Columbia Undergraduate Journal of South Asian Studies, Vol II Issue I by Mallika Narain

THE COLUMBIA UNDERGRADUATE JOURNAL OF SOUTH ASIAN STUDIES Volume II # Issue II Spring 2011

Editorial Collective: Editor-in-Chief: Mallika Narain Editors: Sylvia Abdullah Rakhi Agrawal Nadya Ali Salonee Bhaman Jazmin M. Graves Sarah Khan Anupam Mohanty Maisha Rahman Ayushi Roy The Columbia Undergraduate Journal of South Asian Studies (CUJSAS) is an academic journal based out of Columbia University. The journal is a space for undergraduates to publish their original research on South Asia (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka) from both the social sciences and humanities. It is published biannually in the spring and the fall. http://www.columbia.edu/cu/cujsas/ ISSN: 2151-4801 All work within the Columbia Undergraduate Journal of South Asian Studies is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License. ""!

TABLE OF CONTENTS Letter from the Editor

About the Authors

Notes From the Field

Fieldwork Notes on Inclusionary Zoning: Practical Implications of Policies for Housing Allotments in Gurgaon, India Laura E. Andreae Dartmouth College Papers

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Left-Wing Extremism in Central Bihar: Understanding Decline Amidst Emergence Sean Angiolillo University of Pennsylvania

Bharti Kher: Indian Contemporary Art in a Globalized World Jean Mason Dartmouth College

The Uses of Buddhism in Colonial and Post-Colonial India: Examining Contestation Around the Site of Bodh Gaya Kirstin Krusell Brown University

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LETTER FROM THE EDITOR It has been a semester rife with changes for the Columbia Undergraduate Journal of South Asian Studies. We welcomed enthusiastic new editors, strengthened the Journal’s sponsorship and campus recognition, printed our last issue in hard copy form, and launched an aptly named lecture hop blog, Qalam. This has absolutely been a team effort, and one that has been based in the editorial board’s collective faith in the Journal and the strong sense of friendship that we cultivated during numerous drawn-out meetings. At once informal and serious, these seemingly paradoxical relationships we have created with one another have enabled us to propel the Journal into a new epoch; this EIC could not have asked for a more supportive or committed team of editors. As though deliberately reflecting this sequence of modifications, the nature of our selections for this issue has morphed as well, to better represent original analysis and fieldwork – Jean Mason’s paper on Bharti Kher, for example, balances its research with entirely original analysis, applying the language of visual criticism to contemporary Indian art, which has as yet been underrepresented in academia. Mason explores the burgeoning contemporary art market in India and the contribution of an artist tearing down dualisms evident in gender norms and in the east-west dialectic; her paper suggests that Indian art is, in fact, capable of symbolically depicting hybridization on a number of levels. Too, we have added an entirely new section to the Journal, “Notes From the Field,” with the purpose of furthering journalistic work about South Asia; this section seeks to move beyond academic research in order to provide a platform for the sort of impassioned field research being done by individuals like Laura Andreae. Andreae’s work, which addresses the practical implications of housing policies in Gurgaon, could not have been possible had she not traveled to her target area of research and navigated the public and private spheres she found there. Her policy recommendations are borne out of a series of involved interviews with urban planners, and could prove vital in the re-imagining of housing policies to truly aid the impoverished. The Journal has been, to speak in earnest, an incredible experience for me over the past couple of years. With these concluding remarks rounding out my time as EIC, I am very excited to hand over CUJSAS to a wonderful new editorial board! Mallika Narain May 2011 "$!

ABOUT THE AUTHORS LAURA E. A NDREAE received the 2010-2011 H. Allen Brooks Traveling Fellowship from Dartmouth College. With this graduate fellowship, she traveled through India and China, studying socially inclusive urban planning. These field notes are from her time in Delhi. Laura graduated from Dartmouth College in 2010 with a BA in Human Geography, and she will continue to pursue her research interests by returning to Dartmouthâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Geography Department as a research assistant in Fall 2011. SEAN A NGIOLILLO graduated magna cum laude from the University of Pennsylvania in May 2011 with a BA in International Relations and South Asia Studies. Supported by three research grants, he traveled to India, where he worked as a research intern at New Delhi's Institute of Peace & Conflict Studies and conducted research for an honors thesis in South Asia Studies. He has previously worked as a project lead for the Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program and currently works as a research assistant for the University of Pennsylvaniaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Center for the Advanced Study of India. JEAN MASON is from Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania and is currently a senior at Dartmouth College studying Art History and Studio Art. When she is not in the library or the studio, she enjoys singing in the Dartmouth Rockapellas, an all-female a cappella group dedicated to singing songs of social justice. During the summer after her junior year, she fused her passions for art and social justice and spent the term working in New Delhi at an art gallery dedicated to spreading social awareness. Ever since her time in India, she has enjoyed looking at Asia through the lens of the art world. KIRSTIN KRUSELL graduated from Brown University in May 2011 with a BA in Development Studies and Classics. By studying contemporary heritage management policies, she has been able to combine her diverse academic interests. While at Brown, she coordinated Partnership for Adult Learning, a program that provides educational opportunities for adults with developmental disabilities. In addition, she has conducted research on child nutrition in India and Samoa. She hopes to pursue a career in the field of Global Health. !

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FIELDWORK NOTES ON INCLUSIONARY ZONING: PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF POLICIES FOR HOUSING ALLOTMENTS IN GURGAON, INDIA LAURA E. ANDREAE, DARTMOUTH COLLEGE INTRODUCTION In 2007, India’s National Housing and Habitat Policy estimated the country’s urban housing shortage to be 24.7 million housing units, of which 99% is needed for the economically weaker sections (EWS) and lower income groups (LIG).! There is constant debate about the roles of the state, private sector, and community in responding to the formidable need of providing adequate shelter for the urban poor. Over the past forty years, the Indian government’s approach to housing policies has generally given great weight to the involvement of the private sector. Yet the challenge with a partnership model is determining how to involve the private sector in developing housing for low-income groups when these markets are less profitable. One concrete approach the Indian state has taken to promote the private sector’s development of housing for the urban poor is through inclusionary zoning. India’s Ministry of Urban Development wrote “The Urban Development Plans Formulation and Implementation Guidelines” in 1996, which recommended “alternative models of private sector participation” by requiring private developers to follow inclusionary zoning laws that would reserve a certain percentage of small housing plots for EWS and LIG categories." The state of Haryana implemented this recommendation such that inclusionary zoning in India is casually referred to as “The Gurgaon Model.” !

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Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation, “National Urban Housing and Habitat Policy 2007” (New Delhi: MoHUPA, GOI, 2007), 3. " Ministry of Urban Development, “The Urban Development Plans Formulation and Implementation Guidelines (UDPFI)” (New Delhi: MoUD, GOI, 1996), appendix D.

FIELDWORK NOTES ON INCLUSIONARY ZONING

Gurgaon is a satellite town of Delhi, which grew dramatically with India’s economic liberalization that was gradually introduced in 1985 and then formalized in 1991. According to provisional 2011 census data, between 2001 and 2011, Gurgaon had the highest decadal growth rate of any part of Delhi, with the population increasing by 73.9% from roughly 870,000 to 1,510,000.$ Gurgaon’s landscape has experienced rapid transformation following international models of modernization, with the proliferation of high-rises, shopping malls, business centers, and gated housing complexes. As Gurgaon’s development trends largely cater to the preferences of the upper class, this location’s context provides an intriguing set of dynamics for studying the effectiveness of inclusionary zoning in India. My preliminary fieldwork found that Indian planning professionals widely acknowledge that inclusionary zoning policies for residential township developments fail to provide housing for the poor as intended. Honestly reflecting upon the effectiveness of inclusionary zoning in Gurgaon is of great importance because recent national urban planning reforms in India suggest that other states should follow Haryana’s inclusionary zoning policies. The 2005 Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JnNURM), the largest urban development mission of the Government of India since independence, suggests earmarking at least 2025% of developed land in all housing projects for EWS and LIG categories with a system of cross subsidization.% Thus, this research sought to answer: What is the state of Haryana’s policies regarding inclusionary zoning in new residential developments? Do these policies work as intended? If not, what are the political, economic, and social factors adversely affecting the effectiveness of these policies? METHODS #

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“73.9% Increase in Gurgaon’s Population,” The Times of India, April 6, 2011, accessed April 14, 2011, http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-0406/gurgaon/29387845_1_literacy-rate-female-population-census-officials. $ Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation, “Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission” (New Delhi: MoUPA, GOI, 2005), 14. #

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I obtained copies of the state of Haryanaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s planning policies regarding inclusionary zoning in new residential developments from The Government of Haryanaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Town & Country Planning website. As this research was based out of Delhi, and the capital of Haryana is in Chandigarh, this research was limited by having no direct contact with the state government. I strategized to primarily work through urban planners in the private sector, because this group is particularly knowledgeable about the realities of the implementation of inclusive zoning policies. In researching the effectiveness of these policies, I used qualitative methods because of the sensitive and subjective nature of this topic. During February and March of 2011, I informally interviewed planners from three different companies about how and why the implementation of these policies differs from their intended design. Two of the planners I interviewed are Indian nationals who went to school in Delhi and now work for Indian-based development firms. The other planner is a foreigner who has been working for an international design firm in Asia for over ten years, specifically working in India for the last couple of years. Thus, in my analysis I gave greater weight to the information I collected from my interviews with the two Indian urban planners, Danu and Gopal,& because these individuals have more experience in working with new residential developments in Gurgaon. I also informally interviewed Professor P.S.N. Rao, the Head of the Housing Department at the School of Planning and Architecture (SPA) in Delhi, to gain a deeper understanding of the factors adversely affecting inclusionary zoning policies in India. Each interview included a basic set of questions to guide the conversation, ensuring that all the informal interviews covered the same crucial topics. Each interview lasted at least 45 minutes. I conducted these interviews at the offices of the professionals so they could easily access policy and layout documents during the interviews. To record the interviews, I took notes during the conversations and used an audio recorder to later transcribe the dialogue. My data collection reached a %

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Pseudonyms are used for research subjects who were working in private firms or were residents of Gurgaon

FIELDWORK NOTES ON INCLUSIONARY ZONING

saturation point after the third interview with a professional urban planner, so I then expanded my research to site visits. Access to the township and group housing projects constructed by private developers in Gurgaon is limited because these sites are gated. Thus, my ability to make site visits depended upon connections and availability of someone to provide me with a tour. Ultimately, I made site visits within two different gated residential areas in Gurgaon. For one site visit, Gopal and his colleague Rahul, a land broker who works for the same developer, toured me through one of their firm’s townships, as well as through the surrounding area. Gopal and Rahul are also both residents of Gurgaon, so they also showed me the two apartment complexes where they live. For the other site visit, I went to an apartment complex development and informally interviewed a resident, who is the housewife of a middleupper class family. During both of these visits I photographed the EWS land and housing allotments. HARYANA’S POLICIES FOR INCLUSIONARY HOUSING The Government of Haryana’s Town & Planning Department’s “Policy for allotment of land/flats earmarked for economical weaker section in the licensed colonies,” dated February 2, 2010, outlines the existing policies for EWS housing allotments, as well as makes amendments according to observed misuses. For a residential plotted colony to receive a license, the existing EWS reservation instructions require 20% of the plots to be reserved for EWS. Residential plotted colonies are large plots of land that a private developer or state development organization divides and sells as smaller residential plots. The minimum EWS plot size is 50 square meters. These plots must have a flat rate of 500 rupees per square yard, so the total price is generally 2,500 rupees. The policy has different specifications for group housing projects, which are groups of apartment complexes that a developer constructs and then sells off as individual flats. A group housing site must reserve 15% of the total number of flats for EWS, and 10% of the main dwelling units in a group housing site must have service apartments for domestic help. EWS #

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flats have a minimum area of 200 square feet, and service apartments have a minimum area of 140 square feet. The maximum cost of an EWS flat is 150,000 rupees. Eligible applicants for EWS allotments must have a total family income lower than 3,500 rupees per month. Applicants should be residents of Haryana, have worked in the state for at least six months, or be an employee of the government. Allotments are advertised, and then applicants are selected through a lottery. The February 2010 policy recognizes that the “scheme is being misused by unscrupulous elements by presenting false information while making applications.”' Thus, the February 2010 policy amends previous plans such that 50% of plots in residential plotted colonies must be sold to the state housing board, which will then construct and sell flats to families who qualify as Below Poverty Line (BPL). The remainder of the plots will be sold by the developer. To improve the transparency of the scheme, the amended policy specifies that advertisements for the lottery must be made in the leading English national daily, as well as in two local newspapers in vernacular language with a circulation of at least ten thousand copies. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF HOUSING ALLOTMENTS IN GURGAON One of the first main questions I asked each urban planner was whether land plots and flats are truly reserved for the EWS groups in accordance with state policies. Both Danu and Gopal responded that land plots and flats are reserved for the EWS in new residential developments as required. In contrast, David, the international planner, stated that occasionally land is not allotted as required. David explained that developers may buy a segment of land that is not contiguous with the main plot, such that EWS plot allotments are made outside of the development. Since David works more with projects outside of Gurgaon, this deviation &

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Department of Town & Country Planning, Haryana, “Policy for Allotment of Land/ Flats Earmarked for Economical Weaker Section in the Licensed Colonies,” February 3, 2010, accessed April 19, 2011, http://tcpharyana.gov.in/.

FIELDWORK NOTES ON INCLUSIONARY ZONING

may be more common in other locations, thus explaining why there was some discrepancy with the answer to this question between my different interviews. My site visits confirmed that within Gurgaon, EWS land plots are generally reserved and EWS flats are constructed as per the policies. The township development I visited had EWS allotted plots, and the gated housing colonies I visited had constructed EWS flats. Furthermore, as Gopal and Rahul drove me around Gurgaon, they showed me many other reserved EWS plots and constructed EWS flats. I subsequently asked each interviewee where EWS flat and plot reservations are generally located within a project’s site. All three urban planners responded that EWS land plot and flat allotments are generally located along the periphery of the site on non-preferential land. For sites larger than those in Gurgaon, sometimes the land for new townships encircles the borders of existing villages. In these cases, EWS plots are often made along the side of an existing village. All three planners explained that most commonly, while land or flat allotments are initially made in accordance with policy requirements, the inclusionary zoning policies in Haryana do not ultimately provide housing for the poor as intended. David stated, “In my opinion, the EWS regulations are not working, because all the money is in payoffs with new township developments.”( EWS allotted plots are generally resold at a higher price, so the intended beneficiaries do not occupy these sites as designed. When Gopal and Rahul toured me through a four-year-old township, I saw that none of the EWS had construction, while about 50% of the normal housing plots were built up. According to Gopal, the EWS plots were originally sold at a price of 2,500 rupees as required by the policies, but these plots were resold on the black market for 1 lakh to 1.45 lakh (one lakh is a unit in the Indian numbering system equaling 100,000), which is four to six times higher than the original price. Since EWS plots are allotted without construction, these plots have been left undeveloped, simply acting as a real estate investment for those who bought the plots on the black market. Gopal explained that despite the policies, which try to restrict EWS plots from being resold, these plots are still resold using “certain mechanisms” such as general power of attorney. '

########################################## David, informal interview by Laura Andreae, March 1, 2011, Gurgaon. #

COLUMBIA UNDERGRADUATE JOURNAL OF SOUTH ASIAN STUDIES

As Rahul showed me an area surrounding his company’s township that a state development agency managed, he identified the EWS plots allotted by the Haryana Urban Development Authority. Some of these plots differed from those in the gated township, because they have been developed and occupied. However, the majority of these constructed flats were not acting as the residences for the intended beneficiaries. Rahul explained how these EWS plots were all “grabbed by property dealers or by politicians.”) I confirmed this statement as we drove past the EWS plots and observed that over half of these constructed plots had signs indicating they were offices for real estate agents, while about 10% of the plots had signs identifying the buildings as politicians’ offices. Another building on an EWS allotment site advertised renting rooms for 5,000-6,000 rupees per room. Rahul suggested that only about 5-10% of these allocated plots might be occupied by the intended EWS beneficiaries. Like EWS plots in residential plotted colonies, EWS flats in group housing projects in Gurgaon are constructed according to the inclusionary zoning policies, but they are not occupied by the intended recipients. Gopal and Rahul showed me one of their company’s gated apartment complexes, which had eight fully occupied eleven-story towers and a separate three-story building for the EWS flats. All of these EWS flats were locked and unoccupied. These professionals explained that the original EWS beneficiaries resold their flats on the black market, so these flats were then held as investments. Rahul estimated that if these flats are used, they will likely become offices for businesses. The other group housing project I visited had four apartment buildings that were 18 stories tall, and on the corner of the site a separate four-story building was constructed for EWS flats. This apartment complex was built eight years ago, and while all of the standard apartments were occupied, all of the EWS flats were locked and unoccupied. The resident of the apartment complex Assha explained that applicants for the EWS flats either showed false information or had others buy the flats on their behalf. The majority of people moving into these EWS flats wanted to use the flats as business locations. Because these flats were not going to be used for their intended purpose, they have ultimately been locked and left vacant. As Assha concluded, these EWS flats are “just

(

########################################## Rahul, site visit by Laura Andreae, March 16, 2011, Gurgaon.

FIELDWORK NOTES ON INCLUSIONARY ZONING

a waste of time and space and money.”* POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL FACTORS ADVERSELY AFFECTING INCLUSIONARY Z ONING IN GURGAON One political barrier to the effectiveness of Haryana’s inclusionary zoning laws is the government’s incapacity to ensure that allotments are given to eligible individuals. The state government formally recognized this problem on April 1, 2011, with a memo encouraging local town planners to check the “scrutiny of all applications received as per the parameters prescribed in the policy.”!+ Furthermore, government capacity is challenged not only by the applicant selection process, but also by replacing unintended recipients with intended recipients. Assha explained that when ineligible individuals started using the EWS flats in her apartment complex, the residential welfare association (RWA) joined with the developer to approach the government, and the situation became a legal battle which evicted the ineligible occupants, leaving these EWS flats vacant for the past six years. Underlying all of my interviews with the urban planners and developers working in Gurgaon was a tone indicating little expectation of the government’s ability to ensure that Haryana’s inclusionary zoning laws will function as designed. Political capacity is further challenged when the poor choose to move out of plots or flats allotted to them. As Professor Rao stated, “Maybe you can have certain parcels of land, but the poor people will not stay there. These things require strict enforcement. So how do you do that? That is the problem.”!! In 2009, the Government of Haryana specified that allotments cannot be transferred or sold for five years to )

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Assha, informal interview by Laura Andreae, March 17, 2011, Gurgaon. !* Department of Town & Country Planning, Haryana, “Guidelines for Processing the Applications for Allotment of EWS Plots/Flats in the Licensed Colony,” April 4, 2011, accessed April 19, 2011, http://tcpharyana.gov.in/. !! P.S.N. Rao, Professor and Head of the Housing Department at the School of Planning and Architecture, informal interview by Laura Andreae, March 3, 2011, Delhi. #

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ensure that housing is given to the intended beneficiaries.!" However, Gopal explained that some people do not follow these policies because they do not believe a democratic government has the right to restrict the transfer of EWS plots/flats. If property is illegally transferred, there is supposed to be a penalty equaling the cost of the plot/flat or the property will be resumed by the government to be re-allotted. But my fieldwork indicates that the local government does not currently have the dedication or capacity to re-acquire and re-allot illegally transferred properties. At first I was surprised to hear these professionals speak so openly about the black market; yet, as I understood more of the broader economic context, the reselling of EWS flats/plots on the black market made more sense. Danu stated, “The biggest irony is that people who have the allotments cannot afford to buy these plots or flats.”!$ If the EWS recipients are required to have a maximum family monthly income of 3,500 rupees, these families cannot afford a flat that is 150,000 rupees. Even the 2,500 rupee minimum price of an unconstructed plot in a township is too high for the lowest economic sections of society because they still have to pay to build a house. Furthermore, even if EWS recipients can afford the allotment, as Professor Rao explained, “because of the huge supply and demand gap, the subsidized price at which you are allotting acquires a very high market value, so there is a tendency or temptation for the fellow to sell it away.”!% Rahul showed me EWS flats and plots which currently have a market value of five times the original price. Thus, according to this land broker, investors and property dealers currently hold many of the unconstructed EWS plots and unoccupied EWS flats in Gurgaon because EWS recipients resold the plots/flats to them. In all three of my interviews with the urban planners, these professionals explained that the majority of the urban poor migrating to Gurgaon or being displaced from their land ultimately move to existing urban villages. These rural villages are surrounded by new urban !"

