hard-targets, and give mariners some peace of mind. They know what they’re floating on. Terrorism is real; it’s not a joke. They kill and destroy things. Be vigilant. coming into port, that ship should be boarded far outside the port, and the people who board that vessel for inspection should be armed and ready for conflict, if the situation should arise. Arming air-marshals and sea-marshals is a good idea. The cost of armed presence is a lot less than the catastrophic consequences of an ignited LNG tanker in a highly populated area.

MX: The cruise line industry is an $18 billion a year industry and is responsible for employing over 275,000 Americans. The International Council of Cruise lines insists that its member liners have security plans in place that are examined each year by the Coast Guard. These plans state that, similar to airport passengers, cruise passengers are required to present identification, and that all luggage and carry-ons are x-rayed, hand searched, or searched by dogs. The cruise lines are now using metal detectors for embarking and disembarking. This part of the maritime industry seems to have its act together. Is there more that can be done?

Lynch: Let’s face it. No matter what level of security is in place, there remains a possibility that it can be breeched. I don’t want to come across as being negative, but we’re discussing the issues surrounding security.

Cruise ships are huge vessels that carry thousands of people. So, let’s address this issue in its full measure. A cruise line ship environment must be as tight as it can be. Therefore, those whose responsibility it is for oversight of security must be constantly trained. It’s crowd control in its simplest form. There needs to be security devices that can identify every individual onboard, and when a ship is in port everyone who comes near that ship needs to be identified. These are huge hotels that float. These ships need the highest level of security, and those who are responsible to providing security need to be trained for every scenario imaginable. From force protection to biological warfare, the training needs to be constant and consistent. A security failure on a cruise ship could devastate the industry. I cannot emphasize First Quarter 2002

this enough; train and train, and when you are done training, train some more.

MX: The United States is the largest consumer of petroleum in the world. We consume approximately 18 million barrels a day, and a barrel of oil is 42 gallons. So, as a nation, we consume approximate 756 million gallons of oil per day. Of our daily consumption, approximate 8 million barrels of oil per day is imported and arrives on ships. Because of the very nature of the cargo, should all tankers be hull scanned and stopped for inspection?

Lynch: Why should there be special rules for tankers?

Each and every ship that is considered to be a priority should be checked. There should be no gray area here. If you’re going to stop terrorism, then be diligent. There is no room for error here. If you perceive that there is a problem, then there is one. Terrorists seek out soft-targets; make ships hard-targets, and give mariners some peace of mind. They know what they’re floating on. If security around ships is tight, it’ll slow down commerce a bit, but once everyone knows his job and knows what is expected of him, things will begin to move again.

Terrorism is real; it’s not a joke. They kill and destroy things. Be vigilant.

-MarEx 51

GLEN PAINE

Executive Interview

Glen Paine, Executive Director: mitags/pmi 52

The Maritime Executive

GLEN PAINE

Executive Interview

MX: Since September 11, 2001 our government has instituted national security policies and has

charged the Coast Guard with the task of patrolling our ports, waterways, and coastlines. They have profound limitations in terms of manpower and funding. Does MITAGS have the infrastructure to immediately train sea-marshals and non-working, licensed seamen to assist in the Coast Guard’s security efforts?

Paine: For the last two years, MITAGS has been training mariners working for the Military Sealift Command (MSC) in small arms, chem/bio, and other security related training. Additionally, the federally funded “Community-Police Corps” is located on the campus. The Police Corps takes college graduates and turns them into law enforcement officers within 26 weeks.

Other clients include: the American Pilots’ Association (APA), Military Sealift Command (MSC), United States Coast Guard, marine firefighters, medical personnel, and the International Longshoremen’s Association (ILA). All of these organizations will play an essential role in marine transportation security. Should the Department of Transportation need additional “Sea Marshals,” MITAGS could start the training tomorrow.

MX: Chemical and biological warfare is a frightening weapon, because it cannot be seen nor heard. It is essentially a silent killer. MITAGS has been training MARAD seamen in chemical, biological and radiological defense for years. Does the institute have an open door policy that would allow corporations, port authorities’ personnel and various governmental agencies to be trained in chemical defense? Additionally, do you have the personnel to meet the demands of the open market?

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operating the Ready Reserve Fleet (RRF) vessels.

However, contractors operating vessels for the Military Sealift Command (MSC) must provide mariners with security training. This includes companies such as Patriot Holdings, Waterman, and others. As mentioned earlier we also support the Maryland Police Corps Program that takes college graduates and turns them into police officers over a 26-week period.

MX: The MITAGS slogan is “Leading the Way in Maritime Tradition and Technology.” Please can you elaborate on that statement?

Paine: The business of shipping has been around for a long time.

Although there have been tremendous advantages, we must not forget the many lessons about seamanship, duty, and character. Technology just provides data, not necessarily information.

A mariner un-schooled in traditional skills will undoubtedly over-rely on technology at the worst possible moment. Our history is filled with casualties that occurred due to a failure to adhere to lessons of the past.

Our partnerships with state pilot organizations are good examples of integrating new technology, such as portable piloting units and ship simulation to complement (not replace) the traditional pilot apprenticeship training. MITAGS works hard to ensure that industry understands the limitations, as well as the benefits, of new technology. Another example is our strong belief that instructors should have relevant “real-world” experience.

MX: MITAGS recently purchased a new operating system for your full-mission simulator. It’s an aggressive investment considering the plight of the merchant marine in this country. What did you have to do to get your trustees to envision its future value and to get them to “sign-off” on the purchase?

Paine: MITAGS has been in the continuing education business for almost thirty years. Sophisticated simulation is one of those tools that a program must include if it is going to challenge highly experienced masters, deck officers, and state pilots. However, we still have to make our case to the trustees. It was efficient use of the school assets and the cost-sharing partnership that made the upgrade possible.

“Originally, our small arms training programs were restricted to mariners working for companies contracted to the Military Sealift Command. After 9/11, the MITAGS has been accepting applications from companies with legitimate needs for this training. A good example would be companies that have made the decision to put small arms on their vessels; another would be state pilot associations that have requested training for their membership.”

Paine: MITAGS got into the chemical, biological defense training at the request of the Maritime Administration. The information is valid for both maritime and non-maritime sectors. MITAGS would consider any request for training from companies that have a legitimate concern about this subject.

MX: Jack Lynch is the institute’s expert in force protection, small arms, and anti-terrorism. Are seamen coming to the institute for work related training, who are interested in defense training, being allowed to take these additional courses?

Paine: Originally, our small arms training programs were restricted to mariners working for companies contracted to the Military Sealift Command. After 9/11, the MITAGS has been accepting applications from companies with legitimate needs for this training. A good example would be companies that have made the decision to put small arms on their vessels; another would be state pilot associations that have requested training for their membership.

MX: Beyond the MARAD contract that requires defense training to be taught to its seamen, are there any other agencies being trained by the institute for security, and, if not, are you actively informing the government of your capabilities?

Paine: Ironically, the Maritime Administration does not require security/anti-terrorism training for mariners 54

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A extensive study was performed prior to selecting the STN Atlas- ANS5000 operating system. What was the most significant component in the decision process that swayed your team of advisors to purchase this system?

Paine: The simulation selection process was a tremendous undertaking. Over one year of man-hours went into the research, proposal, design, and selection process. We had a rather complex matrix to assist our decision-making process.

However, STN Atlas’s willingness to meet our custom specifications, backed up with solid guarantees on performance, “uptime,” and delivery schedule, made them our final choice.

MX: The Seafarers’ Trust and Polar Tankers, which operate the Millennium Class tankers on the West Coast, were critical contributors in the purchase of the new simulator. Were there any others who made the purchase possible?

Paine: First and foremost were the company and union trustees that oversee the MATES Program. They include Captain Timothy Brown, Chairman, (MM&P), Mr. Edward Morgan, Secretary, (E-Ships), Captain Glen Banks, (MM&P), Captain Saunders Jones, (American Ship Management, LLC), Captain Donald Marcus, (MMP), Captain John Sullivan, (Matson Navigation Company), Captain Robert H. Groh, (MM&P), Mr. Dennis McCarthy, (CSX Lines), Captain Richard W. May, (MMP), Mr. William M. Cameron, (Waterman Steamship Corporation), Mr. Shawn T. Burke, (NAVIERAS-NPR), and Ms. Valerie Verrecchio, Plans Administrator.

Second were the MITAGS project team, staff, students, and companies that contributed greatly to this project.

This truly was a team effort!

MX: Reading through the materials on the ANS5000 system, there is much discussion concerning the operating program being able to play actual terrain and navigational environments realistically for training mariners in the ports and waterways in which they sail. Can the system be programmed for any operating environment, and is it very expensive to create that environment in the system?

Paine: The system can be programmed to represent almost any port in the world, and, yes, it is expensive to operate. However, one must look at training in context of the cost of casualties due to shiphandling, navigation, or bridge management errors. The real question is whether

GLEN PAINE

MX:

“The system can be programmed to represent almost any port in the world, and, yes, it is expensive to operate. However, one must look at training in context of the cost of casualties due to shiphandling, navigation, or bridge management errors. The real question is whether the industry can afford Not to do this type of training?”

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the industry can afford Not to do this type of training?

MX: With respect to providing ship handlers with a realistic audio and visual training experience, it brings to mind that there are others who could benefit from the STN Atlas system. Can tugboat operators, which push hundreds of barges at a time down the Mississippi, or in a tug-tanker escort mode, be taught on the system? Additionally, how about fast ferry operators or offshore supply boat companies which work around offshore oilrigs?

Paine: One of the reasons for the length of time to develop the simulator specifications was to ensure that it has the capability of handling existing and future technology that is being incorporated into maritime operations. The STN Atlas is fully capable of handling specialty training for fast ferries, tug and tow, push boats, docking tugs, underway replenishment, and port studies. The University of Hamburg and the Danish Maritime Institute, through their partnership with STN Atlas, support our expertise in these areas.

MX: Finally, regarding your new simulator, when will it be operational, and will the instructors require significant lead-time in order to get them up to speed?

Paine: The simulator is already installed and going through its testing phase. The first course starts in January, 2002. We expect to have a grand opening sometime in March. Regarding training, the instructors are currently receiving training on the new system. The software is extremely user friendly, so we can use shipmasters and pilots instructors to operate the simulator, instead of computer technicians. We believe that using highly expe55

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International Maritime Organization (IMO.) This is in response to a growing concern over the deterioration of training standards that paralleled the decline of the traditional flag states. Ratified in 1995, these amendments to the original STCW-78 Convention will go into full force on February 2002. It mostly applies to officers on commercial vessels over 200 gross tons sailing past the boundary line1. It does not apply to the inland waters of the United States or the Great Lakes.

The biggest difference between STCW95 and previous training requirements is the emphasis on “competency evaluations”. The training program must “certify” that the mariner “demonstrates competency” in the skills listed within the Code. For mariners that have taken courses at MITAGS in the past, this concept is not new.

The Coast Guard represents the United States at the IMO, and is charged with implementing the STCW95 requirements in the United States. The Coast Guard has decided to simultaneously administer a dual licensing system for U.S. mariners. This means that mariners will have two licenses2; one is for the existing regulations, and the other is for the STCW95 requirements.

Other countries have opted to replace their existing licensing structure with the one outlined by the Code.

In answer to the second part of the question, every mariner operating vessels of 500 gross tons (international tonnage measurement) must comply. The IMO is preparing the “white list” that states what countries are in substantial compliance with the Code. Flag States that fail to make this “white list” may find their vessel banned from other nations’ ports and waters.

MX: The institute has hired many instructors who were brought aboard to teach classes in their fields of expertise.

Is there life after STCW in terms of continuing education?

Paine: Most people think that February 1, 2002, is the end of STCW-95 training. In fact, it is just the beginning.

The world community is pushing the entire maritime industry into the 21st century. Continuing education will be a part of every mariner’s future (just like the airline industry). The costs of “mistakes” are simply too great in terms of dollars, environmental damage, life, and public opinion. I believe that, within five years, the domestic maritime industry will adopt a modified version of STCW-95. Even the European and U.S. Navies are seriously considering adopting the Code as the basis for their

The Coast Guard has decided to simultaneously administer a dual licensing system for U.S. mariners. This means that mariners will have two licenses2; one is for the existing regulations, and the other is for the STCW-95 requirements.” rienced mariners to operate the simulator is an essential element in conducting realistic training exercises.

MX: Within the industry, the STCW-95 treaty has been the focal point, in terms of bringing mariners into compliance by February 2002. Will there be a scramble of mariners rushing through the doors, or have most already met the mandate?

Paine: The vast majority of unlimited tonnage officers are going to be ready by the February, 2002 date. This is not true of the Offshore Supply Vessel Industry. The Coast Guard has recently issued a policy letter that relaxes the due date for mariners in this sector.

Currently MITAGS is chairing the STCW-95 Problem Solving Working Group set up by the “Mariners Recruitment and Retention Conference.” Of the 150 issues/problems discussed at the August, 2002 working group conference at MITAGS, about fifty percent have been resolved. We expect the balance to be concluded over the next few months.

The STCW-95 working group has volunteered to assist the National Maritime Center in gathering comments pertaining to the problems associated with the full implementation of the STCW-95. Anyone can receive the updates by sending a request (Ms. Andrea Dixon, MITAGS, adixon@mitags.org) to be placed on the STCW-95 e-mail update list. Mariners can also obtain copies of submitted comments on the SOCP website: www.socp.org under “STCW Policies.”

MX: There are many that do not understand STCW. Could you briefly outline the treaty and its importance to the industry? Furthermore, are all mariners worldwide required to comply?

Paine: The STCW-95 Amendments are latest in a series of international agreements promulgated by the 56

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training curriculum.

MX: MITAGS has purchased a tremendous amount of training equipment over the past few years to teach professional mariners on the tools they use for sailing. Beyond the STN Atlas, are there any additional equipment or training tools that need to be purchased?

Paine: MITAGS is committed to providing infrastructure, equipment, and curriculum to meet the needs of our trust companies, the MM&P, and other clients.

In the last three years, MITAGS and PMI (our west coast subsidiary) have spent over $6,000,000 in improvements to meet the needs of our stakeholders. We will continue to invest in improving our capabilities to help companies and mariners meet the challenges of the future.

MX: MITAGS operates a conference center and hotel.

What is being done to develop these businesses?

Paine: I strongly believe that a school must also meet the social and recreational needs, when providing continuing education to professionals. The conference and hotel operations support the school’s mission by providing excellent accommodations, grounds, dining, and meeting facilities. Many companies take advantage of the first-rate facilities to conduct their in-house training at MITAGS. Increasingly, the facilities are also being seen as an ideal meeting place for maritime organizations. The facilities can easily accommodate meetings with up to 500 attendees.

MX: MITAGS has been pro-active with respect to many issues facing the industry. What are some of the areas of involvement that the institute has high on its priority list?

Paine: Proper implementation of the STCW-95 Code is a primary concern. Literally, thousands of man-hours have been spent on commenting on Coast Guard policies, developing curriculum, upgrading quality standards systems, and training staff. Much of the controversy surrounding the STCW-95 is due to the way it was implemented, rather than what is contained within the Code.

We intend to stay on it until all issues are resolved.

MITAGS/PMI continues to be actively involved in Maritime Security, GMDSS Task Forces, SOCP- SMART Card Initiatives, Marine Fire Fighting (ship/shore), Medical, VTS/AIS, ECDIS, Officer in Charge of a Navigation Watch (OICNW), and Chiefmate/Master training standards.

MX: The maritime industry has come a long way since

“Charles Perrow wrote a book called Normal Accidents, Living with High-Risk Technolo-gies…

Perrow stated the maritime industry had an “error inducing” system, as opposed to an “error reducing” system.” …We are only as good as our weakest link.

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the 1970s in its training procedures and requirements for mariners. As executive director of one of the most highly respected training institutes in the nation, where do you believe we need to go from here to create an environment of safety, preparedness, and proficiency for deck officers?

Paine: If the industry is to survive and prosper, it must take a systematic approach to safety. In the 1980’s, Charles Perrow wrote a book called Normal Accidents, Living with High-Risk Technologies, that studied the various transportation modes and other heavy industries that utilized large, technological intensive assets. Perrow stated the maritime industry had an “error inducing” system, as opposed to an “error reducing” system. In essence, the way in which we operated encouraged accidents, hence the term “normal accidents.”

As an industry, we have to find a way to reward the competent and conscientious operators and to eliminate the unscrupulous ones. It will take a coordinated effort of the shippers/charterers, the carriers, the flag states, the class societies, shipyards, and the training institutions to achieve this goal.

The improvements in safety implemented by SOLAS, STCW, ISM, MARPOL, ILO, and other conventions are moving the maritime industry in the direction of an “error reducing” system. However, there is still much work to be done. We are only as good as our weakest link.

MITAGS continues to partner with its stakeholders to develop new and innovative programs that will help raise the professional skill standards of the industry.

1. The demarcation line between inland and near coastal/ocean federal licenses.

2. The STCW uses the term certificate instead of license.

-MarEx

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Gerhard Kurz

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Interview with

Gerhard Kurz, President & CEO, Seabulk International, Inc.

Seabulk International maintains one of the largest fleets of petroleum tankers in the nation. Do you believe that a double-hull tanker is a safer ship than a single-hull tanker with respect to a terrorist attack?

Kurz: I have always been a strong supporter of double-hull tankers. When I was at Mobil Shipping, I persuaded the company to build double-hull vessels for extra protection of the environment. I am not an engineer; however, if a terrorist attached an explosive device to the hull of a ship, the consequences would be catastrophic. It is known that contraband, such as narcotics, has been smuggled into ports attached to a ship’s hull.

Therefore, the scenario of a terrorist being able to blow up a ship is not beyond imagination.

An explosive device placed on a single-hull ship would most certainly destroy the ship and its cargo. In the case of a double-hull, there is a six to twelve-foot space between the inner and outer hulls. This barrier would likely provide a higher level of protection against a terrorist attack than would be the case with a single hull.

The U.S.S. Cole is a prime example of a single-hull ship being disabled and nearly sunk by terrorists. The terrorists evidently put a small boat full of explosives alongside the Cole and exploded it, resulting in a significant loss of life and a gaping hole in the vessel’s hull. The damage might have been less severe with a double-hull design.

If one wanted to study attacks on modern commercial vessels to analyze structural damage, the experience of the Gulf War would provide useful insights, because a lot of commercial ships were attacked and damaged or destroyed. Can you design a vessel that is terrorist-proof?

I doubt it, but innovations like double-hull construction MX:

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can go a long way toward mitigating the damage.

