Messages in the Media - 2016 by Messages in the Media

Messages in the Media

A review of EU member state relations as depicted in national media in 2016 April 2017

Messages in the Media features twenty-one country-specific reports that examine the relationships that different European countries have with the EU. By analyzing the major themes discussed in the national media in 2015 in both EU and non-EU member states, these reports aim to provide valuable insights into the challenges facing each country today, and the way that these domestic perspectives inform dialogue at the supranational level.

2016

Acknowledgements

The publication of this journal would not have been possible without the generous contribution and support from the Arts and Science Student Union (ASSU) and the Centre for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies at the Munk School of Global A airs. We are particularly grateful to Georgina Steinsky-Schwartz for her contribution not only this year, but in the past number of years as well. Furthermore, our gratitude goes out to our incredible team of analysts and editors. We thank you for your time, your hard work, and your dedication. - Elise Wagner, Tea Cimini and Luka Pavicic Messages in the Me-

dia co-Editors-in-Chief

Please do not reproduce any parts of this book without permission from the respective authors. Printed by Sunview Press Limited, Toronto, Canada Published in April 2017

Messages in the Media

Masthead

Table of Contents

Letter from the Editors

Glossary of Terms

France

Macedonia

Austria

Portugal

Kosovo

Czech Republic

Germany

Croatia

Armenia

Italy

103

Greece

115

Russia

132 3

2016

Switzerland

139

Albania

149

Poland

157

Belarus

168

Slovakia

175

Romania

185

United Kingdom

196

Belgium

202

Serbia

211

Messages in the Media

Masthead

Co-Editors-Chief Elise Wagner

Flavian Berneaga Marina Bozic

Tea Cimini

Arina Dmitrenko

Luka Pavicic

Benjamin Falconer

Copy-Editors Monica Brondholt-Sorenson

Dasara Gashi CharlĂ¨ne Hanania

Tatiana Ferrara-Menezes

Jacob Janek

Jack Fraser

Marianne Kalaczynski

Natalia Paunic

Dasha Kuznetsova

Tina Vulevic

Natalia Lasakova

Infographics Designed By: Elise Wagner

Alexandre Meile Tatiana Ferrara-Menezes

Natalia Paunic Anton Rizor

Cover Adriana Workewych

Iason Rodoupolos Leticia Santana

Analysts Charlotte Aston

Danijela Stajic Christina Siomou

Mariam Baghdasaryan

Friederike Wilke 5

2016

Letter from the Editors

We are pleased to bring you the fifth publication of Messages in the Media, the annual journal published by the European Studies Students Association (ESSA). The journal provides an opportunity for undergraduate students in the European Studies program to apply their skills and create a set of succinct and comprehensive reports that detail the major political, social and economic developments of the European Union (EU) and its partners. Drawing from media sources of each respective country, the reports are a unique insight on the most significant issues of the past year. Each analyst is required to review a multitude of articles selected from three reliable and esteemed but also diverse sources from their country. From these articles, each analyst identifies the three most significant themes in the media that link the domestic issues of the country to the wider EU. The content of the articles is then synthesized into a report that cover each theme. This methodology aims to give a clear and balanced presentation of perspectives for each country. We also take pride in the fact that each of our analysts have a proficiency in the local languages, allowing them to analyze the media produced in each country for domestic consumption. All of these factors combine to create highly informative reports. Our role as Editors-in-Chief was to ensure continuity of experience for the reader, and refine the presentation of each report, without compromising their individuality. 2016 was a year of familiar issues for the European Union as well as new challenges. The ongoing refugee and migrant crisis continues to be a domestic concern for countries that are routes through the continent, and the issues continues to affect inter-member relations within the EU. A related and increasingly important topic is the rise of the far-right movements. Divisions have deepened in civil society and views far off the political centre have gained prominence across the EU in the past year. And perhaps the most pivotal event was the â&#x20AC;&#x153;yesâ&#x20AC;? vote in the UK, as a first step towards Brexit. Despite all of these setbacks, 2016 was also a year of success for the EU. The German economy, one of the most critical in the 6

Messages in the Media

EU, experienced positive growth. The EU has established a productive relationship with its neighbour Belarus, as part of its Europeanization efforts. Likewise, the EU has also extended its reach beyond its borders in Switzerland and Armenia, signing key partnership agreements with each state. Croatia, the EUâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s newest member, has also made efforts to further integrate with the EU economy and cooperate with fellow member states. 2016 has tested the European Union in a number of ways, but as provided opportunities as well. Despite crises and issues of varying levels, the EU has had its successes and goes into 2017 with confidence. In all, we hope that this publication of Messages in the Media will provide an informative and thought-provoking look at key developments across Europe, and at how different events are understood by EU member states and their neighbours. Sincerely, Elise Wagner, Tea Cimini and Luka Pavicic

Co-editors-in-Chief 2016

2016

Glossary of Terms

Benelux Economic Union of Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands CAP Common Agriculture Policy CCCTB Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base CEE Central and Eastern Europe COP21 21st Conference of Parties EC European Commission ECB European Central Bank ECJ European Court of Justice EEU Eurasian Economic Union EMS European Monetary System EP European Parliament EU European Union Frontex European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union FYROM Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia G7 Group of Seven (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, UK, USA) GDP Gross domestic product IJC International Court of Justice ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria IMF International Monetary Fund MCV Mechanism for Cooperation and Veri cation MEP Member of the European Parliament MG Minsk Group NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development OLAF European Anti-Fraud O ce OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe PNR Passenger Name Record SAA Stabilization and Association Agreement SAC Stabilization and Association Council TAP Trans Adriatic Pipeline TTIP Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 8

Messages in the Media

Media sources 1- Le Monde: founded in 1944. Owned by Le Monde 2 - Le Figaro: founded in 1826. Owned by Dassault Group 3 - Les Echos: founded in 1908. Owned by LVMH

BY: CHARLĂ&#x2C6;NE HANANIA 9

2016

POLITICAL SPECTRUM SHIFTS 2016 has been a year of action in the political sphere. On each side of the spectrum, leaders are contested and political parties seem to be more divided than ever1. Marine Le Pen and her fringe-right ideas are gaining support as they offer a more controversial change. Since January 2016, the trio consisting of Marine Le Pen, François Hollande, and Nicolas Sarkozy of the 2012 elections was expected to be facing each other in the upcoming presidential elections. The media announced that right wing parties had better chances of going ahead as the outcome of the leftist governance was portrayed as unsatisfactory for many French people.2 Furthermore, August radically altered the political game. The shift started with Emmanuel Macron’s resignation from the position of Minister of the Economy and the Primaries Campaign for the Republicans. When the young former minister announced his candidacy as an independent candidate it shook the left party. While it was pretty much expected of him to do so, his candidacy marks a break from the socialist party and ideas. and the French political scene. For the first time a young, ambitious candidate yet to be elected, came into play. On the right of the political spectrum, François Fillion, was elected as the nominee for the Republican Party for next year’s poll.3 His victory places a solid hurdle to Marine Le Pen for Fillion adopts similar social policies while offering a sturdier economical plan. However, some of the working force electorate will keep they position because they do not agree with the liberalisation of the economy. This turn-around was not predicted by the media. As a matter of fact, the general media considered Alain Juppé the candidate with the most potential. On the left side, François Hollande decided not to run for presidency, a wise decision in view of his popularity scores.4 His non appearance left a power vacuum to his previous first minister Manuel Valls who aims to re-mobilize the Socialists for better odds.5 The political spectrum changed completely, the only remaining fighter seem to be Marine Le Pen and her ideas, used and shared by the Rightwing candidate. The European Union will see major changes that could easily vary from reinforcing the relationship with France to a second instance of a “Brexit”. The Nationalist Party’s program involves the interruption of the long lasting relationship with Brussels.6 These political changes are crucial to observe and understand the 2017 elections. François Hollande’s unpopular presidency and the Socialist party’s struggle to unite will inevitably give an advantage to the right-wing party. Simultaneously, the young ex-finance minister is challenging the balance of power by offering a more liberal perspective. 2016 was defining for the upcoming year as it shook the political sphere and translated the frustrations of the French people.

Messages in the Media NEW LAWS AND CONTINUOUS STATE OF URGENCY The French legal system has been modified internally around the two main concerns the country is facing. The first concern was to handle the work market - especially how it was liberalized by the Socialist Party - additionally the second one was to enhance national security. Since national security was hurt on January 7th 2015, France has lived in panic and scepticism. The November attacks were fatal for democracy as the state of emergency instated but never taken down.7 The unpopularity of the propositions made by the government in Parliament led to a strong opposition. The said opposition, led by both the right-wing and the “Frondeurs” - unsatisfied socialist members of parliament – pushed Manuel Valls to use the 49.3 article of the constitution. This article entails that the prime minister implements the law without consent from the National Assembly. Doing so is representative of an united assembly, and especially of a conflicted Socialist party. Such undemocratic behavior led to lower popularity of the government. As a matter of fact, it is very unlikely that the Socialists will win the upcoming general election.8 The El Kohmri Law or Loi du Travail was imposed through this medium too.9 This reform of the labour market aims to bring more flexibility and thus unlock a major issue in France: unemployment and precarious employment. Easing off the labor market would allow licensing and hiring to be easier for the employers. France has been under a state of urgency since the attacks on Paris last November 13th. It entails that the government can issue warrants on domestic houses without permission of the judiciary system, which resulted in more than 4,000 house arrests in less than a year.10 The French authorities have the right to stop any major public event, or even close down any website.11 This power triggers controversy as it bypasses democratic principles and authorizes the government to impose its own rule to a certain extent. These reforms will have a great impact on the European Union as they are designed to meet the union’s economic expectations. These major changes impact Europe, as part of France’s state of urgency is to strengthen its border. Since the November attacks in 2015, the Schengen Agreement has not been respected by the French government.12 This border restriction implies that threats come from immigration, thus isolating the country. This isolation consolidates nationalist ideas. The classic scapegoat of French politics is the European Union. For France to stay in Europe, politicians have to soften their discourse on the EU and work with it in a positive manner.

STAGNATING ECONOMY & CHALLENGING IMMIGRATION France’s economy was strongly hit by the 2008 crisis, when Nicolas Sarkozy was in office, but has not yet overcome this challenge. François Hollande promised five years ago to turn the unemployment rate down, he has not been

2016 able to meet his promise.13 The unemployment rate has been rising and stabilised around 10% of the country.14 This economic stall was overcame by new that would make the labor market more accessible. In 2015, the Macron Law was established to drive the French economy towards liberalization. In 2016, it was the Law on Market Labor. The Macron Law has not been successful yet and has only challenged a few aspects of economic stagnation.15 The finance minister pushed for a liberalisation of the Market Labor by reforming unions, opening shops on Sundays, offering bus transport between cities, and diminishing the number of regulated jobs. The Law on Market Labor addressed all aspects of daily labor to ease the Market Law.16 This Law states that employees’ schedules will be decided within the firm. Dismissing someone is made easier for start-ups thus making employment easier and other implementing changes that will ease the labor market. This law faced strong reactions from the Nuit Debout movement in March that did not agree with the composition of the law.17 Mocked by the media, the first movement did not hold long due to a lack of leadership and organisation.18 Since the Syrian Refugee crisis started the South-East countries of Europe have been facing the issue of mass immigration. This crisis is topped by the constant economic and political migration of individuals from the Middle East and Africa to Europe. Germany and France were always final destinations for many of these refugees as they offered great security and social support. Germany welcomed over a million of Syrian refugees over the past year.19 France did not accomplish such an exploit but still welcomed 75,000 refugees.20 As all of Europe has been facing the Migrant crisis, France dealt with the “Calais jungle.”21 Around 2 million refugees were parked in Calais, a space where they would wait to be accepted into England. This space had been settled during the Sarkozy administration (2007-2012) with the British Government. The camp was cleaned by sending the migrants all over France is small villages, where they were fed and sheltered. This migration puts a lot of pressure on the economic system of the country as it brings costs and administrative complexity. One of the main challenges for the French economy is to meet EU criteria to stay in the Union. The Maastricht Treaty observes no more than 1.5% inflation higher than the lowest inflation rate in the European Union to keep the Euro stable, the government deficit cannot be greater than 3% of the previous year, and the debt cannot exceed 60% of the preceding year.22 These criteria are not met which puts pressure on the government and upcoming candidates to implement reform and be stricter on their policies.

2016 IN REVIEW This year was a complex one as France had to face many internal difficulties. The Law on Labour was approved propelling a discreet liberalisation of the work market which angered the left union CGT, which demonstrated for months.23 The movement led by the CGT was a long and painful one for the government and the city of Paris as it created deeper gaps between the

Messages in the Media political opinions. The political spectrum was challenged by first the division of the Left Party divided between the Communist, the Conservative Socialist and the governing socialists. The reforms taken by the government did not always align with the ideology of the Party and thus created the gaps in the party.24 This shipwreck will hurt the Socialist Party for the presidential election as they lost credibility in the media and the population. The Republican Party offered quite a few surprises, starting with Sarkozyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s failed revival, and Fillionâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s success in the primaries. The right party is now led by a strong reformist that is willing to keep his momentum around tough changes. The political parties will have to consciously react to the main subject haunting the French populace: security. Since the Nice terrorist attacks on National Day, the debate on nationality has been intensified and created a lot of controversy.

2016 Statistics: https://data.oecd.org/fr/unemp/taux-de-chomage.htm http://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries/member-countries/france_ en 1 Le Monde “Après la candidature de Manuel Valls, des doutes sur sa capacité à rassembler” Le Monde.fr Le Monde, 2016. May 12, 2016. Accessed Jan 17. 2017 http://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2016/12/05/apres-la-candidature-de-manuel-valls-des-doutes-sur-sa-capacite-de-rassembler-et-son-bilan_5043847_823448.html 2 Raphaëlle Bacqué, Bastien Bonnefous, Ariane Chemin « Et Hollande renonça à se représenter » Le Monde.fr. Le Monde, 2016. Web. 12 Dec. 2016. http:// abonnes.lemonde.fr/election-presidentielle-2017/article/2016/12/02/et-hollande-renonca-a-se-representer_5042285_4854003.html 3 François Bouchon, Jean-Christophe Marmara, and Carl Meeusauteur. « Sondage : François Fillon S’impose Comme Le Numéro Un. » Le Figaro. N.p., n.d. Web. 12 Dec. 2016. http://www.lefigaro.fr/politique/2016/12/01/01002-20161201ARTFIG00095sondage-francois-fillon-s-impose-comme-le-numero-un.php 4 “Arthur Berdah « Popularité : à 4% de bonnes opinions, Hollande touche le fond » Le Monde.fr. Le Monde, 2016. Web. 12 Dec. 2016. http://www.lefigaro.fr/ politique/le-scan/2016/10/25/25001-20161025ARTFIG00143-popularite-a-4-debonnes-opinions-hollande-touche-le-fond.php . Monde, Le. « Manuel Valls Lance Sa Campagne Pour La Primaire. » Le Monde. fr. Le Monde, 2016. Web. 12 Dec. 2016. Monde, Le. « Manuel Valls Lance Sa Campagne Pour La Primaire. » Le Monde.fr. Le Monde, 2016. Web. 12 Dec. 2016. 6 R.L. « Présidentielle : le FN inscrira « la priorité nationale dans la constitution », assure Philippot » Le Parisien.fr. Le Parisien, 2016. Web 9 Jan. 2017 http://www. leparisien.fr/elections/presidentielle/presidentielle-le-fn-inscrira-la-priorite-nationale-dans-la-constitution-assure-philippot-09-01-2017-6543675.php 7 Jean-Baptiste Jacquin, « La constitutionnalité des assignations à résidence au long cours attaquée » Le Monde.fr. Le Monde, 2016. Web Jan 12. 2017 http://abonnes.lemonde.fr/police-justice/article/2017/01/12/la-constitutionnalite-des-assignations-a-residence-au-long-cours-attaquee_5061432_1653578. html?xtmc=etat_d_urgence&xtcr=23 8 Benjamin Bruel. « Le Monde.fr - Qu’est-ce Que L’article 49.3? » Le Monde. fr. N.p., n.d. Web. 12 Dec. 2016 http://abonnes.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2016/05/10/qu-est-ce-que-l-article-49-3_4916730_4355770.html 9 Breteau, Alexandre Pouchard Et Pierre. « Ce Que Contient La Loi Travail » Le Monde.fr. Le Monde, 2016. Web. 12 Dec. 2016. http://abonnes.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2016/02/18/droit-du-travail-ce-que-contient-l-avant-projet-deloi-de-myriam-el-khomri_4867746_4355770.html 10 William Plummer. « Hollande Veut Prolonger L’état D’urgence « Jusqu’à La Présidentielle ». Le Figaro. N.p., 15 Nov. 2016. Web. 13 Dec. 2016. http://www. lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2016/11/13/01016-20161113ARTFIG00095-ce-quepermet-l-etat-d-urgence.php

2016 LOI n° 2016-1767 du 19 décembre 2016 prorogeant l’application de la loi n° 55385 du 3 avril 1955 relative à l’état d’urgence (1) 12 Blandine Le Cain. « François Hollande décrète l’état d’urgence » Le figaro.fr. N.p, 14 Nov. 2015. Web 13 Dec. 2016 http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2015/11/14/01016-20151114ARTFIG00005-francois-hollande-annonce-la-fermeture-des-frontieres.php 13 Les Décodeurs. « Chômage, impôts, climat, Syrie…le bilan de François Hollande » Le Monde.fr. Le Monde. Web 12 Jan. 2017 http://abonnes.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2016/12/01/chomage-impotsclimat-syrie-le-bilan-de-francois-hollande_5041835_4355770.html 14 Belouezzane, Sarah. “Le taux de chômage en France a baissé en 2016 pour la deuxième année d’affilée.” Le Monde.fr. February 16, 2017. Accessed March 12, 2017. http://www.lemonde.fr/economie/article/2017/02/16/le-taux-de-chomageen-france-a-baisse-en-2016-pour-la-deuxieme-annee-d-affilee_5080416_3234. html. 15 Patrick Roger. « Un an après, les effets encore limités de la loi Macron sur l’économie » Le Monde.fr. Le monde 2016. N. p. 9 Aug. 2016. Web 12 Jan. 2017 http://abonnes.lemonde.fr/economie-francaise/article/2016/08/09/un-an-apresles-effets-encore-limites-de-la-loi-macron-sur-l-economie_4980211_1656968. html 16 Leila de Comarmond Beauchart Derek Perrotte « Loi Travail : ce qui va finalement changer » Les Echos. Fr. Les Echos 2016. N. p. 20 July 2016. Web 12 Jan. 2017 http://www.lesechos.fr/20/07/2016/lesechos.fr/0211144132980_loi-travail---cequi-va-finalement-changer.htm 17 Le Figaro « Loi Travail : les nouveaux « indignés » français restent mobilisés » Le Figaro.fr. N. p. 3 April. 2016. Web 12 Jan. 2017. http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2016/04/02/01016-20160402ARTFIG00035-loi-travail-les-nouveaux-indignes-francais-restent-mobilises.php 18 Le Figaro « Nuit Debout s’est recouché » Le Figaro.fr. N.p. 30 June 2016. Web 12 Jan. 2017 http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2016/06/30/01016-20160630ARTFIG00280-nuit-debout-s-est-recouche.php 19 Reuters, Lefigaro.fr Avec. “1,09 million de réfugiés en Allemagne en 2015.” Le Figaro. December 30, 2015. Accessed March 12, 2017. http://www.lefigaro.fr/ flash-actu/2015/12/30/97001-20151230FILWWW00141-109-million-de-refugies-en-allemagne-en-2015.php. 20 Mouterde, Perrine. “Réfugiés syriens : les chiffres de l’accueil en France #Syrie5ans.” Le Monde.fr. March 15, 2016. Accessed March 12, 2017. http://www. lemonde.fr/proche-orient/article/2016/03/15/refugies-syriens-les-chiffres-de-laccueil-en-france-syrie5ans_4883220_3218.html. 21 Aline Leclerc « Journalistes à Calais : la loi de la « jungle » Le monde.fr. Le Monde. N. P. 27 Oct. 2016. Web 12 Jan. 2017 http://www.lemonde.fr/actualite-medias/article/2016/10/27/journalistes-a-calaisla-loi-de-la-jungle_5021114_3236.html 11

2016 “European Union Law.” EU Distribution Law. doi:10.5040/9781472561664. ch-001 23 Yann Foreix « Loi Travail : entre 64,000 et 200,000 manifestants en France » LE Parisien.fr. Le Parisien. N. p. 28 June 2016. Web 12 Jan. 2017 http://www. leparisien.fr/economie/en-direct-loi-travail-les-syndicats-dans-la-rue-pour-la11e-fois-28-06-2016-5921807.php 24 Le Figaro « Les frondeurs tentent de s’organiser contre François Hollande » Le Figaro.fr. Le Figaro. N. p. 10 Sep. 2016. Web 12 Jan. 2017 http://www.lefigaro.fr/politique/2016/09/10/01002-20160910ARTFIG00006-lesfrondeurs-tentent-de-s-organiser-contre-francois-hollande.php 25 “Gilles Rof, Matthieu Goar et Julia Pascual « Après l’attentat de Nice, Bernard Cazeneuve dans la tourmente » Le Monde.fr. Le Monde. N. p. 22 July 2016. Web 12 Jan. 2017 http://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2016/07/22/apres-nice-cazeneuve-dansla-tourmente_4973329_823448.html 22

Messages in the Media

Media sources 1- Република: founded in 2012. Owned by Prva Republic DOOEL. 2 - Вечер: founded in 1963. Owned by Sašo Bogdanovski. 3 - Утрински весник: founded in 1999. Owned by Media Print Macedonia DOOEL.

BY: DANIJELA STAJIC 17

2016

MACEDONIA’S ROLE IN THE MANAGEMENT OF THE REFUGEE CRISIS The most prominent topic featured in Macedonian media throughout 2016 was the management of the refugee crisis. Since June 2015, Macedonia has been a key transit link for nearly 700 thousand refugees and migrants who use the so-called Balkan route in order to reach the promised land of Western and Northern Europe. A massive inflow of refugees and Greece’s failure to control the migratory flow have prompted some EU Member States to depend on Macedonia and other Western Balkan countries to manage the refugee crisis with assistance from the EU, as reported by Macedonian media.2 In January, the EU announced that it will provide Macedonia with financial assistance, while FRONTEX made the necessary preparations to operate in a non-member state, and eventually strengthen Macedonia’s borders and increase the country’s capacity for asylum seekers.3 In light of these temporary setbacks, many concerns were expressed in early February 2016 about the possibility of Macedonia being overrun with refugees and turned into a refugee camp.4 Yet, these concerns were counteracted by reports about supplementary financial support from Brussels and the forging of cooperations with the Visegrad countries to strengthen borders.5 March saw the EU and Turkey reach an agreement on refugees, after which the closure of the Balkan route was announced.6 Yet, at a conference in Rome, the Macedonian President, Gjorge Ivanov, noted that the crisis cannot be solved by political declarations and bureaucratic procedures, but must be managed with the help and support from the security services and armed forces.7 In this regard, the President pointed out that the OSCE and the EU lack functional mechanisms for decision-making in times of crisis and went on to criticize the EU for putting Macedonia, a country which is not an EU Member State, on the front line of EU defence.8 Furthermore, the closing of the Balkan route also resulted in increased efforts by migrants to enter Macedonia illegally and by force; notwithstanding, the media emphasized that Macedonian authorities would continue protecting state borders and dealing with the crisis in a responsible manner, by ensuring humane treatment for refugees and acting in accordance with European and international standards.9 Through the summer the refugee crisis was portrayed as a stress test for the EU commitments, and the media emphasized the messages of support Macedonia has received from individual EU Member States, who praised Skopje for its efforts to defend Europe’s borders.10 During the latter part of the year the media extensively reported on the informal refugee summit which took place in Vienna in September. In addition to EU representatives, the summit was attended by representatives from the countries that form part of the Balkan route and share responsibility for its management.11 Among them, Macedonia declared that it expects a more coordinated and integrated approach to resolving the crisis from all EU member

Messages in the Media states and institutions. Macedonian leaders further argued that the management of the refugee crisis cannot be reduced to national decisions of individual countries, but requires a common strategy.12 Despite Skopje’s many claims of contributing to the security of Europe by protecting its borders, preventing illegal entry, providing safe corridors for refugees and ensuring they receive humane treatment, in mid-September eight persons initiated legal action against Skopje claiming violent treatment during an operation aimed at deterring illegal crossings and conducted at EU’s request.13 Furthermore, officials from detention centres in Gevgelija and Tabanovce rejected criticism regarding their treatment of refugees and reiterated that Skopje is committed to dealing with the refugee crisis while ensuring humane treatment in accordance with national laws and international conventions on human rights.14 At year’s end it was announced that the Parliamentary Commission for Security and Defence had decided to extend the state of emergency until June 30, 2017. This decision was adopted because of an increase in the number of refugees entering and transiting through Macedonia.15 The media further reported that dealing with the refugee crisis will continue to be a great challenge for Macedonia, due to the country’s fragile political and economic situation, and an additional strain on its limited resources.16

Political Crisis and Early Elections

Making Skopje’s efforts to contribute to the management of the refugee crisis all the more impressive was the internal political crisis that the country had been going through since the start of 2015 when the leader of the SDSM (Social Democratic Union of Macedonia), Zoran Zaev accused Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski—the leader of VMRO-DPMNE (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization–Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity)—of authorizing the illegal surveillance of some 20,000 people.17 The protests and violence which erupted throughout the country as a result of the ‘wiretapping affair’ before being quelled with the signing of an agreement in Pržino between the main political parties in the country. In accordance with the Pržino agreement, the opposition party SDSM was to participate in the ministries, prime minister Nikola Gruevski tendered his resignation and power was handed over to a caretaker government to bring the country to general elections in April 2016. Furthermore a special prosecutor was appointed to lead the investigations on the wiretapping scandal.18 After all parties had agreed in Pržino that early elections in April were the only way out of the political crisis, throughout the year, talk of elections and making sure that they are free and fair dominated Macedonian media.19 However, it was soon determined that the necessary conditions for holding free and fair elections were not being met. This was further exacerbated by the fact that there were significant delays in the implementation of some aspects of

2016 the Pržino agreement as well as certain reforms, which eventually resulted in postponing the elections to June.20 In consideration of the fact that holding free and fair elections would also confirm Macedonia’s readiness to move forward on its path to Euro-Atlantic integration, representatives of the EU and the United States made certain to closely follow all developments regarding this election.21 When the elections were postponed again, the EU responded by suspending payments to Skopje under the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) program in the amount of 27.1 million euro.22 In September, however, Macedonia celebrated the anniversary of its independence and, while President Ivanov restated his commitment to joining the EU and NATO, a new date was set for the elections: December 11th, 2016.23 Under the watchful eye of the international community, elections were held on December 11th, 2016 and VMRO-DPMNE, emerged victorious.24 Gruevski’s victory was hardly surprising, since his coalition “For a Better Macedonia” received strong international support, while the opposing party SDSM remained fairly isolated.25 Furthermore, leading up to the election, the media consistently portrayed VMRO-DPMNE as the only party committed to Macedonia’s pro-EU and pro-NATO aspirations, whereas SDSM was continuously denounced as deceitful and frequently associated with the fear of a potential ‘Albanization’ of the country.26 Nevertheless, in the aftermath of the election, relevant domestic and international institutions confirmed that Skopje had indeed conducted free and fair elections.27 The High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini and Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, Johannes Hahn assessed the elections positively and urged the winning party to form a government as soon as possible, while reminding all political parties to act in an inclusive manner. They emphasized that an active parliamentary opposition, a constructive dialogue between political opponents, and a vibrant civil society were necessary for Macedonia to ensure the functioning of a healthy democracy, resolve the protracted political crisis and make headway on its Euro-Atlantic path.28

Euro-Atlantic Integration

Macedonia submitted its application for EU membership in 2004 and was granted candidate status the following year. More than a decade later Macedonia’s neighbours have made significant progress: Croatia is already an EU member; Albania has joined NATO; Montenegro is on the verge of becoming a member of NATO and the EU; Serbia’s EU accession negotiations are ongoing. Meanwhile, Macedonia remains at the back of the queue, unprepared to assume the responsibilities of NATO or EU membership.29 Although Macedonia continues to enjoy international support when it comes to its quest to achieve Euro-Atlantic integration, there are many criteria to be fulfilled and one major obstacle to be overcome: the Greek veto.30 The ongoing ‘name dispute’ between Greece and Macedonia has incited

Messages in the Media tremendous nationalist fervour in both countries. Athens understands Skopje’s insistence on using the name ‘Macedonia’ to be an act of usurpation of Greek history and identity, while an overwhelming majority of Macedonians identify with the name and are therefore reluctant to give it up.31 Meanwhile, the status quo is unsustainable, the media warned, pointing out that Macedonia had met the conditions for NATO membership already in 2008 and that the country is also fully ready for the initiate EU accession negotiations.32 In early spring the media continued to report on the importance of opening negotiations for Macedonia’s accession to the EU and the country’s leading political figures continued to insist that any delays in this regard would be detrimental to the stability of Europe, drawing particular attention to the ongoing refugee crisis and the well-known instability of the region.33 This trend continued over the course of the summer and, while Athens remained reluctant to support Macedonia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations, other EU Member States openly expressed their approval and offered statements of encouragement.34 The Macedonian leadership reminded Europe and the rest of the world that Macedonia has no alternative prospects to EU and NATO membership and demanded that their country be seen a valuable partner to Brussels, particularly with regard to efforts to deal with the refugee crisis.35 Nonetheless, they went on to criticize both NATO and the EU for their indecisiveness and procrastination when it comes to the integration of the Balkans, while pointing out that Macedonia’s ambiguous status is one of the main causes behind the country’s political crisis.36 After it was determined that the December 2016 elections were conducted in accordance with international standards, the Commission recommended that accession negotiations with Macedonia be opened. Even so, this continues to be conditional on the implementation of the Pržino agreement and substantial progress in the implementation of certain reforms.37 In the meantime, the media reported, Macedonia remains committed to its future as a member of EU and NATO and will continue to work hard towards achieving these objectives.38

2016 IN REVIEW 2016 had been an eventful year in Macedonian-EU relations, but a number of themes undeniably dominated media coverage in Macedonia: the management of the refugee crisis, ensuring free and fair elections that were to bring an end to the country’s political crisis, and, of course, the country’s progress in achieving EU and NATO membership.It must be noted that, the selected media sources are widely read, but it must be pointed out that despite the intention to select sources that are representative of a wider readership, there are very few media outlets that have a critical attitude towards the Macedonian government, because media outlets are largely financed by public money and there is a lack of transparency when it comes to ownership. Thus, media outlets have very similar news content and frequently publishing pieces that might be

2016 characterized as supportive of the government’s policies. The readers of this report should bear in mind this connection between media ownership and financing and editorial policy. Throughout the year Skopje made tremendous efforts to contribute to European plans to control the inflow of refugees into Europe. Macedonia’s involvement in the management of the refugee crisis was seen in a very positive light, particularly in the individual statements of some EU member-states. Skopje also placed importance on these efforts as it strengthened the case that Macedonia is a reliable EU partner. Although incidents involving refugees’ attempts to force entry into Macedonia, called into question Skopje’s competence, these were dealt with swiftly and responsibly by Macedonian authorities. Despite its size and limited resources, Macedonia played a key role in dealing with the migrant crisis. Its efforts were conducted in cooperation with its European partners and was in accordance with all international conventions on human rights. Nevertheless, a number of consulted articles conveyed a critical view of the EU’s policies, as the refugee crisis was portrayed as a challenge for not only the EU, but Europe in general. The country’s political crisis, was portrayed in a very straightforward manner. Through the year the public awaited the day on which early parliamentary elections in an attempt to resolve the massive wiretapping affair. The elections were postponed twice before taking place on December 11th. Although both Gruevski and Zaev claimed victory, Gruevski’s VMRO-DPMNE emerged as the winner with 2 mandates more than the opposing SDSM. Officials reported no major problems as Macedonians voted in elections that many hoped would end nearly two years of instability. Yet, it remains unclear as to how fair the elections actually were. Both the crisis and the elections, as well as the subversive messages of the competing parties brought into question the state of democracy in the country, despite a number of domestic and international institutions that confirmed that Skopje had conducted free and fair elections. Both the elections and Macedonia’s role in the management of the refugee crisis affected the pace of Macedonia’s progress toward EU membership and its goal of joining NATO. Although it has been a reliable partner, concerns over its democracy limit progress. Furthermore, in Macedonia there is a growing belief that EU membership is no longer in sight. Although Brussels continues to promote the idea of European integration in Macedonia and Macedonia continues to proclaim that it is fully committed to joining the EU, neither Brussels nor Skopje are rushing towards EU accession. Given the many challenges that the EU is facing at the moment, it is simply not capable or willing to accept new members. Therefore, the situation in Macedonia continues to be closely monitored by the international community, but there are many hurdles that need to be overcome with respect Skopje’s aspirations and regardless of how dedicated the government is to convincing its citizens that Macedonia is ready to join the EU and NATO, this is simply not the case. Nonetheless, the main obstacle in the case of Macedonia continues to be the name dispute with Greece and although

Messages in the Media this issue did not have to be treated as an independent topic in this report it frequently arose in articles dealing with all three issues that dominated media coverage. Both Athens and Skopje have become trapped in a vicious circle and their positions have proven almost impossible to reconcile. If this obstacle is not overcome, Macedonia will never achieve Euro-Atlantic integration and the lure of membership offers little satisfaction. In the context of the major topics identified in this analysis, the relationship between Macedonia and the EU remains stable, with the prospect of EU membership enjoying a great deal of support among Macedonians. The amount of coverage on the topics concerning the EU is telling of the interest and support of the public for Macedonia’s European future. The media have generally portrayed a positive attitude of the public towards the EU: a majority of the population is of the opinion that membership in the EU will ensure prosperity and numerous benefits. But with Macedonia trapped in the EU’s ‘waiting room’ it would be no exaggeration to say that Macedonians could become increasingly cynical about their chances of ever joining Europe. If this turns out to be the case, it will become impossible for Macedonia to lay down the foundations for stability and prosperity and instability in Macedonia could quickly engulf the Balkans, which would have far reaching consequences across Europe.

2016 __________________ 1 The use of the term “Macedonia” to refer to the country that is the subject of this report is done for the sake of convenience and does not reflect the author’s position with respect to the name dispute between Skopje and Athens. 2 “Словачка ќе испрати полицајци кои ќе и по магаат на Македонија.” Вечер, January 05, 2016. Accessed December 14, 2016. http://vecer.mk/makedonija/slovachka-kje-isprati-policajci-koi-kje-i-pomagaat-na-makedonija . “Македонската граница е клучна, Фронте кс мора да се распореди.” Вечер, January 27, 2016. Accessed December 14, 2016. http://vecer.mk/makedonija/makedonskata-granica-e-kluchna-fronteks-mora-da-se-rasporedi . “Македонија ќе го глуми д обриот и лошиот полицаец.” В ечер, January 28, 2016. Accessed December 14, 2016. http://vecer.mk/makedonija/makedonija-kje-go-glumi-dobriot-i-loshiot-policaec. 3 “ЕУ бара Фронтекс да ѝ помогне на Македонија.” Република, January 25, 2016. Accessed December 14, 2016. http://republika.mk/545482. “Од Брисел за Македонија милиони е вра за мигрантите.” Утрински весник, January 27, 2016. Accessed December 14, 2016. http://www.utrinski.mk/default.asp?ItemID=0433FA6290B6AA4888D9DFBC7AC87600 . “Фронтекс рефирирал за добра соработка со Македонија на грчката граница .” Утрински весник, January 29, 2016. Accessed December 14, 2016. http://www.utrinski.mk/default.asp?ItemID=32805D0DD17FBD47A0AA42C825A2B540. 4 “Балканот не смее да биде паркинг за мигрантите.” Република, February 06, 2016. Accessed December 16, 2016. http://republika.mk/551016. 5 “EУ даде 10 милион и евра за Македонија за справување со бегалската криза.” Вечер, February 15, 2016. Accessed December 16, 2016. http://vecer.mk/makedonija/eu-dade-10-milioni-evra-za-makedonija-za-spravuvanje-so-begalskata-kriza . “Бегалска криза: Брисел одобри 10 милиони евра помош за Македонија, но не за затворање на границата.” Утрински весник, February 15, 2016. Accessed December 16, 2016. http://www.utrinski.mk/default.asp?ItemID=333A80344D38504E-

Messages in the Media 9659446A5E419004 . “Претсед ателот Иванов во Брисел на состанок за мигрантската криза.” Вечер, February 17, 2016. Accessed December 14, 2016. http://vecer.mk/makedonija/pretsedatelot-ivanov-vo-brisel-na-sostanok-za-migrantskata-kriza. 6 “Брисел го затвара Балканскиот коридор за бегалци?!” В ечер, March 6, 2016. Accessed December 16, 2016. http://vecer.mk/makedonija/brisel-go-zatvara-balkanskiot-koridor-za-begalci . “ЕУ и Турција постигнаа договор за бегалската криза.” Вечер, March 8, 2016. Accessed December 24, 2016. http://vecer.mk/balkan/eu-i-turcija-postignaa-dogovor-za-begalskata-kriza . “Церар: Веќе не постои балканската емигрантска маршрута.” Република, March 8, 2016. Accessed December 16, 2016. http://republika.mk/565027. 7 “Иванов: Потребно е гр ција што побрзи да се испразни од мигранти и бегалци.” Утрински весник, March 04, 2016. Accessed December 14, 2016. http://www.utrinski.mk/default.asp?ItemID=25A85357C8C3D24480812012CA58E7D8. 8 Ibid. 9 “Иванов: Македонија подвлече црта - ќе се штитиме од мигрантите.” Вечер, March 15, 2016. 7 “Иванов: Потребно е гр ција што побрзи да се испразни од мигранти и бегалци.” Утрински весник, March 04, 2016. Accessed December 14, 2016. http://www.utrinski.mk/default.asp?ItemID=25A85357C8C3D24480812012CA58E7D8. 8 Ibid. 9 “Иванов: Македонија подвлече црта - ќе се штитиме од мигрантите.” Вечер, March 15, 2016. Accessed December 22, 2016. http://vecer.mk/makedonija/ivanov-makedonija-povleche-crta-kje-se-shtitime-od-migrantite . “Иванов: Македонија нема да дозволи зголемување на безбедносните ризици од мигрантската криза.” Република, March 16, 2016. Accessed December 24, 2016. http://republika.mk/568649. 10 “Јолевски: Македонија придонесува за евроатлантската стабилност.” Република, April 1, 2016. Accessed December 21, 2016. http://republika.mk/576001 . “Доскоцил: Македонија има водечка улога за заштитата на границите.” В ечер, April 7, 2016.

2016 Accessed December 21, 2016. http://vecer.mk/makedonija/doskocil-makedonija-ima-vodechka-uloga-za-zashtitata-na-granicite . “Наумовски: Македонија не ја брани само својата територија, туку и сите држави на север.” Вечер, April 13, 2016. Accessed December 21, 2016. http://vecer.mk/makedonija/naumovski-makedonija-ne-ja-brani-samo-svojata-teritorija-tuku-i-site-drzhavi -na-sever . “Земан: Македонија се справи со мигрантската криза подобро од некои членки на ЕУ.” Република, June 9, 2016. Accessed December 21, 2016. http://republika. mk/608763. 11 “Димитриев: Самитот за мигрантите во Виена е многу важен за Македонија.” У трински весник, September 23, 2016. Accessed December 21, 2016. September 23, 2016. Accessed December 21, 2016. http://www.utrinski.mk/default.asp?ItemID=A295DCC3D2B2C34E8B5AD2E361E36573 . “Димитриев: Република Македонија е дел од решението за мигрантската криза.” Република, September 24, 2016. Accessed December 21, 2016. http://republika.mk/658068. 12 “Димитриев и европските лидери во Виена на Самит „Миграцијата долж балканската рута”.” Вечер, September 24, 2016. Accessed December 24, 2016. http://vecer.mk/makedonija/dimitriev-i-evropskite-lideri-vo-viena-na-samit-migracijata-dolzh-balkanskata -ruta . “Димитриев: Самитот за мигрантите во Виена е многу важен за Македонија.” Република, September 24, 2016. Accessed December 24, 2016. http://republika.mk/657914. 13 “СКАНДАЛ: ЕУ ни ги враќа мигрантите и им помага да не тужат во Европскиот Суд?!” Вечер, September 15, 2016. Accessed December 24, 2016. http://vecer.mk/makedonija/skandal-eu-ni-gi-vrakja-migrantite-i-im-pomagada-ne-tuzhat-vo-evropskiot-s ud . 14 “Прифатните центри ги отфрлаат критиките за нехумани услови за мигрантите.” Утрински весник, September 26, 2016. Accessed December 24, 2016. http://www.utrinski.mk/default.asp?ItemID=D77FE9A34F480844BAC6FF32858FA519. 15 “Кризната состојба да продолжи до 30 јуни 2017.” Утрински весник, October 10, 2016. Accessed December 16, 2016.

Messages in the Media http://www.utrinski.mk/default.asp?ItemID=9BA37D4A1587EB4286A88B068C6B3EFB . “Мигрантите сеуште проблем,кризната состојба продолжена до 30 јуни 2017.” Вечер, October 13, 2016. Accessed December 22, 2016. http://vecer.mk/makedonija/migrantite-seushte-problemkriznata-sostojba-prodolzhena-do-30-juni-2017. 16 “Македонија игра важна улога во решавањето на мигрантската криза.” Вечер, October 12, 2016. Accessed December 22, 2016. http://vecer.mk/makedonija/makedonija-igra-vazhna-uloga-vo-reshavanjeto-na-migrantskata-kriza. 17 Pete Baumgartner. “Explainer: Roots of Macedonia’s Political Crisis Run Deep.” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, April 15, 2016. Accessed December 28, 2016. http://www.rferl.org/a/explainer-crisis-in-macedonia-leads-to-violent-protests/27675969.html. 18 “Да се сработат обврските за одржување кредибилни избори.” Вечер, January 29, 2016. Accessed December 28, 2016. http://vecer.mk/makedonija/da-se-srabotat-obvrskite-za-odrzhuvanje-kredibilni-izbori . “Изборите на 24-ти април ќе бидат фер, демократски и кредибилни по сите европски стандарди!” Вечер, January 29, 2016. Accessed December 22, 2016. http://vecer.mk/makedonija/izborite-na-24-ti-april-kje-bidat-fer-demokratski-ikredibilni-po-site-evropski -standardi . “Македонија пред разврска на најголемата политичка криза?!” Вечер, February 23, 2016. Accessed December 22, 2016. http://vecer.mk/makedonija/makedonija-pred-razvrska-na-najgolemata-politichka-kriza. 19 “Сите се согласни дека предвремените избори се единствен излез од политичката криза.” Вечер, February 18, 2016. Accessed December 18, 2016. http://vecer.mk/makedonija/site-se-soglasni-deka-predvremenite-izbori-se-edinstven-izlez-od-politichkata -kriza. 20 “Изборите на 5 јуни, почеток на крајот на политичката криза.” Вечер, March 15, 2016. Accessed December 20, 2016. http://vecer.mk/makedonija/izborite-na-5-juni-pochetok-na-krajot-na-politichkata-kriza. 21 “Партиите и институциите се одговорни за кредибилни избори.” Вечер,

2016 April 8, 2016. Accessed “ЕУ: Прочистен избирачки список, балансирани медиуми и казни за заплашување гласачи.” Република, April 15, 2016. Accessed December 24, 2016. http://republika. mk/583302. 22 “ЕУ ја запира помошта за Македонија.” Утрински весник, July 1, 2016. Accessed December 24, 2016. http://www.utrinski.mk/default.asp?ItemID=34407CBC967FD3468E746AD1D6BDD611. 23 “Изборите се шанса да свртиме нова страница.” Вечер, September 7, 2016. Accessed December 22, http://vecer.mk/makedonija/partiite-i-instituciite-se-odgovorni-za-kredibilni-izbori . “ЕУ: Прочистен избирачки список, балансирани медиуми и казни за заплашување гласачи.” Република, April 15, 2016. Accessed December 24, 2016. http://republika. mk/583302. 22 “ЕУ ја запира помошта за Македонија.” Утрински весник, July 1, 2016. Accessed December 24, 2016. http://www.utrinski.mk/default.asp?ItemID=34407CBC967F D3468E746AD1D6BDD611. 23 “Изборите се шанса да свртиме нова страница.” Вечер, September 7, 2016. Accessed December 22, 2016. http://vecer.mk/makedonija/izborite-se-shansa-da-svrtime-nova-stranica. 24 “Изборите ги следат 7.585 домашни и 667 странски набљудувачи.” В ечер, December 11, 2016. Accessed December 24, 2016. http://vecer.mk/makedonija/izborite-gi-sledat-7585-domashni-i-667-stranski-nabljuduvachi-0. 25 “ВМРО-ДПМНЕ со силна меѓународна подршка,СДСМ изолиран на митинзите.” Вечер, December 9, 2016. Accessed December 24, 2016. http://vecer.mk/makedonija/vmro-dpmne-so-silna-megjunarodna-podrshkasdsm-izoliran-na-mitinzite . “ЕУ задоволна од изборите, очекува формирање стабилна Влада.” В ечер, December 12, 2016. Accessed December 22, 2016. http://vecer.mk/makedonija/eu-zadovolna-od-izborite-ochekuva-formiranje-stabilna-vlada. 26 “Само Груевски го интересира ЕУ и НАТО интеграција, другите одложување на изборите и федерализација!” Вечер, May 13, 2016. Accessed December 14, 2016. http://vecer.mk/makedonija/samo-gruevski-go-interesira-eu-i-nato-perspektivata-na-makedonija-site-drugi-gi

Messages in the Media “Под кое знаме ќе се разбудите в понеделник?” Вечер, December 9, 2016. Accessed December 24, 2016. http://vecer.mk/makedonija/pod-koe-zname-kje-se-razbudite-v-ponedelnik . “Груевски: Што побрзо да се формира новата влада.” Вечер, December 13, 2016. Accessed December 24, 2016. http://vecer.mk/makedonija/gruevski-shto-pobrzo-da-seformira-novata-vlada. 27 “Министрите за надворешни работи на ЕУ задоволни од изборите во Македонија.” Република, December 12, 2016. Accessed December 14, 2016. http://republika.mk/699801. 28 “Могерини и Хан честитаа на мирните избори во Македонија и очекуваат брзо формирање влада и активна опозиција.” Република, December 12, 2016. Accessed December 24, 2016. http://republika.mk/700123 . “Попоски во Брисел: ЕУ очекува формирање на стабилна влада.” Утрински весник, December 12, 2016. Accessed December 24, 2016. http://www.utrinski.mk/default.asp?ItemID=0DECAA83C67EFF4090A06B 892BA02375 . “Могерини и Хан честитаа на победниците ВМРО-ДПМНЕ.” Вечер, December 13, 2016. Accessed December 24, 2016. http://vecer.mk/makedonija/mogerini-i-han-chestitaa-na-pobednicite-vmro-dpmne. 29 Миков, Пол (Павле). “Неуспесите на надворешна политика и изборите во Македонија.” Утрински весник, December 4, 2016. Accessed December 24, 2016. http://www.utrinski.mk/default.asp?ItemID=ABB66983BF63C94087DADB03D67FB8EF. 30 “Роудс: Македонија ќе биде тема на самитот на НАТО, но времето е кусо за нејзин прием.” Република, January 14, 2016. Accessed December 24, 2016. http://republika. mk/540918 . Утрински весник, May 9, 2016. Accessed “Павлопулос: нема преговори за ветото за Македонија.” December 14, 2016. http://www.utrinski.mk/default.asp?ItemID=661F623A9D4B26429101DC8B2B956E9B. “Павлопулос: нема преговори за ветото за Македонија.” Утрински весник, May 9, 2016. Accessed 31 “Груевски за „То Вима”: го отфрла иредентизмот, но инсистира на името.” Вечер, February 7, 2016. Accessed December 14, 2016.

2016 http://vecer.mk/makedonija/gruevski-za-to-vima-go-otfrla-iredentizmot-noinsistira-na-imeto. 32 “Средба Попоски-Рот: во фокусот Евроинтеграциите и бегалската криза.” У трински весник, February 1, 2016. Accessed December 22, 2016. http://www.utrinski.mk/default.asp?ItemID=53AE0455AB70A049AA49FBC22132E7CC . “Јолевски: Македонија заслужува итен прием во НАТО.” Утрински весник, February 3, 2016. Accessed December 24, 2016. http://www.utrinski.mk/default.asp?ItemID=0B3AFDC396209546AF5931D67DE7A421. 33 “Одложувањето на преговорите за членство во ЕУ со Македонија се против стабилна Европa.” Вечер, March 14, 2016. Accessed December 16, 2016. http://vecer.mk/makedonija/odlozhuvanjeto-na-pregovorite-za-chlenstvo-vo-eu-so-makedonija-se-protiv-s tabilna-evropa. 34 “Унгарија дава целосна поддршка за влез на Македонија во НАТО и во Европската унија.” Република, May 3, 2016. Accessed December 24, 2016. http://republika. mk/591321 . “Попоски: Македонија ќе биде дел од ЕУ и ќе биде посилна и посолидна како членка и економија.” Република, May 4, 2016. Accessed December 14, 2016. http://republika.mk/591881 . “Во Грција се уште актуелна изјавата на Коѕиас против вето за Македонија.” Вечер, June 22, 2016. Accessed December 14, 2016. http://vecer.mk/makedonija/vo-grcija-se-ushte-aktuelna-izjavata-na-kodzias-protiv-veto-za-makedonija . 2016. http://vecer.mk/makedonija/makedonija-treba-da-stane-chlenka-na-natoi-eu. 35 “Членството во НАТО и ЕУ нема алтернатива.” Вечер, October 14, 2016. Accessed December 14, 2016. http://vecer.mk/makedonija/chlenstvoto-vo-nato-i-eu-nema-alternativa. 36 “Иванов во ОН: бараме да ни се почитува достоинството.” Утрински весник, September 22, 2016. Accessed December 14, 2016. http://www.utrinski.mk/default.asp?ItemID=88CCD2A0F702F34B9E79D48AA0CF0540. “Неодлучноста на ЕУ и НАТО се главна причина за кризата во Македонија.” В ечер, October 8, 2016. Accessed December 22, 2016. http://vecer.mk/makedonija/neodluchnosta-na-eu-i-nato-se-glavna-prichi-

Messages in the Media na-za-krizata-vo-makedonija . “Иванов: заморот од проширувањето на ЕУ доведе до ретроградни процеси во југоисточна Европа.” Утрински весник, October 8, 2016. Accessed December 14, 2016. http://www.utrinski.mk/default.asp?ItemID=31DB30CDBCDB1B48A087A4E7048A555A. 37 “ЕУ ни ја потврди препораката, но и условите.” Утрински весник, December 13, 2016. Accessed December 16, 2016. http://www.utrinski.mk/default.asp?ItemID=1F64C27F017E8648A536038A381DB1DF. 38 “Стари услови, нова препорака за Македонија.” Вечер, November 9, 2016. Accessed December 14, 2016. http://vecer.mk/makedonija/stari-uslovi-nova-preporaka-za-makedonija . “Извештајот е патоказ за идните активности, членството во ЕУ останува приоритет за Македонија.” Вечер, November 10, 2016. Accessed December 14, 2016. http://vecer.mk/makedonija/izveshtajot-e-patokaz-za-idnite-aktivnosti-chlenstvoto-vo-eu-ostanuva-prioritet-za . “Средба на Јолевски со поранешните министри за одбрана.” Утрински весник, December 22, 2016. Accessed December 24, 2016. http://www.utrinski.mk/default.asp?ItemID=D89B91FE09FF8A47A0271CAFE02269CA.

Messages in the Media

Media sources 1- Die Presse: founded in 1848. Owned by Styria Medien AG 2 - Der Standard: founded in 1988. Owned by Oscar Bronner 3 - Kurier: founded in 1954. Owned by Telekurier Online Medien GmbH & Co KG

BY: FRIEDERIKE WILKE 32

2016

AUSTRIA’S PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS The 2016 Austrian presidential election was seen as an important moment for the relationship between Austria and the European Union, as the election further emphasized the trend of rising right-wing parties in Europe. The eighth Austrian presidential election took place on May 22nd 2016.1 During the first round, the two candidates that were selected for the final runoff were The Green Alternative’s candidate Alexander Van der Bellen and Norbert Hofer of the right wing populist FPÖ (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs).2 During the election campaign in the beginning of May, EU Parliamentary President Martin Schulz stated that if Norbert Hofer were to win the election, it would “change Europe’s character.”3 In response, the FPÖ’s general secretary Herbert Kickl implied that it seemed as though he was trying to interfere with Austrian national politics, which was not appropriate considering his political position.4 In the elections, Van der Bellen won with 50.35% of the vote.5 FPÖ candidate Norbert Hofer achieved 49.65%.6 In the beginning of July, Hofer proclaimed that he would support a referendum on an Austrian EU-exit should Turkey become a member state of the European Union.7 However, he also stated that he was generally not in favour of a EU-exit for Austria as it would not benefit the country.8 Van der Bellen and Hofer presented two different approaches to Austrian foreign policy. In general both candidates supported Austria’s EU membership. However Hofer stated that he would not tolerate Turkey as an EU member state and would reconsider Austria’s loyalty to Brussels should that be the case. On July 13th 2016 the Austrian Constitutional Court permitted FPÖ’s call for presidential re-elections.9 The decision was made after the FPÖ claimed that postal votes were counted unlawfully.10 In November both candidates stated in response to EU Commission Jean-Claude Juncker’s call for a European army that they would not support the founding of a unified army as their priority would be the retention of Austria’s neutrality.11 The presidential election was then repeated on December 4th 2016 and the winner of the first, faulty, election round, Alexander Van der Bellen, was able to win the vote with 53.79% and became Austria’s eighth President.12

AUSTRIAN-TURKISH RELATIONS Austrian-Turkish relations have been on a rocky path since the Turkish coup attempt in July of this year as a result of disagreements between EU member states and Turkish political actions. The coup attempt in Turkey on July 15th and 16th resulted in, according to Austrian police, peaceful protests of Erdoğan supporters in Vienna.13 Exterior Minister Kurz criticised these protests, stating that citizens who wanted to get involved in Turkish domestic politics were free to leave the country.14 15 Kurz had also demanded that the Turkish ambassador to come to the exterior ministry in order to get a better picture of “which direction Turkey was heading to.”16

Messages in the Media In early August 2016, Austrian Federal Chancellor Christian Kern demanded an immediate halt to the Turkey-EU negotiations.17 Turkish exterior minister Mevlüt Cavusoglu called Austria the “centre of radical racism” in response to Kurz’s previous statement.18 Three months later, Austrian newspaper Der Standard reported that Austria was planning a weapons embargo on Turkey.19 Six parties in the parliament- SPÖ, ÖVP, FPÖ, Grüne, Neos and Team Stornach presented a motion to ask the Austrian government to refuse export permission to Turkey.20 In the same proposal, the six parties also asked the European Union to prepare “justified measurements” against Turkey in order to protect the democracy and constitutional state of the country.21 Furthermore, in regards to increasing threats made by Turkey in regards to ending the EU-Turkey refugee deal, Austrian Minister of Defence Peter Doskozil announced that the government would take the necessary steps to protect itself from the possible aftermath of the end of the refugee deal.22 He also stated that Turkey “was on a direct path into a dictatorship” and that Austria “was done being threatened”.23 Doskozil invited the ministers of defence of other Central European states to an official meeting in order to create a common strategy. On December 28th 2016, the 28 exterior ministers of EU member states met to find a common strategy regarding Turkey.24 At the meeting, Austria blocked a common statement on the EU’s approach regarding the country.25 Austria had previously announced that they were only willing to sign the statement if it was realistic. Following the discussion, exterior minister Kurz blocked the statement and demanded the complete cessation of negotiations.26 On December 15th it was reported that Turkish exterior minister Mevlüt Cavusoğlu responded in an interview that Turkey would now work against Austria on “all levels”.27 One day later Austrian Chancellor Christian Kurz responded that Turkey’s political actions were completely “unreasonable” and that Austria would continue to defend its position that Turkey is an “important partner” but “does not belong in the EU.”28

THE EUROPEAN REFUGEE AND MIGRANT CRISIS The European refugee and migration crisis played a large role in Austrian domestic politics, especially the presidential elections, and also dominated the other levels of conversation between the Austrian politicians and representatives of the European Union. In February the Kurier reported that the EU Commission had lowered Austria’s refugee quota by 30%.29 However the reduction of the quota was only applicable to 2016.30 In June, Austrian exterior minister Sebastian Kurz said that the European Union should model its refugee policy more after Australia’s policy as “it should be made clear that a sea rescue was not automatically a ticket to Central Europe.”31 He proposed that refugee boats should be towed back to their point of origin or that passengers could also be detained in camps on the Greek island of Lesbos.32 In October Kurz publicly criticized Angela Merkel’s approach to the refugee crisis. He stated that her open border policy was encouraging more

2016 migrants into come to the European Union.33 Germany was taking hundreds of migrants from Italy and Greece each month and while well-meaning, he said that “these policies were wrong.”34 Kurz further demanded that the European Union stop its ongoing attempt to redistribute refugees as the EU-forced quotas on member states could create further conflict between the states and the EU.35 German Chancellor Angela Merkel responded to Kurz’s support for the closure of the Balkan route for refugee, stating that “the problem would not just disappear through maximal ignoring, creating distance and seclusion.”36 At the end of September Austrian newspaper Der Standard reported that Austria’s interior ministry was drafting a bill to increase the sentence for asylum seekers should they willingly give out false statements about their identity in the process of claiming asylum in Austria.37 This policy aims to crack down on criminal activity associated with asylum claims.

2016 IN REVIEW Overall, 2016 was a difficult year for the Austrian government and their relationship with the European Union and its member states. The three main political topics dominating Austria’s national politics were all closely related. Austria’s recent tensions with Turkey is particularly continuing to stress the inter-country relations, while also puts pressure on the European Union as they attempt to maintain a united front regarding the issue. The Austrian presidential election was seen as a possible major turning point for the European Union. As the EU is experiencing a shift to more extreme political ends, on both the radical right and left, there was noticeable tension between EU officials and the Austrian parties and their candidates. While the end result showed Austrian support for the EU, the threat of a shift in political ideologies in European states is becoming increasingly palpable. This imposes further pressure on the EU as it tries to reform while also preserving its core values. The escalating conflict between Austria and Turkey has increased social pressures within Austria, which is home to a large minority group of Austrian Turks. More notably, it has elevated tensions between Austria and the European Union. As the European Union is still approaching the topic of Turkey and its future in a more timid way than Austria, the country is increasingly irritated by the EU’s political response to the conflict. Austria has taken a relatively hard stance on Turkish political actions but the EU has not supported or expressed similar views on the issue in condoning these actions. The ongoing EU refugee and migrant crisis has been, like in the year before, an extensive topic of debate in the Austrian public, and has very heavily influenced the relationship between the Austrian government and the European Union as well. The disputes about the future of the EU distribution quota for refugees have particularly increased tensions. These discussions stalled in the progress of the settlement of refugees. As Austria and other Central European States demand a stricter refugee and asylum claiming policy, Germany’s open

Messages in the Media border policy has led to large inefficiencies in the EUâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s ability to deal with the problem accordingly. Austria had previously demanded a maximum line for refugees, which Germany rejected. In summary, Austria and the European Union had major differences in opinion over the course of 2016. Austria continued to express a strict position on topics such as a EU membership for Turkey and the proceedings in the European refugee crisis, which continues to contribute to the EUâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s identity crisis. While Austria generally remains in support of the European Union, their political views are vastly different and Austria often feels left alone in its opinions.