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Department of Town & Country Planning, Haryana, “Policy for Low Cost / Affordable Housing Projects,” August 8, 2009, accessed April 19, 2011, http://tcpharyana.gov.in/. !# Danu, informal interview by Laura Andreae, February 18, 2011, New Delhi. !$ P.S.N. Rao, informal interview.

FIELDWORK NOTES ON INCLUSIONARY ZONING

development that they are not integrated into, since the urban villages have no development regulations. Gopal and Rahul drove me through Wazirabad, one of the largest urban villages in Gurgaon. In this village I observed how the original occupants build additions to their houses to rent out rooms to migrants and displaced farming families. In these urban villages, one room can be rented for between 1,000 and 2,500 rupees per room. Manual laborers often share a rented room, making the rent around 500 rupees per person per month. Even if an eligible candidate for an EWS plot or flat could afford that housing option, these poor individuals would rather choose to live in more reasonably priced housing in an urban village so they can spend their money in other ways. Social dynamics further inhibit Haryanaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s current inclusionary zoning policies from functioning as intended. One intriguing observation was that the resold EWS plots or flats were not being used for housing, but instead as places primarily for business. Contrary to common misconceptions, the urban poor do have a choice with housing, as they can find housing being built incrementally in slums and urban villages. When migrating to a new area, the urban poor in India tend to follow social connections, where there is mutual trust and an ability to help one another. Then as communities develop, those living in incremental rental housing or unrecognized squatter housing often prefer to stay in these locations due to the benefits of their established social networks, even once they have allotments for housing in a different location. Thus, my assumption is that EWS plots/flats are often not used for housing because these sites have minimal social connections for lower economic classes, especially when allotments are initially done by lottery. Furthermore, the design of the EWS flats and location of the plots/flats may not be attractive to the lower economic classes. A common theme from my interviews with Indian urban planners was that designs for affordable housing projects do not match the lifestyles of people from lower economic segments. Because the poor traditionally live in environments with limited private space, they spend more time working and living in open public spaces. Apartment complex designs are often not conducive to this lifestyle. Furthermore, as the poor have less means for transportation, these sites may not provide adequate connectivity for their daily travels. #

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In exploring the socio-spatial implications of inclusionary zoning, I questioned Gopal about his opinion on urban planning theorists who promote this policy as socially beneficial. His response was that while it is “theoretically good to have an integrated social fabric, when people start practically living it does not actually work. There is a serious change in the social fabric because kids from the EWS create a lot of social conflicts. The kids, they do all kinds of things. They scratch your car. It’s very difficult to handle these guys.”!& The upper class in Gurgaon recognizes how the criminal or offensive behavior of the lower class greatly varies between different contexts. Some urban villages in Gurgaon are perceived as being more nuisance oriented than others. However, sweeping generalizations tend to be made out of fear, thus making the upper class generally uncomfortable with the lower class having access to the same public spaces. This strong upper and middle class stigma against some portions of the lower class has direct implications on the effectives of inclusive zoning policies in Gurgaon. When I talked with Assha about why the EWS flats in her apartment complex had been locked for six years, she explained, “If we gave access to these people who we find suspect, how and when will we be able to contain the security issues? You know, that was the main problem.”!' Assha’s RWA first proposed building a wall and separate entrance between the EWS flats and regular flats, but when this request was denied, the EWS were locked. When the upper class is living in communities developed by private companies, political dynamics with RWAs and the private sector puts the upper classes in a position where they can literally lock out the lower classes. Thus, the upper class’s discomfort with sharing common spaces with the lower class greatly inhibits the successful implementation of inclusionary zoning laws in Gurgaon. However, these social dynamics are further complicated, as my informal interviews with upper class residents in Gurgaon did show nuances in their perceptions towards the lower economic sections. Some families want their domestic help, who they have a trusting relationship with, to be able to live in close proximity. Assha referenced another group housing complex that gave priority to their flat owners to buy the EWS flats within the complex for their domestic help. She continued that she would !%

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Gopal, informal interview. !& Assha, informal interview.

FIELDWORK NOTES ON INCLUSIONARY ZONING

like to purchase one or two of the EWS allotted flats to give to her maid or driver. Similarly, Gopal showed me a luxury condominium complex where he bought a flat and hopes to buy one of the EWS flats when they enter the “market.” He is willing to pay three to four times the legal maximum price so his driver or cook can live on the same site. On the other hand, there is the question of whether these house help would like to live within the same gated area as the upper classes. When I asked Assha about this, she explained that her driver lives with his parents and has expressed a desire to move because of domestic conflicts. Similarly, her maid feels unsafe with her three children in her current location in an informal development. This research should be further expanded on by interviewing members of lowerincome households to more accurately understand how these families would truly feel about living in the same gated area as their upper class employers. FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS This fieldwork suggests that the success of Haryana’s inclusionary zoning policies is inhibited by a complex array of political, economic, and social factors. Thus, while Haryana has recently made minor amendments to its inclusionary zoning laws, these changes will likely have little positive effect because they do not address the roots of the problem. One major area for future research is the exploration of which spatial proximities in Gurgaon are comfortable and beneficial for the homes of those in different socio-economic classes. Most of the flats in Gurgaon’s new housing developments are constructed with an attached bedroom for a live-in house helper. However, many of the flat owners do not want their house help living within their flats, so these rooms serve other purposes such as storage rooms or offices. Yet upper class residents are enthusiastic about the idea of their house help living in separate flats in close proximity to them. If the lower classes are comfortable with this arrangement, then there is a possibility of expanding the extent of land/plot reservations for the poor so this approach can be more effective. Designers of group housing units and townships could build a greater number of low-income flats instead of having only 15-20% of #

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housing units on the site allocated for the lower economic sections. Lower class residents may then feel more comfortable and be able to develop local social connections within their socio-economic class. Developers need to carefully consult with potential occupants of all classes to design a site where there can be both shared and separated spaces as is practical and desired. Furthermore, expanding the existing private-public partnership model could reduce economic barriers to inclusionary zoning if buyers of new condominiums and townships purchased neighboring flats for their domestic help. The government should consider changing policies such that upper class residents can buy smaller, adjacent housing units for their house help. Yet ultimately, even this arrangement will create complications with land rights and housing turn-over. Lower-income families still greatly desire to have security in owning their own land, which will not be provided if their employers own their flats. EWS families may be displaced when their employer moves. Thus, while this model has hope of improving Gurgaonâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s current design of inclusionary zoning, it is not infallible. In the greater scheme of Indiaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s immense housing shortage for the urban poor, such small allotments within new housing developments will be grossly inadequate. The government should consider inclusionary zoning at a larger scale, looking at how land surrounding areas where the urban poor currently live in urban villages can be allotted to the urban poor for organic growth. Master plans should focus on improving the capacity and living conditions of these currently politically neglected areas. This broader approach to inclusionary zoning capitalizes on existing patterns and should be less inhibited by the economic and social dynamics currently limiting Gurgaonâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s inclusionary zoning policies. Ultimately, providing larger land allotments for the urban poor during rural-urban transitions will create more socially sustainable development in these rapidly growing, peri-urban spaces.

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LEFT-WING EXTREMISM IN CENTRAL BIHAR: UNDERSTANDING DECLINE AMIDST EMERGENCE1 SEAN ANGIOLILLO, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA ABSTRACT: Given the predictions of insurgency literature, matched with Bihar’s status as India’s poorest and traditionally worst governed state, one should expect Bihar to be highly susceptible to left-wing extremist (LWE) violence. However, while support for left-wing extremism in India has reached an all-time high, in Central Bihar, it has diminished. In order to gain an understanding of this phenomenon, this study reviews and applies the micro-foundations of conflict literature to the case of Bihar. After examining India’s LWE problem and its counterinsurgency strategy in the context of this literature, it attempts to explain the decline of LWE support in Central Bihar. While recognizing the contributions of the Nitish Kumar administration in improving both governance and development, this study argues that before these advances occurred—in fact during times when governance and development were at their worst—the seeds of decline were already sown. Instead, a range of factors combined to render the mainstream political process the undisputed arena for collective mobilization. This finding carries important implications as India pursues its two-pronged counterinsurgency policy in the face of a growing Maoist rebellion.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! This study could not have been completed without research grants for travel to India from the University of Pennsylvania’s Center for the Advanced Study of India, the South Asia Studies Department, and the Center for Undergraduate Research & Fellowships. The author would also like to thank the staff of the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi for hosting his research. The author gratefully acknowledges the input and comments from all interviewees, particularly Dr. Apoorvanand Jha, Dr. Satish Kumar, Dr. Rakesh Choubey, Mr. P.K. Chaudhary, as well as his faculty advisor Dr. Devesh Kapur, Director of the Center for the Advanced Study of India, University of Pennsylvania. "

LEFT-WING EXTREMISM IN CENTRAL BIHAR

I. INTRODUCTION

On April 13, 2009, ten Indian paramilitary troops were killed in a Maoist attack in Koraput district, Orissa. On June 16, a total of fifteen policemen were killed in separate Maoist attacks in Palamau district, Jharkhand. On October 8, Maoists killed seventeen police officers at a station in Gadchiroli district, Maharashtra. On February 15, 2010, Maoists killed twenty-four Eastern Frontier Rifles (EFR) paramilitaries in their camp in West Midnapore district, West Bengal. And on April 6, a stunning seventy-five Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) jawans were massacred in a Maoist ambush in Dantewada district, Chhattisgarh.# While various regions of India have experienced some level of “left-wing extremist” violence over the past four decades, never have the capabilities of Maoist terror been greater than at present This escalating violence has elevated the CPI(Maoist) and the government’s counterinsurgency tactics into a central national debate. Much of this debate has focused on the origins of left-wing extremist (LWE) support and its corresponding effects on the appropriate counterinsurgency (COIN) response. Most acknowledge that left-wing extremism is a multidimensional problem. Its roots lie not only in interest in the ideology of Marx, Lenin, and Mao but, many would argue, are also directly connected to a lack of socioeconomic development and poor governance. Accordingly, the government has consistently professed a “two-pronged” counterinsurgency strategy of increased police and paramilitary action to regain control of insurgent territory, as well as increased development initiatives to deter citizens from participation in LWE violence.$ Although largely overlooked, the nature of this debate should attract attention to the state of Bihar. According to official figures from the Ministry of Home Affairs, in 2000, India suffered 550 LWE-related casualties. Bihar’s 170 deaths represented 31% of the total that year, the !

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PTI, “Chronology: Major Maoist attacks in last 2 years,” Times of India, May 17, 2010. " Ministry of Home Affairs, Annual Report 2005-2006 (New Delhi: Govt. of India, 2006), 23. !

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second highest contribution of any state. By 2010 however, India’s total LWE violence had nearly doubled to 1,003 casualties, but Bihar’s total declined to 97, not quite half its 2000 total, and constituting only 10% of India’s overall total.% If, however, left-wing extremism appeals to a region’s inhabitants because of poor governance or a lack of development, as theory and debate suggests, certainly Bihar too should be engrossed in Maoist revolt. In addition to its position as India’s classic case of poor governance and abysmal development, in the 1970s through the 1990s, Bihar, particularly Central Bihar,& stood alongside Andhra Pradesh as one of two main centers of Naxal violence. Thus, an important puzzle arises: why has Maoist violence not erupted in Bihar in the manner in which it has in several neighboring states over the last decade? Scholars from a range of disciplines have long sought answers to questions surrounding the causes and motivations driving violent internal conflicts, such as insurgencies, rebellions, and civil wars. What conditions and factors increase the likelihood of civil war and insurgency? Do economic incentives or political grievances motivate insurgents? What causes actors to rebel in some situations, but injustice to be endured in others? Some scholars, such as Fearon and Laitin, emphasize how opportunities for rebellion—whether economic incentives, geographic factors, or weak governance—best explain patterns of civil war and insurgency. Others, such as Gurr, offer a different interpretation, instead arguing that grievances—whether political, economic, or social—more accurately explain internal conflict. COIN experts have used insights from this literature to better understand how to hasten the decline of insurgencies. Some, such as Collier and Hoeffler argue that economic incentives reduce insurgent support, while others, in particular Fearon and Laitin, emphasize improving state presence and control as the key to clamping insurgencies. Still others, like Gurr, would focus on the easing or settling of political grievances. Based upon these insights, some COIN experts advocate a direct approach of eliminating insurgents, while others plead for an indirect approach centered #

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See Figures 1, 2 and 3 of the appendix. $ The term “Central” Bihar actually refers to the southern districts of today’s Bihar. Before bifurcation of Bihar and the creation of Jharkhand in 2000, this region was termed Central Bihar, and most still refer to it with this label.

LEFT-WING EXTREMISM IN CENTRAL BIHAR

on undermining insurgent supportâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;through development initiatives, for example. The tenets of these debates can clearly be seen throughout Indiaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s debate over its LWE problem and its search for an effective COIN strategy. Including elements of both the argument that increasing state presence hinders insurgent action and increasing economic development undermines insurgent support, the Ministry of Home Affairs has consistently voiced a two-pronged strategy of governance and development in its statements and reports. In light of the last five years, many are quick to argue that Bihar represents a success story of this two-pronged model. Since 2005, the Nitish Kumar administration has made significant strides on both of these fronts, and thereby reducing extremist support. However, this decline would not have been as significant if not for prior developments that rendered the prospects of mainstream political opportunities far greater than those of left-wing extremism. Even in the midst of poor governance and development under the Lalu Prasad Yadav administration, the persistent interest and strong competition in democratic politics among marginalized groups, combined with the entwinement of Naxal and caste politics, convinced many former Naxalites that democratic mobilization was a more pragmatic political strategy. Thus, LWE outcomes should not be constructed only within the two-pronged framework of governance and development. Instead, the political dimensions to left-wing extremist support and the importance of alternative forms of mobilization must be strongly considered. In the next section of this study, I discuss the confusion of the terms left-wing extremism, Naxalism, and Maoism and the viability of Bihar as a case study. Subsequently, I review the micro-foundations of conflict literature, and how it applies to the case of left-wing extremism in India. In the third section, I examine Indiaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s LWE problem and its counterinsurgency strategy in the context of this literature. Next, I estimate and analyze how LWE support in Bihar has declined over the last decade. Finally, I offer conclusions and implications of these findings for the longterm viability of a two-pronged COIN strategy.

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A. L EFT-WING EXTREMISM, NAXALISM, AND MAOISM While an ideological investigation is not the objective of this study, a few issues of terminology must be addressed, as this has been a contested issue. This study employs the term most often found in government reports, “left-wing extremism” (LWE). Left-wing extremism, on its most basic level, refers to extralegal communist movements that seek the attainment of communist society through revolutionary means. Unlike the Communist Party of India (CPI) and the Communist Party of India (Marxist), CPI(M), they generally do not see any value in parliamentary institutions. They draw inspiration from the 1967 Naxalbari uprising, and view violence as a legitimate political practice. For the purposes of this study, this term is intended to be the broadest applicable umbrella term, meant to encompass both the terms “Naxalism” and “Maoism.” In today’s media and popular discussion, the terms “Maoist” and “Naxalite” are often used interchangeably. However, the term “Maoism” is actually narrower in scope than “Naxalism”. Maoism can be understood as the one of most radical brands of Naxalism. The 2004 merger of the People’s War Group (PWG) and the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) into the CPI(Maoist), along with the CPI(ML)(Liberation)’s increasing focus on parliamentary politics, has rendered “Maoist” the most appropriate term for today’s conflict. Unlike Naxalism, which has no single doctrine, the specific ideology of Maoism can be found in the official party documents of the CPI(Maoist). Naxalism, on the other hand, refers to a looser definition of radical agrarian violence, the leaders of which ultimately desire communist revolution. The origin of the term “Naxalite” is the 1967 anti-landlord peasant uprising at Naxalbari, a village in West Bengal. This uprising inspired the radical wing of the CPI(M) to establish the CPI(MarxistLeninist), with Naxalbari serving as the model for India’s communist revolution. However, no single group or ideology can claim sole ownership of the mantle of Naxalism. Continuing the trend of India’s communist movement, the CPI(ML) quickly fragmented as leadership disagreed over tactics to achieve communist revolution. This fragmentation of Naxalism resulted in, at one point, an estimated sixty CPI(ML) groups, seventeen of 20

LEFT-WING EXTREMISM IN CENTRAL BIHAR

them in Bihar, professing similar goals and inspiration from Naxalbari, but often different strategies and political practices.' Other non-CPI(ML) groups, such as the MCC, also fell under the Naxalite banner. Moreover, at times, the state or landed interests has often conveniently deemed any violence threatening to them as “Naxalite”, further undermining the term’s clarity.( An in-depth study of these differences in ideology is outside the goals of this study. For this study’s purposes, it is sufficient to understand that the term “left-wing extremism” is meant to encompass all Naxalite and Maoist activity since the Naxalbari uprising. In this case, the term “Naxalite” is used if an exclusion of the current Maoist conflict is necessary. The term “Maoist” is employed when solely referring to today’s conflict, the struggle being waged by the CPI(Maoist). B. BIHAR’S L EFT-WING EXTREMIST MOVEMENT AS A CASE STUDY Some may not immediately perceive India’s LWE movement, particularly in Bihar, as qualifying as a “civil war”, and thus consider the civil war and insurgency literature to be largely irrelevant, or at least unhelpful. However, this literature employs a rather broad definition in its analysis, identifying only three basic criteria. According to Fearon and Laitin, fighting must be between agents of (or claimants to) a state and organized, non-state groups who seek either to take control of a government, to take power in a region, or to use violence to change government policies. Secondly, the conflict must have accumulated at least 1,000 violence-related deaths over its course, with a yearly average of at least 100. Third, to distinguish between civil war and massacre, the conflict must have claimed at least 100 persons on both sides.) Although more fragmented than a typical secessionist civil war %

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Bela Bhatia, “The Naxalite Movement in Central Bihar” (PhD diss., University of Cambridge, 2000), 53. & Prakash Louis, People Power: The Naxalite Movement in Central Bihar (New Delhi: Wordsmiths, 2002), 168. ' James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American Political Science Review 97, no. 1 (2003): 76. !