MX: The events of September 11th have reshaped our lives, and, in fact, the way the maritime industry does business. Has your organization begun to do a “Risk Assessment” for the protection of commerce, clients, and your employees?

Kurz: Immediately after September 11th, Seabulk did a complete review of the vulnerabilities of our ships – both underway and in port – and of our crews. We are an international organization. It was therefore essential that we look at everything, including the crewing of our vessels, to make sure we met the highest safety standards. In addition, we wanted to make sure that, while in port, our vessels were inaccessible and that the security around them was tight.

MX: At the subcommittee hearings in Fort Lauderdale on January 9th, 2002, the Port Director for Port Everglades announced that the National Guard is reducing its presence due to a lack of funding. Is there anything that the federal government can do to federalize port security?

Kurz: Yes. Port security throughout the United States needs to be federalized. When it comes to the security of commerce and vessels, there should be uniformity of standards and procedures across the board. Why The Maritime Executive

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should some ports take the necessary precautions while others, to save money, go about things as if nothing happened?

In Fort Lauderdale and Miami, there are millions of passengers each year leaving on cruise ships for a vacation. These are high-risk ports, and there are many others, such as Houston, New Orleans, Norfolk, Philadelphia and San Francisco, to name a few. Each one of these ports has safety requirements. It is not sufficient to station National Guard troops and local police at the street entrances to ports. Ports need to be guarded on the waterways as well, and that is the real challenge.

In Port Everglades, right at this very moment, you have berth after berth of passenger vessels loading or disembarking vacationers. There are numerous pleasure craft moving around the port with potential access to vessels. This is a safety risk. Our company has tugboats and crewboats, suitable for assisting the authorities in patrolling the port and helping them keep the parade of pleasure craft at a safe distance. This type of security, in conjunction with the National Guard checking cars at the entrances to the port, makes a lot more sense.

There are many industry resources that could be utilized to meet critical security needs. If the government really wanted to implement prompt maritime security First Quarter 2002

in ports and waterways, it could simply hire equipment from local companies and put armed marshals aboard.

There is much that can be done without spending a lot of money.

The federalization of port security should be implemented immediately to establish uniform standards of safety and to promote the flow of critical information within the U.S. port system. Federalizing the airports and seaports is an essential component of this nation’s safety shield against terrorism.

MX: There are 361 port complexes in the United States.

Many of them are located near major cities with large populations, and these ports present special security problems because of their open environments. In light of the fact that most ports are called on by foreign vessels, is it reasonable for each ship to be carefully scrutinized before entering a port, or does this country need to foster closer relationships with foreign ports to provide for the safety and security of vessels bound for the United States?

Kurz: There is no question that maritime security needs to be a two-way street. Foreign port authorities need to communicate and notify the U.S. Coast Guard and port authorities of every vessel’s name, registry, type of cargo carried, and crew manifest including the 59

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nationalities of all people aboard the vessel. There is a critical need for more information-sharing between foreign and domestic ports, particularly in the identification of suspicious vessels or cargoes.

For any ship entering U.S. waters there should be a detailed profile available. High-risk ships with dangerous cargoes could be subjected to extra scrutiny or safety procedures. It’s just that simple.

MX: Risk assessments for ships, terminals, ports, and operating organizations are essential. “The Port and Maritime Security Act of 2001� was recently passed by the U.S. Senate and will provide $1.143 billion over the next four years, with $322 million being authorized for 2002. Do you believe that the government has moved swiftly and effectively in dealing with maritime security?

Kurz: There needs to be more cooperation between government and industry, and this can be achieved by carrying out the mandatory risk assessments that are now being legislated. The federal government needs to establish a national committee of maritime executives to take advantage of their knowledge and experience in developing security measures and procedures.

In order to contain the cost impact of new maritime security requirements, we must adopt a business-like approach to the problem. A partnership with industry makes a lot of sense to me. Government and industry need to share information, expertise and equipment in a joint effort to counter the risks of terrorism. Bring industry to the table to get the input and knowledge of 60

people who are intimately acquainted with all maritime aspects. We need a hands-on approach to make sure we are doing the right thing and that it works.

MX: The San Francisco Bar Pilots are boarding vessels with armed sea marshals. Do you think that the San Francisco plan is sufficient, and do you believe that all ports should do the same?

Kurz: If there is merit in doing this for some, then there is merit in taking these steps in other ports. For high-risk vessels, it makes sense that sea marshals go onboard and check out the documentation, cargoes, and crews to ensure that the ship is safe to enter a port or vital waterway.

MX: It has been said that U.S. flag operators are less of a maritime safety risk than are foreign flag operators.

Do you believe that to be true?

Kurz: Yes. U.S. flag operators do provide less of a risk, because they operate within the U.S. port system under U.S. standards, documentation, and control. We have no such control over foreign ships, their operational procedures, crews or cargoes.

MX: The Coast Guard has done an incredible job in securing our coastlines and ports. Its crews have been working 12-hour shifts seven days a week, and approximately 2,700 reservists have been called up. In the recent legislation that was passed, the Coast Guard received an emergency appropriation of $307 million for 2002. Do you believe that due to the enormity of its maritime security task, in conjunction with its normal The Maritime Executive

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business, the level of funding is adequate?

Kurz: I have always been an admirer of the tremendous job that the Coast Guard is doing in policing our nation’s waterways and carrying out its many and varied responsibilities. Unfortunately, the Coast Guard is not perceived as being as glamorous a service as the Marines or the Air Force. Yet they are providing some of the most vital services to protect the well-being of this nation through their activities in drug interdiction, oversight of fisheries, patrolling the coastlines for illegal immigration, search and rescue and, now, maritime security.

The Coast Guard has always had to work harder and lobby harder than the other services to secure adequate funding. Maritime security is one area in which the Coast Guard could look to industry for support. Instead of spending money on new equipment, it might be more cost-effective to draw on existing industry resources. There is plenty of equipment and manpower available throughout the U.S. port system. So it makes sense to engage industry in meeting the new port security requirements. It might be a lot less costly to develop this partnership.

MX: S. 1587 calls for the transparency and security of vessel registration procedures. ABS, Intertanko, and OCIMF have been strong proponents of this initiative.

Unfortunately, major shipowner associations have not been motivated to strengthen vessel class. Do you see the First Quarter 2002

legislation changing this lack of cooperation, and will it initiate transparency within the shipping industry?

Kurz: Transparency has been an issue for many years throughout the maritime industry. There is not enough uniformity in quality and safety standards.

Yes, higher standards do translate into higher costs.

But why should one vessel operator do the right thing and bear this cost while another largely ignores it?

While much progress has been achieved, there is still room to improve safety and quality standards. But this requires a higher level of transparency within the maritime industry than we have now. Transparency must also encompass the end-user to ensure that the so-called quality circle encompasses all operators.

MX: Looking at the complexity of maritime security, which requires safeguarding all ports, petroleum tankers, container ships, cruise lines, and the integrated intermodal system, is it realistic to secure our 361 ports, 95,000 miles of coastline, over 1,000 harbor channels, 25,000 miles of inland and intracoastal waterways and more than 3,700 terminals that handle passengers and cargo?

Kurz: Security at this level is a very challenging task.

We have an open society and an open economy. Port security and vulnerability analysis will go a long way towards achieving maritime security. The monitoring of ships, cargoes, and crews is a critical element in assuring a higher level of security. It makes a big difference whether or not basic security measures are implemented. A more intense approach could involve limiting certain traffic, including passengers, to only a few, specially protected ports. This would make the task of providing port security more cost-effective. There is already a special focus on LNG vessels, for example, to reduce the perceived risk from this type of vessel or cargo.

As a related thought, I would again suggest that there are existing resources, including equipment within industry, that could be drawn on to help patrol our harbors and coastline. The formation of a national committee of industry executives to provide government with hands-on advice on how best to monitor vessel traffic and improve port security is also important. A close partnership between government and industry will go a long way toward providing a first line of defense against terrorist threats.

In the end, the cost of new measures must be weighed against the benefits, and this is an area where government, industry and consumers all have a role to play.

-MarEx

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Thomas Crowley Jr.

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Balance and Cooperation are Keys to Response to Security Demands

By Thomas B. Crowley Jr. Chairman, President and CEO Crowley Maritime Corporation

www.crowley.com

B

alance and cooperation have always been the key dynamics in addressing issues of safety.

This continues to be the case in the post-Sept. 11 environment of heightened security in the maritime industry.

Throughout our 110-year history, the people of Crowley have recognized the importance of safety and security in our operations, to our customers and to our employees. We also have been committed to the utmost levels of security within a much broader national and global context. This longterm dedication has helped prepare us to most swiftly and efficiently act proactively following the recent unanticipated tragic events.

When the Super Carrier Initiative Agreement (SCIA) was established through the U.S. Customs Service in the 1990s, we were one of the first carriers to enter this partnership at the highest level of anti-narcotic, anti-stowaway, vessel and facility security due diligence security practices. In fact, among ocean carriers, Crowley is one of but eight or nine Maritime SCIA signatories in the world.

Standard operating procedures outlined through the SCIA and throughout our company have in the past most specifically focused upon contraband (particularly illegal drugs), theft, stowaways and unauthorized access to vessels. It is worthy of note that measures dealing with such concerns typically overlap these different areas and may be equally applied to the homeland security and antiterrorism objectives that currently are being legislatively defined.

Crowley’s longstanding investments of both fiscal and human resources in development and implementation of proactive security measures in domestic and international terminals and aboard ships have furnished us a solid base upon which to build, and perhaps put us ahead of many line operators in ability to respond to the present concerns. Also, due in part to

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the fact that Florida, where Crowley maintains significant operations, has been the nation’s most progressive state in recognizing and addressing maritime security, we have been working for years with governmental authorities at all levels on plans that ensure the meeting of strict security-related standards.

Systems for risk assessment and management and emergency response that have been developed over the past decade are now being applied to areas of newest concern. At the same time, we are mindful to sustain such systems as they relate to more historical threats.

Plans for dealing with hurricanes and floods and explosive device threats and hazardous materials release are being looked at in terms of terrorist attack and weapons of mass destruction.

Within 60 days of Sept. 11, Crowley held emergency and evacuation drills at each of dozen the major company facilities, from Seattle, WashingtonAnchorage, Alaska, to Miami, Florida, from Weehawken, New Jersey, to Long Beach, California. Security personnel have stepped up concentration on the letter of security The Maritime Executive

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procedures and adopted an exacting “zero tolerance” policy. Procedures that have been in place for our numerous facilities are being standardized within a formal company-wide security plan template that meets specifications contained in new proposed statutory guidelines.

The interactive synergy between companies in our industry and the full spectrum of governmental agencies involved in maritime transport — from port authorities and local law enforcement to the U.S. Customs Service and U.S. Coast Guard — has never been more important. The cooperative effort must extend beyond our national borders, too, and we have been encouraged to see a number of our trading partners, including Costa Rica, Panama, Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala and Mexico taking new looks at their own port security vulnerabilities.

Within Crowley’s terminal operations, we have been fortunate to have in place contract security personnel who meet high qualifications and have received not only licensing and internal training but also that First Quarter 2002

from outside agencies, such as the U.S. Customs Service. Because facilities are within Customs jurisdiction, these personnel do, of course, have the availability to screen and search vehicles upon entry and exit. With a greater focus on proper clearances, we have stepped up assertion of such privileges. Under Crowley’s ISO 9000 quality assurance program, our existing process for vendor evaluation, selection and approval has minimized risks associated with potential unauthorized access to vessels and facilities.

Employee security awareness training helps protect integrity from the point of cargo origin throughout the transit process, including through intermodal facilities, which pose particular challenges due to the requisite multiple levels of coordination. In fact, the entire January issue of our internal safety and environmental protection publication, “Seaworthy,” has been devoted entirely to security awareness and procedures. We are now looking at extending existing detection and deterrence training programs for vessel operators and crews that would parallel federal sea marshal programs.

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Thomas Crowley Jr.

V E S S E L

As noted initially, we find ourselves in these times endeavoring to strike balances, and one such key challenge the maritime industry faces is weighing the true value of heightened measures against the costs they may exact in terms of restriction of international trade and hampering of free enterprise that indeed is the force that has made our nation great. Our nation must be careful not to merely implement “window dressing” steps that people may perceive as providing a higher level of comfort. Rather, measures must furnish measurable benefits that outweigh restrictive costs. One way to help ensure such appropriate actions is through involvement of industry in the decision-making process.

Another favorable move in this direction would entail a more reciprocal exchange partnership between government agencies and carriers, such that carriers would receive greater information as to security threat alerts, exposures and lookouts to effectively focus resources. The relationship between the U.S. Coast Guard and the shipping industry has strengthened in recent years, and a continuing enhancement of this alliance could be very beneficial.

Ultimately, if cost-benefit analyses are not conducted to determine what measures are reasonable and prudent, taxpayers will wind up paying for unnecessary or ineffective programs and, as consumers, will pay a second time as costs of goods are raised to offset expenses to shippers that trickle down through ports and carriers. This is not to downplay the vital importance of safety and security and apparent need for greater military and overall governmental involvement, but it is to underscore the demand for effective productive partnerships.

For example, it is far from cost-effective to delay and x-ray inspect every container moved by a carrier, but educated company personnel can play an integral role in pinpointing those boxes that should be subjected to increased scrutiny. The container moved by a longstanding major customer according to normal procedures may well move unimpeded, but that which an unknown shipper is seeking to transport at the last minute, paying cash, would, all the more in today’s environment, be put through additional procedures.

Such review and notification procedures with federal agencies have been in effect at Crowley for many years.

Other concerns of balance relate to specific ports and carriers. If increased security costs are exacted only upon certain designated major strategic ports, small ports not so designated may gain a competitive advan64

tage. And, if a higher standard is implemented for ports throughout our nation, what may be the possibilities of cargo shifting to Canada or Mexico or offshore points instead? (Perhaps a solution may be the extension of a system of standards on a global level, standardized through an entity such as the International Maritime Organization (IMO).) Similarly, if ocean carriers are not universally held to the high SCIA levels of diligence to which Crowley is a voluntary signatory, might some lines not garner a competitive edge?

While our participation since Sept. 11 has become further increased, Crowley’s position has long been that active involvement in security efforts is essential. This is indicated by our roles in such private industry bodies as the Maritime Security Council (representing 65 percent of world tonnage) the National Cargo Security Council, as well as the State Department’s Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC).

Ironically, some of the recently implemented measures have proven counterproductive. For example, Crowley has for many years maintained a regular security discipline of conducting selective anti-narcotic K-9 and underhull dive inspections upon vessel arrivals at U.S. ports. However, since Sept. 11, contractor divers that have engaged in such inspections are finding adverse operational limits by severe security restrictions on dock and vessel berth access. It is precisely this kind of unfortunate impact that may be averted through solid synergistic partnerships between public and private entities across a broad spectrum of functions.

We at Crowley have certainly found that union labor is one of the most valuable such partners, including through participation as standing members of various port security councils, and we would hope to see a further strengthening of this bond.

In summary, we believe that firms such as ours are well equipped to face the present challenges of increased homeland security. We are hopeful that necessary cooperative partnerships may continue to grow in a manner that ensures equitable implementation of procedures that are truly beneficial and does not impose unjustifiable costs upon the industry and, ultimately, the American public. Those of us at Crowley will maintain our commitment to the highest standards of safety and security — a commitment that we hope will be mirrored by all with an interest in safe, efficient movement of goods in a secure environment.

-MarEx

The Maritime Executive

At CITGO, we're in the business of refining.

And while we mainly concentrate on oil, we're also dedicated to refining the communities where we live and work. From arts and education, to health, civic and environmental organizations, to the Muscular Dystrophy Association, CITGO is here in Lake Charles, enhancing and improving the neighborhoods we call home.

www.CITGO.com

Š 2000 CITGO Petroleum Corporation

O P E R AT O R S

William O’Malley

V E S S E L

Interview with William O’Malley, Chairman, Tidewater, Inc.

MX: The events of September 11th have reshaped our

lives, and, in fact, the way the maritime industry does business. Has your organization begun to do a “Risk Assessment” for the protection of commerce, clients, and your employees?

O’Malley: As a global marine service provider, Tidewater has always been vigilant with respect to security. In many areas, vessels are exposed to threats from a number of groups ranging from governments to natives. As such, many policies and procedures were in place prior to September 11, 2001 to insure the safety of Tidewater vessels and crews.

However, post September 11 operations have presented new challenges in providing safe, efficient, and secure service to Tidewater customers. In an effort to identify and address these new challenges, Tidewater began a review of risks immediately following the attacks of September 11. Tidewater management has identified three major areas of threat: cargoes, personnel, and external threats from other vessels, vehicles, or aircraft.

The offshore oil and gas exploration/exploitation business has traditionally consisted of a supply chain in which cargo and materials for use at an installation is packaged by one group, transported by a second group, and unpackaged by the end user. In many instances, the three groups involved have no knowledge of the materials packaged, the intended use, or even whether the items may be contraband representing a threat.

In order to combat the risks associated with cargo, it has become necessary for everyone in the supply/transport/use chain to become familiar with equipment and its uses, but, more importantly, to devise methods to insure items are properly identified and sealed with tamper evident devices. Notification systems via Tidewater operations’ bases and vessels insure that any evidence of cargo tampering is immediately communicated to customers, equipment owners, and the appropriate local authorities. Any cargo that is suspected of 66

having been tampered with is either removed from the vessel or not loaded on board at all, until the appropriate personnel determine that it is safe for carriage.

In many circumstances, charterers require vessels to transport not only cargoes but personnel as well.

Tidewater has asked that charterers and their subcontractors provide the names of any personnel who will be boarding Tidewater vessels for transport to installations. All personnel boarding Tidewater vessels must provide photographic identification that matches information provided by the charterer upon boarding the vessel. Likewise, any personnel reporting for duty aboard a Tidewater vessel must be cleared through the area shore base of operations and have their identity verified by the vessel master before boarding the vessel.

Tidewater has for many years had systems in place to protect Tidewater vessels from unauthorized boarding.

Lookouts, required for the safe navigation of any vessel, are instructed to advise the master of any vessel or object approaching the vessel. These lookouts are to use every means available to locate these targets, including radar. Upon detection, the Master has been advised to communicate with any vessels or platforms in the area (if possible), as well as with customers and to take whatever action is deemed appropriate should the vessel fail to identify itself and its purpose.

Similarly, Tidewater vessels have been instructed to The Maritime Executive

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keep well away from installations, unless they are the vessel’s destination and the installation has been advised of the vessel’s approach.

