The Exploit Intelligence Project
Dan Guido SOURCE Boston, 04/20/2011
https://www.isecpartners.com
Intro and Agenda I work for iSEC Partners NYC, Seattle, SF – specialize in Application Security
I don’t have a product to sell you
Today, I’m going to be sharing data and my analysis
of attacker capabilities and methods An informed defense is more effective and less costly
EIP shows that intelligence-driven, threat-focused
approaches to security are practical and effective
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WARNING! The commentary is really important for this talk. If you’re a reporter, please contact me and I’ll be happy to provide that commentary for any section you’re interested in: dguido@isecpartners.com
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We Have An Analysis Problem Or, you’re counting the wrong beans!
Let’s Talk About Vulnerabilities
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*IBM X-Force 2010 Trend and Risk Report
How many vulnerabilities did you have to pay attention to in 2010?
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since 2006
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Vulnerability Origin
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*Secunia Yearly Report 2010
Affected Vendors (2010) 1 2
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Oracle Adobe Microsoft Apple
5
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Wheel of Vulnerability Fortune
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*Secunia: The Security Exposure of Software Portfolios
Locations to Track (2010) 6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Targeted Attacks
ZDI
Prominent Researcher
Personal Website
Known Behavior
Silent Patch
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Google Chrome is Insecure!
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*Bit 9 Research Report: Top Vulnerable Apps – 2010
How many vulnerabilities were massively exploited in Google Chrome in 2010?
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Are we doing something wrong? Yes, you’re doing it backwards!
We Have to Start at Attacks 1.
2.
3.
Where do bad guys get their info from? How do bad guys view the new vulns that come out? How effective are my defenses against this attacker?
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Maslow’s Internet Threat Hierarchy # of Attacks
Data Lost
APT
IP
Targeted
$$$
Mass Malware
Banking Credentials
Mass Malware How does it work?
Kill Chain Model Systematic model for evaluating intrusions Helps us objectively evaluate attacker capabilities
Align defense to specific processes an attacker takes
Typically used as a model to defend against APT Evolves beyond response at point of compromise
Assumes unfixable vulnerabilities
First described by Mike Cloppert
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Recon
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Weaponization
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Delivery
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Exploitation
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Installation
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Command and Control
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Actions on Objectives
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Leads to Cyber Pompeii
Process Overview Recon
Millions of Infected Sites
Weaponize
Thousands of Vulnerabilities
Delivery
Thousands of IPs The last point that you have control of your data
Exploit
<100 Exploits
Install
Millions of Malware Samples
C2
Actions
Existing defenses attack the most robust aspects of mass malware operations
Thousands of IPs
N/A
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Going on the Offensive
Exploit Kit Popularity (2011)
*ThreatGRID Data
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Exploit Kit Popularity AVG Threat Labs
Malware Domain List Krebs on Security Malware Intelligence
Contagio Dump Malware Tracker M86 Security …
Data Sources Blackhole
LuckySploit
Bleeding Life
Phoenix 2.5, 2.4, 2.3, 2.2, 2.1, 2.0
CrimePack 3.1.3, 3.0, 2.2.8, 2.2.1
SEO Sploit pack
Eleonore 1.6, 1.4.4, 1.4.1, 1.3.2
Siberia
Fragus
WebAttacker
JustExploit
YES
Liberty 2.1.0, 1.0.7
Zombie
Unique Pack
Data Processing Decode Jsunpack Generic JS Unpacker
Decodeby.us PHP De-obfuscation
Detect YARA Project
Relate SHODAN HQ Python API for ExploitDB,
MSF, CVE
Live Testing Vmware Windows XP/7
Generic scanning engine
Note: All free tools except VMWare/Windows
Jsunpack Rules rule IEStyle { meta: ref = “CVE-2009-3672” hide = true impact = 8
strings: $trigger1 = “getElementsByTagName” nocase fullword $trigger2 = “style” nocase fullword $trigger3 = “outerhtml” nocase fullword
condition: all of them
} 33
Jsunpack vs Eleonore 1.4.1
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vuln_search.py CVE Name ID
Metasploit Authors Description ID Name Rank
Exploit DB Author Date ID Name
