THE GRAND RAPIDS PRESS / SUNDAY, MAY 8, 2016 / D3
The mistakes made CONTINUED FROM PAGE 2
The problem with emergency managers, the task force said, is they have near-dictatorial powers but can be so focused on finances that other issues get ignored. And, because emergency managers are not elected officials, they can feel free to ignore citizens’ concerns. “The EM situation is clearly a problem,” Rothstein said. “It failed in Flint with acute consequences.” As for the DEQ, Snyder’s administration shifted the mission from enforcement to compliance and continued a decadelong trend of budget cuts in the DEQ’s Office of Drinking Water and Municipal Assistance. “I think the bureaucracy got into a bunker mentality — check your boxes off and don’t stick your neck out,” Chris Kolb, a member of the Flint task force, said about the DEQ. “I think that mentality developed over time. The budget crunch has really spread them thin. You get comfortable doing the minimum.” Ananich and former Flint Mayor Dayne Walling are among those who say Snyder’s governing philosophy set the stage for the water crisis. “The culture that he created is the main culprit of what happened here,” Ananich said. Walling, who believes he lost re-election in November partly because of his own handling of the crisis, said Snyder “just seems to have zero interest in working with local officials.” “I think the governor has spent so much time preaching relentless positive action, he has no ability to deal with real life,” Walling said. “We end up in a bubble of positive information.” Rich Baird, Snyder’s closest aide, defended the governor. “He is not insular and his mentality is not ‘spreadsheet,’ rather it is fact based and accountable,” Baird said in an email responding to MLive questions. “… The final question from him is always ‘What is the right thing to do?’” Ananich and consultant TJ Bucholz, who worked for Engler and former Democratic Gov. Jennifer Granholm, are among those who believe the water crisis would not have happened in those administrations. It’s improbable that Granholm, a politician known for her empathy, would have ignored the public outcry in Flint, Ananich and Bucholz said. As for Engler, he “was too good of a policymaker and politician” to have such a crisis on his watch, Ananich said, echoing the thoughts of Bucholz and Truscott. “He would have expected to know (the details).”
“The governor was relying on only one expert — the DEQ. He wasn’t relying on Marc Edwards or Miguel Del Toral or Dr. Mona (Hanna-Attisha) or the people of Flint coming to his office or the Genesee County Health Department. His information was limited to one entity — and that entity happened to be wrong.” KEN SIKKEMA, FLINT WATER ADVISORY TASK FORCE CO-CHAIRMAN
Flint Water Advisory Task Force co-chairman Ken Sikkema updates the media on the team’s final report on what led to the water crisis March 23, 2016, at Mott Community College in Flint. The team, appointed by Gov. Snyder, seated second from left, reviewed actions regarding water use and testing, and offered recommendations to protect the health and safety of all Michigan residents. (Conor Ralph | MLive.com)
“Clearly, money was a factor,” Sikkema said. Joining the KWA in April 2013 was supposed to save Flint $100 to $300 million over 30 years. Then-state Treasurer Andy Dillon, a Snyder appointee, signed off on the deal, saying Flint officials were eager to leave the Detroit system. “If we rejected this, there would be a political backlash” from Flint leaders, Dillon said about his understanding of the deal at the time. “There was no financial risk to the city of Flint.” The Detroit Water and Sewerage Department wasn’t pleased to lose its largest water customer and gave notice to terminate Flint’s contract in April 2014. If Flint wanted to stay on Detroit water from 2014 until the KWA started operations in 2016, they would have to pay much ALL ABOUT THE MONEY higher rates. “This was never about This did not sit well with Ed money,” Snyder — aka Kurtz, then Flint’s emergency @onetoughnerd — tweeted on manager, who determined the March 6 as Democratic presiden- Flint River was the least expential hopefuls Hillary Clinton and sive option in the interim. Bernie Sanders verbally bashed The catch was Flint had to the governor during a debate in quickly upgrade its water plant, Flint. and the city public works staff Emails, interviews and the had to shift from simply distribgovernor’s own Flint Water uting pre-treated Detroit water Advisory Task Force tell a much to treating and distributing Flint different story. River water. The plant already Finances were behind three was slated to start treating KWA key decisions that led to the Flint water in 2016 but, now, the rush water crisis: was on to get it online by April • The decision to join the 2014. newly formed Karegnondi Water As it turned out, Flint was illAuthority for the city’s water prepared to treat the river water supply, ending 47 years of buying and the DEQ wasn’t providing water from the Detroit Water the proper oversight. and Sewerage Department. “They rushed to do it,” Kolb • Using the Flint River as an said. “They moved too quickly. interim water source until the They just put the pedal to the KWA pipeline was built. floor and tried to do it with an • The continued use of the inexperienced staff.” river for 17 months despite a As problems with the water mounting litany of problems and surfaced, emergency managconcerns. ers said reconnecting to Detroit
Detroit terminates Flint’s water contract, to take effect in 12 months. June 2013: Kurtz makes the decision to use the Flint River as a water source until the KWA is finished in 2016 after meeting with officials from the DEQ, LAN Engineering and the city’s Public Works Department. Flint now has less than a year to get its water plant ready to treat water from the Flint River as opposed to distributing water treated by the Detroit system. April 2014: The DEQ and Flint’s Department of Public Works gear up to start treating water from the Flint River.