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conflict, left-wing extremism in India has far exceeded this minimum casualty requirement for the past decade (where figures are available).* Even Bihar by itself has met or come close to meeting this standard in many years. Despite being much more multidimensional in its expression of political practice, Bihar’s LWE movement also satisfies Fearon and Laitin’s definition of an insurgency, “a technology of military conflict characterized by small, lightly armed bands practicing guerrilla warfare from rural base areas.”"+ Regardless of definitions, the purpose of reviewing this literature is to gain insight into academic theories of internal armed conflict. Moreover, with these broad definitions, the academic literature thus far has largely examined all intrastate conflicts as the same."" Therefore, even though a revolutionary conflict like Maoism is in many ways different than a secessionist civil war, the literature on civil wars still holds value for this study. Nevertheless, the decision to analyze only one of India’s states, rather than its LWE problem at the national level, requires explanation. In their review of civil war literature, Blattman and Miguel argue that the micro-level of analysis possesses the most potential for further research. "# Analyzing all of India as a single case would conceal important regional trends and differences, given its tremendous size and the relatively fragmented nature of LWE violence. Moreover, Bihar’s population is larger than that of many countries studied in the civil war and insurgency literature, and therefore can be deemed large enough for analysis. The selection of the state of Bihar however requires justification. In fact, the relative decline in LWE support in Bihar is the major reason for selection. While escalated violence in tribal belt states, such as Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand, have deservedly attracted greater attention, explaining why Bihar has not suffered similar spikes in violence is an equally valid endeavor. This is especially surprising since Bihar’s reputation as India’s poorest and traditionally worst governed state would seemingly make it a hotbed for LWE recruitment, given the predictions of many academic (

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See Figure 3 of the appendix. )* Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” 75. )) Christopher Blattman and Edward Miguel, “Civil War,” Journal of Economic Literature 48, no. 1 (2010): 30-31. )! Ibid, 3.

LEFT-WING EXTREMISM IN CENTRAL BIHAR

theories. Lastly, while intensity today has declined, Bihar’s historical experience with left-wing extremism is near unmatched, arising soon after the original Naxalbari uprising in 1967 and continuing at various levels up until the present. II. REVIEW OF M ICRO-FOUNDATIONS OF CONFLICT LITERATURE In their effort to understand the decline of insurgencies, COIN experts have utilized insights from the literature examining why actors rebel. This micro-foundation of conflict literature is useful for analyzing the case of LWE in Bihar because it analyzes the decisions behind individual participation in (or conversely abstention from) armed conflict. The dispersed and fragmented nature of left-wing extremism, especially in previous decades, encourages a micro-level approach, focused on gaining insight into individual reasons for participation. Studies adopting this micro-level approach often focus on material or non-material motivations for individual participation in collective violence. In plain terms, does greed or grievance motivate insurgent participation? Some theories, as typified by the work of Grossman, propose that economic incentives encourage rebellion. Individuals suffering great hardship are more likely to respond to material incentives, such as wages, looting opportunities, and promises of future reward."$ These factors are most influential in explaining insurgency and civil war because greater levels of absolute deprivation lower the opportunity costs of participation in collective violence. While in some cases coercion may play a role to some extent,"% rebel leaders must ultimately motivate citizens to join their highly dangerous struggle and forgo alternative paths of mobilization. From this approach, one can hypothesize that, as the opportunity cost of fighting falls, participation in internal armed conflict rises."& Conversely, as the opportunity cost of fighting rises, abstention from armed conflict rises. )"

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Herschel I. Grossman, “Kleptocracy and revolutions,” Oxford Economic Papers 51, no. 2(1999): 267. )# Blattman and Miguel, “Civil War,” 36. )$ Ibid, 10. !

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Others, though, disagree with this interpretation, arguing that while economic underdevelopment may be an underlying cause of conflict, it is not sufficient to incite violence, nor can economic development prevent violence. Instead, various forms of grievances drive conflict. Several theories discuss the origins of conflict-producing grievances. Connor in particular focuses on grievances arising from ethnic nationalism."' Muller emphasizes grievances as a byproduct of economic inequality."( Still, Huntington sees rapid economic growth destabilizing traditional social systems as an invitation for conflict.") A related viewpoint of Gurr is that frustration from the failure to gain from the expected benefits of modernization produces grievances."* Nevertheless, questions still arise over when deprivation produces violence. When is deprivation, absolute or relative, endured and when does it produce action? Those focused on material incentives for violence argue that favorable opportunities for rebellion—such as available financing or rough terrain—explain the turn to violence. A more useful strategy may be examining regime type. A large literature explores how varying levels of state repression influences levels of political violence.#+ For instance, Walter argues that democracies, which provide nonviolent means to express discontent and affect change, insulate themselves from violent internal challenges.#" Conversely, according to this hypothesis, the absence of nonviolent means to pursue change is a necessary precondition for civil war. Others, such as Muller, find a U-shaped relationship between )%

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Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994). )& Edward N. Muller, “Income Inequality, Regime Repressiveness, and Political Violence,” American Sociological Review 50, no. 1 (1985): 47. )' Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968). )( Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970). !* Christian Davenport, “State Repression and Political Order,” Annual Review of Political Science 10, no. 1 (2007):1. !) Barbara F. Walter, “Does Conflict Beget Conflict? Explaining Recurring Civil War,” Journal of Peace Research 41, no. 3 (2004): 385.

LEFT-WING EXTREMISM IN CENTRAL BIHAR

regime repression and the likelihood of insurgency.## While true democracies are indeed less likely to experience internal violent conflict, extremely repressive, autocratic regimes are also unlikely to allow conflict. In some cases, severe regime repression removes nonviolent avenues for change, but also successfully deters or completely prohibits any form of resource mobilization against the state. However, regimes with an intermediate structure of repressiveness, in the middle of the curve, do not provide opportunities for nonviolent collective action, but also do not render resource mobilization impossible. Thus, this position increases the risk of political violence and possible insurgency. Moving to either ends of the curve could equally be reason to see a decline in the chances of insurgency. An extensive empirical literature has sought to test many of these theories. Levels of analysis have ranged from those employing crosscountry, large-n studies to those taking a micro-level approach with more in-depth case studies. In her review of literature, Walter states that crosscountry empirical studies have come to a “near consensus” that poverty, large populations, a low level of economic development, a prior history of civil war, and political instability all increase the chances for civil war.#$ Applying these insights, many of these same scholars, as well as COIN experts, hold the converses of these factors responsible for the decline of insurgencies. Moreover, two of the most influential cross-country empirical studies, one by Collier and Hoeffler and the other by Fearon and Laitin, both conclude that proxies for insurgent opportunities more strongly predict internal armed conflict than proxies for grievances. However, Collier and Hoeffler emphasize opportunities connected to economic incentives, while Fearon and Laitin emphasize opportunities arising from weak government capacity. Focusing on economic opportunities for rebellion, Collier and Hoeffler argue that political grievances are universal, but that economic

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Muller, “Income Inequality, Regime Repressiveness, and Political Violence,” 47. #$ Barbara F. Walter, “Bargaining Failures and Civil War,” Annual Review of Political Science 12, no.1 (2009): 244. !

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incentives for violent conflict are not.#% Opportunities for rebellion, such as financing, a dispersed population, and difficult terrain all increase the likelihood of intrastate war. On the other hand, higher secondary education levels, higher per capita incomes, and higher economic growth rates reduce the risk of conflict. Moreover, proxies for grievances measuring inequality, political rights, ethnic polarization and religious fractionalization were all found to be insignificant. Only when one ethnic group possessed a majority—a dominant presence in society—was internal conflict more likely. Fearon and Laitin’s cross-country study agrees that proxies for political grievances have little predictive capability.#& While more challenging to find appropriate proxies for modeling purposes, grievances, it is agreed, are too common a motivation to distinguish when internal violence will and will not occur. Similar to the finding of Collier and Hoeffler, Fearon and Laitin agree that conditions favorable to insurgency— poverty, political instability, rough terrain, and large populations—put countries at a greater risk of civil war. However, rather than just economic opportunities that encourage insurgency, a weak government in terms of police and military strength also makes insurgency feasible. In fact, they argue that the factors “most important for the prospects of a nascent insurgency are the government’s police and military capabilities and the reach of government institutions into rural areas” (Emphasis in original).#' This hypothesis then suggests that changes in the level of police and military capabilities would be strongly influential in the decline of an insurgency. Thus, with these two studies specifically, the cross-country empirical literature has heavily favored factors that indicate opportunities for rebellion over grievances as key to understanding global patterns in civil war. While the literature discussed above seeks to understand factors behind the origin and decline of intrastate war, a literature seeking to understand the state’s responses to such conflict naturally follows. In broad terms, two main approaches to counterinsurgency (COIN) dominate the !#

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Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and grievance in civil war,” Oxford Economic Papers 56, no. 4 (2004): 563. !$ Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” 75. !% Ibid, 80.

LEFT-WING EXTREMISM IN CENTRAL BIHAR

literature.#( The first strategy is the direct approach. Focused on eliminating the enemy, it operates from the understanding that “a war is a war is a war.” The second strategy is the indirect approach. Ironically enough, Mao Zedong’s own concept typifies this approach. According to Mao, revolutionaries are like “fish that swim in the water of the people”, and therefore the key to defeating an insurgency is to separate the fish from the water. In other words, counterinsurgency operations should focus on removing the people’s support that the insurgency needs in order to challenge the government effectively. By winning the support of the people, insurgents are cut off from their source of supply, personnel, and intelligence. The goal then is not to necessarily kill insurgents, but to win “hearts and minds”.#) This task could take a number of forms and strategies, such as various kinds of development schemes, political reforms, or special privileges. III. INDIA’S LWE PROBLEM IN THE CONTEXT OF C ONFLICT LITERATURE With this brief overview of the relevant intrastate conflict literature in place, this article can address how it applies to the case of left-wing extremism in India. As we have seen in the academic literature, some hypothesize that the fate of insurgencies are tied to opportunities for rebellion, especially because of economic underdevelopment or weak government capacity. Others contend that grievances are the main determinant. Public debates over India’s left-wing extremist movement and state policy have strongly reflected the debates of the academic literature. A. UNDERDEVELOPMENT AS OPPORTUNITY FOR REBELLION Many have applied the argument that economic underdevelopment is a key cause of insurgency to the case of left-wing extremism in India. !&

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John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 26-28. !' Austin Long, On ‘Other War’: Lessons of Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research (CA: RAND Corporation, 2006), 21. !

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Poverty and a lack of economic development reduce the opportunity costs of soldiering. With few economic opportunities in conflict areas, it is easier to attract desperate individuals. Adopting this same logic, many in India interpret the growth in left-wing extremism as a development problem first and foremost. Haridwar Rai and K.M. Prasad argue that “Naxalism is basically a socio-economic problem and only superficially a law and order problem.”#* Under this view, one summarized by Lieutenant General Madan Gopal (Retd.), “Naxalism is not the problem; rather it is the symptom of a problem,”$+ namely the lack of development. The approach paper of United Service Institution of India puts this argument even more explicitly: The absence of developmental activities, including the virtual absence of healthcare, drinking water, electricity, roads, tracks and educational facilities has alienated the people living in the interior areas from the government machinery. This opportunity was quickly seized by the Naxalites to discredit the capability of the government and the failure of the parliamentary democratic system to bring succor to the poor and deprived.$" Since LWE violence is a symptom of poverty and underdevelopment, the “direct” counterinsurgency approach will ultimately be unsuccessful, as it will fail to address the root cause of the problem. Without a greater availability of economic opportunities, LWE leaders will still easily find recruits. Extending this logic, many in India plead for a strong development component in its COIN strategy, often focused on providing alternative economic opportunities. Under this thinking, if development reaches isolated villages, individuals will have less incentive to join left-wing !(

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Haridwar Rai and K.M. Prasad, “Naxalism: A Challenge to the Proposition of Peaceful Transition to Socialism,” Indian Journal of Political Science, quoted. in Amrik Singh Nambran, Poverty, Land, and Violence: an analytical study of Naxalism in Bihar (Patna: Layman’s Publications, 1992), 2. "* Lieutenant General Madan Gopal, PVSM, AVSM and Bar (Retd.), “Third Session: Second Paper,” in National Security: Rise of Naxalism, ed. United Service Institution of India (New Delhi: KW Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 2006), 228. ") United Service Institution of India, “Approach Paper: Rise of Naxalism and its Implications for National Security,” in National Security: Rise of Naxalism, 44.

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extremist groups. This viewpoint is not limited to one particular constituency as it can be found expressed among politicians, journalists, activists, and academics. Taking an example from Bihar, after the initial wave of Naxalite violence in Mushahari in 1968, social activist and Sarvodaya leader Jayaprakash Narayan initiated development works in order to stem Naxal support.$# Similarly today, the media has portrayed Bihar Chief Minister Nitish Kumar as a supporter of this position for his public criticism of “Operation Green Hunt”. In reference to the Centre’s policy, he has stated that “the Maoists can’t be finished off through force alone,” and “We’ve been pleading for a saturation of quality development, for roads, schools, health centres,” the implication being that such development will reduce support for left-wing extremism.$$ B. GOVERNMENT REBELLION

INCAPACITY

OPPORTUNITY

FOR

As seen in the literature review, some scholars concern themselves not with the opportunities for rebellion created by economic underdevelopment, but those from weak governance in terms of police and military capabilities.$% Analysts often apply this argument to India’s problem. To many, a governance “vacuum” allows LWE leaders to operate. Related to this argument is that rough terrain, such as mountains, forests, and jungles, also marginally increases the likelihood of insurgency because it impairs government capacity, allowing left-wing extremism to grow.$& In this view, rather than a lack of development, a lack of governance and security is the primary reason behind the spread of LWE support and violence. According to a 2006 status paper presented in Parliament by the Home Minister Shivraj Patil, “The naxalites operate in "!

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Louis, People Power: The Naxalite Movement in Central Bihar, 148. "" “Force Alone Can’t Rout the Maoists,” Outlook Interview with Nitish Kumar, Outlook India, April 26, 2010. "# Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” 80. "$ Collier and Hoeffler, “Greed and grievance in civil war,” 574; Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” 76. !

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vacuum created by absence of administrative and political institutions.”$' While a lack of development often accompanies the lack of state presence, it is the latter that allows such violence to proliferate. Institute for Conflict Management Executive Director Ajai Sahni summarizes this position in the case of the current conflict: The reality is that the Maoists have consolidated their disruptive dominance in areas where the state has little presence and, worse, the cumulative capacity deficits in the security apparatus are so great that there is little possibility of altering the balance of force in any radical measure to secure a demonstrable victory against the rebels.$( Under this view, the solution, then, to insurgency is not development, but a focus on increasing the state’s presence through a “law and order” solution in order to fill the governance vacuum. Regardless of poverty or a lack of economic opportunities, potential rebels will have opportunities for insurrection if a strong state presence does not first exist. C. INDIA’S COIN STRATEGY FOR L EFT-WING EXTREMISM In many ways, these two arguments—one interpreting underdevelopment and the other state weakness as the root of insurgency—have reflected India’s COIN strategy. From a broad perspective, the government’s policy response has essentially combined elements of both the direct and indirect approaches, constructing a twopronged strategy based on improving governance and development. The policy’s premise is that increased development will raise the opportunity costs of insurgent participation and increased state presence will make it more difficult for insurgents to operate. While many may argue that the state’s commitment to development initiatives has always been lacking, or simply unfeasible due to perilous security situations, this strategy, or at least "%

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Shivraj Patil, “The Naxal Problem: Status Paper Presented by the Home Minister in the Parliament on 13 March 2006,” in National Security: Rise of Naxalism, 49. "& Ajai Sahni, “India and her Maoists: A tiger crouching, a dragon curling…,” Faultlines: Wars within Borders, November 2009, accessed July 15, 2009, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/ajaisahni/09AS-33LimesWord.htm.

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lip service to it, is found in the Ministry of Home Affairs annual reports: [Naxalism] is not merely a law and order problem but has deep socio-economic dimensions. Therefore, a multipronged strategy essentially of sustained and effective police action coupled with accelerated socio-economic development of naxal affected areas is being pursued to effectively tackle this menace.$) In order to achieve their goals, in 2006, the Ministry of Home Affairs created a Naxal Management Division “to effectively tackle the naxalite menace from both security and development angles.”$* In light of this broad two-pronged strategy, it becomes evident that the argument that grievances motivate rebellion more so than opportunities for rebellion has been much less evident in India’s COIN strategy. Measures designed to specifically address grievances—such as various forms of discrimination, unequal citizenship, and land rights—have been discussed, but have seen much less implementation. IV. EXPLAINING DECLINE AMIDST ESCALATION

In light of the academic literature and how it has reflected Indian COIN policy and debate, the focus now shifts to the puzzle of Bihar. Many undoubtedly point to the improvements in both governance and development under the Nitish Kumar administration since 2005. Applying academic theories, governance improvements have made it more difficult for insurgents to operate, while development initiatives have quickened economic growth, raising the opportunity costs of insurgent participation. Although more difficult to quantify, grievances and repression have also declined in the eyes of most. For many, together, these factors largely explain the decline of left-wing extremism in Central Bihar.

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Ministry of Home Affairs, Annual Report 2005-2006, 23. "( Ministry of Home Affairs, Annual Report 2006-2007 (New Delhi: Govt. of India, 2006), 3. !

