RESEARCH BRIEF
D
SPRING 2019
D MIT Sloan’s Dean’s Circle donors share an important quality: they are driven to make an impact. In grateful recognition of your generosity, I am proud to share some of our latest faculty research that—like you—has the potential to make a significant impact in the world. In the following pages, you will find Kristin Forbes’s January 2019 research paper, Macroprudential Policy: What We’ve Learned, Don’t Know and Need to Do, which is set to appear in the American Economic Review later this year. As you will read, Forbes argues that recent efforts to strengthen the global financial system may actually be paving the way for another financial crisis. Preceding the paper is a brief article which summarizes some of this research. If you would like to learn more about the work MIT Sloan faculty and alumni are doing, be sure to attend the MIT Sloan Global Women’s Conference in NYC on October 3rd. This day-long event will be followed by an exclusive Dean’s Circle reception for you to further engage with the faculty speakers, Dean Schmittlein, and other dedicated Dean’s Circle donors. I also encourage you to attend the Boston Dean’s Circle Reception on Friday, June 7th at 6:30 p.m. at the InterContinental Hotel in Boston. Held on Friday evening of Reunion Weekend, this is a highly-anticipated, annual event and is free for all Dean’s Circle donors, including non-reunion year donors. We hope you will join the celebration! As these conferences and research publications illustrate, your Dean’s Circle dollars are integral to continuing the work we do here at MIT Sloan. I hope you enjoy experiencing this ‘Dean’s Circle difference’ firsthand through this research brief, and I look forward to seeing you at a Dean’s Circle gathering in the future. Until then,
Wendy Connors Senior Director of Development
KRISTIN FORBES Kristin Forbes is the Jerome and Dorothy Lemelson Professor of Management and Global Economics at MIT’s Sloan School of Management. She has regularly rotated between academia and senior policy positions. From 2014-2017 she was an External Member of the Monetary Policy Committee for the Bank of England. From 2003 to 2005 Forbes served as a Member of the White House’s Council of Economic Advisers and from 2001-2002 she was a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Quantitative Policy Analysis, Latin American and Caribbean Nations in the U.S. Treasury Department. She also was a Member of the Governor’s Council of Economic Advisers for the State of Massachusetts from 2009-2014. Forbes was honored as one of the top 25 economists under the age of 45 who are “shaping how we think about the global economy” (by Finance & Development, 2014). She was also named as a “Young Global Leader” as part of the World Economic Forum at Davos. She is currently a research associate at the NBER and CEPR and a member of the Bellagio Group and Council on Foreign Relations. Forbes’ academic research addresses policy-related questions in international macroeconomics. Recent projects include work on exchange rate pass-through, capital flows, macroprudential regulation, financial crises, contagion, current account imbalances, capital controls, inflation dynamics, foreign investment, and tax holidays. Forbes has chaired research projects on the Global Financial Crisis, Global Linkages and International Financial Contagion. She has won numerous teaching awards and teaches one of the most popular classes at MIT’s Sloan School. Before joining MIT, Forbes worked at the World Bank and Morgan Stanley. She received her PhD in Economics from MIT and graduated summa cum laude with highest honors from Williams College. In her free time, Forbes enjoys traveling, hiking, and scaling tall peaks (including Mt. Blanc and the Grand Teton). She ran the Boston Marathon in 2014 and the London Marathon in 2016.
Global Economics and Management The Global Economics and Management group (GEM) is an explicitly interdisciplinary group that includes faculty with backgrounds in economics, political science, sociology, finance, strategy, management and energy. The group’s research and teaching focuses on the global business environment through a range of disciplines and aims to increase understanding of the international economy and influence global economic policy for the better.
ARE WE PREPARED FOR THE NEXT FINANCIAL SHOCK? by TRACY MAYOR
Changes to the global financial system aimed at building resilience may actually be sowing the seeds of the next crisis. Measures taken to strengthen the global financial system after the 2008 financial crisis have been effective, but they may be opening up new vulnerabilities, research from MIT Sloan shows. “We’ve made substantial progress in devising tools and regulations to build up capital cushions, support the credit supply, and boost liquidity,” says MIT Sloan professor of management Kristin Forbes in a paper to be published in the American Economic Review. “But many risks remain.” Forbes cautions, “It’s not yet clear that these tools can live up to their promise of reducing systemic financial weaknesses and preventing a future shock — from wherever it emerges — from becoming another costly crisis.”
