RISA's Outlook #1

RISA’s outlook 2010 / 2011 # 1

supported by MGIMO–University HSDSF Foundation

Supplement to “Eastern Europe. Prospects”, an international & regional affairs journal Ed. by Artem V. Malgin

RISA’s outlook 2010 / 2011 # 1

supported by

Four Scenarios of Russia’s Development Anatoly V. Torkunov The MGIMO–University has been involved in a prognosis project, which resulted in formulating four possible scenarios of the Russian political, economic and social future till the year 2020. This research project specifically reflects the political aspects of the Russian development as well as the dynamics of international political and economic environment1.

Each of the four scenarios has its “intrigue” and motives. These are “magnifying glasses” which demonstrate in a very clear way the existing development trends of Russia and the world.

The goal of this study was not just to make a simple prognosis and predict future, but look at the limits of development. The conclusions of research are not abstract vague ideas, but thoughts reflecting specific challenges of modern Russia.

Firstly, these challenges include the impact of external environment on Russia. The foreign policy agenda has often influenced the domestic policy priorities of the country. The logic of industrial and broader economic development of Russia in the 20th century depended a lot on the need to respond to external threats.

In this respect one may think about a certain similarity between the Stalinist industrialization and further Cold War development because both phenomena were dominated by the military-political component. Russia had always to choose — whether be involved in global competition or get “the other 20 years of peace”.

Secondly, social-economic and political modernization of Russia has always been a traditional issue of the country’s development. In this regard the window of opportunity is determined by priorities of national development, its agents, methods, resources and so on.

Today the Russian government seems to have made a strategic choice for the nearest future. It chose to utilize the model of state-centric modernization. However, other alternatives of Russia’s modernization strategies have not been swept away as such.

Thirdly, alternative scenarios of Russia’s future have been historically defined by its territorial structure.

Relations between the Center and Regions have always been of much importance to the country. Predictions of Russia’s dissolution are rarely heard in the political discourse today. Meanwhile, it is obviously early to talk about final settlement of Centre — Regions balance issue and the problem of “crisis” territories.

The following scenarios were formulated as a result of the research:

Scenario 1: “The Kremlin Gambit” In 2020 the world witnesses continuing economic growth, oil is still expensive. The countries of G7 remain the leading economies. Brazil, Russia, India and China develop dynamically. Their share in the world GDP has increased drastically. Globalization is moving forward, but the diversity of economic and political regimes is increasing. The gap between the rich and the poor is increasing.

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Anatoly V. Torkunov The world sees significant conflict potential — fight for energy resources, “grey zones” in Afghanistan, Iraq, some countries in Africa, conflicts in the Middle East, emerging standoffs in the South Caucuses and Central Asia, Islamic radicalism, international terrorism, drug-trafficking and so on. No progress in the sphere of weapons control. But the possibility of global conflicts is minimal — key players compete with each other, but avoid strain of relations.

The deterioration of US-Russian and EU-Russian relations did not come to the new Cold War, but the developed world goes on criticizing Russia’s domestic and foreign policies, its strategy of “energy superpower”.

Russia plays the role of independent centre of power. The basis of Russian international influence is exports of energy resources, military modernization, pragmatic diplomacy based on the country’s national interests. Integration into international institutions (primarily, WTO) has turned profitable for Russia.

Russia managed to achieve these results due to its political course, conserving continuity of economy, domestic and foreign policy. The country’s economic policy determines the key development strategies and investment distribution. Government dominates public-private relations. It controls the energy sector and priority industries — military-political complex, transport.

Government also determines the rules of the game in domestic policies. The system of “sovereign democracy” is dominated by the executive power. Political opposition does not have resources or social support. Society is satisfied with the economic and welfare growth. The federal center almost totally controls the regional developments.

The main priority of the government is rapid modernization of strategic industries of economy, welfare growth and strengthening of Russia’s status in the world. This seems somewhat a chess “gambit”, i.e. limitation of political and economic competition within the country for the sake of strategic modernization of Russia.

Scenario 2: “Fortress Russia” The world in 2020 is very unstable. International law and international organizations are weak. The role of force in international relations becomes decisive. The new arms race has begun. The world sees further proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Russia is actually surrounded by enemies. A curve of ongoing and latent conflicts has formed along its borders. US and EU decided that Russia “is lost”, stopped hoping they can direct Russia’s development and turned back to the policies of Cold War and containment. They make various barriers for the Russia business, tough struggle for energy resources is going on. Oil prices are volatile, which is bad for Russia.

Ukraine and Georgia have joined NATO. American ABMD is deployed close to the Russian borders.

A real union of Russia and Belarus has shaped. Central Asia sees “old” and “new” sparks of civil war. US, EU, China, Iran, Turkey and others try to divide Eurasia south to Russia.

The world witnesses a lot of other conflicts. The old (US, Japan, EU) and new (China, India) centers of economic power struggle for energy and other resources. Centers of global instability have formed in the leftist Latin America, Indonesia and Pakistan. Russia is not actively involved in these conflicts but tries to use them in its interests.

Hostile Western attitude towards Russia has resulted in deflux of capital. Defense budgets have increased. The consumer sector is diminishing, taxes are on the rise. All this has strangled the goals of Russian modernization. But the government retains sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The country must unite to withstand external threats even if it limits individual rights and freedoms.

Russia balances with world’s centers of power, rising like a “fortress” above a dangerous and chaotic ocean.

Scenario 3: “Russian mosaics” By the year 2020 westernized globalization spreads across the world. The leading countries set the economic, technological and sociopolitical standards and all the others aspire to reach them. China, India and such “new giants” as Brazil, SAR, South Korea, Indonesia, Turkey, Thailand and others preserve their national specifics but all in all they also follow the West.

Four Scenarios of Russia’s Development The world economy grows. The oil prices are relatively low due to the new technologies. The international institutions and organizations (stating from the WTO and up to NATO, CE and the OSCE) define the “rules of the game” in the world. The international conflicts are still there, however, they are mostly under control. The “rogue states” and such “non-systemic powers” as international terrorism, Islamic radicalism, drug dealing mafia and international crime are moved to the world periphery.

Russia in this new international system follows the rules it has to accept. It is integrated into the international institutions and has become a member of the western community, although this was achieved not always under advantageous conditions. Russia, however, has become an open country, huge foreign investment and credits flow into the country, the well-being of the active part of the population and regions most participating in the international division of labor raises. Capital and brain drain, however, preserve. Russian regions decentralize and become more sovereign. The regions are more and more autonomous, they define their own development strategies, policies and rules for living. Some, mostly subsidized regions, continue to be dependent on the federal center, others are often supported from abroad. Competition between the regions strengthens. Moscow does not interfere in this process.

The state does not dominate any more — both people and regions are free to live the way they feel is best for them. Corruption and the revenue gap remain, but for the active and the successful ones huge opportunities appeared.

The state sector and the state regulation of the economy are unsubstantial. Some sectors that were nationalized in the first decade of the XXI century (like energy, transport and others) underwent a huge privatization and re-privatization program. Capitals and seaports, regions rich in natural resources, some border adjacent regions advantage from the situation and develop rapidly.

Russia becomes more and more “mosaic-like” and decentralized.

Scenario 4: “The New Dream” Sustained growth in 2020 is ensured mostly by high technologies.

The demand for the energy resources is high, but the oil prices are falling gradually. The gap between the “North” and the “South” remains, but the world community by use of the UN and other international organizations is striving to ensure the sustained development, to soften the inequalities, to settle the conflicts and to preserve peace.

After a successful UN reform the international law is strengthened. The power factor in the international relations is not the defining one.

Russia is a fully participating member of the international community. The UN and not NATO is defining the international “rules of the game”. The conflicts along the Russian borders are more or less settled. However, the influence in this region is split between several actors.

Russia has finally the opportunities to concentrate on the domestic modernization. The falling oil prices made Russia search the intensive ways of development, raise the labour productivity, invest into the high technologies and human resources. “Russian breakthrough” is the motto of the new generation politicians. The new political coalition came to power, the one that does not remember the “Soviet power” and has nothing to do with the corruption and the turmoil of the 1990s. These new power politicians are supported by the majority of the active population.

The state management is carried out according to the existing norms, there is no more “dictatorship of the law”, but the norm of life and not everyone is ready the businessmen are eliminated. For the first time in the Russian history an influential middle class appeared in Russia. However, the gap between the rich and the poor remains. People have to pay for their healthcare, education, habitation, although there is a social insurance and credit systems work properly. Personal success is in your own hands.

To assess desirability and real prospects of the above-mentioned scenarios we’ve organized a full fledged focus-groups examination2. They included both government supporters and opposition

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Anatoly V. Torkunov

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proponents. I don’t want to elaborate much upon techniques of the focus expertise, rather on the results.

In general, overarching perception looks as follows.

The most realistic scenarios are: “The Kremlin Gambit” “Russian mosaics” “Fortress Russia” “New Dream” — seems to be rather unrealistic The most desirable are: “New Dream” “The Kremlin Gambit” “Fortress Russia” “Russian mosaics” — perceived as the least desirable It’s clear that both of scales look simplistic, but 50% of “realistic” and “desirable” are overlapping which makes us, those who were involved in this experiment feel rather safe about Russia’s strategic future.

What we witness today is that Russian President Dmitry Medvedev is trying to bring scenario of a “New Dream” into life. Modernization based on technical innovations and widely associated with success of such projects as Skolkovo is seen as a top priority.

Last summer President of Russia Dmitry Medvedev delivered a speech to Russian ambassadors. The message was clear: the modernization of Russia has an external dimension3, and Russian diplomats are to promote and facilitate the modernization of Russia on the international scene creating a proper global context for its success. In my opinion, this task requires five preconditions4.

First, the mere possibility of military or political confrontation must be viewed as unacceptable. It refers both to the global dimension of the Russian foreign policy and to its regional and subregional policies.

Second, modernization requires political and economic stability on every level of the global system.

Moreover, we do not champion a static stability that implies the preservation of the present status quo with all its drawbacks for the Russian modernization purposes. We stand for a progressive stability and positive dynamics of the world system that will open to Russia new options and opportunities.

Third, the international system must be more transparent and multichannel which would lead to a clearer global negotiation process. Then all the participants and actors of international relations could understand their partners’ interests and goals and be more able to articulate their own ideas.

Fourth, Russia should make best of its economic potential and be more competitive even in such areas of global economy where its presence is rather vague.

Fifth, a certain degree of non-conflict and mutually beneficial consolidation of the post soviet space is required with Russia playing a central role to fulfill all four preconditions mentioned above and to preserve a common cultural space and demographic potential.

Meeting the preconditions mentioned with participation in multilateral institutions is essential to successful modernization of Russia, securing and developing its global role in the new information era or world politics. ________________________________________________ We have taken into serious consideration the precedents of the similar research, conducted both in Russia and abroad. See, for instance, Krasnov M., Satarov G., Fedotov M. 2003. Russia 2015: The Fate of Corruption and the Fate of Russia. / Russia between Yesterday and Tomorrow. Vol.1. Moscow: INDEM. — http://www.anti-corr.ru/indem/2015/Corr2015.htm. Kuzyk B. N., Yakovets Yu. V. 2004. Russia 2050 — The Strategy of Innovative Breakthrough. Moscow: Economy. — http://www.kuzyk.ru/allbooks/index.phtml. Oliker O. Charlick Paley T. 2002. Assessing Russia’s Decline: Trends and Implications for the United States and the U.S. Air Force. Rand: Project Air Force.

Yergin D., Gustafson Th. 1995. Russia 2010: And What It Means for the World. Vintage.

2 Key results of focus-groups discussions in Moscow and in different regions of Russia are presented in the following publications: Melville, Andrei; Timofeev, Ivan. 2020: Russian Alternatives Revisited. // Politea, 2010, #2. Melville, Andrei; Timofeev, Ivan. Russia 2020: Alternative Scenarios and Public Preferences.// Social Sciences, 2009, Vol. 40, No 1.

3 More on international dimension of Russia’s modernization see Торкунов А. В. Внешнеполитическое обеспечение модернизации // По дороге в будущее / А. В. Торкунов; ред.-сост. А. В. Мальгин, А. Л. Чечевишников. — М.: Аспект Пресс, 2010. — С. 11–15.

4 This set of preconditions has been formulated by my MGIMO–University colleague Artem V. Malgin in “Nezavisimaja Gazeta” on 22.06.2010 in his article «Элементы модернизации по выбору» (Modernization a la carte).

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European System: Strategic Performance And New Elements Artem V. Malgin European Performance: Initial Conditions and Basic Elements In the last two decades, the international and political evolution of Europe has been showing a rather stable performance in both intra-regional relations and interaction in the system of international relations in general. Moreover so, the European evolution leads to the adjustment of the very structure of contemporary world system.

This argument may seem to be quite strange amid already common statements about Europe’s stagnation, the crisis in the individual segments of the Euro zone and, finally, the current events in Tunisia, Egypt or Libya Due to a whole range of factors, among which the first and foremost is the ultimate maturity of both the European system in general and most of its regional and subregional elements in particular, the performance of the European political and economic system is to be described as strategic.

The interrelated logic of the various trends of European evolution can be clearly traced from the very beginning of the 1990s, while the adoption of the Paris Charter for a New Europe, for convenience purposes, may be considered as its starting point, which, one must admit, is rather relative. Now it should be mentioned here that the subsequent emphasis on the Charter’s exaggerated humanitarian message has nothing to do with both the further exposition and its real impact on Europe two decades ago. The Charter turned out to be a success. This document summed up all the political notions of that time and became a rather useful symbol thereafter.

The stage of the European evolution, which began two decades ago, has been smoothly absorbing the changes taking place in several extremely important dimensions of Europe’s structure. So, the essence of the performance of the European system lies in the evolution of these dimensions and finally in how their initial characteristics are altered.

The Yalta-Potsdam or the historical and legal dimension — it is within these geographic areas and functional spheres of the greatest localization of the resolutions of the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences that the most significant changes have been taking place in the past two decades. The abandoning of the so-called ‘frontier’ agreements as a result of the German reunification, the breakup of the USSR and Yugoslavia; the dissolution of the already formal phenomenon of the European neutrality related to the early postwar years; the beginning of convergence and later the self-destruction of one of the two socio-economic systems — all this had led to the marginalization of the initial Yalta-Potsdam dimension by the beginning of the 1990s.

On the other hand, the Yalta-Potsdam dimension has introduced at least three elements to the arsenal of the European politics which are still present in it. They are often considered as those values that Russia

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Artem V. Malgin allegedly does not share, although, however surprising it may seem, it was the Russian Federation that made an extensive contribution to those values.

First — the inevitability of punishment of an armed aggressor including that by means of a positive collusion of the most powerful members of the system as well as the non-acceptance of large-scale hostilities in Europe. This is why the bombing of Belgrade and the war in the South Caucasus had such resonance.

Second — the Yalta Conference established the groundwork for the Helsinki Conference and the Helsinki process, of which one of the key elements was the voluntary consent of the former victors, who found themselves in an impasse of bipolar confrontation, to promote the democratization of the European system of multilateral relations. Thus, democracy, to the extent it could go beyond a nationstate, became a characteristic feature of the European system. So the form and quite often the essence of many European institutions are those of representative bodies.

Third — the international legal doctrine of the Yalta-Potsdam agreements and their historic and political logic became the safeguards for the stability of even those borders that were not affected by them directly. This is true, first and foremost, for the state and territorial division of the former Soviet Union as well as the borders between the former proto-sovereign formations that used to be the parts of the USSR. The next background dimension at the time when the Paris Charter was adopted existed in the form of a successful and promising paradigm but faced a far larger variety of rival alternative models and ideas.

The reference, of course, is to Western European (at that point of time) integration which afterwards became one of the core and dominant vectors of the general development of the European continent. In comparison with today’s EU, the previous European Communities of twelve states seem to be nothing but mere geopolitical dwarves.

At the same time these communities turned out to be that very phenomenon which emphasized the special identity of the European system in world economic relations. It is the existence of the EU that gave rise to the phenomenon of center-of-power relations in the Western World, and that of pluralist multi-polarity — in the post-confrontation world.

Not a single integrated entity has so far achieved the political ambitions it set for itself, whereas the goals of the European communities have been achieved in full.

Moreover so, these goals, having been reconsidered and revised within the European Union itself, have expanded beyond their initial geographic and conceptual limits due to both totally European efforts and the generally favorable international context.

The third dimension of the European situation is linked with the U.S. policy in Europe and the Euro-Atlantic relations of which NATO was and still remains, to a certain extent, the core element.

The maturity of the European system combined with the more or less regular displays of opposition by the European partners and yet competitors of the U.S.A.; the extinction of the European theater of operations which was the main arena for potential military confrontation; Europe’s involvement in the new geographic and functional spheres of global politics and economics — all this began to decrease the role of the U.S.A. in Europe. And this tendency became a general rule for the years to come. Of course, the deviations from it in the form of the U.S. ad hoc interference into European affairs (the attempts of Americanization of the elites of small border states, Kosovo, the so-called “colour revolutions”, the BMD) cannot be underestimated. However, hardly can they be compared to that level of highly intense and attentive U.S. guardianship over the European political situation which had been characteristic for several postwar decades in Europe. Without putting the sign of equality between the U.S.A. and NATO, one can say that it was largely because of the changes in the U.S. policy that the loss of clear identity by NATO and the Alliance’s constant search for its place in the contemporary world have become so evident.

Another important dimension of the European system is the one determined by the policy of Russia.

The first conceptual and country priorities as well as tool preferences, which to a certain extent remain in the Russian foreign policy arsenal today, began to take shape in the 1970s. This was so because of

European System: Strategic Performance And New Elements the goals of securing the détente in Europe, participating in the Helsinki Process, romantic attempts to find scenarios for interaction between the European Economic Community (EEC) and the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) as well as reforming the increasingly burdensome relations with the socialist countries. The establishment of a system of fuel-and-energy relations with West European countries, capable of easing political tensions to a certain measure, has played one of the key roles since 1980s, although its significance is still overshadowed by politics. Thus, this specific, though not yet overcome, stance over our role and place in European politics had settled in by the turn of the 1990s.

This specificity lies in the autonomous and self-sufficient nature of Russia’s stance in Europe, of which the influence in the political field can increase or decrease depending on political circumstances. So the possibility (or the illusion) of control over Russia’s involvement in European politics became one of the most significant factors determining the instability of Russian foreign policy in Europe throughout the two decades that followed. Another characteristic feature of this specificity is the sincere urge to shape some universal initiatives which quite often are intercepted by other participants in the system or turn out to be of little use in what concerns their functionality due to either the cumulation of tactical flaws or changes of some domestic preferences.

Without belittling the results achieved by our country in the European system of multilateral relations such as: the active OSCE reorganization; Russia’s entry in the Council of Europe; delineating the framework for the relations with NATO, which does not look very clear but is minimally sufficient; the establishment of multidimensional treaty relations with the EU with a serious conceptual potential and important political opportunities in the future, one can state that Russia lacks in the strategic vision of its place in Europe which should be reinforced with a specific action plan1.

The dimension, which has become one of the most important sources of the European successful performance in the course of the last two decades, is related to the countries of Central, East and SouthEast Europe. In the context of this publication this dimension is the most important and interesting.

Let us focus our attention on the regions of Central and Eastern Europe while localizing and keeping the Balkans events, that have largely been negative and developing for the most part in line with the framework established by endogenous factors in the past two decades, out of our examination.

In the period under review these countries have successfully managed to leave behind their peripheral status within the European system. One has to admit that this process was unique in terms of its speed.

Similar examples of such quick processes can be found only in the Versailles era — or to put more accurately since we are talking about the regions of Central and Eastern Europe — the Versailles-Riga system of international relations.

The course towards the shift in the status quo was and still is the inevitable consequence of the change of the stances of Central and East European countries within the European order. The reorganization and dismantlement of their former political stances in line with this particular direction was conditioned by the actual fact of existence of initially more close ties with their eastern neighbor. All the more so, the USSR, i.e. the former military, political and ideological patron of the Central and East European countries, found itself involved in the process of active regional and institutional development which for some of the USSR successor states was accompanied by the search for international identity.

Landscape of the European Security: Diversity of Tendencies and Attempts to Classify Them The political landscape of contemporary Europe and, moreover so, that of the so-called “Greater” Europe, which geographically includes a portion of Asia, is an extremely complex patchwork. It incorporates various trends as well as gives rise to numerous suggestions concerning their institutional classification.

The well-known initiative concerning the New European Security Architecture became one of such suggestions.

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Artem V. Malgin The necessity to reconfigure the European system of international relations on a regular basis as well as at similar intervals — approximately every ten years — is really paradoxical. The cyclic nature of this phenomenon has been witnessed at least since the beginning of the Common European process: 1973– 1975 — the starting point of the process and the Helsinki Final Act; 1981–1983 — the Madrid Review Conference and confidence-building measures; 1990–1994 — the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, the CFE Treaty, the OSCE institutionalization; 1999 — the Charter for European Security (Istanbul), the socalled “OSCE subcontractors” concept, the adapted CFE Treaty.

It is obvious that whenever the issue of European security is brought up, the first association one comes up with is the homonymic organization — the OSCE. Indeed, one can witness a certain level of intensification of the OSCE activities, including, first and foremost, the Corfu Process and the OSCE Summit in Astana.

There also exists a strategic task which is related to the balance between the OSCE dossiers. Over the last few years, one has been a witness to an eminent change in this balance in favor of the third dossier — humanitarian — which in fact is becoming more and more political and politically loaded. The attempts to resolve the issues comprising the first and the third dossiers crash against the procedural and legal inefficiency of the OSCE as well as the frequent absence of the political will of the leading actors of the European system.

At the same time it is to these dossiers that such matters as conflict settlement, peace-building, the appearance of new state and quasi-state formations in the territories of both former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union are related.