In many respects, the approach of vessels or aircraft represents a threat for which there is little or no response. Action in most vessel approach cases is limited to verbal warning or perhaps the use of firefighting equipment to protect the vessel or any nearby installations. The most appropriate action is to maintain a long range lookout via the use of binoculars or the radar system to allow as much time as possible for the appropriate response from the appropriate authorities.

MX: The Coast Guard has done an incredible job securing our coastlines and ports. Its crews have been working 12-hour shifts, seven days a week, and approximately 2,700 reservists have been called up. What can be done to support the Coast Guard, which will be certainly overwhelmed in a very short period of time?

O’Malley: After the events of September 11, the U. S. Coast Guard was faced with a monumental task, and it has responded in a monumental manner. It has become a critically important branch of the armed services, and its role in homeland security is vital to the success of that initiative. It must be funded at a level where it can meet the challenges with which it is now tasked. With respect to what Tidewater can do to assist the Coast Guard, Tidewater will undertake any action

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requested by the U. S. Coast Guard. However, at this time, those actions can only be limited to reporting activity to the appropriate authorities. As in the risk assessment discussed earlier, Tidewater’s vessel crews have been briefed on their responsibility to maintain a lookout and to report any activity that falls outside the realm of normal activity to the appropriate authorities.

This activity can take place either on the open seas, in restricted channels, or even on the dock or pier itself.

Tidewater vessels have always maintained a watch 24 hours per day, but these duties have been expanded to include dock activity as well as waterborne activity.

MX: The United States is the largest consumer of petroleum in the world. We consume approximately 18 million barrels a day, and a barrel of oil is 42 gallons. So, as a nation, we consume approximate 756 million gallons of oil per day. Of our daily consumption, approximate 8 million barrels of oil per day is imported and arrives on ships. Because of the very nature of the cargo, should all tankers be hull scanned and stopped for inspection?

O’Malley: Tidewater does not own or operate any tankers, so we defer to the more experienced tanker operators to provide a response to this area of inquiry.

However, we do feel the U. S. should conduct any operations necessary to insure that threats are minimized.

As stated, almost 44.5% of daily oil consumption 67

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arrives by vessel. Based on the dependency of the U. S. on oil and oil products, the volatility of the cargo, the potential damage (both explosive as well as environmental), and the relative ease with which a device could be attached to a vessel’s hull, scanning could well be a cost effective, efficient method of reducing risk.

However, while the means exist to perform hull scans in relative short time frames, there is still a cost associated with this activity. Based upon the response the American public has displayed thus far, a strong case for public acceptance of slight cost increases to accomplish this job can be made.

MX: The Coast Guard is reviewing cargo manifests, and is requiring 96-hour notification to review crew lists to identify known terrorists. The San Francisco Bar Pilots are boarding vessels with armed U.S. marshals.

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Do you think that the San Francisco plan is sufficient, and do you believe that all pilots should do the same?

O’Malley: Again, any action deemed appropriate to protect the interest of the U. S., especially domestic security, should be undertaken. As with hull scanning, there are delays and associated costs as well as manpower and equipment costs to consider. Likewise, the American public has demonstrated a degree of tolerance for bearing these costs in return for security.

Identification of crew members and cargoes at least 96 hours in advance of arrival provides a means to search databases for known terrorists aboard and early warning of any potential threats in the cargo. But, because not all terrorists are known and because anyone attempting to bring materials likely to be used in an attack would not disclose their presence aboard the The Maritime Executive

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vessel, it is imperative that boarding take place at least randomly. As far as boarding with armed agents, failure to do so could represent a risk not only to the pilots or agents but also to the public, as there may be no other alternative to prevent the vessel from entering the port or U. S. Waters.

MX: In this country, all oil terminals have a closeddoor policy. Should all of this nation’s ports follow suit?

O’Malley: As a matter of security, all ports should be closed, although whether such methods are practical or possible is questionable. The majority of Tidewater’s ports of operation are near pipeline substations or its vessels travel into areas where pipelines converge. The fact that vessel access is strictly the responsibility of the crew creates a situation where a person could stowaway, if desired, and later attack an installation or pipeline facility either with or from the vessel. Tidewater has taken every precaution, short of arming crews, to insure no one is allowed aboard its vessels without proper clearance from the charterer, Tidewater, or the vessel master. However, because Tidewater and other vessel operators can only control their respective vessels, the remainder of the port is exposed. Restricting port access would help to eliminate this risk.

MX: Since 9-11-01, terrorism has proven to be effective, in that they have disrupted our way of life, our economy, and created chaos in the world. One of our most vulnerable areas is waterborne commerce and its vessels. Has your organization advised its employees with regard to the precautions necessary to operate safely within their job tasks?

O’Malley: All Tidewater employees receive an area specific orientation, in addition to the New Hire Orientation training program. This area specific training has, for the most part, always addressed vessel security in many ways. Post September 11 has expanded this orientation to include all personnel upon return to the vessel, not just those reporting for the first time.

Specific guidelines have been distributed to the vessels to insure that all vessel crew members are aware of the potential threats and their respective responsibilities in the event of a perceived threat.

MX: Risk assessments for ships, terminals, ports, and operating organizations are essential. The Port and Maritime Security Act of 2001will provide $1,143B over the next four years, with $322M being authorized for 2002. Being involved with Capitol Hill, do you believe that the government has moved swiftly and effectively in dealing with maritime security?

O’Malley: It is premature for us to opine whether

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the government has done enough. The U.S. Coast Guard needs to determine the level of funding and resources needed for it to effectively provide the security necessary to protect the country from maritime activity, and Congress needs to fund the U.S.C.G. to allow it to achieve this result.

MX: Your Association represents tanker operators. It has been said that U.S. Flag operators need less scrutiny than do foreign flag operators. Do you believe that vessels, no matter what the flag state, should be randomly boarded for inspection and have their hulls scanned?

O’Malley: Recent activity in the U. S. suggests that while foreign flag operators may be more likely candidates for scrutiny, U. S. flag vessels may also represent a threat. Just last week in Orlando, an American pilot flew his small aircraft into a building and attached a note to his body stating support for terrorists. While this may have been isolated in nature and relatively insignificant in economic impact, it creates a concern that even U. S. citizens and operators are not above scrutiny. As mentioned earlier, hull scans and random checks are relatively low cost in comparison to the level of security provided. If one weighs the cost of the potential damage against the cost of inspection and boarding, there is no reason not to perform these tasks.

MX: Looking at the complexity of maritime security which requires securing all ports, petroleum tankers, container ships, cruise lines, and the integrated intermodal system, is our government, with support from the private sectors, realistically able to manage and secure our 361 ports, 95,000 miles of coastline, over 1,000 harbor channels, 25,000 miles of inland and intercoastal waterways, and more than 3,700 terminals that handle passengers and cargo?

O’Malley: Yes. In fact, most operators and port facilities have taken action to ensure the security of their respective facilities and vessels. Through coordination among private industry, local and federal law enforcement, and the U. S. Coast Guard, and other agencies, almost every item described above can be adequately secured. One item never mentioned is the use of “coast watchers.” This program was significant in alerting Americans of the actions of enemies during the Second World War. Something along those lines could be established in the public to allow private citizens to assist in coast watching. In South Louisiana, this concept already exists for the protection of hunting camps and vessels moored in the bayous and bays.

-MarEx

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Michael Seymour

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Statement from Michael J. Seymour, President & CEO, P&O Nedlloyd, North America

he tragic events of September 11, 2001 have focused the personal and professional lives of all of us; initially on sympathy and concern for the victims of these horrific attacks, and subsequently on means of preventing future terrorist activity. The dilemma we now face is to balance the freedom and openness of American society with a new and ongoing requirement for increased vigilance. This new need has implications for both individual freedom and the conduct of business activities.

As with the arrival at U.S. airports and seaports of passengers from all over the world, the landing at U.S. seaports of millions of tons of goods moving in international trade will be subject to increased scrutiny. This examination must also take into account the movement of intermodal containers throughout the U.S. via rail and truck modes. The two extremes in treating this issue range from “business as usual,” which is not acceptable, to the physical examination of every container arriving at U.S. ports which is not practical.

Between these two positions are means of heightened security which should attain desired goals without significant disruption of trade.

Legislation pending in the U.S. Senate (S1214) focuses on enhancing U.S. seaport security, a tightening of documentation procedures to allow for an earlier analysis of intermodal cargo moving through the U.S., and identification of the partners involved in the trade transaction. This legislation also recognizes the need to extend port security assessment and adoption of standards internationally and to identify those foreign ports whose vulnerabilities indicate a risk. While legislation may not come out of Washington until the new year, the final product will reflect the fact that trade is a partner process, and that preventative measures that go into effect only after a container discharges at a U.S.

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port are just too late. Increased attention to the cargo and to the document flow that accompanies goods moving internationally can begin in the origin countries, and examinations required of containers that deviate from accepted norms (known shippers, consignee identification, standards of seal integrity and monitoring). Many of the tools needed to accomplish these goals are in place, although enhancement and increased focus will be required. As P&O Nedlloyd, we have participated in discussions in the drafting process of S1214 and feel that its enactment will do much to improve security in the port and maritime segment. It will also help to integrate the activities of the numerous federal, state, local, and private organizations which all have a piece of the issue.

An international intermodal transaction, by definition, involves a number of service providers. Each of these participants has an obligation to define and apply security standards that reflect what the U.S. Coast Guard has labeled as the “new normalcy.” These standards must be understood and accepted by all partners in the chain, beginning with the origin supplier and ending with the consignee. The goal is to ensure that the “hand off” of a container from one provider to another is accompanied by confidence that the unit’s security and the legitimacy of the cargo inside are intact and verified. The security of the transfers along the chain also allows for a reasonable knowledge of the unit’s whereabouts during the entire move.

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Given the urgency of the situation and the uncertain time frame of government action, there is an immediate need to gear up security measures. Working through the World Shipping Council, P&O Nedlloyd is actively involved in establishing a broad based industry position with respect to many aspects of the security problem, ranging from container seals to ship security and “known shipper” procedures. The aim of this effort is to establish some agreed upon standards that can be implemented quickly and which will help various government organizations in formulating policy and procedures in this critical arena. As there are many moving parts in the intermodal chain, our efforts as the carrier segment must work in concert with other service providers to achieve the goal of safe movement through the trade process.

In addition, the Company has taken a number of immediate steps.

Office security has been stepped up in all locations through identity procedures, reduced access, and periodic inspections.

Access to ships has been significantly curtailed and now requires advance notice, positive identification, and an assigned escort.

Within the Company’s Fleet Management Division, a senior manager has been assigned responsibility for vessel security, and each ship under our control has a designated security officer, usually the Master.

P&O Nedlloyd ships have participated in UK

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Ministry of Defense exercises aimed at thwarting terrorist activity.

Customer service personnel to have been instructed to be alert to new customers and particularly those that seem to deviate from industry accepted procedures.

We perform criminal background checks on all new employees.

We are complying with new USCG regulations regarding advance notice of vessel arrivals and provision of crew lists.

It is often the case throughout history that tragedies lead to a reassessment and redefining of normal routine. The terrorist attacks in the United States are no exception and there is no doubt that the focus of everyone in the maritime field is on the safety of our staff, ships, and cargo. There is no lack of forums debating the issue, including groups in the public and private sectors. The key is to determine “best practices” and implement them using the enhancement of existing methods to the greatest extent possible.

P&O Nedlloyd, one of the world’s largest shipping companies, operates a fleet of 142 + container vessels (with a standing slot capacity of 361,000 TEUs) and a fleet of over 700,000 owned and leased containers. In 2000, P&O Nedlloyd transported a combined volume in excess of 3 million TEUs. P&O Nedlloyd North America is headquartered in East Rutherford, NJ with regional offices throughout North America.

-MarEx 71

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Charles Raymond

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Interview with Charles Raymond, President, CSX Lines

MX: The events of September 11th have reshaped our

lives, and, in fact, the way the maritime industry does business. Has your organization begun to do a “Risk Assessment” for the protection of commerce, clients and your employees?

Raymond: Since our company was inaugurated, all of our vessels and every terminal facility have had a disaster plan in place. With regard to our ships, we regularly participate in disaster drills, wherein, without crew knowledge, a disaster situation is created. When the crew is advised of this event, they must respond in accordance with company procedures, which include notification of law enforcement, government regulators, ports authorities and all specified CSX personnel.

Preparations for the unknown and the path of information have been key components to ensure that CSX’s emergency system is sound. Fortunately, in 1999, in preparation for Y2K, we updated the “Risk Assessment” for every terminal.

MX: The expansion of heightened security by the government sector will require an effort by the business sector as well. Will your organization require a screening process for vendors, security passes for employees and vessel inspections while in port?

Raymond: Most definitely. We are doing so at the present. However, we understand that more stringent requirements are being written into the law, and, of course, CSX Lines will comply. Furthermore, CSX screens cargoes perceived to be unusual shipments, all hazardous commodities and first-time shippers to ensure their legitimacy.

MX: As government officials move forward to provide homeland security for its citizens, what do you believe needs to be done to provide a safer environment for U.S. commerce on our waterways?

Raymond: Legislation is necessary to define roles and responsibilities in the marine transportation system.

Today, private, federal, state and local jurisdictions are too confusing. Furthermore, the Coast Guard needs better ships and equipment, and more funding to expand its role in Homeland Security. All shipments need to be tracked from the planning stage to delivery, and they must be fully documented. As a facilitator, the 72

planned development and implementation of the U.S. Customs ACE (Automated Commercial Environment) must be accelerated.

MX: Senators Bob Graham and Ernest Hollings, in conjunction with the Breaux – Kerry bill, have initiated the Port and Maritime Security Act of 2001. This legislation will require each port in the nation to perform a risk analysis and then to secure its ports based upon their vulnerability. Ninety-five percent of all international trade moves by sea, and eighty percent of all domestic commerce moves through our waterways. The funding mechanism for government mandates is most generally passed on to the end-users. Is it reasonable to suggest that our government will subsidize the airlines, the steamship lines and the other harbor operating organizations in order to secure the marine environment?

Raymond: I believe port security is a Federal function. The burden of credentialing and security enhancements cannot be put on the shoulders of the employers. Private employers cannot perform background checks in today’s tort system without tremendous legal exposure!

MX: There are 631 port complexes in the United States.

Many of them are located near major cities with heavy populations, and these ports present special security problems because of their open environments. In light The Maritime Executive

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of the fact that most ports are called on by foreign vessels, is it reasonable for each ship to have its hull scanned prior to entering into each and every port?

Raymond: I don’t believe so. However, selective scanning based on a screening of recent ports of call, countries of registry and the nationality of crew members may be appropriate for certain “high risk vessels.”

MX: The international shipping community in this country handles over 18 million containers a year, with the imported volume being approximately 11 million containers. This is an average of 30,000 containers per day. With hundreds of ships calling on our nation’s port every day, what can the port authorities and longshoremen do to prevent a terrorist attack coming from an enclosed and locked container?

Raymond: Port authorities and longshoremen can’t do much, without a system being in place to track shipments through their life cycle, and based upon its scheduled itinerary. Through U.S. customs or other agencies of oversight, information needs to be sorted and screened to detect questionable shipments, even before their movement. As “events” are recorded against each “trip plan,” variances can be flagged.

Shipments that have been flagged can either be inspected at the point of origin or while in transit. Our current manifesting system and filing protocols, I believe, are insufficient to deter terrorism. We need to know what every shipment is, including containerized cargoes, prior to it being lifted aboard a vessel. This situation is no different than screening passengers prior to airline flights. To do nothing leaves our nation and all of us unprotected.

MX: The Coast Guard has done an incredible job in securing our coastlines and ports. Its crews have been working 12-hour shifts, seven days a week, and approximate 2,700 reservists have been called up. What can be done to support the Coast Guard, which will be certainly overwhelmed in a very short period of time?

Raymond: It is essential that the Coast Guard have many of its assets replaced, because its ships are old and expensive to operate. Surprisingly, the Coast Guard has a smaller force than does the NYPD. In addition to

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oversight of aids to navigation, search and rescue, STCW and other mariner certification programs, they now are in charge of maritime security as well. The Coast Guard’s OMB budgetary authorizations are for peacetime, and, like the Department of Defense, they should be assigned a wartime appropriation.

MX: The Coast Guard is reviewing cargo manifests, and is requiring 96-hour notification to review crew lists to identify known terrorists. The San Francisco Bar Pilots are boarding vessels with armed U.S. marshals.

Do you think that the San Francisco plan is sufficient, and do you believe that all pilots should do the same?

Raymond: The San Francisco plan is essentially a pilot plan. (no pun intended) It is too early to say whether it has been effective and whether it should be initiated universally. With this being said, I believe we shouldn’t think that U.S. Flag vessels should be a major concern, as we should focus on foreign-Flag vessels, such as tankers and passenger vessels. Furthermore, no vessel should enter our territorial waters without our government knowing its crew, cargoes or owners.

Although this is an IMO matter, Coast Guard should be pro-active and take the lead.

MX: Looking at the complexity of maritime security which requires the securing of all ports, petroleum tankers, container ships, cruise lines and the integrated intermodal system, is our government, with support from the private sectors, realistically able to manage and secure our 631 ports, 95,000 miles of coastline, over 1,000 harbor channels, 25,000 miles of inland and intercoastal waterways and more than 3,700 terminals that handle passengers and cargo?

Raymond: We have just begun to scratch the surface, and a lot more needs to be done. Port and terminal access is probably the most important issue today. A smart card system should be developed and installed for all MTS transportation workers. The technology already exists and could be installed within a couple of months. Smart Cards can bio-technically identify worker credentials through either fingerprints or eye irises. We need to be absolutely certain who is being allowed into secured areas.

-MarEx

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John McCown

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Trailer Bridge: John McCown, Chairman & CEO Ralph Heim, President & COO

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railer Bridge has established a task force that is currently reviewing our policies and procedures for employee and operational security.

The audit of these programs has, thus far, proven that our system is sound, especially in our terminals. As a U.S. flag operator, it gives us great confidence that our employees are U.S. citizens, and, in the long term, we see this as a positive attribute.

Trailer Bridge is a tug and barge operation that transports cargoes from the Continental United States to Puerto Rico. Our operation is much less labor intensive than a steamship line operation. Our fully wheeled system provides for a much lower probability of concealment of sabotage materials, and, while at sea, the barge is totally inaccessible. Furthermore, our employee-drivers pick up the containers from the shipper’s facility. This ensures that the freight is never out of our possession until it is delivered to the consignee.

Our fully wheeled transportation program combines motor transportation with ocean transportation. It is a totally integrated service that is always under our control.