2016 Statistics: All information from CIA World Factbook. 1 “Alle Infomationen zur Stichwahl am 22. Mai.” (25.04.2016) Kurier. https:// kurier.at/politik/inland/bp-wahl-alle-informationen-zur-stichwahl-am-22mai/195.038.744 2 Markus Hametner, “Bundespräsidentenwahl 2016: Vorläufiges Ergebnis.” (25.04.2016) Der Standard. http://derstandard.at/2000035656257/ Das-blaue-Oesterreich-im-Detail 3 Schulz warnt vor Sieg Hofers – Kickl reagiert.” (06.05.2016) Kurier. https:// kurier.at/politik/inland/schulz-warnt-vor-sieg-hofers-in-stichwahl/197.212.845; “Schulz warnt vor Sieg Hofers – Kickl reagiert.” (06.05.2016) Kurier. https://kurier.at/politik/inland/schulz-warnt-vor-sieg-hofers-in-stichwahl/197.212.845 4 Schulz warnt vor Sieg Hofers – Kickl reagiert.” (06.05.2016) Kurier. https://kurier.at/politik/inland/schulz-warnt-vor-sieg-hofers-in-stichwahl/197.212.845 5 “Präsidentenwahl: Das Endergebnis im Detail.” (24.05.2016) Der Standard. http://derstandard.at/2000037433421/Ab-1700-Hochrechnungen-und-Gemeindeergebnisse 6 “Präsidentenwahl: Das Endergebnis im Detail.” (24.05.2016) Der Standard. http://derstandard.at/2000037433421/Ab-1700-Hochrechnungen-und-Gemeindeergebnisse, “Wahlkarten ausgezählt: Alexander Van der Bellen ist Bundespräsident.” (23.05.2016) Der Standard. http://derstandard.at/2000037495444/ Der-Sieger-der-Bundespraesidentenwahl-heisst 7 “Hofer bekräftigt Willen zu EU-Ausstiegsreferendum.” (02.07.2016) Die Presse. http://diepresse.com/home/politik/innenpolitik/5041900/Hofer-bekraeftigt-Willen-zu-EUAusstiegsreferendum 8 Oliver Pink, “Norbert Hofer: EU-Austritt ware “Schaden für Österreich.” (08.07.2016) Die Presse. http://diepresse.com/home/politik/innenpolitik/5046096/Norbert-Hofer_EUAustritt-waere-Schaden-fuer-Oesterreich 9 “Hofburg-Wahl: Schriftliches Erkentniss des VfGH liegt vor.” (13.07.2016) Die Presse. http://diepresse.com/home/politik/innenpolitik/5049456/HofburgWahl_ Schriftliches-Erkenntnis-des-VfGH-liegt-vor 10 “Hofburg-Wahl: Schriftliches Erkentniss des VfGH liegt vor.” (13.07.2016) Die Presse. http://diepresse.com/home/politik/innenpolitik/5049456/HofburgWahl_ Schriftliches-Erkenntnis-des-VfGH-liegt-vor 11 Nina Weissensteiner, “Hofer und Van der Bellen sträuben sich gegen EUArmee.” (14.11.2016) Der Standard. http://derstandard.at/2000047534598/Hoferund-Van-der-Bellen-straeuben-sich-gegen-EU-Armee; Maria Kern and Karin Leitner, “Hofer und Van der Bellen zu Trump und EU-Armee.” (15.11.2016) Kurier. http://derstandard.at/2000047534598/Hofer-und-Van-der-Bellen-straeuben-sich-gegen-EU-Armee 12 “Es ist fix: Van der Bellen ist gewählter Bundespräsident.” (23.12.2016) Der Standard. http://derstandard.at/2000049765689/Es-ist-fix-Van-der-Bellen-istgewaehlter-Bundespraesident 13 “Erdogan-Anhänger protestieren in Wien gegen Putsch.“ (16.07.2016) Der Standard. http://derstandard.at/2000041204167/Tausende-Erdogan-Anhae-

Messages in the Media nger-demonstrierten-in-Wien-gegen-Putsch 14 “Erdogan-Anhänger protestieren in Wien gegen Putsch.“ (16.07.2016) Der Standard. http://derstandard.at/2000041204167/Tausende-Erdogan-Anhaenger-demonstrierten-in-Wien-gegen-Putsch 15 “Kurz legt Erdogan-Anhängern Verlassen Osterreichs nahe.“ (21.07.2016) Der Standard. http://derstandard.at/2000041493584-1214/Kurz-bestellt-tuerkischen-Botschafter-ins-Aussenministerium 16 “Kurz legt Erdogan-Anhängern Verlassen Osterreichs nahe.“ (21.07.2016) Der Standard. http://derstandard.at/2000041493584-1214/Kurz-bestellt-tuerkischen-Botschafter-ins-Aussenministerium 17 “Türkischer Minister zu Kern: Aussage “ähnlich jener der Rechtsextremen.” (04.08.2016) Der Standard. http://derstandard.at/2000042299544/ Kern-Tuerkei-Beitrittsverhandlungen-nicht-mehr-als-Fiktion 18 “Türkischer Außenminister nennt Österreich “Zentrum des Radikalen Rassismus”.” (05.08.2016) Die Presse. http://diepresse.com/home/politik/aussenpolitik/5063750/Tuerkei_Oesterreich-ist-Zentrum-des-radikalen-Rassismus 19 “Türkei: Nationalrat will Waffenembargo.” (24.11.2016) Kurier. https://kurier. at/politik/inland/tuerkei-nationalrat-wuenscht-sich-waffenembargo/232.388.634 20 “Nationalrat wünscht sich ein Waffenembargo gegen die Türkei.“ (24.11.2016) Die Presse. http://diepresse.com/home/politik/aussenpolitik/5123667/Nationalrat-wuenscht-sich-ein-Waffenembargo-gegen-die-Tuerkei 21 Michael Vosatka, “Österreich will Waffenembargo gegen Türkei beschließen.“ (24.11.2016) Der Standard. http://derstandard.at/2000048109064/Oesterreich-will-Waffenembargo-gegen-Tuerkei-beschliessen 22 “Doskozil will auf Ende des Türkei-Flüchtlingsdeals vorbereiten.“ (04.11.2016) Die Presse. http://diepresse.com/home/politik/aussenpolitik/5112969/Doskozil-will-auf-Ende-des-TuerkeiFluechtlingsdeals-vorbereiten 23 “Doskozil will auf Ende des Türkei-Flüchtlingsdeals vorbereiten.“ (04.11.2016) Die Presse. http://diepresse.com/home/politik/aussenpolitik/5112969/Doskozil-will-auf-Ende-des-TuerkeiFluechtlingsdeals-vorbereiten 24 Österreich blockiert EU-Erklärung zu Türkei.” (13.12.2016) Die Presse. http://diepresse.com/home/politik/eu/5133561/Oesterreich-blockiert-EUErklaerung-zu-Tuerkei 25 Österreich blockiert EU-Erklärung zu Türkei.” (13.12.2016) Die Presse. http://diepresse.com/home/politik/eu/5133561/Oesterreich-blockiert-EUErklaerung-zu-Tuerkei 26 “Österreich verhindert EU-Erklärung zur Türkei.” (13.12.2016) Der Standard. http://derstandard.at/2000049240208/Veto-Kurz-blockiert-EU-Erklaerung-zurTuerkei 27 “Türkei: Konfrontationskurs gegen Österreich “auf allen Ebenen.”” (15.12.2016) Die Presse. http://diepresse.com/home/politik/aussenpolitik/5134642/Tuerkei_ Konfrontationskurs-gegen-Oesterreich-auf-allen-Ebenen 28 “Streit zwischen Österreich und Türkei eskaliert wegen Kurz-Veto.“ (16.12.2016) Kurier. https://kurier.at/politik/ausland/streit-zwischen-oesterreich-und-tuerkei-eskaliert-wegen-kurz-veto/236.139.122

2016 “EU-Verteilersystem: Weniger Flüchtlinge nach Österreich.” (10.02.2016) Kurier. https://kurier.at/politik/ausland/eu-verteilersystem-weniger-fluechtlinge-nach-oesterreich/180.183.950 30 “EU-Verteilersystem: Weniger Flüchtlinge nach Österreich.” (10.02.2016) Kurier. https://kurier.at/politik/ausland/eu-verteilersystem-weniger-fluechtlinge-nach-oesterreich/180.183.950 31 “Flüchtlinge internieren”: Kurz macht UNHCR ratlos.” (06.06.2016) Die Presse. http://diepresse.com/home/politik/aussenpolitik/5003790/Fluechtlinge-internieren_Kurz-macht-UNHCR-ratlos 32 “Flüchtlinge internieren”: Kurz macht UNHCR ratlos.” (06.06.2016) Die Presse. http://diepresse.com/home/politik/aussenpolitik/5003790/Fluechtlinge-internieren_Kurz-macht-UNHCR-ratlos 33 Kurz kritisiert: Merkels Politik lockt mehr Migranten an.“ (02.10.2016) Kurier. https://kurier.at/politik/ausland/kurz-kritisiert-merkels-politik-lockt-mehr-migranten-an/224.053.666 34 Kurz kritisiert: Merkels Politik lockt mehr Migranten an.“ (02.10.2016) Kurier. https://kurier.at/politik/ausland/kurz-kritisiert-merkels-politik-lockt-mehr-migranten-an/224.053.666 35 Kurz kritisiert: Merkels Politik lockt mehr Migranten an.“ (02.10.2016) Kurier. https://kurier.at/politik/ausland/kurz-kritisiert-merkels-politik-lockt-mehr-migranten-an/224.053.666 36 Birgit Baumann, “Merkel kontert Kurz in der Flüchtlingskrise.” (06.10.2016) Der Standard. http://derstandard.at/2000045496659/Merkel-kontert-Kurzin-der-Fluechtlingskrise, “Scharfe Kritik an Sebastian Kurz aus Deutschland.” (03.12.2016) Kurier. https://kurier.at/politik/ausland/fluechtlingspolitik-cdu-generalsekretaer-peter-tauber-weist-kritik-von-sebastian-kurz-an-angela-merkel-zurueck/233.982.333 37 “Fremdenrechtspaket bringt Verschärfung für Asylbewerber.” (22.12.2016) Der Standard. http://derstandard.at/2000049694541/Fremdenrechtspaket-bringt-Verschaerfungen-fuer-Asylwerber 29

Messages in the Media

Media sources 1- Correio da Manha: founded in 1979. Owned by Confina Group, 2 - Jornal de NotĂcias: founded in 1888. Owned by Global Media Group 3 - Expresso: founded in 1973. Owned by Group Impresa

BY: LETICIA SANTANA 40

2016

BREXIT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UK’S PORTUGUESE COMMUNITY As the United Kingdom is the main destination for Portuguese immigration, the media frequently discussed the referendum held by the UK on leaving the European Union. Portugal had a vested interest in the failure of the Brexit vote as one of the cornerstones of the “Leave” campaign was the closure of the UK’s borders to immigration.1 Portuguese media outlets reported mostly on what the result of the referendum would mean for the Portuguese community in the UK, which has an estimated population of half a million. The tone of the coverage pre-referendum was distinctly optimistic, with reassurances that the UK was unlikely to leave the EU, and that even in the event of an exit the interests of the Portuguese community would not be jeopardized. However, the reporting took a bleaker outlook once the United Kingdom voted to leave the EU on June 23, revolving mostly around the uncertainty and difficulties the Portuguese community was expected to face going forward. In an attempt to assuage concerns raised by the vote, the Portuguese government’s message to its people was clear: relations between the two countries would not change, regardless of the outcome of the referendum. After the vote, President Marcelo da Souza cited the long-standing Portuguese-British alliance, established in 1386, to argue that the two countries remained closed linked and that UK’s exit from the EU would not threaten the interests of the Portuguese community.2,3 Prime Minister António Costa delivered a similarly positive message, adding that the UK would remain European “culturally, economically and in terms of peace and security” despite its exit from the European Union.4,5,6 However, these reassurances were not enough to quell the aura of anxiety around the Brexit coverage. In fact, many articles were written about the uncertainty surrounding the future of Portuguese citizens living in the UK. Statements released by the Portuguese government advising those living in the UK to apply for permanent residency and take the necessary legal precautions contributed to this climate unease.7 According to research done by the Portuguese Department of Communities, as many as a third of the Portuguese citizens living in the United Kingdom would not meet the requirements imposed on non-EU immigrants in matters of income, English proficiency, and higher education.8 Many articles were written with personal accounts by members of the UK’s Portuguese community voicing their disappointment with the result of the vote and their anxiety about their future as immigrants within a British society that did not seem to welcome them.9,10, 11,12,13 Likewise, the rise of xenophobia and antiimmigration sentiment in the UK was frequently discussed in the context of what it meant for the Portuguese community currently established there. Reports of hate crimes committed against immigrants living in the UK postreferendum received considerable coverage, with several accounts of harassment ranging from verbal insults to physical attacks.14,15 Overall, Brexit vote was one

Messages in the Media of the major stories in the Portuguese media, with a special focus on what the referendum meant for those Portuguese citizens living and working in the UK.

The Migration Crisis, Refugee Resettlement and the Schengen Zone The migration crisis was often discussed in the Portuguese media. As Portugal is geographically distant from the main refugee routes, the pressure from the flow of refugees is not as intense as that experienced by other EU members. Even so, the current administration put the issue at the top of its European policy priorities.16 The Portuguese media reported heavily on the negotiations that eventually led to the EU-Turkey agreement signed on March 18th. The hallmark of this agreement is the one-for-one program. This clause of the deal states that all migrants and refugees who arrive clandestinely in Greece will be expelled to Turkey. In return, for every person expelled, the EU pledges to resettle one Syrian refugee into its territory.17 During the negotiations, concerns over potential human rights violations were raised in various media outlets. These concerns stemmed from the fact that Turkey is not considered a safe country for refugees and migrants, and therefore any agreement compromising of a return process is problematic.18,19 Also, some feared that Turkey would leverage this deal to gain undue concessions from the EU.20 The argument often repeated was that since the EU was desperate to stop the inflow of refugees, it would not be able to reasonably negotiate a fair deal with Turkey. Even so, the Portuguese government was outspoken in its support of the agreement. Shortly after the deal was signed, Prime Minister António Costa stressed at a press conference in Brussels that even though the agreement “should not give the illusion that the problem is solved”, it was “very important” for migration management.21 In answer to questions about human rights concerns, Costa pointed to the clause in the agreement that “ensures international protection for those who lack it” as evidence of the EU’s commitment to preventing human rights violations.22 Once the EU-Turkey agreement came into effect, Portugal became the first countries to host refugees under the one-for-one program.23 Under its mandate of being a key participant in solving the crisis, Portugal volunteered to raise its quota from 5,000 to 10,000 refugees.24,25 The coverage of the resettlement process was mostly positive, with the only lamentation recorded being that the bureaucratic process was unnecessarily slowing down the redistribution of refugees to Portugal.26,27 Overall, the message in the Portuguese media towards refugees was one of solidarity, with frequent discussions of how the country could improve its involvement in helping refugees.28,29,30 For example, Portugal developed specific programs to integrate the incoming refugees, and those programs were often discussed by government officials. The Foreign Affair Minister, Augusto Santos Silva, highlighted the proposals presented to Germany on programs developed to help integrate refugees into the educational system and into economic activities of the primary sector.31 For his part, Prime Minister António Costa reaffirmed Portugal’s pledge to engage

2016 in bilateral cooperation with Germany, as well as the country’s commitment to “contributing to peace, freedom, and conditions of prosperity to resolve this migratory pressure”.32 Unlike other European countries, the far-right has had very little impact on the public discussion of the topic, with only few instances of reports of anti-immigration sentiment. Portuguese people are reported as having the highest acceptance rate for refugees and the current administration has shown a consistent commitment to being an asset in the EU’s attempt to solve the crisis.33 However, the media has also reported heavily on the dangers the migration crisis poses to the Schengen zone, and concerns about the viability of the union were often discussed.34 The Portuguese government seemed to align with Germany on this topic for the most part, with frequent mentions of Merkel’s call for a common EU position on border protection as a way to prevent the collapse of the Schengen zone.35,36 Foreign Affairs Minister Augusto Santos Silva stated at a hearing at the European Commission that “no movement, no change, no evolution in the way Europe manages the flow of migration must call into question the Schengen area”, a sentiment often repeated by the government of Portugal.37 The consensus seemed to be that the crisis must be solved, but not that the expense of the Schengen zone.

Budget and the Rise Against Austerity

The 2016 State Budget was often discussed in the Portuguese media. The original draft submitted by Portugal raised concerns from the European Commission. Portugal proposed a structural reduction of the deficit by 0.2, an amount significantly lower than the 0.6 recommended by the European Council on July of 2015.38 The European Commission’s questioning of the budget caused a stir in Portuguese media. Many argued the EU was overextending its power and subverting the will of the Portuguese people. After the legislative election of 2015, a left-leaning coalition succeeded in collapsing the right-leaning minority government, a move which many hoped would lead to a shift away from austerity and towards increased government spending.39,40 After widely covered discussions between the Portuguese government and the European Commission, a modified budget was eventually accepted. Overall, the European Commission’s pressure on Portugal to reduce its deficit was represented in the media as an attempt to veer the government away from the mandate under which it was elected and towards the austerity policy dictated by the EU. The government was a mediator, quieting concerns from the European Commission while assuring the people it would fulfill its electoral promises.41 Discussions about Portugal’s sovereignty in the face of EU intervention flared again when the European Commission considered sanctioning Portugal for excessive deficit in July, and once more in October over talks of suspending structural funds to Portugal.42,43 ,44 The consensus in the media during was that Portugal did not deserve either of the punitive measures. In the end, the EU chose not to penalize Portugal, a decision that was well received by the Portuguese government.45 Still, some argued that Portugal was

Messages in the Media only forgiven because the EU could not sanction Portugal without sanctioning Spain. Since Spain would have been unable to handle the brunt of sanctions amidst its political and financial instability, the EU was forced to forgive Portugal as well.46 This is a grievance often voiced in the Portuguese media, namely that different countries get treated differently by the EU.47,48,49 For instance, the Portuguese MEP Marisa Matias articulated this resentment in a debate in Berlin by stating that if every time the UK threatens to leave the EU, solutions are found even in questions relating to topics as central as the freedom of movement, the European institutions should apply the same treatment to Portugal, adding that “the Portuguese people are no less than the British”.50 Similarly, the president of Portugal’s largest trade union, Arménio Carlos, said in a statement about the budget negations, “the European Union continues to play its role: docile and, above all, submissive to the countries that have the most power, and outspoken and aggressive to those countries that have less power, as is the case of Portugal”.51 Overall, the question of Portugal’s sovereignty in the face of EU pressure was often discussed, with the budget being used as an example of EU blackmail. For its part, the government treated a careful line of compromise, with constant attempts to assuage concerns on both the EU side and on the national front.

2016 IN REVIEW Relations between Portugal and the European Union were mostly positive in 2016. The Brexit vote was widely covered by various Portuguese media outlets. Early in the year, the general message was that the UK was likely to stay in the EU. Once the vote took place, the coverage changed significantly and concerns for the Portuguese diaspora living in the UK began to shape discussions of the topic. Even though the Portuguese government repeatedly tried to reassure its people the vote would not change the nature of relations between Portugal and the UK, the reporting around Brexit was still marred by the uncertainty facing the Portuguese community in the UK.52,53 This climate of unease can be expected to linger as the exit negotiations between the UK and the EU continue. The migration crisis was also a subject that received extensive coverage. Portugal’s commitment to collaborating with the EU on matters such as refugee resettlement was widely reported by the media. Generally, Portugal presented itself as being ready to welcome refugees with open arms. 54,55,56 This makes Portuguese somewhat of an outlier in European politics, as many EU members are experiencing a push against open borders and immigration. Lastly, the topic that caused the most strife between Portugal and the EU was the State Budge of 2016. The dialogue between the European Commission and the Portuguese government that led to a modified budget was widely criticized in the media as an undue intrusion of the EU into Portuguese sovereignty. 57,58 A similar lens was used to interpret discussions of sanctions and fund suspension for Portugal. Overall, the government was moderately successful at navigating the EU’s austerity policy while abiding by the public’s wish for more government

2016 spending, especially in areas of public service. Whether or not the government will be able to maintain this careful balance remains to be seen.

Messages in the Media “Brexit: Manutenção do Reino Unido na UE seria melhor para Portugal - Ferreira do Amaral.” June 17, 2016. Accessed December 14, 2016. http://www.cmjornal.pt/cm-ao-minuto/detalhe/brexit_manutencao_do_reino_ unido_na_ue_seria_melhor_para_portu gal___ferreira_do_amaral. 2 “Marcelo acredita que interesses dos portugueses não estão em causa.” Jornal de Noticías. June 24, 2016. Accessed December 14, 2016. http://www.jn.pt/mundo/interior/marcelo-acredita-que-interesses-dos-portugueses-nao-estao-em-causa-5246447.htm l. 3 “Direitos adquiridos dos portugueses no Reino Unido não serão afetados pelo Brexit.” Jornal de Noticías. November 17, 2016. Accessed November 28, 2016. http://www.jn.pt/nacional/interior/direitos-adquiridos-dos-portugueses-no-reino-unido-nao-serao-afetados-pelo-brex it-5503144.html. 4 “António Costa acalma comunidade portuguesa no Reino Unido.” Jornal de Noticías. June 29, 2016. Accessed November 27, 2016. http://www.jn.pt/mundo/interior/antonio-costa-acalma-comunidade-portuguesa-no-reino-unido-5256434.html. 5 “Costa afirma que aliança com Reino Unido “prosseguirá”.” Jornal de Noticías. June 24, 2016. Accessed December 14, 2016. http://www.jn.pt/mundo/interior/costa-afirma-que-alianca-com-reino-unido-prosseguira-5246889.html. 6 “Interesses dos portugueses no Reino Unido não estão em causa.” June 24, 2016. Accessed November 24, 2016. http://www.cmjornal.pt/portugal/detalhe/interesses_dos_portugueses_no_reino_unido_nao_estao_em_causa. 7 http://www.jn.pt/mundo/interior/portugueses-devem-pedir-residencia-permanente-no-reino-unido-5242980.html 8 “Um terço dos portugueses falha requisitos a imigrantes extra-comunitários.” Jornal de Noticías. July 05, 2016. Accessed December 14, 2016. http://www.jn.pt/nacional/interior/um-terco-dos-portugueses-falha-requisitos-a-imigrantes-extra-comunitarios-5267 839.html. 9 Teixeira, Raquel. “120 dias de incertezas para os portugueses em Londres.” Jornal de Noticías. October 22, 2016. Accessed November 29, 2016. http://www.jn.pt/mundo/interior/cem-dias-de-theresa-may-e-meses-de-incertezas-5457706.html. 10 “Comunidade portuguesa em “choque” e preocupada.” Jornal de Noticías. June 1

2016 24, 2016. Accessed November 28, 2016. http://www.jn.pt/mundo/interior/comunidade-portuguesa-em-choque-e-preocupada-5246427.html. 11 “Milhões fazem contas à vida na incerteza de “Brexit”.” Jornal de Noticías. June 15, 2016. Accessed December 14, 2016. http://www.jn.pt/mundo/interior/milhoes-fazem-contas-a-vida-5230430.html. 12 “Portugueses em Londres discute impacto do Brexit.” July 01, 2016. Accessed November 14, 2016. 13 “Portugueses no Reino Unido reclamam mais apoio.” June 29, 2016. Accessed November 14, 201. http://www.cmjornal.pt/portugal/detalhe/portugueses_no_reino_unido_reclamam_mais_apoio. 14 “Portugueses vítimas de racismo após referendo.” Portugueses vítimas de racismo após referendo - Cm ao Minuto. June 28, 2016. Accessed December 18, 2016. http://www.cmjornal.pt/portugal/detalhe/portugueses_vitimas_de_ataques_racistas_apos_referendo. 15 “Crimes raciais aumentam no Reino Unido.” Crimes raciais aumentam no Reino Unido - Mundo. July 08, 2016. Accessed November 14, 2016. http://www.cmjornal.pt/mundo/detalhe/crimes_ raciais_aumentam_no_reino_unido . 16 “Governo quer mais refugiados no próximo ano.” Jornal Expresso. December 17, 2016. Accessed December 29, 2016. http://expresso.sapo.pt/politica/2016-12-17-Governo-quer-mais-refugiados-no-proximo-ano. 17 “Portugal recebe em breve mais 20 refugiados.” Correio da Manhã. April 20, 2016. Accessed November 14, 2016. http://www.cmjornal.pt/sociedade/detalhe/portugal_recebe_em_breve_ mais_20_refugiados_oriundos_da_turquia__ _secretaria_de_estado. 18 Rodrigues, José. “O consenso europeu.” Correio da Manhã. N.p., 14 Mar. 2016. Web. 12 Dec. 2016. <http://www.cmjornal.pt/opiniao/colunistas/jose-rodrigues/detalhe/o_consenso_europeu>. 19 “Acordo UE-Turquia é golpe histórico nos direitos humanos.” Correio da Manhã. March 18, 2016. Accessed December 14, 2016. http://www.cmjornal.pt/mundo/detalhe/migracoes_acordo_ue_turquia_e_ golpe_historico_nos_direitos_humanos___ amnistia. 20 Rodrigues, José. “O consenso europeu.” Correio da Manhã. N.p., 14 Mar. 2016. Web. 12 Dec. 2016. <http://www.cmjornal.pt/opiniao/colunistas/jose-rodrigues/detalhe/o_consenso_europeu>.

Messages in the Media “Costa considera acordo UE-Turquia “muito importante” mas adverte contra “ilusões” .” Correio da Manhã. March 18, 2016. Accessed November 12, 2016. http://www.cmjornal.pt/cm-ao-minuto/detalhe/migracoes_costa_considera_ acordo_ue_turquia_muito_importante_m as_adverte_contra_ilusoes 22 “Costa considera acordo UE-Turquia “muito importante” mas adverte contra “ilusões” .” Correio da Manhã. as_adverte_contra_ilusoesMarch 18, 2016. Accessed November 12, 2016. http://www.cmjornal.pt/cm-ao-minuto/detalhe/migracoes_costa_considera_ acordo_ue_turquia_muito_importante_m as_adverte_contra_ilusoes 23 “Portugal recebe em breve mais 20 refugiados.” Correio da Manhã. April 20, 2016. Accessed November 14, 2016. http://www.cmjornal.pt/sociedade/detalhe/portugal_recebe_em_breve_ mais_20_refugiados_oriundos_da_turquia__ _secretaria_de_estado. 24 “Refugiados chegam a Portugal a ritmo compatível com resposta -- Especialista.” Correio da Manhã. March 15, 2016. Accessed December 14, 2016. http://www.cmjornal.pt/cm-ao-minuto/detalhe/migracoes_refugiados_ chegam_a_portugal_a_ritmo_compativel_com _resposta____especialista. 25 “Portugal aceita refugiados e recusa imigrantes.” Jornal Expresso. September 20, 2016. Accessed November 14, 2016. http://expresso.sapo.pt/revista-de-imprensa/2016-11-30-Portugal-aceita-refugiados-e-recusa-imigrantes. 26 “Europa tem dado resposta “muito fraca” à crise dos refugiados.” Correio da Manhã. December 16, 2016. Accessed December 12, 2016. http://www.cmjornal.pt/portugal/detalhe/europa_tem_dado_resposta_muito_fraca_a_crise_dos_refugiados. 27 “Costa reúne-se com Tsipras em Atenas.” Correio da Manhã. April 05, 2016. Accessed December 18, 2016. http://www.cmjornal.pt/portugal/detalhe/costa_reune_se_comtsipras_na_segunda_feira_em_atenas_e_visita_campo _de_refugiados. 28 “MNE destaca contributo português.” Correio da Manhã. February 06, 2016. Accessed November 14, 2016. http://www.cmjornal.pt/politica/detalhe/migracoes_mne_destaca_contributo_portugues_para_resposta_diversificada. 29 “Costa reúne-se com Tsipras em Atenas.” Correio da Manhã. April 05, 2016. Accessed November 16, 2016. http://www.cmjornal.pt/portugal/detalhe/costa_reune_se_comtsipras_na_segunda_feira_em_atenas_e_visita_campo 21

2016 _de_refugiados. 30 “Governo quer mais refugiados no próximo ano.” Jornal Expresso. December 17, 2016. Accessed November 24, 31 “MNE destaca contributo português.” Correio da Manhã. February 06, 2016. Accessed December 14, 2016.http://www.cmjornal.pt/politica/detalhe/migracoes_mne_destaca_contributo_portugues_para_resposta_diversificad. 32 “Costa afirma ser “injusto” atribuir a Alemanha maiores responsabilidades.” Correio da Manhã. February 05, 2016. Accessed November 14, 2016. http://www.cmjornal.pt/cm-ao-minuto/detalhe/migracoes_costa_afirma_ser_injusto_atribuir_a_alemanha_maiores_r esponsabilidades. 33 “Portugal quer acolher refugiados, mas não imigrantes.” Correio da Manhã. November 30, 2016. Accessed December 14, 2016. http://www.cmjornal.pt/sociedade/detalhe/portugal-e-o-pais-com-maior-abertura-ao-acolhimento-de-refugiados--est udo-europeu. 34 “Crise refugiados pode fazer descarrilar projeto europeu - eurodeputada.” Correio da Manhã. March 29, 2016. Accessed November 18, 2016. http://www.cmjornal.pt/cm-ao-minuto/detalhe/migracoes_crise_refugiados_ pode_fazer_descarrilar_projeto_europeu ___eurodeputada. 35 “Lagarde alerta para riscos da sobrevivência do espaço Schengen.” Correio da Manhã. January 23, 2016. Accessed December 14, 2016. http://www.cmjornal.pt/mundo/detalhe/lagarde_alerta_para_riscos_da_sobrevivencia_do_espaco_schengen. 36 “Chanceler alemã pede “posição comum” europeia Ler mais em: http://www.cmjornal.pt/cm-ao-minuto/detalhe/migracoes_chanceler_alema_ pede_posicao_comum_europeia.” Correio da Manhã. February 17, 2016. Accessed October 12, 2016. http://www.cmjornal.pt/cm-ao-minuto/detalhe/migracoes_chanceler_alema_ pede_posicao_comum_europeia. 37 “Europa tem dado resposta “muito fraca” à crise dos refugiados.” Correio da Manhã. December 16, 2016. Accessed December 12, 2016. 38 “Bruxelas questiona redução do défice estrutural.” Correio da Manhã. January 27, 2016. Accessed November 15, 2016. http://www.cmjornal.pt/portugal/detalhe/bruxelas_nao_aceita ita_orcamento_de_estado. 39 “João Ferreira suggests to Juncker that “he calms his bureaucrats”.” Correio da Manhã. December 3, 2016. Accessed December 15, 2016.

Messages in the Media http://www.cmjornal.pt/politica/detalhe/oe2016_joao_ferreira_pcp_sugere_a_ juncker_que_acalme_os_seus_burocratas 40 Rodrigues, José. “O défice que conta.” Correio da Manhã. July 11, 2016. Accessed December 16, 2016. http://www.cmjornal.pt/opiniao/colunistas/jose-rodrigues/detalhe/o_defice_ que_conta. 41 “Juncker justifies Brussels intervention with European rules Ler mais em: http://www.cmjornal.pt/politica/detalhe/oe2016_juncker_justifica_intervencao_ de_bruxelas_com_regras_europeias_ a_que_portugal_esta_obrigado.” Correio da Manhã. N.p., 3 Feb. 2016. Web. 12 Dec. 2016. 42 “Comissário europeu otimista em relação a Portugal.” Correio da Manhã. October 03, 2016. Accessed November 15, 2016. http://www.cmjornal.pt/politica/detalhe/comissario-europeu-otimista-em-relacao-a-portugal. 43 “Comissários divididos em relação a sanções.” July 07, 2016. Accessed November 16, 2016. http://www.cmjornal.pt/portugal/detalhe/comissarios_divididos_em_relacao_a_ sancoes. 44 http://www.cmjornal.pt/opiniao/colunistas/armando-esteves-pereira/detalhe/ orcamento_sob_pressao 45 “Suspension of sanctions and approval of OE are “good news” Ler mais em: http://www.cmjornal.pt/economia/detalhe/pr-considera-suspensao-de-sancoes-e-aprovacao-do-oe-boas-noticias.” Correio da Manhã. November 16, 2016. Accessed December 12, 2016. http://www.cmjornal.pt/economia/detalhe/pr-considera-suspensao-de-sancoes-e-aprovacao-do-oe-boas-noticias. 46 Amaral, Luciano. “‘Espanções’.” Correio da Manhã. August 1, 2016. Accessed November 13, 2016. reio da Manhã. November 16, 2016. http://www.cmjornal.pt/opiniao/colunistas/luciano-amaral/detalhe/espancoes. 47 “Atenção ao rating.” Correio da Manhã. July 17, 2016. Accessed November 16, 2016. http://www.cmjornal.pt/opiniao/colunistas/armando-esteves-pereira/detalhe/ atencao_ao_rating. 48 “’Portugueses não serão capazes de ultrapassar a austeridade’” Correio da Manhã. December 08, 2016. Accessed December 15, 2016. http://www.cmjornal.pt/portugal/detalhe/portugueses_nao_serao_capazes_de_ ultrapassar_a_austeridade. 49 “CGTP diz que UE não podia penalizar Portugal por défice excessivo.” Correio da Manhã. November 16, 2016. Accessed December 15, 2016. http://www.cmjornal.pt/economia/detalhe/cgtp-diz-que-ue-nao-podia-penal izar-portugal-por-defice-excessivo.50 “’Portugueses não serão capazes de ultrapas-

2016 sar a austeridade’” Correio da Manhã. February 08, 2016. Accessed December 15, 2016. http://www.cmjornal.pt/portugal/detalhe/portugueses_nao_serao_capazes_de_ ultrapassar_a_austeridade. 51 “CGTP diz que UE não podia penalizar Portugal por défice excessivo.” Correio da Manhã. November 16, 2016. Accessed December 15, 2016. http://www.cmjornal.pt/economia/detalhe/cgtp-diz-que-ue-nao-podia-penalizar-portugal-por-defice-excessivo. 52 “António Costa acalma comunidade portuguesa no Reino Unido.” Jornal de Noticías. June 29, 2016. Accessed December 14, 2016. http://www.jn.pt/mundo/interior/antonio-costa-acalma-comunidade-portuguesa-no-reino-unido-5256434.html. 53 “Costa afirma que aliança com Reino Unido “prosseguirá”.” Jornal de Noticías. June 24, 2016. Accessed December 14, 2016. http://www.jn.pt/mundo/interior/costa-afirma-que-alianca-com-reino-unido-prosseguira-5246889.html. 54 “MNE destaca contributo português.” Correio da Manhã. February 06, 2016. Accessed November 14, 2016. http://www.cmjornal.pt/politica/detalhe/migracoes_mne_destaca_contributo_portugues_para_resposta_diversificada . 55 “Costa reúne-se com Tsipras em Atenas.” Correio da Manhã. April 05, 2016. Accessed December 14, 2016. http://www.cmjornal.pt/portugal/detalhe/costa_reune_se_comtsipras_na_segunda_feira_em_atenas_e_visita_campo _de_refugiados. 56 “Governo quer mais refugiados no próximo ano.” Jornal Expresso. December 17, 2016. Accessed November 14, 2016. http://expresso.sapo.pt/politica/2016-12-17-Governo-quer-mais-refugiados-no-proximo-ano. 57 “CGTP diz que UE não podia penalizar Portugal por défice excessivo.” Correio da Manhã. November 16, 2016. Accessed November 15, 2016. http://www.cmjornal.pt/economia/detalhe/cgtp-diz-que-ue-nao-podia-penalizar-portugal-por-defice-excessivo. 58 “’Portugueses não serão capazes de ultrapassar a austeridade’” Correio da Manhã. February 08, 2016. Accessed December 15, 2016. http://www.cmjornal.pt/portugal/detalhe/portugueses_nao_serao_capazes_de_ ultrapassar_a_austeridade.

Messages in the Media

Media sources 1- Telegrafi: founded in 2006 . Owned by Telegrafi 2 - Gazeta Express: founded in N/A. Owned by Media Works 3 - Lajmi.net: founded in 2013. Owned by Lajmi

BY: DASARA GASHI 52

2016

TREPÇA MINES This past year in Kosovo, the Trepça mines have become yet another hurdle between Kosovo and Serbia. Trepça, a mine rich in minerals such as lead, zinc and silver, has accounted for around two-thirds of Kosovo’s GDP. 1 As such, there have been disputes over who owns the mines, with the Serbs claiming they own 75% of it, but only having a small part of the mines within its borders.2 Consequently, this year the government of Kosovo, under Prime Minister Isa Mustafa, initiated the Law of Trepça. The creation of this law began with the creation of a committee, comprised of experts in the area, which included the Serb community.3 For Kosovo, the mines in Trepça are “a synonym of Kosovo’s economic development, but also represents a synonym of sacrifice for Kosovo, which we should not leave aside. But with this law, we as the government, in any case do not claim to restore Trepca in the past, but we claim and we aim to reflect the future and the future opening of Trepça.”4 The mines are an integral part of the economic growth of the region, and as such the law clearly highlights the fact that the Trepça mines are the property of the Republic of Kosovo.5 Included in this law is the fact that the government of Kosovo will have 80% of the shares, while the remaining 20% will belong to the employees of the mine.6 Agim Shahini the leader of the AKB ( Business Alliance of Kosovo) acknowledges that the new laws regarding Trepça may be hard to uphold, but believes that it will help Kosovo build their economy for the future, a sentiment that was echoed by the PM Mustafa.7 Sahini, claims that the Trepça mines are not only beneficial for Mitrovica but for all of Kosovo, as years ago it was the economic giant in not only Kosovo but the Balkans at large.8 This sentiment was reiterated by the manager of the mines Nazmi Mikullovci, who states the mines used to employ over 20,000 people.9 Nevertheless, today the mine is in poor condition, and is only benefiting greedy companies, an issue that the government has taken on in fixing through this new law.10 The new Trepça laws, have angered the local Serbs, who deem the new piece of legislation illegal.11 Branimir Stojanovic, a Serb representative, continues to challenge Prime Minister Mustafa, and continues to campaign against this new law.12 Moreover, Serbian representatives in the government have decided to boycott Kosovo institutions, and have refused to accept the olive branch extended by PM Mustafa who has offered to have a private meeting with Stojanovic.13 Although there has been opposition from the Serb minority in Kosovo, Besnik Berisha the legal advisor of PM Mustafa, holds that the Law of Trepça cannot be disputed as the Constitutional Court of Kosovo has found that no constitutional articles have been infringed upon by the law.14 This comes after a claim that a EULEX judge of the Supreme Court claimed that the Trepça law was unconstitutional.15 However, since this court has no legal authority to comment on constitutional matters such claims are merely opinions.16 As a result of this decision, President Hashim Thaçi signed the law, proclaiming that the Trepça mines are not only important for their minerals, but that the site is a national Kosovar treasure.17

Messages in the Media The Trepça mines Law has without a doubt contributed to the worsening of relations between Prishtina and Belgrade. The EU, who is seen as a facilitator to the “process for normalization of relations” between the two countries, has looked at both countries stance on the issue.18 According to European diplomats, the stance of Brussels is closer to that held by Prishtina, and that Trepça is an “internal issue of Kosovo.”19 The EU statement affirmed that “the EU encourages all political representatives of Kosovo, whether they come from majority or minority political parties, to remain engaged in the political dialogue concerning such an important issue for Kosovo.”20 An important part of the statement made by the EU is that it calls on Kosovar political parties only to participate in this dialogue; a statement foreshadowing that the EU are well aware that Serb politicians will take their cue from Belgrade.21 The reaction from the EU is important because it reiterates the fact that Kosovo is a sovereign state, and that internal issues must be dealt internally without the influence of Belgrade. Due to the fact that both countries are potential candidates for the EU, recommendations made by the EU should be taken seriously.

DEMARCATION In the past year, another issue that has been heavily publicized and criticized in Kosovo is the Demarcation issue with Montenegro. This issue began in 2015 when the governments of Kosovo and Montenegro signed an agreement that would hand over around 12 thousand hectares of land to Montenegro.22 The opposition claims that the new border concocted by Montenegro is not in accordance with the maps of 1974, and have been arbitrarily decided by Montenegro.23 Nevertheless, Deputy Prime Minister at the time, Hashim Thaçi, claimed that the new border agreement was in fact in line with the 1974 borders and the Ahtisaari Plan.24 Thaçi also assured listeners that the new Demarcation would not affect Kosovo’s territory, a stance reiterated by Prime Minister Isa Mustafa who claimed the deal would not take territory away from the city of Peja, as was originally feared.25 Even though both Mustafa and Thaçi have agreed to the new border with Montenegro, the deal has yet to be ratified in Parliament, and a date to do so has still not been agreed upon.26 The main roadblock to having this deal ratified is the opposition who is adamant on maintaining Kosovo’s territorial integrity.27 The refusal by the opposition to change their outlook on this particular issue is costly as it is a necessary step in order for Kosovo to be eligible for visa liberalization.28 For Kosovo, giving up land is an emotional hurdle that many do not want to succumb to. Nevertheless, Kosovo also wants to join the EU, and to achieve this goal, this agreement will have to be ratified. In fact, the EU Commissioner for Neighbourhood—Johannes Hahn has stated “that without the ratification of the demarcation agreement, visa liberalization for Kosovo citizens will not come into effect.”29 As of recently, because of the continued disagreement in parliament, the American embassy in Kosovo, and the Office of the EU, have confirmed their

2016 roles as observers in the new committee.30 The EU’s response to this position is that they want to assist Kosovo in their political stalemate, to ensure that Kosovo will be able to achieve their goal of visa liberalization.31 Moreover, because the EU asserts that Kosovo gaining visa liberalization is necessary to move forward both politically and economically, coming to an agreement in parliament over Kosovo’s Eastern border is imperative.32 Thus, the Kosovar Parliament may have to accept Demarcation with Montenegro, if acceptance into the EU is truly desired.

THE WALL IN MITROVICA

Mitrovica, the most northern region in Kosovo has always been a tumultuous area. Mitrovica is ethnically divided with the Serbs in the North, and the Kosovars in the South. While there has always been tension in Mitrovica, on December 2016, this tension was taken to a new level when the Serbs began the building of a wall. The building of the wall came only a year after a free movement agreement had been signed between Prishtina and Belgrade in 2015.33 Thus, the short-lived relative peace in Mitrovica was halted.34 When it comes to the erection of this wall, there are two different opinions. The Albanian dominant South is venomously opposed to this wall, while the Serb-dominated North is for it. In fact, the mayor in North Mitrovica, Goran Rakic claims that not only will the wall remain but that Edita Tahiri—Kosovo’s Minister of Dialogue cannot stop the wall from being built because it is being built in the Serb North.35 He further claims, that the wall is not actually a wall, but a “supporting wall.”36 On the other hand, Tahiri is adamant that the two-meter wall, is in fact illegal.37 Tahiri has stated clearly that government in Kosovo is “working [to find] a solution to the problem and there will be no wall…”38 The government of Kosovo has stated multiple times that the building of this wall is in violation with not only the laws of Kosovo, but of the Brussels Agreement of 2015 which ensured the removal of all barricades on the Iber bridge.39 Moreover, the government has also claimed that they were never informed that the building of the wall was even taking place.”40 According to the government, “The time of walls should not be allowed in our country, which in its Constitution has decided to establish a democratic state respecting basic rights on freedom of movement, which nobody can violate.”41 This stance has been supported by both the mayor of South Mitrovica Agim Bahtiri, and Ramush Haradinaj of the AAK (Alliance for the Future of Kosovo) party who wants Prishtina and Mitrovica to “build more bridges not walls.”42 The building of the Wall in Mitrovica has once again put the spotlight on the ethnically divided city, and has, thus, required the all-important view and opinion of the EU. According to the EU, “the wall is just a stairway which links the roundabout with pedestrian zone” and that the “stairs will ensure freedom of movement from one side to the other.”43 EU ambassador to Kosovo Natalya Apostolova claims that the decision of the wall has to benefit the North and the

Messages in the Media South, which may lead to the Wall not being taken down.44 However, she also stressed that the EU is important to the development of Kosovo and will continue to be so.45 The decision on whether or not the wall will be taken down by February has yet to be resolved, but with two conflicting ideologies from the Albanians and the Serbs, the position taken by the EU has not been any more definitive.

YEAR IN REVIEW Overall, during the past year, Kosovo has seen both tremendous success and failures.To begin with, the issue over the Trepça Mines is long and complicated. However, with the implementation of the Trepça laws, manager Ahmet Tmava says that production will triple.46 Nevertheless, Tmava also says that they are still waiting for a Board to be established, so that laws can be enforced.47 Since these Mines are publicly owned, Tmava claims that this has lead to them being an important, and positive factor for the economic development of Kosovo.48 As seen earlier, the EU believes that, because Kosovo is a sovereign state, this is a domestic matter. Due to the fact that the mine has been running successfully, it is clear that the EU was correct in their decision, and Belgrade should have no influence over what happens in the mines; the onus should be on the Board, and their laws. Another big issue Kosovo saw in 2016 was the demarcation with Montenegro, a dispute that saw many politicians in Kosovo refusing to give over 12 thousand hectares of land to Montenegro. Although Prime Minister Mustafa and President Thaçi have tried to get the demarcation ratified in Parliament, this goal has still not come into fruition because the opposition is significantly opposed to it. However, since Kosovo wants to join the EU, settling this dispute is imperative because of the ultimatum tied into this decision. MEP Tanja Fajon claims that Kosovo must agree to the Demarcation with Montenegro in order to be considered for visa liberalization.49 The EU has made their position on this very clear, and seeing that the issue of Visa Liberalization is immensely important to the people of Kosovo, it is vital that parliament comes to a decision sooner rather than later. Moreover, finding a solution to this dilemma will further increase EU-Kosovo relations which in turn will only help Kosovo in their goal of becoming an EU member state. Finally, unlike Trepça and the demarcation, a solution has been made recently on the fate of the wall in Mitrovica. This agreement was made in conjunction with the EU Office in Kosovo, the US Embassy, the Minister of Environment and Spatial Planning Ferat Shala, and Mitrovica North mayor Goran Rakic. 50 In a statement released by all parties, this agreement is sure to “ease tensions in the north of Kosovo, enable freedom of movement and create a favorable environment for all citizens in the north and south of Mitrovica.”51 Apostolova stated that this agreement was a “very important” moment and congratulated all parties for being able to come to a negotiation in regards to the wall.52 This compromise was essential for EU-Kosovo relations, and High Representative/Vice-President

2016 Federica Mogherini’s statement proves this when she states, “Progress on normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia is more than ever of utmost importance to preserve peace and stability between the two sides and in the region; it is also crucial for advancing of both sides towards European Union.”53 Thus, when looking at the last year, it is clear that Kosovo took some major steps forward towards EU membership— with the Mitrovica wall, and the success of the Trepça mines economically being just a few examples. Although this is true, the country still has a long way to go. For example, the Demarcation issue must be solved, and the issue of corruption has been brought up by the EU time and time again. Nevertheless, the year 2016 proved instrumental for Kosovo and its relationship with the EU which was highlighted by the signing of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement.54 With the signing of the SAA, Kosovo is without a doubt on the right track, and with their looming application for EU membership rumoured to be submitted this year, this blossoming relationship could not have come at a better time.

Messages in the Media Bytyci, Fatos. “Kosovo government takes control of Trepca mine, Serbs protest.” Reuters, October 8, 2016. Accessed December 5, 2016. http://www.reuters.com/ article/us-kosovo-mines-idUSKCN12808T. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. 4 “Qeveria e Kosovës aprovoi Projektligjin për Trepçën.” Republika e Kosovës Zyra e Krymenistrit, October 5,2016. Accessed December 4, 2016. http://kryeministri-ks.net/?page=2,9,6196. 5 Ibid. 6 “Kryeministri Mustafa: Trepça, aseti më i rëndësishëm strategjik i Kosovës.” Republika e Kosovës Zyra e Krymenistrit, January 14, 2016. Accessed December 4, 2016. http://kryeministri-ks.net/?page=2,9,5516. 7 “Kreditorët serbë kërkojnë nga Trepça 350 milionë euro.” Lajmi.net, November 4, 2016. Accessed December 6, 2016. http://lajmi.net/kreditoret-serbe-kerkojne-nga-trepca-350-milione-euro/. 8 “Ligji i ri i Trepçës ide e mirë për zhvillim.” Telegrafi.com, November 23, 2016. Accessed December 4, 2016. http://telegrafi.com/ligji-ri-trepces-ide-e-mire-perzhvillim/. 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid. 12 “Stojanoviq: S`flas me Isa Mustafën, do të vazhdojë lobimin kundër Ligjit të “Trepçës.” Telegrafi.com, November 23, 2016. Accessed December 7, 2016. http:// telegrafi.com/stojanoviq-sflas-isa-mustafen-te-vazhdoje-lobimin-kunder-ligjitte-trepces/. 13 “Deputy Prime Minister of Kosovo lobbying against “Trepca” Law.” GazetaExpress, November 4, 2016. Accessed December 5, 2016. http://m.gazetaexpress.com/en/news/deputy-prime-minister-of-kosovo-lobbying-against-trepca-law-171404/. 14 Ibid. 15 “Prime Minister’s Office: EULEX cannot dispute Trepca Law.” GazetaExpress, November 3, 2016. Accessed December 5, 2016. http://www.gazetaexpress.com/ en/news/prime-minister-s-office-eulex-cannot-dispute-trepca-law-171402/. 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid. 18 “President decrees “Trepca” Law.” GazetaExpress, October 31, 2016. Accessed December 4, 2016. http://m.gazetaexpress.com/en/news/president-decrees-trepca-law-171372/. 19 ““Trepca” is an internal matter of Kosovo, says the EU.” GazetaExpress, October 13, 2016. Accessed December 5, 2016. http://www.gazetaexpress.com/en/news/ trepca-is-an-internal-matter-of-kosovo-says-the-eu-171237/. 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid. 1

2016 “Kosovo risks to lose 12 thousand acres of land to Montenegro.” GazetaExpress, August 9, 2015. Accessed December 4, 2016. http://www.gazetaexpress.com/en/ news/kosovo-risks-to-lose-12-thousand-acres-of-land-to-montenegro-121242/. and “ Kosovo experts to prove no loss in Montenegro border deal.” Associated Press, January 24, 2017. https://www.yahoo.com/news/kosovo-experts-prove-noloss-montenegro-border-deal-165752081.html. 24 Ibid. 25 “Mustafa and Thaçi: Montenegro will not be given even a single square meter of our land.” GazetaExpress, August 12, 2015. Accessed Decmeber 6, 2016. http:// www.gazetaexpress.com/en/news/mustafa-and-thaci-montenegro -will-not-be -given-even-a-single-square-meter-of-our-land-121973/. Ibid. 26 “Agreement on Border demarcation with Montenegro to be ratified soon.” GazetaExpress, May 11, 2016. Accessed Decmebr 6, 2016. http://www.gazetaexpress.com/en/news/agreement-on-border-demarcation-with-montenegro-to-be-ratified-soon-170965/. 27 “Kosovo experts to prove no loss in Montenegro border deal.” Associated Press. 28 “Malazezët kosovarë me ofertë për Kosovën për Demarkacionin .” Lajmi.net, November 17, 2016. Accessed December 5, 2016. http://lajmi.net/malazezetkosovare-me-oferte-per-kosoven-per-demarkacionin/. 29 “Without ratification of the demarcation agreement with Montenegro, visa lift won’t come into effect.” GazetaExpress, May 18, 2016. Accessed December 7, 2016. http://www.gazetaexpress.com/en/news/without-ratification-of-the-demarcation-agreement-with-montenegro-visa-lift-won-t-come-into-effect-170984/. 30 “Ndërkombëtarët mbështesin Komisionin për matjen e territorit (Video).” Telegrafi.com, January 27, 2017. Accessed JAnuary 23, 2017. http://telegrafi.com/ nderkombetaret-mbeshtesin-komisionin-per-matjen-e-territorit-video/. 31 Ibid. 32 Ibid. 33 “Rakiq: Muri është në projekt – Bahtiri: S’është.” Lajmi.net,December 8, 2016. Accessed December 22, 2016. http://lajmi.net/rakiq-muri-eshte-ne-projekt-bahtiri-seshte/. 34 Ibid. 35 “Rakic: Mitrovica wall will not be destroyed.” GazetaExpress, December 7, 2016. Accessed Decmeber 23, 2016. http://www.gazetaexpress.com/en/news/ rakic-mitrovica-wall-will-not-be-destroyed-171590/. 36 Ibid. 37 “Wall in Mitrovica is illegal, says Tahiri .” GazetaExpress, December 11, 2016. Accessed December 22, 2016. http://www.gazetaexpress.com/en/news/ wall-in-mitrovica-is-illegal-says-tahiri-171618/ 38 Ibid. 39 “ There will be no wall in Mitrovica, says Tahiri.” GazetaExpress, December 13, 2016. Accessed December 23, 2016. http://www.gazetaexpress.com/en/news/ there-will-be-no-wall-in-mitrovica-says-tahiri-171638/. 23

Messages in the Media Ibid. 41 Ibid. 42 “Haradinaj shkon në Mitrovicë: Qeveria fajtore për murin .” Lajmi.net, December 15, 2016. Accessed December 22, 2016. http://lajmi.net/haradinaj-shkon-ne-mitrovice-qeveria-fajtore-per-murin/. 43 “Wall in Mitrovica is illegal, says Tahiri .” GazetaExpress. 44 “Apostolova: Të gjendet një zgjidhje për murin në Mitrovicë.” Telegrafi.com, December 25, 2016. Accessed January 5, 2017. http://telegrafi.com/apostolova-te-gjendet-nje-zgjidhje-per-murin-ne-mitrovice/. 40

Ibid. “Trepça në pritje të formimit të Bordit Mbikëqyrës.” Telegrafi.com, February 7, 2017. Accessed February 9, 2017. http://telegrafi.com/trepcane-pritje-te-formimit-te-bordit-mbikeqyres/. 47 Ibid. 48 Ibid. 49 “Fajon: Për liberalizimin e vizave duhet ta miratoni Marrëveshjen për demarkacionin.” Telegrafi.com, February 21, 2017.Accessed February 25, 2017. http://telegrafi.com/fajon-per-liberalizimin-e-vizave-duhet-ta-miratoni-marreveshjen-per-demarkacionin/. 50 “Agreement reached on Mitrovica wall.” GazetaExpress, February 4, 2017. Accessed February 10, 2017. http://www.gazetaexpress.com/en/ news/agreement-reached-on-mitrovica-wall-172053/. 51 Ibid 52 “Apostolova hopes demolishing of the wall leads to other solutions.” GazetaExpress, February 5, 2017. Accessed February 10, 2017. http:// www.gazetaexpress.com/en/news/apostolova-hopes-demolishing-of-thewall-leads-to-other-solutions-172064/. 53 “Resolution of issues related to reopening of the Mitrovica Bridge.” European Union External Action, February 5, 2017. Accessed February 10, 2017. https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/19952/resolution-issues-related-reopening-mitrovica-bridge_en. 54 “Apostolova submitted 2016 Kosovo Report to Veseli and Mustafa.” European Union Office in Kosovo, November 9, 2016. Accessed February 10, 2017. https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/kosovo/14444/apostolova-submitted-2016-kosovo-report-veseli-and-mustafa_en. 45 46

Messages in the Media

Media sources 1- Lidové Noviny: founded in 1893 . Owned by Agrofert Group 2 - Mladá fronta Dnes: founded in 1945. Owned by Mafra, owned by Agrofert Group 3 - Právo: founded in 1991. Owned by Borgis

BY: JACOB JANEK 61

2016

THE CZECH ECONOMY

The year 2016 was a success for the Czech Republic (CZ) ever since its creation in 1993.1 For the first time since 1993, the budget for the next fiscal year will operate with only a 60 billion Czech koruna (CZK) deficit.2 This is a big change compared to the last couple of years. The state debt is set to fall 46 billion CZK and the good news keeps mounting. Unemployment numbers show that by the end of 2016, the Czech Republic will have the lowest unemployment rate in the whole of the European Union, at around 5.4 percent.3 The news has been heralded by the government as the result of its own policies and actions that led to an economic upswing. According to analysts, however, the current economic upswing in the Czech Republic is part of the normal economic cycle and has much to do with the rise in Czech exports and better access to European funds than in the past.4 Not all economic reports are so positive. Wages, which are traditionally sticky, are even more so currently, thanks to a low minimum wage and the relatively recent faster growth of the economy, which has yet to impact the wages of all working citizens and send them upwards. They have yet to catch up to the European average, currently amounting to only 57% of the European average. Wages are set to start growing, thanks to the Government raising the minimum wage from 9900 CZK monthly, to 11000 CZK.5 This will help to raise wages throughout the economy but could also damage the future employment numbers,6 as many of the jobs being offered are minimum wage and many companies profit from the low minimum wage.7 The Czech economy is an export-oriented economy8 and has been directly profiting from a weak CZK, which has been driving Czech exports since 2011. Access to European Union funds has greatly improved in the new budget period, 2014-2020, and both Czech firms and non-profit organizations have greatly profited from greater oversight by the EU in the management of funds.9 Overall, the economy has profited from many different factors, mainly due to a weak koruna and better access to EU funds.10 Although the news from the financial sector is mainly good, Czechs are still waiting for higher wages. As the economy becomes more robust, especially since the 2008 crisis, Czechs will expect their government to support economic growth with higher spending, but also a balanced budget.11 Parliamentary elections are scheduled for 2017, and the parties that make up the current coalition are doing quite well in polls, due in part to the economy.12 It will be up to the next government to undertake steps to keep the economy strong and more equitable for all Czechs.13

PRESIDENTIAL SCANDALS MiloĹĄ Zeman is the Czech Republicâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s third president and first directly elected president. During the first direct presidential election, Zeman won against Karel Schwarzenberg, who garnered large support in big cities and among liberally minded people, while Zeman won in the countryside, in more

Messages in the Media conservative and traditional regions. Zeman was no stranger to Czech politics; having led the government as Prime Minister between 1998-2002, during a controversial time known as the “Opposition Agreement.” Zeman did run for the 2003 presidential elections, but lost in the first round. His comeback was announced in 2012 and he was sworn in in March 2013. Since 2013, his time in office has been more than controversial, although Zeman has been quite popular14 with the electorate thus far.15 2016 has been his fourth year at the Prague Castle, the seat of the Czech head of state16. This year has also had its share of controversies. Over the course of his mandate, Zeman has shown himself to espouse populist views on any number of topics, such as the migrant crisis, where he has time and again repeated that the Czech Republic should not accept any migrants17 and that citizens should form militias to protect borders. This is surprising as the Czech Republic has very little contact with any actual migrants, most of whom want to go to Germany.18 In March 2016, Zeman welcomed the Chinese President, Xi Jinping, in Prague, where both leaders signed agreements on strategic cooperation between the two countries, in a variety of fields, such as security and industry.19 This visit was very controversial as during the protests against China and its occupation of Tibet, police officers and unidentified persons beat protesters and tore up Tibetan flags, according to some on order from the Presidential Office.20 An investigation into the matter is still ongoing. Another massive scandal was the labeling of famous prewar Czech journalist Ferdinand Peroutka as a Nazi sympathizer and writer of an article called “Hitler is a Gentleman.” Zeman reported that he saw this article sometime in the 1960’s but could not locate the original source and subsequently announced a 100,000 CZK prize for the find. To this date, no one has found any indication of such an article and Peroutka’s granddaughter is in the process of suing the President for libel21. The year ended with a massive scandal involving the Presidential Office lying about giving a State Award to a Holocaust survivor Jiří Brady22 and the President arriving late at a state funeral in Slovakia23, blaming the Airport Transportation Authority,24 even though in both cases the President and his aids were proven to have lied.25 During his tenure, Zeman has toyed with the idea of a “Czech Out” and has repeatedly shown that he believes the Czech Republic should look eastward rather than westward in the future.26 This is sharply in contrast with what the majority of citizens wish and because of this Zeman is the only major Czech populist politician. His rhetoric has been very divisive27 and he has repeatedly spoken against liberal values28. His ideas about the migrant crisis have been celebrated by newly forming political parties that are advocating the banning of Islam in the Czech Republic.29 Although most Czechs support Zeman, most also look with a critical eye at his populist views,30 as can be seen in voting preferences for political parties, which are largely pro-European and liberal, using anti-EU rhetoric only when it is useful and popular.31

2016

THE MIGRANT CRISIS AND ITS EFFECTS ON SOCIETY

Although the migrant crisis has seemingly passed from debate in media, the debate that the crisis provoked in the Czech Republic has been intense and with long term consequences. The debate has raged from the highest levels of society32 all the way to the bottom, effectively polarizing and dividing the population into people who support the helping of migrants and those who would close the borders33 and do not wish to accept EU quotas.34 This popular sentiment35 has been repeatedly repeated from the Prague Castle.President Miloš Zeman,36 who was previously seen as a pro-European intellectual, has constantly called for no migrants to be allowed in the country and for the country to think of leaving the European Union, which wants to dictate who can and cannot come into the Czech Republic.37 This debate has also proliferated into the political scene, where major political parties have sided with their Central European colleagues and decided to reject migrant quotas.38 The debate has also led to the cropping up of small political parties39 such as National Democracy or the Freedom and Direct Democracy,40 who are openly advocating for the banning of Islam41 in the Czech Republic.42 The debate was also happening on the streets, in pubs, restaurants, city halls and universities. According to a poll published on March 8th, 2016,43 illegal migration was one of the primary concerns of the majority of Czechs,44 together with corruption and crime. A very important incident was the case of a group 153 Iraqi Christian refugees,45 who were taken into the Czech Republic. As a consequence of feeling unwelcome, many of the Iraqi Christians decided to leave for Germany and the rest returned back home to Iraq. The case exemplified how most Czechs were reluctant to accept refugees, even if they were Christian.46 The migrant crisis has become a polarizing debate even though the crisis has hardly reached the country. It remains to be seen if Czechs rise above their current attitude in future years.47

2016 IN REVIEW 2016 has been a very interesting year for the Czech Republic, a year that exposed many divisions within society. Although unemployment is at a record low and the EU funds many Czech projects, such as highways, school and education, many people are continuously disgruntled with Czech membership in the EU, a sentiment echoed by populist politicians, namely President Zeman. Zeman’s attitude towards the EU is quite surprising given the fact that he was a proponent of EU membership while serving as Prime Minister and was the first Czech President to raise the EU flag at the Prague Castle, which was rejected by his Eurosceptic predecessor, Václav Klaus. Despite much good news, Czechs are disgruntled with the way their country is being governed, which shows in opinion polls, where populist and previously unknown political forces, such as the ANO (YES) movement founded by Finance Minister Andrej Babiš, are gaining much ground. Worrisome is also the tendency to xenophobia among

Messages in the Media people, especially among vocal, anti-migrant protesters. These tendencies, instead of being assuaged by a calm political scene, are being exploited by some politicians for their own personal purposes. On the background of these tensions in society, the countryâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s economy is running very well, having an actual surplus of skilled jobs and not enough people to fill these positions. Czechs are doing better on all fronts than they have ever had before, economically, socially and culturally. It remains to be seen if the tensions in society will dissipate as more people benefit from a better and healthier domestic economy, or if political tensions will continue to simmer for political benefit. 2017 will be a year to look out for.