Many issues belonging to the third dossier are related to the problems of economic security in general and energy security in particular. The examination of possibilities of establishing some special energy security agencies within NATO, of which the biggest energy exporters and transit countries are not members, as well as the attempts to discuss these matters in the unclear formats of subregional initiatives with the exclusion of Russia, may seem to be strange when such an organization as the OSCE is around.

In other words, today the OSCE, if there is the will, can turn from an organization forgotten in the course of the last years with its functions de facto curbed into a full-fledged dialogue mechanism for the discussion of the widest range of matters.

Whether we want it or not, it is still the OSCE that provides the most ample opportunities for European and Eurasian participation and cooperation.

In the course of the last two years NATO, which symbolizes the Atlantic dimension of European politics, has been showing ever increasing pragmatism and an inclination towards self-scrutiny in what concerns its extensive development. Both NATO’s New Strategic Concept and the Russia–NATO Summit in Lisbon have added to this statement as well.

Meanwhile the plans for the de facto expansion of NATO’s area of responsibility are restrained by an extremely complicated state of affairs in both Afghanistan and consequently in the whole of the political dimension at the intersection of Central and South Asia. The complexes and prejudices that have been cultivated in the course of decades impede the Atlantic Alliance’s interaction with both Russia and other key regional actors including such institutional organizations as the SCO and the CSTO. The improvement of the general political climate still has little practical value for the relations between Russia and NATO. The obvious, although constantly postponed topics for discussion are the issues of conventional arms and conventional armed forces, BMD-related problems and the coordinated understanding of military and strategic threats as well as the legal framework for resolving issues presenting mutual interest of NATO on the one hand, and post-Soviet security agencies and organizations on the other.

Ultimately these issues include the joint search for a remedy against the regular episodes of rudimentary confrontation, propaganda warfare and irresponsible actions in the territory of the “new” Eurasia.

The logic of the evolution of the European Union and the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty have dramatically changed the stance of the EU in the new security architecture. Even now the EU

European System: Strategic Performance And New Elements activities cover the field of the so-called “soft security” almost in full. The EU actions provoke discussions concerning security in the area of the so-called “shared neighborhood”/the Eastern Partnership project and the general character of relations between the EU and Russia.

Today, when we are approaching the signature of a new agreement between Russia and the EU, one can hope that it is in the relations with the European Union that we will be able to reach a consensus on matters related to the energy aspects of security, civilian displacement and both the security and the transparency of borders. It is already clear that it will be impossible to achieve all of this by a framework agreement alone. However it is such an agreement that can provide us with the required legal framework and, moreover so, the very fact of its signature will add to the favorable political climate.

Perhaps many of our EU colleagues do not see the need to abandon the stability and security system based exclusively on the EU growing foreign policy and defense potential as well as NATO’s traditional resources. However, it should be remembered that the contemporary “Greater” Europe expands beyond the geographic limits of Western Europe. In case some countries not associated with either the EU or NATO for this or that reason, are not satisfied with the parameters of the current situation, it is necessary to look for scenarios of mutual adaptation of interests and institutions.

Not being comprehensive, the European security system becomes a sort of a palliative which tends to provoke political tension when used to resolve the actual issues both in Europe and in neighboring regions — South Asia and the Greater Middle East.

It is in this connection that we face the tasks of a peculiar kind of accumulation and the creation of an “inter-modal” mechanism of the institutions of the Eurasian region that would incorporate both regional and subregional organizations — from the so-called “Greater” CIS to the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation and from the CBSS to the SCO. It is obvious that a full institutional harmonization is still just a dream but a certain revision and coherence of actions can at least reduce the cross-time consumption as well as the expenditures of both diplomatic and financial resources.

The concept of European stability and security traditionally includes the issues of military security, arms and armed forces control. It may seem to many that this problem has already become that of yesterday’s. However, it is common knowledge that an unresolved issue can “detonate” when one least expects it. And this is exactly the case with the CFE Treaty. The state of affairs in this field is really paradoxical. Europe, being the world’s most militarized continent and possessing the most advanced high-tech weapons, has been without any up-to-date military activity regulations for the last 11 years.

And the performance in this field has been far from positive.

The credibility of the Russian stance as well as the additional reinforcement of the European system’s stability can be achieved only by means of a dialogue through those bilateral tracks that can guarantee steadfast mutual understanding. Such tracks include the following traditional axes: Moscow–Paris, Moscow–Berlin, Moscow–Rome. It seems something is beginning to work out the way we see it in the Central and Eastern Europe. Soon another stable dialogue channel Moscow–Warsaw may appear2.

No matter how strange it may seem, but there is a sort of a terra-incognita in the European discussion which adds to a certain ambivalence of Russian political resources. This has to do with the post-Soviet states. It appears that Russia lacks a substantial dialogue on European security with its nearest neighbors.

The intensification of the EU policy in the territories of the Former Soviet Union as well as regular failures of the multilateral Russia-oriented projects puts the countries of the so-called “shared neighborhood” into a situation when they inevitably have to choose between this or that institutional involvement scenario or take part in several of them simultaneously.

Quite often the countries of the so-called “shared neighborhood” have to solve some really difficult tactical dilemmas which are false in their essence.

The examples of this can be found in the Eastern Partnership Project and, what is more important — in its numerous interpretations3.

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Artem V. Malgin In this context, one has to state that the EU and the neighboring countries have definitively ceased considering the Russian foreign policy, which is true in its core but totally unattractive from the point of view of its “rejection of bloc confrontation” and “areas of influence” rhetoric, as one capable of producing such a system vision of the multilateral cooperation in the territory of the former USSR that would satisfy the Europe-oriented attitudes of the majority of the ruling elites in the post-Soviet states.

In this situation there is a need for the coadaptation of Russian and European integration initiatives.

We think that such a coadaptation of the Russian and European policy in the area of their ‘shared neighborhood’ can be achieved through a complex deideologization approach. It should contribute to the development of the first cooperation mechanisms and algorithms with the countries of the ‘shared neighborhood’. The exclusion of the possibility of deterioration of socio-economic conditions following the choice of this or that institutional model as well as the achievement of greater political stability are to be the indispensable requirements for such interaction. The coadaptation is to provide for the transparency of partnership development in the Russia–‘shared neighbors’–EU triangle.

‘New Eastern Europe’: an Operational Hypothesis or an Ideological Myth?

Today many seem to forget that the breakup of the Soviet Union did not result in an immediate change of the political, institutional, international and structural order in Europe. Instead it triggered the origination of a rather amorphous but at the same time relatively stable quasi-region which has been developing for more than a decade.

The Baltic states were subjected to an immediate (although to some extent artificial) inclusion into the European sphere of political interests. These countries could afford to choose this scenario due to their relative compactness, geographic vicinity to the center of European integration, the corresponding sentiments of the active parts of their populations and the contribution of American and European elites to this very course of events.

The other twelve countries in the FSU Eurasian territories proceeding from a different combination of strategic and tactical motives in each particular case established a number of transitional and more stable structures for the multilateral coordination of their interests.

Due to the actual economic and infrastructural unity, humanitarian communion and the similarity of political cultures as well as the foreign policy ambitions of the most influential actor of this region — Russia — a number of elements of integration interaction and close politico-military alliance appeared in the FSU territories and their individual subregions and functional areas.

The most successful examples of such relations are the EurAsEC with its Customs Union as its solid core, the CSTO and the Union State of Russia and Belarus, though stagnating but still maintaining the current status quo.

Even keeping in mind the decrease of the number of members of the so-called ‘Greater’ CIS (Turkmenistan being an associated state, the withdrawal of Georgia), one can state the presence of peculiar mutual preference regimes of multilateral interaction in the former USSR territories. The key value of the intraCIS relations lies in the actually free shift of manpower which adds to the preservation of the humanitarian unity. It is noteworthy that none of their neighbors from other regions enjoy the same freedom of relations in the field of manpower migrations as do the CIS states with their partners in the FSU territories.

At the same time the mid-1990s marked the emergence of the initial ‘geopolitical’ rift in Eurasia.

Due to a big number of actors, ethno-confessional cross-border processes, the specific nature of conflict potential and external threats and challenges the Central Asian subregional model began to develop.

The South Caucasian states have been demonstrating contradictory tendencies towards localization and demand for positive interventionism, both Russian and Western. However there are no grounds to declare the emergence of a new South Caucasian regional subsystem. But it is noteworthy that this geographic area differs drastically from other FSU regions due to the peculiar sustained nature of its conflicts and relatively stable conflict and cooperation trends.

European System: Strategic Performance And New Elements The Eastern European geographic area (including Russia undoubtedly) remains the less structured region among the FSU territories. The reasons for this lie in the actual multi-directional character of the policies of its key actors — Russia and Ukraine — which as well incorporates a hint of certain rivalry and the absence of particular multilateral ‘integration’ initiatives that would be common for all of this area.

The idea of a Common Economic Space which presupposed the participation of Ukraine was a rather incomprehensive and totally unrealized attempt to launch such an initiative. However, few participants, orientation on already existing realities and the stagnating character of the Union State of Russia and Belarus do not let the Common Economic Space become a basis for a larger regional initiative.

At the same time all the Eastern European CIS countries without exception (although the degree of their activity and success varies) position themselves as integral participants in the European political and economic relations and consider the EU their major partner in what concerns the promotion of their European strategies.

In the first decade of their independence the certain although probably just technical synchronism of the development of relations between the EU, Council of Europe and these Eastern European CIS states had been contributing to the strengthening of the common and non-conflict character of the goals of European politics.

As the European and Euro-Atlantic issues were discussed within the countries in question and the creation of minimum economic conditions required for fruitful interaction with both the EU countries and the nearest neighbors from “classical” CEE went on, the priorities, tasks and instruments of the FSU countries related to their cooperation with their European partners were diversifying as well.

It may seem strange, but the goals of the key actors — Russia and Ukraine — did not look and were not contradictory. Russia pursued the goal of the creation of a multi-format common space with the EU, while Ukraine in addition to that strived for the eventual membership in the European Union. The fact that these goals were set in the climate of intense bilateral rivalry, being short of conflict, and with the use of many tactical provocations, which quite often were nothing but pure propaganda, is a different matter.

2002–2003 marked the beginning of the process of conscious conceptualization and applied structuring of the EU policy regarding the FSU countries which had already passed several stages and then was boosted by a number of external factors4.

The EU Enlargement in 2004 and 2007 together with the rise of the pro-Western trends in Russia’s East European neighbor-countries had an impact on the EU policy from the strategic perspective. The displays of these trends varied from the Orange Revolution and the permanent instability of government in Moldova to the thaw in the relations between Brussels and Minsk and the conditional inclusion of Belarus into the Eastern Partnership Project.

It was the Eastern Partnership initiative, which can be characterized as the so-called ‘new European approach’ developed largely by Poland, that became a serious political declaration containing not only the first outlines of a more or less specific political course in what concerned the EU’s eastern neighbors but also offering a brand new paradigm for these relations. The essence of this paradigm lies in the development of an individual system of multilateral relations between partner countries within which the cooperation with the immediate neighbors at the so-called ‘technological’ level is to be carried out via border, regional and infrastructure interaction mechanisms. The strategy of these relations can be eventually regulated by free trade zone and economic space agreements concluded between the EU and its individual partners5.

As one remembers, Russia was mentioned rather superficially in the Eastern Partnership initiative6.

Moreover so, the initiative was made public in the unfavorable circumstances of the Georgia — Ossetia conflict which had just ended. However, this does not exclude a possibility that Russia will join this project which in fact has already been done through the ratification of the regional and border cooperation agreements signed in Stockholm in October 2009 at the Russia–EU summit. Paradoxical it may seem, but the highly delicate question about the alleged deliberately anti-Russian nature of the project has

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Artem V. Malgin

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been removed at the legislative level. Whether we will be able to comprehend the far-reaching strategic consequences of those actions undertaken in the context of that Eastern Partnership project version which was neither initial nor final, is a different matter.

Actually we are witnessing the development of a new phenomenon or probably even a so-called ‘new Eastern Europe’ proto-region. So what are its key elements?

Firstly, it includes the three Eastern European CIS countries. However, the three so-called TransCaucasian ‘eastern’ partners have not been part of this project even in its initial version as they do not comply with its so-called ‘technological’ requirements, i.e. they have no common borders with the EU and consequently have no capacities to implement the majority of projects provided for by the Neighborhood Policy which had been developed with the view of immediate geographic vicinity.

Secondly, it includes the ‘classic’ East European states — Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary as well as Romania in the south and probably Bulgaria. These countries are the direct partners in the implementation of border and infrastructure interaction as well as other forms of practical cooperation. Besides, some of these states are actively involved in the political life of their neighbors. For instance, Poland has done everything it its power to become the recognized leader of the EU eastern policy.

Thirdly, it includes the most peculiar countries of the ‘new Eastern Europe’ region — the Baltic states.

The past decades and, to be more precise, the financial and economic crisis, have shown that the absence of equilibrium in the European and quite often Atlantic policies of these countries had coincided with the unpreparedness of their economies and societies to ‘leave the East behind’ once and for all. However, the last years witnessed the adaptation of the Baltic states’ foreign policy ambitions to their actual diplomatic resources which made them focus on the development of their relations with Eastern Europe and Scandinavia as well as the improvement of cooperation with Russia. Now the Baltic states are ready to follow Poland’s example in sharing a portion of the burden of the co-called ‘EU eastern policy’.

Russia is an element of the ‘new Eastern Europe’ as well.

Russia’s activities in this region coincide with its policy in other big and, perhaps, more important strategic regions. However this does not reduce the significance of the area in question for Russia. All the more so that it opens new opportunities with regard to Russia’s adequate activities at least in both the general EU dimension and that of the Former Soviet Union.

The method of historical analogies allows one perhaps to say that today the so-called ‘new Eastern Europe’ resembles the Versailles–Riga system which had been present in this region from 1921 to approximately 1934. Thus a thorough study of the failed experiments of the 1920–1930s period may provide us with a whole range of valuable lessons.

For how long is the phenomenon (or even the region) of the ‘new Eastern Europe’ is going to stay around? This area has witnessed numerous international forms of its organization — from a polycentric unity in the 15th–16th centuries to an imperial condominium in the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century. It is noteworthy that this region has either been a home for several great powers or become a backward province. ________________________________________________ See more: Artem Malgin/Russia–EU relations within European politics//Louvain-la-Neuve, 2002.

See more, the Russian-Polish Group on difficult matters, publication: Белые пятна — черные пятна: Сложные вопросы в российскопольских отношениях: Научное издание / Под общ. ред. А. В. Торкунова, А. Д. Ротфельда. Отв. ред. А. В. Мальгин, М. М. Наринский. — М.: Аспект Пресс, 2010. — 823 с. The same book can be found in Polish, its English abridged version will appear in late 2011.

3 A try to co-adopt Eastern Partnership and Russia centered multilateral initiatives was made in 2010 by a Group of Russian and Polish experts, see more “Eastern Partnership — A New Momentum for the EU — Russia Relations”/ Polish-Russian Expert Group Report elaborated at the margins of preparatory works aimed at establishment of Centers for Polish-Russian Dialogue and Understanding in Poland and Russia http://mgimo.ru/files2/y11_2010/169939/rus_eu-eng.pdf or a Special Supplement to “Eastern Europe.Prospects”, Moscow, 2011.

4 See more Болгова И. В. Политика ЕС В Закавказье и Центральной Азии. Истоки и становление / И. В. Болгова; Общ. ред. А. В. Мальгина.

— М.: Навона, 2008.

5 See more Шишкина О. В. Внешнеполитические ресурсы России и ЕС на пространстве «общего соседства»: сравнительный анализ ­/­/ Вестник МГИМО–Университета. — 2011. — № 1 (16). — С. 56–61.

6 See more Мальгин А.В. «Восточное партнерство» versus «общее соседство»: динамика и концептуализация постсоветского пространства// Южный фланг СНГ. [Вып. 3]. «Общие соседи» и «восточные партнеры» сквозь призму Каспия / редкол.: М. М. Наринский, А. В. Мальгин, А. Л. Чечевишников. — М. : МГИМО, АС-Траст, 2009. — 76 с.

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European Security Architecture: Russian Context Marina M. Lebedeva Russian Initiatives on European Security In June 2008, during the visit to Berlin, Russia’s President Dmitry Medvedev delivered a speech in which he expressed the need to reform European security. A little later, in July 2008, the idea of a European Security Treaty (EST) was formulated in the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, which states: “The main objective of the Russian foreign policy on the European track is to create a truly open, democratic system of regional collective security and cooperation ensuring the unity of the EuroAtlantic region, from Vancouver to Vladivostok, in such a way as not to allow its new fragmentation and reproduction of bloc-based approaches which still persist in the European architecture that took shape during the Cold War period. This is precisely the essence of the initiative aimed at concluding a European security treaty, the elaboration of which could be launched at a pan-European summit”1.

This question President Dmitry Medvedev also addressed at the meeting in Evian in October 2008 and at the Russia–EU summit at Nice the same year. In late 2009, the draft of this Treaty was published2. Its essence is that the military-political sphere in the Euro-Atlantic region should overcome the legacy of the Cold War by securing an international principle of indivisibility of security that would not allow any state or organization to strengthen its security at the expense of others. The Draft of the Treaty consists of 14 articles which provide for the establishment of mechanisms of interaction, from Vancouver to Vladivostok, and is open for signature by all States and international organizations, EU, OSCE, NATO and the CSTO. Also, Article 9 states: “This Treaty shall not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council for maintaining international peace and security, as well as rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations”.

As noted by T.Yurieva in 2009, “after the Caucasus crisis EST continues to be the key initiative of Russia in Europe”3. This statement is probably true for today.

The first reaction to the initiative of the Treaty on European security was relatively restrained. German Chancellor Angela Merkel reacted immediately and said that the post-Cold War European security architecture should be built on the basis of NATO. Then NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, as well as the representative of the administration of George Bush Jr. Pretty responded rather tough on Russia’s initiative. It was said that there was confusion about the initiative and it was noted that the status quo in the field of European security, which is provided by the EU, NATO and OSCE, is fully satisfying.

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Marina M. Lebedeva At the same time, there were positive reactions to the proposals of Dmitry Medvedev. Among NATO member states, perhaps the most positive response was from France, which is due to both historical relations between Russia and France, and also France’s desire to play a significant role in the international arena4.

There were reactions to the Russian initiative also among the academic community. From Russian publications first come reports prepared by the Institute of Modern Development (INSOR)5 and the group of Russian scholars led by S. Karaganov6, as well as works of some other Russian scholars7.

The question arises. Do we need to change the of European security architecture and, if so, how do we have to do it?

It should be noted that the issue of the new European security architecture is an old one. It appeared immediately after the end of the Cold War. T. V. Yurieva draws attention to the fact, that during the Paris Summit of the CSCE in 1990, members of the two blocs — NATO and the Warsaw Treaty — declared in the Joint Declaration of the twenty-two: Firstly, that they are no longer adversaries; Secondly, that they would build new partnerships and draw each other a hand of friendship.

However, later Europe together with the rest of the world shifted in the direction of the game without rules8.

Changes after the Cold War European continent has really changed dramatically over the past 20 years. First of all, the political map of Europe has changed due to the formation of new states. Partly this occurred peacefully (USSR’s disintegration, the “velvet divorce” of the former Czechoslovakia), in part-armed (i.e. former Yugoslavia).

For some countries of the former Soviet Union that joined the EU, some boundaries have disappeared (with the EU), but new borders (with Russia and other former Soviet states) emerged.

Secondly, there has been NATO enlargement, which Russia perceived quite painfully both from psychological point of view and also in terms of internal political processes. More than 80% of Russians, according to the polls of ROMIR9 evaluated NATO as a hostile organization at the end of 1990’s. Currently, this figure has not changed much. Moreover, Russia is very sensitive not only about NATO’s enlargement, but also about the construction of European security on the basis of NATO, i.e. formation of the NATOcentric architecture of European security, despite the existence of other international organizations and institutions in Europe dealing with security issues. This dissatisfaction is reflected, in particular, in the adopted at the beginning of 2010 Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, in which Article 8 states that the desire of NATO to have global functions is seen as a military threat to Russia10.

Third, after the ends of the Cold War, apart from the emerging new states in the Euro-Atlantic region, the new international organization, in one degree or another related to security, have formed there: the CIS, CSTO and SCO. These organizations have arisen in Eurasia and spread to parts of the former Soviet republics, and under the framework of the SCO China is incorporated also. As the result “border” between NATO and non-NATO-states moved to the east and partly extended to the south.

Finally, fourthly, in connection with the changed and changing situation in Europe Russia is concerned not only by NATO’s enlargement, but by the situation with the CFE Treaty and U.S. plans for missile defense system in Europe as well.

Thus, it is obvious that after the Cold War the realities of the Euro-Atlantic space were changed. Events in August 2008 forced to draw on this issue a special attention. D. Danilov notes that if the West after the events in Georgia regretted about the post-Cold War European security system, Moscow, on the contrary, with even greater strength declared that we need a new system of security11.

The new architecture of security is to be aimed for overcoming “the ridge” between different parts of Europe. This statement is acceptable, perhaps, for everyone. The question is on what basis it should be done.

European Security Architecture: Russian Context

Perception and understanding of security by Russia, the U.S. and the EU An important point which must be taken into account when answering the question of European security architecture, and hence the approaches to the problems of European security is a different understanding of European security in Russia, European Union and in the USA. NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen noted: “We also have to be more realistic in recognising that Russia has security interests which we need to understand and take into account. Many things that NATO Allies may regard as entirely benign can sometimes look very different when seen from Moscow — and vice versa”12.

For Russia security has traditionally been associated to a large degree with the safety from militarystrategic point of view. In many ways it is due to many wars and conflicts in the past directly on the Russian territory, not outside it (in the colonies, far from the metropolis). Soviet understanding of European security requires reducing the probability of war and conflict in Europe13.

