The Potomac Foundation
Beyond Minsk II!
Prospects)for)a)New)Russian)Offensive)
Dr.)Phillip)A.)Karber) 25)May)2015)
Major)Points) • The!conflict!between!Russia!&!Ukraine!is!characterized!by!alterna:ng! periods!of!intense!conflict!&!nego:ated!ceasefires -- after Russian "Winter Offensive" Ukrainian forces needed time for reconstitution & refit;! • Current!Minsk!II!ceasefire!between!Ukraine!&!RussianDproxy!forces!is! failing!due!to!inadequate!monitoring!&!no!enforcement!mechanism;! • Minsk II is UNSTABLE -- requirement for Ukraine to withdraw artillery out of range,!coupled!with!lack!of!modern!An:Dtank!Weapons,!leaves! frontD line!infantry!vulnerable!to!armored!overrun!&!invites!preemptive aKack;! • Current!Russian!military!buildup!of!equipment!&!new!Corps/Brigade! structure!in!the!Donbas!and!massing!of!forces!on!border!bodes!ill;! • Russia!has!a!number!of!“Military!Op:ons”!and!may!employ!one!soon;! whichever!op:on!Russia!employs,!Ukraine!is!likely!to!be!surprised!&! vulnerable!due!to!lack!of!strategic!warning!&!overhead!surveillance;! • Ironically,!the!most!successful!Western!sanc:on!has!been!in!embargoing!a! friendly!country!from!acquiring!replacement!weaponry!to!defend!itself.!
50!
Russian)Intervention)&)Ukraine)CeaseGires! Daily!Combat:!15!Aug.!2014!to!12!May!2015!
45!
Russian! Invasion!
Minsk I! OSCE! Ceasefire! Organized!
Russian! Buildup!
Renewed!Russian! Winter! Minsk II! Vows! Buildup! Offensive! Ceasefire!
Russian! Buildup!
Russian! Reorganization!
40!
30!
25!
20!
15!
10!
5!
0! 1! 7! 13! 19! 25! 31! 37! 43! 49! 55! 61! 67! 73! 79! 85! 91! 97! 103! 109! 115! 121! 127! 133! 139! 145! 151! 157! 163! 169! 175! 181! 187! 193! 199! 205! 211! 217! 223! 229! 235! 241! 247! 253! 259! 265!
Combat!Incidents!per!Day!
35!
AUG$
SEP$
OCT$
NOV!
DEC!
JAN!
FEB!
MAR!
APR!
MAY!
Ukraine*Request*for*Potomac*Assessment* Joint+invite+from+NaBonal+Security+Advisor+&+Parliamentary+Leader+
Andriy+Volodymyrovych+Parubiy+
Commandant+of+Maidan+Protest+&++ Secretary+of+NaBonal+Defense+&+Security+Council+
Why$So$Many$Visits$to$the$Front?$ Recent&Observa-ons& • &Understand&how&Russian&theory&of&“New&Genera-on&Warfare”&is&being& implemented&in&prac-ce&–&including&both&their&Strengths&&&Weaknesses:& EE&Russian&have&weird&way&of&structuring&&&manning&composite&BaGalion&Tac-cal&Groups&(BTG)&&& ongoing&organiza-on&of&Donbas&Front&with&introduc-on&of&new&Corps&Commands.&
• &Evaluate&Ukrainian&military&needs&rela-ve&to&requests&for&assistance:& EE&NO&CHANGE&–&desperately&need: - Tandem warhead ATGM (Javelin/TOW&II) to stop Russian reactive armored Tanks; - Only&20%&of&needed&Harris&Digital&Com;& - No& longErange&counterEbaGery&radar&(ANTPQE36/37);& - No&highEal-tude&UAV&for&strategic/opera-onal& warning;& - Only&25%&of&needed&upEarmored&HUMVEE&for&rapid&reac-on&Covering&Force.&