2016 Statistics: http://ec.europa.eu/budget/figures/interactive/index_en.cfm, https:// www.czso.cz/csu/czso/statistiky 1 C “Důvěra v českou ekonomiku je nejvyšší od roku 2008. Roste již pátý ....” 24 lis. 2016, http://byznys.ihned.cz/c1-65530580-duvera-v-ceskou-ekonomiku-jenejvyssi-od-roku-2008-roste-jiz-paty-mesic-v-rade. Datum přístupu: Dec. 8, 2016 2 “Uprchlíci nesmí být automaticky podezříváni z terorismu ... - Lidovky.cz.” 24 pro. 2016, http://www.lidovky.cz/uprchlici-nesmi-byt-automaticky-podezrivani-z-terorismu-nabada-juncker-1o4-/zpravy-svet.aspx?c=A161224_104626_ ln_zahranici_paki. Datum přístupu: Nov. 3, 2016. 3 ““Práce je dost. Nezaměstnaných má česká ekonomika nejméně v EU ....” 3 lis. 2016, http://www.socr.cz/clanek/prace-je-dost-nezamestnanych-ma-ceskaekonomika-nejmene-v-eu/. Datum přístupu: Nov. 28, 2016. 4 ““Česká ekonomika dohání západ. HDP na hlavu se ... - Byznys - Ihned.” 16 pro. 2016, http://byznys.ihned.cz/c1-65560060-nova-cisla-jak-cesko-dohani-zapad-tak-dobre-na-tom-jeste-nebylo-ukazuje-porovnani. Datum přístupu: Dec. 1, 2016. “ “Lednový růst minimální mzdy přijde firmy na 3,5 miliardy. Další zvýšení ....” 28 pro. 2016, http://domaci.ihned.cz/c1-65570080-minimalni-mzdase-od-ledna-zvysi-na-11-tisic-korun-firmy-to-v-roce-2017-bude-stat-zhruba-35-miliardy. Datum přístupu: Nov. 28, 2016. 6 “Nezaměstnanost začala růst, v červenci stoupla na 5,4 - České noviny.” 8 srp. 2016, http://www.ceskenoviny.cz/zpravy/nezamestnanost-zacala-rust-v-cervenci-stoupla-na-5-4-/1379387. Datum přístupu: Dec. 4, 2016. 7 ““Kupní síla Čechů je nejvyšší za 10 let. Oproti průměru EU ale zůstává ....” http://byznys.ihned.cz/c1-65525750-kupni-sila-cechu-je-nejvyssi-za-10-let-oproti-prumeru-eu-ale-zustava-polovicni. Datum přístupu: Nov. 29, 2016. 8 “Zahraniční obchod je v přebytku 21 miliard. Pomohly ... - Byznys - Ihned.” 8 lis. 2016, http://byznys.ihned.cz/c1-65510560-prebytek-zahranicniho-obchoduv-zari-stoupl-na-21-miliard-dobre-se-prodavaly-polotovary-a-prumyslove-zbozi. Datum přístupu: Nov. 19, 2016. 9 “Česká ekonomika rostla rychleji než EU | ČSÚ.” 23 zář. 2016, https://www.czso. cz/csu/czso/ceska-ekonomika-rostla-rychleji-nez-eu. Datum přístupu: Nov. 15, 2016. 10 “Analytici: Vláda k růstu ekonomiky přispěla jen omezeně - České noviny.” 21 pro. 2016, http://www.ceskenoviny.cz/zpravy/analytici-vlada-k-rustu-ekonomiky-prispela-jen-omezene/1429866. Datum přístupu: Dec. 28, 2016. 11 “Česká ekonomika ve třetím čtvrtletí zpomalila růst na 1,9 procenta ....” 15 lis. 2016, http://byznys.ihned.cz/c1-65519740-ceska-ekonomika-ve-tretim-ctvrtletizpomalila-rust-na-1-9-procenta-tahla-ji-spotreba-domacnosti-brzdil-prumysl. Datum přístupu: Jan. 5, 2016. 12 “Veřejné finance budou podle odhadů ČNB v roce 2017 vyrovnané ....” 4 lis. 2016, http://www.ceskenoviny.cz/zpravy/verejne-finance-budou-podle-odhaducnb-v-roce-2017-vyrovnane/1412028. Datum přístupu: Nov. 5, 2016. 13 “Česká ekonomika nadále dynamicky roste | 2016 | Ministerstvo financí ....” 14 lis. 2016, http://www.mfcr.cz/cs/aktualne/tiskove-zpravy/2016/ceska-ekonomi-

Messages in the Media ka-nadale-dynamicky-roste-26622. Datum přístupu: Dec. 11, 2016. 14 “Zemanova stará láska nerezaví - Hospodářské noviny - Ihned.” 15 zář. 2016, http://archiv.ihned.cz/c1-65439630-zemanova-stara-laska-nerezavi. Datum přístupu: Oct. 21, 2016.“Zemanova stará láska nerezaví - Hospodářské noviny - Ihned.” 15 zář. 2016, http://archiv.ihned.cz/c1-65439630-zemanova-stara-laskanerezavi. Datum přístupu: Oct. 21, 2016. 15 “Zeman prohrál, ale poražen není | Hospodářské noviny (IHNED.cz).” 30 říj. 2016, http://archiv.ihned.cz/c1-65495790-zeman-prohral-ale-porazen-neni28-rijna-procinskou-politiku-neobhajil-jenze-spor-o-povahu-demokracie-senerozhodne-na-namesti-nybrz-u-voleb. Datum přístupu: Nov. 01, 2016. 16 “Zeman 2016: hrátky s dispečery, tři omluvy pro Peroutku a byl jednou ....” http://www.lidovky.cz/zeman-2016-hratky-s-dispecery-tri-omluvypro-peroutku-a-byl-jednou-jeden-kalasnikov-ggh-/zpravy-domov.aspx?c=A161222_144611_ln_domov_rsa. Datum přístupu: Jan. 5, 2016. 17 “Zeman v reakci na berlínský útok odmítl uprchlíky na ... - Lidovky.cz.” http:// www.lidovky.cz/zeman-v-reakci-na-berlinsky-utok-zadne-uprchliky-na-uzemiceske-republiky-1r1-/zpravy-domov.aspx?c=A161220_132928_ln_domov_ele. Datum přístupu: Jan. 4, 2016. 18 “Iráčtí křesťané se v Německu odvolali proti vyhoštění do Česka ....” http:// zpravy.idnes.cz/uprchlici-se-v-nemecku-odvolali-proti-vyhosteni-do-ceska-pem-/domaci.aspx?c=A160429_192458_domaci_jkk. Datum přístupu: Jan. 02, 2016.. 19 “ Prezidenti Česka a Číny uzavřeli smlouvu o strategické spolupráci ....” 29 bře. 2016, http://www.ceskenoviny.cz/zpravy/prezidenti-ceska-a-ciny-uzavreli-smlouvu-o-strategicke-spolupraci/1331595. Datum přístupu: Dec. 12, 2016.. 20 “Zeman by měl v květnu znovu navštívit Čínu | ČeskéNoviny.cz.” 23 pro. 2016, http://www.ceskenoviny.cz/zpravy/zeman-by-mel-v-kvetnu-znovu-navstivit-cinu/1430670. Datum přístupu: Jan. 12, 2016. 21 “Peroutkově vnučce se omluvíme, řekl Mynář. Zeman ... - Zprávy - iDNES.” 6 zář. 2016, http://zpravy.idnes.cz/hrad-se-omluvi-peroutkove-vnucce-dqc-/domaci.aspx?c=A160906_115411_domaci_jj. Datum přístupu: Oct. 12, 2016 22 “Herman by měl odejít z vlády, tvrdí Zeman. Poškodil prý zájmy státu a ....” http://domaci.ihned.cz/c1-65507890-herman-by-mel-odejit-z-vlady-tvrdizeman-poskodil-pry-zajmy-statu-a-lhal-kolem-vyznamena-pro-bradyho. Datum přístupu: Jan. 11, 2016.. 23 “Slovensko se loučilo s exprezidentem Kováčem ... - Zprávy - iDNES.” 13 říj. 2016, http://zpravy.idnes.cz/slovensko-pohreb-exprezident-kovac-db5-/zahranicni.aspx?c=A161013_114558_zahranicni_bur. Datum přístupu: Nov. 04, 2016. 24 “Ovčáčkova slova jsou lživá a účelová, odmítají dispečeři ... - Lidovky.cz.” http:// www.lidovky.cz/ovcackova-slova-jsou-lziva-a-ucelova-odmitaji-dispeceri-vinuna-zpozdeni-letu-1hj-/zpravy-domov.aspx?c=A161017_111429_ln_domov_rsa. Datum přístupu: Dec. 12, 2016. 25 “Zeman se měl omlouvat už sedmkrát. Jako prezident se ... - Lidovky.cz.” 11 lis. 2016, http://www.lidovky.cz/milos-zeman-se-jiz-v-minulosti-musel-za-svevyroky-omluvit-pov-/zpravy-domov.aspx?c=A161111_124958_ln_domov_ELE.

2016 Datum přístupu: Nov. 11, 2016. 26 “Senát se distancoval od pročínského prohlášení ústavních činitelů ....” 30 lis. 2016, http://www.ceskenoviny.cz/zpravy/senat-se-distancoval-od-procinskeho-prohlaseni-ustavnich-cinitelu/1421464. Datum přístupu: Dec. 02, 2016. http://www.lidovky.cz/premier-nevyloucil-ze-by-se-cesko-proti-uprchlickym-kvotam-branilo-zalobou-17g-/zpravy-domov.aspx?c=A160417_121426_ln_ domov_ELE. Datum přístupu: Dec. 4, 2016. 27 “Chyběla jen desítka a nátělník. Zeman měl při ... - Relax Lidovky.cz.” 31 pro. 2016, http://relax.lidovky.cz/hanobi-prezident-zeman-sam-sebe-prisvem-vanocnim-poselstvi-sedel-jako-fotbalovy-fanda-grd-/cekstajl.aspx?c=A161230_175901_ln_domov_ele. Datum přístupu: Jan. 12, 2016. 28 “Lidé na náměstích tleskali svobodě a toleranci. Policii zaměstnaly dvě ....” 18 lis. 2016, http://archiv.ihned.cz/c1-65523050-lide-na-namestich-tleskali-svobode-a-toleranci-policii-zamestnaly-dve-stovky-extremistu. Datum přístupu: Dec. 06, 2016. 29 “Vlastizrádní lidovci, hanba Schapirovi’. Letná oslavovala ... - Lidovky.cz.” 18 lis. 2016, http://www.lidovky.cz/vlastizradni-lidovci-hanba-schapirovi-letna-oslavovala-zemana-pvk-/zpravy-domov.aspx?c=A161117_213210_ln_domov_mpr. Datum přístupu: Dec. 18, 2016. 30 “Zeman má víc odpůrců než zastánců. Věří mu nejméně ... - Lidovky.cz.” 5 pro. 2016, http://www.lidovky.cz/zemanovi-veri-nejmene-lidi-za-posledni-rok-uskodila-mu-kauza-s-bradym-1jx-/zpravy-domov.aspx?c=A161205_135643_ln_domov_ele. Datum přístupu: Jan. 04, 2016. 31 “Rok superpolitického ‚pekla’. Na obzoru jsou volby i ... - Lidovky.cz.” http:// www.lidovky.cz/rok-superpolitickeho-pekla-na-obzoru-jsou-volby-i-prezidentska-kampan-1mq-/zpravy-domov.aspx?c=A161231_123657_ln_domov_ELE. Datum přístupu: Jan. 11, 2016. 32 “Premiér nevyloučil, že by se Česko proti uprchlickým kvótám bránilo ....” http://www.lidovky.cz/premier-nevyloucil-ze-by-se-cesko-proti-uprchlickym-kvotam-branilo-zalobou-17g-/zpravy-domov.aspx?c=A160417_121426_ln_ domov_ELE. Datum přístupu: Dec. 4, 2016 33 “Zeman by k ochraně hranic před migranty nasadil i hasiče - Lidovky.cz.” 3 čvn. 2016, http://www.lidovky.cz/zeman-by-nasadil-k-ochrane-statnich-hranicpred-migranty-take-hasice-11f-/zpravy-domov.aspx?c=A160603_145643_ln_domov_ELE. Datum přístupu: Dec. 18, 2016 34 “Příliv uprchlíků do Evropy - iDNES.cz - Zprávy.” http://zpravy.idnes.cz/ priliv-uprchliku-do-evropy-dfm-/zahranicni.aspx?klic=64244. Datum přístupu: Dec. 12, 2016 35 “České úřady i politici se staví k migrantům ... - Zprávy - iDNES.” 18 pro. 2016, http://zpravy.idnes.cz/organizace-uprcjlici-slusne-zachazeni-nepratelsky-postup-cesko-viza-1k7-/domaci.aspx?c=A161218_161500_domaci_ale. Datum přístupu: Dec. 16, 2016. 36 “Zeman chce migranty deportovat do pustiny. Zaorálek - Zprávy - iDNES.” 2 říj. 2016, http://zpravy.idnes.cz/milos-zeman-rozhovor-financial-times-uprchlici-f5u-/zahranicni.aspx?c=A161002_111538_zahranicni_pku. Datum přístupu:

Messages in the Media Dec. 22, 2016. 37 “Zeman: Evropa musí najít odvahu chránit si své hranice - České noviny.” 14 pro. 2016, http://www.ceskenoviny.cz/zpravy/zeman-evropa-musi-najit-odvahuchranit-si-sve-hranice/1427314. Datum přístupu: Dec. 21, 2016. 38 ““Visegrádská čtyřka sabotuje uprchlické kvóty, prohlásil řecký ministr ....” 31 říj. 2016, http://zpravy.idnes.cz/recky-ministr-kritizuje-v4-kvuli-kvotam-fdd-/ zahranicni.aspx?c=A161031_163325_zahranicni_mlb. Datum přístupu: Nov. 11, 2016. 39 “Islamofobní šašek a svéhlavý Zeman. Falešný teror v ... - Zprávy - iDNES.” 23 srp. 2016, http://zpravy.idnes.cz/reakce-svetovy-tisk-konvicka-utok-namesti-praha-fui-/zahranicni.aspx?c=A160823_142420_zahranicni_mlb. Datum přístupu: Dec. 14, 2016. 40 “Hrozba radikalizace muslimů je podobná jako u ... - Lidovky.cz.” 14 zář. 2016, http://www.lidovky.cz/hrozba-radikalizace-muslimu-je-podobna-jakou-predvalecnych-nacistu-rekl-zeman-pro-guardian-g9f-/zpravy-svet.aspx?c=A160914_091100_ln_zahranici_fas. Datum přístupu: Sep. 18, 2016. 41 “Uprchlické tábory mimo EU? Teoreticky výborný nápad ... - Lidovky. cz.” 22 říj. 2016, http://www.lidovky.cz/uprchlicke-tabory-mimo-eu-teoreticky-vyborny-napad-ale-nejde-to-rika-bender-16h-/zpravy-svet.aspx?c=A161021_210831_ln_zahranici_ELE. Datum přístupu: Nov. 11, 2016. 42 “Zeman měl ze začátku pózu intelektuála. Teď se snaží o ... - Lidovky.cz.” http:// www.lidovky.cz/zeman-mel-ze-zacatku-pozu-intelektuala-ted-se-snazi-o-populismus-rika-sociolog-196-/zpravy-domov.aspx?c=A160312_115516_ln_domov_ ele. Datum přístupu: Oct. 19, 2016. 43 ” Průzkum: Co Čechy nejvíc trápí? Úplatky, uprchlíci a ... - Lidovky.cz.” 7 bře. 2016, http://www.lidovky.cz/pruzkum-co-cechy-nejvic-trapi-uplatky-uprchlici-a-hospodarska-kriminalita-1un-/zpravy-domov.aspx?c=A160307_181554_ln_ domov_ele. Datum přístupu: Jan. 3, 2016. 44 “Sami jsme byli uprchlíci.’ OSN ukazuje, že i Čechoslováci ... - Lidovky.cz.” 24 úno. 2016, http://www.lidovky.cz/sami-jsme-byli-uprchlici-osn-v-kampani-ukazuje-ze-i-cesi-prchali-z-vlasti-1oa-/zpravy-domov.aspx?c=A160224_171644_ln_ domov_ele. Datum přístupu: Nov. 27, 2016. 45 “Uprchlíci odjíždějí z Okrouhlíku do Německa. V Česku prý ... - Lidovky. cz.” 2 dub. 2016, http://www.lidovky.cz/uprchlici-odjizdeji-z-okrouhliku-do-nemecka-v-cesku-pry-nemaji-dobre-vyhlidky-1x6-/zpravy-domov.aspx?c=A160402_174556_ln_domov_ELE. Datum přístupu: Nov. 29th, 2016. 46 “Česko žadatele o azyl neláká. Do Unie chtějí nejvíc ... - Zprávy - iDNES.” 22 zář. 2016, http://zpravy.idnes.cz/azyl-eu-zadosti-druhe-ctvrtleti-da4-/zahranicni. aspx?c=A160922_120748_zahranicni_ert. Datum přístupu: Jan. 6th, 2017. 47 “České NE kvótám v EU zatím naráží. Jsme v menšině, přiznalo vnitro ....” http://www.lidovky.cz/ceske-ne-kvotam-v-eu-zatim-narazi-jsme-v-mensinepriznalo-vnitro-p8n-/zpravy-svet.aspx?c=A160421_123439_ln_zahranici_msl. Datum přístupu: Dec. 4th 2016.

Messages in the Media

Media sources 1- SĂźddeutsche Zeitung: founded in 1945. Owned by SĂźddeutsche Medien 2 - Die Welt: founded in 1946. Owned by Axel Springer SE 3 - Handelsblatt: founded in 1946. Owned by Dieter von Holtzbrink Medien GmBH

BY: ANTON RIZOR 70

2016

THE IMPACT OF THE COMPREHENSIVE ECONOMIC AND TRADE AGREEMENT (CETA) ON GERMANY The negotiations for the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, the free trade agreement between Canada and the European Union (EU), were finalized in August 2014. In 2016, all 28 EU member countries approved CETA and Canadian Prime Minister, Justin Trudeau, flew to Brussels on October 30th 2016 to sign the agreement on behalf of Canada.1 The agreement, if enacted, seeks to eliminate 98% of all tariffs between Canada and the EU. While the treaty still has to be ratified by each of the individual EU legislatures, the process of finalizing CETA was filled with stern objections. Most notoriously, the Belgian province of Wallonia blocked the free trade agreement.2 Without the approval of Wallonia, the Belgian government could not sign the agreement.3 This incited debates whether Germany should reconsider their approval of the agreement. In February, a music teacher headed the largest mass lawsuit in German history in front of Germanyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s constitutional court. She unsuccessfully sued the German government over CETA, claiming that the agreement is unconstitutional, as it infringed on electoral rights.4 Further law suits going as far as the German constitutional court and at the European Court of Justice were also unsuccessful.5 The debate particularly heated after negotiations between the United States and the EU about their free-trade agreement, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, increased.6 Seen as a precursor for TTIP, an open debate ensued about whether CETA may be signed. While Canada appeared to be a natural partner for Europe, a common criticism was that CETA was merely the blueprint for TTIP.7 Amid the large public backlash against CETA, German Minister of economy, vice chancellor and head of the Social Democratic Party, Sigmar Gabriel, suggested a renegotiation of CETA, though the coalition partner, the Christian Democratic Union/ Christian Social Union surrounding chancellor Angela Merkel did not accept renegotiations.8 Earlier in the year, the Canadian International Trade Minister, Chrystia Freeland, accepted a change to the agreement by allowing an unprecedented investment court system instead of adhoc arbitrators.9 German politicians cited a lack of trust in the ad-hoc system and had thus been pushing for the new court system.10 Dissatisfaction with CETA was not only amongst the opposition, but also within the governing coalition. However, official course towards CETA was never altered and Germany approved of the agreement.11 CETA has led to multiple disagreements between Germany and the EU. Particularly, the proposal by EU foreign trade minister, Cecilia MalmstrĂśm, to classify CETA as a pure EU agreement led to severe pushback from Germany.12 This would have led to a ratification purely by the EU commission and would have excluded the national parliaments.13 In Germany, including the German Bundestag and Bundesrat in the ratification process was seen as pivotal due to rising skepticism among public opinion.14 Sigmar Gabriel went as far as saying

Messages in the Media that this idea by the EU commission was foolish15. Furthermore, Germany only agreed to the agreement on certain conditions, including the possibility to exit the agreement.16 Moreover, German politicians and press wondered about the general capabilities of the EU to negotiate and implement trade deals, should it fail to pass CETA.17 The situation escalated so much so that the German foreign minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, openly expressed concerns regarding the future of the EU, warning that the tumultuous signing of CETA might lead to the end of the EU.18

THE REFUGEE CRISIS

The refugee crisis was the most prominent issue in Germany and Europe in 2015, and continued to be of tremendous importance in 2016. The crisis prompted discussions over the social conditions and political obligations of the European Union and Germany, resulting in increased discord between member states. Though it originated in 2015, the crisis continued to dominate the headlines of German media in 2016. After accepting a large quantity of refugees in 2015, Germany experienced a public backlash against its open door policy by citizens of Germany and Europe alike. Still, Germany, overall, witnessed a sharp decline in the number of refugees.19 Following two Conferences for the Western Balkans in February and September of 2016, the virtual closing of the so-called Balkan route followed shortly after.20 Moreover, the decision was made to return to closed borders along the Schengen countries, and increase border controls.21 This led to a halt in refugees travelling through the Balkans towards Germany as asylum seekers were stopped at various borders in the Balkans.22 On March 18th 2016 the EU-Turkey agreement was signed, which further helped reduce the number of refugees arriving in the EU and, particularly in Germany, it led to a significant reduction of asylum seekers.23 Still, the German government and the EU faced severe criticism over the deal, with critics citing the potential risk of cooperating with Turkeyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Prime Minister Recep Erdogan and concerns over human rights. 24 At the same time, the German government released its second set of amendments to the existing laws concerning asylum seekers.25 This new legislation limited the abilities for families of refugees to come to Germany and also streamlined the process of granting asylum and deportation.26 This resulted in more voluntary and regular deportations.27 The German government also attempted to tackle the issue of slow integration of refugees in Germany by releasing a new integration law.28 This legislation generated an increase in opportunities for those refugees showing promise for long-term stay, but limited the opportunities for permanent residence to those that lacked intent to integrate. These measures were received with mixed emotions. While there were many stories of successful integration in Germany in 2016, the headlines were dominated by the issues and problems with refugees in the country.29 2016 saw a number of terrorist related events in Germany

2016 linked to refugees. During New Years Eve 2016 widespread sexual assaults mainly occurred at the Cologne Central Train Station.30 Upon investigation, and overwhelming amount of suspects were asylum seekers. In June, German police arrested another terrorist cell with connections to ISIS, whose members had disguised themselves as refugees and entered Germany through the Balkan route.31 Later in the year, attempted attacks carried out refugees occurred in a train near WĂźrzburg and in Ansbach, when a bomb injured 15.32 Also, a refugee is the main suspect in the rape and murder of a 19-year old student in Freiburg.33 Most significantly, on December 19, 2016, a truck crashed through a Christmas market in Berlin, killing 12 and injuring 56.34 The main suspect, the Tunisian Refugee Anis Amri, was killed on December 22nd in Milan.35 These terrorist attacks continue to fuel fears among part segments of the population and contributed to the rise of populist violence. The refugee crisis continues to divide Europe. While Germany tried to lead by example, other EU countries refused to accept refugees.36 Yet, the member states agreed on stricter controls of their borders to limit the influx of refugees. Still, there remains a significant disconnect between EU countries, like with the Visegrad group, concerning refugees.37 Moreover, while Germany would like to continue the border controls, the EU commission wants to hang on to the previously agreed upon deadline in February.38

THE RISE OF POPULISM

Over the last couple of years, Germany has witnessed a re-emergence of right-wing populism. Fuelled by concerns connected to the refugee crisis, protests broke out across the country in 2015. Eastern Germany in particular saw a massive increase in supporters of right-wing organizations such as Pegida (Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the Occident). In 2016, rightwing violence, particularly targeted at refugees, persisted. Similarly, Germany also witnessed the continuation of the rise of the populist Alternative for Germany (AFD). By October 2016, close to 800 criminal offences against refugee homes were recorded, most of which were believed to be motivated by right wing sentiments.39 This is a substantial increase from 2013, where only 69 such offences were recorded.40 Specific instances included a hand grenade failing to set off at a refugee shelter in Villingen-Schwenningen in January, shots fired at a refugee home in Ense in January, the symbolic placing of a pig carcass near a mosque in Leipzig in February and the detonation of Molotov cocktails inside a mosqueâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s courtyard in Neunkirchen in February.41 The largest incident of rightwing violence, however, was the explosion of two bombs near a mosque and a congress center in Dresden in September.42 This rise of populist sentiment could, moreover, be witnessed during provincial elections, where the right-wing Alternative for Germany (AFD) reached major successes. Originated as a Eurosceptic party, the AFD emerged more so as populist with a strong anti-immigration stance. Their message

Messages in the Media appeared to resonate with voters, as they received 15.1% of the vote in provincial elections in Baden-WĂźrttemberg, 12.6% in Rhineland-Pfalz and 24.3% in Sachsen-Anhalt, which made them the second strongest party there (just behind the CDU).43 Then, in September, they finished second in the provincial elections in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (just behind the SPD) and received 14.2% of the vote in Berlin, which is traditionally left-wing oriented.44 These continued electoral successes show that, at least for the moment, the AFD has established itself as a contending party. This rise of right-wing populism is not limited to Germany, and could also be witnessed throughout the European Union. In Austriaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s, right wing candidate Norbert Hofer made it all the way to the final stage of the presidential run-off election.45 In France, Front National Leader Marine LePen appears to have chances to win the presidency next year.46 Similarly, Geert Wilders of the Dutch Freedom Party PVV hopes to gain substantial support in the Netherlands.47 Similar anti-EU sentiment that the AFD relies upon, appeared to have motivated Britain to vote for an exit from the EU.48 While the rest of Europe looks towards Germany to halt the rise of these right-wing parties, little progress seems to have occurred in stopping this rise within the Germany itself. Despite a lot of in-fighting, the populist and anti-immigration rhetoric of the AFD seems to resonate with voters.

2016 IN REVIEW It was a bit of a paradox year for German media. Unemployment continued to decrease sharply, while at the same time income rose faster than prices did.49 Despite these excellent economic results, there appears to be a general feeling of pessimism in the country. Much of this has to do with the struggles during the negotiations for CETA. While ultimately it passed all the challenges so far, the agreement has yet to be ratified by the parliament of each EU member state. The massive popular uproar against it signify growing discontent with Germany and the EU. Further pessimism is derived from the ongoing refugee crisis. Even though the number of new refugees has been drastically reduced and the governing coalition has taken measures to ensure strict border controls, doubt remains. Particular worry exists around the integration of asylum seekers into German society.50 All of this pessimism has fueled the populist rhetoric of the AFD that continuous to gain popularity and has had some electoral success. Domestically, German media coverage mainly covered the reactions and protests to the negotiations surrounding CETA, the continuous refugee crisis, with a particular focus on the violent terrorist attacks, most notably in Berlin, and the rise of right-wing violence and of the populist AFD. Internationally, German media coverage put emphasis on Germanyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s role within the EU. Particular attention was given to the differing opinions on and challenges to CETA. However, the apparent disconnect between EU member states among each other or with EU institutions was further elaborated upon in

2016 debates surrounding the closing and guarding of EU borders, the EU-Turkey deal and other issues related to the refugee crisis. Finally, the international rise of populism that accompanies the popularity of the AFD in Germany played a significant role in the German media coverage.

Messages in the Media Statistics: CIA World Factbook; Europa.eu 1 Brössler, Daniel. “EU Staaten billigen CETA-Vertrag.” Süddeutsche Zeitung. October 28, 2016. Accessed 13. Jan. 2017. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/ ceta-diplomatisches-unding-1.3226583. “Belgien einigt sich bei CETA.” Die Welt. October 27, 2016. Accessed January 13, 2017. https://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article159083435/Belgien-einigt-sichbei-Ceta.html. 2 Prantl, Heribert. “So ist CETA noch zu retten.” Süddeutsche Zeitung. October 25, 2016. Accessed January 13. 2017. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/eu-freihandelsabkommen-mit-kanada-so-ist-ceta-noch-zu-retten-1.3221129#redirectedFromLandingpage. “Wallonie bleibt hart bei CETA.” Süddeutsche Zeitung. October 20, 2016. Accessed January 13, 2017. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/ceta-wallonie-bleibt-hart-bei-ceta-1.3215742. 3 “Kirchner, Thomas. “Die Wallonie sagt Nein zu Ceta: “Dieser Vertrag muss gestoppt werden.”“ Süddeutsche Zeitung. October 14, 2016. Accessed January 13, 2017. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/wirtschaft/belgien-die-wallonie-sagt-nein-zuceta-dieser-vertrag-muss-gestoppt-werden-1.3205563. Tauber, Andre and Christoph B. Schiltz. “CETA Abkommen: Belgien droht Europa in eine Krise zu stürzen.” Die Welt. October 21, 2016. Accessed January 13, 2017. https://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article158934209/Belgien-drohtEuropa-in-die-Krise-zu-stuerzen.html. “EU gibt Belgien bis Montag Zeit Wallonien zu besänftigen.” Die Welt. October, 23 2016. Accessed January 13, 2017. https://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article158987956/EU-gibt-Belgien-bis-Montag-Zeit-Wallonen-zu-besaenftigen.html. 4 Von der Hagen, Hans. “Diese Musiklehrerin könnte das Freihandelsabkommen Ceta stoppen.” Süddeutsche Zeitung. February 24, 2016. Accessed January 13, 2017. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/wirtschaft/buergerklage-wie-eine-musiklehrerin-das-freihandelsabkommen-ceta-zu-fall-bringen-koennte-1.2878197 “Bundesverfassungsgericht verkündet Entscheidung zu Ceta.” Die Welt. October 13, 2016. Accessed January 13, 2017. https://www.welt.de/newsticker/ dpa_nt/afxline/topthemen/article158725840/Bundesverfassungsgericht-verkuendet-Entscheidung-zu-Ceta.html. Von der Hagen, Hans. “Ceta-Klägerin: Das ist mindestens ein 70-Prozent Sieg.” Süddeutsche Zeitung. October 13, 2016. Accessed January 13, 2017. http://www. sueddeutsche.de/wirtschaft/bundesverfassungsgericht-zu-ceta-ceta-klaegerindas-ist-mindestens-ein-prozent-sieg-1.3203995. 5 “Anger, Heike. “Bündnis plant Klage gegen Ceta.” Handelsblatt. May 31, 2016. Accessed January 13, 2017. 6 Heide, Dana. “Freihnandelsabkommen: Hoffnung für TTIP.” Handelsblatt. March 2, 2016. Accessed January 13, 2017. Anger, Heike and Dana Heide. “Eilentscheidung, Karlsruhe akzeptiert Ceta”. Handelsblatt. October 14, 2017. Accessed January 13, 2017. 7 “Piper, Nikolaus. „Kanada ist für Europa ein Traumpartner“. Süddeutsche Zeitung. October 16, 2016. Accessed January 14, 2017. http://www.sueddeutsche.

2016 de/wirtschaft/freihandelsabkommen-ceta-kanada-ist-fuer-europa-ein-traumpartner-1.3205543. 8 Germany is governed by a grand coalition between the center-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU), its Bavarian sister party Christian Social Union (CSU) and the center-left Social Democratic Party (SPD). Neuerer, Dietmar. “Gabriels Freihandels-Dilemma.” Handelsblatt. September 29, 2016. Accessed January 13, 2017. http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/ceta-und-ttip-gabriels-freihandels-dilemma/10770082.html. “Mehr als 200,000 Menschen demonstrieren gegen TTIP und CETA.” Süddeutsche Zeitung. September 17, 2016. Accessed January 13, 2017. http://www. sueddeutsche.de/politik/freihandelsabkommen-mehr-als-demonstrieren-gegen-ttip-und-ceta-1.3166699. Sturm, Daniel Friedrich. “Hü und Hott bei der SPD.” Die Welt. June 21, 2016. Accessed January 13, 2017. https://www.welt.de/print/die_welt/debatte/article156390001/Hue-und-Hott-bei-der-SPD.html. Greive, Martin. “Drei Notlagen entscheiden über Gabriels Schicksal.” Die Welt. August 1, 2016. Accessed January 13, 2017. https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article157426850/Drei-Notlagen-entscheiden-ueber-Gabriels-Schicksal.html. 9 “Riedel, Donata and Thorsten Ricke. “Wir sind auf Europa zugegangen.” Handelsblatt. April 15, 2016. Accessed January 13, 2017. “EU und Kanada fixieren neuen Investitionsschutz.” Handelsblatt. February 29, 2016. Accessed January 13, 2017. http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/international/handelsabkommen-ceta-eu-und-kanada-fixieren-neuen-investitionsschutz/13033948.html. 10 “EU und Kanada fixieren neuen Investitionsschutz.” Handelsblatt. February 29, 2016. Accessed January 13, 2017. http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/international/handelsabkommen-ceta-eu-und-kanada-fixieren-neuen-investitionsschutz/13033948.html. 11 “Unsere Kinder würden uns verfluchen.” Süddeutsche Zeitung. November 27, 2016. Accessed January 13, 2017. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/ freihandelsabkommen-mit-kanada-gabriel-bekraeftigt-notwendigkeit-von-ceta-1.2241513. 12 “Kanada Abkommen muss durch den Bundestag.” Die Welt. June 13, 2016. Accessed January 13, 2017. https://www.welt.de/newsticker/dpa_nt/infoline_nt/ brennpunkte_nt/article156197797/Kanada-Abkommen-Ceta-muss-durch-Bundestag.html. Bauchmüller, Michael. “Gabriel nennt EU Kommisssion töricht.” Süddeutsche Zeitung. June 29, 2016. Accessed January 13, 2017. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/ politik/ceta-gabriel-nennt-eu-kommission-unglaublich-toericht-1.3055801. 13 “Kanada Abkommen muss durch den Bundestag.” Die Welt. June 13, 2016. Accessed January 13, 2017. https://www.welt.de/newsticker/dpa_nt/infoline_nt/ brennpunkte_nt/article156197797/Kanada-Abkommen-Ceta-muss-durch-Bundestag.html. “Ceta-Nervenkrieg: EU will Kanada-Gipfel nicht absagen.” Süddeutsche Zeitung.

Messages in the Media October 24, 2016. Accessed January 13, 2017. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/news/ politik/eu-ceta-nervenkrieg-eu-will-kanada-gipfel-nicht-absagen-dpa.urn-newsml-dpa-com-20090101-161024-99-925110. 14 “Kanada Abkommen muss durch den Bundestag.” Die Welt. June 13, 2016. Accessed January 13, 2017. https://www.welt.de/newsticker/dpa_nt/infoline_nt/ brennpunkte_nt/article156197797/Kanada-Abkommen-Ceta-muss-durch-Bundestag.html. 15 Bauchmüller, Michael. “Gabriel nennt EU Kommisssion töricht.” Süddeutsche Zeitung. June 29, 2016. Accessed January 13, 2017. http://www.sueddeutsche. de/politik/ceta-gabriel-nennt-eu-kommission-unglaublich-toericht-1.3055801. Heide, Dana. “Scharfe Kritik an der EU-Komission.” Handelsblatt. October 23, 2016. Accessed January 13, 2017. http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/ceta-verhandlungen-scharfe-kritik-an-der-eu-kommission/14725650.html. “Gabriel beschimpf Oettinger als ‘neunmalkluger Technokraten.’” Die Welt. October 23, 2016. Accessed January 13, 2017. https://www.welt.de/politik/ deutschland/article158984942/Gabriel-beschimpft-Oettinger-als-neunmalklugen-Technokraten.html. 16 “Deutschland darf CETA nur unter Bedingungen zustimmen.” Die Welt. October 13, 2016. Accessed January 13, 2017. https://www.welt.de/newsticker/ dpa_nt/infoline_nt/brennpunkte_nt/article158729065/Deutschland-darf-Ceta-nur-unter-Bedingungen-zustimmen.html. “EU vertagt Entscheidung über Freihandelsabkommen CETA.”Süddeutsche Zeitung. October 18, 2016. Accessed January 13, 2017. http://www.sueddeutsche. de/wirtschaft/ceta-eu-vertagt-entscheidung-ueber-freihandelsabkommen-ceta-1.3211118. 17 Tauber, Andre. “Ceta wird zeigen ob die EU noch handelsfähig ist.” Die Welt. October 12, 2016. Accessed January 13, 2017. https://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/ article158714919/Ceta-wird-zeigen-ob-die-EU-noch-handlungsfaehig-ist.html. 18 Braun, Stefan. “Steinmeier warnt vor dem Ende der EU.” Süddeutsche Zeitung. October 23, 2016. Accessed January 13, 2017. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/aussenminister-steinmeier-warnt-vor-dem-ende-der-eu-1.3218295. 19 “Flüchtlinkszahlen in 2016 deutlich gesunken.” Süddeutsche Zeitung. January 11, . 2017. Accessed January 14, 2017. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/ de-maiziere-fluechtlingszahlen-in-deutlich-gesunken-1.3329242. “Zahl der Asylsuchenden ist deutlich gesunken.” Die Welt. April 8, 2016. Accessed January 13, 2017. https://www.welt.de/politik/video154133907/Zahl-derAsylsuchenden-ist-deutlich-gesunken.html. 20 Bewarder, Manuel, Gillert, Sonja, Schlitz, Christoph and Daniel F. Sturm. “Europa gibt nach – allen voran Deutschland.”. Die Welt. September 25, 2016. Accessed January 14, 2017. https://www.welt.de/politik/article158356187/Europa-gibt-nach-allen-voran-Deutschland.html. Bewarder, Manuel, Gillert, Sonja, Schlitz, Christoph and Daniel F. Sturm. “Frontex soll die Balkanroute dichtmachen.” Die Welt. September 24, 2016. Accessed January 14, 2017. https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article158352222/

2016 Frontex-soll-die-Balkanroute-dichtmachen.html. Bewarder, Manuel and Marcel Pauly. “Die Balkanroute ist dicht. Europa lange nicht.” Die Welt. September 18, 2016. Accessed January 14, 2017. https://www. welt.de/politik/deutschland/article158225837/Die-Balkanroute-ist-dicht-Europanoch-lange-nicht.html. 21 “An der Grenze wird jetzt rund um die Uhr kontrolliert.” Die Welt. December 15, 2016. Accessed January 13, 2017. https://www.welt.de/regionales/bayern/ article160324652/An-der-Grenze-wird-jetzt-rund-um-die-Uhr-kontrolliert.html. Leubecher, Marcel. “Asylbewerber aus sicheren Drittstaaten an Grenze zurückweisen.” Die Welt. October 28, 2016. Accessed January 13, 2017. https:// www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article159127526/Asylbewerber-aus-sicheren-Drittstaaten-an-Grenze-zurueckweisen.html. “Deutschland darf seine Grenzkontrollen verlängern.” Die Welt. November 11, 2016. Accessed January 14, 2017. https://www.welt.de/politik/article159444947/ Deutschland-darf-seine-Grenzkontrollen-verlaengern.html. 22 “Flüchtlinge sitzen an serbisch-kroatischer Grenze fest.” Die Welt. November 14, 2016. Accessed January 13, 2017. https://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article159491740/Fluechtlinge-sitzen-an-serbisch-kroatischer-Grenze-fest.html. 23 Beitzer, Hannah. “So soll das Tauschgeschäft mit den Flüchtlingen funktionieren.” Süddeutsche Zeitung. April 2, 2016. Accessed January 13, 2017. http://www. sueddeutsche.de/politik/eu-tuerkei-abkommen-so-soll-das-tauschgeschaeft-mitden-fluechtlingen-funktionieren-1.2931695. Munzinger, Paul. “EU-Türkei Deal: ‘Dieses Tauschverfahren ist nichts anderes als Menschenhandel.’” Süddeutsche Zeitung. May 4, 2016. Accessed January 14, 2017. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/eu-tuerkei-abkommen-dieses-tauschverfahren-ist-nichts-anderes-als-menschenhandel-1.2980260. 24 Munzinger, Paul. “EU-Türkei Deal: ‘Dieses Tauschverfahren ist nichts anderes als Menschenhandel.’” Süddeutsche Zeitung. May 4, 2016. Accessed January 13, 2017. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/eu-tuerkei-abkommen-dieses-tauschverfahren-ist-nichts-anderes-als-menschenhandel-1.2980260. 25 “Kompromiss bei Asylpaket II: Familiennachzug soll in Härtefällen möglich sein.” Süddeutsche Zeitung. February 11, 2016. Accessed January 13, 2017. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/fluechtlinge-kompromiss-bei-asylpaket-ii-familiennachzug-soll-in-haertefaellen-moeglich-sein-1.2859185. Gammelin, Cerstin. “Das steckt im neuen Asylpaket.” Süddeutsche Zeitung. February 3, 2016. Accessed January 13, 2017. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/ asylrecht-im-kabinett-das-steckt-im-neuen-asylpaket-1.2845872. Prantl, Heribert. “Das Asylpaket II versorgt nicht die Flüchtlinge – nur die Angst vor ihnen.” Süddeutsche Zeitung. February 25, 2016. Accessed January 14, 2017. . http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/asylpaket-ii-das-asylpaket-ii-versorgtnicht-die-fluechtlinge-nur-die-angst-vor-ihnen-1.2879863. “Das steht im Asylpaket II.” Handelsblatt. January 29, 2016. Accessed January 13, 2017. http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/fluechtlinge-das-stehtim-asylpaket-ii/12894968.html.

Messages in the Media “SPD und CDU legen Streit um Familiennachzug bei.” Handelsblatt. February 11, 2016. Accessed January 13, 2017. http://www.handelsblatt.com/ politik/deutschland/asylpaket-ii-spd-und-cdu-legen-streit-um-familiennachzug-bei/12948848.html. 26 Bewaderer, Manuel. “Beim Familiennachzug der Syrer hat sich Gabriel verzählt.” Die Welt. November 27, 2016. Accessed January 14, 2017. https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article159782673/Beim-Familiennachzug-der-Syrer-hat-sich-Gabriel-verzaehlt.html. 27 “Bund investiert 150 Millionen in Ausreise von Asylbewerbern.” Die Welt. December 9, 2016. Accessed January 14, 2017. https://www.welt.de/politik/ deutschland/article160133812/Bund-investiert-150-Millionen-in-Ausreise-von-Asylbewerbern.html. 28 Braun, Stefan and Constanze von Bullion. “Wer den Sprachkurs schwänyt darf nicht dauerhaft bleiben.” Süddeutsche Zeitung. May 24, 2016. Accessed January 13, 2017. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/integrationsgesetz-wer-den-sprachkurs-schwaenzt-darf-nicht-dauerhaft-bleiben-1.3005958. Prantl, Heibert. “Ein Integrationsgesetz, das seinen Namen nicht verdient.” Süddeutsche Zeitung. April 14, 2016. Accessed January 13, 2017. http://www. sueddeutsche.de/politik/integrationsgesetz-an-jeder-ecke-nickeleien-1.2949298. “Koalitionsspitzen loben Entfurf als Meilenstein.” Handelsblatt. May 25, 2016. Accessed January 14, 2017. http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/ integrationsgesetz-koalitionsspitzen-loben-entwurf-als-meilenstein/13643196. html. “Regierung einigt sich mit Ländern auf neuen Entwurf.” Handelsblatt. May 23, 2016. Accessed January 14, 2017. http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/ deutschland/integrationsgesetz-regierung-einigt-sich-mit-laendern-auf-neuen-entwurf/13629836.html. 29 Alaous, Yahya. “Warum gibt es kein Gerät, das mein Integrationslevel misst?” Süddeutsche Zeitung. July 14, 2016. Accessed January 14, 2017. http://www. sueddeutsche.de/politik/syrischer-fluechtling-in-deutschland-warum-gibt-eskein-geraet-das-mein-integrationslevel-misst-1.3078020.30 Dörries, Bernd, Fried, Nico and Kristina Ludwig. “Schock, Schwere, Not.” Süddeutsche Zeitung. January 7, 2016. Accessed January 14, 2017. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/koelnund-die-nachwirkungen-schock-schwere-not-1.2808551?reduced=true. “Übergriffe auf Frauen: ‘Eine völlig neue Dimension der Gewalt.’” Süddeutsche Zeitung. January 4, 2016. Accessed January 14, 2017. http://www.sueddeutsche. de/panorama/koeln-eine-voellig-neue-dimension-der-gewalt-1.2805418. “Schwere Vorwürfe an die Kölner Polizei”. Handelsblatt. January 7, 2016. Accessed January 14, 2017. http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/uebergriffe-an-silvester-schwere-vorwuerfe-an-die-koelner-polizei/12805476.html. 31 “Deutsche IS Terrorzelle sollte zehn Attentäter umfassen.” Süddeutsche Zeitung. June 3, 2016. Accessed January 14, 2017. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/ politik/anschlagsplaene-fuer-duesseldorf-deutsche-is-terrorzelle-sollte-zehn-attentaeter-umfassen-1.3018900.

2016 “Islamisten planten Anschlag in Düsseldorf.” Handelsblatt. June 2, 2016. Accessed January 14, 2017. http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/ is-terrorzelle-islamisten-planten-anschlag-in-duesseldorf/13679574.html. 32 Wolff, Verena. “Bombe explodierte direkt neben Festivalgelände.” Süddeutsche Zeitung. July 25, 2016. Accessed January 14, 2017. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/ bayern/ansbach-bombe-explodierte-direkt-neben-festivalgelaende-1.3093458. 33 Auer, Katja. “Syrer zünded Sprengsatz in Ansbach – Seehofer: ‘Tage des Schreckens.’” Süddeutsche Zeitung. July 25, 2016. Accessed January 14, 2017. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/bayern/anschlag-nahe-musikfestival-syrer-zuendet-sprengsatz-in-ansbach-seehofer-tage-des-schreckens-1.3093431. Widmann, Esther and Benedikt Peters. “Was wir über den Angriff bei Würzburg wissen.” Süddeutsche Zeitung. July 19, 2016. Accessed January 14, 2017. http:// www.sueddeutsche.de/bayern/anschlag-auf-zugreisende-was-wir-ueber-den-angriff-bei-wuerzburg-wissen-und-was-nicht-1.3084902. Spoerr, Kathrin. “Die Tragik in diesem Fall kann größer nicht sein.” Die Welt. December 4, 2016. Accessed January 14, 2017. https://www.welt.de/debatte/kommentare/article159970734/Die-Tragik-in-diesem-Fall-kann-groesser-nicht-sein. html Kelnberger, Josef. “Ist das nun der Dank?” Süddeutsche Zeitung. December 29, 2016. Accessed January 14, 2017. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/mord-infreiburg-ist-das-nun-der-dank-1.3313821?reduced=true. 34 Matzner, Moritz. “Lampedusa – Berlin – Mailand: eine Chronologie.” Süddeutsche Zeitung. December 24, 2016. Accessed January 14, 2017. http://www. sueddeutsche.de/politik/anschlag-auf-berliner-weihnachtsmarkt-lampedusa-berlin-mailand-1.3309131. 35 “Was wir über den möglichen Täter und den Vorfall in Mailand wissen.” Süddeutsche Zeitung. December 23, 2016. Accessed January 14, 2017. http://www. sueddeutsche.de/politik/anschlag-auf-berliner-weihnachtsmarkt-was-wir-ueberden-moeglichen-taeter-und-den-vorfall-in-mailand-wissen-1.3302499. 36 Bewarder, Manuel and Thorsten Jungholt. „Europas Außengrenze noch immer löchrig.” Die Welt. May 22, 2016. Accessed January 14, 2017. https://www.welt. de/politik/deutschland/article155557559/Europas-Aussengrenze-noch-immer-loechrig.html. 37 “Wir haben die Flüchtlingskrise nicht im Griff.” Die Welt. December 14, 2016. Accessed January 14, 2017. https://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article160306188/Wir-haben-die-Fluechtlingskrise-nicht-im-Griff.html. Winterbauer, Jörg and Jannes van Roermond. “Polen wird zum Einwanderungsland.” Die Welt. November 28, 2016. Accessed January 14, 2017. https:// www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article159812342/Polen-wird-zum-Einwanderungsland.html. Tauber, Andre and Daniel Friedrich Sturm. “Orban sieht im Votum der Ungarn einen Kampfauftrag.” Die Welt. October 3, 2016. Accessed January 1, 2017. https://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article158514717/Orban-sieht-im-Votum-der-Ungarn-einen-Kampfauftrag.html. Kalnoky, Boris. “Jetzt sucht Orban den Grundsatzstreit mit der EU.” Die Welt.

Messages in the Media October 3, 2016. Accessed January 14, 2017. https://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article158510427/Jetzt-sucht-Orban-den-Grundsatzstreit-mit-der-EU.html. “Wie Kaczinski und Orban die EU retten wollen.” Die Welt. September 7, 2016. Accessed January 14, 2017. https://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article157985253/Wie-Kaczynski-und-Orban-die-EU-retten-wollen.html. “Orban lobt Merkels unschätzbare Verdienste.” Die Welt. October 20, 2016. Accessed January 14, 2017. https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article158910414/Orban-lobt-Merkels-unschaetzbare-Verdienste.html. “Merkel wird in Tschechien mit Pfiffen empfangen.” Die Welt. August 25, 2016. Accessed January 14, 2017. https://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article157859672/Merkel-wird-in-Tschechien-mit-Pfiffen-empfangen.html. Bewarder, Manuel, Kogel, Eva Maria and Jacques Schuster. “Das EU-System ist kaputt und ineffizient.” Die Welt. September 3, 2016. Accessed January 14, 2017. https://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article157939088/Das-EU-System-ist-kaputt-und-ineffizient.html. Tauber, Andre. “In Bratislava deutet sich Europeas Richtungswechsel an.” Die Welt. September 16, 2016. Accessed January 14, 2017. https://www.welt.de/ politik/ausland/article158210680/In-Bratislava-deutet-sich-Europas-Richtungswechsel-an.html. 38 Bewarder, Manuel. “Deutschland droht mit Alleingang bei Grenzkontrollen.” Die Welt. December 10, 2016. Accessed January 14, 2017. https://www. welt.de/politik/deutschland/article160177393/Deutschland-droht-mit-Alleingang-bei-Grenzkontrollen.html. 39 “Rechtsmotivierte Straftaten gegen Flüchtlingsunterkünfte nehmen zu.” Süddeutsche Zeitung. October 19, 2016. Accessed January 14, 2017. http://www. sueddeutsche.de/politik/rechte-gewalt-rechtsmotivierte-straftaten-gegen-fluechtlingsunterkuenfte-nehmen-zu-1.3212108. Prantl, Heribert. “Die Rechte Drohkulisse steht.” Süddeutsche Zeitung. September 27, 2016. Accessed January 14, 2017. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/ anschlag-in-dresden-rechtsextremisten-schaffen-ein-klima-der-angst-1.3181302 ?reduced=true. Aykanat, Deniz and Karin Janker. “Moscheen in Deutschland werden häufiger Ziel von Anschlägen.” Süddeutsche Zeitung. September 27, 2016. Accessed January 14, 2017. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/fremdenfeindlichkeit-moscheen-in-deutschland-werden-haeufiger-ziel-von-anschlaegen-1.3181276?reduced=true. 40 “Rechtsmotivierte Straftaten gegen Flüchtlingsunterkünfte nehmen zu.” Süddeutsche Zeitung. October 19, 2016. Accessed January 14, 2017. http://www. sueddeutsche.de/politik/rechte-gewalt-rechtsmotivierte-straftaten-gegen-fluechtlingsunterkuenfte-nehmen-zu-1.3212108. Kampf, Lena. “Bundeskriminalamt spricht von Klima der Angst“. Süddeutsche Zeitung. September 28, 2016. Accessed January 14, 2017. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/fremdenfeindlichkeit-klima-der-angst-1.2969697. 41 “Das Ausmaß der Gewalt ist erschreckend.” Handelsblatt. January 29, 2016. Accessed January 15, 2017. http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/

2016 anschlag-in-villingen-schwenningen-das-ausmass-der-gewalt-ist-erschreckend/12895420.html. “Nach Schüssen auf Asylbewerberheim in Ense ermittelt Staatsschutz.” Die Welt. January 22, 2016. Accessed January 15, 2017. https://www.welt.de/regionales/ nrw/article151337556/Nach-Schuessen-auf-Asylbewerberheim-in-Ense-ermittelt-Staatsschutz.html. “Totes Schwein auf Baugelände für Leipziger Moschee abgelegt.” Die Welt. February 25, 2016. Accessed January 15, 2017. https://www.welt.de/regionales/ sachsen/article152623438/Totes-Schwein-auf-Baugelaende-fuer-Leipziger-Moschee-abgelegt.html. “Unbekannte werfen Molotovcocktails auf Moschee im Saarland.” Süddeutsche Zeitung. February 25, 2016. Accessed January 15, 2017. http://www. sueddeutsche.de/politik/neunkirchen-unbekannte-werfen-molotow-cocktails-auf-moschee-im-saarland-1.2845687. 42 “Explosionen vor Moschee und Kongressgebäude.” Handelsblatt. September 27, 2016. Accessed January 15, 2017. http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/ deutschland/anschlag-in-deutschland-explosionen-vor-moschee-und-kongressgebaeude-in-dresden/14605684.html. “Höchste Sicherheitsstufe am Tag der Deutschen Einheit.” Handelsblatt. October 3, 2016. Accessed January 15, 2017. http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/ deutschland/angespannte-lage-in-dresden-rechts-und-linksradikale-planen-proteste/14631352-2.html. 43 Neuerer, Dietmar. “Welche Rechtspopulisten in den Landtag einziehen.” Handelsblatt. March 3, 2016. Accessed January 15, 2017. http://www.handelsblatt. com/politik/deutschland/landtagswahlen-2016/afd-und-der-super-wahlsonntag-welche-rechtspopulisten-in-die-landtage-draengen/13309710.html. Wishmeyer, Nils. “Dieser Wahlabend ist eine Zäsur.” Handelsblatt. March 13, 2016. Accessed January 15, 2017. http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/ deutschland/landtagswahlen-2016/wahlsieger-afd-dieser-wahlabend-ist-einezaesur/13315610.html. Prantl, Heribert. “Die AFD und Wahlbeteiligung: Nur bedingt Grund zu jubeln.” Süddeutsche Zeitung. March 14, 2016. Accessed January 15, 2017. http://www. sueddeutsche.de/politik/wahlbeteiligung-demokratisches-fest-mit-dubiosen-rednern-1.2906857?reduced=true. “Schwierige Koalitionssuche nach Landtagswahlen.” Süddeutsche Zeitung. March 14, 2016. Accessed January 15, 2017. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/news/politik/ wahlen-schwierige-koalitionssuche-nach-landtagswahlen-dpa.urn-newsml-dpacom-20090101-160312-99-193123. “Endergebnis: CDU gewinnt Landtagswahl in Sachsen-Anhalt, AFD zweistärkste Partei.” Süddeutsche Zeitung. March 14, 2016. Accessed January 15, 2017. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/-endergebnis-cdu-gewinnt-landtagswahl-in-sachsen-anhalt-afd-zweitstaerkste-partei-1.2906218. Fischer, Eva. “AFD Triumph schüttelt das Land durch.” Handelsblatt. March 13, 2016. Accessed January 15, 2017. http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/

2016 deutschland/landtagswahlen-2016/sachsen-anhalt-afd-triumph-schuettelt-dasland-durch/13315538.html. 44 Neuerer, Dietmar. „Das Placebo-Phänomen.” Handelsblatt. September 4, 2016. Accessed January 15, 2017. http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/ landtagswahlen-2016/kommentar-zum-afd-aufstieg-das-placebo-phaenomen/14498808.html. Lechtape, Martin. “Wahl des schlechten Gefühls.” Handelsblatt. September 4, 2016. Accessed January 15, 2017. http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/ deutschland/landtagswahlen-2016/landtagswahl-in-mecklenburg-vorpommern-wahl-des-schlechten-gefuehls/14491512.html. Deutschländer, Luca. “Hier trifft der AFD-Erfolg Merkel persöhnlich.” Süddeutsche Zeitung. September 5, 2016. Accessed January 15, 2017. http://www. sueddeutsche.de/politik/landtagswahl-in-mecklenburg-vorpommern-wo-derafd-erfolg-merkel-persoenlich-trifft-1.3148515. “AFD ist siegesgewiss.” Handelsblatt. September 19, 2016. Accessed January 15, 2017. http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/nach-der-berlin-wahlafd-ist-siegesgewiss/14568296.html. “AFD regiert nach der Wahl in Berlin mit.” Handelsblatt. September 13, 2016. Accessed January 15, 2017. http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/ landtagswahlen-2016/rechtspopulisten-in-der-hauptstadt-afd-regiert-nach-derwahl-in-berlin-mit/14538772.html. Denkler, Thorsten. “Sechs Parteien im Abgeordnetenhaus – das verändert auch die Bundespolitik.” Süddeutsche Zeitung. September 19, 2016. Accessed January 15, 2017. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/nach-der-wahl-in-berlin-sechs-parteien-im-berliner-parlament-das-veraendert-auch-die-bundespolitik-1.3168557. 45 Das Gupta, Oliver. “Wie rechts Norbert Hofer wirklich ist.” Süddeutsche Zeitung. May 20, 2016. Accessed January 15, 2017. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/ politik/praesidentenwahl-in-oesterreich-wie-rechts-norbert-hofer-wirklich-ist-1. 3001489?reduced=true. 46 Wenicke, Christian. “Marine Le Pen will Volksabstimmung über EU Austritt.” Süddeutsche Zeitung. September 18, 2016. Accessed January 15, 2017. http:// www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/frankreich-le-pen-will-volksabstimmung-uebereu-austritt-1.3167596?reduced=true. 47 Kirchner, Thomas. “Geert Wilders: Comeback eines Hemmungslosen.” Süddeutsche Zeitung. January 24, 2016. Accessed January 15, 2017. http://www. sueddeutsche.de/politik/niederlande-geert-wilders-comeback-eines-hemmungslosen-1.2831978?reduced=true. 48 “Die AFD kann ihren Brexit Triumph nicht richtig genießen.” Süddeutsche Zeitung. June 26, 2016. Accessed January 15, 2017. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/ news/politik/parteien-die-afd-kann-ihren-brexit-triumph-nicht-richtig-geniessen-dpa.urn-newsml-dpa-com-20090101-160626-99-454895. 49 Oechsner, Thomas. “Job-Boom und Krisen-Polster.” Süddeutsche Zeitung. January 3, 2017. Accessed January 15, 2017. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/

2016 arbeitsmarkt-job-boom-und-krisen-polster-1.3319366?reduced=true. 50 â&#x20AC;&#x153;In einer Zukunftsfrage sind Deutsche pessimistisch.â&#x20AC;? Die Welt. May 11, 2016. Accessed January 15, 2017. https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article155244418/In-einer-Zukunftsfrage-sind-Deutsche-pessimistisch.html.