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Section IV first provides evidence that LWE support has in fact declined in Central Bihar. Then, it discusses how the Nitish Kumar administration’s efforts on both governance and development fronts have curbed LWE support. However, it subsequently argues that factors outside the two-pronged governance and development framework convey greater importance in providing the seeds of decline. Instead, the role of mainstream political parties in positioning themselves as the primary instruments for expressing discontent and achieving gains, as well as some LWE groups’ internal reevaluation of the parliamentary path, cannot be underestimated in its value for undermining and eroding support for leftwing extremism. A. ESTIMATING A DECLINE OF LWE IN CENTRAL BIHAR Figures 1, 2, and 3 of the appendix illustrate the divergent paths of LWE violence in Bihar and the rest of India’s LWE-affected states. In 2000, the earliest year for which reliable figures are available, Bihar suffered 170 LWE-related deaths, 31% of India’s total, a percentage second only to Jharkhand. That same year Chhattisgarh suffered only 48 LWE-related deaths. Orissa and West Bengal posted a combined total of just five deaths. Ten years later, Bihar’s total for LWE-related deaths declined to 97, only 10% of India’s total. Meanwhile, other states had experienced an explosion. By 2010, Orissa’s death total rose to 79. Jharkhand’s figure rose to 157. West Bengal’s death count escalated to 256. And Chhattisgarh suffered 343 LWE-related deaths. In the midst of this heightened violence, Bihar’s relative contribution to India’s LWE violence demonstrates a relatively steady decline. While sub-state data is unavailable, these trends most likely would be even starker if examining just Central Bihar, LWE’s former stronghold in Bihar. What can explain these starkly different trajectories? This study can only attempt to explain the trend in Bihar, but these findings should raise questions for other states. These figures for incidents and deaths in Bihar do illustrate a decline, but perhaps the greatest decline has been in people’s support, especially in Central Bihar. Judging from a strictly security standpoint, the lack of state presence in several areas still leaves left-wing extremism capable of producing violence. Most notably, the CPI(Maoist) recently took 32

LEFT-WING EXTREMISM IN CENTRAL BIHAR

four Bihar policemen hostage, killing one and eventually releasing the other three in a national drama.%+ Minor Maoist violence also marred Bihar’s 2010 state assembly elections to a limited extent.%" Maoist-sponsored bandhs can still disrupt daily life.%# However, according to scholarly articles, ethnographies, newspaper accounts, and interviews, the mass organization once behind Bihar’s LWE movement appears to have tempered out, and violence certainly has not escalated in the manner of several neighboring states. This decline in popular support has relocated Maoist activity from some of its traditional strongholds in the plains of Central Bihar to the forest fringes along the borders of Jharkhand and Nepal.%$ Although crude measurements based on the number of affected-districts vary widely, at least the last ten years have shown a decline of the movement’s influence in these districts, yet, at the same time, expansion to the regions bordering Nepal and Jharkhand.%% This shift from Central Bihar to the borders hints that external factors have emboldened the movement in recent years. The creation of the separate state of Jharkhand out of Bihar’s southern half in 2000 redirected much of Bihar’s Maoist problem to a new state government. Not only did this severely cut down the geographic scope of Patna’s responsibilities, but #*

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TNN, “Bihar hostage crisis over; Maoists release three abducted cops,” Times of India, Sept 6, 2010. #) PTI, “Poll violence in Bihar: Maoists trigger blasts, BSF retaliates,” MSN News, Nov 1, 2010, accessed Nov 1, 2010, http://news.in.msn.com/national/article.aspx?cpdocumentid=4527051&_p=2a750720-b5dc-4d2c-ae7884ab2190a4ae#uc2Lst2a750720-b5dc-4d2c-ae78-84ab2190a4ae. %# Institute for Conflict Management, “Bihar Timeline 2010,” South Asia Terrorism Portal: Maoist Insurgency Timelines, August 1, 2010, accessed August 9, 2010, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/maoist/timelines/2010/bih ar.html. %$ Satish Kumar, “Social Entrepreneurs: Silent Killers of Naxal Forces in Bihar,” IPCS Article #2856, May 1, 2009, accessed April 5, 2010, http://www.ipcs.org/article/naxalite-violence/social-entrepreneurs-silentkiller-of-naxal-forces-in-bihar-2856.html. ## Satish Kumar, “Naxalism in Decline in Bihar,” IPCS Article #2769, January 4, 2009, accessed March 5, 2010. http://www.ipcs.org/article/naxalite-violence/naxalism-in-decline-in-bihar2769.html. !

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also many CPI(Maoist) leaders migrated to Jharkhand, sensing that the new state would serve as a more fruitful base, chiefly because of thick forest cover, absence of governance, a history of prior support for left-wing extremism in those regions, a disaffected tribal population, and opportunities for extortion from mining operations. Four of Bihar’s six districts in the MHA’s list of the worst thirty-five directly border Jharkhand.%& The other two are adjacent to one of these border districts. To a lesser extent, the northern border with Nepal has also served as a haven. In fact, one major 2007 attack at Riga in Sitamarhi district involved Maoist cadres infiltrating Bihar from the Nepal side of the border.%' Although imprecise to measure, LWE support in Central Bihar has undoubtedly declined over the last decade. B. THE I MPACT OF THE NITISH KUMAR ADMINISTRATION With this evidence of decline amidst escalation, this article first addresses the obvious answer. Many credit the success of the Nitish Kumar administration with the decline in popular support for left-wing extremism. Assuming the role of Chief Minister near the end of 2005, many have described the administration as a sea change, initiating drastic improvements in governance and economic development. Recalling how many scholars argue that economic underdevelopment leads to conflict,%( many see accelerated economic growth in Bihar as an important factor in providing alternatives to violence. Since economic growth raises the opportunity costs of insurgent participation, economic progress under Nitish, many would argue, has been a primary weapon in the fight against left-wing extremism. Some reports have noted just this, illustrating how increased

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! Ministry of Home Affairs Press Release, “Meeting Held with MPs from Naxal-affected Districts; Chidambaram calls for Better Utilization of Funds,” April 30, 2010. #% Bibhu Prasad Routray, “The Enduring Shock,” Outlook India, April 13, 2007. %( Patricia Justino, “Poverty and Violent Conflict: A Micro-level Perspective on the Causes and Duration of Warfare,” Journal of Peace Research 46, no. 3 (2009): 315. %&

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economic growth has provided alternatives to life among Maoist cadres. %) Certainly, the Indian and Western press have heavily praised Bihar’s economic growth “miracle.” According to some figures, although starting from a low base, Bihar has posted an 11% average annual economic growth rate over Kumar’s five years in office.%* While some call it a “statistical illusion”,&+ and others attribute the growth nearly entirely to public works construction,&" most would admit that economic development has increased. Nevertheless, whether the poor have yet to benefit from this growth is another question. As discussed in the literature, economic growth, if heightening inequality, can increase relative deprivation, and so the decline of LWE support cannot be assigned solely to this point. Other academic theories focus on the importance of governance capabilities in limiting opportunities for rebellion. Some theorize weak military and policing capabilities are the most important factors in predicting insurgency.&# In this case, restoring law and order was the Nitish Kumar administration’s first priority, effectively returning the state’s role to “night-watchman rather than rogue.”&$ Crime data illustrates these improvements. According to data dating back to 2001, murder, dacoity, robbery, riots, road dacoity, road robbery, kidnapping for ransom, bank dacoity, and bank robbery all peaked in 2004, the last full year of RJD-rule. Since then, totals for all of these crimes have decreased.&% Moreover, the administration recruited 5,000 special auxiliary police forces (SAP) from exarmy fighters to tackle the Maoist problem.&& #'

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Smita Gupta, “The State at the Doorstep,” Outlook India. April 26, 2010. #( Jason Overdorf, “From Worst to Near First,” Newsweek, February 12, 2010. $* Dipankar Bhattacharya, “Bihar’s Growth Miracle,” Bihar Times, February 28, 2010. $) R. Nagaraj and Andaleeb Rahman, “Booming Bihar: Fact or Fiction?” Economic and Political Weekly 45, no. 8 (2010): 10. $! Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” 80. $" “The Bihari Enlightenment,” Economist, January 28, 2010. $# See Figure 4 of the appendix. $$ Satish Kumar, “Demoralized Police Force and Naxalism in Bihar,” IPCS Article #3010. November 23, 2009, accessed March 18, 2010, http://www.ipcs.org/article/naxalite-violence/demoralized-police-forceand-naxalism-in-bihar-3010.html. !

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While grievances are more difficult to quantify, some evidence suggests that marginalization and repression has declined. The improvements in law and order have largely ended the period of caste senas, or armies. Moreover, reports indicate that the new administration has given a “free hand” to both police and administration to pursue both Maoists and Ranvir Sena members, accelerating trials concerning past atrocities.&' For instances, in May 2010, a Bihar court finally sentenced three men to death and twenty others to life in prison for their roles in the 1996 Bathani Tola massacre, where the Ranvir Sena killed twenty-one Dalits and poor Muslims.&( C. MAINSTREAM POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES While the Nitish Kumar administration has made progress on both development and governance fronts, a consensus confirmed by his coalition’s landslide electoral victory in 2010,&) full credit cannot be attributed here, as many important factors influencing LWE’s decline were initiated well before Nitish’s arrival. Despite these laudable improvements, the presence of the parliamentary process and the role of alternative forms of mobilization should be prioritized. Ironically, while improved governance and development under the Nitish administration have contributed to the decline in popular support for left-wing extremism, the origins of this decline can be traced to the period when governance and development were perhaps at their worst. Walter in particular proposes that the absence of nonviolent means to affect change was a necessary precondition for civil war.&* While democratic institutions existed during the emergence of left-wing extremism in Central Bihar, their significance and interest in them among marginalized groups has escalated. Despite the failings of Indian democracy and at times political marginalization of the lower orders of society, interestingly, most would $%

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Gupta, “The State at the Doorstep.” $& IANS, “Three get death, 20 sentenced to life in Bathani Tola massacre,” Hindustan Times, May 12, 2010. $' Jim Yardley and Hari Kumar, “Ruling Coalition Wins in Indian State,” New York Times, November 24, 2010. $( Walter, “Does Conflict Beget Conflict?” 371.

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agree that democratic politics in general has retained support and legitimacy among these same sections. Januzzi describes the 1967 general elections as evidence of the “awakening” of Bihar’s peasantry.'+ While on one hand the call of Naxalbari was spreading, successful utilization of India’s democratic institutions gradually increased. Following this has been a succession of chief ministers in Bihar from backward and scheduled castes, rather than landholding, high caste elites.'" On a broad scale, electoral participation among the poor and marginalized has increased since the Emergency in 1977. Described as the “second democratic upsurge”, India may be the only large democracy in the world where turnout of the socially marginalized is above that of the most privileged groups.'# Reasons behind this finding are undoubtedly complex. However, it is clear that much of the socially marginalized perceive a stake in India’s democratic process. Consequently, the ideology professed by LWE groups, such as the original CPI(ML), the MCC, and now the CPI(Maoist), which call for poll boycotts and seek the overthrow of democracy, has been exceedingly difficult to advance. While villagers may have been attracted to Naxal leaders’ language of equality and change, the message of the uselessness of bourgeois parliamentary institutions often fell flat. According to ethnographic accounts of Bhatia and others, when given the opportunity, the poor preferred to vote. The desire of the marginalized to achieve political rights has generally outweighed their desire for overthrow of the political system. Evidence of this is that Naxal groups never achieved much success enforcing poll boycotts.'$ Ironically, while some Naxal groups called for poll boycotts, other Naxal groups in Bihar ensured the right of the marginalized to vote. The threat of Naxal violence prevented elites from disenfranchising the poor, and ensured that these groups could vote %*

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Thomasson F. Januzzi, Agrarian Crisis in India: The Case of Bihar (New Delhi: Sangham Books, 1974), 133. %) Ibid, 133. %! Yogendra Yadav, “Understanding the Second Democratic Upsurge: Trends in bahujan participation in electoral politics in the 1990s,” in Transforming India, Social and Political Dynamics of Democracy, ed. Francine Frankel et al. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 120-145. %" Bhatia, “The Naxalite Movement in Central Bihar,” 117. !

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independently.'% Moreover, this increased democratic participation increasingly organized itself on caste lines. Many have argued that while the significance of caste has declined in social terms, it has increased in political terms. At one extreme, Kaviraj has described India as a “democracy of caste groups, rather than of individuals.”'& The issues of “Mandal and Mandir” that dominated Indian politics in the 1990s contributed to making caste one of the most important bases for political mobilization. In many ways, the rise of the political importance of caste has made it more difficult for LWE leaders to mobilize and sustain a class-based communist movement, especially in Bihar. With so many politicians mobilizing constituencies based upon caste identities, Naxal and Maoist class war ideology became even more unsustainable. Populist politicians, such as Lalu Prasad Yadav, mobilized their respective support bases by emphasizing caste ties. Upper castes switched alliances from Congress to the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Moreover, the response of landed interests to Naxal violence organized itself on caste lines, with the formation of upper caste senas, such as the Ranvir Sena. Amidst the general breakdown of state institutions, as many as thirteen landowner militias formed between 1979 and 1994, among both upper and lower castes.'' These twin trends of increasing democratic participation and caste polarization contributed to a dramatic change in Bihar’s political power structure. From 1985 to 1995, the number of backward caste candidates elected to Bihar’s state assembly more than doubled, reaching 50% of its total. Meanwhile, the number of upper caste elected officials more than

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S.B. Singh, “Limits to Power: Naxalism and Caste Relations in a South Bihar Village,” Economic and Political Weekly 40, no. 29 (2005): 3169. %$ Sudipta Kaviraj, “Democracy and Social Inequality,” in Transforming India: Social and Political Dynamics of Democracy, ed. Francine Frankel et al. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 109. %% Nicolas Jaoul, “Naxalism in Bihar: From Bullet to Ballot,” in Armed Militias of South Asia: Fundamentalists, Maoists, and Separatists, ed. Laurent Gayer and Christoffe Jaffrelot (New Delhi: Foundation Books, 2009), 30.

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halved, down to only 17%.'( Over time, the decline of oppressed classes’ political marginalization gave these groups a greater stake in the mainstream political process, as now no party could afford to ignore these highly mobilized and politically assertive groups. Interest in an underground armed struggle began declining, due in part to the greater opportunities and benefits to be found in the democratic mainstream. With many groups vying for the votes of the oppressed, no Naxal group could claim sole representation of oppressed classes, nor could they compete with the benefits of mainstream politics. To make matters worse, Naxal leaders themselves were not immune to caste politics, leading to blatant contradictions between their ideology and actions. The intensified democratic competition in an environment of caste polarization contributed to an exodus of many former Naxalites to mainstream parties. As Lalu Prasad Yadav made dignity of lower castes the dominant political theme, many Yadav Naxalite leaders joined his Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD).') However, when Naxalites left their underground struggle for the greater benefits of mainstream politics, it was hardly a clean break. Rather, in the environment of intense caste polarization, caste ties permeated political ties. Both the MCC and the PWG/Party Unity have been documented to have enjoyed extensive ties with Lalu’s RJD. Thus, underground and mainstream politics became entwined together.'* As the line between underground and mainstream politics blurred, Naxal political practices soon became diverted away from the interests of its original supporters. The corruption of some Naxalite groups through their entwinement with mainstream politics sent a clear signal to Dalits, originally one of their strongest constituencies, that Naxalites no longer represented their interests. Kunnath’s ethnographic study of one Dalit’s exit from the movement documents how the party gradually moved away from representing the interests of landless peasants. Naxal leaders had failed to raise agricultural wages. The slogan “land to the tiller” had not been %&

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Jeffrey Witsoe, “Challenges and Opportunities Facing India’s Poorest State,” India in Transition, August 19, 2007, accessed August 5, 2010, http://casi.ssc.upenn.edu/iit/witsoe. %' Singh, “Limits to Power,” 3171. %( Ibid, 3171. !

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realized. Instead, landed classes had been admitted to the party.(+ Initially built on the contradiction between the landed and landless, Naxalite groups had betrayed their ideals, entering into a strategic alliance with middle peasants in their struggle for state power. Once doing so, the party’s agenda shifted to incorporate the interests of middle peasants, diluting its original mission.(" For example, Naxalites had traditionally targeted Rajputs. However, when Lalu desired an electoral alliance with Rajputs, the MCC significantly reduced this practice.(# Instead, many Rajputs, seeking protection, were even allowed to join the party.($ Other examples from Bihar’s history illustrate how caste ties strongly influenced Naxal action, overriding left-wing extremist goals. The MCC’s leadership had been drawn from both Yadav and Kurmi castes, but after an internal split before parliamentary elections in 1995, a Yadav group murdered the top Kurmi leaders, allowing the MCC to lend greater support to the Yadav-dominated RJD. During that election campaign, the MCC engaged in over a hundred targeted attacks, but none harmed an RJD cadre or leader. The MCC even once assassinated a popular Dalit BSP candidate, leading to the election of an RJD candidate in the re-poll. Furthermore, the MCC only attempted to enforce poll boycotts in areas where parties other than the RJD were dominant.(% Jaoul’s study also confirms reports that the MCC refrained from targeting Yadav landowners and boycotting elections in villages where RJD was dominant. In exchange, MCC activists received a certain degree of protection from the ruling party.(& Actions such as these alienated much of the Naxals’ original support base. The blatant corruption of the movement’s ideology resulted in &*

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George J. Kunnath, “Becoming a Naxalite in Rural Bihar,” The Journal of Peasant Studies 33, no. 1 (2006): 107-108. &) Kunnath, “Smouldering Dalit fires in Bihar, India,” Dialectical Anthropology 33, no. 3/4 (2009): 321; D. Bandyopadhyay, “A Visit to Two ‘Flaming Fields’ of Bihar,” Economic and Political Weekly 41, no. 52 (2007): 5302. &! Singh, “Limits to Power,” 3171. &" Ibid, 3172. (% Mammen Matthew, “Bihar: Caste, Politics & the Cycle of Strife,” Faultlines Vol. 2, July 26, 1999, accessed April 4, 2010, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/publication/faultlines/volume2/Fault2MatthewF.htm. &$ Jaoul, “Naxalism in Bihar,” 35.

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internecine warfare between Naxalite groups that supposedly desired similar goals. Not just indulging in caste politics, the violence between Bihar’s Naxal factions escalated, especially after 1995. Intra-Naxal violence played a key role in diminishing people’s support for Naxalites, as it often positioned the poor in the middle of conflict between groups that were supposed to represent their interests.(' As raising funds for an underground struggle is expensive, some Naxalite groups began offering protection payments to landed interests. Matthew even describes the activities of some Naxal groups as “extended protection rackets.”(( Turf wars soon developed, especially between the MCC and Party Unity, as Naxal groups fought over the right to collect the lucrative protection money from landlords. In another instance of clear hypocrisy, Liberation’s elected officials, most of them Dalits, became targets of the MCC and the PWG, after winning seats in 2001. In 2004, the PWG murder of five Liberation activists revealed connivance of PWG and the ruling RJD, as police, in their search for perpetrators, found a PWG squad commander hiding in the home of a RJD Member of Parliament,() prompting the local saying, according to Liberation, “RJD by day, PWG by night.”(* While initially Naxal groups in some cases were able to provide a greater level of social justice to the oppressed through the fear they inspired in landowners, the corruption of the movement as it entwined itself in caste politics, its subsequent degeneration into intra-Naxal violence, and its failure to represent the oppressed greatly contributed to decline of interest in underground Naxal groups. Considering all of these factors, many Naxalites left their respective illegal outfits for mainstream politics. D. NAXALS’ INTERNAL PARLIAMENTARY PATH

REASSESSMENT

THE

Another important dimension to understanding the decline of leftwing extremism in Central Bihar is Naxalite groups’ own internal &%

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Louis, People Power: The Naxalite Movement in Central Bihar, 33. && Matthew, “Bihar: Caste, Politics & the Cycle of Strife.” &' Jaoul, “Naxalism in Bihar” 33. &( Ibid, 34. !

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reassessment of the parliamentary path. The role of parliamentary institutions in achieving communism has been a hotly debated and divisive issue among India’s communists. The factionalism that debate over this issue has spurred is another major reason behind the decline of LWE support in Central Bihar. In particular, the rectification campaign of CPI(ML)(Liberation) further explains the decline of left-wing extremist support in Bihar. Accordingly, in some traditional strongholds, it is not just that former supporters have lost faith in Naxalite groups. Rather, in some cases, the groups themselves have undergone such transformation that support for such groups is no longer seen as support for left-wing extremism. In many cases, the debate over the role of the parliamentary path has driven a wedge among India’s communists. On one hand, some believe that parliamentary institutions can be utilized as temporary instruments on the path to achieving communism. On the other hand, others, seen as more radical or in this case “left-wing extremist”, view any democratic institutions as bourgeoisie distractions that delay or prevent the attainment of communist society. For them, revolution is the only path to communism. While certainly not the only issue, it has been an important one leading to the divisions of the CPI and the CPI(M), the CPI(M) and the CPI(ML), and the CPI(ML) and all of its splinter factions. Most importantly, this debate has taken the CPI(ML)(Liberation) from categorization as left-wing extremist to official recognition as mainstream political party. Even after its founding in 1969, the leadership of the CPI(ML) never entirely settled the question of the parliamentary path. According to Liberation party documents, by as early as 1972, the CPI(ML) was suffering paralysis from a decimated leadership brought on by severe state repression, resulting in a great deal of general confusion about the party’s future path. While founder Charu Mazumdar was able to dominate the direction of the movement, after his death in police custody in 1972, the question of complete abnegation of the parliamentary path was one of the foremost issues debated.)+ While still today maintaining its link to the original CPI(ML), the segment that came to be known as Liberation made the greatest '*

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! Bhatia, “The Naxalite Movement in Central Bihar,” 110.

