Heartland 01/2000 by matteo belforti

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HEARTLAND is a world partner of LIMES, the Italian Geopolitical Review, published by Gruppo Editoriale L’Espresso It is registered in Hong Kong and in Rome, and published by Cassan Press-HK and by Gruppo Editoriale L’Espresso For any information, please contact Limes, viale Castro Pretorio 116, 00185 Rome (Italy). Tel. 0039 06 4940432; fax 0039 06 4940403; e-mail: bema@limes.net HEARTLAND’s website address: http://www.heartland.limesonline.com Editors: Lucio Caracciolo and Michel Korinman Managing Editors: Francesco Sisci and Zhang Xiaodong Editing and Secretariat: Rosa Balfour, Huang Jianliang, Yu Shicun, Xiang Daiyun HEARTLAND IS PUBLISHED WITH THE SUPPORT OF

BIRINDELLI E ASSOCIATI studio legale

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contents no. 1/2000 5 Why Heartland 7 Romano PRODI - Building Bridges between Asia and Europe 11 ZHU RONGJI - Don’t Be Pessimistic about the Euro PART I WHAT CHINA STANDS FOR 17 31 47 57 71

WANG XIAODONG - The West in the Eyes of a Chinese Nationalist ZHANG XIAODONG - Geopolitical Changes in the Western Regions Francesco SISCI - The Pope in China: Still a Long Way to Go Fabio MINI - From the Rim to the Heart ZHANG JIE - The Foundationers Associated with Mr W.’s Funds

PART II FROM ASIA TO ASIA 93 Tommy KOH - ASEM is a Sunrise Organisation 97 Alison BROINOWSKI - All in the Same Boat? Australia’s Relations with Asia 107 Michel KORINMAN and Lucio CARACCIOLO - There is No Australasia 113 Marie-Sybille de VIENNE - What if Dr Mahathir Was Right? 121 Paolo COTTA-RAMUSINO and Maurizio MARTELLINI - The European Policy towards Korea PART III WHAT IS ASIA? 135 V.K. NAMBIAR - The Indian Bridge 141 YUMIKO YAMADA - Asia Viewed from Japan 149 Vitalij TRET’JAKOV - To Stay in Europe, Russia Must Become an Asian Power 153 Frédéric DURAND - A New World MORE HEARTLAND

159 Luca M. BIRINDELLI - China: One Country, Two Systems, Several Markets (“Go West”) 163 Leonardo DINI, Stefano CELLETTI, Franco CUTRUPIA - Doing Italian Business in China 165 Camillo DONATI - “We Behave Like the Church” 166

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Why Heartland W

HAT IS GEOPOLITICS? GEOPOLITICS IS THE OPPOSITE OF THE “CLASH OF

civilizations” that the political scientist Sam Huntington made famous. It is more; it is the opposite of racism. It postulates the uniqueness of the human species. Every nation has a right to its historical representations and constructs. Every nation has a right to its arguments. Every nation has a right to its geopolitical projects. Geopolitics is also the opposite of exoticism, which in fact is a way of expelling from a literary point of view entire peoples from our mindset. Exoticism is a mild form of colonialism. Instead, for us distance is not significant: the geopolitical dialogue is in any case equal, even if the interlocutor is thousands of kilometres away. Before “globalisation”, Europeans could believe that the exotic approach served to marginalise Asia; and Asians could think that it served to restrain European influences in Asia. But now, to close up – and to impose closure on others – means to be lost. We have moved from exoticism to “endoticism”: we are all actors of one world. Each with his own way of thinking. Why Eurasia? Why are Europeans rediscovering Asia and Asians are increasingly interested in Europe? For Europeans, to project themselves in Asia is also a way of making Europe. Just look at how easily the Europeans who live in Asia group together. Also, single European states do not have the appropriate dimensions to establish an equal dialogue with their Asian partners. And it is evident that Asians are not interested in having the US as their only Western interlocutor.

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WHY HEARTLAND

We know that today Eurasia does not exist. But it is necessary that the dialogue between Europe and Asia makes a qualitative leap. Economic and trade relations are important, but are not all. Via economics, relations must move onto geopolitics. The Silk Road grows through a geopolitical dialogue. Heartland, what for? This journal is a tool for the dialogue between Europe and Asia. It is not just a matter of exchanging ideas on the pages of Heartland, but of building a network for debate between Europeans and Asians. Nothing formal or diplomatic, but an open and promising path. As we all know, the Silk Roads are infinite.

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BUILDING BRIDGES BETWEEN ASIA AND EUROPE

by Romano

PRODI

T THE START OF THE NEW CENTURY,

the two major themes that have dominated the European political and economic scene in the past fifty years – the positive thrust of European integration, on the one hand, and the resolution of the limitations caused by the division of the continent into two opposing blocs, on the other – have changed the face of Europe completely. At the same time, the sustained growth of Asia’s economy has radically transformed the outlook for trade relations: the main axis of international trade may now be shifting not from the Atlantic to the Pacific – as some authors had predicted – but rather to the Asia-Europe route, from the South China Sea to the Mediterranean Sea, via the Indian Ocean and the Suez Canal. Political developments like the peace process in the Middle East, the enlargement of the European Union and the independence of natural-resourcerich Central Asian countries are contributing to the growth of trade between Europe and Asia, as is the accelerating process of establishing a regional identity in a peaceful Asia. Against this background, relations between Europe and Asia are developing a growing momentum. When the challenging task of enlargement concludes, the Union will be able to project its influence far beyond its continental borders, and engage in a genuine partnership of mutual respect and mutual benefit with its friends in Asia. Economic growth in Asia (and in Europe) and economic integration in Europe (and in Asia), and the dense network of relations between “open” economies have created a genuinely global market, in which Europe and Asia are no longer isolated partners, but part of a wider system. These economic processes are increasingly driven more by direct investments from foreign sources than by traditional trading relations. Consequently, each country’s interest in the economies of the others has increased. Modern companies do not perceive distant countries solely as potential markets for their goods, but also as opportunities for investment, creating employment at the same time. And since companies with assets in multiple countries would oppose any attempts at protectionism, increasing liberalisation is almost irreversible.

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BUILDING BRIDGES BETWEEN ASIA AND EUROPE

A healthy two-way flow of investments contributes to a country’s wealth; this gives the economy of each individual country a much greater stake in seeing other economies perform well. The increasingly substantial trade and flows of capital between Europe and Asia are as important for today’s economy as the Silk Road was in the 13th and 14th centuries. Europe has realised that it can no longer ignore a substantial section of the globe, one that includes great nations and will soon be the world’s largest economic region. Until it manages to be a player on the Asian stage, Europe will be unable to formulate a truly global policy. Trade between Europe and Asia has increased by over 100% more than trade between the United States and Asia. This is no accident, and was reflected in the regional policy framework developed at the ASEM summit (Asia-Europe Meeting). The problems that emerged with the Autumn 1997 crisis in the Far East are not, in my opinion, structural. Asian economies will continue to grow, as they have all the physical and human resources they need to do so. They will also continue to be attentive to the need for economic and financial reform, just as we in Europe must always be vigilant in maintaining a healthy economy. The major obstacles to progress in Asia are more political and social in nature: tensions between neighbours, concerns over security and the possibility of disastrous military conflicts – together with the need to meet the challenges of social and political change that come with rapid industrialisation. The development of economic relations can provide a strong incentive to avoid political and social conflicts, but the solutions to these problems must be political and social in nature. Matters such as human rights and transparent and accountable government are vital to meeting these challenges, and indeed are universal elements which all of us, in Europe and Asia alike, must address. China’s growth into a great power will have a substantial international impact. The international community should accept this development, rather than seeking to construct a network of local and global alliances around Beijing. China will play an ever-increasing role in regional and world diplomacy, and will make a constructive contribution to international politics and the global economy, thus developing interests favourable to the maintenance of stability. To defuse and isolate potential sources of regional instability, all the regional powers should join forces to establish a common definition of acceptable behaviour. The potential economic and security benefits of stability could reward the effort needed to moderate policies that are not acceptable to neighbouring countries. Europe’s ability to increase its diplomatic role in Asia depends not only on closer economic ties, but also on the experience it has acquired in building its institutions. Existing institutions, such as the United Nations and the World Trade Organisation, could be used to launch productive forms of cooperation. At the same time, Europe must not just focus on Asia’s economic importance. We must also work together in the political field, and we must also work to increase our mutual understanding and awareness.

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THE SILK ROADS

R U S S I A N F E D E R AT I O N

Istanbul Bursa TURKEY

Ulaanbaatar

K A Z A K H S TA N

1 3

MONGOLIA

SYRIA 4

IRAQ

Beijing

7 6

IRAN

CHINA

AFGHANISTAN

SAUDI ARABIA

PA K I S TA N INDIA YEMEN

OMAN

1234567-

GEORGIA ARMENIA AZERBAIJAN T U R K M E N I S TA N U Z B E K I S TA N TA J I K I S TA N K Y R G Y Z S TA N

Fuzhou

When Europe’s first overseas expansion began in the 16th century, Asia was by far the richest region in the world, and its civilisation was probably the most advanced. The spectacular growth of the last few decades, in spite of the recent crisis, has resulted in a situation in which it would not be unrealistic to expect a return to that happy state of affairs. I do not believe that there will be a “clash of civilizations”. There are opportunities to work together, as long as Asians and Europeans are ready to show each other commitment and goodwill. In the aftermath of the Cold War and its rigid divisions, the old fault lines have failed to give way to new ones. There has simply been a reaffirmation of the importance of diplomacy as a way of finding solutions to shared problems that sooner or later would hinder our progress towards a better future. In the same spirit of keeping channels of thought and debate open, I would like to wish Heartland every success in its endeavour. In our global economy, time and distance count for less and less. Geographical borders are increasingly meaningless. Isolation is the way of the past, not the way of the future. In a world of such rapid change, continued discussion of the issues that shape the destinies of so many people everywhere is absolutely essential, for the sake of stability, and for the sake of progress.

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Don’t Be Pessimistic about the Euro Premier ZHU RONGJI’s Answers to Our Reporter’s Questions

HEARTLAND

Why is the euro in such a bad situation? What could the EU do to chan-

ge it? ZHU RONGJI I’m an engineer instead of an economist. However, I have been engaged in economic work for 50 years, and hence having some experience. I think EU is very promising and has actual strength as an economic entity. Of course, in comparison with the economic entity of USA, EU has not been as prosperous for such a long time and its economy has not developed so fast as USA. However, USA is only a country, while EU includes more than ten countries. There exist some differences between the economic developments of so many countries, and it is certainly not easy to coordinate the actions of these countries. As an economic entity and an economic community with great differences in economic development, I think it is quite an achievement for it to reach the current level of development. It indicates that the European politicians are quite skilled in organisation and management. Therefore, from a long-term point of view, EU’s economic development is quite promising and very hopeful. Of course, the euro has depreciated from 1.17 at the beginning to about 0.9 currently. I think this is a very specialised issue that needs to be analysed. There are a lot of causes for such a situation. I mean it is only a specialised issue but not a full reflection of economic strength. It is also very difficult to maintain a common currency involving more than ten countries and to maintain its stability. As per analysis of various conditions, it is entirely unnecessary to be pessimistic about the euro. I think that with the coordinated development of all EU countries, it is unavoidable for the euro to appreciate gradually. At the same time, China will never undersell its foreign exchange reserve, your euros. Never. HEARTLAND Can you tell me the amount of China’s existing euro reserve? ZHU RONGJI It does not mean I don’t want to tell you. I myself do not know the amount.

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HEARTLAND What’s the influence of IT development on China’s politics? ZHU RONGJI This question covers many other questions. I can not give

you an immediate and clear explanation. Do you mean the development of China’s ecommerce or the development of network economy or any other things? China’s networks have developed very quickly, and the number of Chinese Internet users is almost doubled every half year. China currently has over 10 million Internet users. With the development of networks, we have encountered many new things. Regulation and legislation are required in many aspects. We are wanting in experience in this aspect, and it’s a very serious issue on how to manage networks in a standardised way. HEARTLAND Do you think is it beneficial for the EU to strengthen its internal coordination? ZHU RONGJI That’s sure. But it is not the focus of what I mean. I mean the coordinated development of the economies of all EU members, since there is a great difference between the development degrees of them. EU includes some very developed countries and some moderately developed countries, and there are some very poor regions in some countries. Therefore, the economic policies of these countries are also quite different. These facts lead to their differences in other aspects and different requirements. HEARTLAND What do you think about the Taiwan issue? ZHU RONGJI Concerning our policies toward Taiwan, we remain unchanged. Our consistent policy is peaceful reunification and one country two systems, which were clearly explained in President Jiang Zemin’s “declaration of eight points”. It’s a pity that many countries fail to completely understand what President Jiang said. For example, what we mean by “reunification” and “one country two systems” is very liberal for Taiwan. We will neither change its current political and economic systems, nor interfere with any of their matters. Such a policy is more liberal that those for Hong Kong and Macao. In other words, Chinese government will not send army to Taiwan, and the leader of Taiwan may also hold an important post in the central government of China. Thereby, none of their vested interests will be damaged. However, we must admit that there is only one China and Taiwan is only a part of China. This is a clear-cut point. It’s a pity that the current Taiwan leader does not admit there is only one China, and he even dares not to admit that he is a Chinese. How can the reunification be realised in such a situation? Our requirement is very simple. We can negotiate about anything so far as you admit there is one China. However, after contacting many leaders of European countries, I find quite a number of them fail to have a full understanding of the one-China policy, and they do not know the true nature of Taiwan leader’s clamour for independence. HEARTLAND Some people say Taiwan’s direct election is very democratic. What do you think about it? ZHU RONGJI Is the so-called election in Taiwan really democratic? Why is it so highly estimated? In Taiwan, he (means Chen Shuibian) only got 40% of the votes. He has no experience of holding power at all. They themselves also admit that what

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they are playing at is “black gold politics”. Therefore, such a kind of direct election is entirely meaningless. In addition, we are very clear that without Li Denghui’s playing of his personal roles, Taiwan would take a totally different standing point now. So we may say the so-called direct election can not lead to democracy. What is direct election? Even the election systems of those big Western powers are not completely same. I think French Presidents are directly elected, while USA Presidents are not. Are the Italian Presidents directly selected? Also no. Then, what kind of direct election you are peddling to me? The so-called direct election takes different forms in different countries. Both USA Presidents and Italian Presidents are not produced through direct election. While French President and Premier have different functions, respectively in charge of internal affairs and diplomatic affairs. For the difference of political, cultural and historical backgrounds between different countries, their political systems are also not completely same. There even exist some countries still carrying on the system of constitutional monarchy with kings and queens. According to our own conditions, China currently adopts the system of people’s Congress, according to which, the people’s deputies are selected first and the government is selected by the people’s deputies then. I don’t think such a system of people’s Congress is the most democratic one, and we will not ask the other countries to follow us. However, such a system is suitable for the conditions of China. We will neither evaluate, nor criticise any foreign country’s election system. But Taiwan is not a foreign country, and we know so much about it. While you say Taiwan Presidents are produced through democratic election, we think it’s quite a joke. HEARTLAND Does China have any new measures to propel its private economy? ZHU RONGJI Our formulation about private economy has been dramatically changed. In the past, we said private economy is a supplementation to the socialist economy, while at present, we say it is one of the integral parts of the socialist economy. We admit and encourage the development of non-public-owned and private economic sector. This sector has really seen great development in China in these years. The development would be greater when foreign-funded economy is included. Foreign-funded economy certainly belongs to private economy, and our relevant policies have been greatly liberalised. For example, in the aspect of credit policies, haven’t these private economic sectors developed under the support of credits? They could not gain any development without loans granted by the national banks. So far as they are beneficial for the development of the whole national economy, our attitude towards private economy and individual economy is to encourage and support their development. The development of this kind of economy also has a backward and illegal side. For instance, recently a Chinese TV station reported that some private enterprises in Zhejiang Province had employed a large number of child labourers. Such a phenomenon is absolutely illegal and must be resolutely eliminated. Certainly, this is only some particular phenomenon, and it will not influence our encouraging and supportive attitude towards the legal and healthy development of private economy.