Proceeding from this understanding, the Soviet Union formulated practical measures in this area at the summit of Warsaw Treaty Organization in Budapest in 1969.

Important documents on security issues in Europe until the USSR dissolution were: the Stockholm Document on CSBMs (1986), the Vienna Document on CSBMs (1994), the Charter of Paris for a New Europe (1990); The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE, 1990).

In fact, Russia understood under the “European security” the imperative to preserve and strengthen the results of these agreements until the end of 199014.

The situation started to change in the early 2000’s, as a result of NATO expansion, U.S. plans for missile defense in Europe, and crises around the CFE Treaty. Russia’s leadership has recognized that the system of Stockholm, Vienna and Paris agreements of the CSCE comes into question. Europe, in fact, came back in 1960s when the parties had no rules in the military-political sphere15. The idea of the EST, firstly, intends to find the way out of the situation and to establish new rules of the game, secondly, shows constructiveness of Russia’s position.

A different understanding of European security is in the United States, which certainly took and still takes the “special position in the global system”16. In the 1940–1950, U.S. experts meant by “European security” a system of guarantees for the West European allies. In the 1960’s — 1980’s American analysts considered “European security” through the prism of credibility deterrence: to make the Soviet Union believe in the U.S. willingness to use force to defend its NATO allies. Since the late 1980’s in the foreground for Washington it becomes the continuing of its presence in Europe and giving it a new motivation.

Most U.S. research on European security is focused around the theme of modernization of NATO (maintaining its military-technical capacity) and building relations with Russia17.

EU understanding of European security is different. First of all, it should be noted that in Europe the prevailing mood is to reduce military expenditures18. During the Cold War the debates in Europe came over how close should be cooperation with the U.S. on European security issues. After the Cold War, these discussions have continued, but there is another issue for debates: determination of the new threats that could become the basis of identity in the EU on security and defense.

For those threats that are perceived as common by Russia, European countries, and the USA, for example, terrorism, there are differences in the understanding of the phenomenon. Thus, for EU, in accordance with ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World, European Security Strategy’19, terrorism is caused mainly by religious fundamentalism. For Russia terrorism is associated largely with ethnic problems and separatism20.

Some positive changes occurred in the late November 2010 at the Meeting of the NATO–Russia Council in Lisbon. As its results the President of Russia noted that the fight against terrorism, drug trafficking, piracy, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are topics on which Russia has practically no differences with NATO21. The adoption of a new Strategic Concept of NATO in Lisbon, which states the intention of NATO to develop a closer partnership with Russia, has also been welcomed by Russia.

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Marina M. Lebedeva At the same summit, Russia has proposed an integrated missile defense system that would include a national air defense of NATO countries and Russia.

An important positive aspect of the Euro-Atlantic security became START Treaty, which was signed in 2010, and ratified, by the U.S. and Russia in 2011.

Russian proposals on European Security Russian proposals cover issues that are offered for further development in the course of negotiations.

These issues cover problems of “hard security”. These are the indivisibility of security, arms control, and the settlement of regional conflicts in the Euro-Atlantic region.

Russian proposals on European Security assume that European security should be based on the following principles: 1. On the Helsinki Final Act signed at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1975.

2. On principles of “three not”, which were formulated in the speech by President Medvedev in Evian.

The essence of these principles is as follows: a. do not ensure its security at the expense of others; b. do not take actions that could weaken the unity of a common security space; c. do not allow to develop and to expand military alliances harming other parties of the treaty.

3. In addition, there was also noted that no state and no international organization have the exclusive right for providing security in Europe22.

Assessing Russia’s initiatives in the field of European security, NATO Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen said: “I am aware that the OSCE is the primary forum for such a discussion, and I am also aware that President Medvedev’s ideas have not yet turned into concrete proposals. But to the degree that these ideas demonstrate Russian concerns about being marginalized in European security, I believe that a NATO–Russia dialogue could provide real added value. We must all aim for a Euro-Atlantic security architecture in which Russia sees herself reflected”23.

Ignoring the fact of Russian concerns about security in Europe means only to exacerbate the problem and ultimately to jeopardize European security. Similar results will be obtained by policies aimed to exclude Russia from the process of policy making in the field of European security as it is, for example, in the new National Military Strategy of USA. From geographical point of view it sees the area of cooperation with Russia just in Asia. The Strategy says: “As we strengthen our European alliance, we will increase dialogue and military-to-military relations with Russia, building on our successful efforts in strategic arms reduction. We seek to cooperate with Russia on counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation, space, and Ballistic Missile Defense, and welcome it playing a more active role in preserving security and stability in Asia”24.

Finally, it is important that Russia not only expressed its concern about the European security architecture, but also introduced a document which stated its vision of the problems. It gives a basis for further work.

Issues requiring further elaboration

1. The need for the inclusion of European security issues into the broader context of world politics Despite the fact that the Helsinki Final Act, signed by more than 35 years ago, was focused on Europe, its value is clearly beyond the region. It seems that today the global dimension of European security is repeatedly reinforced. But at the same time it should be kept in mind that the problem of European security could not be solved outside the consideration of it in the context of a broader range of issues.

One of the most important aspects lies in the fact that today one can hardly considers the changes in Europe after the Cold War, apart from those transformations that are experiencing the world, starting from the second half of the twentieth century.

European Security Architecture: Russian Context Three major events of the second half of the twentieth century have led to the transformation of political system the world. The first one is related to the collapse of the colonial system. As the result, in a single political system of the world based on the principles of national sovereignty (rooted in the Peace of Westphalia 1648), appeared very different states relatively to the system. Certainly, states in the Westphalian system have never been similar to each other. States varied in size of territory, economic development, political structure, etc. But in the second half of the twentieth century, to all these parameters was added another and the important one — the differences with respect to the political system. In addition, for the first time in its history Westphalian system based on nation-states has become global.

Three types of states began to form and operate within a single political system of the world: a) States focused mainly on the Westphalian international relations. They recognize and uphold the principle of national sovereignty (states of modern or Westphalian states). They are characterized by rather centralized system of government in a limited area, system of law, based on a complex of administrative, police and military structures, which claims a monopoly on the legitimate use of force; b) States that within the integration process have largely redistributed its sovereignty between national, supranational and subnational entities (states of postmodern, or Postwestphalian states). They are characterized by transparency of boundaries between foreign and domestic policies, efforts to build a supranational identity, mutual control; c) States of traditional culture (states of premodern or Prewestphalian states). They build their political and other relations to a large extent on tribal principles. Earlier many of these states were colonies, and alone were not acted on the world stage25.

Today some of Westphalian and Prewestphalian states form a group of “problem states”. It includes, firstly, failed states, in which governmental institutions are destroyed as a result of civil wars or external intervention.

Such states do not have what St. Krasner called “internal sovereignty”26. Being poorly managed, they create a threat to others, becoming a territory, where the terrorist bases are located; drugs are growing, piracy, etc.

Secondly, the “problem states” should be attributed authoritarian states, threatening others, such as the development of its nuclear programs and tough rhetoric.

Finally, the category of “problem” includes the territories, which are generally left out of the world political system. These are the so-called unrecognized or partially recognized states. According to St. Krasner, such states have no “external sovereignty” (or “external sovereignty” is significantly limited)27, although they may be well managed. Despite the fact that the number of such states is not so great (according to various estimates, it is about 30 territorial units), the problem of exclusion them from the international interaction is rather significant. In Europe such states are Kosovo, Transdniestria, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Northern Cyprus.

Thus, there are fundamentally different states in a single political system. And the differences between them are increasing. Directly in Europe, along with predominantly Postwestphalian states (EU countries) there are mainly Westphalian type of state (most non-EU states) and also “problem states”. Different states are guided by different values, creating differences in perception including perception of security, which was discussed above.

The second important event of the second half of the twentieth century is the active entering into the global arena of non-state transnational actors (TNAs): NGOs, TNCs, etc. This fact is indicated in the early 1970’s by R. Keohane and J. Nye, who wrote about the changing of the political system of the world based on the principles of Westphalia. In the past the only actor was a state28.

Later the activity of non-state transnational actors was accompanied by the following shifts: 1. Increasing of the amount of each of non-state TNAs in the world. Thus, there is a sharp increase in the number of international NGOs. According to some assessments there are more than 30 thousand of such NGOs. Even more impressive quantitative parameters are for the development of transnational corporations, which, according to World Bank estimates that today more than 70 thousand. Similar trends are observed for other non-state transnational actors.

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Marina M. Lebedeva 2. Large numbers of people involved in transnational relations, which is also due to an increase of the number of non-state TNAs. 3. The geography of non-state TNAs was expanded. Previously TNAs based in developed countries and spread its activities in developing nations. The situation today is much more complicated. Various transnational actors are based and operate effectively around the world. Also there are strong differences between TNA in different regions.

4. Non-state TNAs covered almost every sphere of activity, including the security sector, which traditionally belongs to a state. As an example, the activities of private military companies (in particular, Blackwater) in conflict zones.

5. Appearing actors which are only becoming transnational. For example, acquires its own shape as TNA ‘global media’, i.e. global oriented media, mainly for English-speaking audience. Among them are such channels as CNN, BBC, Sky News, «Al-Jazeera», Russia Today and others.

6. There is a “hybridization” of actors, i.e. creation different types of partnership between the state and business, NGOs and government, business and NGOs, etc. Today it is becoming difficult to separate of actors in state and non-state.

7. Functions of transnational actors are intersected. Each of the actors, expanding its traditional roles, begins to deal with “not in the business”: for example, the state — business, NGOs — security, etc.

Finally, the third most important aspect that influenced the political development of the world in the second half of the twentieth century became the scientific and technological revolution. As a result of it, weak state or even a small group of people now could strongly damage others. Contemporary world turned out to be dependent not only on the behavior of powerful states, but also on the weak actor.

In 1990s the transformation of the political system of the world went together with the process of collapse of the bipolar system of international relations, i.e. changing the system of interstate interactions. Usually those interstate changes come to the attention of analysts. Being secondary to the transformation of political systems of the world (it is important to emphasize), they nevertheless had a significant impact on European security. V. Baranovskiy noted that the system of international relations was unbalanced after the Cold War29.

For building the European security architecture, these changes mean that: Firstly, security is increasingly shifted to “soft security”, as well as towards less and less predictable threats and challenges that are connected with the growing chaotic trend in the world. Europe is not an exception in this respect; therefore, developing the European security architecture it is necessary to expand perspectives of “soft security”: terrorism, drugs, climate change, migration, and even education (the problem of access to education, the continuity of the educational space, the internationalization of education) etc. These threats are very significant, despite the fact that in Europe “there is a problem with mutual trust and cooperation namely in the field of ‘hard security”30.

It couldn’t be said that Russia today does not notice the threats of “soft security”. For example, National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2020, approved by Russian President in May 2009, indicates the presence of such threats to Russia. Among such threats is called terrorism, xenophobia, demography, threats associated with the uncontrolled and illegal migration, drug trafficking and human trafficking, other forms of transnational organized crime and others31.

Threats of “soft security” were also noted at the meeting of the Russia–NATO Council in Lisbon in November 2010.

Secondly, non-state actors should be wider involved in the European security architecture, although this should be done carefully, keeping in mind the problems that arise here, particularly the negative experience associated with the activities of Blackwater.

It should be noted that the Russian academic discourse rarely draws attention to the need to involve non-state actors to issues of European security. Among the few such works is the Report prepared by S. Karaganov and his colleagues. It points out the possibility to bring businesses into a solution of the European security issues32.

European Security Architecture: Russian Context Thirdly, threats to European security today, perhaps to a greater extent than it was before, do not come only from within Europe but also from other regions, from “problem-states”, and non-state actors form outside of Europe. These threats are becoming more pressing with the development of scientific and technological innovations that allow «compressing» the geographic space and making Europe vulnerable from other parts of the world. One of the most vivid examples here are the events in North Africa in early 2011 (in Tunis, Egypt, Libya), which resulted in a large flow of migrants rushing to Europe, and in instability in the energy sector.

In part, this problem was noted in EU documents. For example, adopted in 2003 «A Secure Europe in a Better World» said that European security is regarded as avoiding external threats and challenges33.

Fourthly, the Helsinki Final Act, which underpins the architecture of European security, was one of the most important steps during the Cold War, and which allowed not only «softening» the confrontation between East and West, but also strengthening and deepening cooperation. Economy created interdependency. As the result through cooperation, especially in the economic sphere, the political and military tensions in Europe were weakened.

It seems that this logic for economic cooperation should be continued further. Moreover, nowadays the economy of Russia and Europe is already largely close. Thus, Russian trade with the EU consists more than 50% of Russia’s total trade with foreign countries34.

2. Regional Issues Undoubtedly, many questions regarding the European security architecture are not clear yet, but the answers are needed for practical steps. T. Yurieva, for example, points to the need to reach agreement on three issues that remain debatable: 1. The borders of Europe, 2. Threats to national security, The mechanisms of security35.

She notes that, although formally the European space is determined “from Vancouver to Vladivostok”, in fact the European space is becoming fragmented. “The boundaries of certain sub-regions extend far beyond geographical Europe. Thus, NATO embraces the North Atlantic and Western Europe, and after the accession of Bulgaria and Romania in 2004 the Alliance entered into the Black Sea region. CSTO spreads its competence on part of Eastern Europe, part of the South Caucasus and parts of Central Asia. The EU, after the enlargement of 2004–2007, is slightly beyond one of the former classical frames of Europe: from Brest (France) to Brest (Belarus), and it has also entered into the Black Sea Region…

Another problem is the “European identity” of Turkey. It is recognized in NATO, but it still is far from being recognized in the EU”36.

In regard to the definition of security threats there was some progress at the Istanbul Summit of OSCE in 1999. The following threats were named in the Charter for European Security: «Conflicts within states as well as conflicts between states»; «Dangers of confrontation and division between States»; «International terrorism, violent extremism, organized crime and drug trafficking»; «Acute economic problems and environmental degradation»; «Instability in areas nearby…, in particular in the Mediterranean area as well as areas in direct proximity to participating States, such as those of Central Asia»37.

The meeting of the NATO–Russia Council in Lisbon in November of 2010 confirmed the convergence of views on many types of threats. In the field of ‘hard security’ the Joint Statement says: “We strongly support the revitalisation and modernisation of the conventional arms control regime in Europe and are ready to continue dialogue on arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation issues of interest to the NRC. We welcome the conclusion of the New START Treaty and look forward to its early ratification and entry into force”38.

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Marina M. Lebedeva And it is very important that sides mentioned threats in the field of ‘soft security’ such as terrorism, piracy and armed robbery at sea39.

However, problems related to the difference in the perception and understanding of these threats remains, as it was mentioned above. Conflicts in Kosovo and South Ossetia have expressed quite clearly these differences.

Finally, security mechanisms also raise questions. What structures should be involved in this process?

Who should be involved in negotiation process?

In the early 1990’s Russia has been a supporter of the hierarchical model of interaction between institutions of European security. According to this scheme, the CSCE / OSCE was assigned the leading role in regional security, that is, above all other multilateral sub-regional structures such as NATO. At the Istanbul OSCE summit, this idea was abandoned in favor of the concept of “mutually reinforcing institutions”, where the OSCE has been given a coordinating role40.

Nowadays, there are three approaches to participants that could generate European security. The first one is declared in the project of EST. It comes from the fact that there should be a broad basis, including NATO, CSTO, OSCE, all states, the EU, with a central UN role. It says: “Acknowledging and supporting the role of the UN Security Council, which bears the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security”41.

A weakness of this approach is that it is involving too many participants. It implies difficulty for making agreements. In addition, this approach does not presuppose the allocation of key actors that would shape the European security.

The second approach is suggested in the Report of Institute of Contemporary Development (INSOR).

It is based on the elaboration of agreements between NATO and the CSTO42. This approach eliminates the problem of multiplicity of participants, but creates others. Firstly, in this case, not all interested actors are involved in the development of the new European security architecture. Secondly, and this seems more important, we have a risk to create a situation of a new bloc confrontation in Europe, namely, the Collective Security Treaty Organization — NATO’s. As S. Karaganov and others noted, “we should keep in mind that “the Euro-Atlantic area, including the former Soviet Union and the “old” West remains divided, though less deeply and less antagonistically than during the Cold War”43. So, it might remind the confrontation of the Warsaw Treaty — NATO during Cold War, with the only difference is that block boundaries are shifted to the east and south.

Thirdly, China has no intention to be strongly involved into security issues.

The third option is to continue building a security system in Europe based on NATO. For Russia, it is unacceptable, because at the level of mass consciousness it means a “surrender position”. This will inevitably lead to an increase of anti-liberal positions inside Russia.

It seems that there is a fourth option. It consists of two stages and it is based on multilateral and multi-level discussions of the development of the new European security architecture, as well as on the principles of gradual and network discussions. What does it mean? In the initial stages of the discussion is open to all stakeholders, including non-governmental actors. This is some kind of “brainstorming”.

The aim for this sage is to name problems and to form an agenda. At the second stage it is not necessarily that all members should participate in all matters of European security discussions. But it is important to link all issues into a single project. An important to consider during discussions: 1) Wide range of issues, including economic and socio-humanitarian once; 2) Issues of “soft security”.

In this approach, both NATO and Russia can be active participants in shaping a new European security system, and as key actors. In general, this approach corresponds to current trends of developing the world, which include multilevel and multilateral discussion on international issues.

Obviously, this option has also minuses. Firstly, it is the organizational complexity, which leads to a prolongation of the negotiation process and to the difficulties for reaching a solution because of large

European Security Architecture: Russian Context number of participants. Secondly, NATO member countries are unlikely to easily give up a NATOcentric security system in Europe.

However, if the sides take each other’s arguments into account and find compromise solutions, it is this way will make the European security more strong. In addition, the participation of non-state actors in decision-making will prevent or at least minimize the trends related with the polarization of Europe from geographic point of view.

Further steps It should be noted that the European security architecture is not limited to the issue of signing EST. The task is much more complicated. “Ensuring security in the Euro-Atlantic region is a multifaceted problem, the approach to which will require a variety of institutional and international legal instruments.

In this regard, it would be useful at the beginning to promote the idea of a broad and multifaceted process of reformatting the European security architecture, whereas the elaboration and conclusion of the Treaty is only part of the process — an important one but just a part. Such approach could help to take a more flexible initial position and could make easier to start the process of negotiations”44. V. Baranovskiy details this idea. He writes that in the “big project” for European security it is important to initiate and promote a set of parallel processes… It is necessary to take on the development of a network of contractual instruments”45.

We need a complex analytical work to form European security, in which a huge role belongs to the academic community. We need multilateral, multilevel and multifaceted talks on various aspects of European security architecture, which are included in the wider context of world politics. Moreover, as noted by S. V. Utkin, the architecture of European security comprises “not only institutions but also a certain type of behavior of participants, certain characteristics of long-term policies”46. ________________________________________________ The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/docs/2008/07/204750.shtml The Draft of the European Security Treaty http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/275 3 Yurieva T. V. God spustya posle kavkazskogo krizisa: nekotorye problem bezopasnosti v Evrope / Vestnik MGIMO (U). — 2009. — # 5 (8). — S. 32–39.

4 Smertina K. Reformirofanie evropeyskoy struktury bezopasnosti: rossiyskoe predlozhenie i evropeiskiy kontekst / Index besopasnosti. — 2010. — N 1 (82). — Tom 16. — S. 49–70.

5 Arkhitektura evroatlanticheskoi bezopasnosti / Pod red. I. Yurgensa, A. Dynkina, V. Baranovskiy. — М., 2009. http://www.riocenter.ru/ files/INSOR_Architecture_of_the_Euro-Atlantic_security.pdf 6 К Souzu Еvropy. Analitichesky doklad rossiyskoi gruppy mezhdunarodnogo disskussionnogo kluba «Valdai» / Pod red. S. Karaganova i dr. — M. a.o., 2010. http://www.karaganov.ru/docs/Karaganov_valdaj_rus.pdf 7 See: Yurieva T. V. Arkhitektura evropeiskoi besopasnosti: retrospektiva i perspektiva. — Doklad na 5-m konvente RAMI. — Voskva, 2009. http://risa.ru/images/stories/%21_Lebedeva.indd.pdf; Utkin S. V. Rossiya i Evropeyskiy Soyuz v menyausheysya arkhitekture bezopasnosti. — M.: IMEMO, 2010; Smertina K. Reformirofanie evropeyskoy struktury bezopasnosti: rossiyskoe predlozhenie i evropeiskiy kontekst / Index besopasnosti. — 2010. — N 1 (82). — Tom 16. — S. 49–70, Parkhalina T. Evropeiskaya bezopasnost: kakoi ona vidintsya segodnya / Evropeiskaya bezopasnost: sobytiya, otsenki, prognozy. — № 1, http://www.inion.ru/product/eurosec/home_es.htm; Арбатова Н.К Zamorozhennye koflikny v kontekste evropeyskoy bezopasnosti / Index bezopasnosti, 2010. — # 3. S. 57–68; Danilov D. Dogovor o evropeyskoy bezopasnosti v kontekste treugolnika EC-SShA-NATO. — Index bezopasnosti, 2010. — # 3. — S. 1–14. Baranovskiy V. Evroatlanticheskoye prostranstvo: vyzovy bezopasnosti i vozmozhnosti sovmestnogo otveta. — IMEMO, 2010; a.o.

8 Yurieva T. V. Arkhitektura evropeiskoi besopasnosti: retrospektiva i perspektiva. — Doklad na 5-m konvente RAMI. — Moskva, 2009. http://risa.ru/images/stories/%21_Lebedeva.indd.pdf 9 Gruppa ROMIR www.romir.ru 10 Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation/ — M., 2010 http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/33.html (in Russian) 11 Danilov D. Dogovor o evropeyskoy bezopasnosti v kontekste treugolnika EC-SShA-NATO. — Index bezopasnosti, 2010. — # 3. — S. 1–14. — S. 2.