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reevaluation of its political practices. The change in circumstances, namely a decimated leadership, extreme state repression, withdrawal of Chinese moral support, and the realization that even the Emergency would not stop Indian parliamentary democracy, spurred a rethinking by many of the original party line of annihilation. The past neglect of mass struggles became evident to many in the party.)" By 1979, the decision to open mass activities and form mass organizations was formally announced. 82 Liberation began organizing a number of mass organizations, including trade unions, peasant organizations, student wings, and a democratic front. Formed in the early 1980s, the Indian People’s Front (IPF) became Liberation’s open political platform, competing in mainstream parliamentary elections. In 1982, Liberation’s third party Congress officially endorsed electoral participation.83 It contested elections under the banner of the IPF from 1985 to 1994, after which the CPI(ML)(Liberation) itself registered as a political party in 1995. While the IPF’s electoral success was minimal, winning only a small number of seats in Bihar, its greatest achievements were more symbolic. In some cases, marginalized citizens, especially Dalit communities, were able to cast votes independently for the first time.84 Despite maintaining rhetoric about the need for continued armed struggle, it would seem that electoral competition is indeed the primary activity of Liberation. The dramatic results of its rectification campaign are evident in examining its latest Party Congress documents, which make a major departure in its revolutionary course. Its goals have remained the same, but its choice of political practices has radically evolved. As part of a “comprehensive revolutionary practice,” it now states that it will fully utilize “every available avenue of work and extra-parliamentary as well as parliamentary forms of struggle.” In the words of the CPI(ML)’s current ')

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Vinod Mishra, “Evaluation of the Past,” in Vinod Mishra: Selected Works, edited by the Central Committee of the CPI(ML) (New Delhi: New AS Offset Press, 1999), 274. '! Mishra, “How Did Our Party Evolve?” in Vinod Mishra: Selected Works, 281-290. '" Bhatia, “The Naxalite Movement in Central Bihar,” 114. '# Das, The Republic of Bihar (New York: Penguin Books, 1992), 109. !

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General Secretary, the party carved a niche for itself in between the “revisionism” of the CPI and CPI(M) on one hand and the “anarchomilitarism” of the CPI(Maoist).85 Thus, one of the major factors behind the decline of LWE support is due to LWE groups’ own internal assessment of the effectiveness of democratic institutions. Liberation’s gradual shift away from violence and towards democracy redefined a group from left-wing extremist to mainstream. The same group that traces its roots to Mazumdar’s CPI(ML) now openly contests elections under the title of CPI(ML). Therefore, to a much greater extent than in previous times, Walter’s second pre-condition for civil war could not be met. Increasingly, nonviolent means for change were not just available, but seen as available and potentially effective. Once again, these responsible factors stand outside the realm of the governance and development framework. V. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

This study began with the puzzle of why left-wing extremism has declined in Bihar, specifically Central Bihar, while it has intensified in neighboring states. Given Bihar’s depth of experience with previous Naxal movements, and its position as India’s poorest and traditionally worst governed state, Bihar should have been ripe for Maoist rebellion, according to the micro-foundations of conflict literature. Despite this expectation, LWE-related incidents and deaths have declined in absolute and relative terms over at least the last decade. Many would argue popular support for LWE violence has dropped even further than these figures suggest. This has occurred all at a time when New Delhi is debating the deployment of not just more paramilitaries, but the army itself to neighboring regions to quell the Maoist insurgency. In order to begin unraveling this puzzle, this study first examined the academic literature behind reasons for the emergence, and conversely, '$

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Dipankar Bhattacharya, “Trail Blazed by Naxalbari Uprising,” Economic and Political Weekly 41, no. 50 (2006): 5191.

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the decline of insurgencies. Within the micro-foundations of conflict literature, many theories attempt to explain why actors rebel. Some point to economic underdevelopment. Others emphasize weak governance capacity. Other theories stress the role of grievances, and the many ways in which they can be produced. Still other scholars emphasize potential alternatives to violence, considering regime repression and marginalization. In applying these theories, at first glance, Bihar would appear to be the model case for the Union government’s two-pronged strategy of enhanced governance and development. Since 2005, under the Nitish Kumar administration, governance and development have undoubtedly improved, and left-wing extremism has declined, demonstrating the soundness of strategy and the corresponding academic theories. However, the preceding developments that rendered the mainstream political process the absolute, undisputed focus for mobilization, expressing discontent, and pursuing change were crucial. Despite poor governance and development, democratic politics gained the full attention of the marginalized. Extralegal mobilization, with high chance of death and minimal chance for success, became unnecessary when more potentially prosperous avenues opened in the democratic mainstream. Most individuals who left Naxalite groups in the late 1990s and 2000s did not do so because of greater economic opportunities. Nor did left-wing extremism initially decline because the state successfully clamped down on its operations from a governance standpoint. In fact, during this period of decline, paradoxically, law and order problems and development initiatives were probably at their worst under “Lalu Raj”. The kidnapping industry flourished, and economic development was at a standstill. Rather, intensified democratic competition in an environment of caste polarization contributed to an exodus of Naxalites to mainstream parties. The corrupt entwinement of mainstream and Naxal parties introduced blatant hypocrisy to the movement’s ideology, dragging the party away from the interests of those it once represented. Others maintained hope in some original Naxal goals, but shifted their modus operandi away from violence and towards democratic politics. Overall, individuals left Naxal groups when better opportunities presented themselves in the mainstream political realm, rather than the economic realm. These findings carry a number of significant implications. If !

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political opportunities, rather than economic development or a heavy state presence, were the keys to the decline of LWE support in Bihar, then a two-pronged counterinsurgency strategy of governance and development will ultimately be ineffective if mainstream political opportunities are not attractive and viable. Since on the larger scale, left-wing extremism is an ideological war, more focus needs to be placed on strengthening India’s democracy, living up to the values of the Constitution, and convincing the marginalized that democratic mobilization and democratic means are not only morally, but pragmatically, a sounder strategy than Maoist guerrilla war. As seen in the case of Bihar, if people become invested in democracy, support for left-wing extremism withers. While democracy does not ensure good governance or development outcomes, as also demonstrated by the case of Bihar, if one believes in democracy as the best system of government available, voters will know what is best for them. Now, it would seem, democracy has placed Bihar in the right direction. While before “caste-ridden” democratic politics were seen as one key to Bihar’s struggles, now democracy is seen as its strength. The findings of this study also provoke questions for future areas of research. Examination of voting trends between scheduled castes and scheduled tribes, the primary cadres of the CPI(Maoist), would be a useful endeavor. Comparisons with Uttar Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh, and Jharkhand may yield further insight into these questions. First, the story of the failure of a significant LWE movement to emerge in Uttar Pradesh may be similar to the story in Bihar. For instance, how has Dalit participation in a mainstream political party, the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), curbed interest in left-wing extremism? Secondly, Andhra Pradesh is the only other state besides Bihar that has also seen its formerly high levels of LWE violence decline over the past decade. When searching for past models of success to apply to today’s conflict, many point to the state’s strong security response of the Greyhounds, and how it should be replicated. Prima facie, the path of Bihar is the antithesis of the Andhra story, in the sense that government’s incompetence in responding to the violence eventually contributed to a democratic change of power and fortune. How do these two stories of decline actually compare? Finally, a comparison with Jharkhand, Bihar’s former southern half, whose LWE problem has only escalated, is needed. Why have the scheduled castes of Bihar largely come to mobilize through political parties, but it would appear many scheduled tribes of Jharkhand 46

LEFT-WING EXTREMISM IN CENTRAL BIHAR

have gravitated to left-wing extremism? For over forty years, Naxal violence has been a thorn in the side of Indian democracy. Over the last decade however, it has reached crisis proportions in many regions, heightening the demand for an effective COIN strategy. The case of Central Bihar though should not be overlooked or dismissed. A closer look reveals that factors independent of government policy, independent of efforts at improving governance and development, can be equally if not more influential in reducing insurgent support. If the marginalized do not believe that democratic mobilization through political parties is the most pragmatic avenue towards addressing their grievances, then it is difficult to imagine a strained stateâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s efforts at governance or development having a fundamental impact upon the outcome. In Central Bihar however, many realized, and continue to recognize, that more can be gained by working through democratic institutions, rather than by trying to overthrow them. Without this realization elsewhere, governmentâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s best efforts at rehabilitating the marginalized may ultimately be futile.

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APPENDIX Figure 1: State-wise LWE-Related Deaths in 2000 and 2010

Source: All data from Ministry of Home Affairs Annual Reports

Figure 2: Bihar’s Relative Contribution to India’s LWE Violence

,-./012!344!5676!8/-9!:;<;=7/>!-8!?-91!3886;/=!3<<.64!@1A-/7! 48

LEFT-WING EXTREMISM IN CENTRAL BIHAR

Figure 3: State-wise LWE Incidents and Deaths (2000-2010) State-wise LWE Incidents and Deaths (2000-2010)

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

STATE

Others

Total

Incidents

425

278

318

1179

Deaths

113

170

193

550

Incidents

461

169

105

355

1208

Deaths

180

111

200

564

Incidents

346

239

304

353

1465

Deaths

117

157

482

Incidents

576

249

254

341

1590

Deaths

139

127

117

513

Incidents

310

323

352

379

1533

Deaths

171

169

566

Incidents

535

186

385

312

1608

Deaths

208

168

119

677

Incidents

183

107

715

310

1509

Deaths

388

124

678

Incidents

138

135

582

482

1565

Deaths

369

157

696

Incidents

164

620

484

103

1591

Deaths

242

207

101

721

Incidents

232

529

742

154

266

255

2258

Deaths

290

208

158

908

Incidents

100

307

625

501

218

350

2212

Deaths

343

157

256

1003

Source: All data from Ministry of Home Affairs Annual Reports

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!"#$%&'"()*+$,%-&'.*/;<.=-. >$?"*#@ A",,-.@ B<.(%$.@ !C-D# A*"# E*=)$FF*)( E*=)$FF*)(&D".&A$)G"/ A$FA"$=&>$?"*#@ A"$=&A",,-.@ B$)H&>$?"*#@ B$)H&A",,-.@

+,-./0-102-34,05!""#6!"#"7 !""# !""! !""$ !""% !""& !""' !""( !"") !""* !"#" 012034 5652611 072407 5512458 5632997 5562958 5572598 5:6280: 5::2141 5:92194 :2850 :28:3 :2814 :2785 :234: :2441 4208: :2640 :2514 :2:84 5240: 52410 5246: 52409 52505 089 838 836 813 833 42591 424:8 42341 42060 42:90 425:7 52940 521:8 52850 521:7 :26:8 :2594 42041 :2505 :2588 :2140 :2143 :2:3: :2188 :23:9 02370 02904 562:5: 552157 552760 5:2604 542:68 53253: 512445 512133 72146 72991 72570 02500 92963 72135 92008 72469 72113 72760 52870 52037 52018 42188 42448 42:65 42604 429:1 :2534 :2864 :71 :08 ::1 355 415 503 70 88 76 94 938 791 763 5268: 09: 5267: 52544 52635 040 901 419 414 439 479 443 455 515 538 465 469 52408 52:4: 523:6 52791 52:56 52415 52560 709 084 52615 44 47 53 :6 48 51 50 58 9 0 57 51 51 49 7 1 0 9 4 4

Figure 4: Crime in Bihar (2001-2010) Source: Bihar State Police, http://biharpolice.bih.nic.in.

BHARTI KHER

BHARTI KHER: INDIAN CONTEMPORARY ART IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD JEAN MASON, DARTMOUTH COLLEGE ABSTRACT: Since its economic liberalization, India has been launched onto the center stage of the developing world. India’s art scene has benefited enormously from this economic success, and some of the most sought after and impressive works of today’s biennials are the products of Indian artists. This paper looks at one such artist, Bharti Kher, who negotiates her place in this increasingly globalized world through her art. She makes others question their own places as well, and forces the viewer to face his/her own relationship to the modern world, positing the idea that we are all hybrids. Her eye-catching pieces are comprised of imagery and materials, most notably the bindi, that carry an array of associations and evoke different reactions from viewers of different backgrounds. This feature makes her work visually compelling and imbues it with a thought-provoking ambiguity. In the following pages, I will first describe the economic conditions that predicated India’s booming contemporary art scene, explore a few examples of Kher’s work and some of their many possible interpretations, and finally I will look at the Indian woman’s unique place in the work force and the art world.

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India has always been a country associated with vibrant creativity. It is home to ornately carved temples, hands and feet bearing intricately painted mehndi, innumerable gods each with representations and illustrated stories, brightly painted trucks, bolts of colorful block-printed fabric, and decorated motorcycles. The material culture of India is comprised of an unending host of everyday objects that exist symbiotically with their design. The importance of images has remained constant throughout India’s history and its emergence onto the modern world stage. The integration of everyday objects into India’s visual culture has also persisted, and many contemporary artists incorporate these objects into their art, producing compelling statements about India’s position in an ever-globalizing world. This paper examines one such artist, Bharti Kher, and how she uses the bindi to spark thought about a wide host of issues that are pertinent to today’s world culture. Kher is an artist who deliberately employs mediums that carry a range of meanings, and she leaves it to the viewers to decide what her work means to them. This paper will describe the imagery and materials Kher has used in her most recent works and will elaborate on some of the many associations attached to Kher’s art that can influence her work’s reading. Although hybridity, identity, and globalization seem to be the dominant themes and avenues of interpretation of Kher’s work, this paper will also provide background about the economic and religious contexts and Indian ideas about women that contribute to a greater understanding of Kher’s work and how it might be perceived. When art is intentionally ambiguous, a viewer from any walk of life can make an assessment of the piece that is both valid and unique to that viewer; thus, it is important to consider as many angles of interpretation as possible. However, from whichever angle one chooses to interpret her art, Kher’s bottom line can always be whittled down to the same idea: we are all hybrids living in an interconnected world. After independence from the British in 1947, India found itself bound by Nehruvian socialism to inward-looking and isolationist tendencies. After Nehru’s death in 1964, India started to adopt a skeptical attitude towards the state and began to look outside its borders and pull itself out of the economic stasis of the previous two decades. This liberalization reached its peak in the 1990s, when a fiscal crisis forced India to turn to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In return for aid, the 52

BHARTI KHER

prime minister at the time, P.V. Narashima Rao, sanctioned macroeconomic reforms that relieved India of its reputation as “the most controlled economy in the noncommunist world.”1 The most significant reform was the liberalization of trade policy. Government authorization was no longer required for all imports, and between 1991 and 2000, tariff rates fell from over three hundred percent to approximately twenty percent.2 The economic success India has enjoyed since the 1970s and 1980s has transformed the country. Cities like Delhi, Bangalore, and Mumbai have been and are still being rapidly modernized, and a consumerist middle class is growing at a rate of about twenty to forty million people per year.3 India’s economic liberalization has also sparked a blurring of the boundary between Indian and Western life. India has been credited with an exceptional ability to integrate cultures of its various invaders smoothly and has transferred this same ability to its economic partners. By the 1990s, Indians could be routinely seen wearing Western clothing and speaking English, while markers of Indian culture like the bindi, Hindi films, and Bhangra dance music became very trendy in the West. India’s economic success has also impacted the art scene in India and has reinforced the western idea that the art world is heavily entangled with the economy. This notion has complicated the art scene and imbued it with many layers of paradox. There are few public galleries in India, which has made the commercial art world extremely powerful, giving it the capacity to completely make or break an artist. Many Indian artists have found themselves servant to this dominant commercial world. The artist discussed in this paper, Bharti Kher, is only one of the many artists who have felt pressured to deviate from their own preferred media and instead produce spectacular, eye-catching pieces that stand out at biennials. Not only do some artists change medium to placate customers, but the pressure of the market in some cases prevents artistic exploration. There is intense economic incentive to continue producing multiple iterations of a )

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Shalendra D. Sharma, “India’s economic liberalization: A progress report,” Current History 102 (2003): 176. ! Sharma, “India’s economic liberalization,” 176. " Jerome Neutres, “Indian Dream”, in New Delhi new wave (Bologna: Damiani Editore, 2007), 13. !

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successful piece instead of moving onto a new idea that is not guaranteed to be as successful. Nevertheless, these sensational pieces have been enthusiastically sought out by biennial curators and have launched Indian art into the international scene with a splash, and Indian contemporary art has fetched astronomical prices. The new generation of Indian artists working on the international stage finds itself in a state of flux; they are perceived as neither fully Indian nor fully Western, old nor new, traditional nor modern. As a result, topics addressed by these artists often involve exploration of hybridity, the new westernized brand of metropolitan life, and a critique of globalization. The great paradox is that the very phenomenon of globalization is what brought these artists success in the first place and what provided funding to create their works. An example of this paradox is seen in the artist collective “Open Circle”. Founded in 1998, its mission was to expose upper class excesses and “reveal the cultural homogenization and marginalization of others, both in India and in the global perspective,” but ironically, it was dissolved in 2008 because participating artists’ individual careers began to take off.4 Although such paradoxes can be seen as problematic, they nevertheless result in art that has a high degree of ambiguity and interpretive complexity that effectively challenges Indian and Western conceptions of culture, identity, and economic inequality. The hybrid status of this new group of contemporary artists puts them in an interesting place from which to give insight with “eyes that [are] once curious and critical, self confident in their ‘indianness’ and yet not bound by it.”5 Bharti Kher embraces the levels of paradox present in the hybrid identity of globalized India and has created a stunning body of work that provokes consideration of such issues. Born in 1969 in London, Kher lived and studied in England, where she got her Bachelor of Arts in Painting at the Foundation Course in Art & Design Newscastle Polytechnic. She moved back to India in the early 1990s at the age of 23. She now lives and works with her husband Subodh Gupta, who is also a famed contemporary #

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Zehra Jumabhoy, introduction to The Empire Strikes Back: Indian Art Today. (London: Jonathan Cape, 2009), 20. $ Rhadika Jha, introduction to New Delhi new wave. (Bologna: Damiani Editore, 2007), 13.