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Would you please tell me the causes of the decline of trade volume between China and Italy? ZHU RONGJI I think it is not declining now. On the contrary, it dramatically increased in the period from January to May of this year. In the past two or three years, the foreign trade growth of whole China was null or even negative for the influence of the Asian Financial Crisis. However, China’s foreign trade saw great growth in the following five months, and our trade with Italy also increased to a high degree. We attach a great importance to the cooperative relations with Italy in economy and trade. Personally speaking, I have paid great attentions to cooperation with Italy. Because Italy boasts very good experience in technical promotion and technical reform of middle and small-sized enterprises, I cooperated with Italian parties in many projects in the ‘80s. Italian industries have their own features, which are very important for China. I believe the cooperation between China and Italy is very promising. Our purpose is to further improve the China-Italy cooperative relations in economy and trade, especially in the aspects of technical cooperation between middle and small-sized enterprises. HEARTLAND Concerning the issue of Vatican, when will you invite the Pope to visit China? ZHU RONGJI We have contacted the Vatican party for many times, and we have made it clear that our relations could only be established on the basis of only one China. It means that Vatican must admit that the People’s Republic of China is the only legal representative of China, and Taiwan is only a part of China. This is our principle and standing point. Of course, we also insist that the internal affairs of China should not be interfered in the name of religious freedom. Religious freedom has been included into our law, and hence we maintain and protect religious freedom. However, such a matter should not be used to interfere our internal affairs. I think we are just negotiating about this principled stand. The Pope will be invited to China after this issue is settled. “Is the negotiation underway”. I think probably yes. HEARTLAND

(by Barbara Alighiero and Francesco Sisci)

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Part I WHAT CHINA STANDS for

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THE WEST IN THE EYES OF A CHINESE NATIONALIST

by WANG

XIAODONG

O PROMOTE COMMUNICATION, DEEPEN

understanding and remove misapprehension between Chinese and Westerners would be to the happiness of all human beings. I feel quite abashed that I have taken so long to complete this article. One of the important reasons is that I really cannot find enough time, or build up enough writing passion to compose an article in terms of Western “academic norms”. Frankly, I think that Western “academic norms” often set up a barrier in the expression and communication of ideas. The so-called “rigid demands” do nothing but raise the “entry barrier”. Removing the “entry barrier” would require a large amount of spare time and money. In the Third World, at least in China, it would be very difficult for a researcher or thinker to have enough resources to meet the Western “academic norms” without the mighty patronage of Western academic institutions. One of the consequences is that what Westerners hear about Chinese ideas, or at least about those of the Chinese intelligentsia, is in fact born under Western auspices, and therefore to the Westerners’ liking; otherwise, the researcher might not benefit from those auspices another time. These “Chinese ideas” are far from genuine Chinese thoughts, and from these Westerners will never get to know the real ones. Even from a general point of view, leaving aside China, the socalled “academic norms” usually clash with freedom of thought and creativity, barring many intelligent minds from a charmed circle of mediocrities. In the long run, neither the works by Confucius nor the Bible fit in with “Western norms”. I do hope that the above digression about Western “academic norms” will not be edited, for this is an ideological exchange, which might not be without importance. First, I would like to introduce some of my ideas, but the introduction might not be comprehensive and profound enough due to the limited space. In fact, to help foreigners know Chinese nationalists comprehensively and profoundly, it is necessary to compile an anthology including the main thoughts of Chinese nationalists. Westerners have published a few, which, however, mainly include critiques of Chinese nationalists by Westerners and some pro-Western Chinese

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intellectuals.1 Given that few texts have been written by Chinese nationalists themselves, could those criticisms be serious, earnest and responsible to knowledge (here we can also see that the so-called “academic norms” of Westerners cannot guarantee the quality of research)? Of course, one of the important reasons for the absence of texts by Chinese nationalists is that they would not be published (by contrast with the claim by Western researchers that the Chinese government has been instigating and making use of nationalists). Fortunately, Internet provides Chinese nationalists with an unprecedented space to express their ideas. The texts of Chinese nationalists on Internet are a splendid sight.

The Oppression of China’s National Interests by the USA If people say that China was aggressive in Mao’s time, then, in the years after Mao’s death, China adopted a completely defensive posture, and even a tendency to follow the USA. China no longer has the inclination to challenge the US’s national interests. Therefore, the clash of national interests is caused mainly by the oppression of China by the USA. The oppression of China’s national interests by the USA is represented in a few aspects known to all. First, the issue of Taiwan. The USA has played a critical role in severing the state on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. Had the USA not intervened, there would be no severed state. However, American efforts to attempt to break up China go well beyond the issue of Taiwan. Often Westerners use the excuse that the state has been severed for over 50 years and that the USA’s role is to maintain the status quo, without exerting further oppression of China’s national interests. Then American support of the separatists of inland Tibet and Xinjiang is, no doubt, aggressive and invasive. Some might say that the US government has not openly indicated its support for the separatists of Tibet and Xinjiang; at most, it has interviewed the Dalai Lama, or shown concern towards human rights in Tibet and Xinjiang. To this claim I answer that not only do the US authorities interfere, the USA does. I want to make a special mention of the Tibet issue. It is known to all that in recent years a movement in the USA to support the independence of Tibet is surging, in which Hollywood and the American media are involved. I remember an article in an American magazine (Time or Newsweek, I cannot remember clearly) saying that it has become fashionable in the American entertainment circle to support the independence of Tibet. Their excuses appear justifiable, saying that China suppresses human rights and the freedom of religious belief, and so on. Most of these are lies. I admit that there are serious human rights problems in China. I also know that, having been in contact with Western culture, the Dalai Lama has well familiarised himself with Western human rights ideologies, and

1. See for instance J. UNGER, Chinese Nationalism, New York 1996.

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knows very well what he should say to fawn upon the Westerners. Viewed from Western standards, however, before the People’s Republic of China controlled Tibet, the state of human rights in Tibet under the theocratic reign of the Dalai Lama was much worse than in the areas dominated by Chinese people of Han nationality. In those days serfdom was practised in Tibet, which is not far from slavery. Well, the Westerners might argue that it is part of the unique Tibetan culture and religious belief. So why do Westerners claim that human rights are a universal value? Why has the Chinese substantial and obvious improvement of human rights in Tibet been distorted as a trampling of human rights? I also want to comment a view expressed in a letter by an American in the 1990s to Ma Lihua, a Han writer living in Tibet, which goes as follows: “The difference between assistance and intervention rests on whether the other side is seeking it. When Tibetans are seeking help to make progress, and only at this time, if one will and can offer help, will that assistance be understood as a kind of social progress and be readily received? Then one can become a helper, a knight with shiny armour and be considered the saviour. And if the other side has no receptive capability, all the assistance one hopes to give and all the well-meant motives will be dissipated in a hostile environment. Therefore, assistance must sought and hoped for”.2 The American’s view sounds very reasonable, but when talking about some Tibetans seeking assistance, which people of the area does the US refer to? Some Tibetans have sought assistance: I hear that in the heart of many late serfs, Mao Zedong is still a Buddha. But when the USA intervened in Kosovo, was it because the Serbs had asked for it?! Approaching this issue from the human rights perspective, I think Westerners do not have enough grounds to accuse China and give support to the Tibetan separatists. It appears that Westerners are full of a sense of justice, but they are completely under the influence of an ill-natured propaganda by the hegemonic media. When talking about national interests, the misleading propaganda by the West, the USA in particular, is obviously a threat to China’s national interests. To a great majority of Chinese, further improvement of human rights in Tibet is acceptable (and in the whole of China), but the attempt to separate Tibet from China is unacceptable and those who are conspiring to do this are no doubt an enemy of China. Viewed from the experience of other areas in the world, separatism has brought nothing but revenge and harm to human rights, though it might play to geopolitical interests of the USA or the West. American support of the separatist movement in Tibet and Xinjiang is closely connected to its geopolitical strategy. In the USA, some people’s hostility to China does not arise from human rights issues, but from geopolitical interests or racism – human rights are at most a pretext. In 1996, I had a talk with Mr. Ross H. Munro, author of The Coming Conflict with China. In his opinion, the USA’s concern towards human rights in China is uncalled for, and the key problem is that the 2. MA LIHUA, Fleeting Soul, Writer’s Press, 1994, p. 212.

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USA is an established super-power, while China is a growing super-power (although, few Chinese see their country as a growing super-power). From a historical perspective, the only solution to the clash between the two nations’ interests is to go to war. In addition, Mr. Samuel P. Huntington, the author of The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, listed the Chinese civilisation as an enemy of Western civilisation. I think that Mr. Samuel P. Huntington is a racist, whose “clash of Civilizations” is nothing but a euphemism used instead of the politically incorrect “clash of races”. Some Westerners insist that these ideas are not mainstream and that the US is not set to antagonise China. This is acceptable, as much as it is for China to be alert in case that tendency develops. What is more, the armament of the USA, such as National Missile Defence and Theatre Missile Defence, the latter in particular, including early warning radars, will be set up at the gate of China to cover Taiwan. Is this not a real threat to China from the USA? Recently, Westerners like to discuss the “threat from China”. But in our eyes, China makes no threat against Western countries, because it has neither the capability, nor the intention to threaten others, while the threat to China from the USA is obvious to all. On this issue, I think that the USA and other Western countries have no right to preach “morality and justice” to China. China is not powerful enough to compete with Western countries either in military strength or in control over the media, so we can only sit still while the Westerners demonise us. As Chinese nationalists, the lesson we have learned is not to listen to the morality and justice from the mouth of Westerners. In their system, it is strength that counts; consequently, China must aspire to gain more strength.

The Clash of Ideologies The clash of ideologies between China and America has two aspects: between the Chinese government and America, and non-governmental groups and America. The two aspects are strikingly different and must be dealt with separately. The clash of ideologies between the Chinese government and America focuses mainly on human rights and the system of democracy. In this clash, the Chinese government has a completely defensive position of which I can give a persuasive example. On October 19, 1996, the Strategy and Administration office sponsored an informal discussion with Chinese experts in international affairs, and Robert Hawke, former Australian Prime Minister, attended. In the discussion, Mr. Liu Ji, Vice President of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, said, “In modern history, no diplomacy directed by ideologies has succeeded”.3 Immediately Mr. Hawke retorted, “I cannot agree less to Professor Liu’s analysis. Historical facts show precisely the contrary: Western diplomatic policy has been dominated by

3. See Strategy and Administration, 1996, VI, p. 19.

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ideologies, and this policy has achieved a general victory”.4 Mr. Hawke also said a lot and eloquently. At that time, the interpreter, Wang Yong, an Associate Professor from the Institute of International Affairs of Beijing University, did not dare translate the words to Mr. Liu Ji, so I decided to interrupt the discussion and translated the words to him. I noticed that Mr. Liu Ji was in great embarrassment. As a senior official of China, Mr. Liu Ji’s attitude was representative: the Chinese government does its best to avoid an ideological dispute with the West, and expects Westerners not to challenge their ruling with regard to human rights and democracy. The clash of ideologies between non-governmental groups and America is totally different. In the areas of human rights and democratic politics, the general public has no clash with Westerners. The serious human rights and democracy problems of China cause great suffering in the first place to the Chinese. Some Westerners think that Chinese nationalists disregard the human rights and democratic politics advocated by Westerners. With an air of racial superiority, they claim that since the Chinese do not want Westerners to strive for human rights and democratic politics for them, and are instead willing to be enslaved, then, why should Westerners bother? This is totally wrong. Chinese nationalism means nothing without human rights and democratic politics. Human rights, democratic politics and the protection of Chinese national interests can and should run parallel. It should be said that, with regard to human rights and democratic politics, the Chinese, or the Chinese nationalists, are not that different from Westerners or Americans. But together with the image of Western, and especially American, advocates of human rights and democratic politics, another image is in the heart of Chinese: they are the oppressors and exploiters of the poor, of the weakest groups and of states, and they are unjust. From this perspective, Chinese nongovernmental groups are not entirely defensive in the clash of ideologies with America. This has been fully proved by Che Guevara, a play recently staged in Beijing. First, Che Guevara, the enemy of America, was killed by government troops trained and directed by the CIA. He was chosen as the hero of the play to show that America is the oppressor. Secondly, the script is full of derision of the American capitalist values embraced by the upper class of China. The play, a big hit in Beijing, was produced 36 times in a row with full houses for every performance. By the way, although the upper class in China might be dissatisfied with talks about human rights and democratic politics by Americans, they are quite proAmerican. Those who revolt against America are usually the lower classes. The reason might be that the Chinese upper class has accumulated a great amount of wealth in economic dealings with America. Talks about human rights and democratic politics have no visible effect in threatening their interests and their control over Chinese society. On the other hand, the lower and middle classes of 4. Hawke’s words that I accounted here are not exactly the same as that in Strategy and Administration, 1996, VI. What I recorded is more accurate, for the equivocal words in Strategy and Administration might be due to political considerations.

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China have not found much benefit in communication with America and the West. Recently things are getting worse with increasing numbers of people made redundant and unemployed – and it could be well founded to ascribe this to the capitalism advocated by the US. The ideological challenge to America made by Chinese non-governmental groups is still very weak, but its significance is probably far-reaching. China is a relatively strong nation outside the Western club. None of the nations within the club will challenge the well-established international system dominated by the USA, for they are the beneficiaries of the system. While weak nations outside the club have no capability to challenge it, China is a comparatively powerful nation outside the club that has a large population and a long-standing civilisation. Therefore, once the ideological challenge by Chinese non-governmental groups grows powerful, it could be of worldwide significance. This will be good to human beings. Without any challenge, all the injustice and unfairness of human society would never be improved, and the progress of society would never occur.

Chinese Nationalism as a Response to Domestic Problems These trends in ideas, even if apparently with an anti-foreign taint, are firstly a response to domestic affairs. Chinese nationalism is in the first place a response to some domestic problems of the 1980s and 1990s. At the beginning, the name “nationalism” was not adopted; it is a label put on by Western academics and mass media, a point I made clear in the article “Nationalism in China and the Future of China”.5 Please forgive my repeating the main ideas of the article. The reason that the so-called “nationalism of China” is so eye-catching in the 1990s is that it contrasts strikingly with the “reverse-racism” of the 1980s (the original meaning of reverse-racism in English is the objective harm done by antidiscrimination to white people. Here, however, the author gives it a new meaning in the Chinese setting). Chinese “reverse-racism” is a spectacular phenomenon: it is a trend of ideas produced by mainstream Chinese intelligentsia, which deem that the Chinese culture and nation are inferior. The virtuous think that the Chinese nation is disqualified to live on earth until thoroughly changed, while those who are heavily influenced by racism think that this nation is so inexorably despicable that it is not worthy of being on this planet. In the 1980s this kind of “reverse racism” invaded the whole ideological, academic, literary and media fields, the educated broader public, and received even official encouragement. Few Westerners noticed or mentioned that the Chinese authorities encouraged “reverse racism” in the 1980s, yet they are rather sensitive to and make a big fuss over the so-called nationalism used by the Chinese authorities to “bridge the ideological gap” in the 1990s. This is not strange.

5. See China Road Under the Shadow of Globalization, November 1999, Chinese Social Sciences Press, pp. 81-106. Parts of the article were originally published in the September issue of Mingpao Monthly, with the title “From Reverse-Racism to Chinese Nationalism”.

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CHINA R U S S I A N

F E D E R A T I O N

KAZAKHSTAN

HEILONGJIANG Harbin

Ulaanbaatar Ürümqi

M O N G O L I A

XINJIANG GANSU Yinchuan Xining

Under Chinese administration

QINGHAI

NINGXIA

SHAANXI

Claimed by India

Changchun JILIN Shenyang NORTH LIAONING KOREA P’yongyang Hohhot Beijing BEIJING Tianjin Tianjin Seoul Shijiazhuang SOUTH Taiyuan HEBEI SHANDONG KOREA Jinan SHANXI NEI MONGOL

Lanzhou

Xi’an

XIZANG New Delhi

Lhasa

NEPAL

BHUTAN Thimphu

Kathmandu INDIA

Dhaka

JIANGSU

Hefei Nanjing Shanghai SHANGHAI Wuhan ANHUI SICHUAN HUBEI Hangzhou Nanchang ZHEJIANG Chengda Changsha JIANGXI Fuzhou HUNAN Guiyang Taipei FUJIAN Kunming GUIZHOU Xiamen TAIWAN GUANGXI DONG NG Guangzhou YUNNAN Nanning Hong Kong Hanoi HENAN

GUA

BANGLADESH

Zhengzhou

MYANMAR

LAOS Vientiane

Yangon

500 km

PHILIPPINES

THAILAND

Firstly, the Chinese authorities’ encouragement of “reverse racism” was a peculiar and unusual phenomenon, and well beyond the Westerners’ imagination. Secondly, to give publicity to “reverse racism” in China would mean glorifying Westerners – and it is hardly credible that the Chinese government, which had antagonised the West for years, might encourage this. Thus, Westerners believe “reverse racism” was a trend of the intelligentsia, especially of dissidents. In fact, the Chinese authorities greatly supported “reverse racism” publications, sponsored and even organised seminars on the so-called “cultural strategy”, and broke the rules to promote some intellectuals to important positions in control of public opinion. The case of He Shang 6 explains it all. Although in showing this TV film 6. He Shang, the name of a TV series; “He” refers to the Yellow River, the symbol of Chinese civilization; “shang”, means “death before growing up”, so the literal meaning of the title is “death of the Yellow River” (translator’s note).