Trailer Bridge pioneered the utilization of 53’ and 48’ containers. This added shipping advantage allows our shippers to have more cubic foot space in which to move their cargoes over the highways and on the ocean.

We are also a U.S. Flag and Jones Act carrier, and, if one were to look at the macro-observations of maritime security, we believe that the U.S. flag operator has some true benefits over other modes of transportation.

Moreover, since the cargo is always in our possession, there are even some true advantages over other modes within the United States. It’s a niche transportation system that allows our company to be in total control of the entire transportation system, whether it’s over-the-road or in a marine environment.

The natural flow of our cargos is from the eastern nineteen states to Puerto Rico. However, we do handle cargoes from all over the United States. We are a wheeled

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operation that handles full truckloads in which part of our system happens to have a marine portion; hence, the name Trailer Bridge. Our network is the United States and the one hundred miles from Florida to Puerto Rico. Our customers consider us to be a domestic freight carrier.

Our company is currently reviewing all of our existing policies for road and water carriage to see where we might be vulnerable. We are analyzing every aspect of our transportation system from the point of origin, to the port, and across the ocean segment. Our customers are also getting involved in the security issues, as they seem to be very interested in who our employees are and who they hand the freight off to, in terms of personnel identification, which has become much more formalized since September 11th.

The Florida State port security initiative has been ahead of the rest of the world, mainly because of narcotics smuggling. On January 1, 2002, a person cannot get into a Florida state port without a background check and without a proper identification card. In conjunction with these initiatives, and our own security enhancements, we feel that many of the important security issues are already being addressed.

Furthermore, U.S. Customs has always screened various inbound cargoes; however, those inspections have been geared to narcotics. Even though there are no duties assessed, we still provide Customs with a complete manifest of our vessel containers. Most of our customers have been shipping with us with us for years. However, we can guarantee that a new customer will most likely have its container inspected.

The company’s terminals in Florida are gated, and each of our facilities is fenced. In addition to the port’s security force, we also maintain our own security at each terminal.

In Florida, as of January 1st, security measures will be further intensified in accordance with laws that were passed prior to September 11th. In each of our ports of operation, the U.S. Coast Guard provides an additional level of The Maritime Executive

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safety, as the Captain of the Port oversees every inbound and outbound vessel movements. Additionally, they have increased the notification rule from forty-eight hours to ninety-six hours prior to all vessel movements.

Trailer Bridge has another advantage over ship operating companies, in that our tug and barge operations require smaller crews. Our system is much more straightforward to manage than that of a multi-port international transportation company. We believe that U.S. Flag operators are much less vulnerable, and this underscores the need for a stronger U.S. Merchant Marine.

The U.S. Navy is currently searching the world for some twenty-three merchant ships owned by Bin Laden. We don’t know much about these ships. However, I can assure you that none of these ships are U.S. flagged. The U.S. flag fleet is a much more secure environment for ship cargoes than any other fleet in the world. Our company is also a member of the VISA program, which employs merchant ships in times of national peril. This means that our crews are trained in accordance with the VISA policies and requirements.

Again, Trailer Bridge is reviewing the entire issue of

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maritime security and our role within the governmental policies and procedures. We understand that it is essential, whether you transport on land or sea, not to operate without safeguards in place, keeping in mind the horrendous events of September 11th. We pride ourselves in having a well- balanced system in our workplaces and at our terminals, and this translates into a more secure operation for maritime security.

We are a Jones Act carrier, and we absolutely support the continuation of that system. The Merchant Marine in this country needs to be supported by our government and needs to be established as a strong and vital system for domestic security. In times of emergency like these, a strong merchant seamen program can strengthen our defenses and our security. Over the years, this segment of our industry has been devastated, and our pool of seamen is low, and our country has been weakened by its lack of maritime presence. Today, it is essential that our government addresses the merchant marine issue and supports the system. A strong U.S. Merchant Marine means a strong homeland defense.

-MarEx

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P O R T S

Interview with Phillip Allen,

Photo: James Clark

Phillip Allen

T H E

Executive Director,

Port Everglades

MX: The events of September 11th have reshaped our

lives, and, in fact, the way the maritime industry does business. Has your organization begun to do a “Risk Assessment” for the protection of commerce, clients, and your employees?

Allen: Yes. Prior to Sept. 11, Port Everglades already had a four-year security enhancement plan in place which was approved by the Broward County Board of County Commissioners. The plan focused on drug interdiction and protecting cargo from being stolen.

Since Sept. 11, the port reassessed the security plan to include the threat of terrorism. The Commission approved the new plan and directed port staff to implement the plan within one year, as opposed to four years.

MX: The expansion of heightened security by the government sector will require effort by the business sector as well. Will your organization require a screening process for vendors, security passes for employees, and vessel inspections while in port?

Allen: Yes. In 1998, Port Everglades began intensive background checks for the issuance of Restricted Access Area Permits (I.D. cards) to individuals who work at the seaport. Today, we have deputies from the Broward Sheriff’s Office and guardsmen from the Florida National Guard at all entrances to check ID badges and screen other individuals entering the port.

MX: Can you discuss the key differences in your pre-September 11 priorities and those that now exist in your company in terms of insurance, rewriting of company policies, and expansion of budgets for employee awareness training?

Allen: Increased the number of restricted zones throughout the port to include more landside area, as

opposed to just the docks and terminal areas.

Working with the Broward Sheriff’s Office and our consultants to enhance security standards.

Enhancing awareness in the surrounding community to decrease the amount of through traffic in the port (Port Everglades has been a short-cut to the beach) and increase the community’s understanding of the port’s significance to the local economy and standard of living.

MX: As government officials move forward to provide homeland security for its citizens, what do you believe needs to be done to provide a safer environment for U.S. commerce on our waterways?

Allen: The national debate must move go beyond the aviation industry concerns where the events of September 11 began. We now must consider the safety and security of another critical state and national transportation link – our seaports.

MX: Senators Bob Graham and Ernest Hollings have initiated the Port and Maritime Security Act of 2001.

This legislation will require each port in the nation to perform a risk analysis and then secure their ports based upon their vulnerability. Ninety-five percent of all international trade moves by sea, and eighty percent of all domestic commerce moves through our waterways. The funding mechanism for government mandates is most generally passed on to the end-users.

There is no question that the port authorities will share these costs with their customers, the steamship lines and harbor operating companies who already operate on the slimmest of margins. Is it reasonable to suggest that our government will subsidize the airlines, the steamship lines, and the other harbor operating organizations in order to secure the marine environment?

Continued on page 78

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The Maritime Executive

T H E

Richard Steinke, Executive Director, Port of Long Beach MX: Risk assessments for ships, terminals, ports and

operating organizations are essential. SB 1214, (Graham–Hollings Bill) will provide $1,143B over the next four years, with $322M being authorized for 2002.

Being involved with Capitol Hill, do you believe that the government has moved swiftly and effectively in dealing with maritime security?

Steinke: The Hollings Bill (s-1214) will provide a specified amount of money. We don’t know when the funds will be available or what we have to do to access them. There are some estimates that the first of the money may not be available until December, 2002. That is a long time off.

MX: Since 9-11-01, terrorist have proven effective, in that they have disrupted our way of life, our economy, and created chaos in the world. One of our most vulnerable areas is waterborne commerce and its vessels.

Has your organization advised its members on precautions necessary to operate safely?

Steinke: Long before September 11th, we initiated security and safety committees and working groups to discuss security needs and issues. As a result, we were able to respond quickly to the events that occurred on September 11th, and put plans into effect that had already been discussed in the event of an unusual or unexpected catastrophic event.

MX: Looking at the complexity of maritime security which requires securing all ports, petroleum tankers, container ships, cruise lines, and the integrated intermodal system, is it realistic to secure our 361 ports, 95,000 miles of coastline, over 1,000 harbor channels, 25,000 miles of inland and intercoastal waterways, and more than 3,700 terminals that handle passengers and cargo?

Steinke: Yes, but it will take additional resources to sustain the level of security that is in place and even more money to increase it. It is unrealistic to think that we can ever be 100% safe and secure- however, we can and are doing more to improve security. Ultimately, we will have to decide “how safe can we afford to be.” It is First Quarter 2002

Richard Steinke

Interview with

P O R T S

important that we achieve balance between security and commerce at our ports.

MX: It has been said that terrorist seek out soft targets.

Do you believe that all vessel crews should be trained in force protection measures?

Steinke: The training of vessel crews in the area of force protection is important. Many shipping companies are aware of this and have taken appropriate steps.

MX: The international shipping community in this country handles over 18 million containers a year, with the imported volume being around 11 million containers. This is an average of 30,000 containers per day.

With hundreds of ships calling our nation’s ports every day, what can the port authorities and longshoremen do to prevent a terrorist attack coming from an enclosed and locked container?

Steinke: The U.S. Customs Service has an effective, tiered, matrix system in place to evaluate and assess the contents of containers. They know the shippers, distribution chains, and shipping companies. They have the capability of scanning containers for which they have information that suggests they may contain suspicious contents or that may appear to be suspicious.

Longshore workers and port employees assist in this effort by being vigilant and by reporting suspicious or unusual activity. Response to suspicious or unusual incidents is prompt.

MX: The Coast Guard is reviewing cargo manifests, and is requiring 96-hour notification to review crew lists to identify known terrorists. The San Francisco Bar Pilots are boarding vessels with armed sea-marshals.

Do you think that the San Francisco plan is sufficient, and do you believe that all pilots should do the same?

Steinke: The Coast Guard is conducting Sea Marshal operations in LA/LB and San Diego, as well as in San Francisco. It is an effective way of keeping a ship’s control in the right hands.

-MarEx

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P O R T S

Allen Continued from page 76

Phillip Allen

T H E

Our national and state governments need to develop a more fair playing ground between air transportation and sea transportation.

MX: There are 361 port complexes in the United States.

Many of them are located near major cities with heavy populations, and these ports present special security problems because of their open environments. In light of the fact that most ports are called on by foreign vessels, is it reasonable that each ship have its hull scanned prior to entering into each and every port?

Allen: Several of the cruise lines are already having their hulls scanned prior to entering ports of call.

MX: The international shipping community in this country handles over 18 million containers a year, with the imported volume being around 11 million containers. This is an average of 30,000 containers per day.

With hundreds of ships calling our nation’s ports every day, what can the port authorities and longshoremen do to prevent a terrorist attack coming from an enclosed and locked container?

Allen: Increase the use of technology such as x-ray and enhanced documentation of commodities. The entire distribution network needs to be strengthened to ensure safety and security. All individuals working at seaports need to be involved in security measures through education, training, and notification of enforcement.

MX: In this country, all oil terminals have a closeddoor policy. Should all of this nation’s ports follow suit?

Allen: Yes. MX: The Coast Guard has done an incredible job in securing our coastlines and ports. Its crews have been working 12 hour shifts, seven days a week, and approximate 2,700 reservists have been called up. What can be done to support the Coast Guard, which will be certainly overwhelmed in a very short period of time?

Allen: In the short-term, the Coast Guard should be supported by the National Guard. In the long range, federal reserves will be needed.

MX: The Coast Guard is reviewing cargo manifests, and is requiring 96-hour notification to review crew lists to identify known terrorists. The San Francisco Bar Pilots are boarding vessels with armed U.S. marshals.

Do you think that the San Francisco plan is sufficient, and do you believe that all pilots should do the same?

Allen: Port Everglades has implemented armed security for pilots and armed presence in the bridge.

MX: Cruise ships present another and ever more detailed set of circumstances because of the nature of its cargo, Allen:

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which is passengers. Will all cruise liners be boarded by the Coast Guard and Immigration and Customs, as this would extend our resources even further?

Allen: Yes MX: The cruise line industry is an $18 billion a year industry and employs over 275,000 Americans. The International Council of Cruise lines insists that its member liners have security plans in place that are examined each year by the Coast Guard. These plans state that, similar to airport passengers, cruise passengers are required to present identification, and that all luggage and carry-ons are x-rayed, hand searched, or searched by dogs. The cruise lines are now using metal detectors for embarking and disembarking. This part of the maritime industry seems to have its act together. Is there more that can be done?

Allen: We believe that the private security used by cruise lines in the terminals should undergo standard certification and training. In addition, security personnel should be given greater significance, and supervision must be maintained.

MX: Looking at the complexity of maritime security which requires securing all ports, petroleum tankers, container ships, cruise lines, and the integrated intermodal system, is our government, with support from the private sectors, realistically able to manage and secure our 361 ports, 95,000 miles of coastline, over 1,000 harbor channels, 25,000 miles of inland and intercoastal waterways, and more than 3,700 terminals that handle passengers and cargo?

Allen: We must find a way.

MX: The United States is the largest consumer of petroleum in the world. We consume approximately 18 million barrels a day, and a barrel of oil is 42 gallons. So, as a nation, we consume approximate 756 million gallons of oil per day. Of our daily consumption, approximate 8 million barrels of oil per day is imported and arrives on ships. Because of the very nature of the cargo, should all tankers be hull scanned and stopped for inspection?

Allen: Tanker lines need to help determine security measures. Security of petroleum storage areas on land needs to be increased.

MX: Ports generally handle intermodal cargoes that move via rail. What kinds of security initiatives have been put in place due to the separate handling of each container by both the port authority and the railroad?

Allen: External to the port.

-MarEx

The Maritime Executive

T H E

MX: The port was reopened on the morning of

September 13th. Considering that your offices were in the World Trade Centers that were attacked two days prior, what was done to get business moving again so quickly?

Larrabee: I had three priorities following the attack on the World Trade Center: First was taking care of my staff, determining where they were and if they were all right. With one tragic exception, all of the Port Authority’s Port Commerce staff survived the attack.

The second priority was finding a base of operation for key staff to start sorting out how we could re-open the port safely. With tremendous support from our New Jersey marine terminal staff, we were able to set up a base of operations at the Port Newark/Elizabeth administration building. From that location, we were able to get to work on the third priority, re-opening the port. That effort was undertaken with incredible cooperation among the various federal agencies, Coast Guard, FBI, Customs, state and local law enforcement agencies, Port Authority police, as well as terrific support from the terminal operators and labor.

The federal agencies made an assessment of the potential for any additional threats, including threats from the water or at the port. The Coast Guard instituted additional security procedures, and deployed both additional personnel and resources into the port.

Customs instituted additional procedures and received additional resources, including two additional mobile container x-ray machines to increase the number of inspections occurring in the port. State and local law enforcement supplemented Port Authority police in patrolling sensitive port locations and spot-checking trucks entering and leaving the port. With all of these resources deployed and measures in place, we had the confidence to be able to re-open the port to business on the morning of September 13th. It was a tremendous effort on the part of many, many players, and

everyone involved should be proud of his role. Re-opening the port was not only important from a purely “Let’s get back to business” perspective, but it was a very important show of resolve and determination on the part of the people of the New YorkNew Jersey region to the shipping community and the world at large under unimaginable and emotionally difficult circumstances MX: Risk assessments for ships, terminals, ports, and operating organizations are essential. The Port and Maritime Security Act of 2001 will provide $1,143B over the next four years, with $322M being authorized for 2002. Being involved with Capitol Hill, do you believe that the government has moved swiftly and effectively in dealing with maritime security?

Larrabee: There are two different issues here.

Certainly in the case of the New York-New Jersey region and the response of the federal agencies to our immediate needs, we saw a tremendous response, but, again, this response was the result of specific events and done on an emergency basis.

On the broader issue of Hollings-Graham Port Security bill, I think we’re very fortunate that Senators Hollings and Graham were focused on this issue well before the events of September 11th. While the Senate has passed a bill, the House is still developing its version of the legislation. The Congress has been very receptive to suggestions from the port community. As a result, I think there is a very good chance that we’ll have a port security law that will help our ports and industry. The challenge, of course, will be to fund the provisions of the bill in a time of limited resources.

MX: Looking at the complexity of maritime security which requires securing all ports, petroleum tankers, container ships, cruise lines, and the integrated intermodal system, is it realistic to secure our 631 ports,

Richard Larrabee

Interview with Richard Larrabee, Director, Port of NY/NJ

Continued on page 80

First Quarter 2002

P O R T S

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P O R T S

Larrabee Continued from page 79

Richard Larrabee

T H E

95,000 miles of coastline, over 1,000 harbor channels, 25,000 miles of inland and intercoastal waterways, and more than 3,700 terminals that handle passengers and cargo?

Larrabee: Like a lot of issues, the answer is: It depends. It depends on: the level of risk; the level of security necessary based upon a risk or threat assessment; the available resources, etc. All of these are issues that the appropriate federal agencies, starting with the Homeland Security Office, needs to (and I’m sure will) consider.

MX: The expansion of heightened security by the government sector will require an enormous effort by the port authorities as well. What has your port initiated in terms of screening vendors, requiring security passes for employees and tenants, and vessel inspections while in port?

Larrabee: The Port of New York and New Jersey has had in place various security measures that are, for the most part, not found elsewhere in the country.

Since the 1950s, the Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor has operated to reduce criminal activity and screened a large population of port employees.

Over the years, the Port Authority and terminal operators invested in physical and system security measures that were intended to reduce the potential for criminal activity, notably theft. As such, perimeters are secure, and automated systems identify many of the persons entering container terminals. Some of our terminal operators electronically and digitally record who is leaving the premises with which container and chassis.

MX: The international shipping community in this country handles over 18 million containers a year, with the imported volume being around 11 million containers. This is an average of 30,000 containers per day.

With hundreds of ships calling on our nation’s port every day, what can the port authorities and longshoremen do to prevent a terrorist attack coming from an enclosed and locked container?

Larrabee: It is neither a port authorities nor the longshoremen’s responsibility to prevent an “attack coming from an enclosed and locked container.” We need to provide support to those agencies that have that responsibility. However, our goal should be to prevent such a device from ever making it to the United States. The only way to do that is to make maritime security an international issue. Foreign countries must cooperate with us and hold the shipper and port of origin responsible for verifying the contents of a 80

container, similar to what is currently done with the shipment of hazardous materials.

The Commandant of the Coast Guard, Admiral Loy, has recommend that the International Maritime Organization (IMO) establish a working group to look at port security and terrorism, specifically at the issues of cargo visibility and accountability on the part of the port of origin. We support this proposal and believe that the IMO is the most appropriate forum to address this issue of international concern.

MX: The Coast Guard is reviewing cargo manifests, and is requiring 96-hour notification to review crew lists to identify known terrorists. The San Francisco Bar Pilots are boarding vessels with armed sea-marshals.

Do you think that the San Francisco plan is sufficient, and do you believe that all pilots should do the same?