BHARTI KHER

artist, in Gurgaon, a satellite city of New Delhi that is an archetype of the social, cultural, and economic revolution of new India. She is both a Briton of Indian origin and an Indian marked by British speech and customs. She has fully experienced belonging to simultaneously neither and both cultures and always seems to be working as an outsider, and thus hybridity is a pervasive theme in her work. The India she came to in the early 1990s had just begun to break down its isolationist attitudes and embrace outside influence; Kher could relate to this condition of suspension between East and West. The ideas about culture and identity articulated in her work reflect both her private experience as an outsider and India’s economic situation and cultural identity in a globalizing world. Kher is known for her sculptural works that are both visually and conceptually compelling. She creates the opportunity for those who view her work to question their own conceptions of culture and identity by combining elements of western modernism with Indian themes, most notably the bindi, a traditional forehead decoration worn by many women between the eyes. The bindi holds cultural significance for Indians and is a great source of fascination for foreigners, making it an alluring choice of medium imbued with many meanings. Kher seems to have a preference for imagery that can be interpreted in multiple ways. The next section of this paper will look at a few of Kher’s key works, provide a range of possible interpretations carried by the imagery she employs, and explain why the ambiguity of her art’s meaning is integral to Kher’s conceptual approach to her work. Kher’s piece that has recently garnered the most attention is her sculpture The Skin Speaks A Language Not Its Own (2006). This piece takes the form of a life-size plexiglass female elephant lying on the floor in some stage between life and death, or sleep and consciousness. Its majestic size immediately grabs the viewer’s attention, and although the elephant is not an unfamiliar animal, its presence in a gallery seems incongruous. The gallery space becomes a sort of zoo or jungle. Research is one of Kher’s primary modes of artistic exploration. She consults zoology books and meticulously measures and studies the animals she creates. The accuracy gives her work a quality that has been described by Ranjit Hoskote as surrealist, an “ongoing phantasmagoria” and “vivid and hallucinatory

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realism that is unsettlingly attentive to detail.”6 Upon approaching the elephant, the viewer discovers that its skin is covered with a secondary epidermal layer of thousands of white bindis that form flowing patterns over the contours of the elephant’s body. By using very anatomically accurate castes of animal forms and mass-produced bindis, Kher relinquishes true control over the majority of the formal elements of the work, leaving room for a totally semiotic reading, largely uncontaminated by Western-imposed formalist critique. The wide range of meanings communicated by both the bindis and the elephant animate both the actual surface and the message of the work and make a variety of interpretations possible. A globally recognized symbol of India, the elephant represented in The Skin Speaks a Language Not Its Own is significant on many levels and carries multiple associations that differ from culture to culture. In the west, the elephant connotes redundancy and frivolity, and, on a more serious level, wisdom and memory. White elephant, brought to mind by the animal’s skin of white bindis, is both a form of gift exchange and a phrase meaning something that is simultaneously priceless and worthless in the west. However, to the Buddhist, the white elephant is an utterly sacred symbol. According to Buddhist myth, Buddha entered his mother’s womb in the form of a white elephant, prophesizing the birth of an exceptional child.7 Elephants also appear in other Hindu and Buddhist myths and are associated with positive attributes. Myth identifies the elephant as one of the nine jewels (navaratnas) that surfaced when the gods churned up the oceans in their quest for amrit, the elixir of life; thus the elephant is associated with both rain and divinity. The elephant, which is virtually ubiquitously worshiped in India, is also the corporeal form of the Hindu god Ganesh, the god of prosperity and learning and the lord of obstacles. “Ganesh is a complex hybrid figure and this complexity resonates with the complexity of the modern world of collapsing distances, multiple languages,

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Ranjit Hoskote, “The Pursuit of Extreme Propositions: Recent Works”, in Bharti Kher, (New York: Jack Shainman Gallery, 2007), 8. & Klemens Karlsson, “The formation of early Buddhist visual culture,” Material Religion 2 (2006).

BHARTI KHER

KHER, Bharti India b.1969 The Skin Speaks a Language Not its Own (images on next page, Details) 2006 Fibreglass and bindi ed. 1/3 167.6 x 152.4 x 457.2cm (irreg., approx.) Acc. 2007.002 Purchased 2007. Queensland Art Gallery Foundation Collection: Queensland Art Gallery

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BHARTI KHER

layered spaces, immediate access, hybridity, [and] simultaneous stimuli”.8 It is apparent how those familiar with the god might immediately connect the god to Kher’s sculpture, a form also wrought with multiple languages, cultural associations, and literal and figurative layers. Aside from its holy connotations, the elephant also represents strength. Its stature, visibility, and regal stride made it the ideal animal for Indian kings to ride in order to communicate their power, simultaneously making the elephant a symbol of state authority. The perception of the elephant as strong can also be seen in Indian temple architecture. The lowest foundational slab of a temple is called the Gajthar, gaj meaning elephant and thar meaning base, and the apsidal, barrel-vaulted style of temple architecture is called Hastiprstha, or “elephant-back”.9 The bindi is another symbol of India that holds a whole different set of meanings and associations. Derived from the word bindu, the Sanskrit word for dot or point, the bindi is the red dot traditionally worn between the eyes of women to signify their marital status and fertility. 10 The area between the eyes represents a hidden wisdom, so the bindi can also represent a third eye that taps into that wisdom and links the material and spiritual worlds. Over time the bindi has lost much of its significance and is now often used as a fashion accessory by Indians as well as some nonIndian women. The white bindis used by Kher in The Skin Speaks a Language Not Its Own resemble squiggling spermatozoa. The visual dualism present in the form of the teardrop shaped bindis suggests an opportunity for feminist discourse to be layered on top of her other commentary about identity and culture. This dualism effectively collapses male and female characteristics into one. By confusing male and female symbolism, Kher destabilizes the metaphorical polarity of male and female signs and blurs the boundaries between the two genders. This both exposes the structure of male '

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Jayasinhji Jhala, “Journey with Ganesh: Telling stories of objects acting in the world as being acted upon in the world,” South Asian Popular Culture 4 (2006): 35. ( Stella Kramrisch and Raymond Burnier, The Hindu Temple, (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Pub, 1946) 142. )* Meenakshi Gigi Durham, “Displaced persons: symbols of South Asian femininity and the returned gaze in the U.S. media culture,” Communication Theory 11 (2001) 203. !

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hegemony that supports the binaries and serves to enhance the Kher’s pervasive idea that we are all hybrids and do not belong to distinct groupings. According to Hindu cosmology, the female’s status is determined by who controls her sexuality. If she controls her own sexuality, she is considered unstable and has the potential to be both a bringer of destruction and fertility.11 If a man controls her sexuality, she is no longer dangerous and is portrayed as a benign bearer of life. The state of the woman’s duality is totally dependent on her sexuality in the hands of a man. By using sperm-like bindis in her works, Kher is reversing this power dynamic and putting the symbol of male sexuality in a female context instead of vice versa. In a way, Kher herself is doing the same thing and enacting this subversion of the binary; she is excelling in a typically maledominated profession in a traditionally patriarchal country. On a personal level, Kher uses the elephant’s second skin of bindis to reflect her own complex identity as both an outsider and an insider in Britain and India. However, by intentionally selecting loaded Indian symbols imbued with multiple meanings, Kher has created a piece that makes possible a wide array of interpretations, thus revealing truths about not only herself but about modern India and its perception. The traditional bindi and Indian archetype of the elephant juxtaposed with their alternate meanings and the piece’s presentation in the context of a western institution (i.e. the commercial art world) sends both positive and negative messages about India. Kher emphasizes the process of looking, seeing, and re-seeing when encountering the piece, referring to the initial aesthetic impact, the individual reading of each sign, and then fusion of the signs to create meaning. The process of re-seeing produces a different conclusion for each viewer, depending on the associations he/she places on each element of the piece and how the viewer decides to negotiate the relationship between the elephant and its skin. One question the viewer must answer for him or herself plays a large part in setting the overall tone of the piece: is the elephant dying or ))

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Susan Wadley, “Women and the Hindu Tradition,” Women in Indian Society, (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1988), 28.

BHARTI KHER

being revived? Whatever decision viewer makes has a large role in determining whether this piece is read as a critique or praise of modern India. The other question that gives the piece meaning refers to the bindi: what is causing the death or revival of this elephant? Assuming the elephant is dying, presumably the swarms of bindis are the cause of its death. It appears that the mass-produced markers of culture have weighed down the elephant, the symbol of Indian religion and state. Thus, this piece could be read as a critique of economic liberalization as a killer of Indian culture, which has been infiltrated by western values and practices. This is a reading that would most likely be drawn by someone who has experienced or witnessed the dark side of India’s economic rise, as many have. To such a viewer, the suffocating, mass-produced bindis may call to mind the economic reforms of the 1990s that had detrimental effects on some of the population. The Movement Against State Repression (MASR), an NGO in southern Punjab, has estimated about 50,000 suicides across Punjab in the last 20 years.12 There has been a steady increase of economically related suicides since the reforms of the Green Revolution, which has nevertheless been advertised as a success story of western intervention. These reforms introduced a new kind of seed engineered to have a high yield only when combined with expensive fertilizers and irrigation systems.13 Prices of crops remained low, but cost of production rose, leaving farmers in debt and ultimately driving many to suicide. Another possible critical interpretation could view the bindis as representative of individual humans, articulating the crowding and overpopulation of India as a smothering force that is bringing down the country. One could easily turn these negative interpretations of the sculpture on their heads and use the same symbolism to generate positive and optimistic readings of Kher’s work. If the bindis are read as signifiers of Indianness resembling sperm, a more optimistic reading is possible. Despite the elephant’s death, which represents disappearance of the culture of )!

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Mallika Kaur. “The Paradox of India’s Bread Basket: Farmer Suicides in Punjab”, Praxis: The Fletcher Journal of Human Security, Vol XXV (Tufts University, 2010): 39. )" Kaur, “The Paradox of India’s Bread Basket”, 40. !

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India’s pre-globalization culture, the unique language and spirit of India survives in the form of a genetic energy that is passed down through generations of Indians. The bindis act as representations of the innate Indianness that exists and will persist to revive the country’s unique essence in times when that is threatened. The bearer of life in this case is also the artist, who has applied a bloodline of bindis that covers the elephant, activating the work. Another optimistic reading is possible if we see the elephant as being resuscitated rather than killed. Someone who views the economic liberalization of India in a positive light, for example a businessman, a consumer of cheap Indian goods, or a young foreigner establishing a startup company in India, may be inclined to interpret the piece as a sleeping elephant being awakened by the swirling bindis, representing India’s awakening from its socialist period and the revitalization of the country through economic reforms. The sculpture also functions almost as an installation due to its size, which forces the viewer to negotiate the meanings of the sculpture within its current setting. Although The Skin Speaks a Language Not Its Own invites a range of interpretations, each possible interpretation addresses the conflict between tradition and modernity in some way, making the viewer question his own stance on this issue and reasoning for why he interprets this expression of Indian modernity the way he does. The title of the work reinforces the idea that outer appearance and inward values do not always align, and the viewer must consider this while looking at the work. Kher is not hesitant to address issues of identity, culture, and modernity, but she seems to be aware that her efforts are only a tiny fraction of what it will take to transcend these issues. This is communicated by the excessive amount of detail meticulously covering an enormous surface area, suggesting Kher’s determination, the importance of her point, and the magnitude of the task of transcendence. Kher has created a whole zoo full of bindi-laden animals, from elephants to dogs to stags to panthers. These works, while impressive and meaningful, lack a certain interiority and reflectivity that her twodimensional bindi works possess both literally and figuratively. Kher has done many incarnations of these bindi paintings—a mural of gigantic overlapping bindis, boards covered in swirling waves of the sperm-shaped bindis, color groupings of bindis resembling bubbles, organized rows of overlapping monochromatic bindis, and bindis covering mirrors in intricate 62

BHARTI KHER

patterns. These pieces could easily be considered sculpture; however, they have decisively been dubbed paintings. This is perhaps in effort to reconcile the pressure Kher faces to produce large, eye-catching sculptures with her desire to continue painting, the medium she focused on during her studies. In her discussions of these works, Kher delves into the domestic space of the Indian woman, describing the moment in her day when she removes her bindi and sticks it onto her mirror and the moment the next morning when she reapplies the bindi. These are moments in the day when the woman consciously considers her bindi, her third eye, in front of a mirror and has a split second of reflection and self-realization; these moments are unique to the Indian woman. For Kher, this moment has given the bindi a small but powerful significance of one person and reflects passage of time in the life of that person. The variety of patterns and the sheer number of bindis used in the production of these images suggest human migration and give the viewer a sense of Kher’s consideration of a massive amount of people’s passages through time and space. Her awe and appreciation for patterns of human lives comes from her own experience as a child of the Indian Diaspora and she directly attributes her work to this aspect of her life: “Coming from abroad you always notice things that people who live here might not.” 14 These works also have a sense of claustrophobia, which Kher must have felt when she moved from England to crowded Delhi. These bindis are “a call for consciousness.”15 Kher calls for a consciousness of self, consciousness of an interconnectivity between the streams of people constantly moving around the world, and a consciousness of modern womanhood. By representing the roaming human with the bindi, she is setting the bindi free, therefore transforming a symbol of feminine isolation into a symbol of freedom and challenging women who feel trapped by traditional roles. In this way, she links the woman’s interior into a larger world narrative.

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Laura Silverman. “Making Art and Millions, with Bindis”, last modified June 3, 2010, <http://republicofbrown.com/bharti-kher/> )$ Chita Subramanyam. “Master Strokes”, last modified April, 2008, <http://woman.intoday.in/woman/story.jsp?sid=5834> !

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Although Kher does not profess to be overly religious, the employs Buddhist concepts in her bindi paintings to reinforce this pervasive idea of the interconnectedness of all humans. The title of her recent series of bindicovered mirrors, indra’s net mirror (2010), alludes to a Buddhist metaphor that illustrates concepts of interpenetration and interrelation of all beings. Indra’s net is articulated in the Avatamsaka Sutra, which reads as follows: Far away in the heavenly abode of the great god Indra, there is a wonderful net that has been hung by some cunning artificer in such a manner that it stretches out infinitely in all directions. In accordance with the extravagant tastes of deities, the artificer has hung a single glittering jewel in each “eye” of the net, and since the net itself is infinite in all dimensions, the jewels are infinite in number. There hang the jewels, glittering like stars of the first magnitude, a wonderful sight to behold. If we now arbitrarily select one of these jewels for inspection and look closely at it, we will discover that in its polished surface there are reflected all the other jewels in the net, infinite in number. Not only that, but each of the jewels reflected in this one jewel is also reflecting all the other jewels, so that there is an infinite reflecting process occurring.16 In the series indra’s net mirror, Kher is bringing this cosmos of interconnected jewels down to earth in the form of bindis, insinuating that all human lives are reflected in each other. The Avatamsaka Sutra was the first teaching of Buddha, which might emphasize the importance of Kher’s message to those who know the sutra well. The recent and colossal success of female Indian artists has actually become somewhat of a phenomenon that is present in few other countries. India has the highest percentage of renowned professional female artists in the world, which is surprising especially to the western eye that views the )%

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Francis H. Cook, Hua-yen Buddhism: the jewel net of Indra. In William J. Jackson, Heaven’s fractal net: retrieving lost visions in the humanities. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004).

BHARTI KHER

Indian woman as veiled, subdued, and subservient.17 It is worth looking at a brief history of Indian women and their role in the art world to figure out why Indian women’s art in particular has gained such dominance. Historically, women in India have always been at a disadvantage. Many of these disadvantages have their roots in myth and religion. As mentioned earlier, females were condemned as volatile destroyers if left untamed by a man: “in times of prosperity she is indeed Lakshmi, who bestows prosperity in the homes of men; and in times of misfortune, she herself becomes the goddess of misfortune and brings about ruin.”18 This idea contributed to a heavily patriarchal society where women did not enjoy the same rights as men and were subject to substandard treatment. Censuses from 1981, 1991, and 2001 show women as consistently having lower rates of literacy, lower age of marriage, lower sex ratio, and lower working rate than men.19 Additionally, India is one of the few countries where women have equal or slightly lower life expectancies than men, despite the fact that women typically outlive men. Violent crime against women and dowry deaths are increasing, and India has a ratio of maternal mortality that is 57 times higher than the United States. These disadvantages women face are “intrinsically linked to their status in society” and India’s cultural preference for sons.20 New technologies intended to help India’s economy have actually ended up hurting women in the work force; the technology that was introduced displaced people from their jobs, and because of the standing patriarchal social structure, women were the first to lose work.21

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Mary-Ann Milford-Lutzker, “Shakti: The Power of Women’s Art in India”, Orientations 33 (2002): 37. )' “Jagdisvarananda” 1953 in Wadley, “Women and the Hindu Tradition”, 24. )( O.P. Sharma, “2001 Census Results Mixed for India’s Women and Girls”, in Population Today, last modified May/June 2001. !* Victoria A. Velkoff and Arjun Adlakha, “Women’s Health in India”, Women of the World. Issued December 1998. <http://www.census.gov/ipc/prod/wid-9803.pdf> !) Rehana Ghadially, introduction to Women in Indian Society, (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1998), 14. !

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Yet despite all the obstacles women have faced, modern women still seem to be confidently participating at high levels of leadership more than women of other countries.22 Perhaps an explanation for this also lies in Hindu myth. Although women in Hinduism are portrayed as volatile and validated only by men, the duality of each woman is believed to hold a certain power called shakti. The shakti is the feminine power that activates the universe, and this power is said to lie within each woman. Although society calls for a male to tame the woman’s inner shakti and neutralize its potential danger, the fact that women contain the same power that animates all beings is a liberating force that inspires self confidence. Since independence, women have exercised this confidence and shown a particular tenacity in the arts as a mode of expression and a professional outlet, and they have had much success. Bharti Kher is one of the most recent in a line of ground-breaking women in art history since the 1940s. In the period after 1947, Indian artists felt they should work in more individualistic styles like western artists did, and so they began to turn inward and examine their own roots more closely.23 Women were in a better position to excel at this individually driven style for two reasons that both contributed to their state of “rigorous self awareness.”24 Firstly, they had not been let into, thus were not bound by, previous canons of Indian art. Secondly, they did not have the freedom to venture into the world of western art as men did, thus women were more easily able to remain attached to their cultural identity and explore it more thoroughly through their own visual identity. It has been argued that women’s unique cultural viewpoints have enabled contemporary female artists to far surpass their male counterparts.25 Important figures in the advancement of women’s art in India include Amrita Sher-Gil (1913-1941), who has been compared to Mexico’s Frida Kahlo, and Gogi Saroj Pal (1945- present). Saroj Pal !!

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Devaki Jain, introduction to Indian Women, (New Delhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Govt. of India, 1975), xxii. !" Ginu Kamani, “Women Artists of India: India’s women artists have turned their relative seclusion into a cultural vantage point”, Indian Currents Magazine 11 (1998): 20. !# Kamani, “Women Artists of India”, 20. !$ Geeti Sen, “A New Iconography: Indian woman artists in exhibition”, Art AsiaPacific 18 (1998): 32.