12 “NATO and Russia: A New Beginning” Speech by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen at the Carnegie Endowment, Brussels, 18 Sep. 2009 . http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_57640.htm 13 Smertina K. Reformirofanie evropeyskoy struktury bezopasnosti: rossiyskoe predlozhenie i evropeiskiy kontekst / Index besopasnosti. — 2010 N 1 (82). — Tom 16. — S. 49–70.

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid.

16 Baranovskiy V. Evroatlanticheskoye prostranstvo: vyzovy bezopasnosti i vozmozhnosti sovmestnogo otveta. — IMEMO, 2010 17 Smertina K. Reformirofanie evropeyskoy struktury bezopasnosti: rossiyskoe predlozhenie i evropeiskiy kontekst / Index besopasnosti. — 2010. — N 1 (82). — Tom 16. — S. 49–70 18 Baranovskiy V. Evroatlanticheskoye prostranstvo: vyzovy bezopasnosti i vozmozhnosti sovmestnogo otveta. — IMEMO, 2010 19 A Secure Europe in a Better World, European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003. URL: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf 1

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Marina M. Lebedeva 20 Smertina K. Reformirofanie evropeyskoy struktury bezopasnosti: rossiyskoe predlozhenie i evropeiskiy kontekst / Index besopasnosti. — 2010. — N 1 (82). — Tom 16. — S. 49–70 21 http://www.interfax.ru/politics/txt.asp?id=165850 22 Dmitry Mednedev. Vystupleniye na konferentdii po mirovoy politike. Evian, 2008. http://kremlin.ru/transcripts/1659 (in Russian).

23 “NATO and Russia: A New Beginning” Speech by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen at the Carnegie Endowment, Brussels, 18 Sep. 2009 . http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_57640.htm 24 National Military Strategy of the United States of America http://www.jcs.mil/content/files/2011–02/020811084800_2011_NMS__08_FEB_2011.pdf 25 Sørensen G. The Transformation of the State / G. Sørensen // The State: Theories and Issues / C. Hay, M. Lister, D. Marsh (eds.). — Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.

26 Krasner Stephan D. Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy. — Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999.

27 Ibid.

28 Keohane R. O. and Nye J. S. Introduction / Keohane R. O. and Nye J. S.(Eds.) Transnational Relations and World Politics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972.

29 Baranovskiy V. Evroatlanticheskoye prostranstvo: vyzovy bezopasnosti i vozmozhnosti sovmestnogo otveta. — IMEMO, 2010. — S. 10.

30 Danilov D. Dogovor o evropeyskoy bezopasnosti v kontekste treugolnika EC-SShA-NATO. — Index bezopasnosti, 2010. — # 3. — S. 2–3.

31 The National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2020. http://archive.kremlin.ru/text/docs/2009/05/216229.shtml (in Russian).

32 К Souzu Еvropy. Analitichesky doklad rossiyskoi gruppy mezhdunarodnogo disskussionnogo kluba «Valdai» / Pod red. S. Karaganova i dr. — M. a.o., 2010. http://www.karaganov.ru/docs/Karaganov_valdaj_rus.pdf 33 A Secure Europe in a Better World, European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/ cmsUpload/78367.pdf 34 К Souzu Еvropy. Analitichesky doklad rossiyskoi gruppy mezhdunarodnogo disskussionnogo kluba «Valdai» / Pod red. S. Karaganova i dr. — M. a.o., 2010. http://www.karaganov.ru/docs/Karaganov_valdaj_rus.pdf 35 Yurieva T. V. Arkhitektura evropeiskoi besopasnosti: retrospektiva i perspektiva. — Doklad na 5-m konvente RAMI. — Moskva, 2009. http://risa.ru/images/stories/%21_Lebedeva.indd.pdf 36 Yurieva T. V. Arkhitektura evropeiskoi besopasnosti: retrospektiva i perspektiva. — Doklad na 5-m konvente RAMI. — Moskva, 2009. http://risa.ru/images/stories/%21_Lebedeva.indd.pdf 37 Charter for European Security, OSCE, Istanbul, 1999 http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/osce/text/charter_for_european_security.htm 38 Joint Statement at NATO–Russia Council Meeting in Lisbon. November 20, 2010 http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2010/ November/20101120161455su0.8716787.html 39 Ibid.

40 Yurieva T. V. Arkhitektura evropeiskoi besopasnosti: retrospektiva i perspektiva. — Doklad na 5-m konvente RAMI. — Voskva, 2009. http://risa.ru/images/stories/%21_Lebedeva.indd.pdf 41 The Draft of the European Security Treaty http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/275 42 Arkhitektura evroatlanticheskoi bezopasnosti / Pod red. I. Yurgensa, A. Dynkina, V. Baranovskiy. — М., 2009. http://www.riocenter.ru/ files/INSOR_Architecture_of_the_Euro-Atlantic_security.pdf 43 К Souzu Еvropy. Analitichesky doklad rossiyskoi gruppy mezhdunarodnogo disskussionnogo kluba «Valdai» / Pod red. S. Karaganova i dr. — M. a.o., 2010. http://www.karaganov.ru/docs/Karaganov_valdaj_rus.pdf 44 Arkhitektura evroatlanticheskoi bezopasnosti / Pod red. I. Yurgensa, A. Dynkina, V. Baranovskiy. — М., 2009. http://www.riocenter.ru/ files/INSOR_Architecture_of_the_Euro-Atlantic_security.pdf 45 Baranovskiy V. Evroatlanticheskoye prostranstvo: vyzovy bezopasnosti i vozmozhnosti sovmestnogo otveta. — IMEMO, 2010 46 Utkin S. V. Rossiya i Evropeyskiy Soyuz v menyausheysya arkhitekture bezopasnosti. — M.: IMEMO, 2010. — S. 4.

Normative vs pragmatic interest: EU policies in Central Asia Irina V. Bolgova It is primarily Central Asia’s significant potential that makes it attractive for non-regional players. The growing engagement of the parties concerned is associated with the current gap between the amounts of transported and potentially produced hydrocarbons. The widespread view of the reinvigorated EU policies in Central Asia is based first and foremost on the latest initiatives on creating alternative routes for the transportation of Caspian energy to Europe. A more detailed analysis shows that although energy interests are one of the main driving forces of the EU policy in this region, they are not the only factor.

In formulating the strategic framework of the EU activities they come into conflict with a considerable impact of the normative aspect.

Back in 1994 the EU Commission began working on documents which were presented to the European Parliament and the Council in May–June 1995. Separated by several days, two Communications from the Commission were published: ”Relations with Transcaucasian republics — strategy of the European Union”1 and “Relations with Central Asian republics — strategy of the European Union”2. Both documents contained a proposal on forging a “common European position” towards the respective regions. The Commission recommended draft “common positions” on the grounds of the regions’ geopolitical importance to the EU, which has its own interests in the energy sector. In this context it should be stressed that there was identical wording in both draft “common positions”: “to support fair settlement of problems relating to access and transit for export of energy products”. At the same time, it was pointed out that the “common position” did not exclude a bilateral format of the relations.

Partnership and Cooperation Agreements, which had been negotiated on the Council’s initiative since 1992, were proposed as the main instrument.

After analyzing the above-mentioned documents, the Council failed to give any definite reply. As a result, in the “Miscellaneous” section it was decided “to study thoroughly in the near future a number of questions and work out the principles of further relations” between the EU and the states of the respective regions. Addressing the issues concerning the Commission’s Communication on Central Asia, and the adoption of a respective resolution were postponed until 1999. By that time Partnership and Cooperation Agreements had already been signed with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, similar documents were being negotiated with the rest of the region. A report on the situation in Central Asia, prepared for hearings in the European Parliament3, stressed “a catastrophic situation” with human rights and democratisation, which questioned the feasibility of the PCA. The resolution adopted on the basis of that report4, did not mention a “common position” at all.

Moreover, although “the region’s key strategic position and its vast energy potential” were recognised,

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Irina V. Bolgova there was no mention of the widely used wording on enhanced political presence in Central Asia. All political influence, aimed primarily at stabilization and democratization of the region, was to be exercised by backing UN and OSCE conflict resolution initiatives (p. 9); using national influence within NATO’s “Partnership For Peace” programme (p. 10); and discussing regional issues in the Transatlantic dialogue (p. 11).

The events of September 11, 2001 brought the Central Asian region to the forefront of international relations. This helped the EU Commission to form a cohesive vision of Central Asia as a distinct geographical and political region. Relations with it were to be built on the economic principles of the TACIS programme. The remoteness of Central Asia from the EU, the latter’s internal problems related to broadening and deepening integration, the lack among the EU member-states of political interest in the region amid the growing US military and political activism in Central Asia in the fight against terrorism — all these factors a priori prevented the European Union from more active engagement.

A new vision of the region was reflected in Central Asia Strategy Paper5, adopted in 2002 for a four-year term. Despite the existing discrepancy in the levels of development between the region’s states, because of the common regional problems and challenges the Commission found it necessary to use a regional approach. Desire to establish regional cooperation was once again proclaimed as the EU’s main objective in the region6. Regional stability and security, as well as economic development of the region were still considered a priority of the new format cooperation. Therefore, the TACIS programme provided for three areas of activities: strengthening security and conflict prevention; promoting democratic values as a condition for a long-term stability of the region; building a free-market economy as a sine qua non for attracting the inflow of foreign investments and a key to successful economic development7. In this context assistance was to be provided within the framework of regional cooperation and regional support programmes, implemented on a state level.

After the TACIS programme on the whole and the Central Asia Strategy Paper in particular expired in 2007, the region could find itself excluded from the multilateral track of EU foreign policy in the post-Soviet space. Relations with Russia were developing in the framework of “strategic partnership”, the western states of the CIS and the countries of South Caucasus were covered by the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), while relations with the Central Asian states were regulated by obsolete Partnership and Cooperation Agreements. However, Germany, holding the EU rotating presidency in the first half of 2007, met the expectations of the regional players. In November 2006, German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier made an official visit to all five Central Asian countries. It was seen as a clear sign of Germany’s willingness to make efforts both for shaping a region as an entity and for forging a cohesive EU regional policy8. It is also important that since the early 1990s the interests of Germany, which is considered the engine of the EU Central Asia policies, have completely coincided with EU regional goals. As a result, by the end of its presidency Germany put forward a new programme of multilateral cooperation: “EU and Central Asia: the way to new partnership”9, intended for 2007–2013.

The document stresses the EU dependence on the processes which are going on in the region. Extending the scope of EU activities to the South Caucasus, inter alia, by means of the ENP, the “Joint Action Initiative In the Black Sea Region” draws Central Asia closer to the EU. A separate paragraph mentions mutual interests in diversifying energy markets, thus reducing energy security risks. It should be pointed out that in the document the European Union specially insists on the primacy of democratic values and respect for human rights as a necessary condition for cooperation.

Such a dilemma is far from new to the EU, but it is more acute in Central Asia, if anything. What is more important: to remain a leading normative actor in the international arena, using the values-based factor as the main foreign policy instrument10 or seek to ensure pragmatic security interests, primarily in the energy sphere, regardless of the nature of the political regimes which have to be engaged with.

Analyzing the prospects of building energy transportation routes from Central Asia bypassing Russia — today these include the Trans-Caspian and Nabucco pipeline projects — the European analysts

Normative vs pragmatic interest: EU policies in Central Asia identify a new dependence as one of the key problems. As a result of such dependence any further reform incentives in the countries of the region can be diluted. What is even worse, this dependence could facilitate the maintenance of the political regimes like the one in Turkmenistan, which is in stark contrast with the European values11.

The economic expediency of the EU-initiated energy projects has never been the main objective for their authors. The internal monitoring of the existing routes and the on-going analysis of those being designed invariably stressed their shortcomings from the pragmatic viewpoint, particularly emphasising the need to enhance this track of EU activities to ensure regional stability based on the liberal-democratic values taking root.

The first initiative of such economic cooperation (primarily, in the energy sphere) between the European Union and the countries of the region, which became widely known, was the “New Silk Route” programme.

Its technological content, first and foremost, the TRACECA and INOGATE programmes, envisaged reorienting the trade and economic routes and altering the existing “north-south” axis, which was badly received in Russia. At the same time, the initiative was devised and implemented as a structural instrument of managing the existing conflicts and establishing regional cooperation. In 1998 and 2003, the European Commission twice requested an independent expert evaluation of progress in the implementation of the programme. It is important that the evaluations were undertaken as the programme was being implemented, i.e. they were pursuing practical goals and were called upon to help its managers to identify the conditions and consequences of their decisions and actions. Though the evaluations pointed out all the merits of the programme, they were sceptical about the results of its implementation.

The evaluation brief12 drawn up by experts to sum up five years of the programme’s implementation emphasised that the project had been worked out in haste, and in an “atmosphere of the predominance of political goals.” The report acknowledged the leading role of Russia, which still remained a key trading partner for the regional participants in the programme, as well as the special influence of Turkey and Iran, which was often underestimated.

It was reported that Khazakhstan preferred to use the roads going through the territory of Russia, because they were cheaper; overall, since the programme was launched, there had been no significant increase in the trade turnover using the target route (with the exception of Uzbek cotton fibre). The evaluation brief found that ferry transport across the Caspian Sea remained the weakest link of the TRICECA project, because without a smoothly running transportation across the sea the very idea of a single transport corridor from Europe to Asia came under question. In this context, the possibility and feasibility of using the TRICECA routes in combination with the north-south routes was recognised.

The idea was further developed in the Final evaluation report commissioned by the European Commission in 200313. Thus, it noted that the value of Iran’s putative joining the project consisted in the opening of routes to Bandar-Abbas and the Persian Gulf, i.e. the north-south axis rather than the eastwest one.

Experts drew the attention of the EU bureaucrats to the fact that for most of the Central Asian countries TRICECA did not necessarily constitute an attractive prospect of access to the European markets, the only exceptions being cooperation between aluminium plants in Ukraine and Tajikistan and delivering humanitarian aid to northern Afghanistan. Thus, in the region in question the programme is getting increasingly marginalised as compared to the transportation routes through Russia and even Iran. However, the broader goals of the programme (such as the development of regional cooperation) are more actively welcomed.

In was stressed for the nth time that the programme’s original aim, which is still valid, was to enhance the independence of the new states from Russia. Yet, the programme never aimed at excluding Russia from its scope.

The project of transporting gas from Central Asia known as “Nabucco” is not such a large-scale multilateral programme of cooperation as the TRICECA programme considered above. However, in

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Irina V. Bolgova discussing the prospects of its implementation, the European Union once again stresses first and foremost its political component and the implications for the region rather than its economic feasibility for the EU. The planned supplies through Nabucco are to amount to 30 billion cubic metres a year. Given the overall amount of gas consumption by the EU member-countries, which is estimated to exceed 550 billion m3 by the time the system is commissioned and starts functioning, this is insufficient to substantially decrease Europe’s dependence on Russian gas. Remarkably, there is no consensus about Nabucco within the European Commission as well as between the EU member-countries. Thus, Andris Piebalgs, Energy Commissioner, at the initial stage of the discussion of the project, said that “a considerable part of the gas bound for the European market will be coming through the Nabucco pipeline”14. Later, commenting on the likely implications of the implementation of the project for relations between Russia and the EU, he said that "given that in 25 years the EU would need an additional 200–300 billion m3 of gas, at least 7 Nabucco-size pipelines would be necessary to meet these needs15.

Doubts about the Nabucco project's viability, articulated at all levels throughout the whole period of its discussion, are connected with the EU's assessment of its own role as a values-based actor in international relations rather than the project's practical feasibility.

Speeches and analytical articles on the Nabucco project, as well as the new EU Central Asia Strategy, put the main emphasis on the efforts to promote the European governance system, primarily in the energy markets of partner countries. Basic to all the EU initiatives on this track is the idea that development of the energy sector in the Caspian region would enhance European energy security to the utmost when it becomes an inherent part of the efforts to further advance these countries along the road of ensuring appropriate governance, economic development, human rights and stability. But if these changes are neglected, the development of the energy sector per se would do little good16.

Overall, experts examining the Central Asian track of the EU foreign policy answer in the negative the question of whether it is possible for the region to have a substantial impact on the European energy security in the face of recurring anxiety crises concerning Russia. A whole range of reasons account for this, such as the technological challenges in constructing alternative routes of transportation; the insufficient potential of the region for multi-vector energy exports and meeting the growing EU energy needs; an active role that Russia and Gazprom are playing in the energy markets of Central Asia; the unwillingness of, and the impossibility for, the EU to act without taking into account Russia's interests.

However, as has been shown by an examination of various EU energy initiatives in the region, pragmatic interest is not the only factor shaping the EU stand vis-a-vis Central Asia. The European Union sees its fundamental values as universal ones, valid for all societies, states and cultures. The EU self-identification as a leading normative actor in international politics results in the EU awareness of its responsibility for the promotion of the values it is committed to. In the case of Central Asia, the energy diversification factor, though important, is made conditional on the normative factor. In the opinion of its staunchest advocates, the EU' ability to exert beneficial influence on changes in the vitally important regions of Eurasia, first and foremost, in the South Caucasus, Russia, Ukraine and Moldova, directly depends on the EU ability to play an appropriate role in Central Asia17. However, the past experience of the EU foreign policy demonstrates that the effectiveness of the values factor is extremely weak unless it is directly connected with the prospect of EU membership. With regard to the political regimes in Central Asia, the effectiveness of the values-based factor is the less likely the less developed is in the EU external policy actions the institute of political sanctions as the foundation of the political conditionality of economic cooperation. In this respect, the institutional changes resulting from the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty are unlikely to dramatically affect the structure of the EU external action instruments.

Proceeding from the existing contradiction between the pragmatic interests and the normative goals of the EU policies in Central Asia, it can be concluded that this paradoxical balance will remain in the relations between the two actors in the foreseeable future and will make it impossible to achieve more or less tangible breakthroughs in their cooperation that could change the continental balance of power.

Normative vs pragmatic interest: EU policies in Central Asia ________________________________________________ 1 Communication de la Commission au Conseil et au Parlement européen sur «Les relations avec les Républiques transcaucasiennes — stratégie de l'Union européenne», COM(95) 205, Bruxelles, 31.05.1995.

2 Communication de la Commission au Conseil et au Parlement européen sur «Les relations avec les républiques d'Asie centrale — stratégie de l'Union européenne», COM(95) 206, Bruxelles, 9.06.1995.

3 Truscott, P. Report on the Communication from the Commission — «Towards a European Union strategy for relations with the Independent States of Central Asia», A4–0069/99, Brussels, 01.02.1999.

4 European Parliament, Resolution on the Communication from the Commission — «Towards a European Union strategy for relations with the Independent States of Central Asia», (COM(95)0206 — C4–0256/96), Brussels, 19.02.1999.

5 European Commission, Central Asia Strategy Paper 2002–2006, Brussels, 30.10.2002. 56 p.

6 Ibid. P. 7–12.

7 Ibid. P. 17–19.

8 Kempe I. European Neighbourhood Policy and beyond the Priorities of the German Presidency. // International Issues &Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs. — Vol. XVI, #1/2007, p.39.

9 EU and Central Asia: new partnership strategy. October 2007. (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/librairie/PDF/ EU_CtrlAsia_EN-RU.pdf ) It is remarkable that in the English version the title is “EU and Central Asia: the way to new partnership”, i.e. the document contains no clear term “strategy”, there is a term “way” which slightly reduces the pathos of the statements.

10 Cf.: Europeanisation and conflict settlement: specific studies of the European periphery / B.Koppeters, M.Emerson etc. — М.: “All world”, 2005. — 312 p.

11 Energy problems of Central Asia. Crisis group report N°133 Asia , May 24, 2007 . (http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/ central_asia/russian_translations/133_central_asia_s_energy_risks_rus.pdf ) 12 European Commission, Evaluation Unit. Evaluation of the Tacis Interstate TRACECA Programme, June 1998.

13 Evaluation of TACIS Regional TRACECA Programme, Final report, July 2003.

14 Piebalgs A. Nabucco Pipeline — Searching for Alternative Routes for our Gas Supply. Speech at the “Nabucco Energy Ministerial Conference”, Vienna, 26 June 2006. http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/06/413&format=HTML&aged=1&lang uage=EN&guiLanguage=en) 15 Nabucco gas pipeline is approved / BBC , 27.06.06 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/5121394.stm) 16 Energy Problems of Central Asia. Crisis Group Report No133 Asia, May 24, 2007. (http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/ central_asia/russian_translations/133_central_asia_s_energy_risks_rus.pdf 17 Melvin N. The European Union’s Strategic Role in Central Asia // Engaging Central Asia. The European Union new strategy in the heart of Eurasia. / Ed. By Neil J. Melvin — CEPS, 2008. — 196 p.

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Russian Debates On Relations With The United States1 Tatiana A. Shakleina By the end of the Bush administration relations between Russia and the United States were often defined as unsatisfactory and disappointing for both sides, as being in a stalemate, or even in a serious crisis.

Mass media and scholarly papers were full of mutual criticism, however interaction at different levels was going on. There were objective and subjective reasons for such situation. Objective factors that led to misunderstanding and deterioration, were serious changes in international system after bipolar order ended, and in status and policies of both countries. Subjective reasons are related to differences in political thinking, in ideas that determined new political courses, first of all, foreign policies.

In the paper we are not analyzing all the reasons that prevented Russia and the United States to formulate clear and close to reality view of each other’s plans and policies. We shall concentrate on one very important reason of complexities of Russian-American interaction — debates in Russian academic community on issues of world order and role of Russia in its formation, American foreign policy, and Russian-American relations. The hypothesis is that American scholars’ and politicians’ operational code is different from one used by Russian scholars (by the majority): notions and criteria used to describe and analyze Russian foreign policy thinking, interpretations of Russian views on international relations, do not take into account Russia’s certain intellectual autonomy determined by history, tradition, and very complex contemporary stage of development2.