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the producers of He Shang talked about a political risk, it really was a publicity strategy (the Chinese knew that, at that time, there was no better advertisement than claiming a political risk). Indeed, the film would not have been made successfully without the authorities’ support; secondly, after it was shown, CCTV as well as other major official media headed by the People’s Daily dedicated attention and debates to it. The supporters of He Shang said: “The press in China has never paid so much attention to a television series like He Shang, publishing the commentary, writing reports, comments and discussions”. 7 Of course, given the anti-government position that some authors of He Shang held, the Chinese government accordingly changed its attitude. Even so, the “reverse racism” expressed in He Shang still found many supporters in the ideological officials in control of China’s media. How did this “reverse racism”, encouraged by the authorities and raved about by the intelligentsia (who called it “cultural hit”), come about? There are several reasons. The nihilism of national culture denies that its tradition and culture is part of a tradition of the Chinese intelligentsia. The May 4 Movement sometimes contradicted the patriotic calling of the Chinese Communist Party, though on the other hand, from the perspective of historical philosophy, responded to the antifeudal ideology of the Communist Party. It should not be forgotten that the “Cultural Revolution” began by “breaking the ‘four olds’, establishing the ‘four news’”, 8 and destroying the remains of Chinese traditional culture. After the “Revolution”, all the policies of that period were denounced, but the outlook of historical philosophy was completely inherited. I have pointed out once and again that the modes of thinking of many Chinese intellectuals who abhor the “Revolution” point to that as the main characteristic of the “Revolution”. As a consequence, once the “Revolution” that aimed at the destruction of Chinese traditional culture was over, all the blame, including that of the “Revolution”, was cast upon Chinese traditional culture, the wave of denouncing Chinese traditional culture was surging again, and no one ever thought about its absurdity. Apparently this time they went much farther than “May 4” and the “Revolution”. “May 4” ideas were tinted with a “nihilism of national culture”, but lacked such strong “national nihilism” or “reverse racism”, and the mainstream was nationalism. Yet from “nihilism of national culture” to “national nihilism” or “reverse racism”, the development was quite logical. “Reverse racism” was also encouraged because China in the 1980s needed to open its gates rapidly to the West for investments, technology, ideas or forms of entertainment. Viewed as a whole, “reverse racism” met the general policy requirements.

7. TIAN BENXIANG, “On He Shang”, Comments on He Shang, edited by Cui Wenhua, Culture and Art Press, 1988, p. 218. 8. This slogan was quite popular during the “Cultural Revolution”. The “four olds” was used to refer to “old ideas, old culture, old customs and old habits”; the “four news” were new ideas, new culture, new customs and new habits (translator’s note).

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However, regardless of whether “reverse racism” was needed at the time or how its “historical effects” can be evaluated, it could not remain in Chinese consciousness. It would be very difficult for any nation to support ideas that maintain its own inferiority, more so for China, a great nation with a quite glorious and not so far away past, a population of 1.2 billion, and, though frustrated, showing no trace of decline. This does not need to be “proved” theoretically. Every life has a self-affirmative mechanism; otherwise its survival would be impossible. From the late 1980s onwards, the Chinese intelligentsia began revising “reverse racism”, which developed into a strong trend of “nationalism” in the 1990s. Nonetheless, “reverse racism” is still dominant in the Chinese intelligentsia, especially among those in control of the academic and educational fields. It must also be emphatically pointed out that the self-abusive “reverse racism” mania of the 1980s existed mainly among intellectuals and college students, while today it has lost much of its market and is confined to the dignitaries and the “liberal” intellectuals. The average public is influenced by this trend, but generally without the self-abusive mania. In fact, “the silent majority”, i.e. the average public, have been rebelling against it, as the “liberal” intellectuals clearly see. For this reason, they criticise “nationalism” and “populism” together. I have made similar points earlier in this article: in China, “nationalism” stems from the lower and middle classes, while “reverse racism”, pro-American and pro-Western attitudes are common in the upper class of dignitaries, many of whom are corrupt officials hated by the people. Leaving aside theories and ideas and moving on to facts, these corrupt officials often collude with foreign businessmen to sell off national interests and the interests of the general public. One example is provided by the tragedies of those sweatshops created with foreign investment, in which many women workers (sometimes a dozen, and sometimes over a hundred) were burnt to death. Women workers are locked in shops or dormitories like slaves with no escape in case of fire. In disagreements with foreign businessmen, or commercial disputes between foreign and Chinese businessmen, Chinese corrupt officials stand side by side with the foreigners for their own benefits. No wonder that the general public often thinks that Westerners are on the side of the corrupt officials, that their talk of human rights and democratic politics is hypocritical, and that the social politics and economic theories that Westerners thrust upon China only serve the corrupt upstarts in China. In this context it is no wonder that nationalism finds loud echoes among the lower and middle classes. From a certain point of view, nationalism in China is a response to the “reverse racism” embraced by those who believe in “meritocracy” and who scorn, revile and discriminate ordinary Chinese. It also is a response to the corruption of those who collude with foreigners and sell out the interests of ordinary Chinese.

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Freedom, Democracy and Hegemony 9 How can freedom be guaranteed? In 1944, Friedrich August Hayek, a wellknown liberal thinker, argued in The Road to Serfdom that in a competitive society, the freedom we choose is based on such freedom: if one refuses to satisfy our hopes, we may turn to another. But with a monopoly, we can do nothing but be at its beck and call. What Hayek referred to is an authority that monopolises the economic artery. Once such a monopoly arises, we have no freedom. Understandably, he could not discuss the super hegemony that came about 50 years later in international relations. If Hayek’s above judgement is a universal liberal principle (I think it is, and agree with it completely), obviously it will be applicable to the present international order. Such a monopoly has appeared or at least is appearing in the present international order with the hegemony of the USA. For the moment, none of other forces in the world may challenge this hegemony; we can turn to no other force that can counteract the US. In front of such hegemony, what freedom do you say we have? To a great extent, the fall of the Soviet Union foretold the coming of the day in which we would lose our freedom. Some say the Soviet Union was an evil empire that also had the wild ambition to be the lord of the world. And some even say that the threat from the Soviet Union to China was more hazardous than that from the USA. These ideas might be right, but unfortunately they miss the point. The key does not lie in whether the Soviet Union was better or worse than the USA, but whether we have more or less freedom in a unipolar world, compared with a bipolar or multipolar one. The liberal principle tells us that an authority that monopolises the artery of our subsistence entails our loss of freedom. Therefore, under the hegemony of the USA, the world has evidently lost its freedom: in the years since the fall of Soviet Union, the USA has started roughing up the world without scruple, promising a dark future. Some might claim that the several rough-ups of the USA, such as Gulf War and Kosovo, had been caused by brutal atrocities, which had to be stopped by the money, the arms and the people of the USA – a selfless act for the people in other areas of the world. Had the USA not rushed there to stop the atrocities, those who suffered would have been totally hopeless. The USA itself often puts on an air that “I don’t want to be the world guard, but whom else can you turn to when the world needs one?” Here I do not want to plunge into the dispute such as “whether Milosˇevic´ carried out ethnic cleansing or not”. In The Constitution of Liberty, Hayek says that coercion cannot be avoided completely, because the only way to prevent it is to threaten the use of coercion. A free society empowers the country to enforce the monopoly of coercion in order to restrict the use of the power on part of individuals.

9. In “Liberalism and Hegemony”, I discussed the relationships between freedom, democracy and hegemony. See China Road Under the Shadow of Globalization, Chinese Social Sciences Press, November 1999, pp. 58-72.

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From the point of view of traditional international law, the USA’s assault on Yugoslavia was an outright invasion. Then, why do some “liberals” support it in the name of justice? In my opinion, consciously or unconsciously, they are willing to endure the US’s monopoly of power. In international relationships, how can the actions of the USA, a peremptory monopoly, be delimited? It must be kept in mind that democratic politics do not play any role here. We have no right to vote for the President of the USA or the members of Congress. If we cannot limit the actions of the USA – instead of relying on its self-restriction – the international order is exactly the same as a totalitarian system, not yet bad as that thanks to Russia, China and India. The emergence of a unipolar international order will never increase the freedom of the majority in the world except for the monopolising country. I have no intention of debasing the American civilisation and ideal, but the liberal principle tells us that the guarantee of freedom cannot come from the noble morality of the ruler, but from the restriction of the system. No matter how noble and free the American nation-founding ideal is, it cannot create a unipolar hegemony in the world, which would bring a horrible totalitarianism in the international order (intensive bombing on Yugoslavia by US-led NATO clearly shows how horrible such an international order is). It may even carry out, as Hayek puts it, “authoritative government acts according to liberal principles”. 10 But a liberal knows that the ruler is not reliable. In this case we would have “no one to turn to”. Freedom cannot rely on the ruler, but on another one we can turn to. Therefore, a liberal has to consider how to limit the hegemony of the USA in the world, and support those countries that are counterbalancing the hegemony of the USA. Liberalism does not only mean abstract principles. If these abstract principles were not put into practice according to concrete conditions, liberalism and the liberals would be worthless. Unfortunately, few “liberals” stand up to oppose the hegemony of the USA. Have I misunderstood liberalism and the USA, or have they betrayed the liberal principles and turned away from the decency that is essential to a liberal? I think it is the latter case. Of course, there are some reasons for which Western liberals do not protest (though some have done): they are in the club of world conquerors, or have no way to taste what it is like for those who are outside the club, or have selfish motives. But the attitudes of Chinese liberals are strange: when American hegemony is overshadowing the whole globe, they oppose Chinese “nationalism” instead of standing up to the US. I wonder whether they know the meaning of liberalism. If they are true liberals, they should oppose American nationalism instead of Chinese “nationalism”. But they don’t, they impudently support American nationalism and oppose Chinese “nationalism”. If an atrocity such as genocide really were to take place somewhere in the world, all the people in the world should try to find ways to stop it instead of 10. HAYEK, The Constitution of Liberty, 1960.

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looking over with folded arms. The “liberals”, however, should not forget their lectures to us in the past: under totalitarianism we might be less molested by criminals. But we’d rather discard such kind of “safety”, for the cost is too high. The actual example is the bombing on Yugoslavia by the USA. Though Milosˇevic´ was not totally clean-handed, I think American bombing did far more harm to Serb and Albanian civilians. If the international relations of the future are dealt with in this way, the cost that the world will have to pay will be far greater. If ethnic cleansing really were to take place in the present world, do we have other substitutes? In dealing with this kind of issue, a few better ways than intervention in the internal affairs of a state can be found. It is also unacceptable for civilised people to stand by and look onto genocide with folded arms. Human beings in the future should have better solutions, something like a world with GreatHarmony or the like. Why not use the UN? The excuse of the USA is the noncooperation of Russia and China, which would exercise their right to veto in the Security Council. But why wouldn’t Russia and China cooperate? Does the USA have adequate reasons to intervene in Yugoslavia by force? If it does, why not try it in the Security Council so that all people of the world, including Chinese, can see the “hideous acts” of “abusing power” and how “irresponsible” Russia and China are? In fact, China has been very responsible in voting at the UN, especially careful when using its veto power and Russia did not intend to shield Yugoslavia completely (it lacks the capability as well). Obviously, the USA’s purpose in putting aside the UN and invading Yugoslavia in the name of NATO was to establish a new international order with US-led NATO to dominate the world by force. For the rest of the world except the USA or NATO countries, this kind of new order is totally incongruous with freedom. Over half a century ago, Hayek wrote his famous book, The Road to Serfdom. Now the kind of country he referred to no longer exists, and the kind of thought he referred to is in low tide. Since his time, this world has been through great changes. Have the liberals today noticed the changes, the threats from new freedoms, and the different sources of threats to freedom in international relations and internal politics? If the answer is no, the liberals today are unworthy of the glorious word “liberty”. If none of us can realise this, then, a new totalitarian international order will descend on this planet, which is a sure new road to serfdom.

Conclusion: The Prospect of a New International Order

An essential world problem is the distribution of natural resources. In order to scramble for natural resources and living spaces, many bloody wars have broken out in history: World War II, for example, which is still fresh in our memory. After the War, the new argument was that in the postwar free trade system, natural resources and living spaces are not so important: anyone who wins the commercial competition may have a happy life. Those who have discarded

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hypocrisy and are thinking seriously about the problems on this planet will never agree with such a fallacy. If one goes to and has a look at the Chinese inland where natural conditions are extremely inclement but the population extremely dense, he will see that people in those areas are virtually living in despair: the extremely inadequate natural resources doom them to failure in any commercial competition. The inclement living conditions also deteriorate their social relations: when everyone is scrambling for natural resources, tolerance, freedom and democracy find no foothold, and environmental protection is out of the question. Their only hope is to escape to a place where natural resources are plentiful. Recently in Britain a human smuggling incident scored the highest death toll of stowaways. On the early morning of June 19, when British landing waiters were checking a Dutch-registered lorry at the port of Dover in the South of Britain, 58 (54 male, 4 female) corpses of illegal immigrants from East Asia were found in a container, and two survivors were rushed to hospital for emergency treatment. They probably were from China.11 I have read too much news of this kind, and every time I feel a gnawing in my heart. Some Westerners as well as some Chinese who are used to derogating China to fawn Westerners might say that these stowaways were “fleeing a dictatorial regime”. However, every objective and fairminded person knows they were fleeing insufficient natural resources and congested living spaces. Others might say that these stowaways were not very poor, otherwise they couldn’t have afforded the expenses. It has become part of Chinese group subconscious to flee from deficient natural resources and congested spaces. Every year countless Chinese go through innumerable trials and hardships to try to enter areas where natural resources are not so limited and space is not so crowded, and the best places are North America, Europe, and Australia. If not, Russia, Eastern Europe, Latin America will also do, and even some parts of Africa. The examples of the argument that natural resources and living spaces are not important and any winner in a commercial competition may enjoy a good life can only be applied to a few small and very special countries and regions, such as South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan and Hong Kong. Japan seems to be one of the examples, but Japan gained its original capital by defeating China in wars and plundering its natural resources. Natural resources and living spaces are never unimportant. But how are the distribution of natural resources and living spaces determined? No doubt, they have been distributed by wars. The rich nations today, mainly the white and Japan, have lived happily by defeating or even exterminating other races (such as in South and North America) and robbing abundant natural resources and living spaces. This issue can never be evaded. Without mentioning this, it is hypocritical to talk about “human rights”, “freedom”, “environmental protection” and “peace”…. while those sanctimonious intellectuals and politicians avoid this issue. 11. Telecommunication from Reuters on June 19, 2000.

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Even if the issue is evaded, it still lingers in people’s heart, especially of the Chinese, Indians, and peoples of other races in the world. Another essential problem is that the fate of such a large a population is held in the hands of a few who do not know or care about them. From the perspective of internal politics, this is an issue of despotism; from the perspective of international order, it is an issue of hegemony of the club of the USA and other Western powers. I appreciate the democratic system of the USA and other Western countries to the utmost. However, from the perspective of international relationships, it is quite similar to that of ancient Rome. In my view, another group cannot control the destiny of the Chinese, even if the people in that group made the decision through a democratic procedure, for in this procedure, the Chinese were not involved. This is where the difference lies between those pro-Western Chinese intellectuals and myself. Without solving these problems, it would be very difficult for “human rights”, “freedom”, “environmental protection” and “peace” to exist. What really exists is what human beings have done in the long river of history: a group of people with strong fists wipes out another group with weak fists to seek their own benefits. In this case, what is the use of those fair-sounding words? If Westerners really care about these things such as “human rights”, “freedom”, “environmental protection” and “peace”, why not think more about how to distribute the natural resources and living spaces fairly and how to establish a democratic system with all human beings involved notwithstanding race, countries, religious beliefs and sexes. (translated by Yao Ximing)

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GEOPOLITICAL CHANGES IN THE WESTERN REGIONS

by ZHANG

XIAODONG

HE FIRST TIME I GOT TO KNOW “THE

Western Regions”* was at the end of the 1970s, when I took the first College Entrance Examinations after the “Cultural Revolution” and had to stuff my head with a jumble of things I had never heard of. At that time, “the Western Regions” was a geographical name in history that I had to remember. Later, when I studied in the History Department of a university, more and more information about the Western Regions began to accumulate in my mind: Qin’s Moon and Han’s Pass, the exotic pipe and flute, the shining spears and armoured horses, the single column of smoke and the setting sun…1 and also messengers in Han and monks of the Tang Dynasty who were trekking in the flying sand as well as the indefatigable camel train and trade caravan. Although the Western Regions were still remote and obscure, the great spatio-temporal vicissitude had sealed it inside the vast accumulation of historical data. However, since the 1990s the image of the Western Regions gradually began to become clearer and more concrete in the depth of my mind. First, since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, a large number of ethnic nations have mushroomed in the Asian hinterland, a place that is customarily called Central Asia or Transcaucasia. Soon a region that is closely related in geopolitics, security, religion, ethnicity, culture and economy looms into our view. For such a large area that includes Western Asia, Central Asia, the Caucasus and parts of South Asia, only the name “Western Regions” can embrace it all. Second, bordering Chinese Xingjiang and Tibet, this region not only affects our national security and stability of the Great Northwest, but also relates to the development of the West of China, * According to Word Ocean (1979, condensed version, Shanghai Lexicographical Press), after the Han Dynasty, the region west of Yumen Pass (Northwest of Dunhuang, Gansu Province now) was generally called the Western Regions. The word has two meanings: in a narrow sense, it refers to the area East of Congling; in a broad sense, it refers to the regions that can be reached through the area East of Congling, and includes the Middle and West of Asia, the Indian Peninsula, the East of Europe and the Northern parts of Africa. In this article, the Western Regions refer to the Middle East, Central Asia, the Indian Subcontinent and the Caucasian region, which is a little different from the broad meaning. But while a better word is yet to be found to include the above four regions, “the Western Regions” is not a bad choice (author’s note). 1. These are the widely known descriptions of the Western Regions by ancient poets (translator’s note).

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as well as the economic development of China as a whole in the 21st century. Here only the word “Western Regions” can evoke our grand sense of honour and our sense of crisis. The region must be recognised de novo and the influences of the changes in this region on our country must be understood. All of these constitute the main motives of my retrospection on the Western Regions (please forgive my using a word that had been forgotten for over 100 years) at the turn of the millennium.