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consciously exercises her shakti in her paintings that turn the world upside down, employ unusual color combinations, and fuse animals and humans together. Bharti Kher has also created sculptures that integrate human and animal elements; like Saroj Pal, although perhaps less intentionally, she seems to acknowledge her own shakti and unique perspective as a product of the Indian Diaspora. Author and art historian Chaitanya Sambrani states in an article that “when we look for contemporary instances of historically aware and politically responsive art practices that hold up challenges to the hegemony of cultural forms and representations, some of the richest examples come from the work of women artists.”26 Bharti Kher adds to this tradition of the strong and insightful Indian woman artist, while adding her own aesthetics, traditional elements, and modern twists to her pieces. Some of her work is surreal and shocking, and some inspires awe. Either way “it is difficult walking away… without having a strong reaction. She commands it.” 27 Kher challenges the viewer’s definition of self and interpretations of culture from a transnational viewpoint. Her work is changing the way the west perceives Indian culture and contributes to the efforts to change the west’s tendency to look at Asian art solely for a reflection of the east’s values and aesthetics. Kher’s work also manages to eloquently “steer away from the sterile territory of modernism, while avoiding equally the pitfalls of a vacuous revivalism.”28 Her main vehicle for maintaining a balance between the traditional and the modern is her use of symbols and materials that have multiple layers of significance for people in many countries, ensuring that every viewer draws both valid and relevant meaning from her work that reflects a truth of modern India and the globalized world. Because her work can elicit multiple associations from one person, the viewer is forced to synthesize these associations in order to make sense of her work. No matter which angle the viewer chooses to understand Kher’s work, he must always negotiate more than one level of interpretation, a process which proves !%

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Chaitanya Sambrani, “The possibilities of device: the work of Nalini Malani and Nilima Sheikh” in Text and Subtext: Contemporary Art and Asian Women, {Early Lu Gallery, 2000), 128. !& Laura Silverman. “Making Art and Millions, with Bindis”. Last modified June 3, accessed 3/1/11. <http://republicofbrown/com/bharti-kher/> !' Sambrani, “The possibilites of device”, 128. !

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Bharti Kherâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s central point: no one is completely one-dimensional or isolated. We are all a blend of various experiences and beliefs that are undoubtedly linked within a greater web of humanity.

THE USES OF BUDDHISM IN COLONIAL AND POST-COLONIAL INDIA

THE USES OF BUDDHISM IN COLONIAL AND POSTCOLONIAL INDIA: EXAMINING CONTESTATION AROUND THE SITE OF B ODH GAYA KIRSTIN KRUSELL, BROWN UNIVERSITY ABSTRACT: As the place of the Buddha’s enlightenment, the Bodh Gaya temple complex in Bihar, India is foremost among Buddhist pilgrimage sites. However, Bodh Gaya has for centuries been a place of worship for Hindus and Buddhists alike—a fact that is obscured by Bodh Gaya’s current UNESCO World Heritage brand. I set out in this research paper to investigate the historical context in which Bodh Gaya began to be portrayed exclusively as a Buddhist sacred space, and the ways in which this characterization served the colonial administration. Furthermore, I seek to explain the mechanisms through which this representation is perpetuated today. In particular, this paper will focus on the role played by World Heritage designation, and the tourism industry it generates, in sustaining colonial-era evaluations of Bodh Gaya’s origins and authenticity, and in turn, colonial forms of marginalization.

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INTRODUCTION Bodh Gaya is frequently characterized as the “Buddhist Jerusalem,” or the “navel of the earth,” for it is here that some 2550 years ago Siddhartha Gautama reached enlightenment beneath the shade of a pipal tree. Thus, Bodh Gaya is now among the most sacred spaces for the world’s Buddhist community, attracting hundreds of thousands of pilgrims each year. However, Bodh Gaya was never an exclusively Buddhist site. Rather, it remains a stigmatized and neglected fact that “Hindus have been visiting Bodhgaya since at least the Buddha’s own lifetime, and beginning in the fifteenth-century and extending into the twentieth, the site was actually maintained by a lineage of Saiva priests.”1 For this reason, Bodh Gaya’s inscription as a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 2002 was viewed as a triumph for the site’s conservation, and for religious harmony in the region; its fate stands in stark contrast to that of another highly contested religious space— Ayodhya’s Babri Masjid.2 Yet, to what extent has this designation really assuaged the competing claims of ownership between Buddhists and Hindus, and those between national and extra-national actors? I argue that because Bodh Gaya’s inscription as a World Heritage Site is based solely on its significance for the Buddhist community rather than its “nature as a dual-identity pilgrimage place,” World Heritage status has perpetuated and reified the colonial period’s Orientalist focus on Buddhist superiority.3 I further argue that Bodh Gaya’s current World Heritage representation has been determined largely by government officials seeking to sustain a tourism economy around the site. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, British archaeologists viewed the Hindu presence at Bodh Gaya as a desecration of a pure and authentic Buddhist past—a rhetoric steeped in the Orientalist discourse of loss and decay. This notion of a Buddhist golden age having preceded the

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! Jacob N. Kinnard, “When is the Buddha not the Buddha? The Hindu/Buddhist Battle over Bodhgaya and Its Buddha Image,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 66.4 (1998): 817. ! This 16th century mosque was destroyed in 1992 by Hindu nationalists claiming that the mosque had been built on the birthplace of the god Rama. " Kinnard, “The Hindu/Buddhist Battle,” 817. "

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corrupt Hindu present ultimately served as a “legitimizing discourse about Britain’s civilizing mission in India.”4 That is to say, in their positivist quest to objectively “know” India’s past through the Archaeological Survey of India, the British institutionalized a disproportionate valuation on the site’s Buddhist moment of origin. In this way, Buddhism was highlighted in order to subordinate Hinduism, whose polytheistic and hierarchical nature was seen as a barrier to the adoption of Christianity—an integral justification for imperialist expansion. Such anti-Brahmanical ideologies would come to influence the international Buddhist campaign for control of Bodh Gaya, thereby catalyzing over a century of contestation regarding access and management. Indeed, these views persist into modern day in the way Bodh Gaya is branded an exclusively Buddhist site by its World Heritage status, thus obscuring contemporary understandings of Bodh Gaya as a site of living and “multivalent” tradition.5 THE BRITISH “DISCOVERY” OF BUDDHISM According to anthropologist Bernard Cohn, the British colonial project in India was enacted through the belief that Indian society was knowable and by extension, that it could be categorized and harnessed to enhance administrative efficiency.6 In other words, colonial officials believed that they could incorporate an objective, scientifically determined knowledge about Indian culture and society into their laws and policies so as to enhance the effectiveness of their authority. Among the many “investigative modalities” the British employed was the science of surveying, or the systematic collection of data concerning the natural and social features of the empire.7 Out of this effort, amateur architectural and archaeological surveys were becoming increasingly common, such that by 1848, Alexander Cunningham began petitioning the government to

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! Bernard S. Cohn, Colonialism and Its Forms of Knowledge: The British in India. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 5. $ Kinnard, “The Hindu/Buddhist Battle,” 817. % Cohn, Colonialism and Its Forms of Knowledge, 4. & Cohn, Colonialism and Its Forms of Knowledge, 5. %

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establish an official archaeological survey.8 This marked a significant epistemic shift in colonial knowledge production, in which material remains supplemented religious texts as the accepted source to elucidate the historical truth of India’s past.9 When in 1861 Governor-General Lord Canning finally established the Archaeological Survey of India (ASI) with Cunningham as director, there began a growing Western fascination with India’s Buddhist past. By the end of the 18th century, the British had yet to realize that Buddhism was distinct from Hinduism, largely due to the fact that many Hindus regard the Buddha as the ninth avatar of Vishnu. By the mid-19th century however, the difference between the two religions had become apparent through textual studies, and they were even regarded as “irreconcilably opposed.”10 Indeed, the Buddhist past was styled as the pure and authentic “antithesis to the ‘degenerate’ Brahmanical religion” of the present.11 Victorians saw the Buddha as an ally in opposing Hinduism, for he “dared to preach the perfect equality of all mankind…in spite of the menaces of the most powerful and arrogant priesthood in the world.”12 This “diminishing order of priorities” was further manifested in the galleries of Calcutta’s India Museum, where the epochs of Ashoka and Gupta were presented as superior to the Brahmanical and “Muhamaddan” periods that followed. In turn, this view was employed to legitimize Britain’s colonial ambitions in India, and Cunningham himself felt that by uncovering a “counter- religious system of the past” he could facilitate the spread of Christianity in India. 13 Although he later abandoned such explicit evangelical motivations,

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! Alan Trevithick, “British Archaeologists, Hindu Abbots, and Burmese Buddhists: The Mahabodhi Temple at Bodh Gaya, 1811-1877,” Modern Asian Studies 33.3 (1999): 643. * Tapati Guha-Thakurta, “Archaeology and the Monument: An Embattled Site of History and Memory and Contemporary India,” in Monuments and Memory, Made and Unmade, ed. Robert Nelson and Margaret Olin (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 148. )* Kinnard, “The Hindu/Buddhist Battle,” 831. "" Tapati Guha-Thakurta, “Monuments and Lost Histories: The Archaeological Imagination in Colonial India,” in Proof and Persuasion: Essays on Authority, Objectivity and Evidence, ed. Suzanne L. Marchand and Elizabeth Lunbeck (New York: Brepols Publishers, 1997), 149. )! Kinnard, “The Hindu/Buddhist Battle,” 825. )" Guha-Thakurta, “Monuments and Lost Histories,” 149. )

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nevertheless the ASI’s earliest projects were concerned with tracing the itineraries of Chinese Buddhist pilgrims from the 5th to 7th centuries, for Cunningham continued to focus exclusively on India’s Buddhist past as a way to discredit the Hindu population. Thus, instead of a wide-reaching and comprehensive survey of all the archaeological sites in India, “he selected for investigation only those areas or places visited by Fa-Hien and HiuenTsang and described by them as having ancient remains.”14 Among these sites was Bodh Gaya, where fieldwork commenced in 1861. A HISTORY OF M ULTIVALENCE The earliest extant representation of Bodh Gaya is a second century BCE panel depiction of the bodhi, or pipal, tree under which Buddha achieved nirvana, and an inscription that reads “Enlightenment of the Blessed Sakyamuni.”15 Thus, emphasis was placed first on the event rather than the place per se. Similarly, the travelogues of seventh century Chinese pilgrim, Hiuen-Tsang, place little emphasis on Bodh Gaya, although he does mention a vihara, or Buddhist monastery, approximately 160 feet in height. This structure is known today as the Mahabodhi temple (a term coined by Cunningham in his 1892 monograph on the site), and it has been the central focus of modern contestation.16 It is unclear, however, how the temple came to replace the bodhi tree as the primary locus of religious reverence at Bodh Gaya. Nevertheless, the origins of the temple are attributed to the Mauryan emperor Ashoka during the 3rd century BCE.17 Thereafter, the temple was repeatedly destroyed and rebuilt, and two inscriptions indicate that at least once it was rebuilt under the patronage of a wealthy Brahman.18 Bodh Gaya reached its zenith in the late Buddhist period “under Pala and Sena rule, when it clearly stood as a

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! Dilip K. Chakrabarti, A History of Indian Archaeology, from the Beginning to 1947 (New Delhi. Munshiram Manoharlal, 1988), 58. "& Frederick M. Asher, “The Bodhgaya Temple: Whose Structure Is It?” Religion and the Arts 8.1 (2004): 61. )% Asher, “The Bodhgaya Temple,” 64. )& Guha-Thakurta, “Archaeology and the Monument,” 282. )' Asher, “The Bodhgaya Temple,” 64. "%

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thriving hub of royal patronage, artistic production, and pan-Asian Buddhist activity.”19 After possibly being sacked by the Muslim military commander, Bakhtiyar Khalji, in the late 12th century, Bodh Gaya saw little pilgrimage for the next several hundred years and ultimately fell into disrepair.20 Upon the arrival of Europeans, there were few Buddhists left in India and the site was under protection of the Shaiva mahant, or spiritual leader, of Bodh Gaya.21 The mahants trace their lineage back to 1590, when Gosain Ghamandi Giri established a monastery at Bodh Gaya. As it is not historically uncommon that sites with a sacred background are reused by other faiths, the Shaivas probably found the site abandoned during the late 16th century and established their residence.22 In this way Buddhist ritual and imagery lived on, for although the Shaiva worshippers replaced some Buddhist symbols, many others were assimilated rather than destroyed. For instance, Hindus today propitiate their deceased ancestors at the bodhi tree, in addition to adopting and adapting images of the Buddha and Bodhisattvas.23 Cunningham remarked on this religious syncretism during his 1861 inventory at the site, declaring that “no conversion is required, as the people accept one of these votive stupas of the Buddhists as a readymade lingam.”24 While this view regards the Hindu laity as ignorant and lacking in agency, contemporary scholars refer to this process as the “Hindu mode of encompassment”—an inclusive approach in which Buddhist pilgrims were always accommodated as worshippers.25 Thus, while colonial scholars were indeed aware of Bodh Gaya’s history of peaceful HinduBuddhist syncretism, they deliberately cast this process as evidence of )(

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Guha-Thakurta, “Archaeology and the Monument,” 282. !* Asher, “The Bodhgaya Temple,” 65 !) Hinduism is comprised of four main sects, including Shaivism, Vaishnavism, Shaktism and Smartism. Followers of Shaivism revere the god Shiva, and are referred to either as “Shaivas”, “Saivas” or “Saivites”. Shaivism grew out of the Bhakti Movement, a devotional tradition in which personal relationships with god figure more prominently than ritual (Flood, 1996). !! Asher, “The Bodhgaya Temple,” 67. !" Asher, “The Bodhgaya Temple,” 69. #% The lingam is a pillar-like representation of the deity Shiva. Trevithick, “Mahabodhi Temple at Bodh Gaya,” 646. #& Trevithick, “Mahabodhi Temple at Bodh Gaya,” 637.

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Hindu degeneracy and represented the site as purely, authentically Buddhist. Moreover, Cunningham’s reports are rife with derision at the site’s Hindu priesthood, largely due to the site’s state of ruin. Indeed, both the tree and the temple structures of Bodh Gaya had deteriorated immensely— this was “no mere Oriental eye for decay.”26 But Cunningham lamented how Buddhist art had rivaled that of Greece “until its degradation culminated in the wooden inanities and bestial obscenities of the Brahmanical temples.”27 He further criticized the ignorance of the locals, who used the site’s stones as building materials, and in this way “the specter of ‘medieval ravage’ inevitably dovetailed with a more current scenario of ‘native apathy and neglect’”.28 And thus we see once again “the recurrent narratives of authenticity and origin, whereby the true identity of a structure comes to rest on the recovery of a presumed primary moment of its coming into being.”29 Despite this vitriol, few efforts were made to preserve Bodh Gaya, for at this time the purview of archaeology was limited to description and the collection of artifacts. However, this began to change upon the 1874 involvement of Burmese monks in the issue of temple restoration, which stimulated the government’s possessiveness over historical sites within its territory. THE TRANSNATIONAL BUDDHIST COMMUNITY: THE 1874 ARRIVAL OF THE BURMESE RESTORATION T EAM “It is His Majesty’s wish to repair the enclosures of the Great Bodi [sic] tree, which from a long state of existence must have fallen into decay,” read King Mindon of Burma’s memorandum to the Government of India.30 This overture was not a complete surprise to the Government, as there was a long history of Burmese involvement in the conservation of Bodh Gaya. Two prior missions, in which the site’s design was significantly altered, are !%

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Trevithick, “Mahabodhi Temple at Bodh Gaya,” 642. !& Kinnard, “The Hindu/Buddhist Battle,” 828. !' Guha-Thakurta, “Archaeology and the Monument,” 249. !( Guha-Thakurta, “Archaeology and the Monument,” 248. "* Trevithick, “Mahabodhi Temple at Bodh Gaya,” 648. !

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dated uncertainly to 1100 and 1296. Furthermore, in 1811 surveyor Francis Hamilton-Buchanan was told that, “Burmese Buddhists ‘again’ were inquiring about the condition of the site.”31 Thus, in keeping with its posture of religious neutrality, the Government gave permission with the caveat not to “offend the prejudices of the Hindoos, who also possess shrines near the temple.”32 To this end, the Governments of India and Bengal mediated between the mahants of Bodh Gaya and the Burmese monks, clarifying plans until an agreement was reached in 1875. The ground rules laid out by the mahants stated that no Hindu images be displaced, nor pilgrims disturbed, and that land for construction of a Burmese monastery be leased rather than sold.33 Hence, work began in January of 1876 under the direction of the Burmese and there was little, if any, conflict between the restoration team and the Hindu worshippers. However before six months had passed, the Government of Bengal became alarmed at reports that “Burmese workers were making a mess of the old temple at Buddha Gaya.”34 As a result, renowned Bengali archaeologist Rajendralal Mitra was sent to monitor the restoration activities. His instructions were not to interfere, but to prevent as far as possible any irreparable damage to the temple. Yet to his dismay, Mitra discovered that the monks had used the foundations of ancient structures as building materials, and in the sanctum, had plastered over niches meant for images. This was not problematic for the Burmese monks or the mahants, largely because neither had any “interest whatsoever in archaeologically ‘discovering’ or ‘situating’ a Buddhism with which they were already familiar.”35 Yet in his assessment, Mitra deemed the Burmese monks “ignorant of their true history and their faith.”36 Thus, Mitra saw little value in “the practice of Burmese Buddhism as it was now actually encountered,” and instead adhered to the Orientalist perspective that privileges the legitimacy of the moment of origin.37 Ultimately however, ")

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Ibid. "! Ibid. "" Trevithick, “Mahabodhi Temple at Bodh Gaya,” 650. "# Ibid. "$ Trevithick, “Mahabodhi Temple at Bodh Gaya,” 651. "% Trevithick, “Mahabodhi Temple at Bodh Gaya,” 650. "& Trevithick, “Mahabodhi Temple at Bodh Gaya,” 651.

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Mitra lamented that the restoration “cannot be objected to,” for despite the Government’s obvious posture on the superiority of the Buddhist tradition, it ostensibly upheld a policy of religious neutrality.38 ANAGARIKA DHARMAPALA AND THE CALL FOR A BUDDHIST M ECCA: 1891-1949 While the Burmese monks had deferred to the authority of the mahants in their restoration project, Sri Lankan Buddhist leader Anagarika Dharmapala set out to directly challenge their sovereignty. Dharmapala is a contentious character, variously viewed as a “rabble rousing extremist” or “righteous defender of the true tradition.”39 Born to a wealthy Sinhalese family and educated at a Christian mission school, he was influenced in his teens by the founders of the Theosophical Society, Henry Steele Olcott and Helena Petrova Blavatsky.40 With them, he traveled across India endeavoring to revive the Buddhist religion in India. Eventually, he became disinterested in the Theosophical call for universal brotherhood and instead invested his energies in the plight of neglected Buddhist sites. Indeed, after a reading of Edwin Arnold’s poem The Light of Asia and his descriptions of the site’s state of decay, Dharmapala devoted the rest of his life to the “liberation” of Bodh Gaya from the hands of its Shaiva occupants. Dharmapala grew increasingly alienated by Olcott’s conflation of Hinduism and Buddhism. According to Kinnard, “it was not only possible for the two religions to coexist in peace and harmony at Bodh Gaya, but it was natural for them to do so, because for Olcott, Hinduism and Buddhism were in essence the same.”41 Dharmapala, however, staunchly insisted that, "'

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Trevithick, “Mahabodhi Temple at Bodh Gaya,” 650. "( Kinnard, “The Hindu/Buddhist Battle,” 820. #* The Theosophical Society is “an association founded at New York, 1875, by Col. H. S. Olcott, Madame Blavatsky, and W. Q. Judge, its professed objects being: 1. To form the nucleus of a universal brotherhood; 2. To promote the study of Aryan and other Eastern literature, religions, and sciences; 3. To investigate the unfamiliar laws of nature and the faculties latent in man” (Oxford English Dictionary, 2010). #) Kinnard, “The Hindu/Buddhist Battle,” 822. !