Larrabee: This is a determination that the Coast Guard must make. They have recently instituted this program in the Port of New York and New Jersey as well.

MX: The Coast Guard has been charged with the task of maritime security. S 1214 Section 105 authorizes $50M beginning next year and through 2006 for Port Security Vulnerability Assessments and direct funding for the Coast Guard. With 361 ports in our nation, is it reasonable to assume that the Captain of the port for each port is to be responsible to provide the Secretary of Transportation and the Commandant of the Coast Guard with a clear and concise plan, instead of putting the onus on the port authorities?

Larrabee: A fundamental question regarding port security still remains, “Who’s in charge?”

Therefore, among the challenges that we face in addressing the issue of port security is, in the wake of the 1989 Exxon Valdez disaster, we faced a similar question when it came to identifying who was in charge in the event of an oil spill in one of our harbors. Today, we have an answer to that question, because the Congress and others took a coordinated approach to developing new laws that laid out clear responsibilities and roles for each of the agencies involved in responding to an oil spill event. This could serve as a model to coordinate the various agency jurisdictions to first prevent and, if necessary, respond to a terrorist attack on our ports. It is an issue we hope that the Congress and the Office of Homeland Security will address.

-MarEx

The Maritime Executive

S H I P B U I L D E R S

MX: The events of September 11th have reshaped our

lives, and, in fact, the way the maritime industry does business. Has your organization begun to do a “Risk Assessment” for the protection of commerce, clients, and your employees?

Bollinger: Our business involves various “risk assessments” on an ongoing basis. As a government contractor, we continually are evaluating our exposures to all sorts of outside risks. We don’t consider our facilities to be of particular interest to terrorists. We feel that other, much more visible targets are more at risk.

MX: The Coast Guard has done an incredible job securing our coastlines and ports. Its crews have been working 12-hour shifts, seven days a week, and approximate 2,700 reservists have been called up. What can be done to support the Coast Guard, which will be certainly overwhelmed in a very short period of time?

Bollinger: The Coast Guard will need more operating funding, more capital assets, and more ability to expand its role by working with the Navy and other governmental agencies to help offset the need for so many more personnel. I’m pleased to see that the President has acknowledged this need in a recent speech.

MX: The expansion of heightened security by the government sector will require an effort by the business sector as well. Will your organization require a screening process for vendors, security passes for employees, and establish enhanced security measures for your yards?

Bollinger: We already had a pretty aggressive screening process in place for our vendors. We are constantly evaluating the necessary safeguards, while trying to keep our customers and vendors relatively satisfied.

MX: Most businesses within the maritime community are undergoing risk assessments of their docks, terminals, and facilities. Has your organization established a team to provide vulnerability and risk assessments for your facilities and employees?

Bollinger: Our risk management department is constantly evaluating these risks. We don’t especially feel that our operations are a target for terrorist attacks.

MX: As government officials move forward to provide First Quarter 2002

Donald “Boysie”Bollinger

Interview with Donald “Boysie” BollingerChairman Bollinger Shipyards

homeland security for its citizens, what do you believe needs to be done to provide a safer environment for U.S. commerce on our waterways?

Bollinger: The Coast Guard has taken a substantial role in providing a much higher level of security for our ports and waterways. Additionally, Congress recently passed legislation which also increases our port security. We feel that the marine industry, like the rest of the nation, will be living with this “new normalcy” for a long time.

MX: Looking at the complexity of maritime security which requires the securing of all ports, petroleum tankers, container ships, cruise lines, and the integrated intermodal system, is our government, with support from the private sectors, realistically able to manage and secure our 361 ports, 95,000 miles of coastline, over 1,000 harbor channels, 25,000 miles of inland and intercoastal waterways, and more than 3,700 terminals that handle passengers and cargo?

Bollinger: We don’t feel that it is only the government’s responsibility to make sure that we are safe. I think all Americans have “stepped up to the plate,” realizing that some of the effort has to come from our normal “Joe Blow” on the street. I’m very proud to be an American and to watch how Americans and the world have come together on these security issues.

MX: The Coast Guard is reviewing cargo manifests, and is requiring 96-hour notification to review crew lists to identify known terrorists. The San Francisco Bar Pilots are boarding vessels with armed U.S. marshals.

Do you think that the San Francisco plan is sufficient, and do you believe that all pilots should do the same?

Bollinger: We probably need to be specific as to where we need additional security. This is not a risk that needs such a broad-based approach that we become ineffective. No amount of precaution is enough, when we suspect a specific area or target is vulnerable. That same precaution is not necessarily the answer for each situation. We have to start thinking like terrorists to prevent the ill will they would like to bestow on us as Americans.

-MarEx

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Allen Walker

S H I P B U I L D E R S

Shipyard Security Consistency, Knowledge & Coordination

by Allen Walker President, Shipbuilders Council of America

P

rior to September 11, the level and type of security at U.S. shipyards depended almost entirely on the kind of work performed in each yard.

Shipyards building highly sensitive combatant equipment for the armed services have always had extremely sophisticated security controls. The government began demanding increased security measures in yards that perform repair and maintenance on military vessels after the terrorist attack on the USS COLE. Security in shipyards, whose order book consists of purely commercial construction and/or repair, has traditionally been focused on protecting the yard against theft or vandalism. The world changed after September 11.

Today, shipyards, like all businesses, are more focused on security. Those yards doing business with the military must meet increasingly demanding requirements, although the requirements seem to vary depending on the port or area in which the yard is located. SCA member yards engaged in Navy ship construction and repair are working closely with Navy officials, as well as with state and local governments to coordinate safety measures and response plans. Since September 11, these activities have moved to the highest priority level.

Shipyards, large and small, all over the country are working with the Coast Guard and vessel operators to protect shipyard workers, facilities, vessels under their control, and ports and waterways against any potential terrorist activity. So far, there has not been a national, coordinated government response for shipyard security. Congress is still grappling with maritime security issues; however, virtually every piece of legislation 82

being considered includes provisions related to security at maritime facilities. Most belief that the ultimate responsibility for developing and coordinating security protocols for shipyards will fall to the Coast Guard.

The domestic shipyard industry from the smallest shipyard to the largest is committed to safety and to complying fully with whatever government measures are ultimately adopted; however, it must be understood that increased safety measures carry costs with them. Some measures will be expensive to implement and have an impact on shipyard efficiency. SCA believes that it is necessary to develop a national response plan to ensure uniform safety and to ensure that shipyards in one part of the country do not face a competitive disadvantage because of uneven requirements or enforcement.

SCA also believes that safety should not stop at our borders. Certainly, we will take whatever measures appropriate for protection at home, but U.S. military vessels and other U.S.-flag vessels operate all over the globe. We believe strongly that the Government must take measures to ensure that these craft are safe when they enter foreign shipyards. Acknowledging the risk, which in most cases is more acute overseas than at home of putting strategically important or high risk vessels in facilities where there is little if any U.S. control over security measures or personnel is vital.

Protection of assets and workers against terrorist attacks in the U.S. is only part of the problem.

Protective measures must be implemented in every port or shipyard where a U.S.-flag vessel docks.-MarEx

SCA believes that it is necessary to develop a national response plan to ensure uniform safety and to ensure that shipyards in one part of the country do not face a competitive disadvantage because of uneven requirements or enforcement.

The Maritime Executive

T H E

Pete McIsaac

Interview with Captain Pete McIsaac President of the San Francisco Bar Pilots MX: Marine pilots are on the front lines of foreign vessel traffic. Has your organization instructed its pilot membership to provide some level of guidance and precautions to be taken when boarding various, high-risk ships?

P I L O T S

McIsaac: The San Francisco Bar Pilots are following the lead of the USCG’s Sea Marshal program and the guidelines developed during the Port of Oakland’s Port Security Meetings. We’ve also had the USCG provide a security briefing at our monthly meeting. All pilots are Continued on page 84

AN OUNCE OF PREVENTION IS WORTH TONS OF OIL AND A CLEANER ENVIRONMENT. R ip 400 square feet of steel from most fully loaded oil tankers and you’ve got an environmental nightmare. But when the Guardian—one of seven double-hulled tankers in Conoco’s worldwide fleet—was rammed on Oct. 31, 1997, not one drop of the ship’s 550,000 barrels of crude oil escaped into the Calcasieu River at the Port of Lake Charles, Louisiana, USA. Protecting the environment was a major reason Conoco decided to become the first petroleum company to voluntarily commit to build only double-hulled tankers. We made that call in 1990 before U.S. legislation was created, mandating double-hulled protection for tankers in U.S. ports by 2015. Why? Because we wanted to get to the future first.

We still do, especially in transporting crude oil that is used to meet energy demand. How have we done? In 1997, 1998 and 1999, the U.S. National Safety Council Tanker Group ranked Conoco shipping first in safety performance.

First in safety performance. That’s Conoco’s goal. And we’re doubly prepared to carry it out.

600 N. Dairy Ashford Houston, Texas, USA 77079 (281) 293-1000

P I L O T S

Captain Pete McIsaac

T H E

McIsaac Continued from page 83 at a heightened level of awareness.

MX: A marine pilot’s job is boarding ships outside a harbor and providing navigational expertise to those ships. There are many vessels that are high-risks ships, like LNG tankers and ammonium vessels that are highrisk by virtue of their cargo. Do you think that the Coast Guard should board, inspect, and hull scan these high-risks ships, no matter what the flag state, prior to that ship entering a harbor?

McIsaac:The intelligence community is our first line of defense against terrorism.

While the USCG has had a presence on every ship deemed ‘high risk’ entering SF Bay since late September, there is no way to protect against every threat all the time. That was proven when the USS Cole was attacked by a suicide bomber in Yemen.

MX: The Senate recently passed the “Port and Maritime Security Act of 2001, which now has to get through the House of Representatives. The bill provides $1.143 billion for the next four years for port vulnerability studies, new scanning equipment for U.S. Customs, and for local port security committees. The bill also provides for the training of new sea-marshals to board vessels with the pilots for inspections. Were there any provisions within the bill that will benefit marine pilots?

McIsaac: Any bill that increases the security and safety of navigation benefits the San Francisco Bar Pilots.

We have been involved with the Sea Marshals since their inception on September 15th. Since then, we’ve watched the program grow and develop. Any additional training for sea marshals, especially in the transfer between pilot boats and vessels, benefits the pilots.

Finally, our pilot boats and station security is obviously important to us. We hope there will be enough funding in the Hollings bill to allow grants for small organizations, such as pilots and tug operators, to improve their physical security.

MX: The San Francisco Bar Pilots were the first to use sea-marshals because of the narrow confines of the port entrance and the risk to the Golden Gate Bridge.

Should the sea-marshal program be employed in every port or just in those deemed to be high-risk ports?

McIsaac: Each port would have to be assessed individually.

MX: Force protection and chemical, biological, and radiological training are currently being offered by MITAGS. Do you believe that marine pilots on the whole should be trained in some level of force protec-

84

tion? Furthermore, should pilots be trained in small arms protection?

McIsaac: The State Commission that oversees us is currently evaluating the training options that are available to see if they would enhance safety and security.

A pilot’s job is one of safety, not security, so mandatory weapons training should not be required. If individual pilots elect to get the training and a CWP to carry a gun, then they should be allowed to.

MX: Ports and marine terminals are the center of gravity for maritime commerce. Many ports have had National Guard troops at port entrances. However, these costs are becoming prohibitive for many states.

Should marine port security be federalized?

McIsaac: Port security is not my area of expertise, but, in my opinion, it will take a better coordination of assets to provide comprehensive security. Currently, you have the USCG providing security from the waterside, the U.S. Customs overseeing the cargo, and local or port police providing shore-side security. Perhaps each major port needs a ‘Tom Ridge’ like position that is empowered to ensure that the various security providers work together to provide a seamless system.

MX: The USCG is clearly overwhelmed. The Congressional appropriation for 2002 will be $307 million in emergency operational expenses. Considering the magnitude of maritime security in conjunction with its traditional tasks, are these new emergency appropriations sufficient for its maritime security duties?

McIsaac: The USCG priorities have changed dramatically since 9/11. If they are to continue these additional security measures, additional money and personnel will be required. The US Congress will need to provide the funding to insure that commerce can continue to move freely and safely.

MX: Maritime industry executives have stated that the federal government, via the Coast Guard, should employ existing boat assets owned by private companies to patrol ports and waterways. Armed sea-marshals could be put on these boats to keep private watercraft a few hundred yards away from commercial vessels lying at berth in port facilities. Is this a feasible measure for maritime security?

McIsaac: Only if the USCG were unable to provide the assets necessary to insure security. It makes more sense to enhance and increase the USCG’s capabilities then to use private assets.

-MarEx The Maritime Executive

C L A S S I F I C AT I O N

By Chris. J. Wiernicki President ABS Consulting Special to The Maritime Executive

O

ur world may have been irrevocably changed by the events of September 11th, but there are tools available to assess and manage the changes that have been thrust upon us that are tried, tested, and effective.

The principles of risk management were developed in concert with the growth of the nuclear industry.

They have subsequently been applied to a host of industries and activities, from the offshore sector to municipal utilities. As Washington focuses attention on the vulnerabilities of the nation’s marine transportation system (MTS), particularly the ports through which our economic lifeblood of international trade flows so freely, those same principles provide a clear, logical, and highly effective method of dealing with the new threats against our nation’s security.

Risk management is a scientific, systematic, decision making process that looks at the totality of risks inherent in a system. It addresses risks to the facility; it assesses operational risks; it considers catastrophic risk, including the consequences of terrorist action, and it covers business process risk. In the most simplistic terms, it poses and answers three basic questions: 1) What is the threat?

2) What is the potential damage?

3) What can be done about it?

From a risk perspective, these three questions are referred to as hazard identification, risk assessment, and risk management. The objective of a traditional risk management program is to determine which risks can be transferred, through appropriate insurance coverage for example, and which risks must be mitigated.

The threat of terrorist action reduces this to just the latter. It is not possible to transfer such a risk. The entire focus must be on how to deal with it through response plans that may include hardening the facilities, and increasing training and greater awareness among a host of possible actions.

The U.S. Coast Guard, through the Department of

Chris J. Wiernicki

Using Risk Management to Strengthen our Nation’s Maritime Security

S O C I E T I E S

Transportation, has been charged by Congress with developing methodology of evaluating the security and assessing the vulnerability of the nation’s ports to hostile action. The Port and Maritime Security Act of 2001 sets out the proposed requirements, including those for the development of a maritime facility security plan and vessel security plans.

ABS Consulting is the top ranked risk management specialist in the United States. The company has previously assisted the US Coast Guard in introducing risk based criteria into its decision making process. As an affiliate of ABS, one of the world’s largest ship classification societies, ABS Consulting is also able to offer a unique, maritime informed approach to the evaluation of marine facility security. It is developing a series of proposals for the Coast Guard to consider, as it responds to the directive from Congress.

It could be counter-productive to publicly detail the types of specific risks from terrorist activity that have been identified, even though many can be imagined.

However the macro-approach that should be taken is relatively straightforward. It begins with an identification of targets within the marine transportation system. These include vessels, shoreside facilities, and navigable waterways.

The process then considers the threats associated with each of these potential targets. Some of these threats are present at all times, such as those from natural disasters such as earthquakes or storms.

Others relate to accidents that could occur through human error or equipment malfunction. Then, there are those threats specifically arising from terrorist attack or sabotage.

To be effective, the analysis must determine the vulnerability of each target to the specific threat. The vulnerability varies in the face of terrorist threats, natural disaster threats, and accidents.

Continued on page 87

First Quarter 2002

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Clay Mait land

C L A S S I F I C AT I O N

I

S O C I E T I E S

Old Vulnerabilities, New Threats

by Clay Maitland, President, International Registries, Inc.

nternational Registries, Inc., is a relatively “old” company within the maritime industry.

Founded in 1948 by a number of executives, including some former United States Government officials, our business is to administer vessel registrations under the Marshall Islands Flag. One of the founding executives was Allen Dulles, who acted as our legal counsel.

He would eventually become Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and, as you can imagine, we have always had a strong bias towards institutional security.

In 1993, in a conscious effort to provide faster, on-site ship registrations in some of the largest maritime centers in the world, such as London, Hong Kong, Oslo, Hamburg and Athens, our organization decentralized. Our decentralization meant that we had to create a stand-alone information storage and transmittal system available at each center. On September 11th, our midtown Manhattan office business activity was obviously disrupted. However, our global telecommunications network was maintained by our foreign offices, and we continued to register ships and monitor organizational threats around the clock. Our headquarters in Reston, Virginia is a self-contained, company owned building, which meant that we are able to control its security and to protect our employees. The events of September 11th demonstrated to us that our decentralized global operation was less vulnerable to world events and business disruption than one operating from only one location.

Our greatest resource is our employees, and they need to feel safe in their work environment. Since September 11th, the workplace has acquired heightened security structure. However, the invisible threat of anthrax creates a whole new problem, and the search and employee identification badges that have been imposed, especially in the New York office buildings, seem inadequate, if not irrelevant. It seems hard to imagine that the cave-dwelling enemy in Afghanistan could turn workplace security into a nightmare.

Corporate security and its technology is clearly lagging behind the requirements of this new world in which we now live.

The attacks on the World Trade Center have provided us with another interesting lesson. Many small and medium-sized shipping companies depend upon “hard copy” documents and records, which, in many cases, is an unavoidable fact. At International Registries, we reduce the risk of the loss of recorded ship mortgages by the dispersal of counterpart originals or “hard copies” throughout our organizational network. The lesson that should be learned is never to maintain only a single, original document, but to disperse duplicate “hard” copies to secured, off-site locations.

Additionally, employee security requires our special attention. Our valuable colleagues need us to perform a vulnerability risk analysis of their work environment.

Only experts can do this analysis. The recent anthrax attacks, which are being carried out in the mail system, are a prime example of how conventional security precautions are wholly ineffective against the unconventional warfare of terrorists. There are no simple answers to these safety issues. However, there are many protective measures that have been tried and tested and that are effective.

At International Registries, we have had a history of being security conscious. Since 1948, our employees have witnessed quite a lot of “physical threat experience.” In 1968, antiwar protests disrupted downtown Manhattan. The City was once again disrupted when the Puerto Rican National Liberation Front unleashed a series of bombs and created chaos and killed people.

Our London office was damaged after the IRA set off a major car bomb in St. Mary Axe, in London’s “square mile.” On September 10th several of our senior executives happened to be airborne on United and American Airlines flights out of Washington Dulles and JFK airContinued on page 87

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ports. With terrorism prevailing in the world, we are all at risk, and, unfortunately, there are no guarantees, so we have to take our chances. Global corporations, not unlike many American corporations that do business overseas, are learning to reduce their exposure against terrorist activities.