References Vendor URLs (ex. MSB) ZDI Other Notable URLs Powered by:
Sample Results: CVE-2010-1818 Exploit DB
08/30/2010 Ruben Santamarta Apple QuickTime "_Marshaled_pUnk" Backdoor 14843
Metasploit
Ruben Santamarta, jduck Apple QuickTime 7.6.7 _Marshaled_pUnk Code Execution “… exploits a memory trust issue in Quicktime…” exploit/windows/browser/apple_quicktime_marshaled_punk Rank: Great
Refs http://reversemode.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=
view&id=69&Itemid=1 OSVDB-67705
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Recap
Mapping of Exploit Kits -> CVEs + Metadata
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Targeting Trends Java from 2008 to Present
Targeting Trends Java, Round One 12-08 – Prominent researcher finds CVE-2008-5353
08-09 – Wins a Pwnie (researcher interest runs high) 08-09 – ZDI submissions start trickling out 11-09 – 1 kit incorporates CVE-2008-5353
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Java, Round Two 11-09 – ZDI publishes 2nd batch of Java vulns CVE-2009-3867
01-10 – Three kits integrate 1st and 2nd vulns CVE-2008-5353 and CVE-2009-3867
04-10 – 3rd batch of researcher disclosures CVE-2010-0886, CVE-2010-0840, CVE-2010-0842
Back and forth between researchers/malware keeps
interest in Java running high 40
From April 2010 onwards, new Java exploits are added to almost all popular exploit kits 41
Java Today Popularity 11 out of 15 kits include at least one Java exploit (73%) 7 out of 15 kits include more than one (46%)
Where did this trend come from? Who followed who? The malware or research community?
Why can we even compare these two groups together?
What is next? Java and Flash will continue to be a pain point
Quickest path to install malware in IE and Firefox
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The New Trend: more exploits are being rapidly repurposed from targeted attack campaigns in 2010-2011 6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Targeted Attacks
ZDI
Prominent Researcher
Personal Website
Known Behavior
Silent Patch
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Capabilities Assessment If we only had a time machine
Optimized Defense Jan 1, 2009 – what can we put in place to mitigate all
exploits for the next two years? Restrictions: no patching allowed
2009 recap Internet Explorer 7, Firefox 3.0
Adobe Reader 9 Java, Quicktime, Flash, Office 2007 Windows XP SP3
Dataset represents 27 exploits
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Slice and Dice
Memory Corruption (19)
Logic (8)
Partition exploits based on mitigation options 46
19 Memory Corruption Exploits 5 unique targets IE, Flash, Reader, Java, Firefox, Opera
Do I have my sysadmins adhere to patch schedules or
have them test and enable DEP in four applications? Patch schedules: Monthly, Quarterly, Ad-hoc
Two years: 60+ patches in these apps
I choose Data Execution Prevention (DEP) Good choice! It mitigates 14 exploits.
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8 Logic Flaws 4 unique targets Java, Reader, IE, Firefox, FoxIt
Do we have a business case to justify getting
repeatedly compromised by mass malware? No? Remove Java from the Internet Zone in IE
Configure Reader to prompt on JS execution “Disallow opening of non-PDF file attachments”
This leaves two exploits, one in IE and one in FF
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Most Severe Exploits 2009-2010 IE
Help Center XSS
Firefox
SessionStore
Reader
libTIFF
Reader
CoolType SING
Flash (IE)
newfunction
Quicktime (IE)
_Marshaled_pUnk
Java
getSoundBank 49
Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit Microsoft utility that adds obstacles to exploitation On XP: DEP, SEHOP, Null Page, Heap Spray, EAT filter Distributed as an MSI, controlled via CLI or Registry
Apply it to one application at a time Harden legacy applications Temporary protections against known zero-day
Permanent protections against highly targeted apps
http://blogs.technet.com/cfs-
file.ashx/__key/CommunityServer-ComponentsPostAttachments/00-03-35-03-78/Users-Guide.pdf
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Most Severe Exploits 2009-2010 IE
Help Center XSS
Firefox
SessionStore
The Firefox exploit is only in one kit. We can make an informed decision about the amount of risk we are assuming.
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Intelligence-Driven Mitigations Easy mitigations (22 out of 27 exploits) DEP on IE, Firefox, and Reader No Java in the Internet Zone Disallow opening of non-PDF file attachments
Hard mitigations (all the rest) EMET on IE and Reader, the two most attacked apps Upgrade to IE8 for that pesky Help Center XSS Disallow Firefox, patch it, or accept the risk
Extremely limited susceptibility going forward
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Taking It Further Mass malware exploits are:
Result of users browsing internet sites 2. Shortest path to install malware w/ a single exploit 1.