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“India by right belongs to Buddha.”42 Thus, in 1891 Dharmapala established the Mahabodhi Society with the aim of restoring Bodh Gaya to its former state as a pilgrimage center for the world’s Buddhists. According to Dharmapala himself, “The idea of restoring the Buddhist Jerusalem into Buddhist hands originated with Sir Edwin Arnold…and since 1891 I have done all I could to make the Buddhists of all lands interested in the scheme of restoration.”43 The rhetoric of the Mahabodhi Society however, was in line with the “anti- Brahmanical polemic” of Arnold and other British colonizers. Dharmapala viewed himself as filling the need for “a powerful Buddhist’s eloquent voice…to show the knavery of the selfish bigoted Brahman priests.”44 He regarded the Shaiva mahant as having “no religious interests at the shrine” but only financial interest in the land and its guesthouses.45 In this way, Dharmapala perpetuated the “most egregious sort of Orientalist essentialism, [for] to him all Hindus could be reduced to an unambiguous image of the Other: namely the avaricious, duplicitous, and mercenary Mahant—the very epitome of the wily Brahmin.”46 In addition, he regarded the ritual activities that were taking place as a desecration of the Buddha, such as the painting and clothing of statues. More specifically, “whereas the Buddhists did not actually worship the Buddha image, at least not from Dharmapala’s enlightened perspective, but instead only paid it tribute, honoring the memory of the now-absent teacher, the Hindus turned the image into a god and thus into an idol perverting the Buddha and his image.”47 This was not an indigenous debate, but “in significant ways actually created by the opinions of a select group of Orientalists,” who viewed the syncretic tendencies of Hindus as evidence of ignorance and hence a charter for British rule.48 Thus in 1895, in “an open act of aggression aimed at Hinduism in general and at the Bodh Gaya Mahant and his followers in particular,” Dharmapala and his followers attempted to install a Japanese image of #!

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Ibid. #" Kinnard, “The Hindu/Buddhist Battle,” 821. ## Ibid. #$ Kinnard, “The Hindu/Buddhist Battle,” 823. #% Kinnard, “The Hindu/Buddhist Battle,” 824. #& Ibid. #' Kinnard, “The Hindu/Buddhist Battle,” 818.

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Buddha in the inner sanctum of the Mahabodhi temple.49 However, he was immediately thwarted by Bodh Gaya’s Shaiva Hindus. The Magistrate of Gaya District, G. A. Grierson, also affirmed the Bodh Gaya mahant’s jurisdiction over the temple, which he deemed government property. Therefore, “although on the surface it may seem that he was simply trying to restore the image of the Buddha to its rightful place in the Mahabodhi temple, he was himself responding to, and at the same time perpetuating, a long-standing Orientalist conception of Hindu/Buddhist relations in which Hindus, through their idolatrous and fetishistic ritualizing, perverted the pure image of the Buddha.”50 THE 1949 COMPROMISE AND ITS DISCONTENTS Although the initial response of the government was to mandate the removal of the Japanese Buddha, in 1896 they reversed this injunction: “In keeping with its code of religious neutrality, it justified its move in the name not of faith but of art.”51 However, this marked a shift in the government from “a pose of neutrality to one of active intervention in favor of the Buddhists,” such that by 1903, the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, J.A. Bourdillon, took the stance that the temple undoubtedly should be returned to Buddhist control.52 Thereafter, Lieutenant Governor Bourdillon established a commission in order to examine the Buddhist claims to Bodh Gaya. Contrary to Dharmapala’s stories of Hindus who “scowl and spit upon the image of the Buddha and throw stones at the temple,” it was uncovered that local Buddhist modes of worship often intersected with those of Hindus.53 Moreover, the amicable relationship between the mahants and the Burmese Buddhists was held as a counterexample to the aberrant Sinhalese intolerance. Thus, it seems that Dharmapala’s views did not speak for the world’s Buddhist community, but instead were in keeping with European views of Bodh Gaya’s “abominable” #(

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Kinnard, “The Hindu/Buddhist Battle,” 822. $* Kinnard, “The Hindu/Buddhist Battle,” 820. $) Guha-Thakurta, “Archaeology and the Monument,” 294. $! Ibid. $" Kinnard, “The Hindu/Buddhist Battle,” 823. !

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Hindu presence.54 These findings were gathered in preparation for a court case that would drag on for decades, pitting “present possession of the structure on one hand [against] historical claim on the other.”55 Finalizing this debate, Lord Curzon, the Viceroy of India, ultimately decided that the temple “would be held in trust by the government, which would ensure its new status as ‘an exclusively Buddhist shrine’ and issue regulations to guarantee the ‘proper conduct of Buddhist worship’”.56 The mahant was retained only as “ground landlord to draw the fees of all visitors, whether Hindu or Buddhist.”57 In 1904, the mahant successfully argued for the ouster of Dharmapala, and yet the Buddhist cause enjoyed significant popular support, even from Mahatma Gandhi. Several compromises were rejected until finally, in 1949, the Bihar Legislative Assembly enacted the Bodh Gaya Temple Act. This law aims “to make provision for the better management of the Bodh Gaya temple and the properties appertaining thereto” through the offices of the Bodh Gaya Temple Management Committee, which still guides temple governance today.58 The Management Committee is comprised of eight members— four Hindus and four Indian Buddhists. This structure is meant to circumvent the influence of extra-national Buddhist actors like the Mahabodhi Society—a point to which I will return. More significant here are the issues raised by the Chairman, who is always the Magistrate of Gaya District, so long as he is a Hindu. In the case that he is not, the Government of Bihar nominates a sufficient replacement for the Committee. This arrangement effectively creates a Hindu majority within the Committee—an issue that is vehemently disputed by Indian converts to Buddhism. Largely from among the Dalits, this group of Buddhist converts has established the Buddhagaya Mahabodhi Vihar Liberation Action Committee, which petitions the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to bring “justice to the Buddhists around the World by handing over entire control of the Management of the Mahabodhi Mahavihar to the $#

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Kinnard, “The Hindu/Buddhist Battle,” 825. $$ Asher, “The Bodhgaya Temple,” 69. $% Guha-Thakurta, “Archaeology and the Monument,” 295. $& Ibid. $' Asher, “The Bodhgaya Temple,” 69.

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Buddhists.”59 It is likely that “some of the concerns may originate in a feeling of oppression by high-caste Hindus, for several of the points it raises implicate ‘Hindu Brahmins’ as culprits.”60 However, the issue is more complex than the guarantee of a Hindu majority, for this was not the only purpose of the Chairperson rule. Rather, because the Committee was created in the aftermath of Partition, its structure, which does not provide an opportunity for a Muslim Chairperson, reflects a fear of Muslim control of the temple. One local student recently remarked, “Look at what the Taliban did. They destroyed hundreds of Buddhas. What would a Muslim District Magistrate do here?”61 Given the fierce debate it continues to instigate, it is unlikely that the Committee’s structure will remain tenable. For this reason, the 1949 Bodh Gaya Temple Act is viewed largely as a temporary solution to deeper and persistent issues of religious discord. “BRAND BUDDHISM” AND WORLD HERITAGE DESIGNATION: 1949TODAY As a result of these deficiencies in the Management Committee, UNESCO World Heritage status was enthusiastically received in 2002. It was the culmination of a long history of advocacy for a tourism economy, which was presciently suggested in 1902 by the pandit Haraprasad Shastri. He was of the opinion that Bodh Gaya should become the “Mecca of world Buddhism,” and a place of international prestige for India.62 Thereafter, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, who served from 1947 to 1964, began to promote India as the “homeland of Eastern religion” in order to stimulate pilgrimage from neighboring Buddhist countries.63 In fact, at the 2500th Buddha Jayanti celebration in 1956, Nehru invited these nations to establish their own respective religious institutions at Bodh Gaya. As a result, monasteries, temples, and guesthouses built by Sri Lanka, Burma, Japan, $(

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Asher, “The Bodhgaya Temple,” 71. %* Asher, “The Bodhgaya Temple,” 70. %) Ibid. %! Guha-Thakurta, “Archaeology and the Monument,” 296. '$ David Geary, “Destination enlightenment: Branding Buddhism and spiritual tourism in Bodhgaya, Bihar.” Anthropology Today 24.3 (2008): 11. !

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Bhutan, Mongolia, Viet Nam, Nepal and Thailand have gradually replaced the surrounding farmland. Accordingly, although the agricultural sector has diminished since the implementation of Nehru’s policies, the tourism economy has grown exponentially, with souvenir shops and hospitality services supporting the majority of local residents. Thus, despite Buddhists’ ostensible “minority position in terms of the management of the main shrine,” a transnational alliance of Buddhists has successfully transformed Bodh Gaya intro a “thriving centre of Buddhism.”64 In fact, seeing the potential to attract international capital, state, and central tourism, authorities are deeply involved in this “vigorous marketing of ‘brand Buddhism.’”65 As a justification, they often cite a development agenda that capitalizes on spiritual tourism in order to invigorate the stagnant Bihar economy. Thus, 2002 was a pivotal year, for not only was Gaya International Airport completed, but Bodh Gaya was inscribed as a UNESCO World Heritage Site, having been nominated by the Ministry of Tourism and the Government of India. UNESCO employs a set of ten criteria under which a site may be inscribed, five of which apply to Bodh Gaya (Appendices A & B). Each of these criteria makes reference either to Mahabodhi Temple’s architectural, artistic, historical or religious significance as a Buddhist sacred space. The only mention of Hindu tradition in the site’s official description is of a legacy long past, rather than a contemporary Hindu presence—“Opposite [the temple] is a memorial to a Hindu Mahant, who had lived on this site during the 15th and 16th centuries.”66 The same silence is true of the Application for Inscription written by the Ministry of Tourism and the Government of India.67 Nevertheless, Bodh Gaya was touted as the “first living Buddhist monument” to be declared a World Heritage site (as distinct from a “dead monument” or “archaeological zone”) in accordance with

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Ibid. %$ Geary, “Destination enlightenment,” 12. '' UNESCO. “Mahabodhi Temple Complex at Bodh Gaya.” UNESCO World Heritage Centre, (2002). http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/1056. '( Government of India, Ministry of Tourism & Culture. Application for the Inscription of the Mahabodhi Temple Complex as a World Heritage Site. (2002)

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criterion VI.68 Yet, criterion VI refers to sites “directly or tangibly associated with events or living traditions, with ideas, or with beliefs, with artistic and literary works of outstanding universal significance.”69 Today, there are just as many Hindus as Buddhists on pilgrimage at Bodh Gaya, and yet the branding of the site as exclusively Buddhist from time immemorial effectively renders Hindu activity at Bodh Gaya invisible. Thus, “Bodh Gaya has been transformed, rhetorically, at any rate, into precisely what Arnold and Dharmapala had envisioned—the Buddhist Mecca or Jerusalem.”70 In pursuit of maintaining this identity, the International Conclave on Buddhism and Spiritual Tourism was held in New Delhi in 2004. As a result of this conference, the Government of Bihar published a City Development Plan with the assistance of the Housing and Urban Development Corporation. This plan proposes a set of infrastructure developments, among them “a set of heritage policies that seeks to recreate Bodhgaya as a ‘world Buddhist centre’ that provides glimpses of the land of Enlightenment as it used to be in the times of the Buddha.”71 Thus, city officials envision “a serene, verdant ambience, the conceptualization of which was done by the lord Buddha himself.”72 However, the strategies devised in order to achieve this peaceful atmosphere sometimes stand in stark contrast to the development goals so often cited as a justification for the tourism industry.73 For instance, the city has developed a zoning scheme

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The first use of the term “living tradition” in association with Bodh Gaya can be traced back to the colonial government’s Ancient Monuments Preservation Act of 1904. Interestingly, whereas for UNESCO “living tradition” is a criterion for conservation, the Act stipulated that its provisions did not apply to structures “still used for religious purpose”, or “already the property of religious or other corporations”. Trevithick, “Mahabodhi Temple at Bodh Gaya,” 653. '* UNESCO. “The Criteria for Selection.” UNESCO World Heritage Centre, (2004). http://whc.unesco.org/en/criteria/. &* Kinnard, “The Hindu/Buddhist Battle,” 834. &) Geary, “Destination enlightenment,” 13. &! Ibid. &" Nowhere is this more evident than in the proposal for an 18-hole golf course in order “not to attract elite”, but “to prevent other construction” and to “preserve more green areas.” Critics voice fears of spiritual degradation, as !

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in which a 2-kilometer buffer zone protects the “core” religious center. In this buffer zone, there are strict regulations regarding new construction, the height and aesthetics of all structures, noise, and pollution, so as not to “disturb the historical and visual setting of the heritage site considerably.”74 Moreover, Special Area B is “to be developed as a “cultural zone,” in which “only religious and related uses should be allowed.”75 Thus, for the sake of constructing an authentic experience for tourists, the city of Bodh Gaya risks jeopardizing local livelihoods of those who live and work within the buffer zone. This, in addition, endangers the spiritual significance of the site through an emerging process of cultural commodification. There is also evidence that foreign Buddhist groups flout these land regulations, as well as taxes, in order to build their own monasteries and guesthouses. This has caused a growing friction between local merchants and foreign religious institutions, which are viewed as “being wealthy beneficiaries of foreign capital through transnational networks of donations and sponsorships.”76 In addition, tensions have arisen between “local and foreign Buddhists concerning divergent ritual practices” and by extension conflicts have developed around ritual practices that are incongruous with conservation values, such as the painting of statues.77 As local and extra-national actors compete for foreign capital, “spiritual cosmopolitanism, heritage tourism and local livelihoods” collide.78 Thus, “dissidence and discord continue to simmer beneath an outer surface of order” provided by Bodh Gaya’s World Heritage status.79 CONCLUSIONS

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! well as denial of the state’s drought and unemployment problems. Geary, “Destination enlightenment,” 12. (% Shri Ramesh Safaya, et al., Government of Bihar. Department of Urban Development. City Development Plan for Bodhgaya under JNNURM. (2006), 106. &$ Safaya, City Development Plan, 107. &% Geary, “Destination enlightenment,” 13. && Guha-Thakurta, “Archaeology and the Monument,” 301-2. &' Geary, “Destination enlightenment,” 14. &( Guha-Thakurta, “Archaeology and the Monument,” 301.

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Therefore, in retracing contestation around the sanctity of Bodh Gaya, it is apparent that images are “inherently multivalent,” taking on “new roles and new meanings in response to the changing world around them.”80 Although Buddhist rulers built the Mahabodhi temple to commemorate the enlightenment of the Buddha, the site was soon occupied by Saivite Hindus. This fact, however, was portrayed by colonial scholars as an assault on India’s glorious and pure Buddhist past, and hence served the colonial project’s legitimizing discourse of the “civilizing” mission. This resulted in a “museumizing process” that removed Bodh Gaya from the “immediate reality of its people and environment” and later informed transnational Buddhist campaigns for ownership.81 The granting of UNESCO World Heritage status in 2002 was purported to have alleviated many of these tensions, and yet it is evident that the site is valued for its “moment of origin” in the Buddhist past, and by extension, for its potential to stimulate tourism. In this way, the colonial marginalization of the “degenerate Hindu” finds its match in the neglected local resident of Gaya District today.

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Kinnard, “The Hindu/Buddhist Battle,” 832. ') Guha-Thakurta, “Monuments and Lost Histories,” 157. !

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APPENDIX A: UNESCO World Heritage Centre—Criteria for Selectioni To be included on the World Heritage List, sites must be of outstanding universal value and meet at least one out of ten selection criteria. These criteria are explained in the Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the World Heritage Convention, which besides the text of the Convention is the main working tool on World Heritage. The criteria are regularly revised by the Committee to reflect the evolution of the World Heritage concept itself. Until the end of 2004, World Heritage sites were selected on the basis of six cultural and four natural criteria. With the adoption of the revised Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the World Heritage Convention, only one set of ten criteria exists. Selection criteria: i. to represent a masterpiece of human creative genius; ii. to exhibit an important interchange of human values, over a span of time or within a cultural area of the world, on developments in architecture or technology, monumental arts, town-planning or landscape design; to bear a unique or at least exceptional testimony to a cultural tradition or to a civilization which is living or which has disappeared; iv. to be an outstanding example of a type of building, architectural or technological ensemble or landscape which illustrates (a) significant stage(s) in human history; v. to be an outstanding example of a traditional human settlement, land-use, or sea-use which is representative of a culture (or cultures), or human interaction with the environment especially when it has become vulnerable under the impact of irreversible change; vi.

to be directly or tangibly associated with events or living traditions,

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! UNESCO. “The Criteria for Selection.” UNESCO World Heritage Centre, (2004). http://whc.unesco.org/en/criteria/. i

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with ideas, or with beliefs, with artistic and literary works of outstanding universal significance. (The Committee considers that this criterion should preferably be used in conjunction with other criteria); vii. to contain superlative natural phenomena or areas of exceptional natural beauty and aesthetic importance; viii. to be outstanding examples representing major stages of earth's history, including the record of life, significant on-going geological processes in the development of landforms, or significant geomorphic or physiographic features; ix. to be outstanding examples representing significant on-going ecological and biological processes in the evolution and development of terrestrial, fresh water, coastal and marine ecosystems and communities of plants and animals; x. to contain the most important and significant natural habitats for in-situ conservation of biological diversity, including those containing threatened species of outstanding universal value from the point of view of science or conservation. The protection, management, authenticity and integrity of properties are also important considerations. Since 1992 significant interactions between people and the natural environment have been recognized as cultural landscapes.

APPENDIX B: Mahabodhi Temple at Bodh Gaya—Justification for Inscriptionii

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! UNESCO, “Mahabodhi Temple Complex at Bodh Gaya.” UNESCO World Heritage Centre, (2002). http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/1056. ii

+ !

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Criterion (i): The grand 50m high Mahabodhi Temple of the 5th6th centuries is of immense importance, being one of the earliest temple constructions existing in the Indian sub-continent. It is one of the few representations of the architectural genius of the Indian people in constructing fully developed brick temples in that era. Criterion (ii): The Mahabodhi Temple, one of the few surviving examples of early brick structures in India, has had significant influence in the development of architecture over the centuries. Criterion (iii): The site of the Mahabodhi Temple provides exceptional records for the events associated with the life of Buddha and subsequent worship, particularly since Emperor Asoka built the first temple, the balustrades, and the memorial column. Criterion (iv): The present Temple is one of the earliest and most imposing structures built entirely in brick from the late Gupta period. The sculpted stone balustrades are an outstanding early example of sculptural reliefs in stone. Criterion (vi): The Mahabodhi Temple Complex in Bodh Gaya has direct association with the life of the Lord Buddha, being the place where He attained the supreme and perfect insight.

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SPONSORSHIPS

Publishing sponsored in part by the Arts Initiative at Columbia. This funding is made possible through a generous gift by the Gatsby Foundation.

Publishing sponsored in part by the Middle Eastern, South Asian, and African Studies Department at Columbia University.

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