Our successes are likely not nearly enough to avoid another financial crisis. Kristin Forbes | Professor
One of the causes of the 2008 crisis was an insufficient understanding of macroprudential risks — that is, vulnerabilities in the wider financial system by which shocks can spread and become amplified. Before the crisis, most countries relied on central banks for price stability and microprudential regulators for the security of individual banks. The subsequent collapse of the financial system underscored the inherent problems with that approach, Forbes writes.
In the aftermath of the meltdown, most countries established some type of macroprudential authority and adopted new policies and tools, including regulations designed to fortify bank balance sheets and support financial institutions. “These rules have made banks safer, but risks are still there — in some cases they’ve just migrated to other sectors,” says Forbes. The non-bank institutions that make up the “shadow” financial system — including hedge funds, pension funds, insurance companies, securitization vehicles, money market funds, and mortgage funds — are typically outside the regulatory perimeter or subject to oversight by less-powerful bodies, which means they could wind up being a source of broader financial vulnerabilities, she writes.
1
Calibration matters Another issue, says Forbes, is how financial authorities calibrate new regulations. Very tight regulations often significantly reduce risks, but they could also harm economic growth. “Tighter regulations usually entail immediate costs — such as reducing a person’s access to credit to buy a home or start a company. Meanwhile, the benefits of tightening may not appear for years — or may be impossible to measure,” she says. “As a result, figuring out the right level of tightening is a politically tricky endeavor.” More academic research is needed on macroprudential regulations, Forbes argues. In particular, the research ought to focus on better understanding how risks have shifted as investors and institutions find ways around the tighter regulations, as well as creative thinking about future risks. “Macroprudential regulations today prioritize addressing the vulnerabilities behind the 2008 crisis. This makes sense, and there have been important steps forward,” she says. “But we simply don’t know whether changes in the global financial system — including those aimed at building bank resilience — are sowing the seeds of the next crisis.” Article published online at http://mitsloan.mit.edu/ideas-made-to-matter/are-we-prepared-next-financial-shock.
DEAN'S CIRCLE
RECEPTION C O M E T O G E T H E R . R E C O N N E C T. C O N T I N U E L E A R N I N G.
2019 Friday, June 7
Kick-off the summer with Dean Schmittlein at our annual Boston Dean’s Circle Reception! Open to all reunion and non-reunion year Dean’s Circle donors. Friday | June 7, 2019 6:30 - 8:00 p.m. InterContinental Boston - Miel 510 Atlantic Avenue | Boston | MA
Formal invitation to follow. To register early, please email 2
Michele Emonds at memonds@mit.edu.
“Macroprudential Policy: What We Know, Don’t Know and Need to Do.” Forbes, Kristin J. American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings. Forthcoming. (May 2019). Paper prepared for AEA Annual meetings held in Atlanta, GA in January 2019. Copyright & Permissions Copyright © 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018 by the American Economic Association. Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of American Economic Association publications for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not distributed for profit or direct commercial advantage and that copies show this notice on the first page or initial screen of a display along with the full citation, including the name of the author. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than AEA must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. The author has the right to republish, post on servers, redistribute to lists and use any component of this work in other works. For others to do so requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Permissions may be requested from the American Economic Association Administrative Office by going to the Contact Us form and choosing "Copyright/Permissions Request" from the menu. Copyright © 2018 AEA
Macroprudential Policy: What We’ve Learned, Don’t Know and Need to Do BY Kristin J. Forbes* Forthcoming, American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 2019 Abstract: Over the last decade, macroprudential policy has made important advances and become more widely used. We have a better understanding of its goals and tools, and are accumulating evidence that it can be effective on its direct targets, albeit often with unintended leakages and spillovers. There has been less progress, however, in terms of understanding: the ramifications of these leakages and spillovers, the optimal calibration of various tools, and how to identify the next risks as the financial system evolves. A top priority is better understanding the new vulnerabilities developing as risks shift outside the perimeter of existing regulations. * MIT-Sloan School of Management, NBER and CEPR, MITSloan School, Room E62-416, 100 Main Street, Cambridge, MA 02142 (e-mail: kjforbes@mit.edu). Thanks to Thomas Philippon, Annette Vissing-Jorgensen and other participants at the ASSA annual meetings for helpful comments.