At International Registries, some precautions that we insist that our employees take are: When our executives travel to foreign countries that are not considered safe, they stay in touch with U.S. authorities.

Even here in the United States, at our offices in Reston, Virginia and in midtown Manhattan, we insist that all employees keep in contact with their offices, and one another. We stress building security and maintain good relations with local and national security professionals. We ask our employees to follow defensive rules for personal safety, and they all know where the emergency exists are at our offices and

Wiernicki Continued from page 85 Again, it could be counter-productive to provide a public blueprint of these vulnerabilities, but the consequences have been widely discussed in the aftermath of the World Trade Center disaster. They would include human casualties, economic impact, environmental impact, and symbolic impact, among many others.

These steps address the first two questions of “What are the threats?” and “What is the potential damage?” mentioned above. They provide the framework upon which to build the preparedness and response plan that addresses the third question of “What can be done about it?”

Although this plan may address specific responses for individual components within the transportation system, such as an oil terminal or a cruise ship, for example, the strength of the risk management approach is in the totality of the analysis that considers the full spectrum of facilities, activities, and attendant risks. It demands a circular approach to the analysis that encourages continuous evaluation and improvement. It begins with awareness that leads to planning, prevention, and response. That response then demands renewed awareness of the changed environment.

There is a very wide range of risk control actions available to industry and government, when it considFirst Quarter 2002

Clay Mait land Chris Wiernicki

Maitland Continued from page 86

S O C I E T I E S

throughout the buildings.

Regarding vessel safety for ships that are registered under the Marshall Islands Flag, there are a few safety issues that will remain proprietary. However, two things come to mind that are common sense. The first is the protection of the ships while they are in ports.

There are certain vulnerabilities when ships are being serviced at terminals. The USS Cole comes to mind.

Second, what we must develop here in the United States regarding port security is the partnership of flag registries, port authorities, the FBI, U.S. Customs, the new Homeland Defense Agency, and, of course, the Coast Guard. We need a high level of cooperation and flow of security information between industry and government. It is vital to the future success of maritime security within this nation and around the world.

Wayne Gretzky, the Hall of Fame hockey player, once said, “The main thing in hockey isn’t where the puck is now, but where it’s going.”

-MarEx

ers potential threats against our maritime infrastructure. These range from limiting access to certain facilities, to strengthening facilities to better withstand blast and fire, to greater surveillance and improved detection. A detailed risk management program will evaluate each of these, identify what steps will be needed to implement the response, and what resources- financial, physical or human, must be allocated to make the response effective.

The development of Port Vulnerability Assessments has been assigned a high priority by the US Coast Guard, as it responds to the threat of previously unimagined, non-traditional attacks on this nation’s infrastructure. Many of our ports are of critical strategic importance to our military and economy. It is not possible to eliminate the threats that could be made against them, nor to guarantee their integrity if attacked. But the careful application of risk management techniques can help to clearly identify what those threats are, the vulnerabilities that exist within our marine infrastructure, and provide practical responses that will mitigate the risk that such an attack could successfully disrupt our security.

-MarEx

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Captain Timothy Brown

T H E

Interview with Captain Timothy Brown, President, Master, Mates & Pilots Union

The events of September 11th have reshaped our lives, and, in fact, the way the maritime industry does business. Has your organization begun to do a “Risk Assessment” for the protection of commerce, clients and your employees?

Capt Brown: About three weeks after September 11th, the Department of Transportation called to ask what the MM&P was doing in terms of security against terrorism. We don’t take terrorism lightly here at all, but I said if Bin Laden and his terrorists are plotting against the MM&P, they’re not as smart or as devious as we think they are. Now, that being said, with regard to ships, vessel security is an on-going debate. We have a strong working relationship with the Coast Guard, and have asked them to employ MM&P mariners for security on all inbound ships. Currently, the Coast Guard is over-tasked and they don’t have the expertise or manpower to evaluate a threat to a ship. Of course, they have the ability to review a crew list, manifest and ride on the bridge during a harbor passage. However, our mariners are the manning component of a vessel operation and are very knowledgeable about ships and know where to look during sabotage inspections.

MITAGS, our training institute, could provide security personnel for ships in a matter of months and we must provide anti-terror measures now, not down the road.

MX: The Coast Guard has done an incredible job securing our coastlines and ports. Its crews have been working 12-hour shifts, seven days a week, and approximately 2,700 reservists have been called up. What can be done to support the Coast Guard, which will be certainly overwhelmed in a very short period of time?

Capt Brown: In terms of the Coast Guard providing National Defense measures, our deck and engineer officers can become a valuable asset with regard to MX:

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security on ships. They can be the eyes and ears of the Coast Guard, because we understand where to look on a ship for potential sabotage and can monitor the most frequently used areas on a vessel. We can’t tell them if a bomb is buried somewhere in the cargo. However, there are scanners that can be used to provide that information. While there are only a few of these scanners now in existence, Congress is ramping up for the purchase and deployment of more of these scanners in the U.S. Customs system. Furthermore, let me mention just one other thing about the Coast Guard.

Congress is great at addressing problems faced by this nation. However, when it concerns waterborne issues, they just throw it at the Coast Guard, but never give them the funding to effectively manage the problem.

Without the proper amount of appropriations for its National Defense tasks, the Coast Guard can only do so much.

If Congress is serious about national defense and wants the Coast Guard to be closely involved, then they need to fund them properly. It’s just that simple.

MX: The international shipping community in this country handles over 18 million containers a year, with the imported volume being around 11 million containers.

This is an average of 30,000 containers per day. With hundreds of ships calling our nation’s ports every day, what can the port authorities and longshoremen do to prevent a terrorist attack coming from an enclosed and The Maritime Executive

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Capt Brown: The only way

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International Council of Cruise Lines insists that its member liners have security plans in place that are already examined each year by the Coast Guard. These plans state that, similar to airport passengers, cruise passengers are required to present identification, and that all luggage and carry-ons are x-rayed, hand searched or searched by dogs. The cruise lines are now using metal detectors for embarking and disembarking. This part of the maritime industry seems to have its act together. Is there more that can be done?

Capt Brown: Cruise ships are, in reality, crewed by foreigners. It is important to ascertain the vessels that present the most risk to national security.

The general public is the actual cargo that cruise ships transport, with the crews being mostly foreign nationals. It seems reasonable that these ships have a high level of scrutiny.

MX: Looking at the complexity of maritime security which requires securing all ports, petroleum tankers, container ships, cruise lines and the integrated intermodal system, is our government, with support from the private sectors, realistically able to manage and secure our 361 ports, 95,000 miles of coastline, over 1,000 harbor channels, 25,000 miles of inland and intercoastal waterways and more than 3,700 terminals that handle passengers and cargo?

Capt Brown: What works in the Port of New York may not work in Coos Bay, Oregon. We have a big country to defend, and it has a lot of vulnerabilities.

With that said, we also have an extremely powerful government which is addressing each and every vulnerability with all its efforts. We have a common goal in this country finally, and that’s to secure our borders and waterways. September 11th was a wake-up call for every American. We are working hard as a nation, and we are working hard within the MM&P to bring about change and to provide a more secure environment for our citizens. We will survive this ordeal, and we will succeed in bringing terrorism to its knees. All we can do now is stay the course and see this thing through.

-MarEx

Without the proper amount of appropriations for its National Defense tasks, the Coast Guard can only do so much…If Congress is serious about national defense and wants the Coast Guard to be closely involved, then they need to fund them properly. It’s just that simple.

that port authorities will ever be 100% sure that there are not explosive devices within a container is to open the box up and inspect it. However, that’s not going to happen. The ports of Miami and Los Angeles / Long Beach have been inspecting numerous containers, and cargo flowing at these ports has slowed down dramatically.

MX: The Coast Guard is reviewing cargo manifests, and is requiring 96-hour notification to review crew lists to identify known terrorists. The San Francisco Bar Pilots are boarding vessels with armed U.S. marshals. Do you think that the San Francisco plan is sufficient, and do you believe that all pilots should do the same?

Capt Brown: Sea-marshals, without question, are an important safety measure.

Today, there are more foreigners sailing ships that enter this country than ever before, including U.S. Flag ships. The question is: what else should they be looking for while riding a ship into harbor? In New Orleans, an individual aboard an inbound vessel was seen taking photos of bridges and waterways. He was reported to the local police authorities that said they could do nothing. However, the Coast Guard came immediately and that person jumped overboard and was found to have large amounts of cash, as well as names of known terrorists. So, you never know who is on a ship, and, in this case, action by vigilant people paid off. If the sea-marshals are effective, then use them. Preventive safety is a valuable measure against terrorism.

MX: In this country, all oil terminals have a closed-door policy. Should all of this nation’s ports follow suit?

Capt Brown: First, there are many legitimate individuals who need to board a vessel while it’s in port.

As long as they are being checked out prior to entering the facilities, that’s fine. Oil terminals are different.

They have a different risk component and should be closed to any public access beyond its pertinent business activities.

MX: The cruise line industry is an $18 billion a year industry and employs over 275,000 Americans. The

Captain Timothy Brown

locked container?

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Michael Sacco

T H E

Statement from Michael Sacco President,

Seafarers Union

Members of the SIU were heavily involved in emergency operations in New York, beginning just moments after the first attack. SIU-crewed passenger ferries evacuated more than 160,000 people from Manhattan, and our boats also assisted in transporting emergency services personnel.

That same day, the SIU-crewed hospital ship, USNS Comfort, was activated and later sailed from Baltimore to New York. Initially expected to serve its typical role as a floating hospital, the vessel instead became an invaluable refuge for thousands of rescue workers.

In the days following September 11, the SIU quickly moved to a high-alert status. We conducted special meetings at our union halls across the country as well as aboard virtually all of our contracted ships that were in the U.S. We reviewed our responsibilities as the nation’s “fourth arm of defense,” and prepared to operate around the clock in the event of emergency call-ups of civilian-crewed military support vessels. We continued with mandatory anti-terrorism training provided to every student at our vocational training school in Piney Point, Md. In November, a SIU-crewed Ready Reserve Force ship was activated to support Operation Enduring Freedom. We welcome the chance to continue our long and proud tradition of providing sealift for America’s armed forces in times of conflict.

Since the attacks, I have noticed an increased appreciation of the U.S. Merchant Marine’s importance to national security. We as a nation cannot afford to continue ignoring the warnings that our fleet must be revitalized – immediately. That message isn’t new, but as our elected representatives critically assess the country’s security needs, it may finally generate appropriate action.

Obviously, port and shipboard security is an enor-

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mously challenging, multi-faceted issue. The sheer volume of vessels and containers moving in and out of U.S. ports every day is staggering.

In recent months, working with the NDTA and its DOD partners, I have participated in a number of meetings concerning port and vessel security. Other SIU officials also have taken part in these important sessions. Many of these issues were discussed – and their seriousness and scope identified – at the Security Summit conducted at Scott Air Force Base.

One way to make the situation safer is to invest in the U.S. fleet. With regard to port traffic in the United States, how could anyone disagree with the belief that U.S.-crewed, U.S.-flagged, U.S.-built ships are safer and more desirable than their foreign counterparts?

Before they even can climb a gangway, American mariners are required to have photo IDs (merchant mariner documents) issued by a government agency, the U.S. Coast Guard. In short, they are accountable, and they are held to high standards of certification.

They also have demonstrated, from generation to generation, their unfailing patriotism.

The current crisis also calls to mind what happened during the Persian Gulf War, when some foreign crews declined to sail into a war zone. They were supposed to deliver much-needed supplies to U.S. troops. They The Maritime Executive

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Michael Sacco

Another important step is combating the abusive flag-of-convenience system, which clearly is a danger to our country.…My union and all of organized labor stand solidly behind President Bush and the leadership of the country, as they confront a situation unique in American history.

refused, and American forces didn’t get their equipment on time because those foreign crews balked.

Additionally, in some countries that claim to be maritime nations, efforts are under way to reduce crew sizes. This could mean, among other potential security drawbacks, fewer lookouts, fewer chances to monitor and inspect cargo, and generally less efficiency because of fatigue. Obviously, technology and automation have led to reductions in crew sizes worldwide over the last 20 years, but that doesn’t mean we should consider giving up the safety of our vessels or ports.

I’ve been asked what can be done to help the U.S. Coast Guard in securing our coastlines and ports. I’ve been asked what the port authorities and longshoremen can do to help prevent a terrorist attack coming from an enclosed and locked container. Again, the answers are complicated and multiple, but this much is certain: The Coast Guard, port authorities, longshoremen and everyone else involved in maritime security will be best-served by a stronger U.S. fleet. So will every United States citizen. It’s simply the safest way to go.

As a nation, we’re realizing that fast, thorough steps must be taken to ensure safety on American soil, including U.S. transportation modes. We’re in the relatively early stages of what promises to be a lengthy, global war on terrorism.

Moreover, we’re only a few generations removed from world war and a decade removed from the Persian Gulf War. Even beyond the fight against terrorism, you can bet the day will come when yet another major battle will erupt.

In part, that is why we must build on the positive developments that boosted the U.S. fleet since the conflict over Kuwait. There’s no question that we have a long way to go, but it’s important not to overlook the enactment of the Maritime Security Program, construction of the Double Eagle and mil-

U N I O N S

lennium-class tankers, new builds and conversions for the civilian-crewed prepositioning ships of the U.S. Military Sealift Command, and containerships and car carriers reflagging under the Stars and Stripes, among other achievements.

It’s a start. It will take more hard work and continued cooperation from all segments of the industry to build on those successes.

As we face the question of security in our ports, I again submit that a crucial component of that security is a vibrant U.S.-flag fleet. The steps to ensuring such viability include expanding the Maritime Security Program and supporting our nation’s cabotage laws as well as cargo preference provisions, the Title XI shipbuilding loan guarantee program, dredging, and tax incentives.

Another important step is combating the abusive flag-of-convenience system, which clearly is a danger to our country. It was unsettling, to say the least, when reports surfaced that our government is investigating more than 20 FOC vessels that may be linked to Osama bin Laden, and that may only be the tip of the iceberg.

My union and all of organized labor stand solidly behind President Bush and the leadership of the country, as they confront a situation unique in American history.

Since the terrorist challenge facing the United States is global in scope, the nation’s military responses will likely take place thousands of miles from American shores. As in the past, this will require the forward deployment of U.S. military capability, including the repositioning of troops and supplies to overseas staging sites. A reliable source of sealift will be an important part of any successful strategy.

America’s civilian mariners will be ready, willing -MarEx and able to serve – again.

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Michael Crye

A S S O C I AT I O N S

Questions for Michael Crye, Executive Director, International Cruise Lines Council

MX: The cruise line industry is an $18 billion a year

industry and has created over 257,000 Americans jobs.

In the United States, all international passenger vessel operators are required by law to have security plans in place that are examined each year by the Coast Guard.

These plans state that, similar to airport passengers, cruise passengers are required to present positive identification, and that all luggage and carry-ons are x-rayed, hand searched or searched by dogs. The cruise lines are now using metal detectors for embarking and disembarking. This part of the maritime industry seems to have its act together. Is there more that can be done?

Crye: The number one priority of the cruise industry is the safety of its passengers and crew. We are taking every precaution to ensure that everything that goes on and off the cruise ship is 100% secured, identified and determined to be what it has been represented to be.

We had many security measures that were required after the Achilles Laurel terrorist event, which took the life of Leon Klinghoffer, through the IMO and subsequently through the Coast Guard. Since 1996, our security measures have been significantly upgraded.

When you operate in a normal peacetime level, our requirements would not be as stringent as they are today. However, we did have random screening of baggage and the identification of personnel, which included various random passengers.

According to our plans filed with the Coast Guard, the cruise industry has been operating at security level three – the highest level- since September 11th. There are additional security measures that are not apparent to our passengers that are being done on the ships and in the port areas as well.

MX: Cruise ships present another, and ever more detailed, set of circumstances because of the nature of its cargo, which consist of passengers. Do you think that cruise ships should be boarded by Coast Guard, Immigration and Customs for inspections?

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Crye: Absolutely. We have always had the INS and

Customs board our ships. And the Coast Guard can board a ship any time that it chooses for inspections.

There are scheduled Coast Guard safety inspections that take place four times a year in accordance with its Passenger Vessel Examination Program.

MX: Risk assessments for ships, terminals, ports and operating organizations are essential. SB 1214, (Graham–Hollings Bill) will provide $1,143B over the next four years, with $322M being authorized for 2002.

As you are involved with Capitol Hill, do you believe that the government has moved swiftly and effectively in dealing with maritime security?

Crye: Yes. The government is moving swiftly and effectively to enact maritime security policies. Our industry also has many parallel initiatives, which are moving along in conjunction with their efforts.

Representatives of our membership have met people on Capitol Hill, and I’ve recently testified at two hearings. We also had high-level meetings with the Coast Guard and with the Department of Transportation.

This association initiated daily conference calls for nearly two months with our security representatives and key personnel from DOT, the INS and the Coast Guard. These security conference calls have since been The Maritime Executive

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First Quarter 2002

Michael Crye

…we have been sharing with agencies of the United States the manifests of all of our crewmembers and all of our passengers for a significant period of time. That has been a part of our business for years. In addition, cruise ships have frequented ports in the United States for years and are known entities with established security procedures that we work with.

cut back to about three times a week. Our objective with these calls is to facilitate security enhancements for the safety of our passengers and our ships.

Furthermore, there is an ongoing local dialogue with the Coast Guard captain of the port and port directors to facilitate these things on the local level.

Consequently, security is taking place at all levels of the government. Security initiatives are also taking place at the company level in anticipation of governmental initiatives.

MX: Since 9-11-01, terrorism has proven effective, in that it has disrupted our way of life, our economy and created chaos in the world. One of our most vulnerable areas is waterborne commerce and its vessels. Has your organization advised its members with regard to the precautions necessary to operate safely?

Crye: We share information between the member lines in this area and in other areas as well. Our members have expansive security enhancements that they will freely share with other member lines. There is free exchange of information among the association and its members and among the companies themselves.

Security is a common goal that we all aspire to in order to ensure passenger safety.

MX: It has been said that terrorists seek out soft targets.

Do you believe that all vessel crews should be trained in force protection, biological and chemical protection measures?

Crye: There are preparedness plans that are working their way forward. Preparedness for security, safety and training has been a part of our system for years, which also includes intelligence sharing with federal and local agencies. Furthermore, security personnel have been on the ships for years.