Malicious HTML
Google Chrome
DEP Bypass
IE8
DEP Bypass
IE7, Plugins, Java, Flash, etc.
Sandbox Escape
Install SpyEye 53
*DDZ – Memory Corruption, Exploitation and You
Google Chrome Frame
“X-UA-Compatible: chrome=1”
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Google Chrome Frame Internet sites standardized around HTML/JS This is why you don’t need IE6 or IE7 at home
For internet sites, add HTTP header w/ Bluecoat Browser is sandboxed Uses auto-updated Google version of Flash No other plugins are loaded Maintain whitelist of internet sites that need IE Typically established vendor relationships
All intranet websites will load with IE as usual Seamless to the user, mitigates all exploits in use 55
Maslowâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Internet Threat Hierarchy # of Attacks
Data Lost
APT
IP
Targeted
$$$
Now youâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;re ready to defend against more advanced attackers
Banking Credentials
Intelligence-Driven Conclusions Don’t wait to act with Flash and Java Pay attention to targeted attack disclosures in 2011
Force malware authors to use multiple exploits Seriously consider Google Chrome Frame
Are your consultants/MSSPs/scanners evaluating
vulnerabilities the same way that attackers are?
Intelligence-Driven Response Informed defense is more effective and less costly Threat-focused security is practical Attack data is necessary to adequately model your risk
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Thanks Rcecoder, Mila Parkour, Francois Paget, Adam Meyers Exploit Pack Table on Contagio Dump & Exploit Kit Source
Mike Cloppert and Dino Dai Zovi Inspiration, ideas, and encouragement
Chris Clark Getting started with the research process at iSEC
John Matherly Creating SHODAN and fixing my bugs
Dean De Beer ThreatGRID data, screenshots, and background material
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References and Q&A Updates with more data at SummerCon, 6/10 Related Presentations (online) Memory Corruption, Exploitation, and You – DDZ Intelligence-Driven Response to APT – M. Cloppert Any Mandiant Presentation
Related Presentations (at SOURCE) 2011 Verizon Data Breach Report, Hutton Fuel for Pwnage, Diaz and Mieres Dino Dai Zovi Keynote
dguido@isecpartners.com
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Appendix
Frequently Asked Question #1 Q: What do you think about network detections?
A: Apply the same analysis process (kill chain) to the
adversary you care about and determine major source of overlaps in intrusions. You may find better indicators than simply IP addresses. ie., “Hey, all the malicious domains attacking me are
registered with same whois data.” See some of Mike Cloppert’s writings See ThreatGRID when it comes out
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Frequently Asked Question #2 ď&#x201A;&#x2014; Q: How can we keep up with these data? You did a
point in time assessment, but I want this going forward. ď&#x201A;&#x2014; A: This analysis process and data should be picked up
by the security industry and used effectively. AV companies have been doing you a disservice by not doing this in the past. They should start now.
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Frequently Asked Question #3
Q: Aren’t you cheating by saying we should use EMET to mitigate past exploits? A: If we were smart enough to enable mitigations like DEP, we would have had a solid 1.5 years where we weren’t affected by mass malware mem corruption exploits at all, buying us a huge amount of time to investigate other mitigations techniques. The exploits that EMET was needed for came after the tool was released in Oct 2009. If you had someone performing this analysis, you could have observed the exploits that bypassed DEP and responded the same way I did. Intelligence gathering is not a static process, we have to continue collecting and responding to new information. There are more ways to use this intelligence. For instance, since we know that Flash and targeted attacks are so rapidly incorporated into mass exploitation campaigns, we would have known on April 11th that CVE-20110611 would be a significant issue. The patch came out on April 15th, but I doubt many orgs patched over the weekend or enabled other mitigating options before it was massively exploited on April 18th. With this data in hand, they would have realized the seriousness of the original event on the 11th.
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Frequently Asked Question #4 Q: Future analysis? A: How [exactly] do researcher disclosures correlate with
massive exploitation? Are the number of bugs exploited as zero-day increasing? Why? Do researchers follow zero-day disclosure trends or vice-versa? Exactly how much exploit code is modified from public PoC’s before being integrated into a kit? Expect new results some time in June
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