“best practice” macroeconomic framework now involves 3Ms: macroprudential policy, monetary
policy
and
microprudential
supervision. But is their sufficient progress?
During a discussion of the 2008 financial
Can macroprudential tools live up to their
crisis, the Queen of England asked, “Why did
promise of meaningfully reducing systemic
no one see it coming?” One recurring theme in
financial vulnerabilities? Can they prevent the
attempts to answer this question is an
next shock—from wherever it emerges—from
insufficient understanding of macroprudential
evolving into another costly crisis? If not, what
risks—of
more should be done?
vulnerabilities
in
the
broader
financial system and mechanisms by which
The
term
“macroprudential”
seems
shocks can spread and be amplified through the
straightforward (stability of the entire financial
system. The “best practice” macroeconomic
system), but quickly becomes complicated
framework in 2008, which relied on central
when constructing specific policies, applying
banks for price stability and microprudential
them, and assessing their effectiveness. It
regulators for the stability of individual
includes
institutions, was missing this crucial focus.
vulnerabilities. Even translating the goal of
Countries around the world have learned this lesson, however, and most have established
a
diverse
set
of
tools
and
financial stability to specific targets and policies is not straightforward.
some type of macroprudential authority and
As macroprudential policies have been
adopted an array of macroprudential tools. The
adopted more widely over the last decade,
1
however, we are beginning to accumulate evidence on their effectiveness, making this an opportune time to assess their successes and shortcomings. This paper explores what we have learned (Section I), what we don’t know (Section II), and what we need to do to make macroprudential policy more effective in the future (Section III).
I. What We’ve Learned The increased attention to macroprudential policy over the last decade has meaningfully improved our understanding of its goals, tools, effectiveness, and unintended consequences. A. Goals and Tools 1
The discussion suggests that we have made
Unlike monetary policy—which can be
substantive progress in terms of understanding
succinctly summarized as focusing on one goal
the goals and developing a toolkit for
(such as 2% inflation) and accomplished
macroprudential policy. We are also beginning
through a small number of tools (such as
to accumulate evidence that many of these tools
adjusting an interest rate)—macroprudential
can successfully accomplish their specific
policy involves more amorphous goals and
goals, albeit often with unintended leakages
many more tools. It is even hard to assess if
and spillovers. There has been less progress,
macroprudential policy has been successful if
however, in terms of understanding: the
“success” is a crisis that never happened.
ramifications of these leakages and spillovers,
With these caveats, progress has been made
how to calibrate various tools, and how to
in defining three broad (and related) objectives
identify the next set of risks as the global
for macroprudential policy: (1) addressing
financial system evolves. In particular, there is
excessive credit expansion and building
more to do in terms of monitoring the new
resilience in the overall financial system; (2)
vulnerabilities that develop as individuals,
reducing key amplification mechanisms of
banks, and other firms adapt and shift risky
systemic risk; and (3) mitigating structural
exposures outside the regulatory perimeter.
vulnerabilities related to important institutions and markets. Macroprudential policy should improve the economy’s ability to withstand shocks and allow the financial system to function effectively under adverse conditions.
1
For progress on these goals and tools, see CGFS (2010), IMFFSB-BIS (2016), Cecchetti and Schoenholtz (2017) and Forbes (2018).
2
Progress has also been made developing a
attain the ultimate goals of building broader
macroprudential “toolkit” that includes: (1)
financial resilience and supporting economies
capital and reserve instruments; (2) liquidity
during downturns. This is more challenging,
instruments; (3) credit instruments; and (4)
and the initial evidence is mixed, but generally
structural institutions. Individual countries
supportive. 3
have adopted different combinations of these
regulations can support the supply of credit
tools, reflecting their history, institutions,
during downturns, crises, and/or recoveries.
political priorities, and vulnerabilities.