One can say that visible difference in organizational resources between the United States and other great powers, unilateralism and domination of the United States which affected and changed policies of many countries, gave rise to expectations of intellectual subordination (partial or complete) of other countries and their elites to Western (American) theories of contemporary international order. Partially these expectations (or plans) realized but in Russia and many other countries only small section of intellectual elite took American view of world development and accepted subordinated, reactive position in the 21st century. The majority accepted only some ideas and estimations, kept adherence to national political culture, traditions, and produced their own conceptions. This is the case with Russian analysts who study international relations and the United States.

Among reasons why American analysts often fail to give more realistic picture of Russia’s policy and Russian view of the United States and the West, there are the following: 1) Russian “liberals” and “conservatives”, having a number of common general characteristics, however differ in many ways from American “liberals” and “conservatives” due to historic tradition and peculiarities of contemporary stage in the development of the Russian state; 2) Russian political science and international relations studies developed under very strong Western (British and American) influence, are very young and accept a lot

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ith The United States of ideas from Western theories, but Russian IR scholars try to develop Russian school of thought that does not necessarily fully reflect or coincide with foreign (American) theories.

Russian international and American studies scholars: classification One of the mistakes made by Russian studies specialists in the United States, is that they still often divide analysts and politicians using the categories of “Slavophils” and “Westernizers”. This division is obsolete and leads to confusion when we characterize contemporary Russian intellectual and political community. The dominating majority should be analyzed with the categories: “liberal — conservative, and/or “idealist — realist”3. Russian political elite, especially, during late Soviet and post-Soviet years, was formed under the strong influence of foreign thought, as we mentioned above, and analyzes Russia and the rest of the world in generally accepted categories. However, Western theories in Russian practice differ from their practical application in the United States.

We can classify Russian political scientists by analyzing their views on a number of foreign policy issues: world order and world leadership; role of nation state; institutions and norms vs. national sovereignty; global, regional, national in world politics; foreign vs. domestic policy.

In real politics and political discourse we can hardly find “pure” types. Among Russian liberals we can distinguish “liberals-internationalists” (idealists) and “liberals-realists”. Among Russian conservatives, who generally think in realist terms, we can identify “liberal conservatives” or “conservative internationalists” and “traditional conservatives”. The number of “liberals-internationalists” and “traditional conservatives” is not large, and their influence on formation of Russia’s international course is close to zero in 2000s.

“Liberals-realists” also do not have decisive influence in foreign policy decision making though they represent quite visible and strong opinion group in Russian expert community, business community and domestic policy structures.

The most numerous group in international and American studies are “liberal conservatives” or “conservative internationalists” who have decisive influence on foreign policy decision making.

“Traditional conservatives” are not numerous, can be found mostly among politicians, and are not popular or influential in politics and society4.

Russian liberals As we mentioned above, “Russian liberals” are not homogeneous, and there are very few of explicit type. Russian liberals as well as their American colleagues consider values and a human being to be the greatest priority, and while speaking of contemporary Russian development operate within the following paradigm: “values — human being — institutions — state”.

There are not any “crusaders” among Russian liberals because Russia does not have any messianic component in its international policy (like the USSR), does not plan any “crusade” (as compared to views and plans of certain liberal and neoconservative politicians and scholars in the United States who are part of policy planning and ruling elite).

Russian liberals: —— acknowledge unipolar world order as established one, American unchallenged leadership, universality of Western norms and institutions, necessity for Russia to become part of community of “civilized” countries; —— state that in contemporary international system nation states have ceased to be principal actors, and decisive role belongs to non-state actors; —— agree that national sovereignty is not an absolute category in globalizing world; —— consider domestic development the highest priority, and foreign policy as subordinate to domestic demands; —— deny Russia’s great power status and are very critical of Russian foreign and domestic policy in general, and especially after 1999. They claim that Russia, having scarce resources and lagging behind highly

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Tatiana A. Shakleina developed countries, must give up any grand or great power strategy and conduct modest policy aimed at seeking cooperation with the United States and other Western countries. They hope that some day Russia will be part of Western structures (NATO, EU).

Difference between two groups — “liberals-internationalists” and “liberals-realists” is very small. “Liberals-internationalists” — A. Melville, M. Lebedeva, V. Kulagin, V. Baranovski, D. Furman, A. Zagorski and others, concentrate on values (Western values and institutions) and political system that provides democratic development and economic growth, satisfaction of human needs and rights.

“Liberals-realists” — V. Kremenyuk, D. Trenin, S. Karaganov, V. Inozemtsev, V. Nikonov and others, agree with their liberal colleagues on the issues of values and orientation to the West but often use geopolitical categories and realpolitik notions while describing the world and relations between countries. They also pay more attention to foreign policy per se, and not necessarily diminish its role as compared to domestic affairs.

A. Melville, Professor of High School of Economics, is one of the most value oriented scholars (being a philosopher as well as a political scientist). He stated: “Priorities of real but not transcendental Russia are quite simple but important for its citizens: medical care, education, science. They can be fully solved only after Russia gets rid of its imperial burden and concentrate on its internal problems. It has a historic chance to solve problems that were “postponed” because Russia was pursuing a global strategy demanding all resources and lives of its citizens. It needs to finish building its democratic system, restructuring its economic system. The challenge to contemporary Russia they see not in possible loss of its geopolitical status but in failure to build a democratic and prosperous society that will allow finding a new place in the world5.

V. Kulagin, Professor of MGIMO, is also adherent of Russia’s political and economic westernization, critic of Russian foreign policy, especially its policy towards the United States, Russia’s obsession by great power strategy. He stresses the point that Russia should not oppose dominant international trends of globalization and democratization, Western norms and institutions, should accept them and become part of globalizing majority6. He agrees with D. Trenin who wrote in 2000 that if Russia continues putting its stake on greatness of the state (derzhavnost), it will follow its traditional way leading to destruction and degradation. D. Trenin wrote about “unreliable foreign policy of Russia” at the time when Russia started to pursue policy visibly different from 1990s. He warned that to achieve success of reformation of the country, Russia had to give up great part of its political baggage, integrate into Big Europe, learn to play by the rules suggested (or dictated) by stronger players, to become part of international community where the United States play central role, however leaving enough space for maneuver7. Speaking about Russian-American relations he defined them as “constructive asymmetry”: “Refusal to be part of the process of globalization — spread of Western norms of political, economic and societal organization, will lead to marginalization of the country, its turning … into Euro-China”8.

These words were the answer to debates on Russia’s identity (East or West), on democracy in Russia (“sovereign democracy” and “real sovereignty” vs. Western democracy and “divided or restricted” sovereignty), and relations with the West, in particular with the United States9. D. Trenin thinks that to achieve real positive “breakthrough” in relations with the United States, “Russia needs to move forward energetically on the way of domestic reforms and modernization” (rule of law, judicial reform to safeguard private property and to curb bureaucracy), to improve its image in the United States, to become attractive not only for big but also for small foreign business. He stated that only modernization will open doors for Russia into the community of countries who share common values10.

V. Kremenyuk, Deputy Director of the Institute of the USA and Canada Studies, warns that if Russia continues playing a dangerous game of balancing between West and East, opposing the United States who try to organize the international system and solve global problems, it may lose and become part of weak or failed states (marginalized). He stated: “Formation of world society will not stop if Russia continues to hesitate making its choice between West and East. … there are three huge “craters” around

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ith The United States Russia: the West, China and Moslem world. The West is drawing into its orbit Western part of the CIS, and we cannot exclude a possibility that Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Azerbaijan, like the Baltic States, will become part of Western security and economic systems. Moslem world does not have similar attractiveness, but already looks with special interest at Moslem regions of Russia (Northern Caucasus, Tatarstan, and Bashkortostan) as strategically important territories together with Middle Asia and Transcaucasia. Needs of modernization of “Chinese billion” demand access to Russia’s energy and other resources of demographically weak Siberia …”. His conclusion is: if Russia hesitates and continues to play anti-Western or uncertain “unique” and great power politics, its might lose any opportunity to fulfill modernization and become one of the actors of Western world11.

“Liberals-internationalists” and “liberals-realists” agree that Russia is only “geographical East” and civilizationally is the West (though “the Western civilization” rejects Russia as its integral part, and this is quite correct from historic and scientific point of view). Through 1990s and in 2000s they have been supporting this assumption, and are sure that Russia can survive only as part of the West in the long perspective after successful modernization.

So, the message of liberals was and is: to give up some of Russia’s political culture, old great power identity, accept Western rules and values (at least some of them that will make Russia more understandable, predictable and similar to Europe and the U.S.), and new rules of the game in post-modern world. They think that in case Russia accommodates itself with a diminished status in world politics, it will be acknowledged in a very long perspective, together with Europe and America as the third, independent bearing of the enlarged West12.

This idea is very strong, and in 2009, after the Obama administration came to power and there appeared hopes that the United States will change neoconservative course, Russian liberals put forward the idea of “enlarged West” with Russia as the third component of Western system. V. Inozemtsev, Editor-in-Chief of the Journal “Svobodnaya Misl”, wrote that not only Russia should be blamed for remaining an outsider for democratic world, the United States and the West could also be blamed for that, because they could be more decisive and persistent in their efforts and initiatives to incorporate Russia into Western community13.

V. Inozemtsev thinks that establishment of stable world order is possible only on the basis of “enlarged West” which includes Northern America, Australia, New Zealand, European Union, Russia, former Soviet republics (not members of EU) and Latin American countries. He is sure that such unification will be advantageous for all the countries. His opinion is that Western countries might hesitate to create new Pan-American organization as a substitute for NATO, and a new economic organization similar to EU with Russia, Argentina, Mexico, Ukraine and other countries included because of China factor. He puts forward the idea that apprehension that “enlarged West” might cause strong rejection and opposition from China, and it might lead to complexities in international relations. However, V. Inozemtsev and D. Trenin do not think that it is possible, since new Western community will not be seeking any conflict, and any real opposition will be useless.

In 2009 the idea of “constructive asymmetry” got new interpretation in the report prepared by the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy (SVOP). It was said that in new global context Russia and the United States cannot solve key problems of their national strategies without mutual support. This unique situation they defined as “cross” symmetry (“perekrestnaya symmetria”): though there remains general asymmetry in Russian-American relations and power potentials in many spheres, countries can be very useful to each other. The authors think that this mutual need dictates possibility of establishing “big bargain” format of Russian-American relations when agenda should be much bigger than suggested by the Obama administration “resetting” program, which covers only one sphere of coordination and interaction — arms control14.

Russian liberals have always considered Russia as part of the West, and they are trying to persuade Americans and Europeans to accept this axiom, and more actively help Russian liberals to strengthen movement towards the United States and European Union by developing real cooperation in economic,

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Tatiana A. Shakleina security, political, and ideological spheres. V. Nikonov wrote: “… ‘resetting’ button brings program back to some previous condition, to status quo. Were there any status quo in Russian-American relations which we would like to bring back? I doubt that there was one. Computer needs to be seriously upgraded by changing its operational memory. Resetting is not enough”15.

Though liberals’ views have been changing, and they more often spoke of foreign policy and importance of Russia’s international initiatives, they did not become a prevailing group in decision making and influence on public opinion.

Russia’s policy was becoming more pragmatic and decisive, and there were a number of factors that determined such shift: strengthening of criticism of Russia already in the middle of 1990s, bringing back negative image of Russia (already during presidential campaign of 1996), enlargement of NATO and disagreements between countries on security issues, revolutions in CIS countries to a great extent inspired and sponsored by the U.S., accusations of Russia of new imperial plans, big energy very politicized game around and against Russia while it was experiencing economic and social hardships, keeping Russia out of WTO while other very economically weak countries had been accepted, etc.16 Such policy not only spoiled the image of the United States among Russians. It also once more showed that Russia is not viewed in the United States and Europe as a “Western country”, as part of the West, and Russia will have to solve the problem of economic, political and geopolitical recovery relying mostly on its own resources. Russia very reluctantly gave up one-dimensional policy — United States oriented policy — and slowly developed multi-dimensional strategy that was formulated by E. Primakov in 1996, and A. Torkunov and A. Bogaturov in 2009: Russia will work with those countries that are really seeking mutually favorable cooperation. In 2000s Russia started active policy in the East: initiated new agreements, contracts, organizations actions with China, India, Mongolia, Central-Asian countries, Turkey, Iran, Brasilia and other Latin American countries; began new Far-Eastern policy; took steps to be included into Asian-Pacific economic subsystem. The United States were characterized as very important but not the only country that has great importance for Russia.

As Academician A. Torkunov stated, Russia was seeking for stable and friendly relations with the United States, but Russia considers bilateral relations to be important for building up more secure and prosperous world order. Russia will follow this path (of world order construction. — T. Sh.) with the United States when and if possible to cooperate, and when impossible — on its own17.

Russian conservatives Russian liberals and conservatives share many ideas, for instance, necessity of modernization, improvement of political and judicial systems; importance of relations with leading industrial countries of the West, membership in international organizations, and some other. However, there are differences that allow to analyze them as separate groups. All conservatives operate with realist categories, and pay much attention to international context of Russia’s existence. We do not analyze a small group of “traditional conservatives” who are not very much represented in expert community and do not have influence, some of them are still in politics (for instance, A. Dugin, A. Rogozin, G. Zyuganov, L. Ivashev).

The majority are “conservative internationalists” or “liberal conservatives” who acknowledge liberal paradigm “values — individual — institutions — state”, but have different from liberal views on how it should be realized. This group is numerous because from the end of 1990s it unites some of former “liberals-internationalists”, who were disappointed by domestic and foreign policy, and by the course of Russian-American interaction, and those experts who from the very beginning stated that Russia will not be accepted into Western organizations, will not easily get any financial and economic assistance (new Marshall Plan), and will have to solve tasks of national recovery and reformation and modernization in very complex and competitive regional and international environment. This group includes: E. Primakov, E. Batalov, A. Bogaturov, A. Voskressenski, A. Kokoshin, V. Krivokhizha, N. Kosolapov, A. Torkunov, S. Rogov, T. Shakleina, A. Fenenko, V. Pechatnov and others.

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ith The United States “Conservative internationalists” express the following ideas.

On the issue of world order their views differ. Some of them acknowledge that in the 1990s it was unipolar or with “plural unipolarity” (S. Rogov, A. Bogaturov), others always acknowledged only polycentric character of the world (E. Primakov, A. Torkunov, A. Kokoshin, T. Shakleina), E. Batalov wrote about “the world without poles”18. By 2010 practically all of them have stated that the world is multipolar or polycentric, and this structure will be characteristic for the 21st century.

By this time some American and European scholars also acknowledged multipolarity (for instance, R. Haass, R. Kagan, I. Wallerstein, Z. Brzezinski, Ch. Kupchan, P. Khanna)19, though their interpretation of multipolarity is different. According to Russian view, contemporary world structure has more than three centers of power — the United States, European Union, China, or three new empires which will determine world development.

Both Russian and American scholars acknowledge that the United States is the superpower, dominant center in world structure. They differ in the description of centers of power: number, hierarchy, interaction between various centers, perspectives of inter-center relations. Russian scholars think that new world order construction is not America’s prerogative, and Russia, Brazil, India and some other big countries cannot be excluded from the group of countries-participants of world order formation.

—— Special attention is paid to the problem or global leadership. One of the issues is weather the United States is a global leader, and Russia must accept this and follow the leader on its terms. As we mentioned above, Russian liberals recognize the United States as unchallengeable global leader, and denying Russia a great power status, consider it vital for Russia to follow the U.S. Even during the Bush administration second term, when American world regulation policy acquired hegemonic form, they criticized the hegemon but did not doubt the necessity to follow America after change of administration.

The majority of “liberal conservatives” also recognize that the United States is the global leader, and do not accept the idea of obligatory following the superpower on any terms. They attract attention to a new nature of American leadership. A. Bogaturov, Vice-Rector of MGIMO–University, one of principle authors of Russian theory of world order, states that in the middle of the 20th century a serious shift took place: the leader did not try any more to destroy opponents (though traditional forms of defeating opponents — wars, interventions, covert operations, sanctions, etc. were in the arsenal of great powers), but planned its strategy the way that development of a certain country could be slowed down, and growth of its might and potential (economic, military) was under control and restriction. Such policy was “managing” and “manipulating” country’s development in the leader’s interests. This type of leadership, according to Bogaturov’s view, was used by the United States already during the cold war, but more vividly and resolutely after its end20.

In the framework of this concept of “manipulating leadership” American policy toward Russia is seen as very controversial. Declarations made by some American politicians and experts about Russia’s too big and rich territory with very scarce population, its “interference” into life and policy of countries on Russia’s borders; American policy in post-Soviet countries (“orange revolutions), elimination of security agreements, politicized energy policy, etc. are viewed by “liberal conservatives” as actions aimed at reducing opportunities for Russia’s recovery and reinforcement of its regional and global influence.

Another point of view is that one cannot speak about acknowledged American leadership in the world where we have a number of centers of power, and there are countries which do not recognize American absolute authority in shaping new world order and development of other countries. Factor of legitimacy is very important, and not only in rhetoric or emergence of new “precedence norms” initiated by the United States and European Union. The new order needs legalization either in the form of modified old order with changed old norms and institutions (what happened with NATO and OSCE) and added new ones, or as absolutely new order with norms and institutions different from the UN Charter and all other existing principles, agreements and organizations. Various countries express different views on how the

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Tatiana A. Shakleina order should be constructed and function21. There is no consensus on American global leadership being vital to present and future world development. Besides, the borderline between leadership, hegemony and empire is very thin, and all these types of regulation policy have been most vividly revealed in American policy.

Russia does not only stress multipolar character of the world system, but also necessity of collective regulation when the U.S. will have a superpower and very influential status, but other countries will not be obliged to obey everything America suggests, and their opinions and interests will be taken into consideration.

—— “Conservative internationalists” do not think that new world order should be built on Western norms and institutions, stress the importance of regional organizations which can fulfill very important security and economic tasks.

—— “Liberal conservatives” do not deny globalization, openness, interdependency, certain restriction (or division) of sovereignty, but still consider that nation-state and national sovereignty are very important, and in many cases decisive elements and actors in world politics. They point out that non-state and state actors play together, and the outcome of their coexistence in world politics is not absolutely clear (liberals consider that non-state actors already dominate in world politics).

Russian “liberal conservatives” point out that though we cannot deny important role of non-government organizations, strong influence of transnational structures (however not always visible and hard to estimate), and even so called network organizations, these actors are still very dependent on nation states.

They need their political and economic structures, territory and people, they often merge with government structures, and often it is hardly possible to distinguish who is influencing and using whom. Most influential international organizations are still based on state representation, on member-states money. We cannot exclude that in the future balance between state and non-state actors will be changing, but at present we are watching tendency toward strengthening nation-state. European Union model with divided sovereignty is not considered in Russia as an ideal model for other countries22, especially with the example of the United States taking unprecedented steps for safeguarding its national security and rejecting any possibility or attempt to disregard or intrude into its national territory or national interests.

Academician A. Kokoshin wrote: “The main battles in the world are not only for political control over this or that territory, but for “strategic positions” in controlling international financial and informational flows. Principal actors on this field are big banks and financial corporations which often act with open or secret support of nation states”. The message is that we cannot deny nation-states the right to safeguard its sovereignty, however it does not mean that nation states will not be influenced by processes of globalization, interaction, and certain restriction of sovereignty in the system of international and regional organizations23.

Russian “liberal conservatives” attract attention to the fact that tendency toward strengthening national identity is growing due to the United States policy of democratization with forceful methods.

E. Batalov, a well-known Russian philosopher and political scientist, thinks that it is happening because highly developed countries advance and speed up integration at different levels forgetting about human factor in these processes. According to his view, such policy might produce an opposite effect: instead of community of prosperous states we can get an explosive mix24.

“Liberal conservatives” do not consider so called “humanitarian intervention” a legitimate action in its military form, because humanitarian consequences (gumanitarniye posledstviya) are not taken into account and are often ignored. E. Batalov wrote: “If the institution of sanctioned collective humanitarian intervention becomes international norm of the 21st century, it is necessary to think better of its form.

Otherwise, certain groups of people will improve their life by making life of other groups worse”. E. Batalov attracted attention to the fact that while the Iraq operation was being planned, all its military, technical and even economic aspects were analyzed. What was left outside of “the plan of attack” was humanitarian problem which became very serious not only for Iraqi people but also for American people25.

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ith The United States Russian scholars address American colleagues in order to start a serious discussion on issues of great importance for the construction of world order where Russia, the United States and other countries will feel safe and comfortable.

N. Kosolapov, Head of Foreign Policy Department of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, doubtful of effectiveness and legitimacy of American policy of democratization, attracted attention to the fact that “any imposition (even of something positive) is not a democratic act”, which in a long perspective can strengthen (but not weaken) antidemocratic tendencies on a new and more substantial basis: “Democratic missionary” — verbal (propaganda) and practical (military force, intelligence, economic sanctions) advancement of democracy — is a process that can hardly be evaluated. … In case of success it should be praised, but any final estimation of real results can be made not very soon. While “line of verification” has not been reached, democratic missionary policy remains risky”26.

—— “Conservative internationalists” state that Russia’s great power status is a reality, and the country should continue international strategy in accordance with its historic traditions, political culture and attributes of a great power. Great power is defined as a state with independent foreign and domestic policy, traditional attributes — territory, population, natural resources, economic and military potential, intellectual, scientific and informational potential, culture, and organizational resource to exert visible (or domineering) influence on world politics or on politics of certain countries27.

They stress that Russia has complex civilizational nature, and will have relations with different countries in the West and in the East, using pragmatic approach.