• &Observe&effec-veness&of&Ceasefire:& EE&Minsk&II&is&a&disaster&–&OSCE&can’t&do&the&job,&NO&provision&for&ENFORCEMENT&of&growing& viola-ons,&and&UKE&Army&hurt&by&50km&withdrawal&of&Ar-llery&–&an&invita-on&to&invasion.&
• &Assess&current&&&future&combat&capability&of&the&Ukrainian&Army:& EEThey&have&at&most&30&days&of&defense&against&highEintensity&offensive;&compromised&by& irreplaceable&losses&(Tanks&and&Arlllery,&shortage&of&ammo,&little&Air&Force,&and&low&reliability&of&old& stocks)&as&well&as&impact&of&Minsk&II.&Excellent&frontEline&Brigade&Commanders,&troop&morale&now recovered&aker&Debal’tseve&but&now&hurting&due&to&BLEEDING CONFLICT with NO&WESERN&HELP.&
• &With&Administra-on&Ban&on&US&Military&visits&to&Front:& EE&US&Military&is&seriously&disadvantaged&in&understanding&what&is&going&on&Ukraine&side&&&missing& important&details&of&Russian&implementa-on&of&‘New&Genera-on&Warfare.”&&
Russian'Deployment'vs.'Ukraine'
(
Spring$2014$Prepara1on$for$Invasion • •
• • •
(During(the(Cold(War(the(glacis(plate(protec;ng(the(Western(fron;er(of(the(Soviet( Union(was(concentrated(in(Ukraine(and(Belarus.( (Aqer(the(break(up(of(the(Soviet(Union(the(Russian(Army(found(itself(malO deployed(for(modern(con;ngencies(and(with(too(few(forces(covering(to(much( territory(a(factor(that(forced(them(to(move(units(great(distances(in(an;cipa;on(of( a(Ukrainian(con;ngency;(and(bringing(forces(as(far(away(as(the(Bal;c(and(Urals.( (Thus(in(the(spring(of(2014,(the(Russian(Army(deployed(elements(from(nearly(20( different(brigades(and(five(divisions(–(represen;ng(76(baValions(in(the(first( echelon(and(another(65(leq(in(home(bases.( (Learning(a(lesson(from(the(Chechen(War,(they(thought(beVer(of(commivng( conscript(infantry,(many(of(which(were(rota;ng(new(recruits(and(discharging( veterans,(into(high(intensity(combat.(( (Once(the(Ukrainian(Army(mobilized,(the(Russians(did(not(have(enough(assets(naw( their(way(through(a(prepared(defense,(and(In(late(May(Pu;n(announced(a( significant(pull(back(of(Russian(troops(from(the(Ukrainian(border,(albeit(used(that( opportunity(to(both(give(the(an;OKiev(proxy(forces(an(upgrade(in(equipment(as( well(as(send(main(elements(of(the(spring(emergency(deployment(back(to(their( bases(to(collect(much(bring(larger(forces(to(bear,(if(needed.(
Military$Posture$ end$JAN$2014$
61(NIB(
7(Tk(
138(MRB(
28(MRB( 98(Abn(DIV(
25(MRB( 76(Abn(DIV(
6(Tk(
22(MRB(
9(MRB(
2(SF( 216(SF(
2(DIV(
45(SF(
31(Aslt( 21(MRB(
103(Air(Asl(