The Changes in Geopolitics of the Western Regions since the End of the Cold War In the vast expanse of the Western Regions, the end of the Cold War was mainly symbolised by a series of great historical events, such as the Soviet troops’ withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Gulf War, progress in the peace talks in the Middle East and the successive independence of the countries in Central Asia and Transcaucasia, which have not only changed the balance of power and broken the Cold War set-up formed since the World War II, but also ignited momentous rearrangements in geopolitics in this region in over 100 years. First, due to the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russian influence in Central and Western Asia has shrunk on all fronts. From the planned large-scale expansion (1700) of Peter the Great to the annexation of Crimea, Caucasus, Central Asia and so on into the domain of Tsarist Russia (Russians entered Pamir in 1891),2 it took the Russians about 190 years. After the October Revolution, the Soviet Union not only inherited the territory of the Tsarist Russia but also gradually picked up its external policy in Asia. In order to compete for supremacy with the USA, as well as break the encompassing of the USA in the South wing, the Soviet Union took as its main objective the access to the Indian Ocean, snatching strategic points and achieving an advantage in geopolitical competition. In its heyday, the Soviet Union set up military bases in the African Horn and South Yemen, and maintained close ties with some radical Arab countries such as Syria and Libya. From the mid 1980s, under the leadership of Gorbachev, the country undertook a general political and economic reform, which, more like a disaster than a reform to the whole nation and the people, solved none of the substantial problems that the country faced at home and abroad, and instead caused the worst chaos in economic order and the ultimate disintegration of the Union. However, this was good news for the USA, the Western camp and those countries that had been under the Russian threat over the past 100-odd years. Through the Gulf War in 1990-1991, the USA established its dominance in the whole Middle East. In other words, it became impossible to solve any problems in Middle East without the active involvement of the USA, while the Soviet Union (and its heir Russia) turned

2. ZHAO CHANGQING, A Survey of Five Central Asian Countries, Economic Daily Press, Beijing, April 1999, p. 30.

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into an on-looker of Middle Eastern affairs and an endorser of the American scheme. In the North of the Middle East, countries such as Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan, which had been under tight Russian pressure, may slightly relieve the taut nerve at last. The Soviet troops’ withdrawal from Afghanistan and the successive independence of three nations in Transcaucasia and five nations in Central Asia not only drove the threat further North for several hundred and even over one thousand kilometres, but also provided these countries with more space to exert greater influence in regional politics. Second, an immense political vacuum appeared in the hinterland of Asia. No matter how the conquest of Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union in Central Asia and Transcaucasia is evaluated, a fundamental fact is that the successive independence of the three nations in Transcaucasia and the five nations in Central Asia essentially presupposes a total renunciation of the Soviet politics, economics, social system, culture and ideology. In view of this, the so-called political vacuum is represented in the thorough “non-Sovietisation” and “non-Russianisation” in the nations of Central Asia and Transcaucasia. In the next place, due to the disintegration of the Soviet Union, in an instant, Central Asia and Transcaucasia turned from being a Russian exclusive domain into a “derelict enclave” in international politics. No effective influence from any international and regional political power fell upon this region, and these nations themselves are standing in bewilderment, unable to ascertain their identity and future. Just like those nations that have experienced ethnic migration or suffered foreign invasion, the ethnic nations have to make a settlement about the past and a choice about the future. Put another way, the future politics, economy and society of these countries are characterised by great uncertainty and plasticity. Whatever choices are ultimately made, the consequential influence (upon the peripheral countries in particular) will be immense. As a result, nearly at the same time of these countries’ independence, a geopolitical competition with the aim to affect the orientation of the countries in Central Asia and Transcaucasia began to unfold. Turkey, which is close to Central Asia and Transcaucasia in language as well in ethnicity, aspires to establish a Turkish community stretching from the Adriatic Sea to the Great Wall of China.3 The interests that Iran, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and others are pursuing contradict each other to a great extent, but all of them aspire to restore Islamic features in this region. While the USA and other Western countries take it as a matter of course that after casting off the shackles of the Russians who had tied them for over 100 years, the countries in Central Asia will “throw themselves into the arms of the Western-coloured freedom and democracy without hesitation”,4 and therefore their main goals are to “promote democracy”, “establish a liberal economy” and 3. WU CHUANGUN, “On the Developmental Prospect of Pan-Turkism”, Russia Studies, IV, 1993. 4. DONG FANGXIAO, Islam and Post-Cold War World, Social Scientific Literature Press, Beijing, June 1999, p. 190.

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“help this region merge with international society” 5 and so on. To a great extent, the important strategic position of this region, the abundant petroleum and gas resources in the Caspian Sea area further stimulate the desire and enthusiasm of all kinds of powers to fill up the political vacuum. To achieve its strategic aim, the USA not only is planning to compromise with Iran, but also does not have reservations in making use of the “Taliban”, an Islamic extremist organisation, to open up the passage to Central Asia through Afghanistan.6 The Japanese lay special emphasis on “seizing the opportunity to peek the Chinese and Russians from their back” and attempt to avoid “a gap in politics and economy” in Central Asia.7 Third, power integration that crosses regional boundaries. In the 2000 years prior to the mid 18th century, the political, economic and cultural communication among the people in the expansive region that we call Central Asia, Western Asia and South Asia was probably far more complex and frequent than we know. Comparatively the artificial obstruction of the Russian conquest on the regions of Central Asia and Transcaucasia lasted for only 100 years, which might not cause much damage on the longstanding historical connections. However, the past 100 years is a period that characterised not only the rapid growth in economy and technologies in human history, but also extreme clashes in ideologies and national interests. These, on one hand, have made an immense difference in material well being, but on the other have widened the gap in spiritual and political life. It should be specially noted that, as a result of the formation of the two great camps (East and West) and the breakout of the Cold War after World War II, all the differences and gaps widened. The end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union removed the artificial communication barrier between the various regions, and provided the possibility for other international and regional powers to exercise their influence. At the same time, the general emphasis of every country on accelerating economic development and improving people’s living standards has produced sustained stimulation for the integration of cross-regional powers. The first kind of power integration in the Western Regions is the whole-scale expansion of Islamic influence. As part of the traditional Islamic world, the region of Central Asia is covered with fertile soil for an Islamic revival. Furthermore, a large number of Muslim countries (Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Iran and others) add fuel to the fire for the revival of Islam in Central Asia through investments, religious donations, sponsorships for pilgrimages and cultural exchanges. With the very help from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Arab countries, Central Asian countries successively joined in the Organisation of the Islamic Conference

5. GU GUANFU, “The US Intervention in Central Asia and the Security of China”, Institute of China Strategy and Administration, Analytic Report of International Affairs, 1997-1989, p. 52. 6. As above, p. 54. 7. DAIKAKU NAOYA, “Diplomacy along the Silk Road – A Back View of the Strategies of China and Russia”, Japan: Yomiuri Shimbun, February 5, 2000. Quote from: Xinhua Agency, To¯kyo¯, February 5, 2000, Japanese telecommunication.

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(OIC), 8 thus accomplishing the return to Islam on the official level. Meanwhile, under all kinds of influences from within and without, the religious enthusiasm of the general public in this region is continuously surging, and also Islam is gradually becoming an effective weapon of quite a few political opposition groups.9 The second kind of power integration in the Western Regions is the PanTurkism mainly promoted by Turkey, which actively pushes ahead the relations with Central Asian countries in all fields, and established and held a “Turkish Summit Conference”. Turkey can make use of ethnic and language relations as well as the eagerness of the Central Asian countries, in search for a new course of development and to accomplish a “non-Russianisation” at the beginning of their independence. It is not easy to establish a “Turkish Community”, “Great Turkestan” or any other Pan-Turkish entity, but the geopolitical shift engendered in the whole Western Regions by such activities and its influence upon Xinjiang in Chine can never be neglected. The third kind of power integration is probably the most significant and problematic: the economic cooperation of the whole region. In 1992, the “Economic Cooperation Organisation” (ECO, formed in 1985) founded by Turkey, Iran and Pakistan was expanded to include the five Central Asian countries, Azerbaijan and Afghanistan, formally starting the regional economic operation stretching over Central Asia, Transcaucasia and the Northern part of the Middle East. In spite of the summit conferences held in the few ensuing years and quite a number of agreements reached in the fields of banking and infrastructure improvement, few of them have been put into practice. The activities of ECO have virtually stopped, especially when Turkey and Iran placed more attention respectively on the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Association (BSEC) and Caspian Sea Users, two organisations focused respectively on each of the countries. Fourth, the Eurasian continent crossroads. Prior to Russia’s complete control over Central Asia and the Caucasus, this region, the core of the Eurasian continent, had played a unique role in the whole ancient world. For one thing, the “Silk Road” leading to the West from China went through this region, the cities on the way were not only the distributing centres of all kinds of goods, but also posts that maintained the security and smoothness of transportation; secondly, this region was also the only passage for the nomadic ethnic nations in the North of Asia to go down to Mesopotamia, Iran and India. Of course, not all of those who were trudging along the “Silk Road” were travelling merchants, not all of those who were galloping on the Central Asian prairie and in the harsh desert were the cavalry of the barbarian ethnic groups. The region of Central Asia and the Caucasus had in fact grown into a crossroads where the politics, economics and cultures of a few cultural areas on the ancient Eurasian continent converged and 8. DONG FANGXIAO, Islam and Post-Cold War World, Social Scientific Literature Press, Beijing, June 1999, p. 177. 9. MIR ZOHAIR HUSAIN, Global Islamic Politics, Harper Collins Publishers, 1995, pp. 255-256.

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interacted. As René Grousset, a French scholar, described in his monumental work The Empire of the Steppes: A History of Central Asia, “along this road, trade was going on and religions were spreading; along this road, came the Greek arts of the Alexandrine successors and the people who preached Buddhism from Afghanistan. From this road, Greek-Roman merchants went to and tried to take control of Saraga (a name used by Ptolemaeus to refer to Luoyang, which he also called Thinae, author’s note), a place Ptolemaeus had mentioned to be plentiful with silk, and the generals in Eastern Han Dynasty of China had ventured to establish communications with Iranian world and the Eastern part of the Roman Empire”. 10 In the 1990s, having been out of view of the world politics and international communications for over one hundred years, the region of Central Asia and the Caucasus once again resumed its geographic advantage of linking the continents of Europe and Asia. If increasing globalisation were taken into consideration, its geopolitical advantage would probably be far more prominent than in the past. Obviously the leaders of the Central Asian countries have realised the close tie between the geopolitical advantage and the future development of their countries. “As a result, all countries have eagerly declared their desires one after another to become the new ‘tie’ and bridge”. 11 Of course their performing capability has been seriously hindered by underdeveloped economies, fragile infrastructures, complicated religious and ethnic conflicts, but their potential advantages in geography, strategy and even economics cannot be indiscreetly brushed aside. This might be the important reason for which Russia is re-establishing its presence in the region and for which the USA, European Union and NATO are getting involved.

The Western Regions and the National Security of China On the Eurasian hinterland and bordering the Pacific Ocean in the East, China was troubled by the invasion of the nomadic ethnic nations in the North and Northwest in the past feudal dynasties. Hun during the Qin Dynasty, Turk during the period of Sui-Tang, the Northern chaos caused by war during the Five Dynasties, the confrontation between Northern Song and Nuzhen, and later, the successive entrance in the Central Plains of Mongolians and Manchurians, all accounted for a simple fact: the invasions of the nomadic ethnic nations were the major threat to the external security of past dynasties. The rock-firm Great Wall that has been standing for hundreds and thousands of years vividly interprets China’s focus and main orientation in security. With the establishment of the Western maritime hegemony and the rise of capitalism, the main threat against the

10. R. GROUSSET, The Empire of the Steppes: A History of Central Asia, translated by LAN QI, Commercial Press, Beijing 1999, pp. 10-11. 11. SUN ZHUANGZHI, Foreign Relations of Five Central Asian Countries, Contemporary World Press, Beijing, April 1999, p. 35.

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security of China shifted from land to sea. During the 110 years from the Opium War in 1840 to the foundation of the People’s Republic of China, there were numerous invasive wars against China launched from the sea, and China’s capital was captured and ransacked three times: in 1860, the Allied Armies of Britain and France burnt Yuanming Garden; in 1900, the Eight-Power Allied Forces occupied Beijing; and in 1938, Japanese Devils caused a blood bath in Nanjing. It should be noted that even in this period, threats from the North and Northwest had by no means subsided. The territory and borders in the depth of the continent had undergone tremendous changes, from which the threat had not been felt until the 1960s-1970s: from the utmost Eastern part of the Wusuli River to the Pamirs in the Far West, China was half enveloped by the Soviet Union from North to West; the three provinces in the Northeast, the base of China’s heavy industry, were between the hammer and the anvil, and even Beijing, the capital, was within the range of a lightning war. By 1991 the threats from the West and the North had generally undergone two stages. The first stage started around 221 BC and ended in mid 19th century, when the main threat against China came from regular invasions of the Northern nomadic ethnic nations. When the central dynasties were comparatively strong, the invasion caused no more than wars on the Northwestern frontiers; when the central dynasties were vulnerable, the whole Northern regions would fall in the chaos of war including the Central Plains under foreign occupation. Fortunately, although the well-developed civilisation in the Central Plains “had been conquered, yet in the end, it conquered the barbaric and uncivilised victors by inebriating and doping them, and ultimately wiped them out”. 12 From the mid 19th century, the threat from the Northwest underwent substantial changes. First, Russia replaced the nomadic nations and became the main invader from the North, for the expansion of territory cast a spell over Tsarist Russia; second, both the Tsarist and Communist reigning groups were frequently under strong fanatical impulses to launch large-scale invasions and military strikes against China; and third, unlike the regular invasions of the nomadic nations, Russian pressure on the security of China was overwhelming and longlasting. The disintegration of the Soviet Union in December of 1991 and the following independence of the Central Asian countries marked the dawn of a new era in which the security environment in the West and North of China would undergo great changes. Optimistically, the disintegration of the Soviet Union relieved China of the most intense military pressure along the continental border, and in the foreseeable future, there will be no threat of large-scale military invasion in the North and West of China. Even the possibility of border clashes also dropped to the lowest point in history, for China has not only solved the majority of border issues with Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and other countries, but also achieved a common view through dialogue and negotiation au pair on border disarmament 12. R. GROUSSET, The Empire of the Steppes: A History of Central Asia, translated by LAN QI, Commercial Press, Beijing 1999, p. 18.

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and reliance establishment. “The Shanghai Five” in particular, has become a cooperative paradigm in the security field of international society. Nevertheless, it should not be neglected that security in the West and North of China still faces serious uncertainties. The first is related to Islamic extremism and ethnic separatism. Viewed from the whole, the international and regional environments since the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 are propitious to the promulgation of Islamic extremist and ethnic separatist thoughts. From the international perspective, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the frustration suffered under Socialism have not only provided space for the overflowing of all kinds of political and religious trends, but also helped their natural justification: as long as they are trying to shake off Russian control and influence and oppose the Soviet political and economic pattern, they will earn wide support and acclamation in international society. What is more, with the Kosovo war as the turning point, the new interventionism of the USA and NATO has come into shape, represented especially in their support to the “Kosovo Liberation Army”, an extremist faction, and their position on the later Chechen issue. This will stimulate all kinds of separatism. From the regional perspective, both Pan-Islamism and PanTurkism have a ready market in Central Asian regions. One reason for this is that some countries studiously preach and hawk these thoughts in pursuit of their own interests; the other reason is that, to a great extent, these thoughts filled the ideological vacuum during the post Soviet era, and provided a certain ethnic and cultural identity and authenticity. In such great a setting, all kinds of religious extremisms with an Islamic colour and ethnic separatism became active as never before, from the Balkans to the Caucasus, from Central Asia to Afghanistan and Kashmir, that is, along the boundary between the Islamic world and the Eastern camp. To sum up, the Islamic extremism and ethnic separatism active in this region have some common characteristics. First, without exception they lump religious, ethnic and political issues together to evoke widest international sympathy and support; second, while constantly advocating noble religious and political goals, they take up kidnapping, assassination, explosion and other terrorist practices without hesitation as means to achieve their goals; third, in order to acquire reliable resources, the area they control has become a workshop of drugs. It is reported that opium produced in Afghanistan is three times the total amount produced in other areas in the world. In 1999 only, the opium produced in Afghanistan was 4600 metric tons, double the 1998 output. 13 In China there are 10 ethnic groups that believe in Islam, with a population of about 18-20 million, who mostly live in the Northwestern regions. If it was true that during the Cold War, China could cut off the tie between Xinjiang and Central Asia through tight border controls and other security measures, at present it is impossible: in ethnicity, language and religion Xinjiang has a far-reaching

13. AHMED RASHID, “The Taliban: Exporting Extremism”, Foreign Affairs, November/December 1999, p. 33.

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connection with the Western Regions. The bi-directional flow of people, information and materials into and out of the Western Regions is not only the outcome of Xinjiang’s opening to the outside world, it is also the prerequisite of further development. It has been proved that Xinjiang has become the coveting object of extremist religious factions, terrorists and drug dealers, as well as the main infiltration target of “Pan-Islamism” and “Pan-Turkism”. The security and stability of Xinjiang has aroused the unusual attention of the Chinese academic community and governmental departments. The second uncertain element in security that the West of China faces is related to the clash between India and Pakistan. Centred on the dispute of Kashmir, the clash between India and Pakistan has lasted for 50-odd years. Unlike the situations in the past, it is possible that Kashmir will trigger a general war between India and Pakistan. Owing to the disappearance of the Soviet Union, Pakistan has lost its weight in the global strategy of the USA. In the eyes of many Americans, the former strategic ally and hero, which resisted the southward expansion of the Soviet Union, has degenerated into a sheer ruffian: corrupt politicians, the servicemen are unbridled in their truculence and extremist Islamism overspreads; in international politics, the country recklessly develops large-scale weapons, brazenly acts in collusion with Islamic extremist forces, and gravely jeopardises regional stability and peace. On the contrary, India, in the past a “spoiler” in the eyes of the Americans, becomes the exemplary citizen: India is the largest “democratic country” in the world, so it can become the motor of democracy; India puts forth no territorial claims on its neighbours, so it is the protector of the regional order in Southern Asia; even when India risked everyone’s condemnation to conduct nuclear tests, its action was considered a reasonable security demand, and Americans believe that, unlike North Korea and other countries which attempt to possess large-scale antipersonnel weapons, India is one of the most responsible.14 In Southern Asia, India is an absolute leading power. The balance with Pakistan was maintained for over half a century because that the big powers conditioned each other. The collapse of the Soviet Union and especially the adjustment of the USA in its policy concerning Southern Asia have seriously broken the fragile balance in this region. It should be especially noted that, when talking about the so-called “China threat”, the USA and India found a common topic. This might cause India to have an illusion that it has acquired enough freedom and strength to act in Southern Asia, and can solve once and for all the dispute with Pakistan. Unlike before, the dispute probably will lead to serious nuclear confrontation: in the dry tree, Pakistan may fight desperately, while India, holding all the trumps, may well catch the ball before the bound and perform a surgery on Pakistan. It seems that Kashmir has become the “one of the most perilous places in the world” as Clinton, the American President, puts it.15 14. MOHAMMAD AYOOB, “India Matters”, The Washington Quarterly, 23:1, Winter 2000, pp. 27-39. 15. XINHUA AGENCY, UN, April 16, 2000, English telecommunication.