Messages in the Media

Media sources 1- VeÄ?ernji List: founded in 1959. Owned by Styria Media Group 2 - Dnevnik: founded in 2005.Owned by CME Group 3 - Slobodna Dalmacija: founded in 1943. Owned by Hanza Media

BY: NATALIA PAUNIC 86

2016 THE MIGRANT CRISIS IN THE BALKANS As the first country in the European Union after Greece on the Western Balkan migrant route, Croatia has been deeply affected by the migrant crisis since the beginning of the civil war in Syria. To date, Croatia has spent €20 million securing its border and creating processing and welcoming centres.1,2 Such a centre was opened in Tovarnik,3 a city in Eastern Croatia, in 2015, to accommodate refugees crossing into Croatia from Serbia. Considering the Croatian debt and its urgent need for structural economic reforms, this price tag is significant.4 The 2016 migrant crisis in Croatia has been lessened considerably by the signing of the EU-Turkey migrant deal, which, in combination with the closing of borders in several Western Balkan and Central European countries, alleviated pressure on the Balkan route.5 Because of the perceived instability of the EU-Turkey deal, Croatia fears that it could become a hotspot for refugees if Turkey reneges on its promises and “releases another wave” of migrants.6 The prevailing opinion amongst media sources is that the European Union signed the deal with Turkey from a position of weakness, which in return threatens the political and economic stability of all of the countries on the Western Balkan migrant route to Europe. In September 2016, an increase in the level of refugees coming from Turkey into Europe reawakened fears that the Balkan route would be reactivated.7 While Greece and Macedonia8 would be impacted most severely, Croatia also risks becoming a “hot spot,”9 due to the closure of borders in Austria, Slovenia, and Hungary that would force migrants to stay in Croatia.10 Although Minister of the Interior Vlaho Orepić expressed his confidence in Croatia’s border security,11 fears persist that the country would not have the capability to deal with a largescale local migrant crisis, and might be faced with difficult decisions regarding the closure of its borders. 12 These preoccupations inflamed regional tensions with Slovenia and Serbia, which are also on the Balkan route. Tensions with Slovenia culminated in a border dispute between the two EU Member States, as Slovenian authorities built a fence on disputed territory on the Čabranka River, which divides Slovenia and Croatia.13 Increased tensions with Serbia derived from an escalating number of migrants14 attempting to cross into Croatia from Šid, a Serbian city near the Croatian border15, and the temporary erection of a fence on one of the border crossings between Serbia and Croatia.16 Despite expressing difficulties with managing large numbers of refugees, throughout 2016, the Croatian government has publicly emphasized its commitment to respecting human rights, putting the safety of migrants first, and cooperating with the European Union and other countries in the region.17 For this reason, President Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović’s new government will continue to refrain from closing Croatia’s borders and building fences18 as long as it can do so. In the event of a renewed migrant crisis, there is consensus in Croatia that national security would necessitate a more forceful solution, involving physical barriers and the military.19 An aggressive external policy is considered a last resort for Croatia, a sentiment that has been echoed by other countries in the

Messages in the Media region such as Serbia.20 In this vein, Croatia, Serbia, and Slovenia all appealed to the United Nations this year for funding to help manage the migrant crisis,21 which is beyond their structural capabilities. The official position of the government and of the three media sources chosen is strongly in favour of a leadership role for the European Union in solving the migrant crisis, combined with support from the international community.22 Furthermore, in Croatian news it was considered the responsibility of the European Union to solve the migrant crisis with the help of individual Member States and an adherence to the refugee quota, which Croatia has fulfilled, accepting 1,613 refugees predominantly from Syria in the second half of 2016.23 The refugee quota was supported by the Croatian government due to Croatia’s desire to positively contribute to the EU, and to alleviate pressure on Germany.24 Croatia also sees information sharing, the strengthening of external borders, and inter-EU cooperation as key to solving the migrant crisis.25 Taking into account Croatian adherence to the refugee quota, Croatia is a positive example relative to many of its Central Eastern European neighbours, such as Hungary and the Czech Republic. In this way, Croatia views the EU as a potential solution to the migrant crisis.26 Croatia also continually reaffirmed its desire to join the European Union’s Schengen Zone in 2016.27 The date for Croatia’s accession to Schengen is currently 2018,28 and the country has received €120 million in structural funds to meet the accession criteria regarding border security, implementation of Schengen Information System, etc. 29 The support for Schengen is indicative that the perception of the EU in Croatia remains positive, even in light of the migrant crisis. This was exemplified by the government crediting the European Union for peace and stability in Europe.30 THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS OF 2016 Following the dissolution of the Croatian parliament in June 2016 due to a successful motion of no confidence against Prime Minister Tihomir Orešković, snap parliamentary elections were called for September 11th 2016. The contest was between the two largest Croatian parties; the centre-left SDP (Socialist Democratic Party of Croatia) headed by career politician Zoran Milanović, and the centre-right HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union) headed by MEP Andrej Plenković, who had not been heavily involved in domestic Croatian politics until this point.31 A coalition with MOST (Bridge of Independent Lists), a centre-right party created in 2012 and focused on reform, won the election for HDZ.32 Milanović’s SDP was heavily favoured to be the winner33 until his campaign was touched by controversy as he claimed his grandfather was a Croatian fascist during the Second World War.34 Although this was considered by many a political move to attract ultranationalist voters, the public - as well as many politicians - were outraged.35 Milanović’s allusions to Croatian fascist activities during the Second World War, as well as ones to the Wars in Yugoslavia in the 1990s, are not isolated cases.36 The lack of lustration and focus on past history represents a problem for Croatian politics, as fixation on these events prevents discussions

2016 of urgently needed reform in parliament, and overshadows the political and economic platforms of individual parties. Several articles expressed the dissatisfaction of the public and the lack of trust in the government for precisely this reason; accordingly, the parliamentary elections of 2016 represent Croatia’s lowest voter turnout in history.37 The Croatian government has been plagued by inefficiency, political deadlock, and accusations of corruption.38 Tihomir Orešković’s short-lived parliament dissolved after only one year and was replaced by an extremely unpopular transitional government,39 is an example of the instability of Croatian politics. The year was considered by many a poor use of time,40 considering the political and economic reforms necessary for Croatia.41 However, the emergence of new parties such as MOST in 2012 indicate a vibrant democracy and potential for positive reform.42 The articles analysed also noted the recurrence of similar problems of political instability in other ex-Yugoslav countries in the region. It is also recognized that the election process itself is in need of some reform, with changes to be made regarding the uniformity of the voting process in districts across the country.43 Facing the new government are several domestic issues that have remained unsolved due to the political instability of the past year, which saw three separate governments, and saw several leading politicians leave their roles.44 These include the poor management of state finances, the high unemployment rate, and the urgent need for the reform of social security and pension systems, as well as other economic framework.45 The new parliament of Andrej Plenković will be presided over by both HDZ and MOST, who will take turns leading every two years.46 The combination of an established party (HDZ) and a new party (MOST) eager to reform inevitably led to some initial clashes during the formation of the government shortly following the election, especially on the topic of tax reform.47 The support for MOST, who unveiled seven election promises during the election ranging from lowering taxes for small and medium sized enterprises to creating more stringent laws for political spending during elections,48 indicates a weariness with established political parties like HDZ and SDP, and a desire for real change in Croatian politics.49 According to polls, the public views both President Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović and Prime Minister Andrej Plenković50 positively, with a majority believing that the current government will serve its whole term.51 Government stability is crucial if Croatia is to recover economically and retain good standing with the European Commission, which has criticized its political instability as an investment and funding liability.52 Since its election, the Plenković parliament has successfully reformed some aspects of the VAT and income tax, has improved relations with the Serbian minority in Croatia,53 and is generally showing a positive trend for 2017. ECONOMIC REFORM Croatia has experienced slow economic growth and the slow increase of its public debt, which currently sits at 84.6% of its GDP, down 2.5% from last

Messages in the Media year.54 The deficit was also decreased, making Croatia one of fifteen countries in the European Union to do so.55 While this is positive, the Croatian economy was listed as the eleventh weakest economy in the world56 due to the difficulty it will experience in repaying its public debt and its chances of recession. The European Commission applauded Croatia’s efforts to keep its deficit under control57, but voiced its skepticism at Croatia’s ability to introduce the reforms necessary to create long lasting and robust growth. For this reason, in May, the Commission has a negative economic prediction for Croatia due to structural problems and the mismanagement of European Union funds.58 Furthermore, Moody’s, the American credit rating agency, has given both Poland and Croatia negative ratings due to the perceived instability of their governments.59 Perceptions of the domestic economy and investment climate also remain negative due to the public’s distrust in the government’s ability to bring about the reforms necessary to improve Croatia’s economy.60 2016 itself was a very positive year for the Croatian economy, as it experienced 2.9% growth in the last quarter of the year and an increase in consumption.61 Both of these numbers are the highest the country has seen since before the global financial crisis.62 However, positive trends relied heavily on external factors, namely an excellent season for Croatian tourism and low oil prices.63 This makes the Croatian economy especially vulnerable to external shocks, like the recent constitutional referendum on December 4th 2016 in Italy, one of Croatia’s main trading partners.64 Croatian economic experts, the IMF, and the European Commission agree that although short-term growth is positive, Croatia needs to undergo severe economic reform to strengthen its fragile economy65, which could risk deteriorating into a “Greek scenario.”66 Because of the dissolution of parliament and the elections in September, 2016 represents a year of lost economic opportunities for the country.67 As a result, Plenković’s parliament has inherited a great deal of responsibility regarding putting reforms into practice. Economic performance and adherence to the advice of the Commission are especially important if Croatia is to retain its access to European Union funding, some of which has already been withdrawn due to the collapse of Tihomir Orešković’s government.68 The new government has outlined its economic priorities for the following four years, which include investment in education and agriculture and reforms pertaining to income tax, the repurposing of dead capital, and the unemployment rate, which is twice as high as the EU average.69 One of the problems identified by Croatian economists is the persistent over-reliance on the benefits of the European Union70, which has stalled serious reforms in the past. The quick formation of the new government71 and its successes regarding tax reform in early November72 indicate that 2017 should be a productive and politically stable year. 2016 IN REVIEW As the youngest Member State in the European Union, Croatia is still undergoing preparations for joining the Schengen Zone and introducing the

2016 Euro as its currency. In 2016, Croatia’s efforts to align its policies with those of the European Union have been applauded by the Commission, and have lead to a good relationship between the two. This alignment has been augmented by close cooperation regarding funding for Croatia’s full accession. However, Croatia has had a politically tumultuous year, which has been additionally strained by the looming threat of the failure of the EU-Turkey deal and the chance of a recession. Although Croatia remains very committed to the European project, this year represents lost time and lost opportunities for the country. Croatia’s enthusiasm for acceding completely to the Union has led it to try to incorporate the best of the European spirit in its foreign policy, politics, and economics. Croatia’s decision to accept its share of the refugee quota as proposed by the EU is very positive considering the opposition to refugees from other countries in the region such as Austria or Hungary. Croatia also made a conscious effort not to put up borders despite regional tensions and domestic fears of a wave of migrants from Turkey. This decision, according to the Croatian government, was made out of respect for the Schengen zone as a symbol of peace and progress in Europe. Another way in which Croatia has sought to be closer to the EU is through the choice of Andrej Plenković, a former Member of the European Parliament, for the leader of the centre-right coalition government and ultimately as the prime minister of Croatia. This is significant considering the rise of Euroskeptic parties and the threat they pose to the cohesion of the European Union. Although nationalist rhetoric is not foreign to Croatian politics, the choice of Andrej Plenković over Zoran Milanović, who, as a political ploy, claimed to have direct ties to the Croatian Fascist movement, demonstrates the desire of the Croatian people to move in the direction of the European Union. The closeness of the Plenković government to the European Union also demonstrates Croatia’s commitment to entering Schengen in 2018 and to enacting the economic reforms necessary to meet the criteria to also enter the Eurozone. Although full accession to the European Union represents opportunities for future success for Croatia, in 2017 Croatia’s new government will likely look to make inward changes in order to be better prepared to fully accede to the EU.

Messages in the Media Statistics: All data was collected by Eurostat and found on the official website of the European Union, www.europa.eu, except the population of Croatia, which was found on the CIA World Factbook. 1 Borovac, Marina, and Branimir Bradarić. “Migranti dolaze, hoće li i Hrvatska dizati zid na granici.” Večernji.hr. N.p., 12 Sept. 2016. Web. 2 Borovac, Marina, and Branimir Bradarić. “Migranti dolaze, hoće li i Hrvatska dizati zid na granici.” Večernji.hr. N.p., 12 Sept. 2016. Web. 3 Mikić, Domagoj. “HRVATSKA SPREMNA, BEOGRAĐANI NEGODUJU ‘Naš kraj je postao javni toalet’” Dnevnik.hr. N.p., 3 Sept. 2016. Web. 4 “Grabar-Kitarović u New Yorku: Migrantska kriza nije samo europski problem.” Slobodna Dalmacija. 19 Sept. 2016. 5 Kalajdžić, Ahmet. “Orepić: Migrantska kriza razotkrila je sve slabosti naših sustava.” Slobodna Dalmacija. N.p., 14 June 2016. Web. 6 Masle, Antun. “Dogovor s Turskom propada: zid za izbjeglice EU podiže tek na granici sa Slovenijom?” Slobodna Dalmacija. N.p., 13 May 2016. Web. 7 “Nakon sukoba Turske i EU, Makedonija postaje posljednja linija obrane?” Večernji.hr. N.p., 25 Nov. 2016. Web. 8 Masle, ibid. 9 “Hrvatskoj prijeti opasnost da postane ‘hotspot’ za izbjeglice, u Srbiji već čeka 7000 ljudi.” Večernji.hr. N.p., 19 Sept. 2016. Web. 10 Ivanković, Davor. “Kako Hrvatska može zaustaviti izbjeglice? Ili žica na granici sa Srbijom ili zajedničke snage u Makedoniji.” Večernji.hr. N.p., 22 Sept. 2016. Web. 13 Jan. 2017. 11 Domagoj Mikić, ibid. 12 Balen, Vedran. “Vraćanjem iz Austrije u Hrvatsku izbjeglice ponovno izigrane.” Večernji.hr. N.p., 20 July 2016. Web. 13 Balen, Marko. “Slovenci ne odustaju: Žicu na granici sad podižu i na - hrvatskom teritoriju!” Dnevnik.hr. N.p., 20 Nov. 2016. Web. 14 “Migranti krenuli pješice iz Beograda prema Hrvatskoj: ‘Pustite nas preko granice’” Večernji.hr. N.p., 11 Nov. 2016. Web. 15 “Policija pojačala nadzor granice sa Srbijom. Orepić: Zaštitit ćemo hrvatsku granicu.” Večernji.hr. N.p., 13 Nov. 2016. Web. 16 Kristović, Ivica. “Iznenada bio zatvoren granični prijelaz Batina: ‘Nitko nam ništa nije govorio, šokirani smo’” Večernji.hr. N.p., 30 June 2016. Web. 17 “Orešković: Situacija je vrlo ozbiljna.” Dnevnik.hr. N.p., 18 Feb. 2016. Web. 18 “Priprema strategije za novi val izbjeglica: Postavit ćemo žicu na granici s BiH i Srbijom!” Slobodna Dalmacija. N.p., 22 Sept. 2016. Web. 19 “Priprema strategije za novi val izbjeglica: Postavit ćemo žicu na granici s BiH i Srbijom!” Slobodna Dalmacija. N.p., 9 Sept. 2016. Web. 20 “Vučić: Ostao sam jedini u Europi koji je je protiv zidova i ograda.” Dnevnik.hr. N.p., 15 Sept. 2016. Web. 21 Balen, Vedran. “Vraćanjem iz Austrije u Hrvatsku izbjeglice ponovno izigrane.” Večernji.hr. N.p., 20 July 2016. Web. 22 “Grabar-Kitarović u New Yorku: Migrantska kriza nije samo europski problem.” Slobodna Dalmacija. N.p., 19 Sept. 2016. Web.

2016 “Kovač: Hrvatska će primiti 500 izbjeglica iz Turske.” Slobodna Dalmacija. N.p., n.d. Web. 12 Jan. 2017. 24 Ibid. 25 Ivanković, Davor. “Kako Hrvatska može zaustaviti izbjeglice? Ili žica na granici sa Srbijom ili zajedničke snage u Makedoniji.” Večernji.hr. N.p., 22 Sept. 2016. Web. 13 Jan. 2017. 26 Ibid. 27 “Hrvatska u Schengenu nakon 2018. godine.” Dnevnik.hr. N.p., 1 July 2016. Web. 28 Ibid. 29 “Orepić: Hrvatska ulazi u Schengen nakon 2018. godine.” Slobodna Dalmacija. N.p., 1 July 2016. Web. 30 “’’Hrvatska nedvojbeno za proširenje EU-a’’” Dnevnik.hr. N.p., 21 Oct. 2016. Web. 31 Radoš, Ivica. “Tko je Andrej Plenković? Porukama zajedništva privukao je birače.” Večernji.hr. N.p., 21 Oct. 2016. Web. 32 “DIP: Rezultati izbora su službeni, počinje teći rok za prvu sjednicu Sabora.” Večernji.hr. N.p., 26 Sept. 2016. Web. 33 “HRVATSKA 2 MJESECA PRIJE IZBORA Koga bi građani za novog premijera?” Dnevnik.hr. N.p., 13 July 2016. Web. 34 “Tko je Milanovićev djed ustaša kojeg je tek sada otkrio i što je šef SDP-a želio postići ovim razotkrivanjem.” Slobodna Dalmacija. N.p., 14 Aug. 2016. Web. 35 “’Zadivio me ‘ustaša’ Milanović, spreman je za malo vlasti nositi petokraku i slovo ‘u’’” Večernji.hr. N.p., 29 Aug. 2016. Web. 36 “Svjetski mediji pišu: Izbori u Hrvatskoj u sjeni nacionalističke retorike.” Večernji.hr. N.p., 9 Sept. 2016. Web. 37 “Milanović potvrdio: ‘Ne planiram se više kandidirati za predsjednika SDP-a’” Dnevnik.hr. N.p., 12 Sept. 2016. Web. 38 “”Hrvati su umorni od stranaka koje se još svađaju je li ustaški režim bio patriotski ili fašistički”.” Slobodna Dalmacija. N.p., 5 June 2016. Web. 39 Kristović, Ivica. “83 posto građana Hrvatske smatra da država ide u pogrešnom smjeru.” Večernji.hr. N.p., 25 July 2016. Web. 40 “Milanović: ‘Ovo nije bio sretan dan za Hrvatsku’” Dnevnik.hr. N.p., 12 Sept. 2016. Web. 41 “Je li provediv zajednički program Mosta i HDZ-a?” Dnevnik.hr. N.p., 21 Sept. 2016. Web. 42 “HRVATSKA DOBILA NOVU STRANKU “Ne želimo se više bojati”.” Dnevnik.hr. N.p., 18 Dec. 2016. Web. 43 “Hrvatin službene rezultate izbora uručio predsjednici: ‘Postoji čitav niz problema o kojima treba dobro razmisliti i donijeti odluke’” Večernji.hr. N.p., 27 Sept. 2016. Web. 44 Brkić Tomljenović, Ivica. “GODINA PRISILNIH POLITIČKIH MIROVINA Promijenili smo 3 vlade i čak 5 čelnika stranaka.” Dnevnik.hr. N.p., 26 Dec. 2016. Web. 23

Messages in the Media Cuglin, Nevenka. “’Za ostvarenje jamstava Mosta treba hrabrosti. Smislenije reforme mogle bi dovesti do podjela’” Dnevnik.hr. N.p., 13 Sept. 2016. Web. 46 Romić, Tea. “Postignut dogovor: Most usvojio HDZ-ov prijedlog.” Večernji.hr. N.p., 6 Oct. 2016. Web. 47 “Premijer Plenković: Cijela Vlada stoji iza porezne reforme.” Slobodna Dalmacija. N.p., 8 Nov. 2016. Web. 48 Cuglin, Nevenka. “’Za ostvarenje jamstava Mosta treba hrabrosti. Smislenije reforme mogle bi dovesti do podjela’” Dnevnik.hr. N.p., 13 Sept. 2016. Web. 49 “”Hrvati su umorni od stranaka koje se još svađaju je li ustaški režim bio patriotski ili fašistički”.” Slobodna Dalmacija. N.p., 5 June 2016. Web. 50 “Veliki obrat u rejtingu Kolinde Grabar-Kitarović: građani je obožavaju, popularnost joj raste.” Slobodna Dalmacija. N.p., 16 Nov. 2016. Web. 51 “CROBAROMETAR HDZ politički najturbulentniju godinu završava uvjerljivo prvi, a SDP u “slobodnom padu”.” Dnevnik.hr. N.p., 24 Dec. 2016. Web. 52 Didić, Marko. “Zbog kašnjenja MUP-a gubimo milijune eura!” Slobodna Dalmacija. N.p., 14 June 2016. Web. 53 “Plenković postigao sporazum s Pupovcem: evo na koje funkcije u Vladi dolaze predstavnici srpske manjine.” Slobodna Dalmacija. N.p., 23 Nov. 2016. Web. 54 “Podaci Eurostata: Hrvatski javni dug pao drugi kvartal za redom.” Večernji.hr. N.p., 24 Oct. 2016. Web. 55 Ibid. 56 Šunjerga, Marina. “Hrvatska na 11. mjestu na listi najslabijih ekonomija u svijetu.” Večernji.hr. N.p., 5 Feb. 2016. Web. 57 Gatarić, Ljubica. “Europska komisija očekuje reforme koje će otvoriti radna mjesta i smanjiti dug.” Večernji.hr. N.p., 3 May 2016. Web. 58 “Europski povjerenik za ekonomiju: Bez konkurentnog gospodarstva Hrvatska ne može smanjiti nezaposlenost.” Slobodna Dalmacija. N.p., 3 May 2016. Web. Dalmacija. N.p., 3 May 2016. Web. 59 “Moody’s ima negativnu prognozu za Plenkovićevu vladu: Sve je izraženija neizvjesnost na području politike.” Slobodna Dalmacija. N.p., 11 Jan. 2017. 60 Karlović-Sabolić, Marina. “Devedeset dana Timova tima: Vlada ništa nije učinila za ekonomski oporavak Hrvatske.” Slobodna Dalmacija. N.p., 14 Apr. 2016. Web. 61 Arežina, Bojan. “Pogledajte Plenkovićevo novogodišnje obraćanje: ‘U novu godinu Hrvatska ulazi s probuđenim optimizmom’” Večernji.hr. N.p., 30 Dec. 2016. Web. 62 Gatarić, Ljubica. “Turizam donio vodeći rast u EU.” Večernji.hr. N.p., 1 Dec. 2016. Web. 63 Cuglin, Nevenka. “Pad Vlade - što to znači za hrvatsku ekonomiju i građane.” Dnevnik.hr. N.p., 17 June 2016. Web. 64 “Hoće li se i kako situacija u Italiji odraziti na Hrvatsku?” Dnevnik.hr. N.p., 5 Dec. 2016. Web. 65 “MMF poručuje Vladi: Reforme ohrabruju, ali visok javni dug je velik rizik.” Dnevnik.hr. N.p., 5 May 2016. Web. 45

2016 “JAVNI DUG Stručnjak: To je gruda snijega koja može narasti u ‘grčki scenarij’” Dnevnik.hr. N.p., 21 Apr. 2016. Web. 67 Ivanković, Davor. “Grabar-Kitarović: Nitko još nema većinu za mandatara. Plenković: Vjerujemo da ćemo imati više od 76 potpisa.” Večernji.hr. N.p., 28 Sept. 2016. Web. 68 “EU poručuje Hrvatskoj: Zbog Vlade vam propadaju milijarde!” Slobodna Dalmacija. N.p., 2 June 2016. Web. 69 “Europski povjerenik za ekonomiju: Bez konkurentnog gospodarstva Hrvatska ne može smanjiti nezaposlenost.” Slobodna Dalmacija. N.p., 3 May 2016. Web. “odarstva Hrvatska ne može smanjiti nezaposlenost.” Slobodna Dalmacija. N.p., 3 May 2016. Web. 70 “Bez reformi u Hrvatskoj uskoro neće imati tko raditi.” Večernji.hr. N.p., 13 Apr. 2016. Web. 71 “Vujčić: BDP raste snažno, ali to neće biti dovoljno ako se ne provedu reforme.” Večernji.hr. N.p., 26 Sept. 2016. Web. 72 “Premijer Plenković: Cijela Vlada stoji iza porezne reforme.” Slobodna Dalmacija. N.p., 8 Nov. 2016. Web. 66

Messages in the Media

Media sources 1- Mediamax: founded in 1999. Owned by N/A 2 - Armenpress: founded in 1918 .Owned by N/A 3 - Azatutyun (Radio Free Armenia) : founded in N/A. Owned by N/A

BY: MARIAM BAGHDASARYAN 96

2016

EU-ARMENIA NEW FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT Similar to the past year, the relations between Armenia and the European Union (EU) have been have been marked by consistency, stability and increased cooperation Even though in 2014 Armenia decided to join the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), thus abandoning the nearly three-years-negotiated Association Agreement (AA), this did not result in suspension of EU-Armenia relations. Instead, Brussels and Yerevan have decided to continue their partnership in a context of a new agreement, which would replace the current EU-Armenia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement.1 The negotiations are held in three directions: a) political and legal, b) sectional cooperation, and c) trade and investment.2 Similar to the AA, this new agreement also serves to deepen and strengthen the comprehensive cooperation in all areas of mutual interest; however, it is expected to do so without undermining Armenia’s EEU commitments.3 As a member of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the Eastern Partnership (EaP), Armenia has deep and friendly relations with Europe. The new framework agreement, however, is expected to elevate these relations to a new level and, according to the EU’s Vice President and High Representative (HR) Federica Mogherini, create favourable conditions for number of sectors.4 These include trade, investment, sustainable development, as well as stronger cooperation in areas such as energy, transport, and environmental concerns.5 During the meeting with F. Mogherini, the Armenian Foreign Minister has also noted that the free mobility of citizens and an eventual visa-free regime would be an important factor in bringing the two societies even closer together.6 Additionally, Armenia has continuously shown its willingness to negotiate a civil aviation agreement with the EU, for which, according to the Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy Johannes Hahn, the EU is “shortly expecting a green light from the member states.”7 While the process of the negotiations is advancing, there are some mostly economic issues that remain to be agreed upon.8 The later is primarily connected with areas concerning trade and investment, since Armenia as an EEU member cannot separately negotiate on different custom duties with another union.9 Despite the following, however, as many as five stages have been successfully fulfilled and the overall negotiation process is most likely be completed in Spring 2017.10 The conclusion of the the New Framework Agreement, which as mentioned would be very similar to the Association Agreement, is expected to establish renewed partnership between the EU and Armenia and allow cooperation in areas of mutual interest.

ARMENIA AND THE REFUGEE CRISIS The ongoing Syrian Civil War has been an enormous source of concern for Armenia due its proximity to the Middle East, but also due its large diaspora in Syria. Throughout the conflict and increasingly in 2016, Armenia has experi-

Messages in the Media enced a considerable flow of refugees. In fact, it was noted that the nation of just 3 million gave shelter to about 20,000 people, making Armenia the third largest per-capita recipient of Syrian refugees in Europe (after Germany and Sweden respectively).11 Through this, Armenia’s positive role in the Syrian refugee crisis has been recognised by the European Union and the EU-Armenia Parliamentary Cooperation Committee (PCC).12 The PCC also called on the European Commission and EU member states to consider carrying out relevant programmes aiming to support the social integration of Syrian refugees in Armenia.13 Even though Armenia does not receive any direct assistance from the Union, the EU delegation to Armenia has been financing a program by the Armenian Red Cross Society that helps the refugees integrate into Armenian society more efficiently.14 Furthermore, the German International Cooperation (GIZ) and the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) have each been supporting this process.15 The ICMPD, which is a Vienna based organisation, deals with a number of migration-related projects and contributes to increasing the efficiency of border management.16 In November, 2016 a representation of it was opened in Armenia which, according to the Deputy Director General Gabriela Abado, will “intensify relations with Armenia.”17

NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT AND RESOLUTION Armenia’s cooperation with Europe regarding the peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue has continued in 2016 as well. Although the main negotiator of the conflict remains the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and its Minsk Group (MG), the EU has been considerably involved since its member states France (co-chair) and Germany (Presidency in 2016) have been a part of it. Unfortunately, the year saw numerous violations of the established ceasefire between Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan and resulted in an enormous armed struggle in the conflict zone.18 The “April War,” as the Armenian side refers to the conflict was the first major incident since the signing of the ceasefire agreement. The matter was immediately discussed during the plenary session of the European Parliament (EC), during which some MEP’s even demanded the inclusion of Nagorno-Karabakh in the peace negotiations and called for its full international recognition based on the 1991 referendum.19 Federica Mogherini, on the other hand, claimed that the conflict cannot have a military solution and the only resolution would be respecting the ceasefire and continuing the peace talks.20 Together with her counterparts Sergei Lavrov of Russia and the US State Secretary John Kerry, Mogherini also attended the mediated meeting between the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan and expressed her “willingness support the implementation of confidence-building measures in the conflict zone.”21

2016

2016 IN REVIEW As expected, relations between Armenia and the European Union continued to flourish in 2016. Armenia’s geopolitical location as well as its membership in a number of European organisations have helped to establish close links with the EU. Of all the areas of cooperation, the new EU-Armenia Framework Agreement was the most discussed topic in the Armenian media. The agreement, which is very similar to the Association Agreement, is supposed to grow and strengthen the comprehensive cooperation in all areas including political, economic and judicial. Many EU politicians, including, Commissioner J. Hahn and the EU’s ambassador to Armenia Piotr Switalski, have both noted that good progress has been achieved in the negotiations and the talks are expected to be over soon. The newly appointed Prime Minister Karen Karapetyan have likewise expressed “confidence that the parties will successfully maintain the positive dynamics and expand the frames of cooperation.”22 Throughout the year, Armenia’s media coverage also put a primary attention in discussing the country’s role in the Refugee Crisis. In a country, which has been experiencing significantly high emigration rates, accepting as many as 15,000 - 20,000 has gained a wide public attention and media concentration. Such primary focus is also associated with the fact that Syria hosts a large group of ethnic Armenians, who similar to other minorities, have become a major target with the rise of radical forces in the Levant. Last but not least, 2016 was full of pivotal events regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the Union continued its involvement as a mediator. The first half of the year saw a massive conflict escalation on the line of contact, which was classified as the worst clashes since the 1994 ceasefire. Although the main negotiator remains the OSCE MG, the European Union was actively involved in trying to urge the two sides to stop the fighting and respect the mutually signed ceasefire agreement. During the European Parliament’s special discussion on Nagorno-Karabakh, Mogherini stated: “We continue to insist on strict respect of the ceasefire and moving forward with peace talks. Particularly, targeting civilians must be ceased.”23 The following month in Vienna, Mogherini met the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well, as her Russian, American and OSCE MG counterparts to discuss the recent armed clashes in the area. An important outcome of the meeting was the agreement to take measures for creating monitoring mechanisms for investigating potential border incidents.24

Messages in the Media Statistics: Central Intelligence Agency: The World Factbook ex. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/am.html 1 “New EU-Armenia framework agreement will not comprise privileges for customs tariff.” Armenpress.am. October 21, 2015. Accessed December 22, 2016. http://armenpress.am/eng/news/822875/. 2 Hovhannisyan, Taguhi. “Garegin Melkonyan: “The content of EU-Armenia Agreement is the most important part.” Mediamax. September 27, 2016. Accessed December 22, 2016. http://www.mediamax.am/en/news/interviews/19963/. 3 “Armenia-EU Negotiations Launched.” Mediamax. December 08, 2015. Accessed December 22, 2016. http://www.mediamax.am/en/news/foreignpolicy/16356. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid. 6 “Armenia Wants to Negotiate Visa Liberalization with EU.” Mediamx. March 01, 2016. Accessed December 22, 2016. http://www.mediamax.am/en/news/foreignpolicy/17101. 7 “Johannes Hahn: EU and Armenia are entering a new phase.” Mediamax . November 17, 2016. Accessed December 22, 2016. http://www.mediamax.am/en/ news/interviews/20618/. 8 EU-Armenia Talks are Taking Place “In Positive Atmosphere.” Mediamax. October 24, 2016. Assessed December 22, 2016. http://www.mediamax.am/en/ news/society/20326/ 9 “New EU-Armenia Framework Agreement Will Not Comprise Privileges for Customs Tariff.” Armenpress.am. October 21, 2015. Accessed December 22, 2016. http://armenpress.am/eng/news/822875/. 10 “MP Bekaryan Hopes Armenia-EU Talks Will Be Completed in Spring, 2017.” Armenpress.am. December 16, 2016. Accessed December 22, 2016. https://armenpress.am/eng/news/872183/mp-bekaryan-hopes-armenia-eu-talks-will-becompleted-in-spring-2017.html. 11 “Yerevan Seeks Foreign Aid To Syrian Armenians.” March 30, 2016. Accessed December 22, 2016. http://www.azatutyun.am/a/27644841.html. 12 “EuFoA Warmly Welcomes Results of EU-Armenia Parliamentary Cooperation Committee’s Meeting.” Armenpress.am. January 21, 2016. Accessed December 22, 2016. http://armenpress.am/eng/news/832880/eufoa-warmly-welcomes-results-of-eu-armenia-parliamentary-cooperation-committee%E2%80%99s-meeting.html. 13 Ibid. 14 “EU to Continue Financing Projects on Support for Syrian Armenians.” Mediamax. October 25, 2016. Accessed December 22, 2016. http://www.mediamax.am/ en/news/society/20338/. 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid. 17 “Armenian Experience of Refugee Admission and Integration Can Serve as Example for Other Countries.” Armenpress.am. November 15, 2016. Accessed

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2016 December 22, 2016. http://armenpress.am/eng/news/867958/armenian-experience-of-refugee-admission-and-integration-can-serve-as-example-for-other-countries.html. 18 “NATO is deeply concerned over ceasefire violations in Karabakh conflict zone.” Armenpress.am. April 2, 2016. Accessed December 22, 2016. https:// armenpress.am/arm/news/841910/nato-deeply-concerned-over-ceasefire-violations-in-karabakh-conflict-zone.html 19 “MEPs Call on EU to End Putting Sign of Parity Over Nagorno Karabakh Issue.” Armenpress.am. April 12, 2016. Accessed December 22, 2016. http://armenpress.am/eng/news/843248/meps-call-on-eu-to-end-putting-sign-of-parityover-nagorno-karabakh-issue.html. 20 “Status quo is Unacceptable: Mogherini Urges to Transmute Situation in Nagorno Karabakh Into Opportunity for Peace.” Armenpress.am. April 13, 2016. Accessed December 22, 2016. http://armenpress.am/eng/news/843264/ status-qua-is-unacceptable-mogherini-urges-to-transmute-situation-in-nagorno-karabakh-into-opportunity.html. 21 “Armenia, Azerbaijan Presidents Meet In Vienna Over Nagorno-Karabakh.” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. May 16, 2016. Accessed December 22, 2016. http://www.rferl.org/a/armenia-azerbaijan-presidents-to-meet-in-vienna-over-karabakh/27736636.html. 22 “Karapetyan Will Advance EU-Armenia Ties, Switalski Says.” Mediamax. October 18, 2016. Accessed December 22, 2016. http://www.mediamax.am/en/news/ foreignpolicy/20250/. 23 “Status Quo is Unacceptable: Mogherini Urges to Transmute Situation in Nagorno Karabakh Into Opportunity for Peace.” Armenpress.am. April 13, 2016. Accessed December 22, 2016. https://armenpress.am/eng/news/843264/mogerini-priziyvaet-situaciyu-v-nkr-prevratit-v-vozmozhnost.html. 24 “Parties of Vienna Talks Agree Upon Installation of Monitoring mechanisms in Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Zone.” Armenpress.am. May 17, 2016. Accessed December 22, 2016. https://armenpress.am/eng/news/847441/parties-of-vienna-talks-agree-upon-installation-of-monitoring-mechanisms-in-nagorno-karabakh-conflict.html.

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Media sources 1- La Stampa founded in 1867. Owned by Gruppo Editoriale L’Espresso 2 - La Repubblica: founded in 1867 .Owned by Gruppo Editoriale L’Espresso 3 - Il Corriere della Sera: founded in 1876. Owned by RCS MediaGroup S.p.A

BY: TATIANA FERRARA-MENEZES 102

2016

THE BANKING CRISIS Italy has encountered a steady and lingering battle with the state of the banking sector.1 It is a continuing concern since 2015 and has yet to be resolved. For a number of years, the steady and uncontrolled increase in Italian sovereign debt has caused turmoil in the Italian banking system.2 Today, the overall burden has grown to approximately 330 billion euros.3, 4 In January, the European Central Bank requested information from six Italian banks regarding non-performing loans and bad portfolios.5 This has raised concern for government officials as well as investors as Italy is the third largest economy in the EU.6 In February, the Italian President Sergio Mattarella signed into law new rules governing reform of cooperative banks. This would guarantee the secularization of NPLs (Non-Performing Loans).7 This reform was meant to ease Italy’s cooperative institutions by turning their bad loans into asset-backed securities. These bad loans would in turn be offered for sale.8 Due to growing instability in the Italian economic sector, shares in financial institutions have plummeted, thus making Italy unappealing to investors.9 As of October, NPLs had fallen back to low levels recorded at the beginning of the financial crisis, as reported in Bank of Italy quarterly Economic Bulletin.10 In November, the Bank of Italy published a financial stability report which outlined the risk of volatility of the Italian stock markets with the impending referendum.11 Prime Minister Matteo Renzi’s solution would be to bail out the banks with state money. This would go against the EU rules that protect taxpayers from losses by banning the use of state aid to bail out the banks.12 After investigating, the European Commission released a press release reassuring that state aid will not be used to bail out the struggling banks and that Italy is in fact following the EU rules.13 14 15 By mid-year, Italy’s lack of urgency in resolving the problem has induced an increase in sovereign debt. The European Central Bank’s supervision division conducted an interview with Ignazio Angeloni, advisor to the Central Bank. The interview, conducted in May 2016 by La Repubblica, states that Italy’s banking system is heading in the right direction and on the right track.16 The central banks in Italy did not want to sell the equivalent of their bad loans in order to take a loss. The EU deemed Prime Minister Renzi’s efforts positive but felt that he needed to do more in order to stabilize and recover from this crisis.17 In an effort to stabilize the Italian economy, BPM (Banca Popolare di Milano) and Banco Popolare initiated a merger deal.18,19,20 This would provide a very strong financial position, saving $318 million annually.21 22 However, with the onset of Brexit, Italian shares took a further hit, thus making Italy economically weaker. In May, the Minister of Economy and Finance, Pier Carlo Padoan and the European Commission entered talks to resolve this situation.23 Minister Padoan came out of the talks assuring Italians that Italy is not in a situation of a systemic crisis.24 In light of the referendum results and Renzi’s resignation, uncertainty hits the banking sector.25,26 This outcome raises uncertainty of Italy’s relations with the rest of Europe and the Euro.27

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THE REFERENDUM Prime Minister Renzi campaigned for the majority of the year for a constitutional reform. The reform would alter the decision-making process in the nation. At this time, decisions and laws are required to pass through both houses of Senate for approval.28 Both have equal functions and powers. Under Prime Minister Renzi’s reform, power would be removed from the Senate and given to the lower house for approval. In the middle of last year, the Senate had given the approval for a constitutional reform.29 The so called Boschi bill would be transmitted to the Chamber of Deputies for their approval. In March 2016, the Chamber of Deputies gave the approval with a few amendments. With these few amendments, the Senate had to provide a second approval. After this second approval, it would then go to a general vote to the population of Italy.30 31 In May 2016, Prime Minister Renzi had commenced his campaign.32 The goal of Prime Minister Renzi was to make the decision-making process more streamlined, as well as making politics more accessible for the citizens. By the end of the month, 41% of the voters were considering a ‘yes’ verdict, while 26% were undecided. Subsequently, Prime Minister Matteo Renzi stated that he would give in his resignations should the reform not go through after the vote of the people.33,34,35 As uncertainty continued throughout the summer months, the rest of Europe was concerned. The Italians seemed to use this vote as a way to showcase their general discontent with the government. The dissatisfaction of the Italian people could spark a change in government, which could trigger uncertainty to financial sectors and Europe as a whole.36 As time progressed, Prime Minister Renzi began to realize that a ‘No’ vote could be a possibility.37 38 He began to be less visible to the Italian people and they in turn began to continually lose confidence in his stance.39 With this loss of confidence, it seemed that Italians began to look at the vote as a way of portraying their discontent of the governing party and the European Union. The rest of the world watched closely as events began to unfold40, perpetuating mixed opinions.41,42 On December 4th, 2016, the majority of Italy’s population voted against the reform put forth by Prime Minister Renzi.43 The “No” vote was the majority outcome at 60%.44 Thus, the uncertainty that followed thereafter led the European Union to wonder whether Italy, the third largest economy in the EU, would exit the union.45 With a banking system in peril, the vote could delay any proposed assurances to alleviate the banks. With an eminent political vote potentially on the rise, this could signal the coming of a government that is not in favour of maintaining close relations with the EU.46, 47

THE MIGRANT CRISIS

Italy has been facing a mass arrival of migrants and refugees for the past few years. In 2016, Italy has seen an estimated 173,069 arrivals so far.48 In a bid to alleviate the process, Italy’s Senate voted to eliminate the law that made entering

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2016 the country without paperwork illegal. This would eliminate more paperwork and alleviate the burden currently placed on jails already at capacity. This proved insufficient in dealing with the large numbers. In 2015, Italy spent 1.162 billion euros on emergency rescue and help for incoming migrants.49,50 By mid-year, the problem continued to escalate. Italy struggled to find accommodations for the thousands arriving to the country. Italy has come up with a plan to accommodate 2-3 migrants for every 1000 residents.51 This would be a way of encouraging more equal distribution of migrants to less populated areas and less turmoil for the larger cities. By August, the situation worsened with an additional 25,000 migrants arriving to the country. Italy had no choice but to turn away the majority of them.52 By September, the country had reported that it had simply no more money to deal with the migrant issue.53 In December, Italy agreed to contribute 22 million euros to an initiative established by the EU and IOM (International Organization for Migration). This contribution will be integrated in a trust fund for Africa to help strengthen support services and immediate needs of the migrants.54, 55, 56 By the end of the year, Italy is still dealing with the overflow of migrants.57, 58, 59 With Italy being a transit channel for thousands of migrants, who are destined to continue on to countries in northern Europe, Italy is struggling to deal with the overflow. As other countries have closed their borders, Italy is forced to accept and deal with the overflow. As the Italian Minister of the Interior, Angelino Alfano, stated, “Italy cannot simply put barbed wire in the Mediterranean Sea.”60, 61 With resources running out, Italy turned to the European Union for help.62 PM Renzi asked the EU for a Migration Compact asking Europe to work together to finance and reach other communal objectives. In this Migration Compact, Renzi has asked for the EU to issue joint bonds to use as a financial strategy for handling with the migration issue. The President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, agreed on the necessity of increase cooperation among all European countries for help.63, 64 During the Bratislava Summit, an informal meeting of 27 Heads of State on the future of the EU, Prime Minister Renzi pleaded with EU countries, stating that Italy cannot handle the migrant crisis alone. By the end of the year, Italy is perceived as a country that simply cannot get Europe’s help in this matter. The Italian people are seeing migrants take away Italian jobs.65 Prime Minister Renzi threatened to withhold Italian contributions and veto the budget, should the EU not come together to help. With no concise plan in dealing with the thousands of migrants that have been in limbo for months, along with the current changes in government, Italy’s migrant crisis is escalating. Italy does not have a distinct plan in place and the irregular migrants are on the rise, making up 80% of the total.67, 68, 69

2016 IN REVIEW This past year has been turbulent for Italy. The major discussions in the Italian media coverage depict that the country has been facing large challenges, including the ongoing migrant crisis, the banking situation, and the referendum.

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Messages in the Media The political unrest has taken over as a dominant topic of discussion in the Italian media, followed by the ongoing migrant crisis and the economic turmoil. The relationship between Italy and the European Union is at times stressed due to difference of opinion. With regards to the migrant crisis, Italy’s Prime Minister Renzi turned to the EU for aid and asked for the creation of the Migration Compact. However, the Italian government had to initiate this compact and take matters into their own hands prior to presenting it to EU. The Italian government has attempted to change laws, organize distribution of migrants and request a Migrant Compact with other EU countries. But these attempted solutions failed and Prime Minister Renzi continually criticized the EU and its member states for falling short of helping. Therefore, the EU has been a passive actor in helping Italy with the migrant crisis. With regards to the economic situation, Italy has been striving to cope with its banking crisis for some time, and 2016 has been no exception. The country spent the year tackling over 27.6 billion euros in non-performing loans (NPLs)70. Investors began to lose faith and started to withdraw their money as the crisis perpetuated. President Mattarella attempted to reassure investors by establishing new rules guaranteeing the securitization of NPLs and turning NPLs into asset-backed securities. This solution, however, was unsuccessful and stocks in all major Italian banks continued to decline. The EU was consulted when resources were starting to run out. In this case, the EU had acknowledged Prime Minister Renzi’s efforts to stabilize the situation. Moreover, the EU also recognized that using state funds to bail out these banks was not allowed and that Italy is in fact following the rules when it comes to economic policy that comes with being a member state of the European Union. Although the EU did acknowledge Italy in being proactive with dealing with their banking crisis, the EU did not take more measures to aid Italy in its economic downfall. On the political side, the referendum further perpetuated the now mixed relations between Italy and the European Union. When Prime Minister Renzi became distant from the media after a ‘No’ verdict was becoming the majority vote, the population of Italy began to lose confidence in his stance. The Italian people were increasingly dissatisfied with PM Renzi’s efforts and this was reflected in a rejection of his proposed reform. In turn, the EU began to question Italy’s position in the union as a member state. Since this matter brought forth the EU in questioning Italy’s allegiance, the relationship was beginning to be questioned as well. In conclusion, these three topics were the year’s most discussed in the Italian media. The ongoing migrant crisis along with the banking crisis have continued to escalate putting the country as a whole in an unpleasant state. Since these major topics all occurred at the same time, and gave rise to the issue with the state of Italy, the relations with the EU have been brought into discussion. From both the EU and Italy, steps have been discussed to improve the issues that the country is facing.

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2016 Statistics: Europa.eu , Eurotopics.net, Gruppoespresso.it, Reuters.com, Rcsmediagroup.it, Trecanni.it, Tradingeconomics.com 1 Di Maurizio, Maggi. “La grande fuga dalle banche italiane”. La Repubblica. January 19, 2016. Accessed on December 5, 2016. http://espresso.repubblica.it/ attualita/2016/01/19/news/il-grande-freddo-delle-banche-italiane-a-piazza-affari-1.247190?refresh_ce. 2 “Italian Banking Sector: Recent Developments and Reforms” Ministro dell’Economia e delle Finanze. August 3, 2016. Accessed on December 5, 2016. http://www.mef.gov.it/focus/sistema_bancario/ITALIAN_BANKING_SECTOR. pdf 3 “Pogliani, Matteo. “Elenco banche a rischio in Italia”. 6sicuro.it. December 10, 2016. Accessed on December 12, 2016. http://www.6sicuro.it/news/elenco-banche-rischio-italia 4 Massaro, Fabrizio. “Banche, perché crollano in Borsa”. Corriere Della Sera. January 28, 2016. Accessed on December 12, 2016. http://www.corriere.it/ economia/16_gennaio_28/banche-sofferenze-mercato-reclama-un-aggregazione-c8c4dcde-c5e1-11e5-b3b7-699cc16119c2.shtml 5 “UPDATE 1-ECB seeks bad loan data from UniCredit and other Italy banks”. Reuters. January 18, 2016. Accessed on March 13, 2017. http://www.reuters.com/ article/bancopopolare-ecb-idUSL8N15244L 6 “General government gross debt”. Ec.europa.eu. August 11, 2016. Accessed on December 6, 2016.http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table. do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tsdde410&plugin=1 7 “Mattarella firma il decreto, il governo tira dritto sulle Bcc. Altolà di Federcasse: servono modifiche”. La Stampa February 15, 2016. Accessed on December 6, 2016. http://www.lastampa.it/2016/02/15/italia/politica/mattarella-firma-il-decreto-il-governo-tira-dritto-sulle-bcc-altol-di-federcasse-servono-modifiche-MAcBj0JQ6twaOrckQCzHhN/pagina.html 8 “View from Italy: New Incentive Rules for the Unfreezing of Bad Loans of the Italian Bank”. Gtlaw.com. June 2, 2016. Accessed on December 5, 2016. http:// www.gtlaw.com/News-Events/Publications/Alerts/195424/View-from-Italy-NewIncentive-Rules-for-the-Unfreezing-of-Bad-Loans-of-the-Italian-Bank 9 “Rapporto sulla stabilità finanziaria n.2 – 2016”. Bancaditalia.it. November 18, 2016. Accessed on January 11, 2017. https://www.bancaditalia.it/media/notizia/ rapporto-sulla-stabilit-finanziaria-n-2-2016 10 “Economic Bulletin No. 4 – 2016”. Bancaditalia.it. October 2016. Accessed on December 4, 2016. https://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/bollettino-economico/2016-4/index.html 11 “Financial Stability Report No. 2 – 2016”. Bancaditalia.it. November 2016. Accessed on December 4, 2016. https://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/rapporto-stabilita/2016-2/index.html. 12 “Direzione Pd, Renzi alla Procura di Potenza: ‘Le loro inchieste mai arrivate a sentenza’”. La Repubblica. April 4, 2016. Accessed on December 3, 2016. http:// www.repubblica.it/politica/2016/04/04/news/direzione_pd-136891738/. 13 “Aiuti di Stato: la Commissione approva le misure di gestione delle attività de-

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Messages in the Media teriorate per le banche Ungheria e Italia”. Europa.eu. February 10, 2016. Accessed on January 9, 2017. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-279_it.htm 14 Conte, Valentina. “banche, nel maxidecreto non ci sono I rimborsi”. La Repubblica. February 10, 2016. Accessed on January 9, 2017. http://www.repubblica.it/ economia/2016/02/10/news/banche_nel_maxidecreto_non_ci_sono_i_rimborsi-133153683/?rss?ref=rephpnews 15 Galluzzo, Marco. “Renzi: niente tetti sui titoli di Stato per le banche, Italia pronta al veto”. Corriere Della Sera. February 17, 2016. Accessed on January 10, 2017. http://www.corriere.it/politica/16_febbraio_17/pronti-veto-titoli-stato-renzi-germania-132151a2-d598-11e5-bbd0-dbbf7f226638.shtml 16 Giugliano, Ferdinando. “Interview with La Repubblica”. Europa.eu. May 5, 2016. Accessed on January 9, 2017. https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/ press/interviews/date/2016/html/sn160505.it.html 17 “Banche, per Renzi l’accordo con la Ue è ‘a portata di mano’”. La Repubblica. July 11, 2016. Accessed on January 9, 2017. http://www.repubblica.it/economia/2016/07/11/news/banche_eurogruppo-143828108/ 18 Puledda, Vittoria. “Bpm-Banco, via libera dale assemblee: nasce il terzo polo italiano”. La Repubblica. October 15, 2016. Accessed on December 3, 2016. http:// www.repubblica.it/economia/finanza/2016/10/15/news/fusione_bpm-banco_al_ via_le_assemblee_castagna_un_salto_per_guardare_al_futuro_-149830493/ 19 Righi, Stefano. “Sì alla fusion: nasce BancoBpm L’approvazione delle assemblee”. Corriere Della Sera. October 15, 2016. Accessed on January 10, 2017. http://www.corriere.it/economia/16_ottobre_15/al-via-milano-verona-assemblee-bpm-banco-la-fusione-096c5d36-92a4-11e6-aedf-4afd1bcdf31b.shtml 20 Spini, Francesco. “Bpm e Banco Popolare, sì alle nozze. “Ora è nata la terza banca in Italia’”. La Stampa. October 16, 2016. Accessed on January 9, 2017. http://www.lastampa.it/2016/10/16/economia/bpm-e-banco-popolare-s-alle-nozze-ora-nata-la-terza-banca-in-italia-vMCbwhCDTkMMH5lU2RS3EJ/ pagina.html 21 Riccio, Sandra. “’Bpm-Banco, in tre anni oltre un miliardo di utili’”. La Stampa. May 17, 2016. Accessed on January 9, 2017. http://www.lastampa.it/2016/05/17/ economia/bpmbanco-in-tre-anni-oltre-un-miliardo-di-utili-ond0PpCAP5HAttp5LjfWwN/pagina.html 22 De Rosa, Frederico. “’Bpm-Banco darà stabilità al sistema fusion necessaria, segnale al Paese’”. Corriere Della Sera. October 11, 2016. Accessed on January 9, 2017. http://www.corriere.it/economia/16_ottobre_11/bpm-banco-dara-stabilita-sistema-farla-fallire-rischio-il-paese-a752ec9e-8fe4-11e6-a48d-80f1fedf0a64. shtml?refresh_ce-cp 23 Barbera, Alessandro. “Paodan: “In Italia ancora troppe banche ora servono altre aggregazioni’”. La Stampa. May 19, 2016. Accessed on December 3, 2016. http://www.lastampa.it/2016/05/19/economia/ in-italia-ancora-troppe-banche-ora-servono-altre-aggregazioni-4Dw8Nlsxz03eAMaW3Ccg nO/pagina.html 24 “Paodan: per le banche italiane non c’è nessun rischio di Sistema”. Corriere Della Sera. August 4, 2016. Accessed on December 3, 2016. http://www.corriere.

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2016 it/economia/16_agosto_04/padoan-le-banche-italiane-non-c-nessun-rischiosistema-8d4601da-59b9-11e6-9678-6c5e366d4cd4.shtml 25 Puato, Alessandro. “Le più solide e convenienti: la classifica delle banche italiane”. Corriere Della Sera. January 25, 2016. Accessed on December 4, 2016. http://www.corriere.it/economia/16_gennaio_25/piu-solide-convenienti-classifica-istituti-italiani-040c424c-c348-11e5-b326-365a9a1e3b10.shtml 26 Gianni, Massimo. “Banche, la tempesta perfetta”. La Repubblica. December 11, 2016. Accessed on January 9, 2017. http://www.repubblica.it/economia/2016/12/11/news/banche_la_tempesta_perfetta-153864061/ 27 “Banche in rally sulla speranza di un superamento della crisi”. La Stampa. December 12, 2016. Accessed on January 10, 2017. http://finanza.lastampa.it/ News/2016/12/12/banche-in-rally-sulla-speranza-di-un-superamento-della-crisi/MTE3XzIwMTYtMTItMTJfVExC 28 Rubino, Monica. “Referendum: cosa succede se vince il Si o il No alla riforma constituzionale”. October 11, 2016. Accessed on March 13, 2017. http://www. repubblica.it/politica/2016/10/11/news/riforma_costituzionale_come_funziona_oggi_cosa_succede_se_vince_il_si_-149557026/ 29 “ Come cambia la Constituzione col referendum? Tutte le risposte in due minuti e mezzo”. Corriere Della Sera. November 16, 2016. Accessed on March 13, 2017. http://video.corriere.it/come-cambia-costituzione-col-referendum-tutte-risposte-due-minuti-mezzo/f88f26c0-abd9-11e6-b10d-5f5dceb63e51?refresh_ce-cp 30 Ananasso, Agnese. “Riforma costituzionale, via libera della Camera: addio al bicameralism perfetto. Ora il referendum”. La Repubblica. April 12, 2016. Accessed on December 2, 2016. http://www.repubblica.it/politica/2016/04/12/news/ riforme_voto-137460476/ 31 “Referendum popolare il 17 aprile 2016”. Interno.gov.it. February 11, 2016. Accessed on December 2, 2016. http://www.interno.gov.it/it/notizie/referendum-popolare-17-aprile-2016 32 “Referendum: dichiarazione del presidente Renzi a Palazzo Chigi”. Governo.it. April 17, 2016. Accessed on December 3, 2016. http://www.governo.it/articolo/ referendum-dichiarazione-del-presidente-renzi-alle-2305-palazzo-chigi/4512 33 Martini, Gabriele. “I sondaggi sul referendum cambiano verso: fronte del sì giù, persi 5 punti in una settimana”. La Stampa. May 18, 2016. Accessed on December 2, 2016. http://www.lastampa.it/2016/05/18/italia/politica/i-sondaggi-sul-referendum-cambiano-verso-fronte-del-s-gi-persi-punti-in-una-settimana-MFt1xHb00e9LQqEuxUd9VI/pagina.html 34 Redazione Online. “Referendum, Boschi: <<Se vince no, anche io lascio. Veri partigiani voteranno Sî>>. E partono le proteste”. Corriere Della Sera. May 22, 2016. Accessed on December 3, 2016. http://www.corriere.it/politica/16_maggio_22/referendum-boschi-veri-partigiani-voteranno-si-43a7f594-201e-11e69888-7852d885e0fc.shtml9888-7852d885e0fc.shtml 35 “Referendum costituzionale, Renzi: “Se vince il No lascio la politica”. La Repubblica. May 11, 2016. Accessed on January 10, 2017. http://video.repubblica. it/politica/referendum-costituzionale-renzi-se-vince-il-no-lascio-la-politica/239141/239043.

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Messages in the Media Severino, Emanuele. “Referendum costituzione: il sì, il no Ma vince la tecnica”. Corriere Della Sera. June 26, 2016. Accessed on December 4, 2016. http://www. corriere.it/cultura/16_giugno_26/referendum-costituzionale-severino-emanuele-12a0ea7c-3ba4-11e6-9ec4-cc8bddb9414f.shtml. 37 “Il premier è pronto ad aprire per salvare il referendum”. Corriere Della Sera. June 30, 2016. Accessed on January 9, 2017. http://www.corriere.it/politica/16_ giugno_30/premier-pronto-ad-aprire-salvare-referendum-2c134852-3e37-11e68cc3-6dcc57c07069.shtml. 38 De Marchis, Goffredo. “La difesa di Renzi: “Vincono I volti giovani, la sfida è il referendum”. La Repubblica. June 20, 2016. Accessed on January 9, 2017. http:// www.repubblica.it/speciali/politica/elezioni-comunali-edizione2016/2016/06/20/ news/la_difesa_di_renzi_vincono_i_volti_giovani_la_sfida_e_il_referendum_-142408108/. 39 Martini, Fabio. “Idea Renzi, far slittare il referendum e avere più tempo per rilanciare il ‘sì’”. La Stampa. June 23, 2016. Accessed on January 10, 2017. http:// www.lastampa.it/2016/06/23/italia/politica/idea-renzi-far-slittare-il-referendume-avere-pi-tempo-per-rilanciare-il-s-K9C50afYhIVQtnAgHdqXLL/pagina.html. 40 Masterolilli, Paolo. “Trump: “L’Europa ha fatto troppi errori, ora via anche Italia e Francia”. La Stampa. June 26, 2016. Accessed on January 9, 2017. http://www. lastampa.it/2016/06/26/esteri/leuropa-ha-fatto-troppi-errori-ora-via-anche-italia-e-francia-mpn1OZdPFQ7AOrVnUIPf3J/pagina.html 41 Rubino, Monica. “Referendum, sul Financial Times: “Italia fuori dall’euro se vince il No”. Ma gli osservatori economici sono divisi”. La Repubblica. November 21, 2016. Accessed on January 10, 2017. http://www.repubblica.it/politica/2016/11/21/news/referendum_italiano_visto_dai_giornali_finanziari_esteri-152449063/ 42 Caprara, Maurizio. “Ungheria e Italia, due referendum sotto gli occhi dell’Unione europea”. Corriere Della Sera. September 30, 2016. Accessed on 10 January 10, 2017. http://www.corriere.it/opinioni/16_settembre_30/ungheria-italia-duereferendum-sotto-occhi-dell-ue-112327ea-8673-11e6-9ddf-2c9d29242dcc.shtml 43 Masuelli, Elena and Zaffarano, Francesco. “Referendum: vince il No al 60%, Renzi lascia”. December 5, 2016. Accessed on March 13, 2017. http://www. lastampa.it/2016/12/04/italia/speciali/referendum-2016/litalia-vota-il-referendum-seggi-aperti-fino-alle-yJgQJAtwN7kkaLypqgwaEK/pagina.html 44 Sala, Alessandro. “Referendum: costituzionale 2016 Il No al 60%, la riforma non passa Renzi: << Ho perso io, mi dimetto>>”. December 5, 2016. Accessed on March 13, 2017. http://www.corriere.it/referendum-costituzionale-2016/notizie/ referendum-costituzionale-2016-risultati-860b84aa-ba6a-11e6-99a2-8ca865283c 9e.shtml 45 Guerrera, Antonello. “Referendum, la stampa estera: “Ora rischia tutta l’Europa”. La Repubblica. December 5, 2016. Accessed on 6 December 6, 2016. http:// www.repubblica.it/speciali/politica/referendum-costituzionale2016/2016/12/05/ news/referendum_renzi_giornali_stranieri_stampa_estera_crisi-153509128/ 46 Sorgi, Marcello. “Cosa succede ora dopo le dimissioni di Renzi una crisi senza 36

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2016 precedenti le ipotesi di mattarella”. La Stampa. December 5, 2016. Accessed on December 6, 2016. http://www.lastampa.it/2016/12/05/italia/speciali/referendum-2016/cosa-succede-ora-dopo-le-dimissioni-di-renzi-una-crisi-senza-precedenti-le-ipotesi-di-mattarella-k4DQnQ2uEIM1vUMuLJvRmL/pagina.html 47 Iacoboni, Jacopo. “L’Italia del dopo-referendum”. La Stampa. December 5, 2016. Accessed on December 6, 2016. http://www.lastampa.it/2016/12/05/blogs/ arcitaliana/litalia-del-doporeferendum-QaBO0O95GkdxACSYnfe29H/pagina. html 48 “Mediterranean Migrant Arrivals in 2016: 204,311; Deaths 2,443”. Iom.int. May 31, 2016. Accessed on December 5, 2016. https://www.iom.int/news/mediterranean-migrant-arrivals-2016-204311-deaths-2443 49 Pochi, Vladimiro. “Accoglienza, ecco quanto ci costa davvero al di là delle propagande”. La Repubblica. November 8, 2016. Accessed on December 6, 2016. http://www.repubblica.it/solidarieta/immigrazione/2015/11/08/news/accoglienza-126912993/ 50 “Managing the Refugee Crisis. Italy: Progress Report”. Europa.eu. October 2, 2016. Accessed on December 16, 2016. https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/ sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/managing_the_refugee_crisis_-_italy_state_of_play_ report_20160210_en.pdf 51 Longo, Grazia. “Il piano: 3 migranti ogni mille abitanti”. La Stampa. July 18, 2016. Accessed on December 3, 2016. http://www.lastampa.it/2016/07/18/italia/ cronache/il-piano-migranti-ogni-mille-abitanti-E4vOtrBKE3ZQnd20VjmIfJ/ pagina.html 52 Polchi, Vladimiro. “Migranti, l’ondata di settembre verso l’Italia: ospitati già 145mila”. La Repubblica. August 31, 2016. Accessed on December 6, 2017. http:// www.repubblica.it/cronaca/2016/08/31/news/migranti_l_ondata_di_settembre_verso_l_italia-146925428/ 53 Zanichelli, Giulia. “Migranti, la protesta di Calais. I cittadini in strada: “Chiudete la giungla”. La Repubblica. September 5, 2016. Accessed on December 1, 2016. http://www.repubblica.it/esteri/2016/09/05/news/questione_migranti_calais_protesta_chiudete_la_giungla_-147200952 54 “EU and IOM launch initiative for migrant protection and reintegration in Arica along the Central Mediterranean migration routes”. Europa.eu. December 15, 2016. Accessed on January 10, 2017. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP16-4404_en.html 55 “Iniziativa di UE e OIM per la tutela e il reinserimento dei migranti in Africa lungo le rotte migratorie del Mediterraneo centrale”. Europa.eu. December 15, 2016. Accessed on January 10, 2017. https://ec.europa.eu/italy/news/20161215_ rotte_migratorie_it rotte_migratorie_it 56 Offeddu, Luigi. “L’Europa come mito e come realtà Storia di un’idea che significa pace”. Corriere Della Sera. December 23, 2016. Accessed on January 10, 2017. http://www.corriere.it/gli-allegati-di-corriere/16_dicembre_23/offeddu-eu-

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Messages in the Media ropa-iniziative-corriere-geopolitica-storia-a19b9bb8-c92b-11e6-bac6-8c33946b 31a6.shtml 57 Gorla, Simone. “A Como centri per stranieri pieni. E i migranti dormono per strada”. La Stampa. December 13, 2016. Accessed on January 10, 2017. http:// www.lastampa.it/2016/12/13/italia/cronache/a-como-centri-per-stranieri-pieni-e-i-migranti-dormono-per-strada-DNtfq9hjGm49q0yQPi4P0N/pagina.html 58 Sarzanini, Fiorenza. “Migranti, via a retate ed espulsioni Minniti: << Un Cie in ogni regione>>”. Corriere Della Sera. December 30, 2016. Accessed on January 9, 2017. http://www.corriere.it/cronache/16_dicembre_30/migranti-via-retate-edespulsioni-minniti-cie-ogni-regione-f076b8f2-cedb-11e6-b5e0-7665bdba646f. shtml 59 Bonni, Carlo. “Migranti irregolari, riaprono I Cie: “Raddoppieremo le espulsioni”. La Repubblica. December 31, 2016. Accessed on January 8, 2017. http:// www.repubblica.it/cronaca/2016/12/31/news/il_piano_controlli_straordinari_e_ un_centro_in_ogni_regione_per_identificare_e_allontanare_chi_non_ha_diritto_a_rimanere_-155151565/ 60 “ Migranti, Mattarella: “Italia sola nella crisi del Mediterraneo”. Alfano: “Non saremo l’Ellis Island d’Europa”. La Repubblica. October 13, 2016. Accessed on December 2, 2016. http://www.repubblica.it/politica/2016/10/13/news/migranti_ mattarella_italia_regge_sola_peso_crisi_umanitaria_mediterraneo-149704710/ 61 “La crisi dei migranti in sette punti”. Corriere Della Sera. Accessed on 4 December 2016. http://www.corriere.it/esteri/cards/crisi-migranti-sette-punti/ quante-sono-domande-asilo-approvate.shtml 62 D’Argenio, Alberto. “Migranti, lettera dell’Italia: “L’Ue non pùo lasciarci soli a gestire l’ondata dalla Libia”. La Repubblica. April 15, 2016. Accessed on January 10, 2017. http://www.repubblica.it/esteri/2016/04/15/news/migranti_lettera_ palazzo_chigi_ue-137662596/ 63 “Migration Compact”. Governo.it. Accessed on 10 January 2017. http://www. governo.it/sites/governo.it/files/immigrazione_0.pdf 64 Barana, Luca. “Che cos’è il migration compact: le proposte per l’Ue e l’Africa”. Rivitstaeuropae.eu. May 9, 2016. Accessed on December 6, 2016. http://www. rivistaeuropae.eu/politica/quello-ce-sapere-sul-migration-compact/ 65 Polchi, Vladimiro. “Migranti, gli otto falso miti da sfatare”. La Repubblica. October 13, 2016. Accessed on January 9, 2017. http://www.repubblica.it/cronaca/2016/10/13/news/migranti_falsi_miti_bonino-149688642/ 66 “Migranti: Renzi, inaccettabile che Ue lasci sola Italia”. La Repubblica. November 21, 2016. Accessed on December 3, 2016. http://www.repubblica.it/ ultimora/24ore/migranti-renzi-inaccettabile-che-ue-lasci-sola-italia/news-dettaglio/4671852 67 “La Commissione Ue: “Irregolari l’80% dei migranti che arrivano in Italia”. La Stampa. December 8, 2016. Accessed on January 8, 2017. http://www.lastampa. it/2016/12/08/italia/cronache/l-degli-arrivi-di-migranti-in-italia-sono-irregolari-secondo-la-commissione-europea-v40UviiN4Y0jxDkOI3elfK/pagina.html it/2016/12/08/italia/cronache/l-degli-arrivi-di-migranti-in-italia-sono-irregolari-secondo-la-commissione-europea-v40UviiN4Y0jxDkOI3elfK/pagina.html

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2016 “Migranti: 80% arrive in Italia irregolari”. Corriere Della Sera. December 8, 2016. Accessed on January 8, 2017. http://www.corriere.it/notizie-ultima-ora/Esteri/Migranti-arrivi-Italia-irregolari/08-12-2016/1-A_036070897.shtml 69 Custodero, Alberto. “Migranti, Ue: chiusa procedura contro Italia e Grecia su raccolta impronte”. La Repubblica. December 8, 2016. Accessed on January 8, 2017. http://www.repubblica.it/cronaca/2016/12/08/news/migranti_ue_chiusa_procedura_contro_italia_e_grecia_su_raccolta_impronte-153702089/ 70 Occorsio, Eugenio. “Cessione degli Npl, nel 2016 una “pipeline” da record”. La Repubblica. December 19, 2016. Accessed on March 13, 2017. http://www. repubblica.it/economia/affari-e-finanza/2016/12/19/news/cessione_degli_npl_ nel_2016_una_pipeline_da_record-154500182/ 68

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Messages in the Media

Media sources 1- Η ΚΑΘΗΜΕΡΙΝΗ founded in 1919. Owned by Alafouzos Group 2 - In.gr: founded in 1999. Owned by Lambrakis Press Group 3 - TA NEA: founded in 1931. Owned by Lambrakis Press Group

BY: IASON RODOPOULOS 114

2016

COMPETITION FOR BROADCASTING LICENCES Since September 20th, 2015, Greece has been governed by a coalition consisting of SYRIZA (Coalition of the Radical Left) party and the right-wing ANEL (Independent Greeks) party.1 One of the promises they made was that they would “put things in order in the broadcasting environment” because most private broadcasting channels in Greece have been operating without licence.2 On January 29th, the Greek Parliament (which has a SYRIZA-ANEL majority) approved the above decision, and voted in favour of a bill that gives Parliament the ability to decide upon the number of the licences distributed to private television channels.3 This was hardly criticized by the opposition, who argued that the bill was unconstitutional since, according to the Greek Constitution, only the ESR (Greek National Council for Radio and Television) can decide how many channels can have a licence.4 On February 11th, the Parliament decided that four licences would be sold in an auction-like competition, in the GGEE (General Secretary of Information and Communication), by the end of the year.5 According to Kathimerini, owned by Giannis Alafouzos (who is also the owner of SKAI, one of the TV channels that contested for a licence), the Greek government failed to give a satisfying answer to the question of “why only four licences and not more.”6 On April 6th, the journalists Stamatis Malelis and Aris Portosalte were expelled from ESIEA (Journalists’ Union of the Athens Daily Newspapers) because they had openly supported the “YES” option in the 2015 bailout referendum, while reporting on it.7 Many journalists, as well as academicians, protested the government’s decision and condemned the government that the actual reason of this decision was that the two journalists are leading figures in SKAI, which often criticizes the government’s actions.8 On July 4th, Kathimerini reported that the Council of State (Greece’s Supreme Administrative Court) would begin the process for finding out if the new law about the competition is unconstitutional.9 On August 6th, after hard criticism from the opposition, Minister of State Nikos Pappas insisted on the Parliament`s decision to allow only four licences.10 On August 11th, it was announced that nine candidate owners would contest in the competition.11 On August 30th, the candidates concentrated in the GGEE building, where they had to reside for all the days the process lasted. 12 Many media, including in.gr, stated that the conditions the owners had to stay and live in the building were “similar to Big Brother” as they were watched by cameras.13 On the same day, the government’s spokesperson Olga Gerovasili publicly condemned the leading opposition, conservative party New Democracy, for “defending the owners” (meaning that they defend corruption) because of the party’s criticism of the competition process.14 She also announced that any channel that would not win a licence in the competition would have to close within ninety days.15 In the early morning hours of September 2nd, it was announced

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Messages in the Media that the four companies that managed to secure a licence were Alafouzos Group (SKAI Channel), Kyriakou Group (ANT1 Channel), Marinakis Group (Owner of Olympiacos Football Club) and Kalogritsas Group.16 Immediately after the announcement of the results, ESIEA announced that at least 1800 employees (working in the MEGA, STAR, Alpha, Epsilon, Makedonia TV, and ART TV channels that did not secure a licence) would lose their jobs.17 The president of ESIEA stated that it is “impossible” for those channels to just “become black” due to legal and moral issues.18 Minister of Infrastructure Christos Spirtzis announced that if DIGEA (Digital Signal Provider) does not stop those channels’ signal within the next ninety days, “the state itself would do so.”19 The socialdemocratic party PASOK stated that Greece is entering a “news oligopoly.”20 Τhe Communist Party condemned the government for creating a favourable television environment.21 On September 3rd, Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras announced that the state made a profit of 246 million € from the competition and promised that this money would be used to “benefit vulnerable social groups.”22 This announcement caused questions about how easily this money would be earned by the state, in a period of a large economic crisis, and therefore whether “vulnerable social groups” would actually receive this money.23 On September 11th, Alexis Tsipras, when asked during an interview in the Thessaloniki International Trade Fair, whether the Parliament’s decision on broadcasting licences is unconstitutional, stated, that “there is no possibility for the Council of State to find it unconstitutional.”24 On September 26, Kalogritsas announced his withdrawal from the competition, due to the Group’s difficulty to pay for the licence it promised to buy. 25This withdrawal caused many questions about Kalogritsas’ role in the competition because Kalogritsas’ father seems to be a close friend to Minister Spirtzis, while the Kalogritsas Group has undertaken a large number of infrastructure projects during 2016, ordered directly by the Ministry of Infrastructure.26 On October 14th, Ministers Pappas and Spirtzis proposed a change in the new law about the broadcasting licences; a change that gave only five days to the channels that did not secure a licence, to stop broadcasting, or their owners would be imprisoned.27 This abrupt change in the law caused dysphoria within the media and opposition parties and New Democracy condemned the government for “leading the country to an anti-democratic path.”28 The proposal was eventually cancelled, following these protests.29 On October 17th, a sexual scandal concerning one of the Council of State’s judges came up.30 According to an article published on Kathimerini, the fact that this scandal came up just a few days before the CoS announces its decision, was quite bizarre, as well as the fact that the only newspaper that reprinted (from Zougla.gr, the online newspaper that revealed the scandal) personal information about the judge, was Avgi, the official newspaper of SYRIZA.31 On October 26th, the Council of State announced that the overall law about the broadcasting licences was unconstitutional, and therefore, all decisions taken upon should be cancelled.32 On November 10th, Pappas announced that the number of licences will be a decision “of all

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2016 political factors” (including the opposition)33. The leading opposition party New Democracy promised that “no channel will close.”34 As the broadcasting licences case remains unsolved, it is important to note that Malelis and Portosalte were finally found innocent, after a new decision by ESIEA, on October 6.35 The accusations made by opposition parties that the government intends to create a news “oligopoly”, as well as the controversial statements by some government members, has raised questions regarding pluralism in the Greek Television. The European Union is committed to free press, and it is quite worrying to see pluralism of the press to be disputed, in the twenty-first century.