Gov. Rick Snyder answers questions March 17, 2016, during a hearing about the Flint water crisis in front of the U.S. House Committee on Government Oversight and Reform at the Rayburn House Office Building in Washington, D.C. (Jake May | MLive.com)
water was simply not an option, noting it would cost the city $1 million more per month. The biggest blunder — failing to use corrosion control, causing lead from the pipes to leach into the water — also was made in an environment of cost savings. The Flint Water Department and the DEQ were understaffed and underfunded as they scrambled to get the treatment plant into operation. In the process, DEQ officials misinterpreted federal lead regulations and deemed corrosion control unnecessary until after a year of testing. That misjudgment wasn’t directly about money, according to Sikkema, “but it was happening in an environment where everything was about pinching pennies.” Since acknowledging the lead contamination in October, the Legislature has approved more than $67 million in funding to address the Flint water crisis, including the costs of lead test-
Corrosion control is proposed in the city’s operating plan, but DEQ officials later tell the city it’s not necessary. Eight days before the switch, Flint’s water treatment plant supervisor Mike Glasgow sends an email to the DEQ, warning the city is not prepared to handle the job. No one at the DEQ responds to the email and, eight days later, the switch is made. Officials toast glasses of Flint River water in celebration. Spring/summer 2014: There are immediate concerns about the taste and color of the treated Flint River water. By September,
ing and treatment, filters for water taps, bottled water, credits to water bills and the state’s share of paying to reconnect Flint to Detroit’s water system. Snyder has requested another $165 million to provide support for Flint residents affected by the water crisis. The state also is paying $1.2 million for Snyder’s outside legal bills, including contracts with a criminal defense attorney and an attorney specializing in civil lawsuits. In addition, the Michigan Attorney General’s office is spending $1.5 million to conduct its investigation into the crisis. So far, that investigation has led to criminal charges against two DEQ employees and a Flint water department supervisor — and, at this point, the state is paying for the defense attorneys for the DEQ workers. The state also faces the expense of defending civil lawsuits filed against the state on behalf of Flint residents.
WHAT THE GOVERNOR KNEW
Snyder has maintained that the Flint water crisis was the fault of “career bureaucrats” in the DEQ and that his mistake was not asking enough questions. Snyder has said he wasn’t told that Flint had a confirmed lead issue until Oct. 1, 2015, and that he didn’t know until January 2016 about an outbreak of Legionnaire’s disease possibly linked to the switch in Flint’s drinking-water source. The outbreak sickened 91 people, including 12 who died, between June 2014 and November 2015. But the evidence shows Snyder knew since fall 2014 that something was seriously amiss with Flint water. He knew since July 2015 that outside experts were raising concerns about lead contamination. And, while he says he didn’t know about Legionnaire’s earlier, the outbreak was known to the heads of the DEQ and Department of Health and Human Services, as well as at least three top aides in the governor’s office. In addition, because Flint was under emergency management, Snyder was receiving regular, detailed reports on the city’s affairs. In spring 2013, Snyder hosted a meeting with Flint and Detroit officials in which he pushed a new water deal between the two cities. Detroit also was under a state-appointed emergency manager and soon would enter bankruptcy. The effort failed, and Flint opted for the KWA. In spring 2014, Snyder was briefed that Flint was switching to the Flint River as an interim drinking water source until the KWA pipeline was ready. Conversations in the governor’s office about Flint water heated up in fall 2014 when Snyder was briefed about two boil water advisories in Flint due to fecal coliform bacteria, as well as complaints about the water’s color, odor and taste. Then, in October 2014, a new bomb dropped. General Motors announced Flint River water was too corrosive for its manufacturing needs. Many Flint residents saw this as a turning point and demanded to be reconnected to Detroit water. Even Snyder’s top legal aides suggested Flint be switched back. “I see this as an urgent matter to fix,” Valerie Brader, Snyder’s deputy legal counsel, said in an email to Michael Gadola, Snyder’s legal counsel; Dennis Muchmore, Snyder’s chief of staff; and two other aides in Snyder’s office. Gadola, a Flint native, was more personal in his email response. “The notion that I would be getting my drinking water from the Flint River is downright scary,” Gadola wrote. “... My Mom is a City resident. Nice to know she’s drinking water with elevated chlorine levels and fecal coliform. I agree with Valerie. They should try to get back on the Detroit system as a stopgap ASAP before this thing gets too far out of control.” Sikkema said the governor was aware of the problem and Brader’s suggestion to switch back to Detroit water. At a minimum, the governor should have conducted a full review of water quality at that point, according to the task force. But that didn’t happen. CONTINUED ON PAGE 4
Left, city employees and officials raise glasses of treated water from the Flint River April 25, 2014, at the Flint Water Treatment Plant. (Samuel Wilson | MLive.com)
there have already been two boil water advisories because there are signs of bacteria.
October 2014: General Motors announces Flint’s water is too corrosive for manufacturing at its engine plant in Flint. The announcement prompts a flurry of communication among top Snyder officials, including Chief of Staff Dennis Muchmore and his legal advisors. One attorney, Michael Gadola, recommends an immediate switch back to Detroit water. The Department of Health and Human