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To China, an India-Pakistan clash would definitely bring tension and disorder in the Western frontier of China, and even a disastrous influence on the economic development in the area. However, the real danger lies in that it is possible that China will be beguiled into an unexpected clash in which it did not intend to be involved in at all.

The Western Regions and the Security of China’s Energetic Source Over the past 20 years, China has been one of the countries with fastest economic growth. When we are proud of the economic achievements and enjoy the convenience brought along by them, we must give enough attention to one of the important elements that support economic growth – the production and supply of petroleum, and the consequent security issue of the energetic source. In 1993 China became an importing country of crude oil, but strains in its production and demand had appeared before this. As early as in 1978, China’s oil output exceeded 100 million tons (reached 104.05 million tons), while by 1990, output had only increased to 138,3 million tons, which meant that the output only increased 34.25 million tons in 12 years, with an annual increase rate of no more than 2.7%. Compared with the annual increase rate of 11% 16 before 1978 (from 1952 to 1978), there really was a world of difference. There are various indications that the room for oil increase in China is very small. It is virtually impossible for China’s oil output to get onto a new stage unless there are big breakthroughs in oil prospecting. In the meanwhile, the tempo of the opening and reform of China is continually accelerating, and due to the rapid economic development, the demand for oil increasingly swells up. In 1980, oil consumption was 87,574 million tons, in 1985, 91,688 million tons, and in 1987, exceeded 100 million tons and reached 103,122 million tons.17 Throughout the 1990s, the conflict between supply and demand was not relieved, on the contrary, it became worse than ever. In the light of statistics, Chinese output of crude oil in 1995 was 149,064 million tons, in 1996 and 1997 they were respectively 157,292 and 160,441 million tons. From 1998, however, output has been decreasing: in 1998, 160,256 million tons; in 1999, 158,786 million tons; 18 and it seems that even at its best, the oil output in 2000 is hardly more than a return to a little over 160 million tons. In striking contrast with the fluctuation of oil output, its demand repeatedly broke the record. According to the statistics and forecast of IEA, the demand for petroleum in China in 1996 was 3.70 million barrel/day; in 1997, 4.10 million barrel/day; in 1998, 4.20 million barrel/day; and in 1999 and 2000 it will reach 4.40 million barrel/day and 4.60 million barrel/day respectively.19 Put another way, the insufficiency between oil production and demand in China will be as high as 70 million tons.

16. MA XIUQING, Petroleum-Development-Challenge of the Economy of the Middle East — Ahead for the 21st Century, Petroleum Industrial Press, Beijing, February 1995, pp. 200-201. 17. China Statistical Yearbook, 1988; 1994. 18. International Petroleum Economics, vol. 8, no. 2, March 20, 2000, p. 55. 19. IEA, Monthly Oil Market Report, February 11, 2000.

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With the improvement of people’s living standards and the expansion of the Chinese economic scale, and the acceleration of the structure readjustment in energy resource due to the increasing pressure of environmental protection, oil demand in China will further increase. According to the forecast of a report entitled “Studies of the Tendency and Countermeasures of China’s Petroleum Importation” issued by the Economic Research Centre of the China State Commission of Economy and Trade, in 2005, the consumption of crude oil in China will reach 243 million tons, and in 2010 and 2015, 296 million tons and 360 millions respectively.20 If no large oil fields are discovered and the oil output remains at 160 or 170 million tons, the insufficiency of supply will be as large as 200 million tons. The estimation of IEA is more alarming: by 2020, China will daily import more than 8 million barrels of crude oil, or 400 million tons in a whole year. No matter how huge the discrepancy in the estimates on Chinese oil demand in the forthcoming 20 years, a simple fact is that the enormous gap between supply and demand has to be made up by imported oil, while in the present world, the main source of the imported oil is in the Middle East, the Gulf in particular. It is unnecessary to provide the already well known figures on reserves, output and export volume of oil in the Middle East. A glance at the figures in the following table 1 will make one understand more than enough the role played by petroleum from the Middle East in meeting China’s oil demand. At present, the influence of Middle Eastern oil on the energy security of China is limited because, though since 1996 China has become a pure importing country of crude oil, the proportion of the imported petroleum in the total demand is not very high. At the same time, China annually exports some crude oil to the USA, Japan and some Eastern Asian countries. Thus, on balance the proportion of imported petroleum will be much lower. In 1998 for instance, China imported 27,322.90 thousand tons of crude oil, 13% of the total demand (210 million tons, 4.20 million barrels/day). In the same year, China exported 15,600.70 thousand tons to Japan, the USA, South Korea, Singapore and others. On balance, imported crude oil is 11,722.20 thousand tons, taking 5.58% of the total demand. Suppose that it was impossible to import crude oil (16,668.30 thousand tons) from the Middle East for some reason, if the worst comes to the worst, China would stop exporting crude oil to Japan, the USA and others, thus the actual insufficiency would be only 1,060 thousand tons. Obviously this would be far from enough to endanger China’s energy supply and economic security. Nevertheless, the alarm bell is ringing, and oil from the Middle East will ultimately become the critical element in affecting China’s energy security. In 1999, when the amount of imported crude oil increased considerably, the export amount decreased by a large margin (only 7,166.60 thousand tons). With the domestic oil price gradually coming in line with that in international market, this tendency will be strengthened. If the forecasts are accurate, in the 20 years ahead 50% of the 20. http://cn.yahoo.com/headlines/000803/busi/huasheng/20000803jjgjtxt2.html

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Table 1. (Unit: thousand tons) Year

Total importing amount

From Middle East

1996 1997 1998 1999

22,616.90 35,469.70 27,322.60 36,613.70

11,962.00 16,781.60 16,668.30 16,903.90

Percentage of Middle East %

52.89 47.31 61.00 46.16

Source: International Petroleum Economics, vol. 8, no. 2, March 20, 2000, p. 7.

demand in China will have to be provided by imported petroleum, of which at least half will be from the Middle East. Chinese policy-making institutions and academic circles have fully recognised the significance of Middle Eastern oil in meeting China’s demand, and also realised the hazards of excessive reliance on it. Therefore, while strengthening domestic prospecting and production, China takes the diversification of importing sources as its main strategy in risk-spreading. Statistically, Africa and some Southeast Asian countries are two additional importing regions besides the Middle East. However, given the frequent chaos of wars, booming local demand, or the limits in production increase and importing volume, it will be difficult for the two regions to exercise a decisive influence on China’s reliance on the Middle East. By this token, petroleum from Central Asia, and Caspian region in particular, should be given an important position in China’s diversifying strategy. In other words, to strengthen petroleum cooperation with Central Asia, the Caucasus and Russia might be of potential significance. First, the high petroleum reserves and low exploration are advantageous to cooperation between China and related countries. In the light of statistics, the proved oil reserves in the Caspian Basin are as much as 15-29 billion barrels, which, though not a match with the Gulf region, is on a par with the USA (22 billion barrels) and the oil fields in North Sea (17 billion barrels). During the Soviet period, the oil capacity in the Caspian region had not been fully developed, while nearly all the reserves in Azerbaijan, 30-40% in Kazakhstan and Tadzhikistan are under the sea.21 Second, the countries in Central Asia and the Caucasus are particularly interested in international cooperation in the petroleum field. After their independence, these countries have austere situations in economic development. To introduce foreign capital and strengthen international cooperation in the field of energy is one of the few choices to cast off economic crises. What is more, these countries also face problems in national economic security: to get rid of dependence on Russia in

21. IDE SPOT SURVEY, The Caspian Basin Oil and Its Impact on Eurasian Power Games, MANABU SHIMZU (ed.), Institute of Developing Economies, To¯kyo¯, June 1998, p. 5.

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technology, production and transport, a variety of partnerships in energy have become a common policy trend. Lastly, China and Central Asian countries are geographically connected, which greatly facilitates Sino-Central Asian cooperation in the field of energy. Of course, at present there are more hindrances than conveniences in cooperation, such as incessant religious and ethnic clashes, unstable politics, underdeveloped infrastructure and so on in Central Asia. But from a long-term point of view, cooperation in energy with Central Asia ought to and surely will exercise considerable influence on the security strategy of China’s energy source.

On China’s Policy Concerning the Western Regions The end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the resulting series of large-scale geopolitical shifts all help China’s establishment of a continental passage to Central and Western Asia, Southern Asia and even to Europe through the traditional “Silk Road” and the Eurasian heartland. The Western Regions, a word that sparked the imagination of the ancient literati and was buried in oblivion for over 100 years, sailed into the view of the Chinese policy-makers with an entirely new connotation. With the accelerating development of China’s economy, and especially with the gradual unfolding of the development strategy in Western China, the ties with the countries in the Western Regions will be much closer, and China’s interests in this region will be represented on numerous levels. Therefore, the academic community and the government departments should well notice such a diplomatic strategy by evaluating accurately and taking hold of the relationships between China and the Western Regions and the developing trends. At the present, however, the issues of national security, triggered by religious extremism and ethnic separatism, and of energy security due to oil supplies, are two key areas in Chinese diplomatic policy in the Western Regions for the next years. With regard to national security, Chinese diplomacy should unfold on three levels. First, it should have good relations with the big countries, such as Turkey, India, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Kazakhstan. These countries hold the balance in regional relations, including in the security and stability of the West of our country. Turkey is the main base of Xinjiang ethnic separatist exiles, India is the headquarters for the Dalai Lama to instigate Tibetan independence, Saudi Arabia and Iran have wide influence in the Islamic world, while Kazakhstan shares the longest border with China and is the largest Central Asian country with both Islamic and Turkish characteristics. Developing relations with these countries should be the main focus of our diplomacy in the Western Regions. If these countries stick to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, and fully understand the regional harm of religious extremism and ethnic separatism, this would exercise a positive influence upon the improvement and development of bilateral relations and on regional security and stability. To the regular communication of the cross-border ethnic groups, China bears no objection and it would welcome

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heartily a constructive dialogue on the basis of the principle of mutual equality and respect. But under all circumstances, China strongly opposes intervention into other country’s internal affairs under the pretext of ethnic and religious issues. Second, China should strengthen cooperation with Russia and other Western Region countries. It should be acknowledged that the difference in political systems and ideologies, the complexity of religious and ethnic composition, the imbalance of economic and social development and the national interest conflicts in various fields severely impair mutual trust between China, Russia and other countries in the Western Regions. It should also be acknowledged that China, Russia and most countries in the Western Regions are the victims of religious extremism, ethnic separatism, terrorism and cross-border crime, which, as a result, undermine the cooperation potential of these countries in the field of security. China and Russia ought to be the active participants in the security cooperation. Without a full understanding and cooperation between China and Russia, the rampant growth of religious extremism, ethnic separatism and international terrorism cannot be effectively checked. In the meanwhile, China and Russia should also encourage more Western Regional countries to join this form of cooperation. Only through a larger scale of information exchange, personnel training and concerted efforts can the reticular connections of these international criminal organisations be cut off, especially their come-and-go in funds, personnel and trans-national traffic in ammunitions and drugs. At the recent Summit conference of “the Shanghai Five”, great progress was made between China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Tadzhikistan and Kyrgyzstan, united against religious extremism, ethnic separatism and international terrorism. Just as Putin, the Russian President, put it, “the Summit between China, Russia and the Central Asian countries that aimed to solve border problems became a Summit for the prevention of international terrorism and to promote cooperative relations”. 22 The historical change of “the Shanghai Five” indicates that an increasing number of countries have realised the importance of cooperation in security. Third, China should watch out for the strategic intentions of the Western countries in this region. While China, Russia and other countries have discarded the Cold War mentality and are exploring new paths in international and regional security structures, the US-led Western countries still cling to bygone dreams and are infatuated with patching up and just modifying the decade-old Cold War machine: the NATO and Japan-US alliance attempts to contain China and Russian strategically. In the West, NATO’s tentacles have extended to the Caucasus and Central Asia; in the East, to consolidate the alliance with Japan, the USA has attached great strategic importance to the improvement and development of relations with Vietnam, and India in particular. Through the war in Kosovo and the 50th NATO anniversary, the US-led Western countries made an attempt to establish a new form of interventionism. We are more than willing to take their motivations

22. XINHUA AGENCY, To¯kyo¯, July 6, 2000, Japanese telecommunication.

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and goals as kind and noble, but the outcome of the war in Kosovo and the double standards in human rights have shattered our imagination and a severe reality lies in front of us. We would rather believe that this judgement is far from true: when the influence of the USA and NATO infiltrates Central and Southern Asia and begins to harangue human rights, large-scale of chaos in Xinjiang and Tibet will not be very far. The second diplomatic key question for China in the Western Regions is to ensure the stability and security of oil supplies. It must be made clear that the interests of China, the USA, Europe, Japan and other countries are exactly the same in obtaining petroleum supply from the Middle East, and the Gulf in particular. Consequently, China should not only give active support to but also try its best to be involved in any suggestions and efforts aimed at the promotion of regional security and stability in the Middle East and the Gulf. It has to be pointed out, however, that there are divergent opinions on how to bring peace and stability in the Middle East and the Gulf, and ensure the continuous flow of oil from the Middle East to the international market at an acceptable price. Therefore, Chinaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s policy on the Middle East should first focus on multilateral cooperation and opposition to irresponsible unilateral action. Second, multilevel cooperation with oil-producing countries in the Middle East should be substantially strengthened to realise the best combination of economic interests of oil supply and production. Chinese policy-makers should bear in mind that a single tie of petroleum supply and demand, or a high complementarity in trade, would be insufficient to ensure that oil-producing countries sell petroleum to China under any circumstance. Only full-scale cooperation in oil prospecting, production, transportation, refining and related petrochemical fields can ensure the security of oil supplies from the Middle East. Third, the Middle East and the Gulf are unstable regions, as much as the sea route from the Gulf to the Far East through the Indian Ocean, Malacca Strait and South China Sea is unsafe. Thus, the maintenance of security in transport should also be addressed. The prospect (or rather reality) of importing most oil from the Middle East is an even greater challenge to the security of Chinaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s energetic source. Were there another major potential supplier in the Caspian region, it would be pressing to develop a wider ranging policy. Presently, China is not a powerful competitor in the development of Caspian oil: we have neither the favourable geographical position of Russia, nor the abundant financial resources of Americans and Europeans. Therefore, it is not easy to pick the first fruits. Nevertheless, China has potential advantages that other countries lack: among those that can reach the Caspian Sea without passing a third country, China is the one with the fastest growth in the economy and in oil demand. For the countries in the Caspian and in Central Asia that want to achieve economic and social development through developing resources, China is more appealing than the pure petroleum developers. Furthermore, Pacific Asia is a region with great potential in the coming decades. In China, the Central Asian countries can find not only a most reliable

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buyer of oil and other resources, but also the most convenient track for their economies to integrate into Pacific Asia. If the Central Asian countries considered the potential capability of the second Eurasian continental bridge and the immense influence of Chinaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Western development, surely they would think over the role China could play in the development of the energy source in the Caspian Sea and in Central Asia. In view of this, China should not worry about present difficulties, or abandon its fundamental positions in order to pick the first fruits. For the Chinese government and enterprises, the two fundamental principles in energy cooperation in the Caspian Sea and in the Central Asian region are a far-reaching strategy and commercial feasibility.