GOLDEN DAWN TRIAL The ultra-right party Golden Dawn has been in trial since 2015, after its leader Nikos Michaloliakos, its parliamentary team, and tens of members were arrested in 2013.36 The Golden Dawn’s parliamentary team is condemned for “composition of a criminal organization”, for violent attacks against migrants and left-wing unionists37, and for the murder of Pavlos Fyssas, an anti-fascist musician.38 Michaloliakos and the other MPs were soon released after being held in custody for eighteen months (the maximum legal period of custody in Greece).39 The trial of Golden Dawn continued throughout 2016. The events concerning the Golden Dawn in 2016 began on January 28th, with a violent conflict in the area of Monastiraki, Athens, between Golden Dawn members and members of German far-right groups against anarchists.40 On March 18th, Giorgos Roupakias, the G.D. member accused for the assassination of Fyssas, was set free, after his custody period was finished.41 One month earlier, on February 22th, Ms. Vassiliki Thanou-Christofilou, President of Greece’s Supreme Court (and also interim Prime-Minister from August 27th to September 21th, 2015), had mentioned the lack of available court rooms for the case, and that it is extremely important for the government to take action in order to solve the problem.42 On February 23rd, Ms. Maria Lepenioti, President of Criminal Division of the Court of Appeal (were Golden Dawn is trialled), had asked all lawyers’ bars of Greece to allow “special permissions” to all lawyers that are involved with the Golden Dawn case, so that they can be free from other cases and focus on that specific one.43 Two months after Roupakias was released, and about four months after the trial had been stopped for the technical reasons stated above, the trial started again, on May 25th.44 Out of the sixty-eight-people trialled, only six were present, along with their lawyers.45 The trial was stopped two more times in May, one on the 26th46 , and one on the 30th.47 On May 30, after the trial was stopped, Maria Lepenioti publicly implied that the leadership of the Ministry of Justice is partly responsible for the slow progress of the trial.48 Minister of Justice Nikos Paraskevopoulos, responded on June 1st, that the government is doing its best in order for the trial to be finished quickly and accused Lepenioti that she indirectly blamed the Ministry of Justice for political intervention in the case. On June 2, one of the judges that had participated in Golden

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Messages in the Media Dawn’s questioning (the article does not state her name) received a package in her house that contained a threatening letter, as well as seven flares.50 On June 9th, the trial was eventually moved to the Athens Court of Appeal, after months of requests from Lepenioti and Thanou.51 On June 10th, Lepenioti ordered all charged members of the Golden Dawn to be present in the trials, as very few of them have consistently be present.52 On June 16th, it was announced that Golden Dawn MP Ilias Kasidiaris’ trial for threatening police officers in 2012 was to be moved to November 2017.53 On June 27th, one of the witnesses that were present in the murder of Fyssas, recognized three of the people charged and stated that they, along with about ten more people, were persecuting him and his friends, during the night of the murder, and were trying to hit them with bats that had nails on them, until police came.54 He also mentioned that they were shouting “we will slaughter you” at Fyssas and his friends.55 At the same day, Fyssas’ parents complained that, while entering the Court, they received threats from Roupakias and other Golden Dawn people.56 On July 4th, the policeman that saw Fyssas bleeding on the sidewalk, stated that he believed the stab was professional, and that the murderer was trained, implying that Golden Dawn trains its members to perform murders.57 On July 11th, another policeman that was present in the murder controversially responded “I do not remember” when asked about the details of the event.58 On July 15th, a thirty-six years old man attempted to enter the court holding a knife.59 On September 5, after having stopped for the summer break, the trial started again.60 On September 16th, anti-fascist groups, workers’ unions and municipalities organized a three-day mobilization because there is still no court decision concerning the Golden Dawn’s future, despite that three years have passed after the murder of Fyssas.61 On September 19th, Abou Hammad, an Egyptian fisherman that was attacked with this family in 2012, stated that he was personally attacked by a “leading” member of the Golden Dawn.62 A police officer also confirmed that those who performed the attack were wearing t-shirts of the party.63 On October 3rd, the POESY (Panhellenic Association of Editors’ Unions) reported that during the past few months, many journalists covering the refugee crisis in the islands of Lesvos and Chios have received multiple attacks from far right organizations.64 On October 31st, Sotiris Poulikogiannis, a left-wing unionist that was sent to the hospital after receiving, along with other unionists, a violent attack from people that looked like members of the Golden Dawn, stated that “there was an organized attack” against them.65 The case of Golden Dawn remains open as of now (January 2017) and there is still no court decision about it. Despite the trial, the popularity of Golden Dawn increased during 2016.66 The rise in the popularity of a far-right party that is accused of violent attacks and criminal activity, is alarming for the European Union, if it is considered that European nationalist parties have also increased their popularity, with some of them, such as the French Front National, even claiming governance. 67

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REFUGEE CRISIS AND POTENTIAL EXPULSION FROM SCHENGEN ZONE Since 2015, the inability of the Greek government to control the number or refugees that enter the country, has caused some political voices in Europe addressing the option of Greece to be expelled from the Schengen Area.68 On January 3rd, Dimitris Avramopoulos, European Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs, and Citizenship, stated that the Schengen Treaty must be defended.69 On January 23th, the then Minister of External Affairs of Germany, Frank-Walter Steinmeier stated that Greece’s expulsion from Schengen Zone would be a “pseudo-solution.”70 On January 24th, it was revealed during a meeting between Steinmeier and the Greek Minister of External Affairs Nikos Kotzias that Turkey has been asking for granting of Visa card to its citizens by the European Union, in exchange for keeping as many refugees as possible inside Turkey.71 On January 25th, Johanna Mikl-Leitner, Austrian Minister of External Affairs, publicly threatened with a “temporary block” of Greece from the Schengen Zone.72 On October 26th, the European Ministers of External Affairs gave Greece a two-month period to prepare five new refugee hotspots (refugee camps).73 This was also supported by the President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker.74 On January 28th, Olga Gerovasili stated that there has been an attempt of “communicative isolation” towards Greece.75 On the same day, the European Commission gave Greece a three-month period in order to take measures to control the refugee crisis.76 On January 29th, SYRIZA European Parliament Member Dimitris Papadimoulis stated that “a small Schengen is equal to no Schengen.”77 Avramopoulos stated on the same day that there is no option for any country to be expelled from Schengen.78 However, on January 30th, the Greek Minister of Immigration Policy Giannis Mouzalas stated that “a Grexit from Schengen is still possible.”79 On February 5, after having met with Bernard Cazeneuve and Thomas de Maiziere, Ministers of Interior for France and Germany, Prime-Minister Tsipras stated that “Greece is having a huge weight and every one must show responsibility.”80 On February 9th, President of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdoğan publicly threated that it would be very easy for Turkey to open its borders and send thousands of refugees to Greece and Bulgaria if the European Union does notgrant € 3 billion to Turkey for the next year, instead of the next two years that was initially promised.81 On February 10th, the Government of Greece expressed its worry because NATO got involved, along with FRONTEX, in the control of the Greco-Turkish borders.82 On February 12th, Mouzalas caused confusion when he stated that a possibility of a Grexit from the Schengen Zone might cost 1 billion euros to Greece, but it would still be manageable.83 On February 17th, the President of the European Council Donald Tusk expressed his support towards Greece concerning its future in Schengen.84 On the same day, German Chancellor Angela Merkel openly opposed the closing of the Greece-FYROM borders.85 President Jean-Claude Juncker also agreed with Merkel.86 On February

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Messages in the Media 23rd, a meeting between Turkey and the European Union took place.87 On the same day, it was announced that granting of Visa to non-Schengen citizens has become easier.88 On March 3rd, Tusk publicly asked from refugees to stop entering Greece.89 On March 7th, the terms of agreement between Turkey and European Union were announced.90 According to the agreement, more financial help and support would be given to Greece for guarding its borders, and a plan was built so that a large number of refugees would return back to Turkey.91 Turkey’s demand for more financial help became accepted as it was announced that the country would receive € 3 billion until the end of March, as well as “more money” until the end of the year.92 On March 18, the FYROM government started pushing for their country’s entry to the European Union and NATO.93 On May 4, the European Commission proposed the extension of the use of FRONTEX in Greco-Turkish borders for another six months.94 Until June 22, two large new hotspots had been created in Athens: the first in the port of Piraeus and the second in the inactive Ellinikon International Airport.95 On September 29, Kathimerini reported that from the 7000 refugees that were entering Greece every day in October 2015, the number has decreased to only 85.96 On October 26, the European Commission proposed the extension of the borders’ control for another three months, while Avramopoulos stated that around 60,000 refugees are trapped in Greece.97 On November 6, Jean-Claude Juncker stated that “Turkey is getting away from Europe” after Turkey’s refusal to repeal its anti-terrorist law, established after the events that followed the July 2016 failed coup d’état against the Turkish government.98 On December 8, the European Commission proposed the restoration of the Dublin Agreement from March 2017, which will allow members of the E.U. to send any immigrants that will enter E.U. after that time, back to the country they entered from.99 The case has become more complicated due to the suspicions that Muslim terrorists, disguised as refugees, had managed to enter Europe through Greece. On January 10, it was revealed that Ahmed Dahmani, who was involved in the 2015 Paris attack, was in Greece, in August 2015, and had entered the country through the island of Leros.100 On February 19, it was revealed that a suspicious Iraqi man, who was travelling through Greece with two fake passports, was arrested. 101On July 24th, it was announced by the Greek AntiTerrorist Service that four immigrants, who were arrested in Athens earlier that month, and were charged for making fake passports and selling them to refugees, has secret connections with ISIS supporters.102 On August 13th, Europol started investigating for possible terrorist presence in the Greek refugee camps.103 On September 11, it was revealed that there was an “electronic communication” between Raqqa and the two Paris attack terrorists, when they were at Leros.104 On September 27th, a French man that entered Greece through Turkey was arrested and expelled from Greece due to suspicions of being related to ISIS.105 It was a bit of a paradox year for German media. Unemployment continued to decrease sharply, while at the same time income rose faster than prices did.106 Despite these excellent economic results, there appears to be a

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2016 general feeling of pessimism in the country. Much of this has to do with the struggles during the negotiations for CETA. While ultimately it passed all the challenges so far, the agreement has yet to be ratified by the parliament of each EU member state. The massive popular uproar against it signify growing discontent with Germany and the EU. Further pessimism is derived from the ongoing refugee crisis. Even though the number of new refugees has been drastically reduced and the governing coalition has taken measures to ensure strict border controls, doubt remains. Particular worry exists around the integration of asylum seekers into German society.107 All of this pessimism has fueled the populist rhetoric of the AFD that continuous to gain popularity and has had some electoral success. Domestically, German media coverage mainly covered the reactions and protests to the negotiations surrounding CETA, the continuous refugee crisis, with a particular focus on the violent terrorist attacks, most notably in Berlin, and the rise of right-wing violence and of the populist AFD. Internationally, German media coverage put emphasis on Germany’s role within the EU. Particular attention was given to the differing opinions on and challenges to CETA. However, the apparent disconnect between EU member states among each other or with EU institutions was further elaborated upon in debates surrounding the closing and guarding of EU borders, the EU-Turkey deal and other issues related to the refugee crisis. Finally, the international rise of populism that accompanies the popularity of the AFD in Germany played a significant role in the German media coverage.

2016 IN REVIEW

For Greece, 2016 was a year of constitutional and political questioning. The fact that the Greek government did not (according to the opposition) provide a satisfying answer to the question of why only four (instead of more) licences could be sold caused questions about the constitutionality of the “order” that the government intends to put in the media environment. This question became even more intense after the Council of State decided that the broadcasting licences bill and competition was unconstitutional. In the first days of 2017, there was an announcement that the Lambrakis Press Group (owner of In.gr and TA NEA among others) declared bankruptcy and will soon be managed by Vasilis Moulopoulos, who is a member of SYRIZA. This has caused controversy over the future objectivity of the Greek media.107 The opposition’s statement that the government intends to create an “oligopoly” through the competition process is worrying for a developed country that is part of the European Union and the Eurozone. Also worrying is the fact that three years after the murder of Fyssas, there is still no court decision regarding Golden Dawn’s legality. As it became evident through 2016, the Greek judicial system is extremely slow in effectively managing such complicated cases. Meanwhile, Maria Lepenioti’s implication that the government might not particularly interested in helping Justice with the

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Messages in the Media Golden Dawn case, makes the situation even more difficult. The inability of a European countryâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s judicial system to decide in a short time about the legal (or illegal) future of an ultra-right party that is charged with at least one murder, and many violent attacks, is challenging for the European Union, during a period of rising xenophobia and nationalism across the continent. Finally, Greeceâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s inability to effectively control its borders, along with how many (and which) refugees enter the country every year, has become problematic for the European Union. As a result, there exists the possibility for Greece to be expelled from the Schengen Zone. Such action would cause many questions regarding the future of European integrity and the vision of a united Europe. As the refugee crisis, one of the largest challenges the European Union ever had, remains unsolved, it is worthy to mention that on September 6th, two Greek volunteers, helping newly-arrived refugees, were awarded the Nansen Refugee Award by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

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2016 Statistics: http://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries/membercountries/greece_en, https://www.esm.europa.eu/press-releases/esm-boarddirectors-approves-%E2%82%AC75-billion-disbursement-greece 1 Βαρβιτσιώτη, Ελένη. “Μέσα Φεβρουαρίου, η νέα διορία για hotspots.” Η ΚΑΘΗΜΕΡΙΝΗ, January 26, 2016. http://www.kathimerini.gr/847068/article/epikairothta/politikh/mesafevroyarioy-h-nea-dioria-gia-hotspots. 2 In.gr. “Τσίπρας: Θα βάλουμε τάξη στο ραδιοτηλεοπτικό τοπίο.” February 11, 2016. http://news.in.gr/greece/article/?aid=1500057740 article/?aid=1500054972. 3 In.gr. “Πέρασε η τροπολογία Παππά για τις τηλεοπτικές άδειες.” January 29, 2016.http://news.in.gr/greece/article/?aid=1500054972. 4 In.gr. “Πέρασε η τροπολογία Παππά για τις τηλεοπτικές άδειες.” January 29, 2016.http://news.in.gr/greece/article/?aid=1500054972 5 TA NEA. “Οξεία αντιπαράθεση στη Βουλή για τις τηλεοπτικές άδειες - Πέρασε με 154 ψήφους η τροπολογία.” February 11, 2016. http://www.tanea.gr/news/politics/article/5333763/sthn-olomeleia-ths-boylhs-htropologia-gia-tis-thleoptikes-adeies/. 6 ΤΣΙΧΛΙΑΣ, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. “Γιατί μόνο τέσσερις άδειες;.” Η ΚΑΘΗΜΕΡΙΝΗ, February 13, 2016. http://www.kathimerini.gr/849357/opinion/epikairothta/politikh/giati-mono-tesseris-adeies. 7 In.gr. “Διαγραφές δημοσιογράφων από την ΕΣΗΕΑ για τη στάση τους στο δημοψήφισμα.” April 6, 2016. http://news.in.gr/greece/article/?aid=1500069861. 8 ΠΑΛΑΙΟΛΟΓΟΣ, ΓΙΑΝΝΗΣ. “Δίωξη φρονήματος οι διαγραφές ΕΣΗΕΑ.” Η ΚΑΘΗΜΕΡΙΝΗ, April 29, 2016. http://www.kathimerini.gr/858198/article/epikairothta/ellada/diw3h-fronhmatos-oi-diagrafes-eshea. 9 ΜΑΝΔΡΑΒΕΛΗΣ, ΠΑΣΧΟΣ. “Η Δημοκρατία στο ΣτΕ.” Η ΚΑΘΗΜΕΡΙΝΗ, July 3, 2016. http://www.kathimerini.gr/866024/opinion/epikairothta/politikh/h-dhmokratiasto-ste. 10 In.gr “Παππάς: Οι τηλεοπτικές άδειες θα είναι τέσσερις.” August 6, 2016.http:// news.in.gr/greece/article/?aid=1500094341. 11 In.gr. “Εννέα στην κούρσα για τις 4 τηλεοπτικές άδειες.” TA NEA, August 11, 2016.http://news.in.gr/greece/article/?aid=1500095126. 12 Ιερίδης, Χρήστος. “Επιχείρηση τηλεκοντρόλ: 8(;) υποψήφιοι για 4 άδειες.” August 30, 2016. http://www.tanea.gr/news/greece/article/5385146/8-ypopshfioi-gia-4-adeie. 13 In.gr. “Σε συνθήκες Big Brother η δημοπράτηση των τηλεοπτικών αδειών.” August 30, 2016. http://news.in.gr/greece/article/?aid=1500097986. 14 In.gr. “Στην «αρένα» οι υποψήφιοι καναλάρχες για μία άδεια.” August 30, 2016. http://news.in.gr/greece/article/?aid=1500098189.

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Messages in the Media In.gr. “Γεροβασίλη: Σε 90 ημέρες «μαύρο» σε όσα κανάλια δεν πάρουν άδεια.” August 30, 2016.http://news.in.gr/greece/article/?aid=1500098127. 16 Η ΚΑΘΗΜΕΡΙΝΗ. “Οι πρώτες αντιδράσεις μετά τη δημοπρασία των τηλεοπτικών αδειών.” September 2, 2016. http://www.kathimerini.gr/873104/article/epikairothta/ellada/oi-prwtes-antidraseis-meta-th-dhmoprasia-twn-thleoptikwn-adeiwn. 17 ln.gr. “Ανησυχία στους εργαζόμενους των καναλιών που δεν πήραν άδεια.” September 2, 2016. http://news.in.gr/greece/article/?aid=150009894418 In.gr. “ΕΣΗΕΑ: Δεν μπορεί να πέσει μαύρο στα κανάλια που δεν πήραν άδεια.” September 2, 2016.http:// news.in.gr/greece/article/?aid=1500098856 19 In.gr. “Σπίρτζης: Αν η Digea δεν κόψει το σήμα, θα το κάνει η πολιτεία.” September 2, 2016. http://news.in.gr/greece/article/?aid=1500098780. 20 In.gr. “ΠΑΣΟΚ: Οδηγούμαστε σε ολιγοπώλιο στην ενημέρωση.” September 2, 2016. http://news.in.gr/greece/article/?aid=1500098832 21 In.gr. “ΚΚΕ: Η κυβέρνηση επιδιώκει ένα φιλικό γι’αυτήν τηλεοπτικό περιβάλλον.” September 2, 2016.http://news.in.gr/greece/article/?aid=1500098833/ 22 Αντωνίου, Δώρα. “Τσίπρας: Το τίμημα πρόκειται να δοθεί σε ευπαθείς ομάδες.” Η ΚΑΘΗΜΕΡΙΝΗ, September 3, 2016. http://www.kathimerini.gr/873165/ article/epikairothta/politikh/tsipras-to-timhma-prokeitai-na-do8ei-se-eypa8eisomades. 23 Ζούλας, Κωνσταντίνος. “«Καζίνο, με χτυπήματα των 500 χιλιάδων».” Η ΚΑΘΗΜΕΡΙΝΗ, September 4, 2016. http://www.kathimerini.gr/873353/article/ epikairothta/ellada/kazino-me-xtyphmata-twn-500-xiliadwn. 24 In.gr. “Τεταμένοι διάλογοι δημοσιογράφων με Τσίπρα για τις τηλεοπτικές άδειες.” September 11, 2016. http://news.in.gr/greece/article/?aid=1500100613 25 TA NEA. “Αποχώρησε ο Καλογρίτσας από τη διεκδίκηση της τηλεοπτικής άδειας.” September 26, 2016. http://www.tanea.gr/news/greece/article/5392574/ emplokh-me-ton-kalogritsa-zhthse-prothesmia-48wrwn-aporrifthhke-to-aithma/. 26 Μανδραβέλης, Πάσχος. “Συμπτώσεις και «ηθικό πλεονέκτημα».” Η ΚΑΘΗΜΕΡΙΝΗ, September 18, 2016. http://www.kathimerini.gr/875351/opinion/epikairothta/politikh/symptwseis-kai-h8iko-pleonekthma 27 ΤΑ ΝΕΑ. “Τροπολογία Παππά: Λουκέτο σε... 5 ημέρες στα κανάλια που δεν πήραν άδεια.” October 14, 2016. http://www.tanea.gr/news/greece/article/5398241/tropologia-pappa-loyketo-sta-kanalia-se-pente-hmeres/ 28 Η ΚΑΘΗΜΕΡΙΝΗ. “ΝΔ: Η κυβέρνηση οδηγεί τη χώρα σε αντιδημοκρατικό κατήφορο.” October 14, 2016. http://www.kathimerini.gr/879276/article/epikairothta/politikh/nd-h-kyvernhsh-odhgei-th-xwra-se-antidhmokratiko-kathforo 29 In.gr. “Κατατέθηκε για να αποσυρθεί τελικά η τροπολογία για το «μαύρο» στα κανάλια.” October 14, 2016. http://news.in.gr/greece/article/?aid=1500108248 30 Μανδραβέλης, Πάσχος. “Η ροζ «Αυγή».” Η ΚΑΘΗΜΕΡΙΝΗ, October 26, 2016. http://www.kathimerini.gr/880885/opinion/epikairothta/politikh/h-rozaygh. 15

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2016 Μανδραβέλης, Πάσχος. “Η ροζ «Αυγή».” Η ΚΑΘΗΜΕΡΙΝΗ, October 26, 2016 http://www.kathimerini.gr/880885/opinion/epikairothta/politikh/h-roz-aygh 32 In.gr. “ΣτΕ: Αντισυνταγματικός ο νόμος Παππά για τις τηλεοπτικές άδειες.” October 26, 2016. http://news.in.gr/greece/article/?aid=1500110934 33 Παππάς: Αποσύρει το «4» για τις τηλεοπτικές άδειες. “Παππάς: Αποσύρει το «4» για τις τηλεοπτικές άδειες.” November 10, 2016. http://news.in.gr/greece/ article/?aid=1500113935. 34 ΤΑ ΝΕΑ. “ΝΔ: Διασφαλίσαμε ότι κανένα κανάλι δεν πρόκειται να κλείσει.” November 10, 2016. http://www.tanea.gr/news/politics/article/5405420/nd-diasfalisame-oti-kanena-kanali-den-prokeitai-na-kleisei/ 35 In.gr. “ΕΣΗΕΑ: Αθώοι Μαλέλης, Πορτοσάλτε και Κονιτόπουλος.” October 6, 2016. http://news.in.gr/greece/article/?aid=1500106305 36 In.gr. “Χειροπέδες στην ηγετική ομάδα της Χρυσής Αυγής.” September 28, 2013. http://news.in.gr/greece/article/?aid=1231267017 37 Μουστάκα, Μίνα. “Ενταση στη δίκη της ΧΑ.” ΤΑ ΝΕΑ, June 10, 2016. http:// www.tanea.gr/news/greece/article/5365998/entashsth-dikh-ths-xa/ 38 In.gr. “Πήγαμε οργανωμένα στο Κερατσίνι, παραδέχτηκε ο Γ.Ρουπακιάς.” October 15, 2013. http://news.in.gr/greece/article/?aid=1231269355 39 Η ΚΑΘΗΜΕΡΙΝΗ. “Κράτηση κατ’ οίκον για τον Ν. Μιχαλολιάκο, αποφυλακίστηκε και ο Ιω. Λαγός.” March 21, 2015. http://www.kathimerini. gr/808216/article/epikairothta/politikh/krathsh-kat-oikon-gia-ton-n-mixaloliako-apofylakisthke-kai-o-iwlagos 40 ΤΑ ΝΕΑ. “Συγκεντρώσεις εκτός Κέντρου από μέλη της Χρυσής Αυγής και αντιεξουσιαστές - επτά προσαγωγές.” January 30, 2016. http://www.tanea.gr/ news/greece/article/5330753/sygkentrwseis-ektos-kentroy-apo-melh-ths-xryshs-ayghs-kai-antieksoysiastes/ 41 ΤΑ ΝΕΑ. “Αποφυλακίστηκε με περιοριστικούς όρους ο Γιώργος Ρουπακιάς.” March 18, 2016. http://www.tanea.gr/news/greece/article/5343789/apofylakizetai-o-giwrgos-roypakias/ 42 ΤΑ ΝΕΑ. “Εκκληση Θάνου για τη δίκη της ΧΑ με αφορμή την αποφυλάκιση Ρουπακιά.” February 22, 2016. http://www.tanea.gr/news/greece/article/5336914/ ekklhsh-thanoy-gia-th-dikh-ths-xa-me-aformh-thn-apofylakish-roypakia/ 43 Μουστάκα, Μίνα. “Να δοθεί άδεια στους δικηγόρους για τη δίκη της ΧΑ ζήτησε η πρόεδρος του δικαστηρί.” ΤΑ ΝΕΑ, February 23, 2016. http://www. tanea.gr/news/greece/article/5337121/na-dothei-adeia-stoys-dikhgoroys-gia-thdikh-ths-xa-zhthse-h-proedros-toydikasthrioy/ 44 Μουστάκα, Μίνα. “Ξεκίνησε και πάλι η δίκη της Χρυσής Αυγής.” ΤΑ ΝΕΑ, May 25, 2016. http://www.tanea.gr/news/greece/article/5361254/ksekinhse-kai-palih-dikh-ths-xryshs-ayghs/ 45 Μουστάκα, Μίνα. “Ξεκίνησε και πάλι η δίκη της Χρυσής Αυγής.” ΤΑ ΝΕΑ, May 25, 2016. http://www.tanea.gr/news/greece/article/5361254/ksekinhse-kai-palih-dikh-ths-xryshs-ayghs/ 46 Μουστάκα, Μίνα. “Διεκόπη για τη Δευτέρα η δίκη της Χρυσής Αυγής.” ΤΑ ΝΕΑ, May 26, 2016. http://www.tanea.gr/news/greece/article/5361591/diekophews-th-deytera-h-dikh-ths-xryshs-ayghs/ 31

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2016 του Παύλου Φύσσα.” September 16, 2016. http://www.tanea.gr/news/greece/ article/5390001/trihmero-kinhtopoihsewn-gia-ta-tria-xronia-apo-th-dolofonia-toy-payloy-fyssa/62 ΤΑ ΝΕΑ. “Υψηλόβαθμο στέλεχος της ΧΑ «έδειξε» ο Αιγύπτιος ψαράς που καταθέτει στη δίκη.” September 19, 2016. http://www. tanea.gr/news/greece/article/5390707/ypshlobathmo-stelexos-ths-xa-edeikse-o-aigyptios-psaras-poy-katathetei-sth-dikh/ 63 ΤΑ ΝΕΑ. “Οι δράστες της επίθεσης στους αιγύπτιους αλιείς «φορούσαν μπλούζες της ΧΑ».” October 11, 2016. http://www.tanea.gr/news/greece/article/5397042/oi-drastes-ths-epitheshs-stoys-aigyptioys-alieis-foroysan-mployzesths-xa/ 64 ΤΑ ΝΕΑ. “Η ΠΟΕΣΥ καταγγέλλει τη δράση ακροδεξιών στοιχείων στη Λέσβο και τη Χίο.” October 3, 2016. http://www.tanea.gr/news/greece/article/5394616/h-poesy-kataggellei-th-drash-akrodeksiwn-stoixeiwn/ 65 ΤΑ ΝΕΑ. “Μάρτυρας για την επίθεση της ΧΑ: «Λειτούργησαν κατ’ εντολή εργολάβων».” October 31, 2016. http://www.tanea.gr/news/greece/article/5402310/anoigei-h-dikografia-gia-thn-epithesh-kata-melwn-toy-pame-stoperama/ 66 ΤΑ ΝΕΑ. “Δημοσκόπηση Pulce: Προβάδισμα 11% της ΝΔ έναντι του ΣΥΡΙΖΑ.” December 6, 2016. http://www.tanea.gr/news/politics/article/5412515/ dhmoskophsh-pulse-probadisma-11-ths-nd-enanti-toy-syriza/ 67 Η ΚΑΘΗΜΕΡΙΝΗ. “Φιγιόν-Λεπέν: Η μεγάλη αναμέτρηση για τις προεδρικές της Γαλλίας το 2017.” November 30, 2016. http://www.kathimerini.gr/885841/ article/epikairothta/politikh/figion-lepen--h-megalh-anametrhsh-gia-tisproedrikes-ths-gallias-to-2017 68 ΤΑ ΝΕΑ. “Χριστοδουλοπούλου: «Η Ελλάδα δεν θα βγει από “Σένγκεν” και “Δουβλίνο”».” March 12, 2015. http://www.tanea.gr/news/politics/article/5218323/xristodoylopoyloy-h-ellada-den-tha-bgei-apo-segken-kai-doyblino/ 69 Η ΚΑΘΗΜΕΡΙΝΗ. “Αβραμόπουλος: Η συνθήκη Σένγκεν πρέπει να περιφρουρηθε.” January 6, 2016. http://www.kathimerini.gr/844742/article/epikairothta/politikh/avramopoylos-h-syn8hkh-sengken-prepei-na-perifroyrh8ei 70 Reuters. “Σταϊνμάγερ: Ψευδολύση η αποπομπή της Ελλάδας από τη Ζώνη Σένγκεν.” Η ΚΑΘΗΜΕΡΙΝΗ, January 23, 2016. http://www.kathimerini. gr/846906/article/epikairothta/politikh/stainmager-yeydolysh-h-apopomph-thselladas-apo-th-zwnh-sengken 71 Νέδος, Βασίλης. “Τι συζητούν στο Βερολίνο για την Αθήνα «ιδιαιτέρως».” January 24, 2016. http://www.kathimerini.gr/846954/article/epikairothta/politikh/ ti-syzhtoyn-sto-verolino-gia-thn-a8hna-idiaiterws 72 Η ΚΑΘΗΜΕΡΙΝΗ. “Νέες απειλές κατά της Αθήνας για αποκλεισμό από τη Σένγκεν - διαψεύδει ο Αβραμόπουλος.” January 25, 2016. http://www.kathimerini.gr/847025/article/epikairothta/politikh/nees-apeiles-kata-ths-a8hnas-giaapokleismo-apo-th-sengken---diayeydei-o-avramopoylos 73 Βαρβιτσιώτη, Ελένη. “Μέσα Φεβρουαρίου, η νέα διορία για hotspots.” Η ΚΑΘΗΜΕΡΙΝΗ, January 26, 2016. http://www.kathimerini.gr/847068/article/epikairothta/politikh/mesa-fevroyarioy-h-nea-dioria-gia-hotspots.74 Η ΚΑΘΗΜΕΡΙΝΗ. “Politico: Την παραμονή προσφύγων σε ελληνικό έδαφος

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2016 Βαρβιτσιώτη, Ελένη. “Ειδική συνάντηση ΕΕ-Τουρκίας για το προσφυγικό προανήγγειλε ο Τουσκ.” Η ΚΑΘΗΜΕΡΙΝΗ, February 19, 2016. http://www. kathimerini.gr/850013/article/epikairothta/politikh/eidikh-synanthsh-ee-toyrkias-gia-to-prosfygiko-proanhggeileo-toysk 88 Η ΚΑΘΗΜΕΡΙΝΗ. “ΥΠΕΞ: Απλοποιείται η χορήγηση βίζας στους πολίτες εκτός Σένγκεν.” February 23, 2016. http://www.kathimerini.gr/850596/article/ epikairothta/ellada/ype3-aplopoieitai-h-xorhghsh-vizas-stoys-polites-ektos-sengken 89 Η ΚΑΘΗΜΕΡΙΝΗ. “Τουσκ προς μετανάστες: Μην έρχεστε στην Ελλάδα!” March 3, 2016. http://www.kathimerini.gr/851743/article/epikairothta/politikh/ toysk-pros-metanastes-mhn-erxeste-sthn-ellada 90 Βαρβιτσιώτη, Ελένη. “Το προσχέδιο της κοινής δήλωσης της Συνόδου Κορυφής Ε.Ε. - Τουρκίας.” Η ΚΑΘΗΜΕΡΙΝΗ, March 7, 2016. http://www.kathimerini.gr/852243/article/epikairothta/politikh/to-prosxedio-ths-koinhs-dhlwshs-ths-synodoy-koryfhs-ee---toyrkias 91 Βαρβιτσιώτη, Ελένη. “Το προσχέδιο της κοινής δήλωσης της Συνόδου Κορυφής Ε.Ε. - Τουρκίας.” Η ΚΑΘΗΜΕΡΙΝΗ, March 7, 2016. http://www.kathimerini.gr/852243/article/epikairothta/politikh/to-prosxedio-ths-koinhs-dhlwshs-ths-synodoy-koryfhs-ee---toyrkias. 92 Συρίγος, Άγγελος Μ. “5+1 νέα δεδομένα για το μεταναστευτικό.” Η ΚΑΘΗΜΕΡΙΝΗ, March 13, 2016. http://www.kathimerini.gr/852917/article/epikairothta/politikh/51-nea-dedomena-gia-to-metanasteytiko 93 Reuters. “Τα Σκόπια πιέζουν για την ένταξή τους στην Ε.Ε. και το ΝΑΤΟ.” Η ΚΑΘΗΜΕΡΙΝΗ, March 18, 2016. http://www.kathimerini.gr/853404/article/epikairothta/politikh/ta-skopia-piezoyn-gia-thn-enta3h-toys-sthn-ee-kai-to-nato 94 Σουλιώτης, Γιάννης. “Διατήρηση συνοριακών ελέγχων.” Η ΚΑΘΗΜΕΡΙΝΗ, May 8, 2016. http://www.kathimerini.gr/858882/article/epikairothta/ellada/ diathrhsh-synoriakwn-elegxwn 95 Γεωργιοπούλου, Τάνια. “Αύξηση ροών, «ασφυκτιούν» τα hotspots.” Η ΚΑΘΗΜΕΡΙΝΗ, June 22, 2016. http://www.kathimerini.gr/864508/article/epikairothta/ellada/ay3hsh-rown-asfyktioyn-ta-hotspots 96 Βαρβιτσιώτη, Ελένη. “Συστάσεις Κομισιόν για το Δουβλίνο.” Η ΚΑΘΗΜΕΡΙΝΗ, September 29, 2016. http://www.kathimerini.gr/876846/article/ epikairothta/ellada/systaseis-komision-gia-to-doyvlino 97 Βαρβιτσιώτη, Ελένη. “Ελεγχοι συνόρων εντός της Ε.Ε. τρεις μήνες ακόμη.” Η ΚΑΘΗΜΕΡΙΝΗ, October 26, 2016. http://www.kathimerini.gr/880803/article/ epikairothta/politikh/elegxoi-synorwn-entos-ths-ee-treis-mhnes-akomh 98 Η ΚΑΘΗΜΕΡΙΝΗ. “Γιούνκερ: «Έχω ανοσία στις απειλές των Τούρκων ηγετών - Η Τουρκία απομακρύνεται από την Ευρώπη».” November 6, 2016. http://www. kathimerini.gr/882382/article/epikairothta/politikh/gioynker-exw-anosia-stisapeiles-twn-toyrkwnhgetwn---h-toyrkia-apomakrynetai-apo-thn-eyrwph 99 Βαρβιτσιώτη, Ελένη. “Πρόταση Κομισιόν για επανέναρξη των επιστροφών προσφύγων στην Ελλάδ.” Η ΚΑΘΗΜΕΡΙΝΗ, December 8, 2016. http:// www.kathimerini.gr/886955/article/epikairothta/politikh/protash-komision-gia-epanenar3h-twn-epistrofwn-prosfygwnsthn-ellada

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2016 Τελλόγλου, Τάσος. “Οι τζιχαντιστές, το πέρασμα από τη Λέρο και οι επιθέσεις.” Η ΚΑΘΗΜΕΡΙΝΗ, August 13, 2016. http://www.kathimerini. gr/871016/article/epikairothta/ellada/oi-tzixantistes-to-perasma-apo-th-lero-kaioi-epi8eseis 101 Σουλιώτης, Γιάννης. “Ιρακινός ταξίδευε με δύο διαβατήρια.” Η ΚΑΘΗΜΕΡΙΝΗ, February 19, 2016. http://www.kathimerini.gr/850064/article/ epikairothta/ellada/irakinos-ta3ideye-me-dyo-diavathria 102 Σουλιώτης, Γιάννης. “Η σχέση πλαστογράφων με υποστηρικτές του ISIS.” Η ΚΑΘΗΜΕΡΙΝΗ, July 24, 2016. http://www.kathimerini.gr/868643/article/epikairothta/ellada/h-sxesh-plastografwn-me-yposthriktes-toy-isis 103 Σουλιώτης, Γιάννης. “Η Europol ερευνά για τζιχαντιστές σε κέντρα φιλοξενίας.” Η ΚΑΘΗΜΕΡΙΝΗ, August 13, 2016. http://www.kathimerini. gr/871017/article/epikairothta/ellada/h-europol-ereyna-gia-tzixantistes-se-kentra-filo3enias. 104 Σουλιώτης, Γιάννης. “«Ανοιχτή γραμμή» του ISIS από τη Ράκα προς τη Λέρο.” Η ΚΑΘΗΜΕΡΙΝΗ, September 11, 2016. http://www.kathimerini.gr/874323/article/epikairothta/ellada/anoixth-grammh-toy-isis-apo-th-raka-pros-th-lero 105 Γιάννης, Σουλιώτης. “Απέλαση υπόπτου για σχέσεις με ISIS.” Η ΚΑΘΗΜΕΡΙΝΗ, September 27, 2016. http://www.kathimerini.gr/876528/article/ epikairothta/ellada/apelash-ypoptoy-gia-sxeseis-me-isis. 106 Μανδραβέλης, Πάσχος. “Η κατάρα των εγγυήσεων.” Η ΚΑΘΗΜΕΡΙΝΗ, January 22, 2017. http://www.kathimerini.gr/892822/opinion/epikairothta/politikh/h-katara-twn-eggyhsewn 107 In.gr. “Προσπάθεια ελέγχου ΜΜΕ βλέπει η Αντιπολίτευση, υποκρισία η κυβέρνηση.” January 18, 2017. http://news.in.gr/greece/article/?aid=1500125722 108 TA NEA. “Βραβεία σε δύο Ελληνες εθελοντές από την Υπατη Αρμοστεία του ΟΗΕ.” September 6, 2016. http://www.tanea.gr/news/greece/article/5387231/ brabeia-se-dyo-ellhnes-ethelontes-apo-thn-ypath-armosteia-toy-ohe-gia-toysprosfyges/ 100

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Messages in the Media

Media sources 1- Rossiyskaya Gazeta: founded in 1993. Owned by the Government of Russia 2 - Nezavisimaya Gazeta: founded in 1990. Owned by Konstantin Remchukov 3 - Kommersant: founded in 1901. Owned by The Berezovski Group

BY: DASHA KUZNETSOVA 131

2016

RUSSIA’S INFLUENCE ON THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION OF THE WESTERN BALKANS Brexit and the subsequent announcement about the “existential crisis” by Jean-Claude Juncker have placed the European integration project under question.1 Throughout its existence, the European Union (EU) has only been gaining members, losing members has never been the case – until Brexit.2 Brexit questioned the irreversibility of the integration process, which certainly had a ‘psychological impact’ on the other member states and candidates.3 Pause on the integration turned attention to Russia and its increased presence in the Western Balkans. Republika Srpska (RS) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Serbia, and Montenegro are the places where Russian attention seems to be mainly concentrated. When President Milorad Dodik of the RS was in need of support for the referendum concerning the Republic Day on January 9th, President Putin was the first one he turned to.4 In his interview, the Chairman of the Presidency of BiH Mladen Ivanić, described BiH-Russia relations by saying that “without a doubt, there would not be peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina without Russia.”5 Ivanić further thanked Russia for its active role in the UN Security Council as a defender of the Dayton Agreement and the supporter of the territorial integrity of BiH.6 Moreover, Russia has recently made a large material contribution to BiH, of $72,6 millions, in order to pay off the debt the Soviet Union owed to states of former Yugoslavia.7 Ivanić also pointed out that Russia-BiH relations are not purely based on material interests but have an ‘emotional dimension.’8 As for Montenegro, it has been Russia’s ally since the reign of Peter the Great in the 18th century. However, relations between the two cooled when Montenegro joined the EU sanctions against Russia over the annexation of Crimea.9 They further deteriorated when Montenegro – the only non-NATO country on the Adriatic Sea – signed an accession agreement with NATO.10 On the eve of the elections, Prime Minister Đukanović offered the following choice to the people of Montenegro – to become a member of the EU and NATO or a Russian colony. Montenegrins have chosen the former. Đukanović accused the Kremlin of financing the opposition as well as playing a role in an alleged coup attempt on election day.11 Special Prosecutor of Montenegro, Milivoje Katnić announced that the coup was planned by a group of Russian nationalists and it was aimed at preventing Montenegro from joining NATO.12 Moscow denied any connection to the suspects of the coup.13 As for Serbia, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov visited Belgrade to make preparations for the visit of Dmitry Medvedev. In particular, Moscow was interested in solving the question regarding the status of Russian workers in the humanitarian centre in Niš.14 The Kremlin aimed to achieve diplomatic immunity for them, an immunity that would be very similar to the rights that the NATO troops have while on Serbian territory. However, Belgrade tried to postpone resolving that question due to possible problems with the EU that might follow. In terms of

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Messages in the Media economic influence, Serbia and Russia have been negotiating the delivery of six fighter jets for several months now.15 Therefore, the Western Balkans are torn between Russia and the West. Increased Russian presence in the region might complicate their path to the EU membership. Considering the fact that the EU-Russia relations have deteriorated since the Ukrainian crisis, balancing between the two sides becomes extremely difficult.

RUSSIA-EU ENERGY RELATIONS Europe is dependent on Russian gas, especially in Central and Eastern Europe. After several gas delivery disruptions, the EU has been determined to diversify its providers. Meanwhile, Russia has been eager to find alternatives to transit through Ukraine.16 Russian news talked about the possibility of reviving the South Stream – the pipeline that was planned to transport Russia’s natural gas through the Black Sea to Bulgaria and through Serbia, Hungary, and Slovenia. Bulgaria has recently shifted from resistance toward cooperation on the project.17 Moscow and Sofia have announced their readiness to restore energy cooperation. There have also been talks about the Turkish Stream – the pipeline that would transport Russia’s natural gas to Turkey through the Black Sea, and on to Greece, and other European countries – as a result of improved relationship between Russia and Turkey.18 However, since Turkey has been torn by civil war, refugees, and increased activity of radical Islamists, the reliability of Turkey as a transit hub remains questionable. In order to minimize the risks, Russia has been planning to share the financial risks of the project. However, progress with regards to the two projects can only take place when the European Commission gives its approval, which it did not for neither of the two projects.19 In 2014, the EU requested to stop the South Stream project because it did not comply with the requirements of the Third Energy Package.20 While for Russia the two projects are considered to be economically beneficial, there are deep political and legal risks associated with both South Stream and Turkish Stream pipelines.21 For the EU, realization of either of the two projects will make the member states more dependent on Russian gas. That is why the EU is focused on making progress with the construction of the Trans Adriatic Pipeline on the Greek territory, which is supposed to be completed by 2020.22 Although the project would make Europe less dependent on Russian gas, it would not benefit Greece in terms of its energy security and, therefore, Athens would prefer to continue cooperation with Russia.23 Furthermore, at the World Energy Congress in Istanbul, President Putin emphasized the importance of reaching a consensus on output cuts. “In the current situation, we think that a freeze or even a cut in oil production is probably the only proper decision to preserve stability in the global energy market,” stated President Putin during the Congress.24

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2016 Reaching a consensus with regards to energy is as much in the interest of the EU as it is in Russia’s. Both sides are interested in ensuring timely delivery of gas, therefore, an agreement is possible. The difficult part for both the EU and Russia is to avoid turning the energy dialogue into a game of politics.

THE EU AND THE EURASIAN ECONOMIC UNION

The Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) is a group of former Soviet states – Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia – that is working toward “Eurasian integration.” Some argue that it can become a mechanism for dialogue with the EU, while others think that it will only increase Russia’s domination over the region and complicate the EEU members’ relationships with the West. Nevertheless, a cooperative relationship can only be developed through an agreement on the strategic position of Ukraine.25 The leaders of the EEU have recently met in St. Petersburg to discuss the future of the union. It has been two years since the inception of the EEU and the leaders discussed the work that needs to be done to achieve a formation of the common financial market by 2025.26 This year the single market of the medical supplies and medications has already come into force.27 At the World Economic Forum in St. Petersburg, President Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan offered to create the EEU-EU forum in order to develop cooperative relations between the two unions.28 However, Nazarbaev pointed out that sanctions against Russia may inhibit the start of that process as well as complicate the development of the regional economy.29 In particular, governmental officials in Astana - the capital of Kazakhstan - have offered to serve as a mediator between the EEU and the EU and assist in “soft integration” between the two. Chairman of the international affairs committee of the Lower Chamber of the Parliament of Kazakhstan, Maulen Ashimbaev, also pointed out that at least partial lifting of sanctions is required for some kind of negotiations to begin.30 Potential creation of the single economic space between the EU and the EEU has also been discussed in the news, although that would require more than cooperation on free trade. In that sense, the news talked about concessions on the Third Energy Packet and visa-free regime.31 Moreover, President Putin will discuss cooperation between the EEU and the EU during the international economic forum in June 2017 that will take place in St. Petersburg, Russia.32 For the EEU and the EU, finding a common ground is of great importance for the future of regional economy and security. In the era of global interdependence, cooperation and not confrontation or competition is the key to EU-EEU peaceful co-existence.

YEAR IN REVIEW The re-establishment of a cooperative relationship as a result of the Ukrainian crisis remained to be the main issue underlying EU-Russian relations

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Messages in the Media in 2016. Although the relationship between the two has improved, it has done so at a slower rate than desired. Russia is still struggling with economic crisis because of sanctions, while the EU is going through an ‘existential crisis.’ Even though both Russia and the EU acknowledged the need to reach an agreement on energy security, the two, nevertheless, continued to try solving their problem on their own. As proof of this stands Russia’s attempt to proceed with the South Stream and Turkish Stream projects, while the EU was trying to reduce its dependency on Russian gas by constructing the Trans Adriatic Pipeline. Hence, according to the news, Russia looks more interested in deepening its relationship with Asia rather than Europe. Likewise, while the EU has been preoccupied with its ‘existential crisis,’ Russia has been busy with ‘Eurasian integration’ within the EEU.

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2016 Skobzova, Elizaveta and Galina Dudina. “The EU is being united by single army and free Wi-Fi.” Kommersant. September 15, 2016. Accessed December 9, 2016. http://kommersant.ru/Doc/3089025. 2 Lukyanov, Fedor. “Nebolshaya Evropa.” Rossiyskaya Gazeta. August 16, 2016. Accessed September 20, 2016. https://rg.ru/2016/08/16/fedor-lukianov-evrosoiuz-vpal-v-konceptualnyj-stupor.html.com/1991/03/07/world/thousands-of-albanians-flee-aboard-ships-to-italy.html 3 Lukyanov, Fedor. “Nebolshaya Evropa.” Rossiyskaya Gazeta. 4 Sysoev, Gennadiy. “Rossiyu vyzyvayut na Serbskiy referendum.” Kommersant. September 21, 2016. Accessed September 23, 2016. http://www.kommersant.ru/ doc/3094706. 5 Gusman, Mikhail. “Bez Rossii u nas ne bylo by mira.” Rossiskaya Gazeta. December 25, 2016. Accessed December 26, 2016. https://rg.ru/2016/12/25/mladenivanich-bez-rossii-ne-bylo-by-mira-v-bosnii-i-gercegovine.html. 6 IGusman, Mikhail. “Bez Rossii u nas ne bylo by mira.” Rossiskaya Gazeta. 7 “Russia will pay $125,2 millions to pay off the debt of the Soviet Union to the former Yugoslavia.” Kommersant. December 22, 2016. Accessed December 25, 2016. http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3177857. 8 Gusman, Mikhail. “Bez Rossii u nas ne bylo by mira.” Rossiskaya Gazeta. 9 Vasilyev, Andrey. “Five European countries introduced sanctions against Russia.” Rossiyskaya Gazeta. October 25, 2016. Accessed October 28, 2016. https:// rg.ru/2016/10/25/piat-evropejskih-stran-vveli-sankcii-v-otnoshenii-rossii.html. 10 Fedyakina, Anna. “Zakharova: Montenegro is being artificially drawn by the NATO.” Rossiyskaya Gazeta. May 19, 2016. Accessed October 29, 2016. https:// rg.ru/2016/05/19/zaharova-chernogoriiu-iskusstvenno-vtiagivaiut-v-nato.html. 11 Borisov, Alexander. “Voting at the parliamentary elections in Montenegro has finished.” Rossiyskaya Gazeta. October 16, 2016. Accessed October 20, 2016. https://rg.ru/2016/10/16/v-chernogorii-zavershilos-golosovanie-na-parlamentskih-vyborah.html. 12 Sysoev, Gennadiy. “Traces of Russian Nationalists were found in Montenegro.” Kommersant. November 7, 2016. Accessed November 15, 2016. 13 Sysoev, Gennadiy. “Traces of Russian Nationalists were found in Montenegro.” Kommersant. 14 Sysoev, Gennadiy. “Russia will define the relationship with Serbia.” Kommersant. December 12, 2016. Accessed December 17, 2016. http://www.kommersant. ru/doc/3168738. 15 Sysoev, Gennadiy. “Russia will define the relationship with Serbia.” Kommersant. 16 Simonov, Konstantin. “The pipe plays on the nerves.” Rossiyskaya Gazeta. October 31, 2016. Accessed November 20, 2016. https://rg.ru/2016/10/31/rfmozhet-polnostiu-otkazatsia-ot-uslug-ukrainy-po-tranzitu-gaza.html. 17 Solovieva, Olga. “Bulgaria Unfreezes.” Nezavisimaya Gazeta. 9 Aug. 2016, accessed 18 October 2016. http://www.ng.ru/economics/2016-08-09/1_bolgaria. html. 18 Komrakov, Anatoly. “Prospective of the Turkish Stream” depends on the Euro1

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Messages in the Media pean Commission.” Nezavisimaya Gazeta. September 12, 2016. Accessed October 15, 2016. http://www.ng.ru/economics/2016-09-12/4_stream.html. 19 Komrakov, Anatoly. “Putin hasn’t gone to Istanbul in vain.” Nezavisimaya Gazeta. October 11, 2016. Accessed November 15, 2016. http://www.ng.ru/economics/2016-10-11/4_stambul.html. 20 Komrakov, Anatoly. “Prospects “Turkish stream” depend on the European Commission.” Nezavisimaya Gazeta. September 12, 2016. Accessed November 5, 2016. http://www.ng.ru/economics/2016-09-12/4_stream.html. 21 Solovieva, Olga. “Bulgaria Unfreezes.” Nezavisimaya Gazeta. August 9, 2016. Accessed October 18, 2016. http://www.ng.ru/economics/2016-08-09/1_bolgaria. html. 22 Gasuk, Alexander. “Delo – Truba.” Rossiyskaya Gazeta. May 17, 2016. Accessed December 10, 2016. https://rg.ru/2016/05/17/v-grecii-oficialno-zapustiat-stroitelstvo-gazoprovoda-tap.html. 23 Gasuk, Alexander. “Delo – Truba.” Rossiyskaya Gazeta. 24 Komrakov, Anatoly. “Putin hasn’t gone to Istanbul in vain.” Nezavisimaya Gazeta. October 11, 2016. Accessed November 15, 2016. http://www.ng.ru/economics/2016-10-11/4_stambul.html. 25 Vinokurov, Evgeny.“EU and EEU: development of the relationship. Regnum. September 1, 2016. Accessed November 16, 2016. https://regnum.ru/news/economy/2173129.html. 26 Latuhina, Kira. “Stepped up toward a “number.” Rossiyskaya Gazeta. December 26, 2016. Accessed December 26, 2016. https://rg.ru/2016/12/26/lidery-rossii-armenii-kazahstana-i-kirgizii-obsudili-budushchee-soiuza.html. 27 “Latuhina, Kira. “Stepped up toward a “number.” Rossiyskaya Gazeta. 28 “Ermolaeva, Nadezhda. “Nazarbaev offered to create the EEU-EU forum.” Rossiyskaya Gazeta. June 17, 2016. Accessed November 10, 2016. https://rg. ru/2016/06/17/reg-szfo/nursultan-nazarbaev-prizval-evrosoiuz-k-sotrudnichestvu-s-eaes.html. 29 Ermolaeva, Nadezhda. “Nazarbaev offered to create the EEU-EU forum.” Rossiyskaya Gazeta. 30 Dudina, Galina. “Today the relations between the EEU and the EU are destructive.” Kommersant. November 28, 2016. Accessed December 1, 2016. http://www. kommersant.ru/doc/3155798. 31 Edovina, Tatiana. “Fight for barriers without borders.” Kommersant. August 22, 2016. Accessed December 10, 2016. http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3069821. 32 Petrov, Vitaly. “Putin and Juncker Will Discuss Cooperation Between the EEU and the EU.” Rossiyskaya Gazeta. May 30, 2016. Accessed December 17, 2016. https://rg.ru/2016/05/30/putin-i-iunker-obsudiat-sotrudnichestvo-eaes-i-es. html.