Martin and Philippon (2017) show how
B. Effectiveness As these macroprudential tools are being more widely used, a body of research is beginning to provide evidence on what does—
Several
macroprudential
papers
regulations
find
could
that
have
reduced unemployment during the 2008-12 recession in the Eurozone. C. Unintended Consequences
and does not—work. 2 Although this literature
A final set of results emerging from this
is still in its infancy, and the observations and
literature is that macroprudential policies often
period for which to assess their impact is
have unintended leakages and spillovers. 4
limited, the evidence suggests that many
Leakages are shifts in lending or credit to other
macroprudential tools can influence their
institutions in the same country, while
immediate objective. For example, papers
spillovers are shifts to other countries. The
show that raising bank reserve requirements
evidence suggests these leakages and spillovers
reduces aggregate credit growth, and housing-
regularly occur and can be significant.
related policies restrain household credit
Two studies provide concrete examples.
growth. A smaller set of studies shows that
Aiyar et al. (2014) shows that increased capital
limits to foreign currency (FX) exposures
requirements on UK domestic banks causes
reduce bank borrowing and lending in FX.
foreign banks to increase their UK lending,
Several studies have a more ambitious goal,
with this “leakage” about one-third of the
of assessing whether macroprudential policies
contraction in lending by UK banks. Ahnert et
2 For evidence and cites, see Cerutti et al. (2015), Buch and Goldberg (2016), IMF-FSB-BIS (2016) and Forbes (2018). 3 Also see Cerutti et al. (2015), IMF-FSB-BIS (2016) and Forbes, Fratzscher and Straub (2015).
4 For evidence, see Avdjiev et al. (2016), Buch and Goldberg (2016), Agénor and da Silva (2017) and Forbes (2018).
3
al. (2018) shows that tighter regulations on FX
discussed
bank borrowing causes companies to increase
vulnerabilit
FX debt issuance, with this “leakage” about
Although
10% of the initial reduction on bank FX
magnitude
borrowing.
spillovers)
Studies
focusing
on
the
international
than the di
spillovers from macroprudential regulation
policies, it
also often find significant effects, but usually
context. Th
smaller in magnitude. For example, Buch and
meaningful
Goldberg (2016) finds that macroprudential
of the secto
tools can generate significant cross-border
consider A
bank credit spillovers, but the magnitudes are
tighter FX
usually moderate and sometimes insignificant.
leakage of
Forbes et al. (2017) finds larger spillovers in
increase in
global capital flows—but this may reflect its
to the reduc
focus on the UK, a major banking center.
equivalent,
II. What We Don’t Know Despite these advances in our understanding of macroprudential policy, there is still much that we do not know. I will focus on three areas crucial for these regulations to meaningfully bolster financial resilience: the new risks from the leakages and spillovers, appropriately calibrating the regulations, and targeting the next shock rather than focusing on the past. A. Incorporating the Risks from Leakages and Spillovers An assessment of macroprudential policy should incorporate the leakages and spillovers
4
FX corpor
markets suc
meaningful
the purview
Even mo
correspond
broader fin
example ab
Are these e
their new c
solvent if th
If not, wi
systemic ris
FX risk u
critical sect
tions on FX to increase
discussed
above,
including
any
new
vulnerabilities introduced.
age� about
Although the evidence suggests that the
bank FX
magnitude of these leakages (and especially spillovers) tends to be meaningfully smaller
nternational
than the direct effects of the macroprudential
regulation
policies, it is important to put these results in
but usually
context. The unintended effects can still be
e, Buch and
meaningful when assessed relative to the size
oprudential
of the sector where the risks shift. For example,
ross-border
consider Ahnert et al. (2018), which shows
gnitudes are
tighter FX regulations on banks generate a
nsignificant.
leakage of “only� 10% (measured as the
pillovers in
increase in corporate FX debt issuance relative
y reflect its
to the reduction in bank FX borrowing). This is
center.
equivalent, however, to a 15%-20% increase in
w
derstanding
s still much
n three areas
eaningfully
w risks from
ppropriately
rgeting the
FX corporate debt issuance for emerging markets such as Brazil and Indonesia. This is a meaningful impact on a market that is not under the purview of macroprudential regulators. Even more difficult to assess is what any corresponding shifting of risks implies for broader financial stability. Continuing with the example above, who holds this new FX debt? Are these entities aware of the risks related to
the past.