This civilizational nature of the Russian state has nothing to do with the issue of “Russia’s special way” or “unique role”. The point is that we cannot ignore the fact that countries are different, and “common nature” of Western countries cannot be the model for the rest of the world, consisting of countries with different cultures, social and political systems, ideologies, and socio-anthropological characteristics of people (“chelovecheskiye kachestva” or so called “national character”). It is a very serious theoretical question, and its ignorance will not permit Russia and the United States to become real complimenting partners in world politics. The same is true of other countries, China in particular, which is very distinguished from other nation states.

One of the points of disagreement is Russia’s political system, and according to American estimations, Russia is departing from democracy of the 1990s (while China is going closer to Western type of democracy). “Liberal conservatives” state that in discussions on democracy and political systems not similar to Western type there is seen strong influence of ideology and history. In the West authoritarian system in contemporary international situation is still defined as an equivalent either to monarchy of past centuries or dictatorships of the 20th century. It is not correct from scholarly point of view, and in the age of globalization, world regulation and management, autocracy can be analyzed as a “form of management” — “hierarchy with determined functions”, combination of centralism of management and decision making and democracy. Only in this combination it gives positive results28.

—— “Liberal conservatives” come to the conclusion that present world is field of competition for resources and influence, so the task is to ensure favorable surroundings and conditions for Russia’s economic development and security.

—— Russian-American relations are viewed as very important, but opinions of America’s international policy and policy toward Russia are rather critical.

Russian criticism of the United States at the academic level should be analyzed with the following idea in mind: the majority of Russian scholars (both classic academics and ones involved at various consulting levels into decision making — direct and indirect) do consider positive interaction with the U.S. as important and very desirable. The difference between liberals and conservatives concerns conditions of Russia’s interaction with the United States and European Union who have common policy for new world order construction.

Russian “liberals” do not make difference between 1990s and 2000s when they speak about trends in international development and Russia’s status in world politics, identity, interests, opportunities, etc.

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Tatiana A. Shakleina “Liberal conservatives” (at least the majority) do pay attention to different situation in international relations in 1990s and 2000s, and to changes of Russia’s status, identity, interests.

Some of them have always acknowledged Russia’s great power status (A. Bogaturov, E. Batalov, A. Kokoshin, N. Kosolapov, V. Krivokhizha, T. Shakleina), others started to write using this category in 2000s (A. Torkunov, S. Rogov, A. Voskressenski, A. Fenenko). Great power status was recognized at the government level as well, and this acknowledgement together with changes in international relations demanded new conceptions of Russia’s foreign policy and terms of Russian-American interaction.

A. Bogaturov wrote that in 1986–1991 relations between the USSR and the U.S. were of “nonconfrontational equal partnership” type, in 1992–1999 Russia was put into position of “junior partner”.

In 2000s though the Bush administration declared Russia to be a partner in anti-terrorist campaign, this cooperative potential had not been realized, and Russia did not get an important status in relations with the United States. However, during 2000s Russia was dramatically changing inside, was also changing estimations of its status in contemporary world and of challenges to its development. “Russia rejected the role of «a weak country», and this is a new factor in international system at the beginning of the 21st century29. This new Russia’s attitude is the source of misunderstanding between Russia and its foreign partners, or even crisis”, — stated A. Bogaturov30. Growth of criticism was caused by this change in Russian political mentality and foreign policy, while European Union and the United States continued to keep Russia in the status of junior and dependant player who is constantly blamed for something.

Changes in experts’ views had impact at the government level. In 2006–2007 there were changes in a number of doctrinal documents. It was declared that “Russia must take the responsibility for global and social-economic development according to its status and potential”31. Russian analysts concluded that Russia got “the first global doctrine of the Russian Federation”32. They paid attention to five main points of the new doctrine that manifested dramatic shift in Russia’s estimation of its role in world politics: —— Russia is against any kind of confrontation, and will not participate in any kind of “Holy alliances”.

Russia is for civilizational dialogues without any ideology.

—— Russia will conduct policy of diversification that will allow using most favorable methods, mechanisms, trends, actors, campaigns, markets, etc. to achieve success and economic profit for the country.

—— Russia acknowledges globalization in its positive and negative dimensions. It understands that globalization accelerates more even distribution of resources in the world, and formation of a multipolar order.

—— Russia admits that nature and sources of threats to Russia’s security changed since 1990s, when the main threat was of internal character (stability of the federation and economics). In 2000s threats are of external character caused by growth of conflicts, proliferation, uncontrolled arms race, interference into internal affairs of countries, imposition of political systems and culture, ignorance of international norms, etc.

—— Russia will be more active in formulating global agenda and in its implementation. It can be achieved only by collective leadership of leading world powers (multilateral diplomacy).

A.Torkunov wrote: “In the process of globalization tendency toward achieving certain similarity must be reasonably balanced by tendency toward mutual tolerance — first of all, in understanding freedom of an individual or a nation. In foreign policy Russia tries to have constructive relations with highly developed Western countries, but it is free to maneuver and establish relations with other countries as well. This freedom of choice is determined by Russia’s identity of a democratic country with deep historic traditions of strong state sovereignty, and by objective drive for regional leadership”33.

The new Obama administration declared “reset” approach to bilateral relations, but it is still not quite clear what are the contents of relations between the countries. In Russia debates continue, and “liberal conservatives” express their dissatisfaction with the agenda. They say that Russia is not interested in any new confrontation with the West, but it cannot stand systematic attempts of the U.S. and NATO

Russian Debates On Relations W

ith The United States to establish absolute superiority over Russia, to deprive it of having independent policy not only in the military sphere, but also in economic sphere. Some analysts attract attention to the fact that many regional powers are already trying to keep out non-regional players from settlement of regional problems and conflicts. The United States is a non-regional actor for Eurasia, but they try to interfere everywhere and make NATO a global security organization34. S. Rogov, Director of the Institute of the USA and Canada Studies, also mentions that it is not in Obama’s interests to antagonize Russia because the United States are interested in Russia’s support to solve a number of international security problems. He states that the United States cannot ignore Russian interests because it will not make one-sided concessions.

Improvement of bilateral relations is street with two-way movement35.

Present stage of relations is defined as “peaceful separation”, as compared to “opposition on the verge of conflict” during the Bush administration. N. Kosolapov writes that very often American policy toward Russia gives the impression that there is systemic and civilizational incompatibility between Russian and American cultures and mentality, and the Russian state is not accepted by America in any form. He wrote that by 2008 Russia and the United States came very close to the possibility of serious conflict (even military). He refers to the events of August 2008 in the Caucasus when American military forces were indirectly used against Russia (in the form of assistance to Georgia), and there were no similar situations during the cold war between the U.S. and the USSR36.

Some “liberals-realists” agree with “liberal conservatives” that dilemmas of Russian-American relations cannot be solved with the old approach: “Russia must change radically to correspond to American standards and demands, and only then it will be suitable for cooperation to solve international problems”. V. Kremenyuk states that differences between the countries are not incompatible: both countries believe that democratic system is the optimal political system (there is no dictatorship in Russia), and market economy is an appropriate economic system. He believes that in contemporary world Russia and the United States depend on each other and can cooperate in many spheres of world politics. However they cannot realize their plans and safeguard their interests only in bilateral format, they will act in multilateral context. For Russia relations with the European Union, China, India, will be of great importance37.

Conclusion Analysis shows that both liberal and conservative political scientists agree that Russian-American relations cannot continue on the basis of principles either of “junior partner” or “world without Russia”.

Russia is ready for serious dialogue on world and bilateral issues, it does not conceal that its economic development depends very much on cooperation with most developed countries, it does not deny that security dilemmas in Eurasia can be solved collectively with the U.S. participation. However Russia views present situation of “peaceful separation” with the United States as a transition period, period of mutual adaptation to each other and to new international situation which requires strong and unprejudiced relations38. ________________________________________________ Paper was prepared for the 51st Annual Convention of International Studies Association, 17–21 February 2010, New Orleans Russian IR school of thought to a very great extent developed under the influence of Western theories and is very young as compared to British and American schools. We never deny that. However, Russian IR scholars try to say their own word in analyzing and describing contemporary world and world history. Some of them, for instance, A. Bogaturov, M. Khrustalev, N. Kosolapov, and A. Voskressenski developed their own analytical apparatus and suggest their own conceptions and views of international relations and foreign policies of various countries, first of all, Russia, the United States, China and other states. They assume that their may be different approaches to world order structure and ways of its construction, and the result should be the product of collective interaction.

3 Those who “dream” of monarchist empire or “new USSR” are very few, do not make any practical steps and have no support in the society.

4 Among “traditional conservatives” we can mention G. Zyuganov, A. Dugin, S. Kurginian, M. Delyagin; V. Zhirinovski and A. Prokhanov are “hawks” in this group, and often are not characterized as “traditional conservatives”.

5 Melville A. Demokraticheskiye Tranziti (Democratic Transits). M., 1999; idem. Liberal Foreign Policy Alternative for Russia? // Otkrytaya Politika. 1998. No. 6. P. 84–85.

6 Kulagin V. Mir i Zapad v Rossiiskoy Politologii (The World and the West in Russian Political Science) // Mezhdunarodniye Protcessi. Vol. 4. No. 3 (September–December 2006). P. 97–105. / http://www.intertrends.ru 1

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Trenin D. Tretiy Vozrast (The Third Age) // Pro et Contra. Vol. 5. No. 2 (Spring 2000). P. 17.

Trenin D. Integration and Identity. Russia as a «New West». M, 2006. P. 12.

9 On this topic, see, for instance, the author’s paper presented at the 47th ISA Annual Convention, San Diego, 2006: T. Shakleina. Russia Between East and West / http://www.isanet.org 10 Trenin D. Why America and Russia Need Each Other // Pro et Contra. No 2 (March–April 2007). P. 16–17.

11 Kremenyuk V. Rossia Vne Mirivogo Obschestva (Russia Outside World Society) // Mezhdunarodniye Protcessi. Vol. 4. No. 3 (September– December 2006). P. 52–61 / http://www.intertrends.ru 12 Trenin D. Identichnost i Integratsia: Rossia i Zapad v 21 veke (Identity and Integration: Russia and the West in the 21st Century) // Pro et Contra. Vol. 8. No. 3. 2004. P. 9–22.

13 Inozemtsev V. Konturi Postkrizisnogo Mira (Contour of the World after the Crisis) // Russia in Global Politics. No. 3 (May–June 2009) / http://www.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/38/11949.html/ последнее посещение 27.08.2009 14 Perenastroika a ne Perezagruzka (Retuning but not “Resetting”). Ed. by S. Karaganov. SVOP — RIA-Novosty // Russia in Global Affairs.

No. 4 (July–August 2009 / http://www.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/39/12356.html 15 Nikonov V. Obama Udivil (Obama surprised) // Russia in Global Affairs. No. 4 (July–August 2009) / http://www.globalaffairs.ru/articles/12021.html 16 See, for instance: T. Shakleina. Russian-American Relations in Retrospect. Paper presented at the 49th ISA Annual Convention. San Francisco, 2008 17 Torkunov A. Slovo i Delo v Otnosheniyakh SSHA s Rossiey (Word and Deed in Relations Between the U.S. and Russia) // Izvestia.

31 March, 2009 / http://www.izvestia.ru/comment/article3126869/index.html 18 The debates on the issue of world order are described in the monograph: Shakleina T. Russia and the United States in New World Order. M., 2002 / http://www.obraforum.ru 19 Kagan R. The Return of History. The Los Angeles Times, 2007, 5 August / http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications; Khanna P. The Second World. How Emerging Powers Are Redefining Global Competition in the Twenty-First Century. New York: Random House, 2009; Haass R. The Age of Nonpolarity. What Will Follow U.S. Dominance. Foreign Affairs. 2008, May/June. /http://www.foreignaffairs. org/20080501faessay87304; Brzezinski Zb. and Scowcroft B. America and the World. Conversations of the Future of American Foreign Policy. N.Y., 2008; Layne Ch. The Peace of Illusions. American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present. Ithaca, 2006.

20 Bogaturov A. Liderstvo i Decentralizatsia v Mezhdunarodnoy Sisteme (Leadership and Decentralization in International System) // International Trends. Vol.4. No. 3 (September–December 2006). P. 5–15 / http://www.intertrends.ru 21 Shakleina T. Status Quo Kak Oppozitsia Miroporyadku (Status Quo as an Opposition to World Order) // International Trends. Vol. 4. No. 1 (January–April 2006). P. 104–110 http://www.intertrends.ru; idem “Poriadok Posle Gruzii” ili “Poriadok pri Obame”? (“World Order after Georgia” or “World Order with Obama Administration”?) // International Trends. Vol. 6. No.3 (September–December 2008). P. 4–14 / http:// www.intertrends.ru; idem. Kriticheskoye Napravleniye Issledovanii Miroporiadka v SSHA (World Order as a Research Problem in the U.S.: Critical Views // International Trends. Vol. 5. No.3 (September–December 2007). P. 66–75 / http://www.intertrends.ru 22 Baykov A. “Integratsionniye Marshruti” Zapadno-Tsentralnoy Evropi i Vostochnoy Azii (“Integrationist Trends” in Western-Central Europe and Eastern Asia) // International Trends. Vol. 5. No.3 (September–December 2007). P. 4–17 / http://www.intertrends.ru 23 Kokoshin A. Realniy Suverenitet (Real Sovereignty). M., 2006. P. 14, 44.

24 Batalov E. Anthropology of International Relations // International Trends. Vol. 3. No.2 (May–August 2005). P. 12 / http://www.intertrends.ru 25 Batalov E. Anthropology of international Relations // International Trends. Vol. 3. No.2 (May–August 2005). P. 4–16 / http://www.intertrends.ru 26 Kosolapov N. Svoboda i Nesvoboda v Globalnom Miroporiadke (Freedom and Lack of Freedom in Global World Order // International Trends. Vol. 2. No. 3 (September–December 2004). P. 12 / http://www.intertrends.ru 27 Shakleina T. Russia and the United States in Politics of the 21st Century. M., 2010.

28 Kosolapov N. Svoboda I Nesvoboda v Globalnom Miroporiadke (Freedom and Lack of Freedom in Global World Order // International Trends. Vol. 2. No. 3 (September–December 2004). P. 16 / http://www.intertrends.ru 29 This new “factor” was noticed by American scholars as well. See, for instance: Kuchins A. Russia Is Back in the Game // The Wall Street Journal. May 2006.

30 Bogaturov A. Liderstvo i Decentralizatsia v Mezhdunarodnoy Sisteme (Leadership and Decentralization in International System) // International Trends. Vol.4. No. 3 (September–December 2006). P. 6–7 / http://www.intertrends.ru 31 President Putin. Speech at the meeting with Ambassadors and Permanent Representatives of the Russian Federation. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. June 27, 2006 / www.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2006/06/107802/html; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Review of Foreign Policy. 28 March, 2007 / www.mid.ru/brp_4nsf/sps/3647dA97748A106BC32572AB002AC4 DD 32 Bogaturov A. Three Generations of Foreign Policy Doctrines // International Trends. Vol. 5. № 1 (January/April 2007). P. 54–69 / www. intertrends.ru 33 Torkunov A. Rossiiskaya Model Demokratii i Sovremennoye Globalnoye Upravlenie (Russian Model of Democracy and Contemporary Global Governance) // International Trends. Vol. 4. № 1 (January/April 2006). P. 28–29 / www.intertrends.ru 34 Bogaturov A. Khochesh Otkritoy Systemi — Stroy Zakritiy Blok? (In Case One Wants an Open System — Build up a Closed Bloc?) // Nezavisimaya Gazeta — Dipcourier. 15.06.09 / http://www.ng.ru 35 Rogov S. “Perezagruzka” v Otnosheniykh Mezhdu Rossiey i SSHA Prodolzhaetsa (“Reset” in Relations Between Russia and the U.S. Continues) // NG — NVO. 25.09.2009 / http://www.ng.ru 36 Kosolapov N. Porogoviy Uroven i Veroyatnost Konflikta SSHA s Rossiey (Possibility of Conflict between the U.S. and Russia) // International Trends. Vol. 6. № 3 (September–December 2008). P. 22–24 / www.intertrends.ru 37 Kremenyuk V. Rossia i SSHA: Vremya Ispitaniy (Russia and the U.S.: Time of Trial) // Rossia i SSHA v XXI Veke. Electronic Journal. № 3, 2007 // http://www.rusus.ru 38 See: Discussion in the Journal “Mezhdunarodniye Protcessi”: Political Democracy and World State. Megatrends. Vol. 7. No. 3 (September–December 2009). Articles by V. Kremenyuk, A. Torkunov, A. Bogaturov, I. Wallerstein, T. de Montbrial, F. Zakaria, C. Calhoun, I. Shapiro, J. Naisbitt.

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US Global Strategy in Application to CIS Mikhail A. Troitsky Over the past two decades, US approach to relations with Russia’s neighbors has undergone considerable changes. In the early and mid-1990s, Washington was driven by a desire to promote political and economic reforms in those states and by an aspiration to establish them in international affairs as independent actors whose sovereignty would not be challenged by Moscow. That policy of ‘geopolitical pluralism’ was dictated by interests related solely to the CIS countries, including Russia. The situation had changed by the late 1990s when US policy motives in Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus and Central Asia turned ‘continental’, Eurasian. US interests extended to include the construction of pipelines between the CIS countries and other Eurasian states as well as the use of some CIS member states’ potential to counter the Taliban in Afghanistan or contain Iran. In that period, the US became also interested in resolving post-Soviet self-identification conflicts and stepped up its mediation efforts.

By the late 2000s, the interests Washington was guided by in its policies toward the CIS countries had become truly global. American strategists made partnerships with Russia and its neighbors contingent on their reaction to China’s growing influence, support for global nonproliferation and arms control regimes, fight against transnational religious extremism and the development of an interstate cooperation model in the Arctic.

In light of the situation in the early 2010s, it would be methodologically and substantively unwarranted to analyze US policy toward individual countries or CIS regional segments in isolation from the global environment surrounding those countries and regions. It would be even less productive to single out certain developments in US relations with individual neighbors of Russia in an attempt to identify a unique logic underlying the evolution of each bilateral relationship. Even cooperation with Russia does not appear to be an end in itself for US foreign policy; that is why the US approach to relations with the CIS countries, too, is increasingly less dependent on Washington’s strategies toward Russia.

Transformation of American Approach From the early 1990s, in its relations with each of the three CIS segments (Eastern European, South Caucasus and Central Asian) the US was guided by a specific dominant interest. For instance, Washington was eager to assist Ukraine and Moldova in their nation building efforts aimed above all at strengthening national identity and sovereignty. In the South Caucasus, the US was interested in Azerbaijan’s oil and gas resources and opportunities to participate in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution and conduct an exemplary democratization campaign in Georgia. Finally, in Central Asia one could discern signs of religious extremism fuelled by the civil war in Afghanistan since the mid-1990s.

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Mikhail A. Troitsky In the mid-2000s in the context of the transition to ‘transcontinental’ motives of its policy toward the CIS, Washington carried out an administrative separation of the Central Asian sub-region of the CIS from those located in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus. In 2005 US relations with Central Asian states were transferred to the purview of the US Department of State Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, while the South Caucasus along with other European states (including Russia) remained within the competence of the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs. The Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs also dealt with US relations with India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri-Lanka and the Maldives. Each US Department of State bureau is headed by an assistant secretary.

Assistant secretaries in charge of geographic bureaus and offices are responsible to the Under Secretary for Political Affairs.

Bringing together issues related to South and Central Asia policies under a single bureau reflected the US official approach to effective ways of regionalization in South and Central Eurasia. A number of influential American pundits put forward a proposal to that effect in the mid-2000s1. The Department of State saw improved relations of the five Central Asian CIS countries with India, Pakistan and Afghanistan as a catalyst for their economic development. Accordingly, Washington planned to facilitate the removal of trade and other barriers between the states that the Department of State transferred to the purview of the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs. In the Central Asian states themselves (above all in Kazakhstan, the most economically developed country), the Department of State reorganization was initially taken as an indicator of a lower significance attached to the interaction with those states in the US foreign policy priorities. Kazakhstan, which sought to establish itself as a Eurasian (i.e. European as well as Asian) state and chaired the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in 2010, was disappointed at that turnabout in US foreign policy priorities in the region and, more importantly, at US proposals relating to region building, whereby Astana was to liberalize trade and the movement of persons regime first of all with its southern neighbors rather than Russia or China that enjoyed a far more intensive cooperation with Kazakhstan.

Despite that administrative reorganization of the mid-2000s, the seemingly disparate problems emerging along the southern rim of Eurasia were gradually melding into a multidimensional threat posed by a mixture of religious extremism and the spread of dangerous military technologies, above all weapons of mass destruction. The threat was relevant even for EU countries, which in the 2000s began to cause Washington’s distress due to the swathes of their populations of Middle Eastern origin, susceptible to Islamic radicalization while enjoying a visa free entry into the US2. In 2010 the danger of terror attacks in Western European countries themselves prompted the US Department of State to issue warnings to US nationals about risks involved in travel to Western Europe. Had this signal from the US authorities been repeated more than once, it could have taken its toll on trans-Atlantic business and social relations.

US policies in the CIS were also affected by Washington’s approach to Turkey, which in the late 2000s stepped up its activities in the international arena seeking, in particular, to secure a role of a mediator in the resolution of conflicts in the Near and Middle East and in the South Caucasus. At the same time, given the growing tensions between local populations and Muslim ethnic minorities, a serious consideration of Turkey’s accession to the EU is obviously put off indefinitely. In this situation, preserving Turkey’s links with the West both through NATO and bilateral ties between Washington and Ankara became a key objective for the US. It is definitely taken into account when the US develops its approach to the settlement of the Nagornо-Karabakh conflict or supports the development of certain oil and gas transportation routes from the Caspian basin to global markets.