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Messages in the Media

Media sources 1- Neue ZĂźrcher Zeitung: founded in 1780. Owned by the Neue ZĂźrcher Zeitung AG 2 - Basler Zeitung: founded in 1729. Owned by Basler Zeitung Medien 3 - Tages Anzeiger: founded in 1893. Owned by Tamedia

BY: ALEXANDER MEILE 138

2016

MASS IMMIGRATION INITIATIVE (MASSENEINWANDERUNGSINITIATIVE) The Swiss referendum on the ‘Mass Immigration Initiative’ (MEI) is a proposal to implement a quota on the amount of foreign immigrants coming into Switzerland per year. It takes into account Swiss economic interests, as well as the interests of the Swiss population, who accepted the referendum vote fore the MEI with 50,3% in February 2014. The initiative demands that the state and bilateral contracts between Switzerland the EU to be changed if they conflict with the terms of the initiative. In the year of 2016, the focus of the Federal Council rested on creating a EU compatible bill towards controlling and driving immigration into Switzerland, as the EU claimed that this initiative was going against the common principle of the free movement of people between the EU and Switzerland. The EU seems to find the implementation of the new law as unacceptable and in turn offered to extend similar laws to the Swiss in the EU. By January 2016, it is clear that the Swiss see it as crucial to reach an agreement with the EU with regards to the MEI, which would hurt the principle of individual freedom of movement.1 Switzerland is still uncertain at this stage which way the initiative will go, as signs had shown that the EU would not give Switzerland any special treatment, yet much rather seek a compromise agreement.2 By Spring 2016, the situation became clearer as the federal council decided that the MEI articles shall to a great extent be unilaterally implemented, whilst at the same time arranging for a compromise agreement. The implementation of the MEI would see establishment of yearly quotas of immigrants from EU and EFTA states, which are determined once a threshold number has been surpassed. This shall be done in context to the domestic economic situation.3 The effect of the MEI led to the Swiss expanding their ‘individual freedom of movement agreement’ (FZA) to Croatia, as EU insisted that it will terminate cooperation after the acceptance of the MEI, to which it now presses the Swiss government to ratify this act in an effort to show goodwill for further talks.4 Debate had been going on over a unilateral protection clause in case no agreement with the EU could be reached, yet this proposal by the federal council is unpopular with parliament has the outlined quotas would seriously harm the FZA.5 Noteworthy too is that the immigration numbers, not in context with the MEI, had actually decreased in the first quarter in 2016.6 The ‘Brexit’ lead to grave consequences for Switzerland as the Federal Council could not advance its discussions with the EU on the MEI, despite having ratified the Croatia protocol.7 Therefore, the national council began focusing on an autonomous implementation of the MEI, yet without a protection clause as demanded by the Schweizerische Volkspartei (SVP) party, as it would hurt the FZA and potential future bilateral EU negotiations.8 After the Brexit, the federation must now handle mass immigration without and EU agreement, and national council man Philipp Müller proposes that a ‘resident priority system’ shall be put in place instead of quotas on immigrants.9 This system would see employers being obliged to advertise job vacancies to regional citizens before publicly offering them

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Messages in the Media three weeks later, and would thus not endanger bilateral negotiations.10 Bruno Sauter, the CEO of the Swiss job center endorses this agreement.11 The Federal council could implement threshold values for the implementation or duration of proposed measures, which would vary across regions and economic sectors, these would need to be approved by the EU.12 The MEI must be passed in parliament by December 16th, 2016 and by this date the clouds had cleared as the EU has ultimately received the decision of the Swiss Parliament, to implement the MEI, well.13, 14 The chief spokesperson stated that the new legislative MEI law seems to go into the right direction as quotas have not been implemented and EU citizens will continue to have open and unlimited access to the Swiss job market.15 The MEI had made the Swiss negotiating position in Brussels at first groundless in 2014 whilst at the same time unsettling Switzerland domestically.16, 17 The MEI initiative did not outline any measures for the complete stop of immigration or the halting of individual freedom of movement, yet it had sent Switzerland on mission impossible to negotiate new terms in Brussels back in 2014, which now seem to come towards a conclusion.18, 19

BANK SECRECY & TAX DISPUTE (BANKGEHEIMNIS & STEUERSTREIT) The Bank Secrecy is a longstanding obligation law of the Swiss Banks, which safeguard customer’s private details and terms of their Bank Account at a Swiss Bank. Yet in 2014 the Swiss joined the declaration of the OECD for the future automatic information exchange with regards to taxes. The Banking Secrecy of the Swiss is unpleasant for the EU as some EU citizens deposit their money in Swiss Banks. In these last few years and up to this day numerous Swiss Banks became involved in tax disputes with EU nations and the US. In 2015 the EU and the Swiss signed a Tax treaty which will after 2018 communicate all Bank Account details to and from the EU. This is the end of the Banking Secrecy tradition. This treaty came about through immense pressure from the USA and Germany. Domestically, the Swiss bank secrecy still functions while it has perished for foreign customers, yet it is threatened as the ongoing international tax disputes might unhinge it.20 In February, the federal council voiced its desire to take part in the ‘automatic information exchange’ (AIE), thus lifting the bank secrecy and exposing foreign customers to their respective tax authorities.21 The Swiss economic commission abandoned its primary initiative and began to focus on an alternative concept where the status quo of the bank secrecy for Swiss citizens shall be embedded in the constitution, only allowing for information exchange to occur if there is a suspicion for grave tax violations.22 It is also in February when the tax dispute between the Swiss UBS Bank and France flared up again, as UBS was accused of playing a central role in committing tax fraud between 2004-2012 for French clients with an estimated 8.4 billion Euros in France alone.23 A crucial factor for why Switzerland is still amidst these disputes rests on the fact that the German finance minister of Westphalia, Mr. Walte-Borians, is sharing bought bank data (customer data) from Swiss banks with other 27 other EU states.24, 25

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2016 UBS now has to deliver information, a demand issues Swiss tax authority, which was triggered by a French request for international support in regards to the issue.26 Switzerland had thus increasingly come under pressure whilst at the same time the Swiss Banking industry became less attractive. The Swiss economic commission of the National Council outlined a far reaching alternative draft in May which would encompass the embedding of the status quo of the bank secrecy in the constitution.27 National Councilman Leo MĂźller voiced his favor for this alternative draft, arguing that it would see the claim to private sphere and financial data of individuals embedded in the constitution, whilst it would however allow for the increased flow of information to the tax authorities.28 This measure forces the Swiss banks to provide information upon request, and this information may only be passed on by the banks themselves, making the new alternative draft on the banking secrecy initiative a lot more compatible with global standards against money laundering.29 As of 2017, a new era of worldwide transparency will begin with regards to taxes, where Swiss banks will begin to deliver data to foreign tax offices in accordance with this new OECD standard, from which only the US is abstaining.30 The above depicts the situation by fall 2016, where the Swiss had made bilateral tax agreements according to OECD standards, which will obligate the Swiss to serve any requests made by foreign offices in regards to taxation disputes, with the UBS most recently providing the Netherlands with data.31 All of it shall act as a signal showing that the Swiss are willing to support achieve global standards.32 The federal council supports the new draft, which strives to prevent information transfers within Switzerland on Bank customers and date, as many argue that a â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;good relationshipâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; between the state and citizen must be maintained.33 Local opposition to this argues that this right to privacy is already guaranteed in the constitution and thus does not need any further protection offered by this draft. Nevertheless, a few Swiss banks, like the WIR Bank, are already beginning to adapt by ridding themselves of the traditional banking secrecy; meaning customers as of 2017 will not be entitled to it and their information may upon a reasonable request be passed on to a respective authority.34 With regard to the prevailing tax dispute with the EU, mitigation seems to be on the right course as some Swiss banks have effectively passed through the tax debate, yet at a cost. In December, the Zurich State Bank has reached an agreement with German authorities after intense negotiations throughout 2016, which resulted in a 5.7-million-franc payment by the institution. It seems that the Swiss will soon reach a total conclusion with the Germans and the broader of EU countries, whilst the same cannot be said for the US.35

NUCLEAR PHASEOUT/EXIT (ATOMAUSSTIEG SCHWEIZ) After the disastrous Fukushima earthquake in 2011, which raised world wide concerns regarding Nuclear power plant safety, Switzerland has been increasingly debating on phasing out nuclear energy. The Federal council began looking for a long-term solution last year, which transformed into a prolonged

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Messages in the Media debate throughout 2016 up until the recent referendum. As the council does not want to see the abrupt phasing out of nuclear energy, as proposed by the counter initiative, it instead seeks an alternative path of gradually taking power plants off the grid. Since 2013, the counter initiative pressed for a faster phasing out of nuclear energy, which resulted in a referendum in November of 2016. The initiative proposes a complete phasing out to occurs by 2029, whereas the state seeks longer operation times. The debate on what effect a potential acceptance of a more rapid phasing out would have on the energy supply in Switzerland prevailed throughout 2016, which immediately established links to economic arguments with relations to the EU. The year began with debates on closing the oldest nuclear power plant in the world, which is located in Beznau Switzerland, yet the national council see to follow the policy of the main political parties, the SVP and FDP, in preventing an imminent closure and in turn not specify a projected closing date.36 Axpo, the operating firm of the power plant, is in financial difficulty, despite having invested over 700 million Francs into the old facility, which for the opposition appears as a security issue and thus demand either the closure or an intervention by the federation to financially aid the company.37 By spring, the federal council began talks on the energy policy for the future, with the people demanding a long term solution to not be reliant on nuclear energy, yet it remains ambiguous by March 2016 on what path the parliament will vote on as the right wing faction and federal councilwoman Leuthard are moving towards supporting increased operation times for power plants.38 On the other hand, national councilwoman Regula Rytz is supporting the demands made by over 6000 citizens during a demonstration on closing Beznau in the late spring of 2016. It appears that the majority of the population and government sees the immediate ‘nuclear exit’ as a step too large for the country to handle.39 Throughout the summer discussions within the political sphere continue on proposing a plausible alternative to the people’s initiative of immediate phasing out process, and the Canton and City of Zurich see a local vote on June 5th, 2016 on selling its nuclear power plant shares and not receive any more nuclear energy, with a switch to alternative resources being proposed.40 It was argued that a YES in this regional vote would not solve any problems, as it would cost the city hundreds of millions, and thus the proposal was declined with a No in the vote.41 By fall the referendum initiative, which was called into life by Alliance Energy and other small organization and challenging the recently proposed energy policy 2050 of the council, reached a stalemate.42 The ‘Nuclear Energy Exit Initiative’ demanded all power plants to be shut down after an operation time of 45 years, and thus to be totally taken off the grid by 2029, as Switzerland runs three of the oldest power plants in the world.43 It is notable that by the end of October, preliminary surveys predicted that 55% of citizens would be for an immediate phasing out process to occur, yet it was at this same time and a month before the referendum, that growing concerns for an ‘electivity gap’ were being voiced both within and outside the governmental sphere.44 Despite the opposition initiative

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2016 arguing that this would not occur, the nuclear industry and the population began arguing for the need of an ordered phasing out period over time, as an abrupt shut down would lead to Switzerland being forced to import â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;dirty (coal) electricityâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; from EU countries like Germany.45 On November 18, Switzerland votes a clear NO, with 54.2% of votes declining the immediate phasing out of Nuclear energy.46 The reason for this result is that the voices of two parties, the ones who wanted a gradual exit and the ones who are for nuclear energy, united for the vote. The SVP sees the vote result as a confirmation of the trust of the people in Swiss nuclear energy.47 The question of a future exit remains, yet now it rests on the federal 2050 initiative, which is supported by the right parties and companies like AXPO and ALPIQ. This initiative will allow for prolonged running times of the power plants, thus cancelling the need to import EU electricity to fill the deficit and in turn open up new discussions with the EU, aside from the numerous current issues that are prevailing between the two.48 EU nations simply observed the Swiss nuclear debate throughout 2016, in which the Swiss ultimately realized in October 2016, that the immediate phasing out brings about more problems than benefits, especially financial ones.

2016 YEAR IN REVIEW Over the course of 2016, the relationship between Switzerland and the EU, especially between the big EU powerhouses Germany and France, remained somewhat tense and frozen up until the third quarter of the year. With regard to the MEI, relations were at first tense as Switzerland sought to implement the initiative, which the EU threatened might harm relations. Ultimately, the Swiss government swung on an alternative path, one which veered away from the original text of the peopleâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s initiative, yet allowed for the continued freedom of movement and access of EU citizens to Switzerland, thus de-thawing relations once again by the end of fall. In the Banking sector the bilateral relations between Switzerland and EU nations have been improving after the first semester of 2016, when Switzerland took decisive steps to show good will and support the European community in implementing OECD standards with regards to taxation disputes, despite this ringing in the end of the Swiss tradition of banking secrecy. Ultimately, the Atomic phase out initiative and referendum had a minimal impact on relations with the EU as the initiative was turned down in November. This meant that a likely energy deficit was avoided and thus the need to import energy from EU nations, like France and Germany. 2016 had its controversies, like the MEI initiative and the major changes in the energy and banking sector, yet in all, Switzerland maintained its positive relationship with the EU.

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Messages in the Media Statistics: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ sz.html 1 Fontana, Katharina.“Der Volkswille spielt keine Rolle.” Neue Zürcher Zeitung. October 28, 2016. Accessed November 6, 2016. http://www.nzz.ch/schweiz/ zuwanderungsinitiative-und-freizuegigkeit-der-volkswille-spielt-keine-rolleld.4701 2 Gujer, Eric. “Die Schutzklausel ist noch nicht tot.” Neue Zürcher Zeitung. February, 23, 2016. Accessed November 9, 2016. http://www.nzz.ch/meinung/ kommentare/die-schutzklausel-ist-noch-nicht-tot-1.18699922 3 Nuspilger, Niklaus. Gerny, Daniel. “Einvernehmliche Lösung trotz Schutzklausel.” Neue Zürcher Zeitung. March 4, 2016. Accessed November 12, 2016. http:// www.nzz.ch/schweiz/aktuelle-themen/bundesrat-schutzklausel-eu-schweiz-personenfreizuegigkeit-zuwanderung-kroatien-ld.6195 4 Nuspilger, Niklaus. Gerny, Daniel. “Einvernehmliche Lösung trotz Schutzklausel.” Neue Zürcher Zeitung. March 4, 2016. Accessed November 12, 2016. http:// www.nzz.ch/schweiz/aktuelle-themen/bundesrat-schutzklausel-eu-schweiz-personenfreizuegigkeit-zuwanderung-kroatien-ld.6195 5 Gmür, Heidi. Gemperli, Simon. “Umsetzung der SVP-Initative verzögert sich.” Neue Zürcher Zeitung. April 15, 2016. Accessed November 9, 2016. http:// www.nzz.ch/schweiz/zuwanderung-umsetzung-der-svp-initiative-verzoegert-sich-ld.14253 6 “Ausländer gehen auch ohne SVP Initative.” Tagesanzeiger. April 15, 2016. Accessed November 11, 2016. http://www.tagesanzeiger.ch/schweiz/standard/ auslaender-gehen-auch-ohne-svpinitiative/story/23819351 7 Gemperli, Simon. “Was ‘Leave’ für die Schweiz bedeutet.” Neue Zürcher Zeitung. June 24, 2016. Accessed November 17, 2016. http://www.nzz.ch/schweiz/ europapolitik-und-zuwanderung-was-leave-fuer-die-schweiz-bedeutet-ld.91340 8 Gmür, Heidi.“Marschrichtung steht.” Neue Zürcher Zeitung. July 1, 2016. Accessed November 13, 2016. http://www.nzz.ch/schweiz/aktuelle-themen/ masseneinwanderungsinitiative-entscheide-zur-steuerung-der-zuwanderung-vertagt-ld.103383 9 Bühler, Stefan.“Brüssel zwingt uns gar nichts.” Neue Zürcher Zeitung. July 3, 2016. Accessed November 13, 2016. http://www.nzz.ch/nzzas/nzz-am-sonntag/ zuwanderung-bruessel-zwingt-uns-zu-gar-nichts-ld.103583 10 Bühler, Stefan.“Brüssel zwingt uns gar nichts.” Neue Zürcher Zeitung. July 3, 2016. Accessed November 13, 2016. http://www.nzz.ch/nzzas/nzz-am-sonntag/ zuwanderung-bruessel-zwingt-uns-zu-gar-nichts-ld.103583 11 Valda, Andreas. “Die Rolle der Arbeitamtschefs in der MEI Debatte.” Tagesanzeiger. December 2, 2016. Accessed December 16, 2016. http://www.tagesanzeiger.ch/schweiz/standard/die-rolle-des-arbeitsamtschefs-in-der-meidebatte/ story/31804324 12 Gemperli, Simon.“So funktioniert die neue Schutzklausel.” Neue Zürcher Zeitung. September 2, 2016. Accessed November 11, 2016. http://www.nzz. ch/schweiz/aktuelle-themen/masseneinwanderungsinitiative-so-funktioniert-die-neue-schutzklausel-ld.11452113 “Common Foreign and Security Policy

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2016 (CFSP) of the European Union.” European External Action Service. Accessed January 5, 2016. http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/index_en.htm. 14 “Security and Defence - CSDP.” European External Action Service. Accessed January 5, 2016. http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/index_en.htm. 13 Gmür, Heidi.“Wie geht es jetzt weiter?.” Neue Zürcher Zeitung. September 22, 2016. Accessed November 13, 2016. http://www.nzz.ch/schweiz/masseneinwanderungsinitiative-der-staenderat-solls-richten-ld.118083 14 “Erste positive Signale aus Brüssel.” Basler Zeitung. December 16, 2016. Accessed December 28, 2016. http://bazonline.ch/schweiz/standard/erste-positive-signale-aus-bruessel/story/25037171 15 Ibid. 16 “Gemperli, Simon.“Wie es in der Europapolitik nun weiter geht.” Neue Zürcher Zeitung. December 16, 2016. Accessed January 2, 2017. http://www.nzz.ch/schweiz/zuwanderungsvorlage-so-geht-es-weiter-in-der-europapolitik-ld.134127 17 Gemperli, Simon. “Die Schweiz braucht ein reinigendes Gewitter.” Neue Zürcher Zeitung. December 16, 2016. Accessed January 2, 2017. http:// www.nzz.ch/meinung/kommentare/zuwanderung-und-bilaterale-die-schweiz-braucht-ein-reinigendes-gewitter-ld.134678 18 Gemperli, Simon. “Die Schweiz braucht ein reinigendes Gewitter.” Neue Zürcher Zeitung. December 16, 2016. Accessed January 2, 2017. http:// www.nzz.ch/meinung/kommentare/zuwanderung-und-bilaterale-die-schweiz-braucht-ein-reinigendes-gewitter-ld.134678 19 “EU-Staaten wollen mehr Daten austauschen.” Tagesanzeiger. December 9, 2016. Accessed December 28, 2016. http://www.tagesanzeiger.ch/ausland/europa/eustaaten-wollen-mehr-daten-austauschen/story/25718838 20 Amrein, Marcel.“Der Steuerstreit ist nicht vorbei.” Neue Zürcher Zeitung. February 8, 2016. Accessed November 14, 2016. http://www.nzz.ch/meinung/ kommentare/der-steuerstreit-ist-nicht-vorbei-1.18692062 21 Ibid. 22 Schöchli, Hansueli. “Ausweg für die Bankgeheimnis-Initiative.” Neue Zürcher Zeitung. February 8, 2016. Accessed November 14, 2016. http://www. nzz.ch/wirtschaft/wirtschaftspolitik/ausweg-fuer-die-bankgeheimnis-initiative-1.18691447 23 Brouzos, Jorgos. “Wie die UBS Affäre in Frankreich ausgeschlachtet wird.” Tagesanzeiger. February 19, 2016. Accessed November 22, 2016. http://www.tagesanzeiger.ch/wirtschaft/wie-die-ubsaffaere-in-frankreich-ausgeschlachtet-wird/ story/22239016 24 Eisenring, Christoph. “Was die Steuer CD verraten.” Neue Zürcher Zeitung. April 14, 2016. Accessed November 29, 2016. http://www.nzz.ch/wirtschaft/ wirtschaftspolitik/steuerstreit-schweiz-deutschland-was-die-daten-cd-verratenld.14002 25 Baches, Zoe. “Hat die UBS das Bankgeheimnis verletzt?” Neue Zürcher Zeitung. July 9, 2016. Accessed November 30, 2016. http://www.nzz.ch/wirtschaft/ wirtschaftspolitik/ubs-und-frankreich-heikle-fragen-zu-den-ubs-kundendatenld.104818

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Messages in the Media “Pariser Justiz und Bund setzen UBS unter Druck.” Basler Zeitung. July 5, 2016. Accessed December 29, 2016. http://bazonline.ch/wirtschaft/unternehmen-und-konjunktur/pariser-justiz-und-bund-setzen-ubs-unter-druck/story/21890590 27 Schöchli, Hansueli. “Gegenentwurf zur Bankgeheimnis-Initiative.” Neue Zürcher Zeitung. May 20, 2016. Accessed November 30, 2016. http://www.nzz. ch/schweiz/aktuelle-themen/schutz-der-privatsphaere-gegenentwurf-zur-bankgeheimnis-initiative-ld.83871 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid. 30 Bräuer, Sebastian. “USA werben dreist um Schwarzgeld.” Neue Zürcher Zeitung. August 14, 2016. Accessed December 13, 2016. http://www.nzz.ch/nzzas/ nzz-am-sonntag/bankgeheimnis-usa-werben-dreist-um-schwarzgeld-ld.110896 31 Fontana, Katharina. “Schweiz liefert Daten von UBS Kunden.” Neue Zürcher Zeitung. September 12, 2016. Accessed December 2, 2016. http://www.nzz.ch/ wirtschaft/unternehmen/bundesgericht-bewilligt-gruppenanfrage-der-nierdelande-ubs-kundendaten-werden-geliefert-ld.116251 32 Schöchli, Hansueli. “Die Einladung zum Rückzug der Volksinitiative.” Neue Zürcher Zeitung. November 16, 2016. Accessed November 30, 2016. http://www. nzz.ch/schweiz/bankgeheimnis-die-einladung-zum-rueckzug-der-volksinitiative-ld.128900 33 “ Nationalrat unterstützt Initative- und auch den Gegenvorschlag.” Neue Zürcher Zeitung. December 15, 2016. Accessed December 29, 2016. http://www.nzz.ch/ schweiz/bankgeheimnis-nationalrat-unterstuetzt-initiative-und-auch-den-gegenvorschlag-ld.134968 34 “Erste Schweizer Bank schafft Bankgeheimnis ab.” Basler Zeitung. November 1, 2016. Accessed December 22, 2016. http://bazonline.ch/wirtschaft/unternehmen-und-konjunktur/erste-schweizer-bank-schafft-bankgeheimnis-ab/story/28944642 35 “ZKB schafft sich Steuerstreit vom Hals.” Basler Zeitung. December 27, 2016. Accessed January 4, 2017. http://bazonline.ch/wirtschaft/unternehmen-und-konjunktur/zkb-schafft-sich-steuerstreit-vom-hals/story/19731232 36 “Axpo soll Beznau stilllegen- und dafür vom Bund Geld erhalten.” Tagesanzeiger. February 1, 2016. Accessed November 23, 2016. http://www.tagesanzeiger. ch/schweiz/standard/axpo-soll-beznau-stilllegen-und-dafuer-vom-bund-gelderhalten/story/10506367 37 Ibid,. 38 Bäumle, Martin. “Drohender Rückschritt ins Atomzeitalter.” Tagesanzeiger. March 1, 2016. Accessed November 3, 2016. http://blog.tagesanzeiger.ch/politblog/index.php/64699/drohender-rueckschritt-ins-atomzeitalter/ 39 “Tausende demonstrieren im Aargau gegen Atomenergie.” Neue Zürcher Zeitung. June 19, 2016. Accessed November 12, 2016. http://www.nzz.ch/schweiz/ aktuelle-themen/atomenergie-tausende-demonstrieren-im-aargau-gegen-atomenergie-ld.90092 40 Hudec, Jan. “Atomausstieg im Alleingang.” Neue Zürcher Zeitung. April 26

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2016 28, 2016. Accessed November 30, 2016. http://www.nzz.ch/zuerich/abstimmungsvorlage-atomausstieg-im-alleingang-ld.16644 41 Ibid. 42 Stalder, Helmut. “Wenig Lust auf Referendum gegen Energiewende.” Neue Zürcher Zeitung. October 9, 2016. Accessed November 30, 2016. http://www. nzz.ch/schweiz/energiestrategie-2050-wenig-lust-auf-referendum-gegen-energiewende-ld.120063 43 “AKW sollen bis 2029 vom Netz gehen.” Neue Zürcher Zeitung. October 5, 2016. Accessed December 2, 2016. http://www.nzz.ch/schweiz/atomausstiegsinitiative-akw-sollen-bis-2029-vom-netz-gehen-ld.120405 44 “SRG-Trendumfrage- 57 Prozent für Atomausstieg.” Basler Zeitung. October 21, 2016. Accessed December 2, 2016. http://bazonline.ch/schweiz/standard/srgtrendumfrage-57-prozent-fuer-atomausstieg/story/20424850 45 “AKW sollen bis 2029 vom Netz gehen.” Neue Zürcher Zeitung. October 5, 2016. Accessed December 2, 2016. http://www.nzz.ch/schweiz/atomausstiegsinitiative-akw-sollen-bis-2029-vom-netz-gehen-ld.120405 Adler, Kathrin.“Das gibt Schäden in Milliardenhöhe.” Neue Zürcher Zeitung. October 30, 2016 Accessed December 2, 2016. http://www.nzz.ch/nzzas/atomausstieg-axpo-milliadenforderung-an-bund-ld.125201 Eisenring, Christoph. “Deutschlands überstürzter Atomausstieg.” Neue Zürcher Zeitung. November 8, 2016. Accessed December 27, 2016. http://www.nzz.ch/ wirtschaft/unternehmen/lehren-fuer-die-schweiz-deutschlands-ueberstuerzter-atomausstieg-ld.126982 3/4 Stalder, Helmut. “Die Tücke der Lücke.” Neue Zürcher Zeitung. November 10, 2016. Accessed December 16, 2016. http://www.nzz.ch/schweiz/atomausstiegdie-tuecke-der-luecke-ld.127510 46 Stalder, Helmut. “Nein mit Deutungsspielraum.” Neue Zürcher Zeitung. November 18, 2016. Accessed December 16, 2016. http://www.nzz.ch/schweiz/ atomausstieg-nein-mit-deutungsspielraum-ld.131032 47 Stalder, Helmut. “Vertrauen, aber kein Freipass.” Neue Zürcher Zeitung. November 27, 2016. Accessed December 16, 2016. http://www.nzz.ch/schweiz/ atomausstieg-vertrauen-aber-kein-freipass-ld.131014 48 “CVP: Freisinnige sollen sich endlich klar bekennen.” Basler Zeitung. November 27, 2016 Accessed December 19, 2016. http://bazonline.ch/schweiz/standard/ cvp-freisinnige-sollen-sich-endlich-bekennen/story/15355515

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Messages in the Media

Media sources 1- Gazeta Shqip: founded in 2005. Owned by Top Media Group 2 - Panorama: founded in 1996. Owned by Panorama Group 3 - Shekulli: founded in 1997. Owned by Koço Kokëdhima

BY: CHRISTINE SIOMIOU 148

2016

IMPROVING RELATIONS OF ALBANIA WITH NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES

Relations between Albania and its neighboring countries have been in constant turmoil during the past century. However, for the last twenty years there has been an attempt from both sides to create strong ties of cooperation and diplomatic alliance. Albania’s historical relations with Serbia, Kosovo, and Greece have led to the country’s current diplomatic identity. With Serbia, the ties are more historical than geographical and involve the conflict over the territory of Kosovo, located in between the two countries. The relations between Albania and Kosovo are very tight even to this day, which means that any attacks against Kosovo are disapproved and protested in Albania. The thawing of the relationship between Albania and Serbia deteriorated during the Euro 2016 qualifier soccer game between Serbia and Albania when a drone1 with a pro-Kosovo flag landed on the pitch, fueling animosity and leading to fighting between the players and supporters. This eventually led to the game being called off with repercussions such as point deduction and fine sanctions to both teams. The past few years, Albanian-Serbian relations have seen a great improvement all in light of Albania’s accession to the European Union. According to the related article from Prime Minister’s Office, such improvement in the relationships can be seen from the meeting of the Albanian Prime Minister with both the Serbian delegation with Mr. Vučić and the Kosovar delegation and Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi.2 When asked if the relations between Serbia and Albania were improved, the PM answered that there are still a lot of issues that need discussion because the notion of peace is trying to be achieved in Kosovo, however by not recognizing the state, Serbia blocks the way to such peace. According to a poll held by the Albanian Institute for International Studies (AIIS), only 13.4 per cent of Albanians consider the relationship good between the two countries, while 29.5 per cent assess it as bad.3 There has been an improvement over the time between the two countries and it seems that the relations are improving a little with time, but not as fast as the public would like. The biggest obstacle between the two countries is this historical feud, which can only be solved through mutual understanding of each other’s culture, history, and language and cooperation for a brighter and more peaceful future for the Balkans. On the southern side of Albania, Greece is the second neighbor that Albania is trying to resolve those “hot” issues that are based on historical and geographical differences. After the fall of communism in Albania in 1992, an influx of economic refugees and immigrants fled to Greece in search of a better life, mainly to seek employment, however these immigrants were not documented. Another conflict between the two countries is related to the recognition of Kosovo, since Albania recognized it as a state, while Greece has not, which creates a schism of financial loses and political clashes that in a modern day European Union should not be allowed.4

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Messages in the Media Currently the two countries enjoy a mutual and peaceful cooperation in political, judicial, and energy fields, as well as tourism. The two governments have had frequent discussions and co-training sessions as part of the NATO training program aiming to the modernization of the Albanian Army Forces.5 This means that the armies of Albania and Serbia cooperate under the causes of NATO. According to the President of the Albanian Parliament, Ilir Meta, the relations between Greece and Albania are “relations of strategic importance, of practical exchanges and of vital importance for both countries.”6 The improvement of the relatIons between Albania and its neighboring countries is seeing positively from other European Union nations such as Germany. Albania’s entrance in the E.U. will be seen more favorable by other nations if its relations with Greece, Kosovo, and Serbia demonstrate a spirit of cooperation and friendship, which are important pillars of the Union.

CONCERN FOR THE INCREASE OF ISIS INFLUENCE IN EUROPE Recent terrorist attacks in Europe are threatening the safety and integrity of the security measures utilized by the European Union. The number of refugees coming from Syria and neighboring countries because of war and political persecution is as large as 1.2 million people who requested asylum status in various EU states. With this increase of asylum seekers, there have been a lot of instances where civilians are lured from the ideologies of the Islamic State. One example includes the involvement of a Kosovar-Albanian citizen, Ardit Ferizi, who was arrested by Malaysian police in the airport of Kuala Lumpur. He was sentenced to imprisonment for 20 years from the United States Embassy in Pristina and the Ministry of External Affairs of Kosovo, with the accusations of electronic crime and terrorism.7 Ardit was a working on behalf of the Islamic State, exposing the identities of U.S. military employers in Europe spreading terror in the area. The Washington Post explains Ferizi’s involvement: he began communicating online before 2015 with an Islamic State recruiter and that initiated his involvement. Also, Ferizi was the host of a pro-Islamic website that openly supported the group online. Elizabeth Mullin who is Ardit Ferizi’s lawyer, argues that the list of the U.S. government and military employers was “propaganda since it did not include the personal or work addresses.”8 Although there has been psychiatric proof of his unstable mental state to lessen and explain his charges, the question remains for the European Union states as to whether the current security measures and refugee integration and screening sufficient for the safety of Europeans.9 Mullin mentioned that while the accused was in Malaysia, a Kosovar journalist wrote that he was fighting on the side of the Islamic State in Syria. Mullin mentioned that it “was a juvenile action from a misguided teenager that did not know what he was doing.”10 The Assistant Attorney General for National Security of the United States commented that this case “is a very real and dangerous national security threat that came from hacking and terrorism.”11 He continued by saying that this event acted as a wake-up call for law enforcement

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2016 and private industry representatives.

INTEGRATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION THROUGH JUDICIAL REFORMS

Albania’s accession to the European Union has given rise to discussions regarding the legislative system of the country and there has been a recent vote to allow the changes the E.U. Commission suggested.12 The amendments have been officially voted as of July 22, 2016 and have paved the way for further negotiations for Albanian membership starting from December 2016.13 The PM, in a speech he gave in the Albanian Parliament in October 2016, mentioned that the only way that judicial reforms could take place facilitating the entrance of Albania into the European Union, is through cooperation with the opposition (PD- Partia Demokratike). The Kryeministria website released a statement by the Minister of Finance Arben Ahmetaj. The recent approval of the full funding package for the judicial reforms is a requirement for Albania’s accession into the European Union.14 In his statement, he presented to the general public the process of negotiation for the financial package with the Parliamentary Committee. In addition, he stated that the funding needed to improve all the elements in the justice system amounted to €1.8 billion.15 This package will aim to increase wages, the number of employees, as well as the establishment of new institutions referred in the constitutional package of justice reform.16 The minister continued his statement by highlighting the importance of the importance of receiving package, which was created by the World Economic Forum, since it refers to Albania’s increase in ranking on the global competitiveness index for 2016-2017.17 Albania was previously ranked 93rd and it improved by 13 places, ranking 80th, leaving behind other countries in the region such as Greece, Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina.18 The everyday lives of citizens has been improved massively and that can be linked to the economic indicators of the country.19 To present more examples of this economic improvement, the Minister mentioned the retail trade index, which is an indirect statistics index that shows buying power and consumption. According to INSTAT (Institute of Statistics- Republika e Shqipërisë Instituti i Statistikave), in the second quarter of 2016, the volume index of sales in retail trade has increased 6.2 per cent.20 Thus, keeping in mind this increase, the minister wanted to point out that the government’s main goal is to improve the economy, which will be reflected in the improvement of the daily lives of Albanian citizens. The European Commission has asked Albania to deliver reforms of five identified key areas that the country has not fulfilled yet and these are: public administration, rule of law, corruption, organized crime, and fundamental rights. More recently, Germany has declared that they would veto the opening accession talking until 2018 even though the Albanian parliament has already voted for the new judicial reforms to be implemented in the new year (2017).21 The reason for this veto is that the Bundestag believes that Albania has not yet met the preliminary

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Messages in the Media requirements for full integration in the European Union.

2016 IN REVIEW 2016 was an eventful and decisive year for Albania as three main issues circulated in the media stirring up international and local politics. The first topic is the turmoil in between Albania and Serbia. The long conflict over the territory of Kosovo and the well-being and safety of ethnic Albanians in the former Serbian province is a significant barrier for the improvement of the relations. However, The articles from Gazeta Shqip and Qeveria Shqiptare Keshilli i Ministrave present the comments of the Albanian side from the talks between representatives from both countries in order to improve the diplomatic relations. The relations between Albania and Serbia have recently seen a great improvement as the Prime Minister Rama attended a two-day working visit in Serbia.22 The similarities in their cultures and their dynamic economic competitiveness in the Balkans has created a strong bond between them. Their relationship has never been better and through visits of officials in Serbia and Albania, both countries are ready to leave the past behind. The second issue that the Albanian and international media took notice of this year was the case of the Kosovar-Albanian citizen, Ardit Ferizi. This case brings Albania’s and Kosovo’s credibility down because it presents a lack of unity within countries of the European continent in the face of the ISIS terrorist attacks that have been a threat since 2013. This lack of unity could mislead the other country’s head leaders to believe that Albania harbors such criminals and they do not agree with the ideals of a united European Union demanding the peace and freedom of all its citizens. Therefore, this may put pressure on the legislations that other European countries pursue in order to accept more refugees, so that it does not seem that the security of the Europeans is compromised. On the other hand, this idea raises questions about the way that the countries are perceiving the threat of the Islamic extremist and their violent actions as well as the humanitarian need the refugees require. A good idea would be for the nations of the E.U. and the aspiring E.U. countries to discuss new ways to limit such threat by drafting new laws about the acceptance of refugees, without compromising the lives of European and Albanian citizens as well as asylum seekers. Lastly, the Albanian media were concerned about one of the most pivotal reforms for the Albanian government that will seal the country’s accession to the European Union. The judicial reform’s details and effects on the Albanian market and in the country’s, general economy were presented in a press release from the Minister of Finance Arben Ahmetaj after it was published in the official website of the Albanian government. The 6.2 per cent increase in the volume index of trades for the second quarter of 2016 for the economy means that the focus will be to improve the citizens’ lives and well-being through these reforms. This package of reforms marks a very significant moment in the lives of many Albanians, as its citizens will be seeing better living and working conditions, which will ease the transition to the European Union. In addition, this acceptance of

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2016 these reform packages can make Albania a much more competitive market for investments than it used to be, which will of course allow a greater economic prosperity for its citizens and the country’s trading relations among European nations. Furthermore, Germany declared that they would veto Albania’s accession talks until 2018 in order to make sure that all those five key points are satisfied. This action supports two key ideas. Firstly, it demonstrates how strict the regulations for a new country entering the E.U. is, which subsequently reinforces Germany’s leading position among the other nations. Secondly, it shows that Germany is a great ally to Albania that wants to guarantee the entrance of the country in the system, both for reasons that will benefit the Union as well as benefiting Albanians. drafting new laws about the acceptance of refugees, without compromising the lives of European and Albanian citizens as well as asylum seekers. Lastly, the Albanian media were concerned about one of the most pivotal reforms for the Albanian government that will seal the country’s accession to the European Union. The judicial reform’s details and effects on the Albanian market and in the country’s, general economy were presented in a press release from the Minister of Finance Arben Ahmetaj after it was published in the official website of the Albanian government. The 6.2 per cent increase in the volume index of trades for the second quarter of 2016 for the economy means that the focus will be to improve the citizens’ lives and well-being through these reforms. This package of reforms marks a very significant moment in the lives of many Albanians, as its citizens will be seeing better living and working conditions, which will ease the transition to the European Union. In addition, this acceptance of these reform packages can make Albania a much more competitive market for investments than it used to be, which will of course allow a greater economic prosperity for its citizens and the country’s trading relations among European nations. Furthermore, Germany declared that they would veto Albania’s accession talks until 2018 in order to make sure that all those five key points are satisfied. This action supports two key ideas. Firstly, it demonstrates how strict the regulations for a new country entering the E.U. is, which subsequently reinforces Germany’s leading position among the other nations. Secondly, it shows that Germany is a great ally to Albania that wants to guarantee the entrance of the country in the system, both for reasons that will benefit the Union as well as benefiting Albanians.

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Messages in the Media Statistics: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/geos/al.html; http://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/ files/pdf/albania/ipa/2011/1_en_annexe_part1_v3.pdf 1 Cakrani, Rina. “Albania-Serbia Relationship.” Politics Made Public | The Public Life Magazine, August 28, 2016. Accessed October 22, 2016. 2 “Dialogue between the parties for a peaceful future.” Qeveria Shqiptare Keshilli i Ministrave, October 14 2016. Accessed October 22, 2016. http://www.kryeministria.al/en/newsroom/news/dialogue-between-the-parties-for-a-peaceful-future 3 Mejdini, Fatjona. “Albanians Feel Reserved About Serbs, Poll Shows.” Balkan Insight, October 28, 2015. Accessed October 22, 2016. 4 Champion, Marc. “Recognize Kosovo or Pay the Price.” Bloomberg.com. Bloomberg, February 29, 2016. Accessed October 22, 2016. https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-02-29/recognize-kosovo-or-pay-the-price 5 “South-Eastern Europe Brigade Multinational Peace Force.” South-Eastern Europe Brigade Multinational Peace Force.Web. Accessed October 22, 2016. http:// www.seebrig.org/ 6 Kolasa-Sikiaridi, Kerry. “Greece-Albania Relations of ‘Vital Importance to Both Countries’ Says President of Albanian Parliament.” Greek Reporter. October 22, 2016.2016. http://greece.greekreporter.com/2016/10/10/greece-albania-relations-of-vital-importance-to-both-countries-says-president-of-albanian-parliament/ 7 “ISIL-Linked Kosovo Hacker Sentenced to 20 Years in Prison.” ISIL-Linked Kosovo Hacker Sentenced to 20 Years in Prison | OPA | Department of Justice, September 23, 2016. Accessed October 22, 2016. https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ isil-linked-kosovo-hacker-sentenced-20-years-prison 8 Weiner, Rachel. “Hacker who sent ‘kill list’ of U.S. military personnel to ISIS: ‘I feel so bad.’” The Washington Post. WP Company, September 23, 2016. Accessed October 22, 2016. https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/ hacker-who-sent-kill-list-of-us-military-personnel-to-islamic-state-i-feel-sobad/2016/09/23/dc0ba0ea-8196-11e6-b002-307601806392_story.html?utm_term=.23effa74136e 9 Erald, Adi Shkembi, Florenc, and Ana Kurti. “Si u tentua të parandalohet ekstradimi në SHBA i hakerit shqiptar të ISIS.” Si u tentua të parandalohet ekstradimi në SHBA i hakerit shqiptar të ISIS, September 30, 2016. Accessed October 22, 2016. http://www.panorama.com.al/408208-2/ 10 Weiner, Rachel. “Hacker who sent ‘kill list’ of U.S. military personnel to ISIS: ‘I feel so bad.’” The Washington Post. WP Company, September 23, 2016. Accessed October 22, 2016. https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/ hacker-who-sent-kill-list-of-us-military-personnel-to-islamic-state-i-feel-sobad/2016/09/23/dc0ba0ea-8196-11e6-b002-307601806392_story.html?utm_term=.23effa74136e 11 Ibid. 12 Press, Associated. "Albania passes judicial reform, key in EU integration steps." Daily Mail Online. Associated Newspapers, July 21, 2016. Web. Accessed October 22, 2016. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/ap/article-3700896/Albania-Par-

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2016 liament-vote-judicial-reform.html 13 Ibid. 14 â&#x20AC;&#x153;The government approves of full funding of the judicial reform.â&#x20AC;? Qeveria Shqiptare Keshilli i Ministrave, September 28, 2016. Accessed October 22, 2016. http://www.kryeministria.al/en/newsroom/press-releases/the-government-approves-of-full-funding-of-the-judicial-reform 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid. 18 Ibid. 19 Ibid. 20 Ibid. 21 "Germany decides to vote against the launch of negotiations between the EU and Albania." Independent Balkan News Agency, 25 Nov. 2016. Accessed December 20, 2016. http://www.balkaneu.com/germany-decides-vote-launch-negotiations-eu-albania/ 22 "Rama: Albania-Serbia relations at historic high." EBL News., October 14, 2016. Web. Accessed October 22, 2016. https://eblnews.com/news/balkan/rama-albania-serbia-relations-historic-high-40418

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Media sources 1- Tygodnik PrzeglÄ&#x2026;d: founded 1990. Owned by N/A 2 - Dziennik Gazeta Prawna: founded in 2009. Owned by INFOR 3 - Rzeczpospolita: founded in 1920. Owned by Gremi Media

BY: MARIANNE A. KALACZYNSKI 156

2016

ABORTION LAWS IN POLAND AMONG MOST RESTRICTIVE IN EU Throughout October 2016, thousands of individuals took to the streets in protest in Warsaw, Gdańsk, Łódź, Wrocław, Poznań and other cities and towns across the country and Europe to challenge a proposed blanket ban on abortion. The protest was successful, forcing Poland’s ruling conservative Law and Justice party (PiS) to shelve the original proposal.6 ,7 Despite the success of the protest held on October 3, campaigners stressed that women in Poland remain under threat from a government they describe as beholden to hardline conservative activists and elements of Poland’s powerful Roman Catholic church.8,9 Despite Poland’s parliament rejecting the near-total ban on abortion after protests on October 6, in which women and doctors would have faced up to five years in jail for performing an abortion, Prime Minister Beata Szydło stated the government will attempt to introduce fresh proposals regarding abortion by the end of the year, but hinted that any new restrictions would be relatively modest. 10,11 Furthermore, PiS leaders are now hoping to tighten Poland’s abortion laws by removing the right for termination in cases in which the fetus has a congenital disorder. Jarosław Kaczyński, head of PiS, said the government wants to ensure that even pregnancies involving a child “certain to die, very deformed, still end up in a birth so that the child can be baptized, buried, have a name.”12 Poland currently has one of the most restrictive abortion laws in Europe, with terminations legally permitted only when the life of the fetus is threatened, when there is a threat to the mother’s health, and in cases of pregnancy resulting from rape or incest. The European Parliament has in the past avoided commenting on Polish women’s rights. Group leaders prohibited MEPs from touching on the issue in January and April this year, during wider debates on the situation in Poland.13 A debate at the European Parliament in early October was not accompanied by a resolution, a fact that reduced the importance surrounding the issue of women’s rights. But Green MEP Terry Reintke said that her office would try to include Polish women’s rights in the European Commission’s monitoring of the rule of law in Poland. Swedish left-wing MEP Malin Bjork said her office had previously tried to introduce women’s rights into the commission’s rule of law probe from the very beginning, but leaders of the parliament’s other fractions had blocked the effort. Belgian socialist MEP Marie Arena said the EU directive on non-discrimination in access to healthcare services could serve to strengthen sexual and reproductive health within the EU and its member states.14 She could also see a stronger role for the EU in promoting sexual education and fighting the misuse of conscientious objections by doctors who didn’t want to carry out abortion procedures - a problem not only found in Poland, but also in Italy and other EU countries.15

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Brexit and the UK’s Polish Immigrants One The June 23 referendum to leave the European Union unleashed a wave of xenophobia Britain. Before the vote, the far-right, who supported leaving the EU, played skillfully on concerns about unchecked immigration, warning that the EU’s open borders threatened the British way of life, hurt workers, and made the country vulnerable to terrorism.16 Poles constitute the largest number of foreign-born residents of Britain, with 831,000 of them currently in the country.17,18 In June, shortly after the referendum, the Polish Social and Cultural Association in the Hammersmith district of London, home to a large Polish community, was vandalized.19 In early July, abusive messages like “No more Polish vermin” and “Go home, Polish scum” were left on cars and at several properties in Cambridgeshire, north of London.20 Numerous other known Polish buildings were vandalized, individuals speaking or known to be Polish were harassed.21 However, what garnered most attention this year in Poland and Europe was the fatal beating of Arkadiusz Jóźwik in Harlow.22 Jóźwik came to Britain in 2012 to work, had been targeted because he was speaking Polish.23 The large Polish community in Harlow gathered the following weekend for a silent march and vigil to honour his memory and grieve along with his brother and mother.24 Both the British and Polish government were surprisingly quick to respond to this hate crime.25 Prime Minister Beata Szydło sent a Polish delegation composed of the Minister of Internal Affairs Mariusz Błaszczak and the leader of the delegation Witold Waszczykowski to meet with Home Secretary Amber Rudd and Boris Johnson.26,27 The Polish ministers expressed their concern, while the British assured them of their commitment to assuring Poles residing in the United Kingdom their safety.28 Poland was heavily criticized for the fact that they sent two ministers to discuss the matter, while Deputy Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki was in London at the same time, among others.29 The EU reached the consensus that the Polish response to the death of Arkadiusz Jóźwik was exaggerated and inadequate to the political situation that Europe, and specifically the European Union, was dealing with at the time. It continued to state that it would be next to impossible that the fatal beatings of a French, Italian, or German national on the islands would garner such attention from those nations and resulting in a delegation of this size sent to London.30 However, there was widespread belief that the Polish delegation was sent to reprimand the British government of how to handle and execute internal security, which echoed in Westminster of a strong push back and criticism on Poland’s part against the current government.31 Polish Ambassador Arkady Rzegocki attempted to lighten the situation, stressing the fact that up to this point the Polish and British governments had worked together well and should maintain this cooperation.32,33

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EU Accuses the Polish Government of Undermining Democracy A constitutional crisis that gripped the country for five months has allowed PiS to govern with a free hand, prompting protests nationwide.34 In April this year, the European Parliament accused Poland’s right-wing government of undermining democracy by overwhelmingly adopting a resolution urging it to respect the decisions of a top Polish court.35,36 The resolution, backed by a coalition of liberal and left-wing factions and passed in a meeting in Strasbourg, calls on the Polish government to respect the decisions of the country’s Constitutional Tribunal (Trybunał Konstytucyjny), which is empowered to review Poland’s laws.37,38 The motion urged the European Commission to take actions to force the Polish government to follow the resolution’s recommendations.39 If the Polish government fails to do so, it could face penalties. Representatives of PiS quickly denounced the vote, calling it “absurd” and saying the government would not comply with it.40,41 After PiS came to power in October 2015, it appointed five judges to the Constitutional Tribunal, disregarding the decision of the previous government to appoint a different group of judges.42 This action followed the passing of a law that severely limited the tribunal’s powers. PiS contended that because the previous, left-wing government had, according to PiS, illegally appointed two of those judges — as the Constitutional Tribunal had ruled — none of the five should be seated. 43 However, in December 2015, the tribunal ruled that the three judges who had been properly appointed by the previous government should be seated. PiS refused to seat those judges, and President Andrzej Duda refused to swear them in.44 In March, the tribunal struck down the new law restricting its powers,but the government said the court did not have the authority to do so, and it refused to publish the tribunal’s ruling, which is required for it to take effect.45,46 The impasse effectively neutralized the tribunal and prompted the European Commission to open a three-step inquiry into whether the Polish government had violated the European union’s democratic norms. According to the resolution, the European Parliament “is seriously concerned that the effective paralysis of the Constitutional Tribunal in Poland endangers democracy, human rights and the rule of law.”48,49 The resolution is not legally binding, but it offers yet another sign that Poland faces growing pressure from Western powers.50,51

2016 IN REVIEW 2016 in Poland constituted of a conflict on two fronts for the Polish right-wing government, with issues arising both domestically and internationally. Starting the year off with a potential European Union intervention into what was occurring in Poland with the country’s Constitutional Tribunal caused more internal conflict, as Poles became increasingly divided over the present government. Even though the reforms were mainly internal, Poland’s

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Messages in the Media membership in the EU called for special attention to be made to the insurance and protection of democracy in its member state. Although the intervention could be seen as merely a warning, it called for a restatement of what the role of the EU should be in Polandâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s internal affairs. Further concern on a continental scale was marked by Brexit mid-year, which brought about a flood of xenophobia and hate crimes committed against Polish immigrants in the United Kingdom. The concern for safety of Poles on the island was furthered by Polish citizens, criticizing the government for being unable to cooperate with the British government to ensure their safety and punish those who would threaten it. This social concern culminated with the fatal beating of Arkadiusz JĂłĹşwik, which prompted a response from the Polish government. However, the Polish government was criticised for the way it responded to the event, both domestically and by the European Union. It caused a general distaste in Polish-British relations; not only because a fifth of the Polish government suddenly arrived in London, but also because Poland itself is not perfect, a fact the Brits know perfectly. However, the year did not quiet down after, as the proposed near total ban on abortion was heavily protested both in Poland and in Europe. It garnered attention from the EU and evoked the possibility for consequences that could be adapted regarding sexual and reproductive health in its member states. This event reignited yet again the discussion regarding the amount of affluence the EU ought to have in its member states, from democratic to human rights.In conclusion, 2016 can be seen as the beginning of a schism occurring between Poland and the EU, as the right-wing PiS government continues to speak out on and implement its anti-EU policies and stances.

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2016 Statistics: The Central Intelligence Agency. “Poland.” The World Factbook. January 12, 2017. Accessed on March 3, 2017. https://www.cia.gov/library/publica, “EU Funds in Poland 2014–2020.” Rödl & Partner. Nd. Accessed December 11, 2016. http://www.roedl.com/pl/en/services/state_aid_advice/eu_funds_in_poland_20142020.html. 1 The Central Intelligence Agency. “Polan d.” T he World Factbook. January 12, 2017. Accessed on March 3, 2017. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ geos/pl.html. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid. 5 “EU Funds in Poland 2 014–2020.” R ödl & Partner. Nd. Accessed December 11, 2016. http://www.roedl.com/pl/en/services/state_aid_advice/eu_funds_in_poland_20142020.html. 6 Leśniewicz, Kacper. “Bun t kobiet.” Tygodnik Przegląd. October 11, 2016. Accessed on December 11, 2016. http://www.tygodnikprzeglad.pl/bunt-kobiet/. 7 Raczkowski, Wiktor. “Dziewuchy w aleczne.” T ygodnik Przegląd. October 25, 2016. Accessed on December 11, 2016. http://www.tygodnikprzeglad.pl/dziewuchy-waleczne/. 8 Malinowski, Przemysław. “Czarny Protest pod domem Kaczyńskiego.” Rzeczpospolita. October 13, 2016. Accessed December 11, 2016. http://www.rp.pl/Spoleczenstwo/161019577-Czarny-Protest-pod-domemKaczynskiego.html#ap1. 9 “Sympatycy PiS wyróżniają się postawami etatystycznymi, PO - postawami proeuropejskimi. S ONDAŻ.” Dziennik Gazeta Prawna. June 29, 2016. Accessed on December 11, 2016. http://wiadomosci.dziennik.pl/polityka/artykuly/525070,cbos-sympatycy-pis-wyrozniaja-sie-posta wami-etatystycznymi-po-postawami-proeuropejskimi.html. 10 Malinowski, Przemysław. “Jarosław Kaczyński: Będziemy dążyli do tego, aby aborcji było dużo mniej niż obecnie.” Rzeczpospolita. October 12, 2016. Accessed on December 11, 2016. http://www.rp.pl/Prawo-i-Sprawiedliwosc/161019666-Jaroslaw-Kaczynski-Bedziemy-dazyli-do-te go-aby-aborcji-bylo-duzo-mniej-niz-obecnie.html#ap-1. 11 “Rząd RP zrobi wszystko, aby chronić ludzkie życie.” P rawo i Sprawiedliwość. October 6, 2016. Accessed on December 11, 2016.

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Messages in the Media http://pis.org.pl/aktualnosci/rzad-rp-zrobi-wszystko-aby-chronic-ludzkie-zycie. 12 Malinowski, Przemysław. “Jarosław Kaczyński: Będziemy dążyli do tego, aby aborcji było dużo mniej niż obecnie.” Rzeczpospolita. October 12, 2016. Accessed on December 11, 2016. http://www.rp.pl/Prawo-i-Sprawiedliwosc/161019666-Jaroslaw-Kaczynski-Bedziemy-dazyli-do-te go-aby-aborcji-bylo-duzo-mniej-niz-obecnie.html#ap-1. 13 “Sympatycy PiS wyróżniają się postawami etatystycznymi, PO - postawami proeuropejskimi. SONDAŻ.” Dziennik Gazeta Prawna. June 29, 2016. Accessed on December 11, 2016. http://wiadomosci.dziennik.pl/polityka/artykuly/525070,cbos-sympatycy-pis-wyrozniaja-sie-posta wami-etatystycznymi-po-postawami-proeuropejskimi.html. 14 Pilawski, Krzysztof. “W potrzasku.” T ygodnik Przegląd. October 10, 2016. Accessed on December 11, 2016. http://www.tygodnikprzeglad.pl/w-potrzasku/. 15 Ibid. 16 “Ministerstwa odpowiadają RPO ws. sytuacji Polaków mieszkających w Wielkiej Brytanii.” Rzeczpospolita. November 3, 2016. Accessed on December 11, 2016. http://www.rp.pl/Polak-za-granica/311039931-Ministerstwa-odpowiadaja-RPO-ws-sytuacji-Polak ow-mieszkajacych-w-Wielkiej-Brytanii.html. 17 Walenciak, Robert. “Oni się bali nie muzułmanów, ale Polaków.” T ygodnik Przegląd. July 22, 2016. Accessed on December 11, 2016. http://www.tygodnikprzeglad.pl/sie-bali-muzulmanow-polakow/. 18 Podskoczy, Alicja. “Brexit odstraszył Polaków. Nie chcą już wyjeżdżać do Wielkiej Brytanii.” Rzeczpospolita. November 10, 2016. Accessed on December 11, 2016. http://www.rp.pl/Rynek-pracy/161119951-Brexit-odstraszyl-Polakow-Nie-chcajuz-wyjezdzac-doWielkiej-Brytanii.html#ap-1. 19 “Ambasady państw UE w Londynie donoszą o wzroście przestępstw z nienawiści. Najwięcej dotyczy Polaków.” Dziennik Gazeta Prawna. September 19, 2016. Accessed on December 11, 2016. http://wiadomosci.dziennik.pl/swiat/artykuly/531263,ambasady-panstw-ue-w-londynie-donoszaowzroscie-przestepstw-z-nienawisci-najwiecej-dotyczy-polakow.html. 20 Ibid. 21 Krupa, Jakub. ““Atak na Polaków nikogo tu nie dziwi” [REPORTAŻ Z LEEDS].” Dziennik

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2016 Gazeta Prawna. September 12, 2016. Accessed on December 11, 2016. http://wiadomosci.dziennik.pl/swiat/artykuly/530776,atak-na-polakow-nikogo-tu-nie-dziwi-reporta z-z-leeds.html.22 Mazzini, Mateusz. “Wyspy nienawiści.” T ygodnik Przegląd. September 12, 2016. Accessed on December 11, 2016. http://www.tygodnikprzeglad.pl/wyspy-nienawisci/. 23 Ibid. 24 Ibid. 25 Niedziński, Bartłomiej. “Co się stało z tymi kulturalnymi Anglikami? Nakręca się spirala nienawiści.” Dziennik Gazeta Prawna. September 11, 2016. Accessed on December 11, 2016. http://wiadomosci.dziennik.pl/swiat/artykuly/530680,co-sie-stalo-z-tymi-kulturalnymi-anglikami.ht ml. 26 Mazzini, Mateusz. “Wyspy nienawiści.” T ygodnik Przegląd. September 12, 2016. Accessed on December 11, 2016. http://www.tygodnikprzeglad.pl/wyspy-nienawisci/. 27 “Zabójstwo Polaka w Harlow. Szef polskiego MSZ będzie rozmawiał z Borisem Johnsonem.” Dziennik Gazeta Prawna. September 1, 2016. Accessed on December 11, 2016. http://wiadomosci.dziennik.pl/polityka/artykuly/529877,szefowie-dyplomacji-polski-i-wlk-brytaniibedarozmawiac-m-in-o-zabojstwie-w-harlow.html. 28 “Ambasady państw UE w Londynie donoszą o wzroście przestępstw z nienawiści. Najwięcej dotyczy Polaków.” Dziennik Gazeta Prawna. September 19, 2016. Accessed on December 11, 2016. http://wiadomosci.dziennik.pl/swiat/artykuly/531263,ambasady-panstw-ue-w-londynie-donoszaowzroscie-przestepstw-z-nienawisci-najwiecej-dotyczy-polakow.html. 29 “Szef MSZ: Po Brexicie prawa Polaków na Wyspach takie, jak Brytyjczyków na kontynencie.” Dziennik Gazeta Prawna. September 3, 2016. Accessed on December 11, 2016. http://wiadomosci.dziennik.pl/polityka/artykuly/530082,szef-msz-po-brexicie-prawa-polakow-nawyspachtakie-jak-brytyjczykow-na-kontynencie.html. 30 Mazzini, Mateusz. “Wyspy nienawiści.” T ygodnik Przegląd. September 12, 2016. Accessed on December 11, 2016. http://www.tygodnikprzeglad.pl/wyspy-nienawisci/. 31 “Ministerstwa odpowiadają RPO ws. sytuacji Polaków mieszkających w Wielkiej Brytanii.” Rzeczpospolita. November 3, 2016. Accessed on December 11, 2016. http://www.rp.pl/Polak-za-granica/311039931-Ministerstwa-odpowiada-

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Messages in the Media ja-RPO-ws-sytuacji-Polak ow-mieszkajacych-w-Wielkiej-Brytanii.html.32 Mazzini, Mateusz. “Wyspy nienawiści.” T ygodnik Przegląd. September 12, 2016. Accessed on December 11, 2016. http://www.tygodnikprzeglad.pl/wyspy-nienawisci/. 33 “Unia Europejska musi wrócić do wartości, które legły u jej podstaw.” Prawo i Sprawiedliwość. July 21, 2016. Accessed on December 11, 2016. http://pis.org.pl/aktualnosci/unia-europejska-musi-wrocic-do-wartosci-ktore-legly-u-jej-podstaw. 34 “Co z ochroną praworządności w Polsce? Rzecznik rządu: Będzie pisemna odpowiedź na pismo Komisji Europejskiej.” D ziennik Gazeta Prawna. October 25, 2016. Accessed on December 11, 2016. http://wiadomosci.dziennik.pl/polityka/artykuly/534041,rzecznik-rzadu-bedzie-pisemna-odpowied z-ws-zalecen-ke.html. 35 Walenciak, Robert. “Wstaliśmy z kolan i uderzyliśmy się w głowę.” T ygodnik Przegląd. April 19, 2016. Accessed on December 11, 2016. http://www.tygodnikprzeglad.pl/wstalismy-kolan-uderzylismy-sie-glowe/. 36 Bartkiewicz, Artur. “13 grudnia kolejna debata o Polsce w Parlamencie Europejskim.” Rzeczpospolita. December 8, 2016. Accessed on December 11, 2016. http://www.rp.pl/Unia-Europejska/161209023-13-grudnia-kolejna-debata-o-Polsce-w-Parlamenci e-Europejskim.html. 37 Walenciak, Robert. “Wstaliśmy z kolan i uderzyliśmy się w głowę.” T ygodnik Przegląd. April 19, 2016. Accessed on December 11, 2016. http://www.tygodnikprzeglad.pl/wstalismy-kolan-uderzylismy-sie-glowe/. 38 “Co z ochroną praworządności w Polsce? Rzecznik rządu: Będzie pisemna odpowiedź na pismo Komisji Europejskiej.” D ziennik Gazeta Prawna. October25, 2016. Accessed on December 11, 2016. http://wiadomosci.dziennik.pl/polityka/artykuly/534041,rzecznik-rzadu-bedzie-pisemna-odpowied z-ws-zalecen-ke.html. 39 Bartkiewicz, Artur. “13 grudnia kolejna debata o Polsce w Parlamencie Europejskim.” Rzeczpospolita. December 8, 2016. Accessed on December 11, 2016. http://www.rp.pl/Unia-Europejska/161209023-13-grudnia-kolejna-debata-o-Polsce-w-Parlamenci e-Europejskim.html.