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THE POPE IN CHINA: STILL A LONG WAY TO GO

by Francesco SISCI

HE HISTORY OF RELATIONS BETWEEN

China and the Vatican is fraught with misunderstandings. It is fascinating, especially from the Catholic side, but ridden with mistakes with far reaching consequences for both sides. Just recall the controversy of rites that pulled the Jesuits out of China in the 18th century, or the war of attrition between the Pope, committed to an anti Communist crusade in the 1950s, and Mao’s comrades, which ended with the expulsion of foreign missionaries from China. Over the past two years, two men with very different personal backgrounds and ambitions put a completely different spin on bilateral ties, starting a new and crucial phase in this sensitive relationship and drawing in the rest of the world. The two men are Li Hongzhi, head of the Falungong cult, and Chen Shuibian, president of Taiwan.

The Falungong Threat On 25 April 1999 over 10,000 Falungong followers held an unprecedented demonstration around Zhongnanhai, the residence of Chinese top leaders in Beijing. The Chinese Communist Party was challenged for the first time not by spontaneous protests, but by a large, well organised, semi-clandestine organisation with clear political ambitions, a strong religious ideology and whose leader was residing outside China. Moreover, Chinese leaders realised they had not heeded the many alarm signs against the sects and cults that were mushrooming all over the country. They had underestimated the political dangers posed by the sects, had not received accurate intelligence on them, and genuinely theorised a policy of greater tolerance towards religions. Many senior officials were followers of the new sects and did all they could to cover up their actions. The end result was that the many warnings from all quarters passed unnoticed. In the spring of 1999, Chinese leaders discovered that the previous year a senior Buddhist priest, Chen Xingqiao, had written a book to refute the Falungong (Foujiao qigong yu falungong, The Buddhist Qi gong and the Falungong). Not only. Discreetly but clearly all “traditional religions” – those recognised by the state and including the official Catholics – had warned against

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the spread of new cults. But until the demonstration, the leadership would rather trust the new sects than the “old enemies”, the traditional religions that had been fought by the old Chinese Communist Party. The CCP had been reading the signs wrongly, thinking that the hostility of traditional religions towards the Falungong and their likes stemmed from normal animosity in the face of the competition. The new challenge of the cults did not drastically change the CCP’s suspicion towards traditional religions, but put it into a different perspective. The CCP began to realise it had lost its old appeal on people’s mind. The Communist Party in the past 20 years had become secularised and no longer claimed to provide a total answer to people’s problems. Its appeal to Maoist Communists had been watered down by Deng’s new dogma “no matter if the cat is black or white as long as it catches rats”, i.e. be pragmatic and cast aside highflying theories. Its hold on power had been kept by running the country well. Deng’s approach reversed the priorities of Maoist times: he would manage the country well, improve people’s life and gradually loosen old ideological bonds. This policy received praise from everywhere but left a spiritual vacuum, as Communist leaders realised already in the early 1980s when they launched the first of their campaign against “spiritual pollution” against the dangers of Western ideas pouring in, unhindered, through the open door policy. They did not pay any attention to the new Qi Gong wave that spread in China. On the contrary, masters of the old breathing technique, were given ample coverage on TV and radio. Official papers gave credit to the miracles they could perform and even elderly leaders sought their advice and cure for ailments. Youngsters taught themselves Qi Gong by reading old and once forbidden books or by looking for old monks. Incredible stories were circulating of masters capable of flying, passing through walls, and materialising miles away within seconds. As early as 1988 there were unheard calls for prudence. Young students experienced physical and psychological problems while practising Qi Gong without the supervision of trained masters. Taoist and Buddhist monks, who had been preserving the technique for centuries, warned that Qi Gong could turn out to be dangerous. Officials did try to pay attention to these calls but they did so in a way that ultimately made matters even worse. The government kept an eye on the phenomenon by having Qi Gong associations registered under the Sport Commission, implicitly leading many people to believe Qi Gong was a harmless sport rather than a new religion. In the early 1990s dozens of masters appeared from nowhere and organised their styles, and also brought in new beliefs filling the vacuum left by traditional Communism, accompanied by new organisations that collected money for the master and spread the technique. The diffusion of those ideas was so powerful that hardly no one can claim to have never practised any Qi Gong. It also contributed to bringing back a tradition worth preserving, and appeased millions of Chinese with an important part of their cultural legacy. Last but not least, the new Qi Gong wave provided spiritual support for people who

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had lost faith in everything and felt deeply disoriented in a fast moving society where old values were dying out. The people and government preferred trusting new Qi Gong masters rather than old Buddhist and Taoist monks or Protestant and Catholic priests. Traditional Taoists or Buddhists were also associated with the Guomindang tradition of the Nationalist party, the sworn enemy of the Communists for almost a century. Buddhism was dangerously close to the religion practised by the Dalai Lama, spiritual head of the Tibetan ethnic group with many grievances against Beijing. Compared to Buddhism, newly founded Qi Gong sects appeared quite tame and manageable. The objective of the Beijing government, in line with the imperial tradition, was to hinder the growth of organised religions that aspired to share power with the State. China has never known wars of religion and has seldom had conflicts of interests and power in any way comparable to those between the Pope and the European sovereigns. Given China’s tradition of religious tolerance, the policy up to 25 April was to keep traditional religions, considered more dangerous, under firm control and let other sects develop. This policy was first reviewed in 1998 when the Falungong held many demonstrations against the media, radio stations and newspapers, guilty of criticising the cult. In all instances the media retracted their allegations, and the writers and scientists who had discreetly attacked the sect were warned by the Propaganda department. The pattern was clear: the government did not want any conflict with the Falungong or any other sect and saw those criticising the sect as stirring up trouble by upsetting the social balance the sects had somehow contributed to maintain. However, the growing number of people complaining with the authorities about their relatives being swayed and harmed by the sects, and the increasing number and dimension of Falungong demonstrations drew the attention of the official departments. At the end of 1998 the government estimated that those practising Falungong were tens of millions, though not all as blind followers. The Falungong had reached the army and the security department, which had introduced Qi Gong practice as part of their martial arts training. Its organisation was tightly knit, with a clandestine pyramidal structure, emulating the Communist Party’s, with a kind of politburo and central committee and many local branches. Now the party suspects that as early as 1998 the Falungong was actually preparing for a struggle with the party. Although far from illegally, Li Hongzhi had left the country to the US that year, and had organised, according to official reports 1 three levels of clandestine leaders, so that anybody arrested could be easily replaced. Officials said that until the 25 April demonstration the government had no intention of cracking down on the Falungong. On the other hand, I have been told by followers that a repression was in the offing since early 1998 and that they were simply trying to resist it, citing Li Hongzhi’s flight to the US as proof of his personal 1. See People’s Daily Commentary, October 28, 1999.

CATHOLICS IN THE WORLD (1997)

SOUTH AMERICA Population: 313,354,000 Catholics: 276,090,000 Percentage: 88.10%

WORLD Population: 5,687,374,000 Catholics: 989,366,000 Percentage: 17.39%

AFRICA Population: 725,850,000 Catholics: 107,077,000 Percentage: 14.84%

ASIA (MIDDLE EAST) Population: 198,430,000 Catholics: 3,152,000 Percentage: 1.58%

OCEANIA Population: 28,200,000 Catholics: 7,760,000 Percentage: 27.51%

ASIA (SOUTH - FAR EAST) Population: 3,257,850,000 Catholics: 98,058,000 Percentage: 3.00%

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CENTRAL AMERICA Population: 123,541,000 Catholics: 115,721,000 Percentage: 93.67%

ANTILLES Population: 35,890,000 Catholics: 22,941,000 Percentage: 63.92%

EUROPE Population: 711,497,000 Catholics: 288,953,000 Percentage: 40.61%

ASIA 3,456,280,000 101,210,000 2.92%

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NORTH AMERICA Population: 292,762,000 Catholics: 69,614,000 Percentage: 23.77%

AMERICA Population: 765,547,000 Catholics: 484,366,000 Percentage: 63.27%

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danger. But in this case the official version seems more credible. The 25 April demonstration appears to be a pre-emptive defensive attack in by the cult. The party was unprepared for confrontation with the Falungong, as demonstrated by the two feverish months the party took to ban the sect. Furthermore, most of the arrests and identifications of followers occurred during the demonstrations: were the party planning a crackdown, it would have long prepared lists of names to keep under surveillance. The subsequent repression on the Falungong and all other “creepy” Qi Gong sects creates a different environment for traditional religions, in particular for Catholicism.

The Catholic Opportunity Chinese leaders became genuinely frightened of the Falungong, which has repeatedly shown signs of intolerance, by protesting against foreign journalists even mildly critical of the sect. The Party feared it because of its organisation, its structured ideology/faith, its experience of confrontation with the Party, and its leader safely outside the country – all the elements that had made the success of the CCP over half a century before. The Falungong could reap the benefits of social discontent due to economic reforms and it could, if unchecked, constitute a threat to the country’s stability. The government’s analysis is sound from the socio-political point of view, but a repression of the Qi Gong sects would leave yet again a spiritual vacuum. In spring 1999 the party launched, without much success, a science and Marxism campaign to cater for the spiritual needs of society. Chinese scholars were soon sceptical of its possible results. The people craved for a spiritual bond with the world, with the after life and the cosmos, and science so far has been unable to satisfy this craving. The most fanatical form of Marxism, which claimed to provide an exhaustive answer to human needs, is now out of question in China. As the country is set to join the club of the developed nations, and conduct its affairs according to the international standards of the World Trade Organisation, a return to Maoism is impossible. This leaves no choice but reconsider the policies towards traditional religions, which, because of their history and their now proven integration in the Party apparatus, could become reliable partners in what the state considers its duty to manage the people’s spirituality. Catholicism could stand out as the most interesting among the traditional religions. Thanks to their strong organisation, Catholics could be tough adversaries, but also reliable allies. It would be best to join hands with the most organised religious group that is most likely to follow Party directions once an agreement with its leaders has been reached. The path is not easy but things are changing rapidly. The Catholics of the Patriotic Church, loyal to the Party, have been slowly moving towards reconciliation with Rome. Catholic officials admitted that the Patriotic Church is conducting a dialogue with many bishops of the underground church, who could join the official Church once ties with the Vatican

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are normalised. Catholics, along with other traditional religions could then expect to enjoy more freedom to do missionary work in the country. Of course this will not come without a price for the Vatican, which perhaps is higher than expected. Vatican officials claim to be informed that tougher regulations will be applied on the Catholics’ activities in China after the normalisation of ties. They are privately worried that these new regulations are aimed at stopping religious activities while cashing the international points Rome could offer to Beijing, which will be discussed in the next paragraph. In a way the Vatican seems to miss the logic of the reconciliation for Beijing. The new relationship can work on purely utilitarian grounds because there is a possible win-win solution. The Party has an interest in Chinese people becoming Catholic rather than Falungong, once and if the Catholics guarantee that they will not use the strength gained through the new converts to destabilise the country, but to stabilise it. But how can the party be sure of the honesty of the Vatican’s intentions? The answer is by imposing a close monitoring of the Catholic activities. The Falungong grew because it went unchecked by Beijing, but government tolerance created a direct challenge to its legitimacy, and greater intolerance towards intellectuals, who had grown far more fearful of the Falungong than of the party censorship. The Falungong went unchecked until it decided – unprovoked – to move against the party leadership, grossly overestimating its strength. This is a mistake party leaders cannot afford again, lest loose the country. As a matter of fact, from a structural point of view the Catholics are just the same as the Falungong: well organised, a structured ideology/faith, an experience of confrontation with the Party, and their leader is safe outside the country. The Party can and has an interest to do business with the Vatican, but cannot underwrite a blank check to the Pope. Certainly the Pope can claim none of Li Hongzhi’s weird ideas, and can positively affirm to head an organisation known for its reliability. While these are good enough reasons to start talks, guarantees, i.e. strong checks, are necessary in a new venture, especially for the CCP. On the other hand Beijing appears definitely interested in opening a dialogue with Rome, which represents the only religion that can offer an internal solution as well as an external advantage.

Taiwan

The election of Chen Shuibian as president of Taiwan last March has further complicated Beijing’s sentiments about the island. Since the mid 1990s Beijing has been very worried about Taiwan’s drift toward a formal declaration of independence. Several steps taken in Taiwan were perceived as moving to this end. President Lee Teng-hui’s visit to the US in 1995 was followed by the vocal presidential election of 1996, when Lee was elected and the American intervened in the Taiwan Strait with two aircraft carriers groups. In 1999 the controversial announcement of the “special two state theory” was considered by Beijing as a further move to independence and, finally, the

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candidate of the pro independence Progressive Democratic Party Chen, was elected in March 2000 despite the Mainland’s stern warnings against him. Since 1996 economic relations between the two sides of the Strait have improved but political distance has increased. Bilateral trade increased from $18.9 billion dollars in 1996, to $19.8 billion in 1997 and to $20.4 billion in 1998. But during the same period Chinese scholars perceived a growing cultural distance between the two sides, denouncing a “taiwanisation” of culture. The authorities of the island tended to emphasise the local cultural identity in contrast with the Mainland. Minanyu, the language of the majority of the island’s population and in the Mainland’s province of Fujian, is gaining more prestige at the expense of Mandarin, seen as the language of unification. Museums feature a new history of Taiwan, illustrating the island’s individual culture, first inhabited by people of Malay stock, rather than the Han origin of the present population. Beijing has little hope of influencing “taiwanisation”, and does not appear to have started thinking about a counter cultural strategy. In the mid 1990s the dominant idea was that better economic ties would reverse the drift toward independence. But the experience of recent years proves that other means must be found. Taiwan’s bid for greater independence could be contrasted by reducing its diplomatic room for manoeuvre and proving to public opinion that “taiwanisation” will lead nowhere. At the moment the Vatican is the most important of the 28 governments holding diplomatic ties with the island. Taiwan is the big prize at stake in the normalisation of relations between China and the Vatican. New ties could convince some Latin American governments to switch sides in the diplomatic tug of war between Beijing and Taipei. They could also improve China’s image in the US where the Catholic Church is very influential and, within a couple of decades, with the growth of the Hispanic population, could command the loyalty of the majority of voters. The ties would have huge positive impact in Europe and in the rest of the world, and would further isolate the Dalai Lama’s position. It would be more difficult for his people to understand why the Dalai cannot reach an agreement with Beijing if the Pope could. It would have a positive impact on China’s human rights record. In other words better relations with the Vatican could trigger the start of a badly needed tidal change in China’s image abroad. In China there were past fears of very close links between the Pope and the US. Suspicions of an American-Vatican alliance to bring down the East European block have grown weaker for many reasons. In the past 10 years the agenda of the Vatican and that of the US have increasingly diverged. Moreover, neither wants to bring about the collapse of the Communist party, which could cause an even greater implosion of the country than the one experienced in the former USSR. The US administration has proved its best intentions by signing a ground breaking WTO agreement in November 1999 and by campaigning with Congress to extend the Permanent Normal Trade Relations treaty to China. The NPTR is a major step in building better relations on the two sides of the Pacific.

