Power and Control in Disinvested Affordable Housing: San Francisco’s Limited Equity Housing Co-operatives

The promise of the co-operative housing typology extends beyond providing stable, affordable housing. Co-operatives strive to offer a resident-centered site of democratic participation, where ownership and limited equity combine to provide both collective and shareholder ownership of a valuable community asset. Contentiously, local governments and civic institutions seek certainty and control in housing, prioritizing technical expertise and institutional relationships over deeper investment in resident-owner capacity. Affordable housing practitioners face complex and politicized projects, where co-op health is often threatened by mistrust, institutional failures, and funding scarcity.

In San Francisco, more than 2,000 limited equity housing co-operative units constitute a significant portion of the city’s legacy 1960s and 70s federally-funded housing stock. Co-ops routinely fall into crisis, where residents rely on dysfunctional boards, ill-suited housing management companies, and insufficient government support for their survival. Numerous co-ops face critical survival questions, including deferred maintenance and disrepair, potential redevelopment, political instability, and waning institutional support.

This client-linked thesis delves into the landscape of one local government’s relationship with its co-operative housing ecosystem. Through dozens of interviews, a literature review, policy analysis, and several case studies of existing co-ops, this thesis elucidates present-day challenges and findings, and by discussing peer-city case studies of Vancouver, Canada, and Washington, D.C., proposes viable solutions charting a path forward.

Alberto Cuéllar Cerón

Thesis Advisors: Albert Saiz, Justin Steil Entrepreneurship