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2016 “Polska jest normalnym, demokratycznym państwem.” Prawo i Sprawiedliwość. April 25, 2016. Accessed on December 11, 2016. http://pis.org.pl/aktualnosci/polska-jest-normalnym-demokratycznym-panstwem. 41 “Polska przekazała Komisji Europejskiej odpowiedź na zalecenia ws. praworządności.” Dziennik Gazeta Prawna. October 27, 2016. Accessed on December 11, 2016. http://wiadomosci.dziennik.pl/swiat/artykuly/534237,polska-przekazala-ke-odpowiedz-na-zalece nia-ws-praworzadnosci.html. 42 Łukaszewicz, Agata. “Oświadczenia majątkowe: Władza bierze się za sędziów.” Rzeczpospolita. November 12, 2016. Accessed on December 11, 2016. http://www.rp.pl/Sedziowie-i-sady/311129991-Oswiadczenia-majatkowe-Wladza-bierze-sie-za-s edziow.html. 43 “Polska przekazała Komisji Europejskiej odpowiedź na zalecenia ws. praworządności.” Dziennik Gazeta Prawna. October 27, 2016. Accessed on December 11, 2016. http://wiadomosci.dziennik.pl/swiat/artykuly/534237,polska-przekazala-ke-odpowiedz-na-zalece nia-ws-praworzadnosci.html.44 “Sędziowie TK zebrali się ws. nowego regulaminu Trybunału.” R zeczpospolita. November 8, 2016. Accessed on December 11, 2016. 40

http://www.rp.pl/artykul/1295913-Sedziowie-TK-zebrali-sie-ws--nowego-regulaminu-Trybunalu.ht ml. 45 “Sejm uchwalił ustawę o organizacji i trybie postępowania przed TK.” Dziennik Gazeta Prawna. November 30, 2016. Accessed on December 11, 2016. http://wiadomosci.dziennik.pl/polityka/artykuly/536706,sejm-uchwalil-ustawe-o-organizacji-i-trybi e-postepowania-przed-tk.html. 46 “Sędziowie TK zebrali się ws. nowego regulaminu Trybunału.” R zeczpospolita. November 8, 2016. Accessed on December 11, 2016. http://www.rp.pl/artykul/1295913-Sedziowie-TK-zebrali-sie-ws--nowego-regulaminu-Trybunalu.ht ml. 47 “Magierowski: Duda oczekuje, że TK będzie działał w zgodzie z prawem.” Rzeczpospolita. December 8, 2016. Accessed on December 11, 2016. http://www.rp.pl/Sedziowie-i-sady/312089877-Magierowski-Duda-ocze-

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kuje-ze-TK-bedzie-dzialal -w-zgodzie-z-prawem.html. 48 Gutkowski, Maciej and Kardas, Piotr. ““Polski system konstytucyjny został cofnięty do

zamierzchłych czasów”.” Dziennik Gazeta Prawna. December 5, 2016. Accessed on December 11, 2016. http://wiadomosci.dziennik.pl/opinie/artykuly/537108,polski-system-konstytucyjny-zostal-cofniety -do-zamierzchlych-czasow.html. 49 “Co z ochroną praworządności w Polsce? Rzecznik rządu: Będzie pisemna odpowiedź na pismo Komisji Europejskiej.” D ziennik Gazeta Prawna. October 25, 2016. Accessed on December 11, 2016. http://wiadomosci.dziennik.pl/polityka/artykuly/534041,rzecznik-rzadu-bedzie-pisemna-odpowied z-ws-zalecen-ke.html.http://pis.org.pl/aktualnosci/chcemy-dojsc-do-porozumienia-w-sprawie-tk. 51 “Co z ochroną praworządności w Polsce? Rzecznik rządu: Będzie pisemna odpowiedź na pismo Komisji Europejskiej.” D ziennik Gazeta Prawna. October 25, 2016. Accessed on December 11, 2016 .http://wiadomosci.dziennik.pl/polityka/artykuly/534041,rzecznik-rzadu-bedzie-pisemna-odpowie dz-ws-zalecen-ke.html.

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Messages in the Media

Media sources 1- Belarus Digest: founded in . Owned by 2 - BelTA: founded in 1996. Owned by Panorama Group 3 - BFP News: founded in 1997. Owned by Koço Kokëdhima

BY: ARINA DMITRENKO 167

2016

THE EU LIFTS SANCTIONS AGAINST BELARUS

The lifting of sanctions against Belarus has been a reoccurring topic in the Belarusian media, appearing in late 2015 and remaining significant throughout 2016. In October of 2015, negotiations in Brussels led the EU to suspend sanctions against 170 people in Belarus, including the current president Lukashenko.1 This decision was made by the EU “in response [to which Belarus must] release of all Belarusian political prisoners on 22 August and in the context of improving EU-Belarus relations.”2 This decision was announced during the lead up to the Belarusian election. Belarusian politics are rooted in a history of unfair elections where the government in power abuses the practice of law to alter election outcomes.3 Imprisonment is a common tactic used by the government to manage the opposition, leaving Belarus less democratic.4 In addition, the Belarusian law still condones the death penalty – a violation of human rights in the eyes of the EU.5 6 The lifting of sanctions was welcomed by Dmitry Mironchik, the Head of the Information Office, Press Secretary of the Belarusian Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a positive shift towards the improvement of Belarus-EU relations.7 He was quoted saying, “We are convinced that the decision meets interests of Belarus, the EU, and the entire European region as a whole.”8 The official opposition in Belarus, the BPF led by Aleksiej Janukievich, has expressed concern for the lifting of sanctions. The BPF spoke out stating that by lifting the sanctions on Belarusian officials, the EU is promoting the continuation of an authoritative regime and a continuation of human rights violations.9 The BPF has also acknowledged that the EU’s decision is based on the prevention of future violence against the political opposition rather than a push for significant change.10 This recognition by the BPF shows the underlying intention on behalf of the EU and the motivation behind Belarus’ actions in response to the lifting of sanctions. A bold move on the EU’s part, the lift of sanctions remains a critical window for future relations between Belarus and the Union. Belarus has regained some of the trust from the EU and the EU will continue to use this decision as a stepping stool for a greater conversation regarding the active practice of the death penalty in Belarus.

THE LAUNCH OF THE EU MOBILITY PARTNERSHIP WITH BELARUS Continuing to seek improvement in relations with the EU, Belarus managed to sign a joint declaration launching a Mobility Partnership with the EU and the member states.11 As explained in the news source BelTA, “The document envisages measures to boost cooperation in the areas of legal and labor migration, readmission, security of identity and travel documents, prevention and combating of irregular migration, including smuggling of migrants and trafficking in human beings, and also granting of asylum and protection of refugees.”12 Belarusian Interior Minister Igor Shunevich signed the agreement in Luxembourg on October 13th, 2016. Shunevich stated that Belarus was interested in cooperating with

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Messages in the Media the EU in the areas of migration and mobility with the intention of managing migration flow.13 The instability of other countries forces many illegal immigrants to attempt to find refuge by escaping to the EU, making Belarus a gateway to Europe.14 The Mobility Partnership will implement greater security against the growing population of illegal immigrants in the EU.15 In addition, the Mobility Partnership brings a positive note to Belarus-EU relations, leaving Belarus hopeful for future cooperation and economic growth under the guidance of the EU. However, the agreement poses several threats to labor visas as stronger policies will be implemented against high immigration rates.16 Individuals will be faced with a more complex process for acquiring labour visas and limited opportunity for labour based immigration. Considering the current relevance of illegal immigration within Europe, the Mobility Partnership is a great achievement for the EU. Fueled by their self-interest, the EU has now opened the floor for a conversation with Belarus on the grounds of border cooperation. As Belarus continues to build closer ties with the EU, improvement in relations is certain – a benefit to both parties.17 Belarus will be able to establish closer trade and support from the EU and the Union will find Belarus a useful neighboring link to the border of the EU.

THE FIRST RECESSION IN 20 YEARS Since gaining independence in 1991, Belarus has witnessed five terms of Lukashenko’s presidency — beginning in 1994 and carrying through to present day. During his time in office, Belarus’ economy has remained fairly unchanged until the most recent events. Starting in 2011, Belarus slowly entered into its very first recession.18 Lukashenko spoke out outlining the several reasons for Belarus’ economic decline from 2011-2015; among some being the fall of the gross domestic product of the EU in 2013, and the slowing down of Russia’s economic growth (Belarus’ main trading partner).19 Lukashenko also touched upon the geopolitical tension that surrounds Belarus, drawing attention to Russia and its relationship with the EU.20 The most telling figure for Belarus was the drop in Belarusian-Russian trade, falling from $45 billion to a mere $27.5 billion in 2015.21 The economic collapse in 2015 provided an incentive for Belarus to look for other trading partners and to boost foreign investment into the country. Belarusian economists predict that foreign investments will provide an efficient solution and outlet for economic growth in Belarus.22 Deputy Prime Minister Vladimir Semashko stated that the Belarusian economy is on its way to recovery with “inflation running under 12%, as planned,” making Belarus all the more attractive to foreign investors.23 With investment and growth plans in place, Belarus must also evaluate the obstacles that stand in the way of their economic recovery.24 For instance, the authoritarian regime in Belarus inherently challenges its economic recovery by proving trading relations to be difficult. The past five years have shown a steady decline in the investment expenditures of public industries in Belarus. With no domestic investors in sight, Belarus is left to depend heavily on trade with Russia and support from other

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2016 European countries.25 In an attempt to salvage the economy and receive support from Europe’s investors, the Belarusian government was ready to discuss some reform.26 An example being, a cooperation agreement being signed between the foreign minister, Vladimir Makei and the head of the Republican Confederation of Entrepreneurship, Vladimir Karyagin.27 The willingness of Belarusian authorities to open up the country to new agreements was noted by the EU as the union expressed support for the reforms, hoping to continue the conversation.28 A more open and negotiable Belarus would serve as a great aid to the EU in their trade and border policies. Although plans to boost foreign investments are forecasting economic recovery, obstacles are preventing the project from functioning. Lack of property protection and the general lack of the rule of law leaves investors concerned with the security of their investments and the predictability of possible outcomes.29 With the Belarusian government owning a large share of the economic property, the border between the role of the government as owner and regulator becomes blurred. Not to mention the absence of a stock market and a transparent, competent bureaucracy leaves more to be desired for European investors.30 Belarus is still searching for foreign investments opportunities; however, it is unlikely that Belarusian officials will seek any solution to the investment drought which would jeopardize the state’s monopoly on power.31 Considering that the government of Belarus manages most of the economic factors in the country, it is unreasonable to assume that a compromise involving the loss of control over economic factors is in Belarus’ interest.

2016 IN REVIEW Throughout 2016, EU and Belarus focused on developing a working relationship in order to pursue their own strategic goals. This developing relationship was strengthened by the lift of sanctions against Belarus created by the EU, the establishment of the Mobility Partnership and the Belarusian hunt for economic support from European investors. In previous years, the EU has viewed Belarus as an authoritative, corrupt country, distancing themselves from potential cooperation with the state – this is still largely the case. Yet, in 2016, a decision to improve cooperation emerged from both the EU and Belarus to encourage a change in relations rather than the continued isolation of Belarus from relations with the EU. The Mobility Partnership acted as a primary binding between the EU and Belarus, showing first signs of successful, mutually beneficial cooperation. The Mobility Partnership seeks to establish stronger regulations on illegal immigrants which will promote closer EU-Belarus relations. The lift of sanctions – carried out conveniently in time for the election – provided Belarus with political trust from the EU and instilled hope for Belarusian economic recovery plans which involved investors and support from the EU. The recession and route to recovery will provide a stability for EU relations to thrive on. All three political sources in Belarus agree that the emerging Belarusian-EU relations will benefit both the state and the union.

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Messages in the Media Overall, the year posed to be successful for Belarus and Belarus-EU relations. With the economy on its way to recovery, Belarus will continue to work on strengthening its economic ties with Russia as well as creating new ones with the EU â&#x20AC;&#x201C; eventually re-creating a full functioning, stable economy.

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2016 “Belarus Reality Check, Life After Sanctions - Digest of Belarusian Analytics,” belarusdigest.com, 16 March 2016, Accessed on: 2 January 2017, http://belarusdigest.com/story/belarus-reality-check-life-after-sanctions-digest-belarusian-analytics-24985. 2 “Editorial: Why The EU Lifts Belarus Sanctions,” belarusdigest.com, 2 November 2015, Accessed on: 27 November 2016, http://belarusdigest.com/story/editorial-why-eu-lifts-belarus-sanctions-23611. 3 “Issues of democracy and human rights shouldn’t vanish from agenda of Belarusian and European cooperation,” narodny.org, 30 January 2016, Accessed on: 3 January 2016, http://narodny.org/english/?p=686. 4 “Editorial: Why The EU Lifts Belarus Sanctions,” belarusdigest.com. 5 Lizaveta Kasmach, “Death Penalty: Is There A Price Tag For Mercy?,” belarusdigest.com, 21 March 2016, Accessed on: 10 December 2016, http://belarusdigest. com/story/death-penalty-there-price-tag-mercy-25003. 6 “Samoseiko: Minsk conference on death penalty will promote cooperation with the EU,” belTA, 10 March 2016, Accessed on: 17 December 2016, http://eng. belta.by/politics/view/samoseiko-minsk-conference-on-death-penalty-will-promote-cooperation-with-the-eu-89527-2016. 7 “Belarus Welcomes EU Decision to Lift Most Sanctions,” BelTA, 15 February 2016, Accessed on: 2 January 2017, http://eng.belta.by/politics/view/belarus-welcomes-eu-decision-to-lift-most-sanctions-89001-2016. 8 Ibid. 9 “Issues of democracy and human rights shouldn’t vanish from agenda of Belarusian and European cooperation,” narodny.org, 2 May 2016, Accessed on: 3 January 2017, http://narodny.org/english/?p=686. 10 Ibid. 11 “EU-Belarus Mobility Partnership launched in Luxembourg,” BelTA, 13 October 2016, Accessed on: 2 January 2017, http://eng.belta.by/society/view/eu-belarus-mobility-partnership-launched-in-luxembourg-95380-2016. 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid. 14 “Increase in Illegal Migration To EU Via Belarus, Cultural Treasures Restitution – State Press Digest,” belarusdigest.com, 8 February 2016, Accessed on: 17 December 2016, http://belarusdigest.com/story/increase-illegal-migration-eu-belarus-cultural-treasures-restitution-state-press-digest-2454. 15 “EU launches Mobility Partnership with Belarus,” Europa Commission, 13 October 2016, Accessed on: 3 January 2017, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-3426_en.htm. 16 “Joint Declaration on a Mobility Partnership Between the Republic of Belarus and the European Union and its Participating Member States,” Europa Commission, Accessed on: 4 January 2016, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/international-affairs/global-approach-to-migration/specific-tools/docs/mobility_partnership_of_belarus_en.pdf. 17 “More Europe for Belarus,” narodny.org, 8 April 2013, Accessed on: 4 January 2017, http://narodny.org/english/?p=341. 1

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Messages in the Media “2016 Will Be Tough, Reforms Or No Reforms – Digest Of Belarusian Economy,” belarusdigest.com, 8 January 2016, Accessed on: 4 January 2017, http:// belarusdigest.com/story/2016-will-be-tough-reforms-or-no-reforms-digest-belarusian-economy-24243. 19 “Lukashenko names reasons for economic slowdown in Belarus in 20112015,” BelTA, 22 June 2016, Accessed on: 2 January 2017, http://eng.belta.by/ president/view/lukashenko-names-reasons-for-economic-slowdown-in-belarus-in-2011-2015-92395-2016. 20 “WB expert: Belarus is becoming more attractive for Chinese investors,” BelTA, 7 April 2016, Accessed on: 2 January, 2017, http://eng.belta.by/economics/view/wb-expert-belarus-is-becoming-more-attractive-for-chinese-investors-90336-2016. 21 “Ambassador: Intercompany cooperation will help Belarus, Russia overcome recession in mutual trade,” BelTA, 2 March 2016, Accessed on: 17 December, 2016, http://eng.belta.by/economics/view/ambassador-intercompany-cooperation-will-help-belarus-russia-overcome-recession-in-mutual-trade-88669-2016. 22 Aliaksandr Filipau, “Foreign Direct Investments In Belarus: Many Words But Few Actions,” belarusdigest.com, 1 November 2016, Accessed on: 2 January 2017, http://belarusdigest.com/story/foreign-direct-investments-belarus-many-words-few-actions-27682. 23 “Semashko: Belarusian economy showing signs of recovery,” BelTA, 7 July 2016, Accessed on: 14 November, 2016, http://eng.belta.by/economics/view/semashko-belarusian-economy-showing-signs-of-economic-recovery-92825-2016. 24 Aliaksandr Filipau. 25 “Belarus And The Declining Eurasian Economic Union,” narodny.org, 8 August 2016, Accessed on: 2 January 2017, http://narodny.org/english/?p=671. 26 Aleś Alachnovič, “Belarus Finally Reforms Its Economy?,” belarusdigest.com, 1 October 2015, Accessed on: 17 December, 2016, http://belarusdigest.com/story/ belarus-finally-reforms-its-economy-23364. 27 “Economic recession prompts Belarusian government towards dialogue with civil society,” belarusinfocus, 25 July 2016, Accessed on: 2 January 2017, http:// belarusinfocus.info/society-and-politics/economic-recession-prompts-belarusian-government-towards-dialogue-civil-society. 28 Ibid. 29 Aliaksandr Filipau. 30 Ibid. 31 “Economic recession prompts Belarusian government towards dialogue with civil society,” belarusinfocus, 25 July 2016, Accessed on: 17 December, 2016, http://belarusinfocus.info/society-and-politics/economic-recession-prompts-belarusian-government-towards-dialogue-civil-society. 18

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Media sources 1- Pravda: founded in 1920. Owned by P E R E X, a.s. 2 - Hospodรกrske Noviny : founded in 1993. Owned by MAFRA Slovakia 3 - SME: founded in 1993. Owned by Petit Press

BY: NATALIA LASAKOVA 174

2016

EUROPE’S REFUGEE CRISIS AND ITS IMPLICATIONS ON SLOVAKIA’S INTERNAL AFFAIRS Now entering its sixth year, the Syrian refugee crisis has undoubtedly been at the forefront of challenges for most European countries. In 2016, over 1 million refugees sought asylum in Europe.1 While Sweden and Germany have been granting asylum, Eastern Europe has been struggling to accept Europe’s quotas2 – including Slovakia. The European Union’s inability to accommodate a unanimous solution for the crisis has taken a toll on Slovakia’s domestic politics. Citizens are angry and the polls have shown for it. On March 5th 2016, Slovakia held its parliamentary elections with results that shocked the entire continent.3 Social Democratic Party of Slovakia (SMER) leader and current Prime Minister, Robert Fico, lost majority in Parliament and paved way for an increase in right-wing extreme parties opposing refugee quotas and putting in place more robust policies on already existing minorities within Slovakia.4 With 8.2% of popular vote, Marian Kotleba, leader of the right-wing people’s party Our Slovakia, attained a platform in Parliament to represent those who are unhappy with the current situation.5 Shortly after the elections, SME.sk reported that Kotleba’s voters are not necessarily supporters of radicalism, but rather frustrated voters who are discontent with Fico’s inability to solve the quota issue.6 After a few weeks of Fico unable to form government, on March 17, he formed a coalition government composed of four parties with very diverse political ideologies.7 His attempt at bringing together centre-left and right-wing parties, nationalists and a Hungarian party, has been vastly criticized. Slovakia’s parliamentary elections were consequential to the complete failure of politicians’ inability to answer to the internal demands of its citizens.8 With average income being just under 900 euros per month, Slovaks find it difficult to back up policies demanding taxpayers’ money in support of immigration on a European wide scale.9 Interestingly enough, Slovakia is not one of the most popular destinations for migrants flowing from the south. This is hugely due to its homogenous culture and lack of resources and support for migrants.10 Today, less than 2% of the population of 5.4 million consists of refugees.11 Prior to the election, the Visegrad (V4) countries – Slovakia, Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary – have strengthened their cooperation on issues regarding the migrant crisis.12 Slovakia vowed to accept Brussel’s decision to cooperate with Turkey, but added that it will seek its own route through close cooperation with its V4 counterparts.13 During German Chancellor Angerla Merkel’s political tour around various European countries in August 2016, Germany’s Chancellor met with the V4 countries and formally acknowledged their concerns on the lack of resources and funding to meet Brussel’s quotas.14 Germany’s acknowledgment of V4’s concerns and its willingness to work together was seen as a victory for Central European governments but questioned in the domestic sphere.15 Hospodarské Noviny reported that V4 cozying up to

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Messages in the Media Germany meant Slovakia was closer to accepting Germany’s plan of solidarity and quota placement.16 The results of the parliamentary elections came as a wakeup call for the Slovak government. Throughout much of 2015, Slovakia spent its political energy in a vigorous fight to reject the Union’s migrant quotas.17 Slovakia’s government failed to mediate the migrant crisis and find a cooperative solution between the EU’s demands and its citizens. In late October 2016, Ivan Kočok, Minister of External Affairs, admitted that Slovakia is in need of taking a step back and resolving the issue by allowing its neighbouring countries to take a unanimous approach on behalf of Visegrad 4.18

SLOVAKIA’S FIRST PRESIDENCY OF THE EU COUNCIL On July 1, 2016, Slovakia took over the Presidency of the Council of the EU.19 Taking place at a crucial time for the EU, Slovakia’s term in office is very symbolic. The presidency of the Council rotates among the EU member states every 6 months with member states working closely in groups of three. Slovakia, alongside its predecessor the Netherlands, and its future successor, Malta, shaped the European Union’s legislation, coordinated its policies and sought agreement between the individual institutions on important political issues.20 Slovakia’s presidency carries quite a bit of weight, as the European Union is currently dealing with some of the greatest challenges of its time.21 On September 16, 2016, Bratislava hosted its first summit for the EU’s now 27 heads of states.22 Its main objectives included: restoring full control of the external borders, ensuring internal security and fighting terrorism, strengthening EU cooperation on external security and defense, and boosting the single market and offering better opportunities for young Europeans.23 With the formal drafting of these objectives into the Bratislava Declaration and Roadmap, Europe’s leaders sought to highlight their commitment and dedication to cooperate and deliver as united member states, in hopes of restoring people’s trust and confidence in the European Union.24 Both Angela Merkel, Chancellor of Germany, and Donald Tusk, President of the European Council, stated that this meeting, although informal, provided a pivotal outline for the direction in which the EU is heading, now without the UK.25 To the same degree of importance, if not more than the challenges of ensuring internal security and gaining full control of external borders emphasized at the Bratislava Summit, lied Slovakia’s responsibility to promote a mutually beneficial withdrawal process of the United Kingdom’s membership.26 Although the United Kingdom has not yet formally triggered Article 50, Slovakia supported the notion of the UK officiating its exit as soon as possible.27 Having previously dealt with the dissolution of the Czechoslovak Federation, Slovak Minister of Foreign Affairs, Miroslav Lajčák, stated that when it came to Brexit, Slovakia’s priority as President of the Council of the European Union was to take a similar approach and mirror the – although emotional, but smooth – split between Slovakia and Czech Republic in 1993.28

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2016 As Slovakia’s 6-month presidency is nearing its end and soon-to-be replacement of Malta in January 2017, State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, Ivan Korčok, retrospectively concluded that its presidency proved to be successful.29, 30 Slovakia’s citizens, foreign investors and various EU leaders agreed with the reported successes of the presidency.31 Prime Minister, Robert Fico, added that he has witnessed a significant coming-together of the two camps of the migrant crisis issue.32 He feels that those who aggressively supported solidarity and those who strongly opposed Europe’s quotas are starting to regain trust in the European Union’s process in finding middle ground.33

IMPLICATIONS OF BREXIT

The events of UK’s referendum on June 23, 2016 left the continent both startled and fearful of the repercussions on the rest of Europe. As the Bratislava Summit hosted in mid-September has demonstrated, the 27 member states are setting out plans for the future, in unity, now without the UK’s participation.34 With the effects of Brexit already apparent, Bratislava urges the UK to enact Article 50 sooner rather than later. As a citizen of the European Union, one is entitled to study in any higher institution within the EU, under the same conditions as nationals.35 Although entry conditions vary across individual institutions, they are irrespective of one’s nationality within the Union. The United Kingdom represents the second most preferred destination for 36 000 Slovaks seeking to study abroad.36 After the UK’s announcement of the desire to leave the EU, many young adults feared losing their educational privileges. On October 11, 2016, the British government announced that these arrangements would not change if the UK exits the Union.37 The British Minister for Universities and Science, Joseph Johnson, stated that the decision would mean that students applying to study from 2017 to 2018 would not only be eligible for the same funding and support as they are now, but that their eligibility will continue throughout their studies, even if the UK exits the European Union during that period.38 For those seeking work in the UK, however, the process will be somewhat more pricier. The British government announced that after formally exiting the Union, British employers would be required to pay fees for hiring employees from other EU countries including Slovakia.39 Although, the UK is only the eighth largest destination of Slovakia’s exports, analytical predictions of the National Bank of Slovakia call for a significant decrease in overall demand for Slovak exports.40, 41 This is to be the case with most of UK’s European trading partners. Economically, the direct implications of Brexit on Slovakia’s agriculture should not exceed more than 0.34% loss in rate of growth. This would result in around 5,300 job losses and an inflation of 0.4%.42 Furthermore, one third of the largest European companies fear legislative changes, lack of mobility of labour force, and a reduction in opportunities for export.43 In November 2016, Slovakia’s Minister of Foreign

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Messages in the Media Affairs, Miroslav Lajčák, expressed interest in the potentiality of Slovakia welcoming companies and industries leaving the UK.44 He stated that this would not be an easy process and would require cooperation of various legislative bodies in both countries, but would assist in easing the economic impact of Brexit for both European and foreign investors. This idea came about shortly after a group of representatives of the largest Japanese corporations paid a visit to Slovakia in early November 2016. One of the topics they were greatly interested in was the future of their corporations based in the UK.45 Many of these representatives were open to considering outsourcing to Slovakia, as it would benefit their economic interest of maintaining a large market within the EU. The Slovakian economy, heavily reliant on “industrial exports (mainly automotive related) remains very vulnerable to Eurozone downturns and adverse developments in the automotive sector.”46

YEAR IN REVIEW The year 2016 was without a doubt very symbolic for Slovakia’s relationship with the European Union. Despite occupying much of its EU Council presidency with finding solutions to tackle critical issues such as migration, Brexit and EU’s growth, it also strengthened its position within the Union in various ways. Firstly, its close partnership with Visegrad countries not only strengthened Slovakia’s voice as a smaller member state, but also provided an alternate route for mending the disagreements between EU’s quota proposals and V4’s reservations. Germany’s recognition of such reservations and its willingness to step forward and consider alternate policies proved advantageous for Slovakia and its fellow Visegrad counterparts. The Visegrad countries spent much of 2016 collaborating at a political level to provide an effective response to the migrant crisis on behalf of Central Europe. Secondly, this year was particularly symbolic for Slovakia’s Presidency in the Council of the European Union. Its 6-month rotation came at a rather decisive time. According to critics, Slovakia met its objectives and successfully progressed in displacing efforts to tackle internal security, terrorism and lack of EU cooperation. The efforts were evident in September’s Bratislava Summit and the subsequent drafting of various official documents, further committing member states to reach the above stated objectives. Despite the political, social and economic consequences of UK’s exit hovering over the EU sphere, Slovakia continued to project political and economic influence, concluding that it would not be detrimental to the overall growth of its standing within the EU. Furthermore, Slovakia’s students looking to study in the UK retain the same educational privileges as well as their ability to complete internships abroad. In late 2016, Slovakia hosted Japan’s investors who positively received Slovakia’s proposal to transfer some of their investments from the UK eastward. This presented Slovakia with great potential opportunities to further expand its offers to foreign investment.

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2016 Even so, similar to other European Union members, in 2016, Slovakia fell susceptible to the right wing wave that is currently dominating the EUâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s political sphere. MariĂĄn Kotleba, a right-wing nationalist, secured an unexpected amount of seats in parliament. Although his party does not have particularly large impact on Slovakiaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s domestic policy, his electoral success further contributes to the populist movement the European Commission strongly discourages.

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Messages in the Media Statistics: http://www.eu2016.sk/en/about-the-presidency/budget 1 “The Syrian Refugee Crisis and its Repercussions for the EU.” Syrian Refugees. September 2016. Accessed December 8, 2016. http://syrianrefugees.eu/ 2 ČTK. “Rokovanie ministrov vnútra EU ukázalo rozdiely v názore na kvóty.” Pravda. June 16, 2016. Accessed December 8, 2016. http://spravy.pravda.sk/svet/ clanok/358637-rokovanie-ministrov-vnutra-eu-ukazalo-rozdiely-v-nazore-nakvoty-pre-migrantov/ 3 SITA. “Smer vyhral voľby. V NR SR bude aj Kotleba a Kollár, KDH nie.” Pravda. March 5, 2016. Accessed December 8, 2016. http://spravy.pravda.sk/parlamentne-volby-2016/clanok/385784-skoncili-sa-volby-sledujte-minutu-po-minute-kto-sa-dostane-do-parlamentu/ 4 SITA, “Guardian: Ficov strach z imigrantov prospel iným stranám.” Pravda. March 6, 2016, Accessed December 8, 2016. http://spravy.pravda.sk/parlamentne-volby-2016/clanok/385836-guardian-ficov-strach-z-imigrantov-prospelinym-stranam/ 5 “Parlamentné Voľby.” Pravda. March 5, 2016. Accessed December 8, 2016. http://volby.pravda.sk/parlamentne-volby/ 6 Cuprik, Roman. “Bránik: Kotleba je len začiatok, prídu horší.” SME. March 7, 2016. Accessed December 8, 2016. http://domov.sme.sk/c/20112433/branik-kotleba-je-len-zaciatok-pridu-horsi.html 7 SITA. “Prieskum: Nová vládna koalícia je pre verejnosť neprijateľná.” Pravda. March 23, 2016. Accessed January 5, 2017. http://spravy.pravda.sk/domace/clanok/387693-prieskum-nova-vladna-koalicia-je-pre-verejnost-neprijatelna/ 8 “Slovakia’s coalition partner splits, but government will stay on.” EURACTIV. August 17, 2016. Accessed January 5, 2017. http://www.euractiv.com/section/ elections/news/slovakias-coalition-partner-splits-but-government-will-stay-on/ 9 Rybár, Jozef. “Rok 2016: priemerná mzda na Slovensku pokorí 900 eur.” Hospodárske Noviny. December 21, 2015. Accessed January 7, 2017. http://dennik. hnonline.sk/ekonomika-a-firmy/531240-rok-2016-priemerna-mzda-na-slovensku-pokori-900-eur 10 IOM, “Migrácia na Slovensku.” Medzinárodná organizácia pre migráciu. 2016. Accessed January 9, 2017. http://www.iom.sk/sk/migracia/migracia-na-slovensku 11 Ibid. 12 Meľúch, Ján. “Vyšehradská štvorka razí pri utečeneckej kríze vlastnú cestu.” Hospodárske Noviny. February 16, 2016. Accessed January 7, 2017. http://dennik.hnonline.sk/svet/534696-vysehradska-stvorka-razi-pri-uteceneckej-krizevlastnu-cestu 13 Ibid. 14 TASR. “Merkelová dnes bude rokovať s V4: Hlavnými témami budú brexit a utečenci.” Topky. August 26, 2016. Accessed January 7, 2017. http://www.topky. sk/cl/11/1570855/Merkelova-dnes-bude-rokovat-s-V4--Hlavnymi-temami-budu-brexit-a-utecenci 15 TASR. “Krajiny V4 posilnia spoluprácu s médiami: Občanom chceme dať vedieť, že sa o nich zaujímame.” Topky. December 4, 2016. Accessed January 13,

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2016 2017. http://www.topky.sk/cl/100535/1593365/Krajiny-V4-posilnia-spolupracus-mediami--Obcanom-chceme-dat-vediet--ze-sa-o-nich-zaujimame 16 CHO. “Kvóty sú opäť v hre. Najviac sa bráni Slovensko, píše Financial Times.” Hospodárske Noviny. September 4, 2015. Accessed January 9, 2017. http://dennik.hnonline.sk/svet/526362-kvoty-su-opat-v-hre-najviac-sa-brani-slovenskopise-financial-times 17 “Slovensko stále odmieta kvóty, ale diskusiu počas predsedníctva EÚ umožní.” SME Svet. June 7, 2016. Accessed January 13, 2017. https://svet.sme. sk/c/20184736/slovensko-stale-odmieta-kvoty-ale-diskusiu-pocas-predsednictva-eu-umozni.html 18 Balážová, Daniela. “Utečenecké kvóty. Slovensko sa tejto téme nevyhne.” Pravda. June 5, 2016. Accessed January 5, 2016. http://spravy.pravda.sk/domace/ clanok/395202-utecencke-kvoty-slovensko-sa-tejto-teme-nevyhne/ 19 TASR. “Slovensko sa ujíma predsedníctva v Rade Európskej únie, pricestoval aj Juncker.” SME. July 1, 2016. Accessed January 14, 2017. http://domov.sme. sk/c/20205192/slovensko-sa-ujima-predsednictva-v-rade-europskej-unie-pricestoval-aj-juncker.html 20 “About the presidency.” SKEU2016. 2016. Accessed January 5, 2017. http:// www.eu2016.sk/en/about-the-presidency/what-is-the-presidency 21 Ibid. 21 TASR. “Toto sú najdôležitejšie míľniky slovenského predsedníctva v Rade EÚ.” TERAZ. December 31, 2016. Accessed January 5, 2017. http://www.teraz.sk/ video/vyberova-chronologia-udalosti-spojen/235675-clanok.html 22 “Informal meeting of the 27 heads of state or government, 16/09/2016.” Council of the European Union. September 16, 2016. Accessed January 13, 2017. http:// www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/european-council/2016/09/16-informal-meeting/ 23 Ibid. 24 “The Bratislava Declaration and Roadmap 2016.” Council of the European Union. September 16, 2016. Accessed January 13, 2017. http://www.consilium. europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/09/16-bratislava-declaration-and-roadmap/ 25 ČTK. “Tusk: Bratislavský summit EU27 nebude riešiť brexit.”Pravda. September 1, 2016. Accessed January 12, 2017. http://spravy.pravda.sk/svet/clanok/403802tusk-bratislavsky-summit-eu27-nebude-riesit-brexit/ 26 ČTK. “Juncker verí v úspech slovenského predsedníctva v Rade EÚ.” Pravda. June 30, 2016. Accessed January 12, 2017. http://europa.pravda.sk/aktuality/clanok/397815-juncker-veri-v-uspech-slovenskeho-predsednictva-v-rade-eu/ 28 27 Ibid. 28 CHO. “Lajčákov rezort neposkytol informácie o podozrivých zákazkách, pretože Transparency zahlcuje úradníkov.” Hospodárske Noviny. January 3, 2017. Accessed January 13, 2017. http://hnonline.sk/slovensko/885707-lajcakovo-ministerstvo-neposkytlo-informacie-o-podozrivych-zakazkach-pretoze-transparency-zahlcuje-uradnikov 29 Matuščáková, Zuzana. “Ďalšie kroky po našom predsedníctve v EÚ.” Hospodárske Noviny. December 28, 2016. Accessed January 5, 2017. http://dennik.

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Messages in the Media hnonline.sk/ekonomika-a-firmy/882810-dalsie-kroky-po-nasom-predsednictve-v-eu 30 SITA, “Korčok: Predsedníctvo prinieslo konkrétne výsledky, bolo úspešné” Pravda. January 2, 2017. Accessed January 13, 2017. http://spravy.pravda.sk/ domace/clanok/415601-sk-pres-prinieslo-konkretne-vysledky-bolo-uspesne-tvrdi-korcok/ 31 Ibid. 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid. 34 TASR. “Summit v Bratislave skončil: Toto je aktuálny stav Únie spolu s nasledujúcim plánom.” Topky. September 19, 2016. Accessed January 13, 2017. http:// www.topky.sk/cl/10/1575787/Summit-v-Bratislave-skoncil--Toto-je-aktualnystav-Unie-spolu-s-nasledujucim-planom 35 “Admission and entry into university” Your Europe. October 27, 2016. Accessed January 9, 2017. http://europa.eu/youreurope/citizens/education/university/admission-entry-conditions/index_en.htm 36 Minchaerová, Radka. “Many Slovaks will migrate for work.” The Slovak Spectator. May 18, 2015. Accessed January 5, 2017.http://spectator.sme.sk/c/20057367/ many-slovaks-still-migrate-for-work.html 37 “Financovanie.” Scandinavian Study. 2016. Accessed January 7, 2017. https:// scandinavianstudy.sk/studium-v-uk/financovanie/ 38 “Takimi Urgjent I Këshillit 38 Hotura, Roman. ““BREXIT” nemá vplyv na poskytnutie študentskej pôžičky v UK pre študentov z E.Ú.!” SME. November 10, 2016. Accessed January 9, 2017. http://romanhutira.blog.sme.sk/c/438389/brexit-nema-vplyv-na-poskytnutiestudentskej-pozicky-v-uk-pre-studentov-z-e-u.html 39 Buchláková, Lenka. “Briti cez poplatok obmedzia prácu cudzincom.” Pravda. January 13, 2017. Accessed January 13, 2017. http://spravy.pravda.sk/svet/clanok/416671-briti-cez-poplatok-obmedzia-pracu-cudzincom/ 40 “Slovakia” OEC. 2016. Accessed January 9, 2017. http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/ profile/country/svk/ 41 Kušnírová, Michaela. “Pozrite sa, ako sa brexit dotkne Slovenska a Európy.” SME. June 22, 2016. Accessed January 9, 2017. http://ekonomika.sme. sk/c/20197761/pozrite-sa-ako-sa-brexit-dotkne-slovenska-a-europy.html 42 SITA. “Priamy dopad brexitu na slovenskú ekonomiku má byť len mierny.” Pravda. June 24, 2016. Accessed January 9, 2017. http://spravy.pravda.sk/ ekonomika/clanok/397131-priamy-dopad-brexitu-na-slovensku-ekonomiku-ma-byt-len-mierny/ 43 ČTK. “Tretina veľkých európskych firiem má obavy z dopadov brexitu.” Pravda. November 15, 2016. Accessed January 13, 2017. http://spravy.pravda.sk/ekonomika/clanok/411040-tretina-velkych-europskych-firiem-ma-obavy-z-dopadov-brexitu/ 44 Ibid. 45 SITA. “Lajčák: SR má záujem o firmy odchádzajúce z Británie.” Pravda. November 3, 2016. Accessed January 13, 2017. http://spravy.pravda.sk/domace/clanok/409787-sr-ma-zaujem-o-firmy-odchadzajuce-z-britanie-hovori-lajcak/

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2016 “Country Report – Slovakia 2016” Atradius. September 15, 2016. Accessed January 13, 2017. https://atradius.de/publikation/cese-country-report---slovakia-2016.html 46

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Media sources 1- ADEVĂRUL: founded in 1871. Owned by Adevărul Holding 2 - COTIDIANUL: founded in 1991. Owned by Nistorescu/ Realitatea-Cațavencu 3 - GÂNDUL: founded in 2005. Owned by PubliMedia International

BY: FLAVIAN BERNEAGA 184

2016

TALKS ON REUNIFICATION WITH MOLDOVA The year 2016 saw increased ambivalent opinions in the talks regarding a potential union between Romania and Moldova. In Moldova, the topic was galvanized by the presidential election, in which the anti-unionist candidate Igor Dodon emerged victorious. A man with public Russophile displays, Dodon defeated pro-European candidate Maia Sandu, who welcomed Romanian involvement in Moldovan affairs and supported the establishing of institutions that would create a more lenient pathway for European integration.2 Both before and after the elections, Dodon engaged in a series of anti-unionist, controversial accusations, perpetually blaming Romania of wanting to dissolve the Moldovan state. In December, he stated that Moldovans are in the midst of a conspiracy meant to “Romanianize” them through study scholarships in Romanian universities.3 After the elections, he argued Moldovan politicians should formulate an official apology to the leaders of breakaway region of Transnistria, an entity that ignited civil war in 1992 amidst rumours that Moldova and Romania considered forming a single country.4 In an interview for Sputnik News in November 2016, translated by adevărul.ro, Dodon proclaimed himself as a saviour of the Moldovan state, which would have been dissolved by Romania if he did not win the elections. Equally, he demanded that Romania sign a Frontier Agreement, which Romanian politicians have been reluctant to draft, because it would equate to an acceptance of the border imposed by the Ribbentrop – Molotov Treaty.5 Following the results of the Moldovan election, Romanian president, Klaus Iohannis emphasized that Romania’s strategic objective is Moldova’s European integration.6 Nevertheless, Iohannis stated that the goal of the union remains a sole desideratum until conflict in Transnistria comes to an end.7 Similarly, ex-Romanian president, Traian Băsescu, rejected Dodon’s ideas as a broader propaganda meant to frighten Moldovans.8 In a more optimistic note, he opined that union will happen in 5 to 7 years, depending on whether the Parliaments of both countries will have pro-Romanian majorities.9 Prounionist politicians and NGO’s in Chișinău have also made their voices public. Moldovan Defence Minister, Anatol Șalaru, said that the time for debate around the idea of the union has passed, and that Romania must make its presence felt in Moldova through mass-media, enterprises, capital, energetic connections, building of bridges, railways, roads, etc.10 Present in Iași at the celebrations of 157 years since the creation of the Romanian modern state, the mayor of Chișinău, Dorin Chirtoacă, expressed his hopes that in the future he will be able to attend national celebrations using only one passport and holding only one flag.11 Similar sentiments echoed in the non-governmental sphere, as the NGO “Onoare, Demnitate și Patrie” organized an event in Chișinău where they unveiled a 1-kilometre-long tricolour in the colours of the two states’ flags to celebrate the 98 years since the making of the union between Romania and Moldova.12 Equally, in October 2016, 2000 people gathered to protest in

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Messages in the Media Bucharest, demanding Romanian president, Klaus Iohannis and Romanian Prime Minister, Dacian Cioloș, to categorize the union as a national project.13 The protest derailed when the gendarmerie intervened and arrested 5 individuals, including George Simion, the leader of the movement.14 The group mounted tents and slept in a public square overnight. The following day, protests ended after unionist leaders met with politicians and negotiated for more prounionist agendas.15 At the end of August, the US ambassador to Moldova, James Pettit, made a series of controversial statements, where he explicitly said that union with Romania, for EU-accession purposes is not a viable solution, because “the Republic of Moldova is not Romania”.16 Following Pettit’s declarations, the head of the Romanian Senate, Călin Popescu-Tăriceanu, drafted a declaration for American President Barrack Obama, where he demanded explanations for the ambassador’s statements. Pettit, Tăriceanu argued, addressed an extremely sensible and painful subject for all Romanians, as it brought back memories of the tragedies and humiliations suffered by Romanians in Moldova under the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact.17 The issue was settled when the American ambassador apologized for his remarks, arguing the US can do nothing to skew popular demand if the two populations desire the unification.18

NATO DEVELOPMENTS In May 2016, NATO inaugurated a missile defence system at Deveselu, in Romania, as part of a broader attempt to securitize the Eastern border of the North-Atlantic union. The system has been stated to be purely defensive, as it will intercept any short and medium-range missiles coming from potential Middle Eastern threats.19 The activation of the shield threw Romania in the middle of a series of accusations, coming from officials of the Russian Federation. The ambassador of the Russian Federation to Romania at the time, Oleg Malginov, expressed his dissatisfaction towards the building of NATO missile systems in the proximity of Russia. According to Malginov, “steps will be taken to counterbalance this equity violation between the two countries”.20 His sentiments were echoed by the Deputy Foreign Minister of Russia, Sergey Ryabkov, who categorized Deveselu as a breach of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) by the USA,21 as well as by the president of Russia, Vladimir Putin, who classified Deveselu as a security threat to Russia, initiated by American interests.22 Putin warned that, “if in the past, the people from those parts of Romania did not know what it means to be in the crosshairs, then today we will be forced to carry out certain measures to ensure our security.”23 However, in an interview for Gândul, Joel Shapiro, professor at the National Intelligence University of Washington and adviser for the American administration for almost 30 years, offered a calmer perspective on the Russian response to the inauguration of the Deveselu shield.24 He argued that Russia cannot afford to launch an attack on a NATO member, because it would trigger

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2016 a series of reactions that could lead to a nuclear war without having any special interest in the zone. He continued by stating that Russian interests are located in Syria, not Romania, as victory in Syria is paramount for maintaining good popular support.25 In August 2016, rumours surfaced on the website euractiv.com, cited by adevărul.ro, that NATO started transferring 20 nuclear weapons from the Incirlik base in Turkey to Romania, at the newly-established Deveselu base, a move done in the context of colder relations between Washington and Ankara.26 The beliefs of sceptics were enhanced by the official response given by the Pentagon which said “it is the policy of the USA not to confirm or infirm the presence or absence of nuclear weapons in any location, general or specific”, a secrecy that was argued to be essential in keeping information secret from sabotage and terrorist threats. Mihnea Motoc, Romanian Minister of Defence, denied the claims, saying there is no intention of planning or proceeding in that direction, and arguing that the rumours are pure speculation.28 Romanian ex-Foreign Affairs Minister, Cristian Diaconescu, said the rumours are an “aberration from head to tail,” as it would breach the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCoC), an extremely restrictive agreement within the EU. According to general-lieutenant Alexandru Grumaz, the existence of such weapons is not even logistically possible due to the fact that the Deveselu base does not own facilities which can store warheads containing hydrogen; thus, the idea of the transfer is not impossible, but the issue of storage would represent a security threat ipso facto, he said.29 Finally, Jens Stolberg, NATO Secretary General, also dismissed the claims as “unjustified and irresponsible,” saying the US does not desire to start a new Cold War with Russia.30

LEGISLATIVE ELECTION

On December 11th 2016, legislative elections took place in Romania. The electoral campaign saw two parties contend for parliamentary majority: the Social-Democratic Party (PSD) and the National Liberal Party (PNL), alongside a set of other smaller parties. The environment preceding the elections was encapsulated by talks about abolishing corruption, reminding Romanians of the massive protests of 2015, when a fire in the “Colectiv” nightclub killed 64 and injured 147, which was followed by, massive protests and the resignation of then-Prime Minister, Victor Ponta. Survivors of the fire were present all over media and social media, asking Romanians to go vote and not be apathetic about their fates.31 In his remarks prior to the elections, president Klaus Iohannis made a reference to the “Corruption kills” slogan, which circulated on social media following the Colectiv fire.32 The fight against corruption was also outlined as a main theme in the Europe Online Magazine, cited by Gândul, which concluded that 352 of 746 candidates were rumoured to be involved in acts of corruption.33 The elections, which witnessed a low turnout of only 39,5%, ended with the triumph of the Social-Democratic Party (PSD), who garnered 45,47%

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Messages in the Media of the votes; a pre-established alliance between the Social-Democrats and the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats Party (with 5.62% of the votes) offered them parliamentary majority. On the other hand, the elections proved the rupture within the Romanian right-wing which suffered a humiliating defeat, with the National-Liberal Party obtaining only 20,04% of the votes. In fact, after seeing the results, the leader of the Liberals, Alina Gorghiu, resigned, saying she recognizes the party’s defeat and that her departure is the best option possible for the survival of the party.35 In his first appearance after elections, Klaus Iohannis targeted Liviu Dragnea, the president of the Social-Democratic Party. Dragnea had been publicly seeking the Prime Minister position, without chances of obtaining it due to a Supreme Court conviction for charges of electoral fraud. Eventually, a Iohannis–Dragnea conflict started to take shape, igniting rumours of a major scale political war.36 Dragnea back down from nominating himself and brought forward Sevil Shhaideh, a female politician coming from the Turkish-Tatar Muslim minority; her nomination sparked outcry by Romanians, who accused PSD of playing on populist messages during their campaign, but wanting to put a Muslim politician as head of government after they won the election.37 Iohannis refused the nomination without offering any reasons for it. However, political analysts in Romania determined that his motives revolved around Ms. Shhaideh’s marriage to Akram Shhaideh, a Syrian immigrant, who exalted the accomplishments of Hezbollah leaders on Facebook and who supported the Bashar al-Assad regime on television.38 Shhaideh’s refusal made Dragnea accuse Iohannis of not respecting the popular vote and of wanting to start a political crisis, warning that his party was willing to consider presidential impeachment, if needed.39 Nevertheless, as predicted by political scientists, Dragnea preferred to propose Sorin Grindeanu for Prime Minister. A close affiliate of the secret services, Grindeanu was deemed by the media as Dragnea’s “obedient puppet”, who will not take advantage of the situation and overturn his power within the party.40 The naming of Grindeanu did not come without new tensions. The new Prime Minister received the news about his investment over SMS from Iohannis, believing initially it was only a prank.41 Tensions followed at the swearing in of the new government, where Iohannis said he found out from TV that Dragnea is the only person knowing the new plan of governance. He then mockingly asked the PSD president to be kind enough to share the plan with the rest of the Ministers as well.42

2016 IN REVIEW The year 2016 has seen further developments in the relations between Romania and Moldova, as pro-Russian Moldovan president Igor Dodon has launched perpetual attacks towards Romania, claiming it is preparing for a military invasion of Moldova. At the same time, important political leaders of both countries, as well as members of the civil society have maintained the union is indeed desirable, staging protests and displaying a 1-kilometre long tricolour

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2016 on Romaniaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s national day. Security-wise, the opening of the anti-missile defensive shield at Deveselu, under NATO supervision has alienated members of the Russian Federation, who fear that the shield may be a threat to their state. Amidst unproven rumours that the United States were transferring nuclear warheads from Turkey to Deveselu, these fears exacerbated. On the Romanian side, all officials and experts disregarded Russian fears, saying that the shield was purely defensive and that Romania had no malevolent intentions towards the Kremlin. The end of the year was marked by the legislative elections, which saw triumphant the Social-Democratic Party. As the leader of the SocialDemocrats, Liviu Dragnea, could not be named premier due to being convicted by the Supreme Court, he proposed for the position Sevil Shhaideh, a Muslim woman. Shhaideh was denied the position as consequence of her marriage to a Syrian citizen who posted a video on social media praising Hezbollah and who also denied on television the acts of violence of the Bashar al-Assad regime. Eventually, Sorin Grindeanu, a politician believed to be a puppet for Dragnea, was named Prime Minister, as a means to prevent the outburst of a political crisis in Romania.

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Messages in the Media Statistics: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tsdec100&plugin=1 1 Popescu, Andrei. «Interviu exclusiv cu Maia Sandu: “În Republica Moldova se construiește acum o verticală a puterii pe model putinist ». Gândul. November 11th, 2016. Accessed December 20th. http://www.gandul.info/interviurilegandul/ interviu-exclusiv-cu-maia-sandu-in-republica-moldova-se-construieste-acum-o-verticala-a-puterii-pe-modelputinist15940955 2 Botnarenco, Iurii. “Dodon îndeamnă Rusia să se implice mai activ în Moldova: Moldovenii primesc cetățenie română, asta e românizare”. Adevărul. December 17th, 2016. Accessed December 20th, 2016. http://adevarul.ro/moldova/politica/dodon2 Botnarenco, Iurii. “Dodon îndeamnă Rusia să se implice mai activ în Moldova: Moldovenii primesc cetățenie română, asta e românizare”. Adevărul. December 17th, 2016. Accessed December 20th, 2016. http://adevarul.ro/moldova/politica/dodonindeamnarusia-implice-mai-activ-moldova-moldovenii-primesc-cetatenie-romana-e-romanizare1_5853f1f05ab6550cb87c994e/index.html 3 Botnarenco, Iurii. „Dodon: De războiul civil din Transnistria este vinovat Chișinăul, fiindcă și-a dorit unirea cu România. Trebuie să ne cerem scuze”. Adevărul. December 16th, 2016. Accessed December 20th, 2016. http://adevarul.ro/moldova/politica/dodon-razboiul-civil-transnistria-vinovat-chisinaul-fiindca-si-a-dorit-unirea-romaniatrebuiecerem-scuze-1_5853e4005ab6550cb87c4a4b/index.html 4 I.R. «Cum a “salvat” Dodon Republica Moldova de România. » Cotidianul. November 18th, 2016. AccessedDecember 20th, 2016. http://www.cotidianul.ro/cum-a-salvat-dodon-republica-moldova-de-romania-291436/ 5 Zachmann, Sebastian. ““Unirea” cu Republica Moldova începe cu un război între președinți”. Adevărul. November 30th, 2016. Accessed December 20th, 2016. http://adevarul.ro/news/politica/unirea-republica-moldova-incepe-razboi-presedinti1_583ef8af5ab6550cb8ff647f/index.html 6 Diaconescu, Marius. „Președintele Klaus Iohannis face primii pași pentru Unirea Basarabiei”. Adevărul. November 10th, 2016. Accessed December 20th, 2016. http://adevarul.ro/news/eveniment/unde-gresestepresedintele-klaus-iohannisprivintaunirii-basarabiei-1_582418235ab6550cb85fc750/index.html iohannisprivintaunirii-basarabiei-1_582418235ab6550cb85fc750/index.html 7 Campean, Ioana. „Băsescu, mesaj către Dodon: Nu mai pierde vremea și ia-o spre Vest, că asta e direcția”. Adevărul.

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2016 November 26th, 2016. Accessed December 20th, 2016. http://adevarul.ro/moldo 8 Campean, Ioana. „Băsescu, mesaj către Dodon: Nu mai pierde vremea și ia-o spre Vest, că asta e direcția”. Adevărul. November 26th, 2016. Accessed December 20th, 2016. http://adevarul.ro/moldova/actualitate/basescu-mesaj-dodon-numai- pierde-vremea-ia-o-vest-e-directia-1_583977f05ab6550cb8de2361/index. html 9 « Băsescu, despre unirea cu Moldova: Se va produce peste 5 ani, peste 7 ani, dacă există condiții politice ». Gândul. October 31st, 2016. Accessed December 20th, 2016. http://www.gandul.info/politica/basescu-despre-unirea-cu-moldova-se- va-produce-peste-5-ani-peste-7-ani-daca-exista-conditii-politice-15884648 10 Botnarenco, Iurii. “Șalaru: Trebuie să-i convingem pe moldoveni să voteze pentru Unire, iar pentru asta trebuie să simțim prezența capitalului românesc în Moldova”. Adevărul. December 2nd, 2016. Accessed December 20th, 2016. http:// adevarul.ro/moldova/politica/Salaru-trebuie-sa-i-convingem-moldoveni-voteze-unire-trebuie-simtim-prezenta-capitalului- romanesc-moldova-1_584173f65ab6550cb80d4adc/index.html 11 Dumitrescu, Paul. „Chirtoacă își dorește unirea R. Moldova cu România”. Cotidianul. January 24th, 2016. Accessed December 20th, 2016. http://www. cotidianul.ro/chirtoaca-isi-doreste-unirea-r-moldova-cu-romania-275078/ 12 Botnarenco, Iurii. „Pe 1 Decembrie la Chișinău va fi întins un tricolor de un kilometru lungime: Îi vom demonstra lui Igor Dodon că nu poate interzice istoria, limba și cultura română”. Adevărul. November 29th, 2016. Accessed December 20th, 2016. http://adevarul.ro/moldova/social/pe-1-decembrie-chisinau-intins-tricolor-kilometru-lungime-Ii-vom-demonstra- igor-dodon-nu-interzice-istoria-cultura-limba-romana-video-1_583d6b935ab6550cb8f537a6/index. html 13 Tutulan, Radu, Raluca Pancu and Andrei Popescu. „Violențe, sâmbătă, la marșul pentru unirea României cu Moldova. Manifestanții vor să doarmă in Piața Universității”. Gândul. October 22nd, 2016. Accessed December 20th, 2016. http:// www.gandul.info/stiri/violente-sambata-la-marsul-pentru-unirea-romaniei-cu-moldova-manifestantii-vor-sa-doarma-in- piata-universitatii-update-15845448 14 Ibid. 15 Tutulan, Radu. „Manifestanții pro-unire, la discuții cu reprezentanții partidelor de la București. Ideea lui Băsescu: Ministerul Reunificării”. Gândul. October 23rd, 2016. Accessed December 20th, 2016. http://www.gandul.info/politica/ manifestantii-pro-unire-la-discutii-cu-reprezentantii-partidelor-de-la-bucuresti-ideea-lui-basescu-ministerul- reunificarii-15847708 16 Manga, Raluca. „Ambasadorul SUA la Chișinău: Unirea cu România nu este o alegere practică”. Gândul. August 28th, 2016. Accessed December 20th, 2016. http://www.gandul.info/international/ambasadorul-sua-la-chisinau-unirea-curomania-nu-este-o-alegere-practica-15622648 17 Citre, Cristi. „Tăriceanu îi cere explicații lui Obama după declarațiile ambasadorului SUA la Chișinău”. Gândul. August 31st, 2016. Accessed December 27th,

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Messages in the Media 2016. http://www.gandul.info/politica/tariceanu-ii-cere-explicatii-lui-obama-dupa- declaratiile-ambasadorului-sua-la-chisinau-15635215 18 „Ambasadorul SUA la Chișinău își toarnă cenușă în cap: Respect unioniștii”. Gândul. September 6th, 2016. Accessed December 27th, 2016. http://www.gandul.info/international/ambasadorul-sua-la-chisinau-isi-toarna-cenusa-in-cap-respect- unionistii-15663323 19 Toma, Ileana. “Scutul de la Deveselu adduce România în atenția presei din întreaga lume”. Adevarul. May12th, 2016. Accessed December 27th, 2016. http:// adevarul.ro/international/europa/scutul-deveselu-aduce-romania-atentia-preseiintreaga-lume-1_573449a15ab6550cb8dd6bd0/index.html 20 Campean, Ioana. „Ambasadorul Rusiei: Oamenii serioși înțeleg că dezvoltarea sistemului de la Deveselu va costa contramăsuri. Rusia este stabilă, NATO se mută”. Adevărul. June 26th, 2016. Accessed December 27th, 2016. http:// adevarul.ro/news/eveniment/ambasadorul-rusiei-oamenii-seriosi-inteleg-dezvoltarea-sistemului-deveselu-va-costa- contramasuri-rusia-stabila-nato-muta-1_576f74065ab6550cb84c467a/index.html 21 Draghici, Mihai. „Rusia amenință: Elementele anti-rachetă din România încalcă tratatul INF. Vor fi consecințe”. Gândul. September 22nd, 2016. Accessed December 27th, 2016. http://www.gandul.info/international/rusia-ameninta-elementele- antiracheta-din-romania-incalca-tratatul-inf-vor-fi-consecinte-15743274 22Draghici, Mihai. „Putin, acuzații dure la adresa NATO. România, pe lista țărilor împotriva cărora Rusia va riposta”. Gândul. November 21st, 2016. Accessed December 27th, 2016. http://www.gandul.info/international/putin-acuzatii-dure- la-adresa-nato-romania-pe-lista-tarilor-impotriva-carora-rusia-va-riposta-15989131 23 Preda, Ionuț. „Vladimir Putin amenință România și Polonia că s-ar putea găsi în raza de acțiune a rachetelor rusești”. Adevărul. May 28th, 2016. Accessed December 27th, 2016. http://adevarul.ro/international/rusia/vladimir-putin-romaniasi- polonia-s-ar-putea-gasi-raza-rachetelor-ruse-1_5748b94e5ab6550cb85f2b80/index.html 24 Popescu, Andrei. „Cum îl vede pe Putin omul care a sfătuit 30 de ani administrațiile SUA: Dacă aș fi în locul României, nu m-aș îngrijora prea mult”. Gândul. June 2nd, 2016. Accessed December 27th, 2016. http://www.gandul.info/interviurilegandul/cum-il-vede-pe-putin-omul-care-a-sfatuit-30-de-ani-administratiile-sua-daca-as-fi-in-locul-romaniei-nu-m-as- ingrijora-prea-mult-15418812 25 Ibid. 26 Romanovschi, Andreea. „EurActiv: Statele Unite își mută armele nucleare din Turcia la baza de la Deveselu. Partea română neagă”. Adevărul. August 18th, 2016. Accessed December 27th, 2016. http://adevarul.ro/international/europa/ euractiv-statele-unite-inceput-mute-arsenalul-nuclear-turcia-romania-partea-romana-neaga-1_57b5704d5ab6550cb8dcf2df/ index.html 27 Lazăr, Ana-Maria. „Pentagon, exclusiv pentru Mediafax: SUA nu confirmă sau infirmă prezența sau absența nuclearelor în niciun loc”. Gândul. August 18th, 2016. Accessed December 27th, 2016. http://www.gandul.info/stiri/pentagon-ex-

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2016 clusiv- pentru-mediafax-sua-nu-confirma-sau-infirma-prezenta-sau-absenta-nuclearelor-in-niciun-loc-15581942 28 Bunila, Iulian. „Ministrul Mihnea Motoc spune că mutarea de arme nucleare din Turcia în România este o speculație”. Adevărul. August 18th, 2016. Accessed December 27th, 2016. http://adevarul.ro/locale/buzau/ministrul-mihnea-motoc- spune-mutarea-arme-nucleare-turcia-romania-speculatie-1_57b593b35ab6550cb8de0341/index.html 29 Popescu, Andrei. “SUA ar transfera arme nucleare din Turcia în România. MAE neagă ferm, surse oficiale spun că legal nu este posibil”. Gândul. August 18th, 2016. Accessed December 27th, 2016. http://www.gandul.info/stiri/sua-artransfera- armele-nucleare-din-turcia-in-romania-mae-neaga-ferm-surse-oficiale-spun-ca-legal-nu-este-posibil-15578771 30 Radu, Ioana. « Șeful NATO: Amenințările Rusiei, iresponsabile”. Cotidianul. May 12th, 2016. Accessed December 27th, 2016. http://www.cotidianul.ro/seful-nato-amenintarile-rusiei-iresponsabile-281074/ 31 „Apelul supraviețuitorilor din Colectiv înainte de alegeri: „Mergi la vot! Nu-i lăsa pe alții să decidă pentru tine!”” . Gândul. December 7th, 2016. Accessed December 27th, 2016. http://www.gandul.info/votez-cu-mine/apelul- supravietuitorilor-din-colectiv-inainte-de-alegeri-mergi-la-vot-nu-i-lasa-pe-altii-sa-aleagapentru-tine-16018363 32 « Iohannis îi îndeamnă pe români să voteze pentru continuitate. Cele două puncte cheie ale mesajului președintelui înainte de alegeri ». Gândul. December 9th, 2016. Accessed December 27th, 2016. http://www.gandul.info/politica/ iohannis-ii-indeamna-pe-romani-sa-voteze-pentru-continuitate-cele-doua-puncte-cheie-ale-mesajului-presedintelui-inainte- de-alegeri-16021671 33 Olteanu, Mircea. “Presa străină vede alegerile din România drept un referendum privind corupția”. Gândul. December 8th, 2016. Accessed December 27th, 2016. http://www.gandul.info/international/presa-straina-vede-alegerile-din-romania- drept-un-referendum-privind-coruptia-16020450 34 Andrei, Cristina and Andrei popescu. “Rezultate alegeri parlamentare 2016. Noua hartă politică a României, județ cu județ”. Gândul. December 15th, 2016. Accessed December 27th, 2016. http://www.gandul.info/politica/rezultate-finale- alegeri-parlamentare-2016-noua-harta-politica-a-romaniei-judet-cu-judet-16029176 35 Pancu, Raluca. „Alina Gorghiu a demiosionat de la șefia PNL: Sunt și alți lideri care își asumă aceeași atitudine”. Gândul. December 12th, 2016. Accessed December 27th, 2016. http://www.gandul.info/politica/alina-gorghiu-a-demisionat-de-la- sefia-pnl-sunt-si-alti-lideri-care-isi-asuma-aceeasi-atitudine-16024455 36 « Iohannis îi transmite lui Dragnea că nu îl va pune premier : Nu am renunțat la criteriile de integritate. Mâine încep consultările la Cotroceni ». Gândul. December 13th, 2016. Accessed December 27th, 2016. http://www.gandul. info/politica/ iohannis-ii-transmite-lui-dragnea-ca-nu-il-va-pune-premier-nuam-renuntat-la-criteriile-de-integritate-maine-incep- consultarile-la-cotroceni-live-16025983 37 Mihalache, Mădălina. « Vom avea premier marți, după Crăciun. Iohannis a

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Messages in the Media sunat-o pe Sevil Shhaideh”. Adevărul. December 22nd, 2016. Accessed December 27th, 2016. http://adevarul.ro/news/politica/vom-premier-marti-craciun- iohannis-sunat-o-sevil-shhaideh-1_585c048b5ab6550cb8ac46ee/index.html 38 Mihalache, Mădălina. “Călcâiul lui Ahile pentru Sevil Shhaideh. De ce este invocat soțul sirian ca o piedică față de numirea premierului propus de PSD ». Adevărul. December 26th, 2016. Accessed December 27th, 2016. http://adevarul. ro/ locale/constanta/calcaiul-ahile-sevil-shhaideh-invocat-sotul-sirian-piedica-fata-numirea-premierului-propus- psd-1_58612a4d5ab6550cb8c8f9ff/index. html 39 Mihalache, Mădălina. “Dragnea, răspuns către Iohannis: Acest om vrea să declanșeze o criză politică în România. Dacă este bine să-l suspendăm pe președinte, nu o să am nicio ezitare”. Adevărul. December 27th, 2016. Accessed January 3rd 2017. http://adevarul.ro/news/politica/va-psd-alta-propunere-premier-insista-sevil-shhaidehh-liderul-psd-liviu-dragnea- raspunde-iohannis-ora-1600-1_5862629e5ab6550cb8cfdfdb/index.html 40 Zachmann, Sebastian. « Sorin Grindeanu este noul premier propus de PSD. Dragnea: Nu am renunțat la idea de a fie eu premier, vă spun foarte cinstit ». Adevărul. December 28th, 2016. Accessed January 3rd 2017. http://adevarul.ro/news/ politica/Sedinta-decisiva-psd-dragnea-alta-nominalizare-premier-forta-suspendarea-iohannish-spun-social- democratii-1_58637fb15ab6550cb8d83408/index.html 41 Zachman, Sebastian. “Cum a fost desemnat noul premier: Iohannis i-a trimis SMS, Grindeanu nu avea numărul și a crezut că e o farsă. Dragnea pozează în adevăratul premier”. Adevărul. December 30th, 2016. Accessed January 3rd 2017. http://adevarul.ro/news/politica/sorin-grindeanu-noul-premier-romaniei-1_586614c05ab6550cb8e99024/index.html 42 Pancu, Raluca. „La jurământul lui Grindeanu, Iohannis îi dă un sfat lui Dragnea : Aflarăm de la televizor că sunteți singurul care cunoaște programul de guvernare din scoarță în scorță. Vă rog, învățați-i și pe ei”. Gândul. January 4th, 2016. Accessed January 4th 2017. http://www.gandul.info/politica/la-juramantul-lui-grindeanu-iohannis-ii-da-un-sfat-lui- dragnea-aflaram-de-la-televizor-casunteti-singurul-care-cunoaste-programul-de-guvernare-din-scoarta-in-scoartava-rog- invatati-i-si-pe-ei-16047658

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Messages in the Media

Media sources 1- The Guardian: founded in 1821. Owned by Scott Trust Limited 2 - The Telegraph: founded in 1855. Owned by David and Frederick Barclay 3 - BBC News: founded in 1936. Owned by British Broadcasting Company

BY: CHARLOTTE ASHTON 195

Messages in the Media

BREXIT On the 23rd of June 2016, Britain voted to leave the European Union. The leave campaign won by 52% of the votes compared to the 48% of votes for the ‘remain’ campaign.1 Britain joined the EU on January 1st, 1973,2 and since then has been one of the leading nations in the. As a natural consequence of the EU, the majority of European countries have become an interlinked system, as they share, laws, business and in many places currency. The downfall of one country has implications across the, as seen the Greek crisis. Thus, the decision of Britain to leave the EU will see large ramifications across the entire continent, and within Britain itself. In order for Britain to leave they have to invoke Article 50 of the Lisbon Treatyowever, no one has done this before it may take time before Britain actually leaves the EU.3 Since the vote, the leaders of two significant parties, namely, the Conservatives and the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), have resigned.⁴ The most significant being David Cameron, leader of the Conservative Party and Prime Minister at the time, leaving the country in the hands of Theresa May. Cameron led the ’remain’ campaign and thus his resignation shows his inability to grasp the national sentiment and opinion on Britain’s place within the EU. Much of the nation believed that he led the ‘remain’ campaign effectively, with a 10% lead in the final months,5 however, events regarding immigration and terrorism such6 as the Brussels attack in March and the attack on policemen in France arguably swung the vote. Since the vote the question has been raised as to whether Britain intends to have a ‘hard’ or ‘soft’ Brexit. A ‘hard’ Brexit would entail leaving the EU entirely and having a single market economy and to having a relationship based on the World Trade Organisation rules. On the other hand, a ‘soft’ Brexit would mean that Britain withholds some form of membership within the EU and their economic market, which would offer Britain more flexibility with regard to trade.7 Thus, 2017 will be a decisive year for Britain, with regard to its political and economic relationship with the European Union, and to an extent the rest of the world.