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The intentions of the Vatican are less apparent and certainly need to be clarified to the Party. Despite the risks, the benefits for Beijing could be huge. The risks should not be underestimated because Chinaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s leadership tends to be very cautious on issues touching yishixingdai, ideology in a very broad sense. If Beijing is interested in this big prize it must act swiftly. In the Vatican there is no consensus on the benefits of normalising relations with Beijing. Allegedly Pope John Paul II is personally in favour of the re-establishment of relations, but not everybody agrees with him. With a new Pope and agenda, China might have to start all over again. A strong constituency in Rome thinks the Holy See cannot trust the Chinese Communists, and certainly the CCP has no particular interest in or sensitivity to Catholic issues. Dealing with the Communists would be a new ball game for cardinals and bishops, used to relate to political leaders who show sensitivity if not outright respect or worship for their religion. The pros and cons would have to be measured in purely geopolitical terms, without the plus of religious influence, which can be played worldwide in most occasions. It would certainly be a challenge new to many princes of the Church, and arguably something John Paul II, because of his personal experience in Communist Poland, is more ready to deal with. However, not even in Poland or former USSR was there the deep rooted, almost callous, insensitivity to Catholic issues one can experience now in China. Catholicism per se is not a problem: four million Catholics are well organised in a established Patriotic Church, the other four million of the underground Church are less important compared to the Falungong and represent a small fraction of the 1.3 billion population of China. The Catholic issue becomes important for Beijing only in geopolitical terms. But the Vatican might think it is not worth the effort. Rome has waited 50 years for China, it could just as well wait another 50 and respect the sacrifices of the millions Chinese who upheld their faith in dire straits and never gave up their loyalty to the Pope. Cutting a deal with Beijing could seem a betrayal towards those people, who are the backbone of Catholicism in China. If the time is ripe for the Vatican, because of the present Pope, things may change rapidly in China. In a couple of years both the Taiwan and Falungong issues might be under control by different means and without the Vatican. In which case a deal with Rome may appear less interesting for Beijing. Historically, the Catholics had an important chance at the beginning of the Qing dynasty in the 17th century that Rome did not understand and missed. There now is a broad consensus in the Church that in the 17th century Rome made a mistake with China, so the logical outcome would be avoid another mistake and strike a deal now. In a few years, without formal ties with the Vatican, the underground Church could stop being Catholic altogether. It is currently experiencing serious problems. In the 1980s, because of the anti Christian persecution that made it impossible for Rome to monitor events in China closely, the Pope granted the right to appoint their bishops without his approval to the Chinese underground Church, but the situation is allegedly getting out of hand,

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and in ten or twenty years what now is the backbone of the Church could become very unreliable for Rome. Both the Party and Rome are fully aware that bilateral relations are a new policy of opening up. Through what might appear just a small opening, new water will flood into China. No matter how small the opening is initially, the water pressure will naturally expand it. The trend will continue even if, as it is likely, the Chinese authorities intervene to reduce the opening, which might grow to become an internal cleavage. In other words, the agreement for the Vatican could be on how to create an opening and how to keep it of a reasonable size. With the ecumenical aspirations of the Church, can the Holy See afford to miss a second chance in China? It is important to focus on the entire picture rather than on the many tricky details. For both parties it is worth thinking of Deng Xiaoping. It is important to open the window, though remembering that once the window is open flies will come in along with the fresh air. In mid September bilateral relations took an unexpected twist. Cardinal Roger Etchegaray was invited – after a seven years’ absence – to China to discuss religion, but was then received with courteous yet firm protest about the Vatican’s decision to “sanctify” 120 Chinese martyrs on the following 1 October, China’s national day. China saw the ceremony as a provocation, and objected to the choice of martyrs. Many of the martyrs were killed during the boxers’ uprising, which China considers a first anti colonialist movement. The Vatican delegation in Beijing appeared genuinely surprised by this fierce reaction. This proves that the Vatican did not mean it as a provocation, but also shows the great distance in understanding between Beijing and the Vatican. On 6 January 2000 Beijing ordered six new bishops: it was a clear provocation by Beijing that chose the traditional Catholic day for their appointment. Was then the October celebration a tit-for-tat? It will still take weeks to clarify what happened, but it is certainly clear that bilateral relations, although in theory helpful to either side, are hampered by reciprocal misunderstandings. Beijing is not clear about the Vatican, and somehow the Vatican has many misconceptions of Communist China. The first bridge to establish relations is therefore understanding, which for the Chinese means first that Catholic missionaries have to become more Chinese, and not vice versa. Today this means that the Catholics have to understand fully the trappings of the Chinese Communist system (very Chinese and little Communist), which is ingrained in society, and is not just a veneer. It is a matter of nationalist sovereignty for Beijing. This takes us back to Matteo Ricci and the controversy on the rites. Understanding the Chinese Communist system could be seen as a betrayal of the true faith and as an easy concession. How to strike a balance? Or is it necessary to strike a balance at all? The other road for the Vatican is to wait for the fall of Communism in China. But who knows when this will happen and if the next government will be less nationalist than the present one.

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FROM THE RIM TO THE HEART

by Fabio

MINI

LMOST ALL THE GREAT GEOPOLI-

tical forecasts have fallen short of the mark. Models of the remote past linked to geographic considerations have not been of any great benefit in making predictions, even though they did rationalise possible scenarios. The inability to foresee the collapse of the Soviet bloc was the greatest demonstration that, notwithstanding an enormous intelligence apparatus and teams of dedicated analysts, reality is always uncertain. Today, no one hazards any grand projections and many experts limit themselves to detailed examinations of the present or the recent past, at times making it seem as if the present were the past and vice versa. With respect to Asia, a good exception is the study by Cass and Schwarz (C&S) 1 who in 1993 analysed three hypothetical main scenarios for the next decade. These scenarios are worth outlining, as they are still plausible. In fact, one of them, the least favourable, prognosticated the Asian economic crisis along with some of its related political and social consequences. The two experts identified some of the driving forces of Asian development in the following factors: • resources and influence of the overseas Chinese network; • the constraints of a rapid economic growth; • the uncertainty of regional security; • the increasing importance of intra-regional commerce and flow of capital; • the emergence of sub-regional development; • the affirmation of Asian capitalism (defined as “monolithic capitalism”) as the dominant socio-political-economic model. An analysis of each of the above factors had lead to some interesting deductions that in many ways are still valid today, seven years from their initial formulation. Specifically, Cass and Schwartz identified some of the limitations to Asian economic growth in the education and qualification of the work force. With the growth rate that existed during that period, it should have been clear that the national educational systems would not be able to assure a qualitative replacement 1. S. CASS and P. SCHWARTZ, From Silk Road to Silicon Road-Managing the Challenges of Success in the Asia Pacific During the 1990s. This work is the result of a project conducted by Global Business Network in 1992 to study future scenarios for the Asia-Pacific region.

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and renewal of the productive force. Indeed, given that the field of mass production into which Asia plunged rapidly exhausts markets and, at the same time, makes them more sophisticated in their requirements, it should have been obvious that without an adequate educational system, competitiveness would fall short and growth would either slow down or stop altogether. This phenomenon is still in full development and is truly a limiting factor, especially for China. Another factor of deceleration would have been the excessive urbanisation of development. The examples of the megalopolis of Bangkok, Djakarta, Beijing, Seoul and Tokyo anticipated a certain type of structural collapse. In material terms this collapse has yet to take place, but we have witnessed the collapse of real estate prices and a consequent reduction of returns on investments. Furthermore, the implosion of the megalopolis is pre-announced by the overcrowding of suburban areas. Today, in China, a huge mass of people lives on the outskirts of large cities, yet officially resides in the country and is computed as rural work force. Another trend that should have had a positive influence on development was the Asian model of capitalism. Cass and Schwarz defined it as a monolithic model – although not much is monolithic in Asia – and viewed it as substantially different from Western models since it was not based on the relative “laissez faire” of the American system and was far removed from the European welfare system. The principal characteristics of this capitalism were viewed as: • high level of government/business integration both in the definition of economic objectives and in policy implementation; • relatively weak multi-party systems, with a tendency toward favouring the soft authoritarianism of a predominant party or a charismatic leader, whether this be the Chinese Communist Party or Suharto; • a relative lack of concern for social welfare or for “safety-net” mechanisms compared to European or North American models. These characteristics are still largely valid, as much as Cass and Schwarz’s observation on the fact that while the United States are incapable of integrating national and foreign policy with economic and military policy to reach common objectives, their Asian counterparts have no difficulty in achieving this. In addition, Asian capitalism is little influenced by ideology or politics or by what in the West are called civil liberties or individual rights. According to the prevalence of one or more of the aforementioned driving forces, the two experts of the Global Business Network foresaw three interesting scenarios: regional integration, in which there is a strong connection between Asian economic and political forces; sub-regional integration, in which this phenomenon is limited to lower level economic areas; of dis-integration, in which nationalist forces and protectionism prevail over designs of coordinated power and the Asian economy does not succeed in assuming a guiding role on a global level.

Regional integration. In this scenario the dominant forces are the network of the Chinese diaspora and the growth of intra-regional market of capital and trade.

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Together with an open world market, the Asian region maintains a high growth rate and becomes highly integrated. On a global level, commercial blocs such as NAFTA and the European Community resist protectionist pressures and become supporting elements of an even more integrated global economy. The Chinese diaspora practices a type of capitalism never before seen in the West: authoritarian and Confucian, accepting economic freedom but neglecting democracy, despite the increasing role of a growing middle class. Sub-regional integration. If the dominant driving forces are sub-regional development and a weak regional security structure, Asia, according to Cass and Schwarz, can reject integration in favour of a more localised approach to development and cooperation. In this case Asia develops into 4 sub-regions, from North to South: (1) The Sea of Japan (or Greater Korea) based on the $30 billion project of the Tumen River (TRADPT – Tumen River Development Program) which incorporates the areas of the two Koreas, Northeast China, Siberia and Japan. (2) Greater China, which includes the Southern provinces of China (Guangdong, Fujian, Guanxi, Hainan, Hong Kong) and Taiwan. With a population of 120 million inhabitants and a GNP of $320 billion (1991), this Greater China already has a pro capita GNP of 2700 dollars, compared to the $200 of the interior provinces. 75% of direct foreign investments come from Hong Kong and Taiwan. Other provinces that could become part of this zone are Zhejiang, Shanghai, Jiangsu, followed by Hunan, Jiangxi and Anhui. (3) Greater Indochina, centred on Thailand and inclusive of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, Burma, the Chinese province of Yunnan and Singapore. (4) An insular Southeastern Asia based on the development triangle of Singapore, the Malaysian state of Johore and the island of Batam in Indonesia. This area includes Brunei and the rest of Indonesia as well as Papua New Guinea. This sub-division appears to be the natural evolution of a process of synergy between sources of capital, labour, raw material and productive capacities to maintain rapid growth and reduce the effects of infrastructure bottlenecks in transport, communication, energy and labour. In this scenario, there is no clear political regional leader and the US presence continues to be crucial for the area. But China’s security policy toward the exterior and its doctrine of external defence becomes increasingly superimposed onto the need to ensure resources and commercial routes. China’s movements towards the South China Sea appear even more threatening. Only American presence and naval cooperation with Vietnam would make China more reasonable. This initial fear of China leads ASEAN to become a significant political and economic force. Military cooperation accelerates, as does the sale of weapons. ASEAN becomes a military alliance with an anti Chinese and anti Japanese function. This scenario also contemplates a potent player in a subsequent phase: a unified Korea, causing Japan and China to reconsider their relations.

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The reunification of Korea would be the first result of sub-regionalisation. But given the German experience, South Korea is in no hurry to ally itself with the poor economy of the North. As part of its strategy to achieve development prior to unification, South Korea invests in the North and in the Tumen project. Subregional development becomes diversified and triggers a new investment market in the region.

Dis-integration. This is the final scenario. The driving forces indicate that there is another possible future, one in which Asia does not succeed in managing the challenges of success. In a world of growing protectionism, if obstacles to development are not confronted appropriately, growth in the Asia-Pacific area slows down. The limited development of qualified labour, excessive centralisation and urbanisation, restrictions imposed by energy requirements and environmental deterioration become real impediments to the economy. The social result is the growth of nationalism and militarism. In this context economic problems begin to generate political friction. The new “ideological” conflict and nationalism emerge from the global competition of different models of capitalism. Protectionism develops as soon as the breaking point with Asian economies that refuse to “play according to the rules” is reached. Europeans raise protectionist barriers to halt immigration and preserve the politics of welfare that are so dear to them. The Asians are confused and distressed by European and US insistence on “opening” and other issues like the environment, the rights of workers, copyrights and a number of other intangible factors that lead only to greater problems for Asian affairs. Triggered by the deceleration of regional economy, Chinese political relations also suffer. A repressive foreign and security policy and the lack of security in Asia nourish each other in a downward spiral of intra-regional political tensions. China moves to fill the gap created by American and European isolationism in Southeast Asia and sets its sights on the Indian Ocean. Japan increases its military role in Indochina to secure resources and markets. Soon China is perceived by other Asian nations as an arrogant power in search of regional hegemony. South Korea, Japan and Singapore lead the effort to contrast Chinese expansion but are hampered by their own economic and social problems. While China expands into the South China Sea, towards the Senkakus Islands and up to the Indian Ocean for resources, environmental confrontation escalates due to the increase in CO2 and the problem of water supplies. Because of its identification of the Asian structural problem and its vision of the consequences of a global economic break down, this final scenario has something prophetic. Today we are witnessing many of the signs and factors of this scenario, though its catastrophic effects are not yet visible. For example: Indonesia is falling apart, China expands, India itself is looking for a way to the South China Sea, the “fear of Asia” is driving Australia towards a “sheriff’s role” that is not recognised by anyone and is far from stabilising the situation.

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With respect to China, this latter scenario is as likely as the others. China possesses the potential to guide the region or a sub-region or even to find its own way in the general chaos. But since 1993, the year of the Cass and Schwarz study, the Asian geostrategic picture has changed significantly and China’s position merits new consideration.

A New Geostrategic Framework for China Even though the Cass and Schwarz scenarios are excellent examples of strategic analysis, they limit China to the Asian context, and, most important, view the latter in a marginal framework with respect to the rest of the world. Attention is still centred upon the United States and the Western world. But something is changing and perhaps this viewpoint is no longer appropriate to interpret global geostrategic phenomena. There are a great many areas of tension in the world today and it is absolutely and unquestionably true that the United States are at the very centre of all of them: their global interests and the divine mission they have taken upon themselves to keep the world from sin place them at the centre of the world. It is nevertheless a centre that is strictly political; a centre that is involved out of interest, not survival: no one is threatening the territory of the United States, no neighbouring country is having tantrums or seeking to remove itself from their control. This attribute has led the United States over the past few years to develop a mania for extraterritoriality. Since US territory is not threatened it must defend US interests wherever these may be, without regard to the sovereignty or the will of others. It is a role that historically is so anomalous that it cannot last for long and is destined to set off new balances or imbalances of power. In this sense, China’s position is totally different, and, if we will, historically more comprehensible: at the moment it is the only country that is in the direct centre, and in contact with, development, trade opportunities, tensions and conflicts of any nature and of a global scope. What has happened and what could happen? From the “rim” to the “heart”. Communist China has for decades been placed at the periphery of the developed world. This was something downright offensive, not so much due to China’s marginal economic role but by reason of its political significance, since it was and is a member of the United Nations Security Council. Even in periods of greatest external influence, when it exported revolution to Third World countries and fomented extremist movements in Western countries, China did not succeed in assuming a global dimension. The vision of a tripolar world as contemplated in the 1970s was a pure academic exercise. The power factors upon which China based its presumed race toward hegemony, or at the very least the consideration of the powerful, were completely anachronistic or scarcely credible. Anachronistic was the demographic factor. To base the extent of one’s power upon the number of mouths to feed was a concept the West had abandoned at least a century before. Anachronistic was the economic factor based

62 Buddhist Japanese

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Source: S. P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, pp. 26-27 - New York 1996

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on agriculture when the world had already gone on to industrialisation. Anachronistic and superfluous was mass industrialisation when the world had already graduated to advanced technology and the development of service industries. Scarcely credible were factors of military power based on a people’s army and a militia that was ill equipped and incapable of carrying out any concerted operation outside of its own territory. In fact, until the 1980s the great Chinese military exercises consisted of biblical movements of men on trucks or on foot for the classic 10,000 li (5,000 kilometres). Scarcely credible, as a threat against the exterior, was the strategic concept of a people’s war or guerrilla warfare or of the “you fight your way I’ll fight my way and I’ll always beat you” method. Following years of support for Vietnam in a strictly anti-American and anti-Russian function, when the Chinese army decided to teach a “historical lesson” to that country, winner but martyred nevertheless, it revealed its total strategic and tactical inability to conduct conventional operations of the pre-modern type. And this was 1979. Scarcely credible also was the strategic nuclear threat. A strategy of deterrence based on a confrontation of thousands of warheads and highly sophisticated systems to provide either party with the ability to react or survive a surprise attack – exactly four intercontinental missiles, perfectly identified by satellites and of a technology that could be easily downed in flight – did not represent a serious threat to anyone. Unless the “first use” was to apply. But China always rejected this possibility increasing suspects and decreasing its already weak credibility. Overcome on the continent by the Soviet Union, thwarted at sea by American power, forced to autocracy not by political choice but by social and economic conditions, uninfluential in the economic marketplace and limited along its internal border by the impossibility of acting upon its external one, until the 1980s China was the suburb of the world – exotic, idealised, but non-existent as a power. It was in this China that the United States could allow itself the luxury of installing intelligence gathering posts, the USSR could acquire territories and Taiwan and other Asian tigers freely draw upon low cost labour and young virgins for their brothels. With the end of Maosim and the advent of the reforms of Deng Xiao Ping the picture begins to change. Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia shift economic attention to the Pacific Rim, the “border” of the Pacific Ocean, of which however, the United States remains the principal manager. China is gradually, but at an increasingly accelerated pace, integrated into this economic picture and up to 1989 becomes one of the countries of the Rim, one of the players, if for no other reason that the market absorption it can offer other countries. The crisis of Tiananmen was at once a consequence of this new international Chinese dimension (the students did not wish to bring down the government or the Party but wanted a little democracy and commercial freedom as in the other Asian nations) and reason for the freezing of the process of internationalisation. Tiananmen however turned out also to be the good fortune of