MX: Your Association represents many foreign flag cruise operators. It has been said that U.S. Flag operators need less scrutiny than do foreign flag operators. Do

you believe that vessels, no matter what the flag state, be randomly be boarded for inspection and have their hulls scanned?

Crye: We believe that vessel operations should be in accordance to the threat levels. We have an open dialogue with the agencies that are tasked with assessing the threats and we are prepared to meet the criteria that are necessary to counteract those threats.

MX: The Coast Guard is reviewing cargo manifests, and is requiring 96-hour notification to review crew lists in order identify known terrorists. The cruise industry itself has established a 100- yard security zone around your ships. Are these types of measures effective?

Crye: We’re curious to find out how the 96-hour notification impacts ferry boat operators who sometimes have passengers who drive up to the piers in their cars from Canada and the Bahamas to the United States or from Mexico to the United States. This is a really interesting requirement, especially if you’re operating the Alaska State Highway Ferry system, the Canadian Ferry systems or the Washington State Ferry system. I would imagine that these requirements are very difficult for those folks to meet. Our members, however, are meeting those requirements.

MX: The San Francisco Bar Pilots are boarding vessels with armed sea-marshals. Do you think that the San Francisco plan is sufficient, and do you believe that all ports should do the same?

Crye: Let me answer this question in two parts. As it relates to general cargo shipping, it’s important for the Coast Guard or for those tasked with security on vessels entering the United States, that those vessels have crewmembers and cargos that are safe for entry into the country. To that end, the sea-marshal program adds incremental reassurance that the vessel is safe and that its cargoes have been properly manifested.

As it relates to the cruise industry, we have been

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Michael Crye

A S S O C I AT I O N S

sharing with agencies of the United States the manifests of all of our crewmembers and all of our passengers for a significant period of time. That has been a part of our business for years. In addition, cruise ships have frequented ports in the United States for years and are known entities with established security procedures that we work with. Therefore, I question the incremental value of sea-marshals versus the added cost to the agency’s efforts. Now that I’ve said that, I question it. But our industry is perfectly willing and able to cooperate fully with the Coast Guard wherever they implement it.

MX: Looking at the complexity of maritime security which requires securing all ports, petroleum tankers, container ships, cruise lines and the integrated intermodal system, is it realistic to secure our 631 ports, 95,000 miles of coastline, over 1,000 harbor channels, 25,000 miles of inland and intercoastal waterways and more than 3,700 terminals that handle passengers and cargo?

Crye: This level of security can only be realistically accomplished if force multipliers are applied. There needs to be a free exchange of information by all the stakeholders including all aspects of the maritime industry. Those maritime stakeholders need to become force multipliers for those agencies that are responsible. Those force multipliers act as the eyes and ears and are free information sharers within a network focused on a universal security system.

MX: The Coast Guard has done an incredible job securing our coastlines and ports. Its crews have been working 12-hour shifts, seven days a week, and approximate 2,700 reservists have been called up.

What can be done to support the Coast Guard, which will be certainly overwhelmed in a very short period of time?

Crye: First, we must ensure that they have the adequate resources to be able to do their job. That means money, personnel, equipment as well as the authority and the cooperation of all other agencies that are involved in this process, such as state, local and federal authorities, and the cooperation of maritime stakeholders. It is incumbent upon us all to participate and to leverage the Coast Guard resources in any way that we can.

MX: S 1587 calls for transparency and security of vessel registration procedures. ABS, Intertanko and OCIMF have been strong proponents of this initiative. Unfortunately, major ship owner associations have not been motivated to strengthen class. Do you see the legislation

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changing this lack of cooperation and will it initiate transparency within the shipping industry?

Crye: This is the debate of unilateral versus international oversight. The debate of the United States versus the rest of the world is a never-ending process. It’s important to the United States and for all other countries in the world to promote international solutions to international problems. For instance, with respect to the examination of all containers coming into the country, if you put a requirement that all containers being off-loaded from a ship must be examined at the port, you will paralyze the free flow of commerce, or, at least substantially delay it to a crawl. If you have a recognized international process in place that is honored by all of the major shipping countries in the world which examines the cargo when it is loaded onboard a ship that’s bound to the United States, for instance, with assurances that the cargo is exactly what it has been labeled to be, then you have taken care of the problem at the port of loading. It is im-portant for all of us to move forward in the process of international recognized requirements.

MX: Is there anything that needs to be said about the cruise line industry that hasn’t been touched upon?

Crye: This industry is committed to maintaining security at the level, which will reassure the passengers and will not take away from their enjoyment of their vacation experience. The highest priority of our industry has always been to maintain the appropriate level of security for our vessels and our passengers, and we will continue to do that. Furthermore, with cruise prices the way they are today, it is cheaper to go on a cruise vacation than to stay at home. Now is the time to book your cruise.

MX: Well, on that note, are the customers coming back to your industry now that it has been weathering the terrorist threat for a few months?

Crye: Our industry has been fairly fortunate in that people have continued to go on their cruises and have perceived it to be a tremendous value and a tremendously enjoyable experience. We have a large base of people who want to come back and enjoy themselves.

We have been steadily booking cruise vacations and the ships have been going out fairly full. The concern is the daily yields per bed. Recently, these types of cruises have been operating at a reduced price.

However, prices are coming back, but we won’t really know until the heavy booking season that begins at the first of the year.

-MarEx The Maritime Executive

A S S O C I AT I O N S

A

t MSRC, our organization has always had a strong health, safety, and environmental commitment. We have a corporate Health, Safety, and Environmental person to oversee and to ensure that these high standards are met. Additionally, there are staff positions in our operational regions that supervise and oversee these functions as well. We are in a business that operates equipment and spill response boats in some of the most hazardous conditions, with much of our effort occurring spontaneously. Therefore, we put a high premium on safety in an effort to avoid personal injuries and environmental discharges.

Since September 11th, we have had an added focus on corporate and operational security with our people and our hard assets. Our safety personnel have been charged with creating policies and procedures to safeguard our overall security. Prior to 9/11, security issues were relatively standard in nature, such as alarms installed on our vessels, fencing around our facilities, and safeguarding our computer systems and software.

Since the tragedies in New York and Washington D.C., our whole approach to security has changed, and now we are concerned about protecting our people, hard assets, and the environment from terrorist attacks. Our country, our industry, and businesses in general, are reviewing and establishing policies and procedures against terrorism. Today, unfortunately, it’s a stark reality.

MSRC is in the unique business of protecting the environment from oil spills, and we are constantly vigilant and proactive in saying, “What if?�

Terrorism presents a whole new set of circumstances, and we are now concerned about potential terrorists attacks, especially against the petroleum industry (e.g. tankers, refineries, platforms). These threats are real and their impact on the environment or the

Steven Benz

Steven Benz President of Marine Spill Response Corporation (MSRC)

economy due to the destruction of any terminal, vessel, or refinery would be significant. Consequently, our method and approach to maritime security is being enhanced throughout our organization.

Even though we are a U.S. based marine spill response organization, we can respond to spills anywhere in the world by airfreighting equipment and manpower. Our organization has nineteen manned sites throughout the United States that stretch from Portland, Maine to the Puget Sound, the Hawaiian Islands, and throughout the U.S. and the Caribbean including the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico. We operate fifteen state-of-the-art spill response vessels, each of which is approximately two hundred feet long and is designed based on a typical supply boat style. Each of these vessels cost approximately $14 million, including all of the spill response equipment. We also have seventeen ocean going barges that are dedicated to spill response, since it is often storage of the oil-water mixture that constrains recovery on a response.

We provide services to the major oil companies on several levels. We are prepared to respond to the oil platforms in the Gulf of Mexico, offshore and near coastal pipelines, and oil terminals and refineries in the U.S. We also have contracts with independent tanker owners and operators throughout the world. All of our customers are members of the Marine Preservation Association (MPA), which acts collectively to fund our operations.

Continued on page 96

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A S S O C I AT I O N S

Steven Benz

Benz Continued from page 95 Finally, we have a number of dry cargo owners/operators who carry large amounts of bunker fuel on their voyages to the U.S. In this business segment, which represents such a vast, yet fragmented market, the P&I Clubs contract directly with us to cover their assureds.

Since we have contracts with ten of the twelve major P&I Clubs, we provide plan citation and spill response services for approximately ninety percent of the dry cargo operators transporting cargoes in U.S. territorial waters.

Consistent with being a firehouse concept for spill response, MSRC spends a significant amount of time each year participating in customer drills and exercises.

The oil companies, who comprise a large part of our customer base, have a legal obligation to perform oil spill response exercises annually. Since September 11th, a number of our oil company customers have notified us that it is their intention to add terrorism issues to their emergency deployment exercises. In the past, these customer drills have typically involved an accidental scenario of a tanker grounding or a refinery or terminal spill. In our conversations with oil industry executives, we have been told that there may now be some component within these drills that will be related to a terrorist attack. Since MSRC participates in about one hundred and eighty drills a year- almost one every other day- the inclusion of terrorist acts will be a significant addition to the U.S. drill program that our customers develop.

While most of these exercises are scheduled and structured to meet certain requirements for our customers, MSRC conducts its own internal unannounced drills in an effort to keep our people sharp and always prepared for the unexpected situation.

MSRC is now including terrorist scenarios in our own unannounced drill program, so we will be better prepared should such an event occur to a MSRC facility or impact our customers.

Terrorism adds an additional factor that is beyond the traditional safety issues of responding in a quick fashion to an oil spill. Now, we will need to add the interaction with law enforcement and various federal 96

Since September 11th, a number of our oil company customers have notified us that it is their intention to add terrorism issues to their emergency deployment exercises .…The events of September 11th have added a whole new dimension to our way of thinking.

and state agencies that are focused on homeland defense. Our organization has never participated in a drill that includes the FBI or local law enforcement. This is a new feature in our way of thinking about emergencies that relate to tankers or petroleum facilities.

Our emergency responders have a checklist of items that identifies essential procedures involved in their response. We must now factor in the terrorist element.

The terrorist “What if?” scenario will become a part of these checklist procedures.

We must be certain that a disabled tanker or an explosion at a waterfront terminal or refinery wasn’t an intentional act. As our crews rush to the scene, we now have to consider if they are mobilizing into a series of “land mines” that may include multiple or delayed attacks. Consequently, the flow of information is critical for everyone involved in an emergency situation, and because our organization is performing drills on a constant basis, MSRC is in a unique position to develop a strong communication network with the added component of dealing with law enforcement personnel.

As an added note, the U.S. Coast Guard is now stretched even more as they focus their priorities on port security issues. Personnel normally involved with marine pollution have been diverted to other issues.

MSRC, as a private enterprise, therefore must be prepared to pick up additional responsibilities in spill clean up that Coast Guard officials might have taken on themselves prior to September 11.

The business of MSRC is responding to oil spills.

The events of September 11th have added a whole new dimension to our way of thinking. It is incumbent on us to think outside the box and put in place advance plans and contingencies that may need to be implemented for a terrorist attack. We must constantly review our vulnerabilities concerning our hard assets and personnel. We must now deal with new issues about our safety and the involvement of law enforcement in our daily activities and in our drills and exercises. It’s a new world, and MSRC is continually refining its role and establishing a new set of contingencies -MarEx in responding to an oil spill.

The Maritime Executive

A S S O C I AT I O N S

MX: The Chamber of Shipping of America represents

what aspect of the industry?

Cox: Our association represents American companies that own, operate or charter ships. We also have an associate member group, comprised of companies that for some reason or another don’t fit into the first group MX: Since 9-11-01, terrorism has proven to be effective, in that they have disrupted our way of life, our economy and created chaos in the world. One of our most vulnerable areas is waterborne commerce and its vessels. Has your organization advised its members with regard to the precautions necessary to operate safely within their sphere of business?

Cox: Yes, but obviously it varies with each company.

When a new crew boards a vessel, the ship is searched and both departing and entering crew are involved, and when a new crewmember joins a vessel, his bags are searched. There are lights on the waterside and standard watch keeping now includes the waterside.

These are just a few of the many things that can be tailored to a particular operation. The basic premise is that you have to be more aware of your surroundings and have crews that are vigilant. The International Chamber of Shipping, an affiliate organization, recently published its guidelines for the protection of ships from terrorism and sabotage. It’s comprehensive and covers many of the issues that will be dealt with by most shipping organizations.

MX: It has been said that terrorist seek out soft targets.

Do you believe that all vessel crews should be trained in force protection and biological, chemical and radiological protection?

Cox: Having armed crews on ships is not a comfortable situation to think about. We’ve had open discussions with various governments concerning the piracy issue that mariners face. The conclusion in a piracy situation was that everyone onboard should simply gather in a specified room that would be locked and let the pirates take what they want. In terms of chemical warfare, I believe the same course of action applies. In either situation, the terrorists are going to be well prepared to take over their targets, and they’ll move swiftly.

Joe Cox

Interview with Joe Cox President, Chamber of Shipping

Furthermore, I believe that cruise lines are more of a terrorist target than are a cargo ship crew.

MX: Risk assessments for ships, terminals, ports and operating organizations are essential. SB 1214, (Graham–Hollings Bill) will provide $1,143B over the next four years, with $322M being authorized for 2002. Being involved with Capitol Hill, do you believe that the government has moved swiftly and effectively in dealing with maritime security?

Cox: The government has moved as quickly as can be expected and has approached the prevention of terrorism in the right way. The Coast Guard, understanding that they will have the authority to establish security domestically, is already focusing on port vulnerability assessments. They have moved quickly to design a methodology which will be applied to a model port. In other words, they design an approach for security based upon a model port and apply this mechanism to the ports being assessed.

MX: Over the years, the shipping industry has minimized its crews to improve the bottom line. Should additional personnel be added to crews for the sole purpose of security, and what type of specialized training should those persons have in terms of force protection?

Cox: First, let me say that crews have not been reduced solely as a cost reduction effort. It is technology that has reduced crew size. Better engines that are automated have reduced engineering crews. New techniques in shipbuilding and the coatings that are now applied have reduced the need for individuals to perform preventive maintenance tasks while on voyages. In terms of adding force protection people onboard a vessel, a more logical approach is to have a cadre of security people sweep the ship and identify crewmembers while at port. This would be a much more effective use of security force than would be a force protector.

Continued on page 98

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A S S O C I AT I O N S

Joe Cox

Cox continued from page 97 MX: Your Association represents various types of vessel operators. It has been said that U.S. Flag operators need less scrutiny than do foreign flag operators. Do you believe that vessels, no matter what the flag state, should be randomly boarded for inspection and have their hulls scanned?

Cox: First, let me say that if you don’t inspect U.S. Flag vessels, you’re inviting them to become targets. Vessels need to be profiled, and I’m not sure that it’s based upon their flag state. Coast Guard maintains a Boarding Priority Matrix, and inspections should follow suit. Now, an LNG carrier, no matter what flag it has on its stern, should be checked. The risk of that type of ship far exceeds the nature of its flag. Again, we need to prioritize our inspections, because of our limited resources in money and manpower.

MX: The Coast Guard has done an incredible job securing our coastlines and ports. Its crews have been working 12-hour shifts, seven days a week, and approximate 2,700 reservists have been called up. What can be done to support the Coast Guard, which will be certainly overwhelmed in a very short period of time?

Cox: The Coast Guard has taken every asset they have and have thrown it at maritime security. They’ve even gotten patrol boats from the Navy and manned them with their personnel, because they need assets to do their job properly. They’ve taken resources from drug interdiction, search and rescue and other areas of responsibility. However, I’m sure that they’re beginning to shift back some of those resources due to functional necessity. Now, for them to perform maritime security tasks, we have got to create new assets. This means a bigger Coast Guard, and so be it. Security is the big change in the world, and we all have to buy into it.

That means more government assets.

MX: The Coast Guard is reviewing cargo manifests, and is requiring 96-hour notification to review crew lists to identify known terrorists. The San Francisco Bar Pilots are boarding vessels with armed sea-marshals. Do you think that the San Francisco plan is sufficient, and do you believe that all ports should be doing the same?

Cox: In San Francisco, the Bar Pilots felt that the Golden Gate Bridge was a significant target, and there is validity to it. State pilots are on every ship coming into the U.S., and they now have a new threat and task before them. Their role is to pilot a ship, and if it were to be used as a weapon, then they need some form of protection. The pilot is the first American on the vessel, and they’ll be the first to know if something isn’t right.

Not even the sea-marshal will know there’s a problem 98

until the pilot knows it. He’s going to give an order, and it’s not going to be followed, and he’s immediately going to know that something isn’t right. When I gave testimony on the Hill, I stated that pilots needed to maintain a separate source of communications with their shore-based people. They should have a device with a button that sets off an alarm that says we have a situation that requires the authorities to take action.

MX: In this country, all oil terminals have a closed-door policy. Should all of this nation’s ports follow suit?

Cox: Oil terminals are in a unique position because they are at either a refinery or a distribution point and already need to protect their assets. There are many private and public cargo terminals that currently have some level of protection. There are many ports in this country that are a part of public areas, such as the New Orleans waterfront. Cruise lines can often restrict access to the ship, but are usually at some public area.

MX: The international shipping community in this country handles over 18 million TEU containers a year, with the imported volume being around 11 million TEU containers. This is an average of 30,000 TEU containers per day. With hundreds of ships calling on our nation’s ports every day, what can the port authorities do to prevent a terrorist attack coming from an enclosed and locked container?

Cox: Honestly, you can’t check every container that enters the country. However, you can profile boxes and check those that could have a potential problem. Where you do that and how you do it are questions that the government is addressing now. It is not a simple answer of “yes” or “no.” It about getting everyone involved in reviewing the process and managing it accordingly. The further offshore these reviews take place, the better we are.

MX: Looking at the complexity of maritime security, which requires securing all ports, petroleum tankers, container ships, cruise lines and the integrated intermodal system. Is it realistic to manage and secure our 631 ports, 95,000 miles of coastline, over 1,000 harbor channels, 25,000 miles of inland and intercoastal waterways and more than 3,700 terminals that handle passengers and cargo?

Cox: Again, it’s about probability and understanding the weaknesses within the system. We use our assets at our weak points and move on from there. I believe that we can do a good job protecting ourselves. It’s too vast a country to protect every inch, and, more importantly, we shouldn’t have to give up our liberties to exist in this country. We can only do the best we can. -MarEx The Maritime Executive

A S S O C I AT I O N S

MX: What aspect of the industry does the World Shipping Council represent?

Koch: Our organization represents the international liner shipping industry, including container ships, roll on-roll off vessels, and car carriers. Our members operate both foreign and U.S. Flag ships.