The US policy toward the South Caucasus in the 2000s made allowance not only for the Turkish factor but also — and to a greater extent — for the Iranian problem. For American policymakers, Turkey, Iran and the South Caucasus made up a single set of tasks for Washington to address. Afghanistan, Pakistan and later India were an eastward extension thereof. China is also linked to this Near-Middle East and South Caucasus subsystem, both through Central Asia and Iran, which supply China with energy re-

US Global Strategy in Application to CIS sources, and through Afghanistan, where Beijing seeks to present itself as a progressive developing state by rendering assistance in infrastructure projects.

In the early 2010s, all these circumstances make the US pursue approaches to Eastern European, South Caucasus and Central Asian CIS member states that take into account virtually all pivotal avenues of Washington’s foreign policy, including weapons of mass destruction non-proliferation, prevention of regional conflicts, fight against Islamic extremism and assessment of China’s foreign policy intentions.

At a time when other centers of power show a rapid relative growth of influence, which is recognized by leading US politicians and experts3, Washington appears to be unable to afford to pursue tailor-made, specialized strategies toward geopolitically important areas of the world, such as, for example, Central Asia, let alone less important areas. The US strives to develop a clear-cut system of foreign policy and security policy priorities. At the same time, the George W. Bush administration, while recognizing the existence of such global issues as non-proliferation and religious extremism, sought regional solutions to them (democratizing Middle Eastern states, eradicating extremists in Afghanistan or building coalitions in Eastern and South-Eastern Asia to contain China). Under President Obama, Washington chooses to seek global multilateral responses to global issues.

Judging by the National Security Strategy of the United States of America released in May 20104, the Obama administration differentiates between the states essential for the attainment of major foreign policy goals and countries which, though important for the US, can only indirectly help it implement its foreign policy agenda. The latter include, for example, Central and Eastern European states, whose foreign policy ambitions must be respected if the US wants to confirm the solidarity of NATO as an alliance and to demonstrate military political support to liberal democracies. But Russia has been ranked as a state whose cooperation can directly assist the US in addressing its security issues. Moscow provides support to Washington in tackling the global issues of arms control and nonproliferation; it is also helpful at the regional level in Afghanistan and stands ready to coordinate its policies toward Iran and discuss China’s future role in global politics.

What was important about the transformation of the US approach to the CIS countries under Obama was that democratization, which was viewed by the Bush administration above all as a tactic aimed at eroding and changing authoritarian regimes, was supplanted with an assertive and yet reserved approach based on a patient waiting strategy.

Thus while analyzing US policies on the CIS space it is methodologically useless to look for specific motives and goals pursued by Washington with regard to individual states or even small groups of states. For instance, the US approach toward Russia has been overhauled since 2009 precisely because the White House decided to bring its relations with Moscow in line with the key global priorities of US foreign policy. (Consequently the form and substance of Russian-American relations can change if the global goals and style of US policy are reviewed). Analysts seeking to explain and predict how US policies in the CIS will develop should first of all ask themselves a question: what US global policy objectives does Washington’s approach to Russia’s neighbors reflect?

Factors Shaping US Policies and Future Scenarios in CIS Currently, US policies in the CIS are shaped by such elements of Washington’s global strategy as the projected reduction of US involvement in the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, curtailment of Russia’s influence in its neighboring countries, strengthening of US energy security and development of the US alliance system in Eurasia. How US activities on each track can affect the situation in the CIS states neighboring on Russia is analyzed below.

Drawing Down International Force in Afghanistan Soon after President Obama took office, he declared that the drawdown of American troops in Afghanistan would start in July 2011. Before that throughout 2009–2010 in seeking to inflict a decisive defeat on the

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Mikhail A. Troitsky Taliban forces, Washington had increased its contingent in Afghanistan to 100,000 troops. However, by the fall of 2010 the US had witnessed a rise in criticisms against maintaining numerous US forces in Afghanistan. In that context, the Obama administration had to seek and clearly formulate an ‘exit strategy for Afghanistan’, despite the conceivable costs of announcing in advance the timeline for the considerable troop reduction. Since October 2010 the Coalition Forces Command has started facilitating talks between the Afghan authorities and representatives of the Taliban. Given the irreconcilable ideological-religious and political differences between Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai and the Taliban leaders, the very fact of such negotiations attests to the fact that the US and its allies believed the chances of a conclusive victory over extremists to be slim and were ready to consider virtually any ‘route of retreat.

If the US indeed decides to promptly reduce its troops in Afghanistan, the other countries are unlikely to keep sizeable contingents there. Thus their troops, which would be capable of producing a discernible effect on the security situation in Afghanistan, can be effectively drawn down within two to five years.

At the global level, ISAF withdrawal from Afghanistan can be interpreted by Islamic extremists all over the world as a victory: those who demanded that the ‘infidels’ should leave have gotten their own way, at least in Afghanistan. This will boost these forces’ prestige among both the Afghans and the populations of the CIS states bordering on Afghanistan — above all of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The withdrawal will also affect Kyrgyzstan and probably Kazakhstan. It may lead to a rise in pro-Islamist opposition in Central Asian states, with sympathy and support coming directly from Afghanistan. One can expect a breakthrough of armed extremists from Afghanistan northwards as it happened in the late 1990s when the Taliban governed Afghanistan. The influence of Islamists’ ‘success’ in Afghanistan on the situation in Central Asia can be limited by the fact that the ‘victory’ over the international coalition will be appropriated by the Afghan Pashtuns — Talibs, who just as in the 1990s will again clash with the ethnic Tajiks and Uzbeks. In any case, Russia, China, the US and other international actors will be faced with a rise in extremism in the Central Asian Republics.

In this context, the US will want to retain an opportunity to keep its bases in the Central Asian states, which are likely to be ready to afford it unless there is fierce opposition from Russia or China.

In view of its own waning influence in Central Asia, Moscow is unlikely to insist on the withdrawal of US troops from the Manas base (Kyrgyzstan) or block other opportunities for the region’s countries to cooperate with the US on security issues. One can also forecast Beijing’s disapproval of sustained US military presence in Central Asia. The PRC will suggest that Russia exert extra pressure on the US; however on its own, Beijing is unlikely to impose tough demands on its Central Asian neighbors at the risk of severely damaging relations with them. Given the growing extremist sentiment and in the light of the February 2010 events, when Moscow and the CSTO assumed a wait-and-see attitude rather than use force to support the collapsing regime in Kyrgyzstan, Bishkek and Dushanbe will be more interested in US support on security issues.

Military-political cooperation will make it easier for Washington to cooperate with the Central Asian states on energy resources extraction and transportation. This will become important if fundamentally new opportunities will emerge for bringing Central Asian oil and gas to global markets, for example, through the Caspian Sea and the South Caucasus or Iran. Washington will be more interested than before in uniting economic and socio-political spaces of Central and South Asia, which could allow successful and relatively stable Central Asian states (above all, Kazakhstan) and India to facilitate economic development of Afghanistan and North Eastern Pakistan.

Expanding and strengthening US multilateral alliances system Withdrawal from Afghanistan — either gradual or otherwise — will engender difficulties in maintaining the traditional alliance between the US and Euro-Atlantic states. Firstly, NATO will be shorn of the important mission which thus far has helped unite the alliance and made it possible to involve in real battlefield cooperation those states that have announced their willingness to accede to the bloc. Called into question

US Global Strategy in Application to CIS will be the efficiency of NATO as a military-political alliance capable of using force to achieve the desired outcomes in conflicts. Secondly, additional tension within NATO will prompt Washington to engage its allies in the continuation of the nation building project in Afghanistan, which will be difficult to implement after the departure of ISAF even if the remaining coalition troops will continue to carry out targeted operations in Afghanistan and render military-technological support to the Afghan government.

Both before and after the drawdown of the ISAF troops, Washington will need stronger political support to be able to attain its goals. President Obama, who during his term has been trying to establish multilateral cooperation on Afghanistan and other issues, is particularly aware of this. It is important for the US to ensure the recognition of its leading role in the existing alliances and to assert their importance in the eyes of other member-states. This will be the only way to preserve the durable ties within NATO, to prevent a rapid withdrawal from Afghanistan of the allies, which are slashing their military budgets, and to sustain non-NATO states’ interest in cooperation with the Alliance, for instance, within ISAF or other peacekeeping operations in the future.

In this context, it was a logical move to promptly accept into NATO a number of CIS states which at different times expressed their desire to accede to the North Atlantic Alliance. That expansion, however, provoked Russia’s vehement backlash in 2008–2010, making it virtually impossible for Georgia to join NATO in the foreseeable future. Ukraine, after President Yanukovich took office in 2010, has changed its attitude toward prospective membership in NATO. Washington has demonstrated flexibility and adjusted its position accordingly.

When addressing the School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University in October 2010, Assistant Secretary Philip H. Gordon, the head of the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, made no mention of a possible NATO expansion as he described US policy goals with regard to the Alliance. He only mentioned plans to develop ‘New partnerships and deeper existing partnerships’.

At the same time, among the priorities common for the US and the European Union, he pointed out the need to promote European integration, which should extend to the Balkans and the Caucasus. According to Philip H. Gordon, EU enlargement has always been instrumental in ‘consolidating and supporting the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe’5.

Some time before that, Washington had stopped calling for Ukraine’s accelerated accession to NATO. For instance, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said that she respected Ukraine’s choice set forth in the Act on the Principles of Internal and External Policies of July 1, 2010, in her Kiev speech in July 2010. In accordance with the Act, Ukraine dropped its bid both for NATO and CSTO membership, thus confirming its status of a non-aligned state6. By abandoning the idea of speeding up Ukraine’s accession to NATO, the Obama administration probably believed that Ukraine would not apply for the CSTO, either.

In the same Kiev speech, Hillary Clinton admitted that the policy most appropriate for Ukraine would be ‘a well-balanced policy aimed at cultivating relations with the US, EU and Russia’, with the US ‘backing Ukraine’s aspiration to reach the needed balance’7. By saying that the Secretary of State dissociated the incumbent Administration’s policy from that of the George W Bush Administration aimed at encouraging Ukraine to make an ‘either-or’ choice. According to that approach, Ukraine (as well as a majority of other Russia-neighboring states) was supposed to make an unambiguous and ultimate choice of the ally.

The range of choice was limited to either the West (the US, NATO and the EU) or Russia. In the Bush Administration’s vision, the range was preconditioned by the historical ‘fork’ of developing either democratic institutions or reactionary authoritarianism. President of Ukraine Yushchenko made a radical choice in favour of the West, which, together with other reasons, caused a decline in his popularity among Ukranian voters and, as a result of it, Victor Yanukovich’s victory in the presidential election of 2010.

With the immediate NATO’s expansion being highly unlikely and the policy of ‘resetting’ Washington and Moscow’s relations having brought tangible results, the US focused on identifying acceptable ways to integrate Russia into the Euro-Atlantic security system and boosted its intermediary efforts aimed to resolve conflicts on the Eurasian territory.

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Mikhail A. Troitsky Since 2009, the US has been gradually reducing the tension in its interactions with Russia concerning the Georgia issue, admitting the reality that after Russia’s having recognized the sovereignty of South Ossetia and Abkhazia a comprehensive solution to the problem of Georgia’s territorial integrity is only possible in the long term perspective. Washington seems to have reassessed Georgia’s position among the US foreign policy priorities. During her visit to Tbilisi in July 2010, Hillary Clinton mentioned two reasons underlying the US support for Georgia. According to the Secretary of State, the first one was that the idea of the Georgian ‘Rose Revolution’ was in line with ‘the American values’ that laid the foundations of the American state. Hillary Clinton said that by that she meant Georgia’s peaceful secession from a ‘colonial power’ and overcoming the legacy of ‘colonialism’. The second one, in Hillary Clinton’s opinion, was that modern Georgia’s efforts to develop democratic institutions and liberally reform the economy were worth supporting. So the Secretary of State tried to clarify the reasons for Washington’s support for Tbilisi solely in ideology and value terms. Unlike the high ranking diplomats of the Bush Administration, Hillary Clinton did not focus on the geopolicy-driven episodes concerning, for instance, the pipelines on Georgia’s territory8. The Obama Administration was equally measured in supplying weapons and military equipment to Georgia, which puzzled Georgia. The Georgian President brought that to the attention of the US Secretary of State at their joint press conference. Nevertheless, Washington paid Georgia most of the $1bn promised by the US to Georgia as humanitarian aid right after the August 2008 war, only after Barack Obama was elected President. According to Washington observers, Vice-President Joe Biden as well as the State Department leadership kept in close touch with President of Georgia Mikheil Saakashvili, including the monthly telephone calls of Joe Biden with him9.

In the wake of the 2008 war in the Caucasus, the differences in the approach to the resolution constituted the most complex element of the Russian-American relations. The Russian military presence on the Georgian territory as well as Moscow and Washington’s differences in the approach to recognizing the sovereignty of Abkhazia and South Ossetia were the two most acute interconnected issues. The differences had practical consequences for the implementation of Russian foreign policy. For instance, in 2010 Georgia put further obstacles in the way of Russia’s joining the WTO, insisting on the enforcement of Georgian customs regulations on the Russian borders with Abkhazia and South Ossetia10.

Yet, despite the stalemate in the issue of the republics that broke away from Georgia, it was never brought to the foreground of the Russian-American interaction. First, while admitting the disagreements, Moscow and Washington were probing the possibilities of reaching an interim solution mutually acceptable for most of the parties. For instance, a possible Russian-Georgian agreement on mutual non-use of force, as well as possible designations for an EU monitoring mission in the conflict zone, were discussed in the Geneva negotiations. Second, the failure to resolve the situation with Abkhazia and South Ossetia spurred Russia in cooperation with the US and other mediators to more actively look for ways of resolving the other ‘frozen’ conflicts, namely, the ones in Nagorny Karabakh and Transdniestria.

For instance, in her Baku speech in July 2010, Hillary Clinton welcomed the Russian intermediary efforts in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict11. Despite the recommendations of a number of American and European experts who argued that the existing resolution mechanisms for the Nagorny Karabakh conflict were outdated and subject to replacement12, during her visit to Baku and Yerevan in July 2010, Hillary Clinton made several references to the OSCE Minsk group as an efficient forum of mediators and mentioned the US participation in it in cooperation with the other two Cochairmen (Russia and France)13. Washington’s stance on the Transdniestrian conflict was ‘depoliticized’ under the Obama Administration. The US renounced their support for the initiatives aimed at a radical modification of the status quo in the conflict and stopped trying to make the Transdniestrian party immediately reintegrate into the state of Moldova. Washington regarded the Kosovo case (whose sovereignty was recognized by Washington) as a ‘unique case’ which could not establish a precedent for other conflicts of self-determination, including the Transdniestrian one14.

US Global Strategy in Application to CIS On the whole, since 2009 the US has in no way prevented Russia from mediating in the conflicts in the Russia neighboring regions. Washington has regarded Russia as a partner rather than an opponent in the mediation mission. Among other, it attests to the fact that the concept of a ‘zero-sum game’ on the Eurasian space has been successfully fought.

A same retreat from the ‘zero-sum game’ has taken place in the field of energy security. There, it has been externally galvanized in the first line by the decline in demand for hydrocarbons as a result of the world economic downturn of 2008–200915. Amidst the situation, Russia did not have to reserve as much Turkmen gas as possible (which was previously a matter of US concern, as the US supported constructing trans-Caspian pipelines), as there was no demand for it any longer either in Russia or in the European states to which Russia re-exports natural gas.

Meanwhile, it was clear that, given its geographical proximity, China, which launched the TurkmeniaChina pipeline at the end of 2009 and prior to that had finished the construction of the pipeline between Kazakhstan and the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, would want and be able to buy all the hydrocarbon surplus in Central Asia. Neither the US nor Russia could anyhow prevent the main lines of oil and gas supplies from Central Asia from being transformed. Moreover, Moscow said it saw no threat to its interests in the increasing supplies of hydrocarbons from Central Asia to China, though in the wake of opening the new Turkmen-Chinese pipeline, China imported more Turkmen gas than Russia16.

Containing Russia Given the US and Russia’s progress in arms control (the two Presidents’ signing and the State Duma and Senate’s ratifying the new START in 2010–2011), the Afghanistan campaign and countering the potentially dangerous aspects of Iran’s nuclear program, the US and Russia’s policymaking communities enhanced their effort to find ways to institutionalize Moscow and Washington’s cooperation. Throughout 2010, there were discussions of Russia’s possible participation in the regional missile defence systems along with the US and its NATO allies as well as options of a new format of Russia–NATO interaction.

Amidst the political context, the conventional arguments of the necessity to contain Russia both in terms of its influence on the neighbouring states and preserving the US nuclear missile capacity of deterrence started getting blurred. Russian analysts17 raised similar questions. Yet US policymakers and experts took the risk of undermining their reputation and losing popularity among colleagues when and if they questioned the necessity to contain Russia’s clout in the CIS. The US policymaking community was unanimous about the necessity to stave off the scenario of ‘restoring the USSR’ however unlikely it was.

Nevertheless, there was no consensus concerning the objective criteria that should guide the US Administration in assessing Russia’s actions in the CIS. US policymakers and experts gave various answers to the question of why the US had to contain Russia in the CIS at all. The answers boiled down to how the US expert community tended to perceive Russia.

The key elements of the perception are as follows: —— The ‘big’ and expansion-prone Russia ‘oppresses’ minor states that seek to cooperate with the US. So Washington must help the minor states to reinforce their independence from Russia. Yet one can’t fail to notice that some states of the CIS (for example, Kazakhstan and Ukraine) are hard to regard as minor or even medium-sized states. Moreover, not all of the CIS states that have complained of Moscow’s pressure have also expressed their desire to cooperate with the US (for example, Belarus).

—— Russia’s neighbours have higher rates of democratization than Russia does, and Russia interferes with their democratization both by direct action and by its negative example. External support for democratic reform in the states could spur similar processes in Russia, which would mean an easier cooperation with it for the West, including the US. However, some CIS states (for instance, Georgia) that the West sees as actively pursuing a democratic path have displayed signs of authoritarianism. The relative political liberalization in Kyrghyzstan in the early 2000s triggered a series of power takeovers. Moreover, almost all Russia’s neighbors are balancing on the wafer-thin brink of nation building and ethnocracy.

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Mikhail A. Troitsky A number of states virtually slid into ethnocracy causing a drain of non-title ethnic groups in the 1990s and a more complicated living situation for ethnic minorities, the Russian-speaking one in the first place. The situation runs counter to the American value of a multi-ethnic ‘melting pot’ where no ethnic community can aspire to be the ‘title’ one. Based on the current course of events, Russia and Belarus, and, to some extent, Ukraine, seem to be most plausible to satisfy the criterion among the post-Soviet states.

—— Russia is a ‘spoiler’ seeking to harm US interests both in the CIS and beyond it. Given Russia’s insatiable drive to expand, its interests will always be at odds with the American ones18. As a counter-argument one can say that Russia has opposed US influence on CIS-countries only if Washington supported exclusively anti-Russian forces in the states (for example, ethnocrats seeking to create a new national myth based on a vision of Russia as an implacable enemy). In such cases, Russia’s discontent can be justified both pragmatically and psychologically.

In any case, under the Obama Administration Washington has gradually come to realize that over the two decades of CIS history, Russia has acquired rather a ‘dense’ international environment of states that have proved to fare better or worse, but in any way independently. The majority of the states have obtained sufficient American aid in the nation building process (the Baltic states, Georgia, Ukraine), while others have fully employed internal resources to maintain stability and growth (the hydrocarbon deposits in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan).

Given the conditions and failing US support, Moscow would never have been able to gain full discretion, attain dominance and further turn it into a semblance of the Soviet Union, whose restoration is taken by Washington as a most serious threat to national security. Even if the US had reduced its efforts at countering Russia’s clout in the CIS (thus eliminating the major irritants in Russian-American relations), Washington would have had every reason to rely on Russia’s neighbors’ ability to counterbalance Moscow either individually (in certain spheres) or collectively (in the worst case scenario), if necessary.

For instance, in 2009–2010, Belarus dared to conflict with Russia while being in almost full international isolation. In Central Asia China managed to secure a pivotal position not only in trade and investment, but also in security, thus constituting a counterbalance to Russian influence. Georgia is the only South Caucasian state that has found difficulty in maintaining internal stability in the absence of Washington’s support. Finally, at the end of the 2000s Ukraine and Moldova experienced a strong influence of the EU, with the prospect of rapprochement with it curtailing Moscow’s ability to influence the political elites in Kiev and Kishinev.

In the situation, a number of American experts urged the Obama Administration to assess the feasibility of cooperation with this or that CIS-state on the basis of the widest possible range of considerations, with those of global security playing a central role. In the experts’ opinion, it would be counter-productive if Washington only sought to balance Moscow’s clout and consider a narrow range of the issues of energy security and freight and troops transit to Afghanistan19. Instead, they proposed to look for a long-term, mutually beneficial interaction and cultural exchange with Russia’s neighbors. The concept of boosting political transformation on the Eurasian space was criticized due to the unpredictability of its short-term consequences, uncertainty of its long-term benefits together with the guaranteed damage of such actions to US-Russian relations.

*** Throughout 2009–2010, the Obama Administration’s policy towards CIS-states, including Russia, helped to lay solid foundations for a resolution of chronic and other disputes on the Eurasian space.

Washington declared its aspiration to pursue more global objectives than the ones pursued by the previous US administrations, which prodded the players on the space into more activity. Given the two-decade experience of international relations in the CIS, a step-by-step resolution of security and economic problems in the regions neighboring Russia with the help of third parties does not bring

US Global Strategy in Application to CIS tangible results. In the situation, the conflicting parties could not see anything but an adversary in each other, so they exchanged mutual accusations and ‘drove the disagreements inward’, which then led to an acute crisis such as the war in South Ossetia in August 2008.