CALAIS CHILDREN

In October 2016, the French authorities decided to close down the Calais refugee camp.8 The camp had grown with a reputation as being the last struggle to freedom, as Calais is the closing crossing point across the English Channel to England. The refugees who sought accommodation at the camp were mainly families of women and children, many of whom had fled from the violence and destruction in their home countries in Africa and the Middle East. On October 17th, the date to be scheduled destruction of the camp, it was home to 10,000 refugees.9 With the destruction of the camp there was concern as to where these refugees would move to the French authorities appealed to

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2016 neighbouring countries to welcome a certain quota of refugees. This sparked controversy between France and England, with French authorities arguing that the 200 children have links to England should automatically be accepted into the country.10 This comes months after the British vote to leave the European Union, and the subsequent increase in tensions between the two nations. The British Home Office responded by stating “all children in Calais during the clearance operation - including those being assessed for possible transfer to the UK”.11 The controversy that arises is whether Britain still has a humanitarian obligation to Europe with regards to accepting refugees, despite not having officially left the EU. However, the Le Touquet Treaty still remains in force, despite British absence in the EU.12 Britain stated that they would only accept the children under three conditional provisions, firstly the likelihood they would be granted refugee status, secondly, whether they were aged 12 or under and finally whether they were at risk of sexual exploitation.13 In addition, there was the indication that these hildren accepted into Britain would not be able to sponsor their parents into joining them.14 Furthermore, according to the Refugee Rights Data Project, only 22 % of migrants stated they wanted to seek asylum in France, with the majority saying they would prefer to move to Britain. 15 French authorities claimed it was under British interest that the camp be cleared, due to the disruption to channel travel and border control, thus Britain stated they would contribute £36 million into clearing the camp and maintaining security in Calais in the long term.16 It is believed that this agreement will keep relations strong between Britain and France, which be vital over the coming months and years as Britain negotiates its exit from the European Union.

SCOTTISH REFERENDUM AND BREXIT

Scotland held a referendum on September 18, 2014,17 as to whether to leave the United Kingdom or not. With a majority voting to stay, Scotland remains part of the United Kingdom. In light of the Brexit vote, officials have been questions as to whether this would have changed the result of the Scottish Referendum had it been held after the Brexit vote In the EU referendum 62% of the Scottish population voted ‘remain’, making it the nation with the highest ‘remain’ vote in the United Kingdom.18 This suggests, had the Scottish referendum had been held two years later - after Brexit - Scotland would have voted to leave the UK. Scotland is home to 173,000 EU nationals,19 with a large majority attracted to the universities that charge European students to attend.20 Not only do European students get free higher education in Scotland, Scottish students get free university education in places in Europe under European law,21 and so the removal from the European Union may see a repeal of this law, with Scotland losing a significant figure from its GDP. Another issue as to why Scotland want to leave Britain but remain in the European Union is due to their legal system. England shares a legal system with Wales, and the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland have very similar systems of common law, whereas, the EU relies on a civil law system. Scotland,

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Messages in the Media on the other hand, has hybrid but aligns much more with the EU, and so they are much less alienated by European law than they are by the English common law system.22 The issue lies, in the fact that the British government stated that democracy would be respected, but since the Scots voted to remain, the terms of Britain leaving the EU will determine the relationship between the two nations. It has been said that if Scotland wants to remain in the EU would have to go through the same process as a new nation would, and on this basis they may not even be accepted. However, as the EU does take pride in being flexible and not “straitjacketed by monolithic conceptions of political power”23 and so independent membership has not been completely taken off the table. In the next few years both Britain and Scotland will be forced to come to an agreement with themselves and the European Union in order to prevent the disintegration of the United Kingdom and the European system as a whole. 2016 IN REVIEW 2016 was a particularly prominent year for both the United Kingdom and the European Union, with regard to Brexit. The issue of Britain leaving the EU has caused tensions not only between European countries and the United Kingdom, but also between the countries that make up the United Kingdom. Britain’s decision to leave the EU has been regarded as a betrayal to the other European nations, which means Britain is going to have to fight to have withdrawal negotiations on their terms. Scotland, especially, has the potential to cause issues and raise matters that will increase the tensions and make British negotiations on their removal from the EU much more difficult. If Scotland secedes and remains a part of the EU, Britain will see a complete economic and social upheaval. Brexit has raised issues that have never been considered before, with regard to invoking Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty, as Britain is the first nation to leave the United Kingdom, and so negotiations may take longer than expected, increasing inter-national tensions and making the terms more unfavourable. Moreover, the destruction of the camp in Calais has highlighted some uncertainties regarding Britain’s role in the immigration crisis in Europe during and after their exit from the EU. With the refugee crisis not showing signs of slowing down Britain will have to continue to negotiate their role with the EU alongside the negotiations for their removal. Therefore, seeing as the refugee crisis is an ongoing issue, it could make or break the relations between Britain and the EU and other European nations. Although 2016 has proven to be a pinnacle year in the history of the United Kingdom and the European Union; The ramifications of the Brexit vote, the refugee crisis and the threat of Scottish succession has the potential to isolate the UK from Europe and jeopardize the economic, social and political relationship between them.

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2016 Statistics: http://ukandeu.ac.uk/fact-figures/when-did-britain-decide-to-jointhe-european-union/ 1Hunt.AlexandWheeler.Brian,“Brexit:AllyouneedtoknowabouttheUKleavingtheEU”, BBCNews ,2n d December2016,accessed10t h December2016 http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-32810887 2MailOnline,“BritainjoinsEUin1973”, DailyMail ,24t h June2016,accessed4t h October2016 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/ap/article-3658942/Britain-joinsEU-1973.html 3Wilkinson,Michael,“WhatisArticle50?Theonlyexplanationyouneedtoread”, TheTelegraph, 25t h January 2017,accessed31s t January2017 http://www.telegraph. co.uk/news/0/what-is-article-50-the-only-explanation-you-need-to-read/ 4R.Mason, R. Booth and A. Gentleman, “Nigel Farage resigns as UKIP leader after ‘acheiving political ambition of Brexit’”, The Guardian , 4th July, 2016, accessed 12th January 2017 https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jul/04/ nigel-farage-resigns-as-ukip-leader 5McTague,Tom&Spence,Alex&Dovere,Edward-Isaac,“HowDavidCameronBlewIt”,P olitico ,25t h June2016, accessed4t h October2016 http://www.politico.eu/ article/how-david-cameron-lost-brexit-eu-referendum-prime-minister-campaign-remain-b oris-craig-oliver-jim-messina-obama/ 6Mchugh, Jess, “Europe Terrorist Attacks 2016: Timeline of Bombings and Terror Threats Before Brussels”, IBT Times ,24t h March2016,accessed6t h October2016 http://www.ibtimes.com/europe-terrorist-attacks-2016-timeline-bombings-terror-threats-brussels-2341851 7Ahmed,Kamal,“Whatdoes‘hard’or‘soft’Brexitmean?”, BBCNews, 29t h September2016,accessed4t h October 2016 http://www.bbc.com/news/business-37500140 8BBC,“Calaismigrants:Hundredsmovedfrom‘Jungle’camp”, BBCNews ,24t h October2016,accessed12t h December 2016 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37745386 9Rothwell, James, “Calais ‘jungle’ demolition: what will happen to child refugees when the camp is razed, and wherewilltheygo?”, TheTelegraph ,22 nd October2016,accessed11t h December2016 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ news/2016/10/22/calais-jungle-demolition-what-will-happen-to-child-refugeeswhen / 10 Chazan, David, “Nearly 700 Jungle kids expected to apply for British asylum as remaining 1,600 leave Calais”, The Telegraph, 2n d November2016,accessed12t h December2016 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/11/02/last-group-of-calais-refugee-children-evacuated-from-camp/ 11 BBC,“Calais‘jungle’childrenwithnowheretosleep”, BBCNews, 27t h October2016,accessed11t h December 2016 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37783489 12 Rothwell, James, “Calais ‘jungle’ demolition: what will happen to child refugees when the camp is razed, and wherewilltheygo?”, TheTelegraph ,22 nd October2016,accessed11t h December2016 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ news/2016/10/22/calais-jungle-demolition-what-will-happen-to-child-refugees-

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Messages in the Media when / 13 BBC, “Calais migrants: ‘Several hundred’ more child refugees to arrive in UK”, BBC News, 24th October 2016, accessed11t h December2016 http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-37752193 14 BBC, “Calais migrants: ‘Several hundred’ more child refugees to arrive in UK”, BBC News, 24th October 2016, accessed11t h December2016 http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-37752193 15 Rothwell, James, “Calais ‘jungle’ demolition: what will happen to child refugees when the camp is razed, and wherewilltheygo?”, TheTelegraph ,22 nd October2016,accessed11t h December2016 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ news/2016/10/22/calais-jungle-demolition-what-will-happen-to-child-refugeeswhen / 16 BBC, “Calais migrants: ‘Several hundred’ more child refugees to arrive in UK”, BBC News, 24th October 2016, accessed11t h December2016 http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-37752193 17 Kettle, Martin,“NicolaSturgeon’smanoeuvresofferachancetoshapeBrexit”, TheGuardian ,13t h October2016, accessed20t h December2016 https://www.theguardian.com/politics/scottish-independence 18 BBC“EUReferendumResults”, BBCNews ,25t h June2016,accessed4t h October2016 http://www.bbc.com/news/politics/eu_referendum/results 19 GovScot,“EUMembership”, Gov.Scot ,28t h June2016,accessed20t h December2016 http://www.gov.scot/Topics/International/Europe/Benefits-EU-Membership 20 BBC, “Analysis:UniversitytuitionfeesinScotland”, BBCNews, 11t h July2013,accessed20t h December2016 http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-23279868 21 BBC, “Analysis:UniversitytuitionfeesinScotland”, BBCNews, 11t h July2013,accessed20t h December2016 http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-23279868 22 Ramsey, Adam, “Nine reasons Scotland is more Remain, (and what will happen if it’s dragged out)”, Open DemocracyUK, 14t h June2016,accessed20t h December2016 https://www.opendemocracy.net/uk/adam-ramsay/eight-reasons-scotland-ismore-remain-and-what-will-happen -if-its-dragged-out 23 Douglas-Scott, Sionaidh,“CanScotlandremainintheEUafterBreit”, TheGuardian ,29t h June2016,accessed20t h December 2016 https://www.theguardian.com/ commentisfree/2016/jun/29/scotland-remain-eu-brexit-european-union-scotseng land-wales 23 Douglas-Scott, Sionaidh,“CanScotlandremainintheEUafterBreit”, TheGuardian ,29t h June2016,accessed20t h December 2016 https://www.theguardian.com/ commentisfree/2016/jun/29/scotland-remain-eu-brexit-european-union-scotseng land-wales

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Messages in the Media

Media sources 1- Lâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;Echo: founded in 1881. Owned by Mediafin 2 - La Libre Belgique: founded in 1884. Owned by David and Frederick Barclay 3 - Le Vif: founded in 1983. Roularta Media

BY: BENJAMIN FALCONER 201

Messages in the Media

BRUSSELS ATTACKS AND AFTERMATH 2016 was a reputational disaster for Belgium, with the perpetrators of the Paris attack found to be originally from the Muslim-majority Molenbeek1 neighbourhood in Brussels. Little could have prepared them for what the country was to endure in 2016; on March 22, 2016, 4 days after the capture of Paris attack planner Salah Abdeslam in Molenbeek, 3 separate explosions were set off by suicide bombers linked to the Islamic State (IS) and the Paris attackers2 at both the Brussels International Airport and the Maalbeek train station killing 32 civilians.3 Repercussions were felt both domestically and internationally for the small nation. Indeed, Belgium has long suffered issues of social cohesion, starting from linguistic challenges to the young-old divide, while immigration from non-Western countries, especially in the wake of the European migrant crisis, emerged as a more recent social challenge.4 Since the Brussels attack, the Belgian government has been more focused on problematic regions, especially with regards to integration, with the two worst being Molenbeek and Schaerbeek; indeed, both neighbourhoods suffer from high levels of unemployment (23.7% and 19.9% respectively) and lack of higher education leading to an inability to integrate, ample opportunity for radicalization.5 The government has continued to push its deradicalization strategy, reportedly beginning to see results in the Molenbeek neighbourhood through education and job programs as well as the dispatch of additional police forces.6 Nevertheless, the battle is far from finished, with Schaerbeek the site of a stabbing in October.7 At the International level, in order to improve security and informationsharing, efforts to institute an EU-wide Passenger Names Record to track travelers have been redoubled - with Belgium among its most ardent supporters.8 Intelligence failures were at the heart of the Brussels bombing coupled with numerous policing errors, information-sharing inefficiencies and an overall weak intelligence infrastructure harming chances of pre-emptively sniffing out the plot.9 The Transport Minister, Jacqueline Gallant, resigned as part of this issue, having seemingly covered up a failure to act on a report criticizing several security flaws in Belgium’s airports.10 Finally, on a less procedural note, the Brussels bombings continued to play into the narrative promulgated by the Flemish anti-immigrant right-wing, as well as general anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim feelings, both in Belgium and throughout the rest of the continent.11 Certain commentators have argued, for example, that the Brussels’ attack, in tandem with the Paris attacks, had a substantial effect on the decision to vote ‘Leave’ in the British referendum.12 Nevertheless, in the midst of a continuing migrant crisis as well as deep-seated anxieties towards Islam in general, the Brussels bombings have continued to feed the general feelings of threat, insecurity and suspicion gripping Europe.

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2016

CETA CONTROVERSY

Deliberation over the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) ended this year, with the signature of the agreement on October 30, 2016.13 With negotiations for the agreement beginning in mid2009, the ratification of the agreement was a landmark moment, providing an important precedent for EU trade deals moving forward.14 Designed to bolster free-trade between Canada and the EU, the agreement’s primary purposes are to eliminate tariffs between Canada and the single-market as well as provide investor protection through alternative methods of investor-state dispute resolution – namely, a supranational independent tribunal known as the Investor State Dispute Settlement that would allow investors to take governments to court in the case of liability in loss of profit.15 The signing of the agreement was not accomplished without some measure of struggle as, at the 11th hour, Belgium’s French region, Wallonia, led by Paul Magnette’s Parti Socialiste (PS)-Centre démocrate humaniste (cdH) centre-left coalition, pronounced itself incapable of assenting to the agreement, primarily citing concerns over the outsized power given to multinational corporations in relation to worker protection, as well as in suing domestic governments over lost profits, a move that would legally prevent, or at the very least hinder, their ability to effectively legislate in the public interest.16 Further concerns with the agreement existed over competitiveness for Belgian smallholder farmers, with guaranteed access to the single-market for Canadian livestock, as well as the potential for American companies headquartered in Canada to access the single-market through a figurative backdoor tactic.17 Finally, loose environmental and health care protection, due to the lack of explicit safeguards, have also been raised as a key issue with regards to the potential for renegotiation of standards in the case of the former and foreign privatization in the case of the latter, allowing pharmaceutical companies and private providers to usurp public healthcare.18 The EU decided to classify the agreement as a “mixed treaty,” with some of its elements to be implemented at the individual level, forcing a concurrent nation-by-nation consultation; with Federal power in Belgium reliant on a complex consensus among the three linguistic regions, Wallonia’s concerns would need to be alleviated before signature. To contextualize, Wallonia is relatively poor in comparison to its neighbouring Flanders and Brussels regions, with growth lagging the rest of Belgium and 2x unemployment rates.19 Labour and multinational relations have been tense, with multinationals unwilling to bear the high labour cost, such as the case of American machinery manufacturer Caterpillar who abruptly left the region laying off 2000 workers – opposition on Wallonia’s part was thus to be expected.20 Mr. Magnette’s crusade finally provoked a response at the highest levels, with assurances of a review of the ISDS in the European Court of Justice in return for Wallonia’s assent.21 This assent, however, is conditional on the review’s results, as well as on the changing of several of the environmental and public service provisions.22 In order to ratify the agreement,

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Messages in the Media the EU will once again have to put CETA before its individual states. Indeed, it seems as though Europe has only bought itself time; CETA remains very much at risk of collapsing as Wallonia, the poor and tiny region of only 3.5 million, appears set, barring major changes, to continue to hold the single-market hostage, a continuation of 2016’s major anti-globalization theme.

DEBT, DEFICIT AND BUDGET

Prime among the Michel government’s focus has been balancing the budget through a series of largely controversial austerity measures.23 The European Commission has cited both Belgian Debt-to-GDP and Deficit-to-GDP ratios as cause for concern heading into 2017.24 The latter, especially, has attracted the attention of the Commission as Belgium’s structural deficit begins to close in on the prohibited 3% figure implemented under the Stability and Growth Pact , severely limiting its budgetary maneuverability moving forward.25 Both figures are considered to be overly high by credit rating agencies and the IMF, pushing the Michel government to cut public service spending and pensions, as well as implement salary moderation, longer work weeks and raise new consumption taxes.26 This has triggered a hostile reaction among workers as labour and transport unions have organized mass protests against said measures.27 Protests have been particularly concentrated in the Wallonia region, with growth rates significantly lower and unemployment rates significantly higher, exacerbating already existing tensions between the French and Flemish Communities.28 To make matters worse, Belgium has been forced to increase its expenditures in the face of security concerns following the Brussels attack.29 Additional police forces have been deployed to areas of concern such as Molenbeek and Schaerbeek in order to stifle radicalization efforts; meanwhile patrolling in public areas has increased substantially.30 Yet, a major issue leaving residents susceptible to radicalization has been the lack of integration via the workforce, as unemployment remains high levels, an issue compounding with already widespread poverty to keep much of the Muslim community in these highly homogeneous areas at the fringe of Belgian society.31 Thus, the budget issue operates at the level of investor confidence, but has a much deeper political meaning both in Belgium, in terms of security and ethnic tension, as well as in the broader European community, in terms of Eurozone financial stability and security, as Belgium continues to be a high-risk radicalization environment and the European Union continues to attempt to recover from the sovereign debt crisis, a proposition only increasing in difficulty as Brexit looms near. 2016 IN REVIEW Belgium’s media coverage this past year primarily revolved around 2 major themes; the aftermath of the Brussels attacks and the economy. In reporting on Belgium’s efforts and challenges in handling radicalization, the neighbour-

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2016 hoods of Molenbeek and Schaerbeek continued to receive the bulk of the attention, with heavy criticism of communitarianism that has allowed radicals to hide from Belgian police. Coverage gradually shifted to government attempts to solve both the radicalization in problem areas, as well as patch up the weak intelligence and security infrastructure that allowed the attack to occur. Internationally, EU efforts to do the latter also received coverage, with Belgium part of a group of state pushing efforts to increase information-sharing and passenger cataloguing among European intelligence agencies. Moving to the economy, the CETA agreement and the budget were at the centre of news coverage, with the former’s blocking by the Walloon parliament receiving extensive coverage both at home and internationally. Wallonia’s issues with the treaty stemmed from its heavy socialization; indeed, Wallonia has lagged economically behind the rest of Belgium for some years and this situation is now exacerbating relations between the French and Flemish communities, the latter viewing the former as a drag on their own strong economy. Fears of a lack of social protection and multinational favouritism forced the Walloon parliament’s hand, leading to extended negotiations before the agreement was finally assented to on October 31, 2016. The budgetary issue had similarly international implications, with the IMF, credit rating agencies and the European Commission warning of high levels of debt and structural deficit, especially in light of EU regulation, all issues that continue to affect Belgium as it attempts to attract investment in the midst of post-attack concerns. Ultimately, what is of interest are the broader trends of economic dissatisfaction and the concurrent feeling of anti-globalization at the root of Belgium’s multiplicity of issues. Wallonia has continued to lag economically, while the Muslim migrant population has been poorly integrated. Both have manifested their dissatisfaction with protests against the Michel’s government austerity proposals and the CETA agreement, as well as against issues of radicalization. Time will tell whether the country will be able to substantively address its underlying economic issues and cleavages as opposed to the endless application of “band-aid” solutions in current fashion among Belgium’s political class.

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Messages in the Media Statistics: Source: Europa.eu 1 “Le “communautarisme” à Molenbeek a “protégé” Abdeslam,” LeVif.be , N.p., March 21, 2016, <http://www.levif.be/actualite/international/le-communautarisme-a-molenbeek-a-protege-abdesl am/article-normal-480623.html>. 2 “L’arrestation de Salah Abdeslam a pu constituer un élément déclenchant,” La Libre.be , March 22, 2016. <http://www.lalibre.be/actu/belgique/l-arrestation-desalah-abdeslam-a-pu-constituer-un-element -declenchant-56f1128335702a22d5 9dd4cc>. 3 “Attentats de Bruxelles: le déroulement des événements,” LeVif.be , March 23, 2016. <http://www.levif.be/actualite/international/attentats-de-bruxelles-le-deroulement-des-evenement s/article-normal-481307.html>. 4 Tendances, Trends. “Intégration économique des immigrés: “La Belgique n’a jamais réalisé d’investissements adéquats”,” LeVif.be . August 18, 2016. <http://trends.levif.be/economie/politique-economique/integration-economique-des-immigres-la- belgique-n-a-jamais-realise-d-investissements-adequats/article-normal-539545.html>. 5 Ibid. 6 “Molenbeek: comment des départs en Syrie sont évités,” LeVif.be , January 31, 2016. < http://www.levif.be/actualite/belgique/molenbeek-comment-des-departs-en-syrie-sont-evites/art icle-normal-456355.html >. “’Moins de radicalisés à Molenbeek qu’il y a un an’,” Echo.be . November 14, 2016. <http://www.lecho.be/dossier/invite/Moins_de_radicalises_a_Molenbeek_ qu_il_y_a_un_an.983 0461-7838.art>. 7 “Policiers poignardés à Schaerbeek: Le domicile de l’auteur perquisitionné,” La Libre.be , October 5, 2016. <http://www.lalibre.be/actu/belgique/policiers-poignardes-a-schaerbeek-le-domicile-de-l-auteur- perquisitionne-57f4db04cd70e9985fea2a11>. 8 Georis, Vincent. “La Commission Juncker veut accélérer la lutte anti-terroriste,” Echo.be , October 12, 2016. <http://www.lecho.be/actualite/archive/La_Commission_Juncker_veut_accelerer_la_lutte_anti_t erroriste.9819379-1802.art?highlight=passenger names record>. 9 Mathieu, Benoît, “Aurait-on pu éviter l’horreur?” Echo.be , March 23, 2016. <http://www.lecho.be/dossier/attaquesparis/Aurait_on_pu_eviter_l_horreur.9747343-8267.art?hi ghlight=attentats bruxelles>. “Attentats de Bruxelles: la chaîne de communication n’a pas été optimale.” La Libre.be , June 2, 2016. <http://www.lalibre.be/actu/belgique/attentats-de-bruxelles-la-chaine-de-communication-n-a-pas -ete-optimale-574f3d4e35702a22d7ee90a8>. 10 “Qui pourrait succéder à Jacqueline Galant?” Echo.be , April 15, 2016. <http://www.lecho.be/dossier/galantgate/Qui_pourrait_succeder_a_Jacqueline_ Galant.9755088- 8254.art>. 11 Toussaint, Gilles. “”Daech veut accroître les tensions communautaires en France”,” La Libre.be , July 27, 2016. <http://www.lalibre.be/actu/international/ daech-veut-accroitre-les-tensions-communautaires-en-f rance-5798d64f35705dcbd708cb19>.

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2016 “Les attaques de Bruxelles pourraient avoir une influence sur le Brexit,” International - LeVif.be , March 30, 2016. <http://www.levif.be/actualite/international/les-attaques-de-bruxelles-pourraient-avoir-une-influe nce-sur-le-brexit/ article-normal-484241.html>. 13 “Ecolo:”Tirons les leçons du CETA”.” Belgique - LeVif.be . N.p., October 31, 2016. <http://www.levif.be/actualite/belgique/ecolo-tirons-les-lecons-du-ceta/ article-opinion-567851.ht ml>. 14 Gosset, Olivier. “Ceta: le Canada appelle l’UE à ‘finir son job’,” Echo.be , October 22, 2016. <http://www.lecho.be/economie_politique/europe_economie/Ceta_ le_Canada_appelle_l_UE_a_f inir_son_job.9823132-3167.art?highlight=ceta>. 15 Rohart, Frédéric, and Benoît Mathieu. “Les huit questions polémiques autour du Ceta.” Echo.be . N.p., October 23, 2016. <http://www.lecho.be/economie_politique/international_economie/Les_huit_questions_polemiq ues_autour_du_ Ceta.9823145-3168.art?highlight=ceta social>. 16 Rohart, Frédéric, and Benoît Mathieu. “Les huit questions polémiques autour du Ceta.” Echo.be , N.p., October 23, 2016. <http://www.lecho.be/economie_politique/international_economie/Les_huit_questions_polemiq ues_autour_du_ Ceta.9823145-3168.art?highlight=ceta social>. Le Bussy, Olivier.” Vu du Canada: “L’objectif du CETA est de protéger les intérêts des multinationales”.” La Libre.be , October 17, 2016. <http://www.lalibre.be/ actu/international/vu-du-canada-l-objectif-du-ceta-est-de-proteger-les-int erets-des-multinationales-58052979cd701eed8fcefd25>. 17 Rohart, Frédéric, and Benoît Mathieu. “Les huit questions polémiques autour du Ceta.” Echo.be , October 23, 2016. <http://www.lecho.be/economie_politique/international_economie/Les_huit_questions_polemiq ues_autour_du_ Ceta.9823145-3168.art?highlight=ceta social>. “CETA: les détails de l’accord intrabelge.” La Libre.be , October 28, 2016. <http:// www.lalibre.be/actu/politique-belge/ceta-les-details-de-l-accord-intrabelge5812577ccd7 0958a9d5906be>. Le Bussy, Olivier . “Vu du Canada: “L’objectif du CETA est de protéger les intérêts des multinationales”.” La Libre.be , October 17, 2016. <http://www.lalibre.be/ actu/international/vu-du-canada-l-objectif-du-ceta-est-de-proteger-les-int erets-des-multinationales-58052979cd701eed8fcefd25>. 18 ”Une centaine d’activistes anti-CETA s’est enchaînée au Berlaymont.” La Libre. be , October 27, 2016. < http://www.lalibre.be/actu/international/une-centaine-d-activistes-anti-ceta-s-est-enchainee-au- berlaymont-5811f745cd70fb896a613b99 >. “Magnette rejette l’échéance de vendredi pour se prononcer sur le CETA.” LeVif. be , October 18, 2016. <http://www.levif.be/actualite/belgique/magnette-rejettel-echeance-de-vendredi-pour-se-pronon cer-sur-le-ceta/article-normal-563455. html>. 19 Lefèvre, François-Xavier. “Pourquoi la croissance wallonne reste-t-elle sous la moyenne belge?” Echo.be , October 27, 2016. <http://www.lecho.be/dossier/ statistiques/Pourquoi_la_croissance_wallonne_reste_t_elle_sous_l a_moyenne_ 12

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Messages in the Media belge.9824802-8582.art?highlight=pib wallon>. “En 23 ans, le chômage n’a presque jamais baissé en Wallonie et a augmenté à Bruxelles.” La Libre.be , November 28, 2016. <http://www.lalibre.be/economie/ conjoncture/en-23-ans-le-chomage-n-a-presque-jamais-baisse- en-wallonie-et-a-augmente-a-bruxelles-583bc32bcd703561307805ea>. 20 ”Manifestation du non-marchand ce jeudi à Bruxelles: “Que l’on arrête de nous dire qu’il n’y a pas de moyens, c’est faux”.” La Libre.be, November 22, 2016. <http://www.lalibre.be/actu/belgique/manifestation-du-non-marchand-ce-jeudi-a-bruxelles-que-l- on-arrete-de-nous-dire-qu-il-n-y-a-pas-de-moyens-cest-faux-583452eccd7035613074fce1>. Lefèvre, François-Xavier. “Pourquoi la croissance wallonne reste-t-elle sous la moyenne belge?” Echo.be , October 27, 2016. <http://www.lecho.be/dossier/statistiques/Pourquoi_la_croissance_wallonne_reste_t_elle_sous_l a_moyenne_belge.9824802-8582.art?highlight=pib wallon>. 21 “CETA: les détails de l’accord intrabelge.” La Libre.be , October 28, 2016. <http://www.lalibre.be/actu/politique-belge/ceta-les-details-de-l-accord-intrabelge-5812577ccd7 0958a9d5906be. 22 “CETA: Magnette menace d’activer la clause de suspension du traité si le Fédéral traîne.” La Libre.be , December 1, 2016. <http://www.lalibre.be/ actu/belgique/ceta-magnette-menace-d-activer-la-clause-de-suspension-d u-traite-si-le-federal-traine-584060dfcd707c9b300e9774>. 23 “Cinquante milliards d’austérité en cinq ans, pour quels résultats?” Echo.be , November 30, 2016. <http://www.lecho.be/agora/carte_blanche/Cinquante_milliards_d_austerite_en_cinq_ans_pour_ quels_resultats.9836794-2339.art?ckc=1&ts=1487447277>. 24 Malengreau, Danaé. “Les 3 risques pour le budget belge, selon Moscovici.” Echo.be , October 3, 2016. <http://www.lecho.be/dossier/budgetf%E9d%E9ral/ Les_3_risques_pour_le_budget_belge_selon _Moscovici.9819466-8144.art?ckc=1&ts=1487447277>. 25 Van Haver, Kris. “Le budget belge est ‘risqué’ selon la Commission. Wilmès répond.” Echo.be , November 16, 2016. <http://www.lecho.be/dossier/budgetf%E9d%E9ral/Le_budget_belge_est_risque_selon_la_Com mission_Wilmes_repond.9831374-8144.art?ckc=1&ts=1487447277>. 26 “Fitch dégrade la note belge et ce n’est pas une catastrophe.” Echo.be , December 26, 2016. < http://www.lecho.be/actualite/archive/Fitch_degrade_la_note_belge_et_ce_n_est_pas_une_cata strophe.9846166-1802.art?ckc=1&ts=1487447277 >. “Le FMI s’inquiète de la détérioration des finances publiques en 2016.” LeVif.be , December 12, 2016. <http://www.levif.be/actualite/ belgique/le-fmi-s-inquiete-de-la-deterioration-des-finances-publiq ues-en-2016/ article-normal-585319.html>. Dubuisson, Margot. “’Le gouvernement reste fort avec les faibles, faible avec les forts’” Echo.be , October 15, 2016. <http://www.lecho.be/dossier/budgetf%E9d%E9ral/Le_gouvernement_reste_fort_avec_les_faibl es_faible_avec_les_ forts.9820444-8144.art?ckc=1&ts=1487447277>. 27 “Manifestation du non-marchand ce jeudi à Bruxelles: “Que l’on arrête de nous

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2016 dire qu’il n’y a pas de moyens, c’est faux”.” La Libre.be , November 22, 2016. <http://www.lalibre.be/actu/belgique/manifestation-du-non-marchand-ce-jeudi-a-bruxelles-que-l- on-arrete-de-nous-dire-qu-il-n-y-a-pas-de-moyens-c-estfaux-583452eccd7035613074fce1>. 28 “En 23 ans, le chômage n’a presque jamais baissé en Wallonie et a augmenté à Bruxelles.” La Libre.be , November 28, 2016. <http://www.lalibre.be/economie/conjoncture/en-23-ans-le-chomage-n-a-presque-jamais-baisse- en-wallonie-et-a-augmente-a-bruxelles-583bc32bcd703561307805ea>. 29 “’Moins de radicalisés à Molenbeek qu’il y a un an’,” Echo.be , November 14, 2016. <http://www.lecho.be/dossier/invite/Moins_de_radicalises_a_Molenbeek_ qu_il_y_a_un_an.983 0461-7838.art>. 30 “’Moins de radicalisés à Molenbeek qu’il y a un an’,” Echo.be , November 14, 2016. <http://www.lecho.be/dossier/invite/Moins_de_radicalises_a_Molenbeek_ qu_il_y_a_un_an.983 0461-7838.art>. 31 “Comparez votre commune à Molenbeek-Saint-Jean.” Echo.be , November 18, 2016. <http://www.lecho.be/dossier/attaquesparis/Comparez_votre_commune_a_Molenbeek_Saint_Jea n.9700655-8267.art?highlight=chomage%20 molenbeek>.

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Messages in the Media

Media sources 1- Politika: founded in 1904. Owned by Politika, East Media Group 2 - Blic: founded in 1996. Owned by Ringier Axel Springer Media AG 3 - VeÄ?ernje Novosti: founded in 1953. Owned by Novosti AD

BY: MARINA BOZIC 210

2016

SERBIAN ECONOMIC GROWTH & PROSPERITY IN 2016 The Serbian media frequently reported on the economic topics of national debt, budget and foreign investment in 2016. News relating to the national budget for 2016 set the groundwork for the vastly positive outlook on the Serbian economy by the Serbian media. As of October 2016, the 2016 budget was reporting a 34.3 billion-dinar surplus (approximately 277 million euros), essentially surpassing expectations of its execution.1 Likewise, the deficit of goods and services throughout January-September 2016 decreased 23.1% compared to 2015,2 making the expected deficit at the end of 2016 an approximate 25 billion dinars.3 The expected deficit for 2016 was originally 121.8 billion dinars (approximately 980 million euros), making the final result relatively surprising.4 The positive outcome of the 2016 budget has prompted the Serbian government to push a relatively similar, optimistic outlook when planning the 2017 budget.5 After days of debate in Serbian parliament, the budget for 2017 was based on the success of the 2016 budget namely on the basis of higher earnings in the Serbian economy and lower deficit.6 Serbian Prime Minister Aleksandar Vucic proclaimed that he is proud of the 2016 budget’s fiscal stability and surplus. Prime Minister Vucic mentioned his government’s economic policy initiative of allocating 100 million euros towards pension funding so far in order to affirm that the budget’s success will not be compromised by this initiative.7 Prime Minister Vucic’s optimism was shared by Minister of Finance Dusan Vujovic, who stated his expectations for the public debt to start dropping by the end of 2016, and GDP to in turn begin rising throughout 2017. The Serbian economy in 2016 was also marked by the growing flow of foreign investment, as Serbian relations with Europe develop and strengthen. The improving stability of the Serbian economy was seen as a major factor in inducing interest by foreign investors in Serbian markets, as Serbian exports steadily surpassed imports from 2010-2016 by 15.9% boosted the Serbian economy and foreign trade. Serbia’s foreign invest appeal grew in 2016, with the National Bank of Serbia estimating 1.8 billion euros of foreign direct investment occurring in 2016.8 Most investments in Serbia by foreign companies have been in infrastructure projects, energy, the food industry and the commercial apparel industry Foreign investment in Serbian has resulted in increased profits for companies operating out of Serbia in 2016.9 Many small and medium businesses are optimistic about their future prosperity due to economic successes in 2016, and are planning increased employment and higher wages in the year to come.10 In fact, 50% of companies in Serbia believe their bank loans will be more accessible in 2017, 59% expect similar profits in 2017 as that in 2016, and 39% expect higher profits for the future.11Similarly, Prime Minister Vucic has announced that the 2017 national budget will include more funds to facilitate investments.12 Serbian media also covered the visit of Chinese leader Xi Jinping in June 2016 very closely, as the visit was seen by many in the Serbian media as crucial in the tightening of economic and political ties between the two

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Messages in the Media nations, with Chinese businesses starting to look to Serbia for future investment potential.13 Prime Minister Vucic has also stressed the importance of Serbia’s path towards the European Union as being the underlying factor that has forwarded Serbia’s business environment for foreign investment in 2016.14

STATUS OF MIGRANTS IN SERBIA The Serbian media was consistent in providing updates throughout 2016 on current events, policy changes and news regarding refugees travelling through Serbia and Southeastern Europe. In September 2016, news outlet Politika reported an estimated 7000 migrants in Serbia, whether temporarily residing in camps and refugee centers or continuously travelling through Serbia on their way to Northern European countries.15 The Ministry of Labour and Social Issues has noted that Serbia saw an overall smaller number of migrants entering the state in 2016 than in the year prior.16 In November, a new reception center for migrants from the Middle East was announced in Pirot, as a collaborative effort between Serbia and the United Nations.17 Shortly after, the Serbian Commissariat for Refugees announced new contracts to solve the housing problems of 899 refugee families, containing the details of the purchases of 567 rural homes for refugees as part of the new Regional Housing Program.18According to popular media outlets, Serbia has maintained a positive reputation for its humane handling of refugees, and Serbian Minister of Internal Affairs Nebojsa Stefanovic has affirmed Serbia’s unchanging policy towards migrants, especially with regards to the so-called Balkan Route.19 The Balkan Route has lead migrants through Serbia on a path northwards to the rest of Europe, with migrants coming through the southern part of the Bulgarian border, in hopes of crossing into Croatia or Hungary.20 However, in March 2016 the Balkan Route was closed, with both Croatia and Hungary terminating access through their borders in hopes of preventing migrants from entering.21 In November of 2016, the Serbian Ministry of Labour and Social Issues affirmed that the Balkan Route will remain open on the Serbian border with Macedonia in the future.22 Additionally, State Secretary of the Ministry of Labour and Social Issues Nenad Ivanisevic stated in December that he thinks an influx of migrants is unlikely in the year to come due to Turkey’s announcement of potentially opening its borders.23 The Serbian Commissariat for Refugees added that it is expected that the European Union will soon reach an agreement with Pakistan and Afghanistan for the readmission of refugees into those nations, and that Serbia will most likely be included in the agreement in order to be able to legally send refugees back to the region.24 The nature of the refugee crisis has called on international cooperation of nations in Europe, resulting in Serbia not only receiving aid from the EU and European financial organizations, but additionally increasing coordination between Serbia and its neighboring countries in securing borders. The Development Bank of the Council of Europe gave Serbia 755,000 euros in 2016 to aid in handling the refugee crisis, with the bank stating that Serbia is a good example of responsible spending of the bank’s aid grants.25 The European

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2016 Union’s financing worth approximately 1 million euros has aided Serbian efforts in managing the refugee crisis, specifically aiding in providing better control of illegal migration and increasing security at borders.26 Neighboring nations Croatia and Hungary announced additional physical barriers on their borders with Serbia in September of 2016 as well.27 Notably, Serbia has also increased its border security in 2016, but not quite to the extent of Croatia and Hungary. Minister of Internal Affairs Stefanovic stated that Serbia increased efforts in combating all crime and smuggling on the border that has been evident since the beginning of the refugee crisis.28 In the last few weeks of 2016, Serbian police forces have arrested 119 smugglers attempting to help refugees across the Serbian border.29 Additionally, in 2016 the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia began to aid the Serbian police in securing state borders, which marked the newfound cooperation between Serbian police and police from the European Union.30

SERBIA’S ADVANCEMENT AND ISSUES WITH EU MEMBERSHIP One of the most eminent topics of national interest in Serbia in 2016 was Serbia’s bid for EU membership and its implications. The government of Serbia announced in December 2016 that Serbia and the EU will be opening chapters 5 and 25 of the ascession process in order to maintain the current dynamic negotiations.The 27 EU member states all voted in favour of continuing the ascension process and opening the next two chapters except for the Republic of Croatia.31 The other nations showed support for the process, with Slovenian Foreign Minister Miroslav Lajcak calling the update “good news” for both Serbia and the EU, and going on to state that this is exemplary proof of the EU enlargement process being “a two-way street.”32 Likewise, Johannes Hahn, the EU Enlargement Commissioner stated that he believes that Serbia will open more chapters in the coming year and take further steps in the negotiation process.33 Additionally, the German Foreign Ministry stated that Germany’s willingness to open the next three chapters in the ascession process was Germany’s way of recognizing Serbian achievements in the negotiations so far.34 The Portuguese Secretary of State, Margarida Marques, spoke on the topic as well in an interview with Politika, stressing the importance of understanding what it means to open another chapter, since Portugal’s ascension process lasted nearly a decade.35 She elaborated that future challenges will lie in the upcoming chapters, stating that the upcoming chapters will push analysis of Serbia’s laws and regulations in order for them to be adapted to EU standards.36 Yet, Serbia’s ascesion is facing complications. Prime Minister Vucic stated that although he believes EU membership is right for Serbia’s future, 2016 saw a steady decline in popularity of EU membership amongst Serbian citizens and an increase in hostile sentiments towards the EU.37 Similarly, while addressing students at the Paris Institute of Political Science, Prime Minister Vucic noted that the Serbian people are finding the ascension process tiresome

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Messages in the Media and lengthy, but also stressed that if the Western Balkan nation are accepted into the EU, they would have a lot of potential for economic growth and political prosperity.38 With neighboring Montenegro opening chapter 26 of their own EU membership process in early December, 39 Serbia is prompted to take initiative to address issues in its own bid. The EU enlargement Commission has highlighted the key current challenges in Serbia’s negotiations, noting the need to reconstruct many Serbian independent institutions, implement public administration reform and invest in privatization of state-owned companies.40 Michael Davenport, the Head of the Delegation of the EU in Serbia, proclaimed that the time has arrived for the Serbian government to show effort in reforming these complications, along with reforms in the rule of law.41 T he European Council of Ministers emphasized its expectations of evidence of a transparent and fair public procurement system at state and local levels. The Council likewise expects evidence of new measures ensuring implementation of national legislation in regards to public procurement- all prior to Serbia’s ascession to the EU.42 Lastly, the longstanding tension regarding Serbia’s friendly relationship with Russia has been a topic of discussion in the Serbian media’s covering of the EU membership bid. In December 2016, while the EU Summit announced its plans for discussing the extension of sanctions against Russia,43 Serbian Foreign Minister Ivica Dacic was reinstating Serbia’s relationship with Russia, proclaiming that Russia continues to be an important ally to Serbia, and an aid in preserving Serbia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty.44 The implications of conflicting views such as those towards of Russia of both Serbia and EU have been problematic for several years. Yet, the former European Commissioner for Enlargement, Stefan Fule, cautioned the EU against letting it be a major divisive factor, due to his belief that the EU moving away from the Western Balkans would immediately result in Russia taking advantage of the opportunity to become influential in the Balkans.45

2016 IN REVIEW Throughout 2016, Serbia’s prominent issues as covered by the media saw significant improvement in contrast to their standing in the year prior, with the Serbian media giving an overall positive outlook on these developments. News and updates on the Serbian economy, the migrant crisis and Serbia’s relationship with the European Union emphasized the achievements and forward steps made in each of these stories, making 2016 a year of progress in Serbia. The highlight stories for the Serbian economy in 2016 were the budget surplus of 34.3 billion-dinars,46 and the smaller than expected deficit of goods and services, 25 billion dinars, which down 23.1% since 2015.47 Throughout the year, news of the rising presence of foreign investment in Serbia only further contributed to the impression of steady improvement in the Serbian economy. Since it is necessary for Serbia to meet certain economics standards set by the EU in order to move forward with the ascension process, signs of growth and progress in the Serbian economy have contributed positively to the status of Serbia’s candidacy for EU

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2016 membership. As the migrant crisis continues to be prominent in the European Union and the Balkan region, Serbia maintained its reputation of being a welcoming nation in 2016. Serbia launched new initiatives to solve housing problems of refugees currently residing in Serbia, and affirmed the status of the Balkan Route as open, after refugee-opposed nations Croatia and Hungary closed their borders. Serbia also strived to work with neighboring Croatia and Hungary on border control issues, and Serbian police collaborated with police from the European Union on border-related issues as well. The media reported European banks and the EU continuing to financially aid Serbia in its efforts relating to the migrant crisis.48 Serbiaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s ascession process to the European Union had high points and complications in 2016. The opening of chapters 5 and 25 in December was a positive step forward, but also highlighted the internal issues that the Serbian government needs to address in the coming year in order to meet certain requirements laid out in the chapters. Some issues the Serbian government will need to address in 2017 include reconstructing many Serbian independent institutions, implementing public administration reform and investing in the privatization of state-owned companies.49 It is important to note that the overall favorable developments in the Serbian economy and handling of the migrant crisis have likely had a positive impact on the EU ascension, as the maturation of the Serbian economy is essential to the ascension, and Serbiaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s behavior during the migrant crisis has helped display a very encouraging image of the role Serbia intends to take-on in regards to international issues in the future.

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Messages in the Media Statistics: http://www.tradingeconomics.com/serbia/indicators/ https://euobserver.com/enlargement/127187 “Budzetski suficit 34,3 milijarde.” Politika Online. N.p. December 6, 2016. Accessed December 19, 2016. <http://www.politika.rs/scc/clanak/369413/Budzetski-suficit-34-3-milijarde>. 2 Mikavica, Aleksandar. “Usluge smanjuju deficit u trgovini sa svetom.” Politika Online. N.p. December 5, 2016. Accessed December 1, 2016 <http://www.politika. rs/scc/clanak/369280/Usluge-smanjuju-deficit-u-trgovini-sa-svetom>. 3 “Budzetski suficit 34,3 milijarde.” Politika Online. N.p. December 6, 2016. Accessed December 19, 2016. <http://www.politika.rs/scc/clanak/369413/Budzetski-suficit-34-3-milijarde>. 4 “Skupština Srbije sutra o budžetu.” Večernje Novosti. N.p. December 3, 2016. Accessed December 19, 2016.. <http://www.novosti.rs/vesti/naslovna/politika/aktuelno.289.html%3A638113-Skupstina-Srbije-sutra-o-budzetu>. 5 “Mijatović, V. “Usvojen budžet za 2017. godinu: Veće zarade, a manji deficit.” Večernje Novosti. N.p. December 10, 2016. Accessed December 19, 2016. <http:// www.novosti.rs/vesti/naslovna/ekonomija/aktuelno.239.html:639268-Usvojenbudzet-za-2017-godinu-Vece-zarade-a-manji-deficit>. 6 Ibid 7 Jasnić, I. M. “Vučić u Hamburgu: Da sam ja Nemac, došao bih da investiram u Srbiju.” Blic.rs. N.p. October 31, 2016. Accessed December 19, 2016. <http://www. blic.rs/vesti/politika/vucic-u-hamburgu-da-sam-ja-nemac-dosao-bih-da-investiram-u-srbiju/0jxhsn0>.. 8 MORAVČEVIĆ, S. “Srbija je među prvih pet zemalja za investiranje.” Vecernje Novosti . N.p. December 10, 2016. Accessed December 19, 2016. <http://www.novosti.rs/vesti/naslovna/ekonomija/aktuelno.239.html:638402-Srbija-medju-top-5-drzava-za-ulaganja>. 9 Ibid.. 10 R., M. “MALA I SREDNJA PREDUZEĆA U 2017: Svako četvrto planira više zaposlenih i veće plate.” Blic.rs. N.p. December 13, 2016. Accessed December 19, 2016. <http://www.blic.rs/vesti/ekonomija/mala-i-srednja-preduzeca-u-2017svako-cetvrto-planira-vise-zaposlenih-i-vece-plate/dd7y2ny>. 11 Ibid. 12 Mijatović, V. “Usvojen budžet za 2017. godinu: Veće zarade, a manji deficit.” Večernje Novosti. N.p. December 10, 2016. Accessed December 19, 2016. <http:// www.novosti.rs/vesti/naslovna/ekonomija/aktuelno.239.html:639268-Usvojenbudzet-za-2017-godinu-Vece-zarade-a-manji-deficit>. 13 “Potvrda prijateljstva Srbije i Kine!” Večernje Novosti. N.p. June 18, 2016. Accessed December 19, 2016. <http://www.novosti.rs/vesti/naslovna/politika/aktuelno.289.html:610870-Sastanaka-Vucica-i-Si-Djinpinga>. 14 Jasnić, I. M. “Vučić u Hamburgu: Da sam ja Nemac, došao bih da investiram u Srbiju.” Blic.rs. N.p. October 31, 2016. Accessed December 19. 2016.<http://www. blic.rs/vesti/politika/vucic-u-hamburgu-da-sam-ja-nemac-dosao-bih-da-investiram-u-srbiju/0jxhsn0>. 1

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2016 “U Srbiji oko 7000 migranta.” Politika Online. N.p. September 23, 2016. Accessed December 19, 2016. <http://www.politika.rs/scc/clanak/364141/ У-Србији-око-7-000-миграната >. 16 “Ivanišević: Ne očekujemo veći priliv migranata zbog zatvaranja granica Turske.” Blic.rs. November 27, 2016. Accessed December 19, 2016. <http://www.blic.rs/vesti/drustvo/ivanisevic-ne-ocekujemo-veci-priliv-migranata-zbog-zatvaranja-granica-turske/meb8pet>. 17 C. V. “Još jedan centar za migrante.” Večernje Novosti. N.p. November 29, 2016. Accessed December 19, 2016. <http://www.novosti.rs/vesti/naslovna/drustvo/aktuelno.290.html%3A637358-Jos-jedan-centar-za-migrante>. 18 ”Uručeni ugovori za stambeno zbrinjavanje 899 porodica izbeglica iz BiH i Hrvatske.” Večernje Novosti. N.p. November 26, 2016. Accessed December 19, 2016. <http://www.novosti.rs/vesti/naslovna/drustvo/aktuelno.290.html:636249-Uruceni-ugovori-za-stambeno-zbrinjavanje-899-porodica-izbeglica-iz-BiH-i-Hrvatske>. 19 ”Stefanović i Pinter razgovarali o migrantskoj krizi.” N.p. November 20, 2016. Accessed December 19, 2016. . <http://www.blic.rs/vesti/politika/stefanovic-ipinter-razgovarali-o-migrantskoj-krizi/49hl7r3>. 20 Ibid. 21 ”Dolazi zima: Kako će se region odnositi prema izbeglicama?” Politika Online. N.p. September 2, 2016. Accessed December 19, 2016. <http://www.politika.rs/scc/clanak/362853/Долази-зима-Како-ће-се-регион-односити-премаизбеглицама>. 22 “Stefanović i Pinter razgovarali o migrantskoj krizi.” N.p. November 20, 2016. Accessed December 19, 2016. <http://www.blic.rs/vesti/politika/stefanovic-ipinter-razgovarali-o-migrantskoj-krizi/49hl7r3>. 23 “Ivanišević: Ne očekujemo veći priliv migranata zbog zatvaranja granica Turske.” Blic.rs. N.p. November 27, 2016. Accessed December 19,2016. <http://www.blic.rs/vesti/drustvo/ivanisevic-ne-ocekujemo-veci-priliv-migranata-zbog-zatvaranja-granica-turske/meb8pet>. 24 “Hiljadu migranata u parkovima.” Večernje Novosti. N.p. December 26, 2016. Accessed December 19, 2016. <http://www.novosti.rs/vesti/naslovna/drustvo/aktuelno.290.html:641663-Hiljadu-migranata-u-parkovima>. 25 “Srbija za migrante dobija 755 000 evra od Banke za razvoj SE .” Politika Online. N.p. September 15, 2016. Accessed December 19, 2016. <http://www.politika.rs/scc/clanak/363595/Србија-за-мигранте-добија-755000-евра-од-Банке-за-развој-СЕ >. 28 ”Stefanović i Pinter razgovarali o migrantskoj krizi.” Blic.rs. N.p. November 20, 2016. Accessed December 19, 2016. <http://www.blic.rs/vesti/politika/stefanovici-pinter-razgovarali-o-migrantskoj-krizi/49hl7r3>. 29 ”Vojska i policija za dve nedelje uhapsile 25 krijumčara migranata.” Vecerne Novosti. N.p. December 31, 2016. Accessed December 31, 2016. <http://www. novosti.rs/vesti/naslovna/hronika/aktuelno.291.html:642583-Vojska-i-policija-za-dve-nedelje-uhapsile-25-krijumcara-migranata>. 30 Panić, Z. “Stefanović: Srbija štiti svoju, ali i teritoriju drugih država.” Blic.rs. N.p. 15

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Messages in the Media December 1, 2016. Accessed December 19, 2016. <http://www.blic.rs/vesti/hronika/stefanovic-srbija-stiti-svoju-ali-i-teritoriju-drugih-drzava/6key7yg>. 31 “Vučić o pregovorima sa EU: Zbog poglavlja 26 više neću u Brisel, Srbiju niko neće ponižavati.” Blic.rs. N.p. December 13, 2016. Accessed December 19, 2016. <http://www.blic.rs/vesti/politika/vucic-o-pregovorima-sa-eu-zbog-poglavlja26-vise-necu-u-brisel-srbiju-niko-nece/g1m5dvm>. 32 “Lajčak: Otvaranje poglavlja dobra vest za Srbiju i EU.” Blic.rs. N.p. December 13, 2016. Accessed December 19, 2016. <http://www.blic.rs/vesti/politika/lajcak-otvaranje-poglavlja-dobra-vest-za-srbiju-i-eu/b5y6wqr>. 33 “Han: Srbiji sledeće godine više poglavlja nego ove.” Blic.rs. N.p. December 13, 2016. Accessed December 19, 2016. <http://www.blic.rs/vesti/politika/han-srbiji-sledece-godine-vise-poglavlja-nego-ove/fn4f959>. 34 “Štir i Štajnmajer: Uskoro otvaranje poglavlja 26.” Politika Online. N.p. December 14, 2016. Accessed December 19, 2016. <http://www.politika.rs/scc/clanak/370076/Stir-i-Stajnmajer-Uskoro-otvaranje-poglavlja-26>. 35 Vujić, Liljana. “Zatvaranje poglavlja glavni izazov za Srbiju.” Politika Online. N.p. December 13, 2016. Accessed December 19, 2016. <http://www.politika.rs/ scc/clanak/369840/Затварање-поглавља-главни-изазов-за-Србију>. 36 Ibid. 37 “Vučić: Sad stvarno mora da se uradi nešto za region, u suprotnom...” Politika Online. N.p. September 26, 2016. Accessed December 19, 2016. <http:// www.politika.rs/scc/clanak/364051/Вучић-Сад-стварно-мора-да-се-урадинешто-за-регион-у-супротном>.politika.rs/scc/clanak/364051/Вучић-Садстварно-мора-да-се-уради-нешто-за-регион-у-супротном>.politika.rs/scc/ clanak/364051/Вучић-Сад-стварно-мора-да-се-уради-нешто-за-регион-усупротном>. www.politika.rs/scc/clanak/364051/Вучић-Сад-стварно-мора-да-се-урадинешто-за-регион-у-супротном>. 38 ”Vučić francuskim studentima: Balkan ponovo značajan, EU -cilj.” Politika Online. N.p. September 16, 2016. Accessed December 19, 2016. <http://www.politika.rs/scc/clanak/363680/Вучић-француским-студентимаБалкан-поново-значајан-ЕУ-циљ>. 39 Radosavović, B. “Crnogorci još dva koraka bliži Evropi.” Večernje Novosti. N.p. December 13, 2016. Accessed December 19, 2016. <http://www.novosti.rs/vesti/planeta.300.html:639771-Crnogorci-jos-dva-koraka-blizi-Evropi>. 40 ”Šta Devenport zamera Srbiji.” Politika Online. N.p. September 16, 2016. Accessed December 19, 2016. <http://www.politika.rs/scc/clanak/363661/Шта-Девенпорт-замера-Србији>. 41 Ibid. 42 “Šta EU očekuje od Srbije nakon otvaranja poglavlja 5 i 25.” Blic.rs. N.p. December 13, 2016. Accessed December 19, 2016. <http://www.blic.rs/vesti/svet/sta-eu-ocekuje-od-srbije-nakon-otvaranja-poglav-

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2016 lja-5-i-25/bl4bn1z>. 43 Blagojevic, Dragan. “Samit EU diskutovaće o sankcijama Rusiji, bezbednosti i migrantima.” Blic.rs. N.p. December 14, 2016. Accessed December 19, 2016. <http://www.blic.rs/vesti/svet/samit-eu-diskutovace-o-sankcijama-rusiji-bezbednosti-i-migrantima/w4gd1tv>. 44 ”Bez Rusije nemoguće zaštititi integritet Srbije.” Politika Online. N.p. December 12, 2016. Accessed December 19, 2016. <http://www.politika.rs/scc/clanak/369901/Без-Русије-немогуће-заштититиинтегритет-Србије>. 45 ”File: Udaljavanjem EU od Balkana otvara se put uticaju Rusije.” Večernje Novosti. N.p. December 8, 2016. Accessed December 19, 2016. <http://www.novosti.rs/vesti/planeta.299.html:638936-File-Udaljavanjem-EU-od-Balkana-otvara-se-put-uticaju-Rusije>. 46 ”Budzetski suficit 34,3 milijarde.” Politika Online. N.p. December 6, 2016. Accessed December 19, 2016. <http://www.politika.rs/scc/clanak/369413/Budzetski-suficit-34-3-milijarde>. 47 Mikavica, Aleksandar. “Usluge smanjuju deficit u trgovini sa svetom.” Politika Online. N.p. December 5, 2016. Accessed December 1, 2016 <http://www.politika.rs/scc/clanak/369280/Usluge-smanjuju-deficit-u-trgovini-sa-svetom>. 48 ”Srbija za migrante dobija 755 000 evra od Banke za razvoj SE .” Politika Online. N.p. September 15, 2016. Accessed December 19, 2016. <http://www.politika.rs/scc/clanak/363595/Србија-за-мигранте-добија-755000-евра-од-Банке-за-развој-СЕ>. 49 ”Šta Devenport zamera Srbiji.” Politika Online. N.p. September 16, 2016. Accessed December 19, 2016. <http://www.politika.rs/scc/clanak/363661/ШтаДевенпорт-замера-Србији>.

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