MX: Since 9-11-01, terrorism has proven to be effective, in that they have disrupted our way of life, our economy, and created chaos in the world. One of our most vulnerable areas is waterborne commerce and its vessels. Has your organization advised its members with regard to the precautions necessary to operate safely within their sphere of business?

Koch: We have not recommended any specific operational procedures at this time. However, we have established a Security Advisory Committee and have been working with the Congress, U.S. Customs Service, and the Coast Guard and the Department of Transportation to help develop policies on how to address the issues of maritime security.

MX: It has been said that terrorists seek out soft targets. Do you believe that all vessel crews should be trained in force protection and biological, chemical, and radiological protection?

Koch: It has not been the practice to arm crews on merchant ships, nor is that presently contemplated.

Other kinds of training would depend on the facts of the situation, and the industry will certainly work with the Coast Guard and the International Maritime Organization to address such issues. Let’s face it: every port is a soft target; every train is a soft target; every truck is a soft target, and every ship could be considered to be a soft target. Developing international training standards for such threats, however, is worthy of consideration.

MX: Risk assessments for ships, terminals, ports, and operating organizations are essential. SB 1214,

Chris Koch

Interview with Chris Koch President & CEO World Shipping Council

(Graham–Hollings Bill) will provide $1,143B over the next four years, with $322M being authorized for 2002. Being involved with Capitol Hill, do you believe that the government has moved swiftly and effectively in dealing with maritime security?

Koch: It’s a huge, difficult problem, and I think that government is moving as quickly as possible.

MX: Over the years, the shipping industry has minimized its crews to improve the bottom line. Should additional personnel be added to crews for the sole purpose of security, and what type of specialized training should those persons have in terms of force protection?

Koch: We haven’t seen any evidence that would justify such a requirement for the liner industry. It may be appropriate to designate a member of the crew as responsible for security issues, and the Coast Guard is reviewing that. But that does not mean that an additional crewmember is needed for this purpose.

It is everyone’s responsibility to be aware of security.

MX: Your Association represents various types of vessel operators. It has been said that U.S. Flag operators need less scrutiny than do foreign flag operators.

Do you believe that vessels, no matter what the flag state, should be randomly boarded for inspection and have their hulls scanned?

Koch: This is something that the Coast Guard is Continued on page 100

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99

A S S O C I AT I O N S

Chris Koch

Koch continued from page 99

country handles over 18 million going to have to decide. There The Commandant of the Coast TEU containers a year, with the needs to be some good reason to undertake such an operation. Guard has talked about maritime imported volume being around 11 million TEU containers. This If the government feels that domain awareness, and that conis an average of 30,000 TEU conthere is a need to scan hulls based on facts it has, then the tainers per day. With hundreds cept applies to everybody — of ships calling on our nation’s industry would accept that measure. If the government whether it’s the ship operator, the ports every day, what can the port authorities do to prevent a decides that random vessel inspection is needed, the indus- terminal operator, or the shipper. terrorist attack coming from an enclosed and locked container? try would comply. However, Everybody has to use an increased any such inspection program Koch: The Commandant of the should be based on the most Coast Guard has talked about awareness of the risks and has to maritime domain awareness, and effective use of that agency’s limited resources to address do what they can to enhance the that concept applies to everybody security concerns.

— whether it’s the ship operator, MX: The Coast Guard has the terminal operator, or the security of cargo transport. done an incredible job securing shipper. Everybody has to use an our coastlines and ports. Its crews have been working increased awareness of the risks and has to do what 12-hour shifts, seven days a week, and approximate they can to enhance the security of cargo transport.

2,700 reservists have been called up. What can be done The Government is still looking at the answer to that to support the Coast Guard, which will certainly be question, in terms of what precisely needs to be done overwhelmed in a very short period of time? and by whom. The Customs Service is reviewing the Koch: The Coast Guard clearly needs more resources. issue. The Department of Transportation is reviewing They are being stretched thin, and they’re doing a the issue. It is complicated because the issues involve remarkable, conscientious job. Their resources have to not just the United States and not just transportation, be scaled to the long-term implementation of the secubut how international commerce is conducted. rity program that the government is establishing.

MX: Looking at the complexity of maritime security, which requires securing all ports, petroleum tankers, MX: The Coast Guard is reviewing cargo manifests and container ships, cruise lines, and the integrated interis requiring 96-hour notification to review crew lists to identify known terrorists. The San Francisco Bar Pilots modal system. Is it realistic to manage and secure our are boarding vessels with armed sea-marshals. Do you 631 ports, 95,000 miles of coastline, over 1,000 harbor think that the San Francisco plan is sufficient, and do channels, 25,000 miles of inland and intercoastal you believe that all ports should be doing the same? waterways, and more than 3,700 terminals that handle passengers and cargo?

Koch: Should all ports be under the sea-marshal program? I don’t believe that the Coast Guard has found Koch: We are a free country that believes in free trade, that to be necessary. They are currently using the sea and those two principles, combined with the facts that marshal program in San Diego and San Francisco. The your question contains, illustrate the magnitude of the authority of the Coast Guard to decide where it needs tasks before us all. To guarantee that aviation will never to be done is ample, and I would defer to its judgment have another airplane incident is to never fly again. when this program might be necessary.

The only way that you can guarantee that maritime MX: In this country, all oil terminals have a closedtransportation cannot be used by terrorists is not to door policy. Should all of this nation’s ports follow suit? engage in international trade. Obviously, those are not Koch: Senate Bill 1214, which has passed the Senate, feasible, practical, or desirable options. Everybody recclearly establishes the principle that marine terminals ognizes the severity of the issue; therefore, everybody are required to have increased security procedures. needs to do his best to improve security. There will There is no question that U.S. marine terminals need never be a guarantee. All we can do is utilize our best to institute credentialing and that positive access conefforts. If we do, it is realistic to improve security and trols are a needed component of maritime security. to conduct international trade in an efficient, reliable MX: The international shipping community in this manner.

-MarEx 100

The Maritime Executive

A S S O C I AT I O N S

Kurt Nagle

Flexibility and Federal Resources Essential for Port Security

E

By Kurt J. Nagle, President American Association of Port Authorities

ffective seaport security calls for a partnership between the Federal government and local ports.

In addition, increased Federal resources are required to sustain a heightened level of security at ports, more personnel, equipment, intelligence capabilities, technology, and training.

Protecting America’s ports is critical to the nation’s economic growth and vitality. Ports handle 95 percent of our nation’s overseas trade by volume and are a vital part of our transportation infrastructure.

International trade accounts for almost one fourth of our Gross Domestic Product. Ports support the mobi-

lization and deployment of U.S. Armed Forces. In 2000, more than 6 million North American passengers began and ended their cruise vacations from port authorities.

The port industry and port users generate 13 million jobs. Ports enhance our quality of life by providing consumers with a variety of product choices and jobs for importers and exporters.

Since September 11, port authorities throughout the United States have instituted heightened security measures and invested in increased security at their facili-

Continued on page 102

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Kurt Nagle

Nagle continued from page 101

ties. Finding the resources to sustain and further enhance these measures over an indefinite period of time is a major issue facing ports, and the local, state, and Federal agencies that play a role in seaport security.

Also important is ensuring that ports have local flexibility to design the most effective port security programs. Because of their diversity in size and types of cargo, individual public port security should be coordinated at the local level. To establish guidelines specific to each port, the U.S. Coast Guard and port authority should coordinate local committees to include stakeholders from local industry, government agencies, terminal operators, and labor unions.

The American Association of Port Authorities’ (AAPA) 85 U.S. public port authorities (seaport agencies) include large container ports, small bulk and specialty cargo ports, operating and landlord ports, and cruise ports.

Security at seaports involves multiple state, local, and Federal government jurisdictions, as well as the private sector. Federal agencies with law enforcement responsibilities at seaports include: U.S. Customs, Coast Guard, Department of Agriculture, Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

At the non-Federal level, seaport security practices vary, depending on the resources, statutory authority, and corporate policies of the individual seaport agencies. Some port authorities have full-fledged departments of officially sworn police officers. At landlord ports, including those with sworn police forces, security at leased terminals is generally the responsibility of the tenant companies. Port authority police patrol perimeter roads and other common use areas, respond to emergencies, and frequently advise tenants on how to improve physical security at their facilities.

More typical are ports that rely on proprietary, in-house security forces or contract security services for physical protection and on municipal or state police agencies for law enforcement. Others contract with local police agencies for law enforcement services. In some instances, the tenants themselves, particularly the larger ocean shipping lines and cruise ship operators, have in-house professional security divisions.

The number of security personnel varies greatly depending on the size of the port and whether the port authority is also responsible for other public assets such as airports, bridges and real estate.

Federal support will be essential to enhance seaport security. Ports around the country commended 102

Congress last December for providing Federal funding to enhance seaport security in the Department of Defense (DOD) appropriations bill, H.R. 3338, and in S. 1214. The DOD bill provides $93.3 million to the new Department of Transportation (DOT) Transportation Security Administration to provide grants for port security assessments and enhancements.

The U.S. Coast Guard and Customs Service also received additional funds in the bill.

S. 1214, the “Port and Maritime Security Act of 2001,” sponsored by Senator Ernest Hollings (D-SC), also passed the Senate on December 20. S. 1214 provides additional resources to the U.S. Coast Guard and Customs. Over a five-year period, it also calls for $390 million in grants for port security infrastructure improvements.

The funds provided in the H.R. 3338 conference agreement can be used for port security assessments and for implementation of measures, once assessments have been performed at ports. The Under Secretary of Transportation for Security is expected to work in cooperation with local port authorities and other involved federal agencies, including the U.S. Coast Guard and the Maritime Administra-tion, in developing and administering this grant program.

Before September 11, security resources were invested primarily in preventing crime and cargo theft. Like other public agencies, ports now need Federal help to adopt new security requirements in a timely and efficient manner. To address terrorism threats, the Federal government must make immediate and significant investments in enhanced intelligence and information management, port assessments, equipment and personnel, and training.

The Fall 2000 Report to Congress of the Inter-agency Commission on Crime and Security at U.S. Seaports estimated that enhanced security could cost between $14 and $40 million per port. In the state of Florida alone, the cost of complying with the new Florida Minimum Standards for a port covered by the new Florida Act is estimated at between $80 to $100 million.

AAPA and its member ports will continue to work with Congress and the Administration on maritime security in 2002.

AAPA is an international trade association based in Alexandria, Virginia, with more than 450 members, including 150 corporate (port) members, and another 300 sustaining, associate, and honorary members – firms and individuals with an interest in the seaport -MarEx industry.

The Maritime Executive

NEWS

U.S. Merchant Marine Academy Midshipmen Join in Rescue Efforts on September 11th eginning at 1215 on Tuesday September 11th, USMMA midshipmen worked side-by-side with New York City Fire Department (FDNY) Marine Division in the initial and recovery operations following the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center. The cadets, faculty, and staff worked day and night until September 19th.

Over the course of those nine days, they assisted in moving in excess of 1,500 firefighters, EMTs, police officers, and other rescue personnel. These volunteers moved tons of food, water, rescue supplies, and other material from locations in Brooklyn and New Jersey staging areas. During the operation, 144 individuals participated, including: 22 First Classmen, 29 Second Classmen, 21 Third Classmen, 18 Plebes, 9 civilians and alumni volunteers, and 45 members of the faculty and staff.

The FDNY Marine Division, operating at the Nay Yard in Brooklyn, requested USMMA’s assistance. They initially responded with a flotilla of nine vessels, and spent the first day rushing firefighters and rescue personnel to the site.

Following the initial surge, they scaled down their operation to four boats, which were manned 24 hours a day until September 19th.

USMMA assets were primarily “tasked” by the FDNY, with secondary assignments coming from the USCG On-Scene-Commander. These duties were critical to support the FDNY. As a result of the collapse of nearly a dozen structures, the firefighting infrastructure of underground water mains and fire hydrants was destroyed. For over a week, all the FDNY fireboats were used to pump seawater into temporary water mains set up in the streets.

First Quarter 2002

Photo: Midshipman, Eben Samuelson.

B

After a couple of hours on duty, it became apparent to the midshipmen and staff how important their perceived “simple” task of shuttling personnel was. By saving a firefighter an hour’s drive to the site, he was able to get more rest or spend more time working at the disaster site. In addition, USMMA EMTs provided invaluable service, helping to bandage the wounds and cuts of its passengers.

By providing these simple services, they were able to help ease the burden of the firefighters and rescue workers in those desperate and difficult first days.

The Regiment of Midshipmen, worked countless hours to maximize support of the FDNY, until they were able to put in place their own personnel, supplemented by civil and commercial resources. USMMA continues to receive expressions of thanks and appreciation for their professionalism and dedication during those tragic and difficult times. Their service was invaluable to the members of the FDNY, their families, and all who had been affected by this tragedy.

-MarEx 103

SECURITY SYSTEMS Dragnet Security–A Passenger and Cargo Security System As the federal government and private industry search for new technologies that will enhance security for cruise line and airline passengers, as well as identify and keep track of cargoes that are being moved in trucks, planes, railroads, buses, and ships, all kind of systems and mechanisms are being reviewed. Our publication was fortunate enough to be able to preview an excellent system that instantaneously provides data regarding passengers, their baggage and the movement of the baggage on and from the ships. The system can also provide shippers/consignees, transportation companies, and governmental agencies with an instant manifest of cargoes and all the essential information for identification.

It is often said in business that partnerships are formed when two parties have similar needs. Dragnet Security and the cruise and commercial shipping industry could very well have a harmonious partnership. Dragnet Security Software is the brainstorm of a computer scientist and a marketing entrepreneur. Russell M. Divvens, the computer scientist, is a partner and corporate officer of All American Software Systems, a developer of an Artificial Intelligence Software Engine used in mathematical predictions and logic. He is also a computer programmer in Rapid Applications Development (RAD) and a network and communications specialist. Lawrence Kratish, the entrepreneur and president of Hallmark Stevedoring, is also an accountant, an insurance agent, an inventor of patented products that are sold through his firm-Lawrence Sales Company, and, finally, also a licensed Florida realtor.

The Dragnet Security System was in the process of being developed prior to September 11th. In fact, Hallmark Stevedoring, a Kratish company, loads and unloads passenger vessels in Port Canaveral and the Port of Miami. Mr. Kratish understood that the high tech approach to processing information was too laborious and what was needed was an instantaneous database that companies and governmental agencies could analyze on the spot.

Kratish and Divvens began working on a system that could be sold to every segment of the transportation industry, without recreating the wheel each time. This universal system employs a laptop computer and a high frequency wireless scanner that communicates via radio frequency. The database or manifest originates from the transporter. For instance, a cruise line passenger is mailed scan labels in advance with his ticket. When the passen-

Russell Divvens (left) and Lawrence Kratish with the Dragnet System.

ger and his baggage arrive at the ship, everything is scanned and manifested instantaneously. Their movements anywhere on the ship, and, to and from the ships, can be reviewed instantaneously. On their departure, the same procedure takes place again, and everything is scanned to ensure that the passenger and his luggage have exited the ship.

One of the most impressive features of the system is that multiple hand-scanners at various checkpoints can be used at the same time by different inspectors utilizing a central database. These hand-held scanners will allow an inspector to review all the pertinent information about the passenger, such as date and place of entry or departure, passport number, height, weight, and color of eyes and hair. The inspector can instantaneously access any information put into the system.

The great thing about this application is that it is entirely mobile and can be placed on or in a device as small as a golf cart and moved thousands of feet away from any outside electrical source with total reliability. The scanners and equipment react instantaneously, feeding off the database with 100% accuracy. One laptop can support a half-dozen scanners easily, and the information is recorded and can be used by the carrier and governmental agencies at a later time.

For more information, you can go to the Dragnet Security Systems website at www.travel.to/dragnet or call the Lawrence Sales Company, Inc. by phone at 954-472 1927.

AUTHORS NOTE I wrote "MTBE -Clean Air or Clean Water: Why Can't We Have Both?" in the spring of 1998. Looking back at the article, and the way in which state and federal governments have dealt with the MTBE problem I am both encouraged and saddened. I am encouraged to see that MTBE is now widely recognized to be the environmental threat that it has been since it was first added to gasoline. I am saddened to find that MTBE is still in use at all.

In California our gas pumps now have a sticker informing us that the gasoline being dispensed contains MTBE which the state has identified as presenting a serious environmental threat. But, we have little choice when it comes to finding gasoline without MTBE. MTBE is scheduled to be phased out in California -- by the end of 2002. I had hoped for quicker action.

The EPA, in March, 2000, finally rounded the corner on MTBE and is seeking to require a reduction or phase out of MTBE usage. Congress has been slow in coming on board. Although a number of bills have been introduced, especially by Senator Feinstein, it appears that little serious legislation has made it into law.

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The oil industry is now happy to have the oxygenate requirement eliminated, as are the environmental organizations. One stumbling block has been agribusiness, which wants to keep the oxygenate requirement so it can make moneys selling ethanol and methanol as oxygenates. If you are interested in the messy, sausage-making details, I suggest looking at the Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, available at the THE NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SCIENCE AND THE ENVIRONMENT website at http://www.cnie.org/nle/air-26.html#_1_14 .

William Reid Brown, Jr. is a registered professional Chemical Engineer, and a non-practicing Attorney. He hasn't stepped into a courtroom in more than two years now, and he is gainfully employed and enjoying life. He can be reached via email at chemlaw@yahoo.com. The views expressed in the article are entirely his and do not necessary reflect those of his present or past employers, his past clients, or The Maritime Executive.

The Maritime Executive

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Electronic Navigation ■ Chiefmate/Master Upgrade ■ Fast Rescue Boat ■ Bridge Resource Management & Shiphandling ■ Medical Person in Charge ■ Basic Safety Training Basic & Advanced Firefighting ■ Tankerman Person in Charge (PIC) ■ Crowd and Crisis Management ■ Heavy Weather Avoidance ■ Global Maritime Distress & Safety Systems

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Setting new standards in: Offshore ENERGY SU PP O R T

MARINE Transpo rt at ion

Ship Assis t & TOW I NG

Navigating a New Vision Seabulk International, Inc. is a leading provider of offshore energy support services to the worldwide oil and gas industry. Seabulk is also a leading provider of marine transportation services in the U.S. market with a fleet of ten petroleum product and chemical tankers, including five double-hulls. Seabulk’s tug fleet is one of the country’s newest, largest and best crewed, with a concentration in Florida and the Gulf of Mexico.

Headquartered in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, we have been providing benchmark quality service to our customers since 1958, with safety and reliability as the hallmarks of our worldwide operations.

Seabulk International, Inc. www.seabulkinternational.com 954 523 2200 tel 954 763 1501 fax