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the Chinese system in a political sense. The isolation to which China was subjected by the international community, and which China imposed upon itself, allowed it to come to grips, without any restrictions and external interference, with the global changes taking place at that very moment: the breakdown of blocs and the end of the Cold War. During the years of probation and supervised sovereignty brought about by Tiananmen, China had the time to reflect on the failure of the Communist system and the collapse of the Soviet empire, on the effects of the Perestrojka and the wild development that China itself had set off. Thus it was able to re-organise its leadership, make plans, tighten up, encapsulate its centrifugal forces and develop a new nationalistic conscience by re-launching the great themes of reunification. This is the period of the establishment of a leadership that allied the murderers of Tiananmen with the moderates and cast aside those who, like Zhao Ziyang and Yang Shangkun, had supported democratic appeals in order to subvert a tottering power system. However, the system itself became stronger and even from a military perspective China grasped the occasion to tear down old schemes no longer suitable either to managing internal power or facing up to external challenges. During the Tiananmen crisis the weakness of the military had become apparent as military regions and army corps commanders refused or hesitated in following Beijingâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s orders. The armed police forces had demonstrated their ineffectiveness; there were no rapid reaction forces within the army or in the police. Tiananmen brought about significant changes both on the political and the military sides, while on the front of conventional warfare, the Gulf War demonstrated clearly and without the shadow of a doubt what type of military instrument any power had to have to participate in the global political-diplomatic game. And it was an instrument the Chinese did not have and which they realised they would not have soon. But the upgrading of the entire apparatus does begin during those years. The cadres of the Yang clan, asserting local power on the basis of personal acquaintances, were purged; the regularisation of the armed forces began, as did the reduction of conventional forces, the strengthening of strategic forces, and the development of collateral activities connected to the acquisition of technology and funds required for modernisation and the establishment of rapid reaction forces. Command and control is concentrated in the central military commission not only in political terms but in operational ones as well. The military begin to make national, economic and foreign policy. It is a veritable social, economic and military revolution that goes almost unnoticed because Europe and the United States are apparently satisfied with the Madrid sanctions, fully intending to ignore them if it is a question of making money. From the ashes of Tiananmen emerged a new China, fully conscious that it must and can take on a new regional and global role, even though it is not yet sure which, and aware that it needs the economic, political and military instruments to exercise this role. The primary political instrument, in this sense, is the affirmation of a search for stability along its borders as well as domestically. Stability becomes a slogan

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that tends to reassure the exterior and prevent any dangerous deviations from the interior. The China of today, while the Madrid or Washington sanctions are still active, but Tiananmen almost completely forgotten, is no longer simply one of the countries along the Pacific Rim but is the centre of a vast area of global geostrategic significance. Notwithstanding the claims of a search for stability, China is at once the centre and the container of tensions, conflicts, positive ferment and instability. And all these things are not limited in causes and effects to local and regional factors but involve the entire world. In this sense, China has once again become the Kingdom of the Middle (Zhong Guo) of the imperial period of 2000 years ago. Centre of continental power. The new central Chinese dimension is not connected to the old imperial power, which was essentially one of protecting the interior from the exterior while expanding its influence, but the exact opposite: the new imperial power of attraction of the exterior. In this sense China is expanding its influence. At the same time it is like the bordering areas into which investments and exploitation of the West may be poured, greedy and on the constant look-out to safeguard its own standard of living by exploiting those who have no such standard. China itself is the centre of this vast continental area that possesses enormous resources yet is not capable of exploiting them properly. It is surrounded by a Russia undergoing a profound crisis, but which is also another unnatural black hole into which the resources and investments of the immense surplus of the Western world may be poured. It borders with Central Asia, which is just waiting for investments to return twice what was put in. To the Northeast, the great project of the economic zone of Tumen stagnates even though large investments had already begun. The Siberia of Vladivostok is flooded with approximately 300,000 Chinese operators while the province of Heilongjiang becomes the conquered land of Russian operators. Mongolia depends almost entirely on its commerce with China and is not at all happy with this state of things. To the West, the area of Central Asia is the site of an economic boom without precedent. Immense resources and the ability of new governments to avoid social and international tensions place this area among those with the highest potential for growth. China has more than one interest in the area and has developed both agreements and infrastructure networks that allow for osmosis with neighbouring countries. It is nevertheless an area of turbulence because the greatest Chinese player in this new frontier of economic development is the province of Xinjiang, with a majority of Uygur separatists and breakaway groups, and a new generation of native sons (heirs of the Chinese transplanted by force) that is centrifugal or at the very least federalist. To the South is the great Indian sub-continent with its human resources, culture, intelligence, productivity and immense consumption potentials. And Southeast Asia itself, connected to the continent, one peninsula behind the other, like branches in an ocean that itself becomes a continent, with its myriad islands and enormous reserves of energy. China is the centre of this great pole of

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attraction and it is also the only country that can, at this time, ensure the security of the sole great continental route that connects the world of the satiated with that of the hungry.

Centre of ferment and economic instability. China is at the centre of a vast economic area of great turbulence as well. The Asian crisis that has struck Japan, South Korea, the â&#x20AC;&#x153;Tigersâ&#x20AC;?, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and others, has been too superficially defined as a financial crisis and too simplistically treated with financial and currency measures. In an all too banal manner, this crisis is considered to have no influence on China itself simply because China does not participate in the mechanisms of global financial markets. Superficial also is laying the blame on Asia for the so-called domino effect that the Asian crisis supposedly would have set off in world financial markets. A chain reaction is the most natural effect of speculative investments, on callous private and public, international, multinational and supranational interventions that view government and geospolitical systems in transition only as an opportunity for a quick profit. It is these investments that draw the attention of these same states away from real problems and tempt leaders with the chimeras of easy wealth and participation in global politics. Crises, on the contrary, are symptoms of the great difficulties in which Communist or former Communist systems, or those with centralised economies (such as Russia and almost all the other Republics of the dissolved USSR) and systems without planning and control (like Latin America) find themselves in their transition to a market economy. This transition is the condition imposed by the Western world and by international monetary bodies to grant funds and guarantee investments. It is the condition for achieving what the Clinton administration maintains is the highest expression of democracy: market democracy. All these countries in transition, or en route to constructing a stable economic model, had clearly perceived only the immediate advantages of that passage: those resulting from financial speculation, and they are now feeling the mid-term effects they had neglected in their race to easy money. Thus the Asian crisis is the first issue to come to light, followed by the Russian one and Latin America. In reality it is a profound structural crisis that involves systems of power management (politics), development management (economy and social policy), and security systems (defence and geostrategic balance) and that provokes social imbalances that become more dangerous as they become more evident. This structural crisis has struck and will make itself felt increasingly in China unless appropriate measures are taken. Because this is the crisis of governmental systems of production freed of the economic reality of the market (the most serious problem in China). It is the crisis of priorities in development with excessive emphasis on services infrastructure (which in China is somewhat macroscopic, given the growing number of 5-star hotels and obsolete factories). It is the crisis of production unfettered by research (something which in China is shameful as research is understood to be simply the acquisition of the technology of others). It

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is, furthermore, the crisis of a social system that bears no burden because it excludes welfare (in China social costs are not borne by the government but by productive units and new high technology companies still bear no costs as they have hired only young people, have almost militarised production and foresee no union movement). It is the crisis of a generation renewal in the leadership of political and economic systems (something that has occurred only marginally in China). In fact, there has been no political change in most of the countries touched by the crisis: power is in the hands of the same people and, above all, is managed using the same logic. It is the crisis of employment because this has never been considered a social factor and can now no longer be ignored. It is the crisis of the banking and credit system used to great risks in favour of the powerful (as is dangerously becoming obvious by the bankruptcy of the Guangdong International Trust and Investment Corporation and the suspicions of insolvency that now weigh upon other financial institutions and on the “red chips”) and no risk to assist the small (translated into enormous suffering for the state and no incentives for new businesses). Finally it is the crisis of a fiscal system unable to collect in accordance with contribution capacity. Today much praise is being heaped upon China for its resistance to the devaluation of the yuan or restraints placed on the liberalisation of money. The United States, Japan, Korea and dozens of other countries thank them. 2 China assumes the role of saviour of the world to increase its international influence, acquire global recognition and the power to influence the decisions of others. These are the true Chinese objectives and to attain them, China, as always, is ready to sacrifice its resources and even the life of its people. If these objectives may be reached by also allowing the Chinese abroad who support the economic policy of the PRC, and the mainland Chinese, who have invested widely in Wall Street rather than Shanghai, to make a few deals, so much the better. The fact that the financial crisis in Asia emerged in the countries supported by the capital of the overseas Chinese, precisely when Communist China re-launched infrastructure investments throughout its territory and wished to contain Japanese and Korean commercial pre-eminence, is symptomatic rather than accidental. It is also singular that the social upheavals taking place in Cambodia, Thailand and Indonesia this time have only marginally involved Chinese expatriates. In 1969 a similar situation in Indonesia lead to the massacre of more than 200,000 Chinese, considered the “Jews of the East”. The fact that the greatest effects of the Asian crisis (or the Russian one) are visible in the financial markets is due to the extremely dynamic nature of this market which, thanks to global computer technology reacts quickly to any pressure and is, in fact, able to precede pressures to the point of actually provoking them. Indeed this factor also is cause for further reflection on Chinese involvement: it is no accident that the crisis occurred at the exact moment in which the greatest 2. “We also appreciate what China and Hong Kong have done and the price that has been paid to stabilise the situation”, Statement by Bill Clinton in Honk Kong, South China Morning Post, July 3, 1998.

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technological and commercial battle in the world concerned the acquisition of the Chinese telecommunications market first, the Asian one second and finally the global one. Nor is it an accident that over the past few years the Chinese have dedicated themselves body and soul to developing a communications network and to exploiting space launches for telecommunications. The 55 million Chinese of the diaspora who control 75% of the capital market in Asia and who are massively present on Wall Street began only a few years ago to entrust their own transactions to cellular and computers rather than couriers and to evaluate the potential of other regional markets.

Centre of geostrategic instability. This Chinese centrality of a financial and economic nature corresponds, in an even greater measure, to a geostrategic centrality on political and military issues. China has become the â&#x20AC;&#x153;centre of gravityâ&#x20AC;? for tensions that have an explosive potential. Regions that China perceives as internal are in fact buffer zones, in contact with others that are already highly unstable. The explosion of conflicts in these areas may extend outwards, just as external conflicts may extend to the interior of China or threaten its system by provoking reactions that would be extremely dangerous to global security. In addition to Xinjiang, which has connections with Afghanistan, Kashmir, Pakistan and India, there is inner Mongolia in which a Mongolian minority demands autonomy and towards whom Mongolia, and even Russia, are not indifferent. Then there is Tibet which, following the resurgence of hostility between India and Pakistan and the dangerous nuclear show, has once again become crucial to Chinese control of the Indian sub continent. The Dalai Lama sees it as the nerve centre from which peace in Asia may be achieved. This is true and not only for religious considerations. To the South there is the question of the Spratley Islands, considered Chinese territory by the Chinese but also claimed by Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam and others. The province of Yunnan has become the throughway for organised crime from the golden triangle and a theatre of local instability due to the drastic measures that the Chinese periodically, but alternatively, adopt with respect to a population consisting of more than 26 nonChinese ethnic groups. The Southern and Eastern China Seas have become a theatre of piracy that for the moment is commercial, but which neighbouring nations accuse of being nurtured by units of the Chinese navy. To the South, the question of Taiwan, stubbornly considered by the Chinese as one of its rebel provinces, is explosive in the truest sense of the term: the echoes of the missile launches of 1995 and 1996 can still be heard and the development of political relations based only on common interests presupposes that there are advantages to be attained rather than crises to share. To the East, Chinaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s support of the North Korean regime is perhaps lukewarm but not over. Among other things, Chinese influence on North Korea is the only way the rest of the world has to dialogue with a disagreeable interlocutor. To the Northeast, border problems with Russia for the territories of the Amur-Ussuri appear subdued, but the district of Vladivostok and

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the Cossacks of the Transbaikal do not forgive the Duma in Moscow nor do they forgive Gorbachev for ceding the territory of â&#x20AC;&#x153;Great Mother Russiaâ&#x20AC;?. In addition, the entire area of Manchuria (provinces of Heilongjiangm Jilin and Liaoning) is one of the most unstable from a social and economic perspective. It is the traditional area of the great Chinese government industry; which is now presented as failing and deficient, which is induced to bankruptcy, to reconversion and to dismissing hundreds of thousands of workers. This area feels victimised by Beijing and is increasingly turning to Russia and to Japan. Centre of international relations. This new central dimension is strongly perceived by the Chinese who, to tell the truth, had never stopped considering it even when the world was going in the opposite direction. It is obvious, from political and diplomatic relations and from the position China holds with the rest of the world, that it considers only a few countries as privileged interlocutors and not all of them for reasons of objective power. With Europe its relations are unfocused, one of the reasons being that Europe, for the Chinese, is not even a geographic expression. The European Union is an interesting entity only for its commercial aspects, but bilateral relations with each member country are favoured. Germany and Italy receive priority consideration, the first for its quality products, the second for its culture and design. France enjoys excellent cooperation, which, however, it pays dearly with a policy of acquiescence. Great Britain has been, and will for a long time to come, be identified with the coloniser, the arrogant one of the opium wars, the power that has oft times humiliated China and whose original sins shall not be forgiven, not even by returning Hong Kong which, nevertheless represented the first of many signs of a national reawakening. Eastern Europe still has close ties with China, and the former Yugoslavia still manages somehow to maintain its current regime thanks also to Chinese support. In this instance the Chinese position is not so much in defence of the Serb regime as it is in defence of non-interference and resistance to NATO, viewed as the armed wing of American and Western political and economic power. In North Africa, relations with Algeria, Libya and Egypt are good but not significant. More important are its relations with Israel with which it has a true technical and political military association by virtue of which China acquires technology and is, in return, viewed as placatory with Syria and Iraq for Israeli interests. With Iran and Iraq cooperation is important and respect is mutual. In Asia, relations with India continue to be tense and those with Pakistan of total support. Traditional cooperation in the area of armaments was only tempered by recent Pakistani acquisitions in Eastern Europe, in particular of T80 tanks from the Ukraine. But this has not prevented China from openly defending its old ally during the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests. The prospect that Pakistan may become radical and align itself with Afghan Taliban and Iranian fundamentalists is another factor that prevents China from changing policies with this ally or with India. Good

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FROM THE RIM TO THE HEART

relations with Pakistan, Iran and other central Asian republics are for China the sole guarantee that the enormous region of Xinjiang will not escape them. In Latin America, China has long had great commercial interests with oil and mineral producers in Argentina. With Australia, its relations are good even though the Australian defence white book cites China as a potential threat from the North. With Japan, cooperation continues and although the scenario of a regional triad between China, the US and Japan has not yet come true, this is only due to Japanese economic and political difficulties. The leadership of the two countries is slowly being assumed by leaders who have little or no memory of the past and of the wounds China suffered at the hands of Japan. This will aid cooperation and a pragmatic industrial and commercial synergy, apart from any atavistic diffidence, cannot be excluded. With South Korea and other countries touched by the Asian crisis, the attitude is one of superiority. The same, but with more caution and refinement, holds true with respect to Russia which is adequately considered for opportunities of industrial cooperation, especially in the field of armaments and as a counter-balance to the United States, but is no longer feared. The dissolution of the USSR was a great lesson for Beijing. But the evolution of power in Russia is now followed with great interest and concern and no longer with the arrogance of 1990, when the Chinese viewed the failure of real Communism and the strengthening of their own characteristics with such satisfaction. As can be seen from this rapid and incomplete chronicle, todayâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s China believes it has only one interlocutor at its own level: the United States. And even the US is perceived as a â&#x20AC;&#x153;virtualâ&#x20AC;? centre of political and military power; an important dimension, but not as important, to Chinese eyes, as the geostrategic and geospolitical continental centrality represented by the world of Sino-centric instability. This instability is at the moment an instrument of political power, but shortly it could evolve into a controlled ferment of development. At any rate, if the technological brains and the purse strings are in the West, the heart of the world, today as hundreds of years ago, throbs in Asia, and China is perhaps the centre of gravity of this new continental dimension. It has nothing else to teach, nor ideologies or technologies to export. It has, however, an immense attraction potential that can succeed in obfuscating and seducing the brain as it can loosen the purse strings, especially for those who require the circulation of money (any kind, anywhere and for any purpose) to permit the survival of their own ideology and way of life. China, for the moment is also the only nation that is succeeding in managing this potential of attraction by itself. And not always under peaceful conditions, on the contrary, often by fighting on several fronts. If its culture is not further exportable, if its political system is at the very least non-reproducible and largely not proposable, its example of independence and stubbornness may become the conduit for reawakening the entire continent and make it again the Heartland.

(translated by Jo Di Martino)

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Pagina 71

A NEW SILK ROAD?

The Foundationers Associated with Mr W.’s Funds by ZHANG JIE

Not all artists are the same. History and the strategic conditions of their countries heavily weigh on their behaviour, as well as on their work, causing clashes of personalities almost as loud as those of civilisations. A geopolitical comedy by one of China’s greatest writers on the backdrop of a Western arts foundation naively convinced that all artists are equal.

LTHOUGH THE DOCTOR HAD NOT

told him anything, Mr W. sensed the imminence of his end. He was not ill, he was just about to leave this world. Folks tend to name such doom “a natural death”. Except for a few sketches which were still affixed to the walls of his old house, he had already donated to national museums his entire collection – including paintings, sculptures, manuscripts left behind by some 18th or 19th century authors, and relics (such as spectacles, tufts of hair, pieces of music, batons) belonging to some deceased composers. The only thing he was not at peace with regarded the way to dispose of his immense fortune. He had a sadly transient married life that left him issueless, apart from some, not lasting amorous experiences. And it was not incumbent on him, he calculated, to bequeath anything to his nephews or nieces. Remembrances of his bygone days did occur to his mind, though! Life for him was literally all plain sailing. However, in the privacy of his thoughts he was haunted by only one gnawing suggestion that all his exertions towards making himself an art expert remained forever unrequited. He was in love with art as a man would be with his beloved woman. But, to his bewilderment, art seemed to have never requited him with the same passion. In his youth he learned to play the piano, practised painting, and tried to mould a writer out of himself.

071-092/occhLiMes/ZhangJie

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