This took place in the absence of discussing ‘a desired common vision’ as the ultimate goal pursued by all the parties involved, including regional and influential non-regional powers. The ground for discussing the ‘common vision’ appears to have ripened long ago, at least back in the early 2000s, when the RussianAmerican quasi-alliance was forged in Central Asia for a short period. To launch the discussion the parties were only to stop interpreting their goals narrowly and to be ready to integrate the goals into the eventual outcome of comprehensive talks.

The option of a comprehensive discussion of the desired situation emerged after the US foreign policy agenda had been amended, and Russia and some other CIS-states had responded to it positively. Given clear goals (if not threats) (fighting the ‘overflowing’ extremism and the drug traffic from Afghanistan; containing nuclear proliferation; staving off regional rounds of the arms race in the South Caucasus; overcoming the stalemate in controlling conventional and tactic nuclear weapons in Europe), it is realistic to expect joint organized efforts on the part of CIS — and other states to attain them together.

Yet the ‘window of opportunity’ can shut once the understanding of collective advances on the ‘road map’ has been lost and grounds for mutual suspicions of seeking unilateral benefits without respective costs have emerged. ________________________________________________ See, for example, S. Frederick Starr. A Partnership for Greater Central Asia // Foreign Affairs. July–August 2005. P. 164–178.

See, for example, Robert Leiken. Europe’s Angry Muslims // Foreign Affairs. July–August 2005.

3 For US views on the prospects for and consequences of a reduced relative potential of the US see, for example Fareed Zakharia. The Post-American World.

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New York: W. W. Norton & Co, 2009; Richard Haass. The Age of Non-Polarity // Foreign Affairs. May–June 2008.

National Security Strategy (of the United States of America). May 2010 http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf 5 Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs Philip H. Gordon, Remarks at the Center for Transatlantic Relations, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University. Washington, DC, October 18, 2010 http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2010/149608.htm 6 Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, Speech at Town Hall of Kyiv Polytechnic Institute. July 2, 2010 http://www.state.gov/secretary/ rm/2010/07/143941.htm 7 Ibidem.

8 Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, Joint Press Availability with Georgian President Saakashvili, Presidential Palace, Tbilisi, Georgia. July 5, 2010 http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/07/143973.htm 9 See.: Samuel Charap. There Is No One Under the Bus // Foreign Policy. June 16, 2010 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/16/whos_under_ the_bus 10 See., for example, Josh Rogin. Washington won’t mediate between Russia and Georgia on WTO // Foreign Policy. October 29, 2010 http://thecable. foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/10/29/washington_won_t_mediate_between_russia_and_georgia_on_wto 11 Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, Joint Press Availability With Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Mammadyarov, Heydar Aliyev International Airport, Baku, Azerbaijan. July 4, 2010 http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/07/143961.htm 12 See, for example, Thomas de Waal. Remaking the Nagorno-Karabakh Peace Process // Survival. August–September 2010. P. 159–176.

13 See, for example, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, Joint Press Availability With Armenian Foreign Minister Eduard Nalbandyan, Presidential Palace, Yerevan, Armenia, July 4, 2010 http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/07/143969.htm 14 Assistant Secretary of State Philip J. Crowley, Daily Press Briefing, Washington, DC, July 22, 2010 http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2010/07/145065.htm 15 See, for example, Samuel Charap. The Transformation of US–Russia Relations // Current History. October 2010. P. 281–287 http://www.americanprogress. org/issues/2010/09/pdf/charap_us_russia_relations.pdf 16 See, for example, Dmitry Kosyrev Should All Pipelines Run Through Russia? RIA ‘Novosti’ News Agency Analytical Materials. December 15, 2009. http:// rian.ru/analytics/20091215/199416857.html 17 See, for example, Mikhail Troitsky. Containment Must Be Overcome. Long Cycles of Russian-US Relations// Russia in Global Affairs. September–October 2010. P. 50–59 http://www.globalaffairs.ru/number/Uiti-ot-sderzhivaniya-15014 18 See, for example, Ariel Cohen. Russia bears down. Obama’s ‘reset’ button is broken // Washington Times. August 19, 2010 http://www.washingtontimes. com/news/2010/aug/19/russia-bears-down/?page=1 19 See Samuel Charap, Alexandros Petersen. Re-Imagining Eurasia // Foreign Affairs. August 20, 2010 http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66542/samuelcharap-and-alexandros-petersen/reimagining-eurasia 4

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Key Priorities And Dimensions In China’s Central Asia Policy Ekaterina V. Koldunova China and Central Asia1: relations from historical perspective The destinies of China and Central Asian states have always been intertwined historically and geographically. Yet the character of China’s presence in the region varied in form and intensity depending on a particular time period.

Thus key priorities and dimensions in China’s Central Asia policy should best be analyzed within the framework of the following macro-periods.

Until the beginning of the 19th century China viewed the national entities existing on today’s Central Asian space through the prism of Sino-centric foreign policy conception, also shared by the Manchurian Qing Dynasty (1644–1911). The conception, as Russian scholars point out, attributed the populations of Central Asian khanates to a category of “peoples of states nominally subordinated to China”2, although formally they were independent.

The period between the 19th — early 20th centuries until the disintegration of the Russian Empire was marked by the so-called “Great Game” in Central Asia consisting in a rivalry between Great Britain and Russia over influence in that region. Simultaneously, the Qing Empire was steadily losing ground. By the 1860s the dynasty had mostly lost control over Xinjiang area, to be regained with the help of the Russian Empire only by the 1880s.

During the period from 1917 to the founding of PRC in1949 the region saw a series of complex and controversial processes related to the rise of so-called popular revolutions, the founding in 1921 of the People’s Republic of Mongolia, and the entry of Central Asian nations into the USSR. At the same time in the mid-1930s and 1940s China faced a series of Muslim uprisings in Xinjiang. Initially the Soviet government’s policy concerning Xinjiang was ambivalent: on the one hand support was given to China seeking to keep the area as its integral part, whereas on the other hand, political assistance was provided to the Interim Government of the Republic of East Turkistan founded in 1944 by the anti-China movement.

It was not until 1945 that such ambivalence in the USSR — China relations was eliminated following the signing of a Sino-Soviet Friendship and Alliance Treaty.

From 1949 to 1991 PRC’s Central Asia policy was contingent on two dimensions. First, in the 1960s — 1980s the Sino-Soviet relations were characterized by confrontational tendencies, some of which were caused by border disputes in Central Asia, Kazakhstan and the Far East. Second, since the 1980s the crossborder trade, economic and cultural ties between China’s border areas and Central Asian republics were being restored as part of normalized Sino-Soviet relations and Deng Xiaoping-led Chinese leadership’s policy of economic reforms.

Key Priorities And Dimensions I n China’s Central Asia Policy After the collapse of the Soviet Union, in early January 1992 China established, in succession, diplomatic relations with all Central Asian states, thus signaling a new stage in its policy towards the region.

China’s Central Asia strategy: 1990s — 2000s Current priorities and dimensions in China’s Central Asia policy are dictated by economic, as well as national security considerations. The latter is due to the region’s close proximity to the Xinjiang — Uighur autonomous region, one of the more troublesome administrative and territorial entities of PRC. The former, economic consideration, stems from the Central Asian location of key suppliers of energy, particularly required by China during this period of accelerated economic growth.

It may be justifiable, therefore, at this stage to consider China’s strategy towards Central Asia as a uniform entity, as well as analyze separate aspects of PRC’s bilateral relations with individual states in that area. Despite a wide-range debate within the international academic and expert community concerning parameters of a Central Asian regional communality, there is considerable ground for such an approach to China’s strategy in the region. One reason is to be found in the commonly shared regional security challenges, whereas the other is linked to China’s politico-economic strategy towards the region which is largely pursued through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

At the same time we might consider separate sets of relations between China and each of the five Central Asian republics, particularly because the SCO-sponsored projects do not include Turkmenistan as a state not belonging to that organization. Several aspects of bilateral relations will be considered in greater detail in the final part of the chapter.

A distinguished Chinese scholar Zhao Huasheng defines six strategic priorities for China’s Central Asia policy. They are as follows: —— Resistance to acts of terrorism, separatism and extremism (the so-called concept of striking “The Three Forces”), —— Maintenance of security in border areas, —— Promotion of regional stability, —— Engagement in the economic development of the region, —— Non-acceptance of situations leading to a dominant position in the region of states or military blocks hostile to China, —— Access to regional energy resources3.

At the early stages of China’s relations with newly independent states the first three priorities were mostly linked to the border issue existing in the region. Following the disintegration of the Soviet state the borders of the five Central Asian states, previously belonging to a single politico-economic body of the USSR, acquired the status of national borders of new states. Of those, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan had a common border with China necessitating resolution of certain outstanding issues, as well as delimitation and demarcation in conformity with the norms of international law.

In 1996 and 1999 China and Kyrgyzstan reached an agreement on the common (858 km) border issues. The border between China and Kazakhstan was 1,533 km long, with bilateral agreements on that section concluded in 1994 and in 1998 and the demarcation completed in 2002. Agreements on the Sino-Tajik border (414 km) were signed in 1999 and 2002. In addition, back in 1996 in Shanghai all of the above states, as well as China and Russia signed an Agreement on confidence-building measures in the military sphere in border areas, and later, in 1997 the same participants signed an Agreement on mutual arms reductions in border areas. Those agreements constituted the basis of the so-called “Shanghai Five”, an SCO predecessor, founded in 2001 with the participation of the five aforementioned states and Uzbekistan.

By removing the major international disputes in the area the resolution of border issues made common regional security challenges, already under discussion within SCO, a top priority subject for

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Ekaterina V. Koldunova China. The focus now is on the need to counter terrorism, separatism and extremism and to maintain stability in the region. For China this means a close linkage with the situation in the Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR), mainly populated by Muslims of Turkic origin. Historically, ethnically and denominationally the region is related to the Central Asian area. Therefore Central Asian stability provides the positive environment within which the Chinese leadership sees the possibility for a progressive development of XUAR. XUAR had long been economically backward, lagging behind the eastern parts of PRC in development.

The lasting historical contradictions between ethnic Han4 and non-Han populations, along with the existing separatist movements and groups had further exacerbated the socio-political situation in Xinjiang. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of five Central Asian states engendered hopes for a revival of an independent East Turkistan state among the separatist movements membership.

In the late 1990s — early 2000s the Chinese side obtained a promise from the Central Asian republics not to provide support in any form to the separatist movement in Xinjiang, making increased mutual trade and investment5 contingent on the issue. Later this was followed by a series of agreements between China and Central Asian republics on joint actions to counter separatism and extremism. The issue is also a key aspect of cooperation within SCO. On the whole, as we have already shown, China views stability and security in Central Asia as an indispensible prerequisite for an effective economic cooperation in the area rather than an end in itself.

China and the regional economic cooperation: infrastructure and energy projects For centuries the territories of China and today’s Central Asia have been quite close in economic and transportation terms as well as in terms of political and ethno-demographical processes. The “Silk Road” connecting China with Central, South, and West Asia as early as at the beginning of the Christian era may serve as the most vivid example of an historic inter-regional transportation route.

At its current stage of development PRC puts a premium on economic cooperation with various regions of the world, including Central Asia. Several aspects of economic cooperation between China and Central Asian states deserve particular attention, namely: 1) trade relations including cross-border trade promotion, 2) cooperation in the energy sphere, 3) joint infrastructure projects.

Trade and economic relations between China and Central Asia. In the 1990s mutual trade between China and Central Asian states was characterized by instability. By the mid-1990s the fast growth of the early decade had given way to a relative slowdown, caused in part by the regional states’ policies of curtailing the flow of low-grade goods from China. However, the 2000s already saw a dramatic increase in trade with an almost 15-fold growth against the 1990s levels in less than a decade. The growing number of joint ventures had also made a positive impact on mutual trade development. By 2007 trade with PRC had constituted 14% of Central Asian states’ overall trade volume, whereas trade with Central Asia accounted for 0.7% of China’s foreign trade⁶.

Among China’s key trade partners in Central Asia are Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. As of 2009, China’s trade volume with Kazakhstan amounted to 11.8 bn., with Uzbekistan — 1.4 bn., with Kyrgyzstan — 0.46 bn., and with Tajikistan — 0.41 bn.US dollars⁷. Compared with others, trade with Turkmenistan has only a modest volume (0.05 bn. dollars in 2009).

As part of cross-border trade development policy, the Chinese leadership, back in the early 1990s, made turning XUAR into a base region for promoting trade and economic ties with Central Asia its strategic objective, facilitated by historical and geographical connection between Xinjiang and Central Asian states. This task was to be achieved through a series of government policies, such as establishment of special economic zones, opening of new and refurbishing of the existing crossings along the borders with Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, and granting an open city status to a number of urban centers with cross-border markets to be created in them. Cities like Horgos and Kashgar were, among others, earmarked for such urban development. The Chinese government

Key Priorities And Dimensions I n China’s Central Asia Policy intends to transform Kashgar, situated in close proximity to Pakistan, Kyrgyzstan, Afghanistan and Tajikistan borders, into a major trade and logistics hub. The city already boasts one of the major functioning regional markets with trade operations on a wide range of products from daily commodities and clothing to horse trading⁸.

Implementation of energy and energy transportation projects. According to expert evaluations, oil and gas export will play a key role in PRC’s industrial development in the mid-term and, possibly in the longterm perspective, as Chinese enterprises are not yet ready to convert to alternative types of energy. In 1993 China became a net oil importer and since then it has been characterized by a fast growth of energy consumption.

In the past China had tried to develop its own energy resources of the Xinjiang oil fields and on the East China Sea shelf, but later chose the path of restructuring its energy sector and investing in oil producing companies around the world. Three state-owned companies — China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), China National Petroleum Corporation (Sinopec) and China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) — have been founded within the framework of PRC’s energy sector.

China’s largest energy projects are being implemented in three Central Asian republics — Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, with China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) actively engaged in all three.

In Kazakhstan CNPC⁹ has been active since the late 1990s within oil and gas field joint development and energy infrastructure projects. In 1997 CNPC purchased a 60.3% share in Kazakhstan’s “Aktobemunaigas”, later to raise its share to 85.42%. “CNPC-Aktobemunaigas” operates the Zhanazhol and the Kenkiyak sub-salt and supra-salt fields, and since 2002 it has been engaged in exploration in the Central block of the Eastern part of the Caspian Plain.

In 2005 CNPC also bought the oil and gas group “Petrokazakhstan”. However, CNPC then transferred 33% of its shares to “KazMunaiGas”, retaining only the remaining 67%. Structurally “Petrokazakhstan” consists of “PetroKazakhstan Kumkol Resources” and “PetroKazakhstan Oil Products”, with the former being an upstream and the latter a downstream operator. The bulk of the company’s oil production comes from Kyzylordinskaya oblast (in the southern part of the country) and from the Yuzhno-Turgaiskiy oil field (in the central part of Kazakhstan). The company is also involved in geological survey and prospecting.

CNPS holds shares (25% each) in the Konys and the Bektas fields in Kyzylordynskaya oblast and owns a 50% share in the Severnoye Buzachi field in Mangystauskaya oblast in the south-west of Kazakhstan, with the other half (50%) belonging to LUKOIL. Within the framework of bilateral energy cooperation work is being performed to make the Kazakhstan–China oil and gas pipelines fully operational.

Since the second half of the 2000s CNPC has been taking part in the exploration of oil and gas fields in Uzbekistan. Thus in 2006 the company joined an international investors’ consortium of “Uzbekneftegas”, LUKOIL, the Malaysian “Petronas” and the Korean national oil company (KNOC, South Korea), carrying out geological survey and prospecting operations in the Uzbek sector of the Aral Sea (the “Aral” Project).

There are also several joint Sino-Uzbek ventures in Uzbekistan’s oil and gas sector, such as for example, JV “UzCNPC Petroleum”, established in 2005 and specializing in further exploration and subsequent operation of fields in the Bukhara region (in the south-west of Uzbekistan), or a JV company founded in 2008 for the exploration of the Myngbulak oil field in the Namangan oblast (in the north-east of the Fergana Basin).

China has been consistently increasing its presence in Turkmenistan’s energy sector. In 2007 China and Turkmenistan signed an agreement on product sharing in the fields on the right bank of the AmuDarya River. Since 2002 under an agreement between CNPC and the state-owned “Turkmenneft” concern, the Chinese corporation conducted operations on secondary exploration of the Gumdak field (in the eastern part of Turkmenistan).

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In 2009, under an inter-governmental agreement, PRC provided Turkmenistan with 3bn dollars to be used for the exploration of a north-eastern gas field of Southern Eolotan (Lepabskaya oblast). The deposit is estimated by experts as the fourth largest in the world (4.7–14 trillion cubic meters of estimated reserves)¹⁰.

China’s cooperation with the above-mentioned countries has laid foundation for a major regional project to construct a Turkmenistan–Uzbekistan–Kazakhstan–China gas pipeline, also in some sources referred to as “Central Asia-China” gas pipeline, whose first line was put into operation in December 2009. The pipeline beginning in Turkmenistan, runs across central Uzbekistan and southern Kazakhstan terminating at Horgos in the Xinjiang-Uighur autonomous region in China. The pipeline’s design capacity is 30 bn. cubic meters with a possibility of future enlargement to 40 bn.

Through a gas compressor station at Horgos the gas is then transported to Shanghai, Guangzhou, Hong-Kong and other regions of China. In future an internal pipeline will connect Horgos via Guangdong province with Hong-Kong. Thus the Central Asia-China gas pipeline must help cover China’s growing domestic gas consumption demand, with an ultimate aim of shifting PRC’s energy mix in favor of natural gas.

Transport projects. It should be noted that energy transportation projects are not the only example of cooperation between China and Central Asia in the infrastructure area. Dynamically growing trade and economic ties and an increasing interdependence of Central Asian states and China create the environment necessary for realization of new transport projects aimed to raise the level of infrastructural interconnectedness of the countries under discussion.

Among such projects are the Kashghar (China) — Irkeshtam (Sino-Kyrgyz border area) — Osh (Kyrgyzstan) — Anjijon (Uzbekistan) railway, the Osh — Sarytysh — Irkeshtam — Kashghar and the Bratstvo — Dushanbe — Dzhirghatal — Karamyk — Irkeshtam — Kashghar motorway routes, plans to build a branch road to Tajikistan from the Karakorum mountain motorway, and a number of others.

*** The dimensions of China’s policy in the region discussed above may lead us to a conclusion that within less than two decades, by steadily implementing its designated strategy, China has become one of the key players in Central Asia. Despite other strong political and economic actors such as Russia, the USA, India, Iran and some other Asian states being present in the region, with the help of joint economic projects, including energy and infrastructure cooperation, China is pursuing a consistent policy of drawing Central Asian states into its geo-economic influence orbit, constituting the kind of politicoeconomic power that could hardly be overlooked, either in the short- or in the long-term perspective. ________________________________________________ Here and below the term “Central Asia” is used to denote the current situation in the region consisting of five states — Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan — although geographically the region covers a wider space including the territory of today’s Mongolia and north-eastern China. In the soviet historiography the region was known as Middle Asia and Kazakhstan. Chinese scholars terminologically define the group of the five aforementioned states as part of the Central Asian region.

2 A.D.Voskresenskiy. Chinese and Russian factors in Central Asia: traditional challenges and new opportunities/ A.D.Voskresenskiy, S.G.Luzyanin// Vostok. — 1

2003. — №3. — P. 96.

3 Zhao H. China, Central Asia and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization/H.Zhao// Moscow Carnegie Center. Working Papers. — 2005. — No 5. — P. 50.

4 Self-name of the Chinese ethnos.

5 Swanström N. China and Central Asia: A New Great Game or Traditional Vassal Relations? / N.Swanström// Journal of Contemporary China. — 2005 (November). — Vol.45, Iss, 45. — P. 572 6 Ibraimov S. China-Central Asia Trade Relations: Economic and Social Patterns/S.Ibraimov//China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly. — 2009, — Vol. 7, No 1, — P. 48 7 Here and below trade volumes data are quoted from the following source: What China Seeks and Finds in Central Asia/ Izvestiya. 26.05.2010.

8 Kashgar to Become Economic Development Zone/China Briefing. 25.06.2010.

9 For further detail on CNPC see: http://www.cnpc.com.cn 10 China Begins Off-Take of Turkmen Gas/ Kommersant. 25.06.2009

Authors

Prof. Anatoly V. Torkunov — rector of the MGIMO–University, President of Russian International Studies Association, member of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

Dr. Artem V. Malgin — chief of the Rector’s office and associate professor of the International Affairs and Russia’s Foreign Policy department at the MGIMO–University, ed.-in-chief of “Eastern Europe.

Prospects”.

Prof. Marina M. Lebedeva — head of the World Politics department at the MGIMO–University.

Dr. Irina V. Bolgova — senior researcher of the Post-Soviet Studies Centre and associate professor at the MGIMO–University, deputy ed.-in-chief of “Eastern Europe. Prospects”.

Prof. Tatiana A. Shakleina — head of the International Applied Analysis department at the MGIMO–University.

Dr. Mikhail A. Troitskiy — associate professor of the International Affairs and Russia’s Foreign Policy department at the MGIMO–University, associate director of Moscow office, MacArthur Foundation.

Dr. Ekaterina V. Koldunova — deputy dean of the Political Affairs School and associate professor of the Oriental Studies department at the MGIMO–University.

Contents

Anatoly V. Torkunov Four Scenarios of Russia’s Development.. ..................................... 3 Artem V. Malgin European System: Strategic Performance And New Elements............ 7 Marina M. Lebedeva European Security Architecture: Russian Context.. ....................... 15 Irina V. Bolgova Normative vs pragmatic interest: EU policies in Central Asia......... 25 Tatiana A. Shakleina Russian Debates On Relations With The United States.................. 30 Mikhail A. Troitsky US Global Strategy in Application to CIS.................................... 41 Ekaterina V. Koldunova Key Priorities And Dimensions In China’s Central Asia Policy......... 50 Authors................................................................................ 55

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