their new currency exposure? Will they remain
m Leakages
If not, will their failure generate broader
ntial policy
d spillovers
solvent if there is a large currency movement? systemic risks? Although this reduction in bank FX risk undoubtedly builds resilience in a critical sector, this shifting of risks outside the
regulated sector may not only introduce new
tight these regulations should be to provide
vulnerabilities—but
less
sufficient protection during a downturn. Many
not monitored, and harder to
of these tools have only been widely used over
prepare for. If these new FX-related exposures
the past few years—a period of recovery—
are dispersed and diversified, there may be less
providing limited experience of how much
systemic
are
resilience they provide during a period of
financial
financial stress. Will the current levels of
interrelationships, they could amplify risks in
macroprudential regulations prove stringent
unexpected ways that are harder to address.
enough to provide the expected financial
understood,
risks
implications,
concentrated
and
but
feed
that
if into
are
they
B. Calibrating the Regulations A second issue about which we need to learn more is how to appropriately set and calibrate different regulations—especially given the inherent political challenges. Macroprudential regulations have costs and benefits, and calibrating their levels to find the optimal balance is not straightforward. Very tight regulations on certain types of exposures would significantly reduce the risks related to those exposures, but could also significantly harm economic growth. If the economic slowdown was large enough, it could even increase the risks of financial instability in the future. Setting tighter regulations will also increase incentives for borrowers to shift outside the regulated sector, increasing the risks related to leakages and spillovers. Aggravating this challenge of finding the optimal level at which to set macroprudential regulations is the limited experience of how
5
stability when the next downturn hits? Stress tests attempt to answer this question, but it is extremely difficult to model the various interactions. The only true test will come with the next downturn. Moreover, even if we knew how to calibrate regulations optimally, there are challenging political hurdles. Tighter regulations usually entail immediate costs (such as reduced access to credit), while the benefits may not appear for years—or even be impossible to measure at all (i.e., a crisis avoided). Any macroprudential authority influenced by the political cycle would be tempted to adopt less stringent regulations.
Uncertainty
about
optimal
calibration only adds to this bias. Why would any politically sensitive authority adopt costly regulations if there is uncertainty about whether they are even necessary? A clear example of how these challenges can bias macroprudential authorities to being “soft” is use of the counter-cyclical capital buffer
(CCyB). The CCyB is a macroprudential tool
(such as hedge funds, pension funds, insurance
that has widespread academic and policy
companies, securitization vehicles, money
support and a well-defined framework. It could
market funds, and mortgage funds). Most
cushion economies against “booms” as well as
macroprudential regulations focus on banks,
“busts”. Although many countries have a
leaving these “shadow” institutions outside the
framework in place to use the CCyB, as of 2017
regulatory perimeter or subject to oversight by
only about six countries have tightened it at all.
other bodies, which are usually less powerful,
None have tightened it or varied it as
adopt less stringent regulations, and are less
aggressively as suggested by basic calculations
focused on macroprudential risks. In fact, many
on its optimal use (i.e., Hanson et al., 2011).
of
C. The Source of the Next Shock A final concern about the current state of macroprudential policy is if it is sufficiently preparing for the next shock. Macroprudential regulations today prioritize addressing the vulnerabilities behind the 2008 crisis. This makes sense, and there has been meaningful progress, especially in requiring that the banks at the heart of the last crisis are better capitalized and less leveraged. But where will the next shock come from? Could changes in the global financial system—including those aimed at building bank resilience—be sowing the seeds of the next crisis? One potential vulnerability is the “shadow” financial system—the range of non-bank institutions involved in financial transactions
5
See Forbes (2018) for evidence of this in Iceland. In 2016 pension funds in Iceland originated over half of new mortgages by value.
6
the
leakages
from
macroprudential
regulations are diverting financial flows to this shadow financial system. Moreover, these “shadow” institutions could be a source of broader financial vulnerabilities. For example, if tighter regulations on banks’ mortgage exposures cause consumers to shift to other sources of housing finance (such as pension funds)—then another key sector of the economy could become exposed to the housing market. 5 Or, as non-bank institutions take on the “leakage” of FX exposure that was previously held by banks, if these non-bank financers have bank loans and become insolvent after a large currency movement, the banks would still be negatively affected by FX movements. As another example, consider recent shifts in cross-border capital flows, shifts that partly reflect tighter bank regulations. Gross cross-
border banking flows collapsed by over two-
importance
thirds between 2007 and 2017. Since cross-
combined with its more widespread use, has
border banking flows tend to be the most
undoubtedly helped improve the resilience of
volatile type of capital flow and played a key
financial systems.
role in the severity of the 2008 crisis, this has
of
macroprudential
policy,
These successes, however, are only a start,
of
and likely not nearly enough to avoid another
financial systems around the world to the types
financial crisis in the future. There are key
of shocks behind the 2008 crisis.
issues around macroprudential policy about
undoubtedly
increased
the
resilience
But what about the next set of shocks? As
which we do not have sufficient understanding,
international banking flows have declined,
such as on the new risks generated from the
portfolio debt flows now constitute a larger
leakages and spillovers, on how to calibrate the
share of gross global capital flows. Portfolio
different regulations (especially given political
debt flows can also be volatile, and along with
incentives), and on the potential risks to
cross-border debt flows, are key drivers of the
financial stability outside the mandates for
sudden “surges” and “stops” that correspond to
most macroprudential authorities.
periods of financial instability (Forbes and
On a more positive note, there are a number
Warnock, 2014). Portfolio debt flows could
of steps that economists and policymakers can
also be particularly vulnerable to the current
take to address these shortcomings.
Are
First, more academic research is needed on
macroprudential regulations nimble enough to
macroprudential regulations. This is not an
address these new types of vulnerabilities?
easy field to delve into. It requires learning a
changes
in
global
interest
rates.
substantial number of acronyms and technical
III. What We Need to Do
language—none of which is taught in graduate
This paper has highlighted a number of successes of macroprudential policy. There is a more coherent framing of its goals, a more developed toolkit of policies to target these goals, and an emerging body of evidence documenting that these tools can significantly affect their primary targets, albeit with unintended
7
consequences.
The
elevated
school. Nonetheless, it would be well worth the effort. Few academics have yet ventured into this area, and the rapid adoption of different regulations across countries over the last decade has provided a wealth of data and potential evidence. Careful research could have substantial impact on policy at the highest level and should be a priority for economists—
especially for a profession that was slow to see
especially those arising outside the purview of
the vulnerabilities that led to the 2008 crisis.
most regulators. Macroprudential regulations
A second area for progress is on designing
currently focus on where the last set of
institutions to support the optimal use of
vulnerabilities arose, especially in banks and
macroprudential
mortgage
policy.
Although
most
markets.
These
are
critically
countries have some type of committee or
important, but the next crisis could start in other
institution in charge of macroprudential
sectors. In fact, the success of existing
regulations, there is little consistency and “best
regulations in reducing the risks in banks could
practice” yet. 6 Tightening macroprudential
be
regulations can be politically challenging, as
vulnerabilities elsewhere, such as by shifting
the costs are immediate and apparent, while the
exposures to currency and liquidity risk to the
benefits are more amorphous and may not
corporate
appear for years. The CCyB example suggests
system—sectors about which regulators have
that regulations are not being sufficiently
less information and where entities may be less
tightened to provide the resilience that is hoped
prepared to handle surprises.
for. The optimal macroprudential authority
contributing
sector
to
the
and
build-up
shadow
of
financial
Macroprudential policy has made impressive
should be independent and somewhat insulated
progress
from the political cycle, while at the same time
probability of another crisis unfolding in the
maintaining a high degree of transparency and
banking
accountability, as macroprudential regulations
Macroprudential policy still has some way to
can affect consumers, firms, and the broader
go, however, to ensure that there is not another
economy.
show
crisis and economists are not asked again by a
Policy
future monarch: “Why did no one see it
Several
promise—such
as
frameworks the
Financial
Committee at the Bank of England—but careful analysis is needed of which frameworks are most effective and politically viable across the business cycle. A final area where more progress is needed is creative thinking about future risks—and 6
See IMF-FSB-BIS (2016), Edge and Liang (2017), and Forbes (2018) for key issues.
8
coming?”
and
significantly
system
as
it
reduced did
in
the 2008.
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Macroprudential Policies: New Evidence.”
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“Inspecting
the
Mechanism:
Leverage and the Great Recession in the Eurozone.” American Economic Review 107(7): 1904-37.
FINANCE BEYOND CRISIS Impact, Disruption, and Innovation
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