79(MRB(
(5(MRB(
4(Tk(DIV(
27(MRB(
23(MRB( (3(SF(
19(MRB(
336(NIB(
15(MRB(
218(Rec(
7(MRB( 6(MRB(
120(MRB( 11(MRB(
13(MRB(
106(Abn(DIV(
50(MRB(
10(MRB(
BRIGADE$TYPES$
38(Air(Asl( 16(SF(
Infantry$ 56(Aslt(
39(MRB(
Marine$
1(Arm( 51(Mech(
95(Air(Mob( 169(Mech(
Mechanized$ 92(Mech(
30(Mech( 24(Mech(
72(Mech(
Mountain$
20(MRB(
Armored$
80(Abn(
25(Abn(
128(Mech(
34(MRB( 93(Mech(
17(Arm(
Air$Assault$
(22(SF(
Airborne$ 28(Mech(
MANEUVER$BRIGADES$ READY$FOR$COMBAT$
79(Air(Mob(
TN(Grp(
Belarus$
18(MRB(
205(MRB(
No$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$Yes$
Russian$
Spetsnaz$
52(Mech(
10(SF( 810(NIB(
36(NIB(
100(Rec(
7(Abn(DIV(
33(Rec(
19(MRB(
77(NIB( 8(MRB(
17(MRB( 136(MRB(
Ukraine$
693(MRB( 13(MRB(
Military$Posture$ end$FEB$2014$
61(NIB(
7(Tk(
138(MRB(
28(MRB( 98(Abn(DIV(
25(MRB( 76(Abn(DIV(
6(Tk(
22(MRB(
9(MRB(
2(SF( 216(SF(
2(DIV(
45(SF( 21(MRB(
103(Air(Asl(
79(MRB(
4(Tk(DIV(
27(MRB(
(5(MRB(
23(MRB(
19(MRB(
336(NIB(
15(MRB(
218(Rec(
7(MRB( 6(MRB(
120(MRB(
13(MRB(
11(MRB( 50(MRB(
106(Abn(
10(MRB(
BRIGADE$TYPES$
38(Air(Asl( 16(SF(
106(Abn( 1(Arm( 51(Mech(
39(MRB(
169(Mech(
Infantry$ Marine$
106(Abn(
Mechanized$
92(Mech(
30(Mech( 72(Mech(
24(Mech(
Mountain$
20(MRB( 80(Abn(
Armored$
56(Aslt(
25(Abn( 93(Mech(
128(Mech( 17(Arm(
Air$Assault$
34(MRB(
(22(SF(
Airborne$ 28(Mech(
Maneuver$Brigades$ Ready$for$Combat$ No$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$Yes$
Russian$
Spetsnaz$
52(Mech( 79(Air(Mob( 95(Air(Mob(
TN(Grp(
31(Aslt(
(3(SF(
100(Rec( 7(Abn(DIV(
810(NIB(
10(SF( 33(Rec(
19(MRB(
Belarus$ Ukraine$
18(MRB(
205(MRB(
77(NIB( 8(MRB(
17(MRB( 136(MRB(
693(MRB( 13(MRB(
Military$Posture$ end$MAR$2014$
61(NIB(
7(Tk(
138(MRB(
28(MRB( 98(Abn(DIV(
25(MRB( 76(Abn(DIV(
22(MRB( 9(MRB(
2(SF( 216(SF(
2(DIV(
45(SF( 21(MRB(
79(MRB(
4(Tk(DIV(
103(Air(Asl(
336(NIB(
(5(MRB(
23(MRB(
19(MRB(
7(MRB(
6(MRB(
15(MRB(
218(Rec( 13(MRB(
120(MRB( 11(MRB( 50(MRB(
10(MRB(
106(Abn(
38(Air(Asl(
106(Abn(
6(Tk( 1(Arm( 30(Mech( 51(Mech(
39(MRB( 27(MRB(
BRIGADE$TYPES$
16(SF(
106(Abn(
Infantry$ Marine$
169(Mech( 72(Mech(
92(Mech(
Mechanized$
20(MRB( 93(Mech(
24(Mech(
56(Aslt(
Mountain$
25(Abn( 128(Mech(
Maneuver$Brigades$ Ready$for$Combat$ No$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$Yes$
Russian$
Air$Assault$ Airborne$
52(Mech(
TN(Grp( 28(Mech( (3(SF(
(22(SF( 95(Air(Mob(
80(Abn(
(Mili;a(
79(Air(Mob(
Spetsnaz$
34(MRB(
18(MRB(
205(MRB(
31(Aslt(
BATTALION$ GROUPINGS$
100(Rec(
Belarus$ Ukraine$
Armored$
17(Arm(
7(Abn(DIV( 810(NIB(
10(SF( 33(Rec(
19(MRB(
77(NIB( 8(MRB(
136(MRB(
Par1al$RUS$Units$+$link$to$Parent$ 693(MRB( 13(MRB(
Mechanized$
17(MRB(
Armored$ Spetsnaz$
Military$Posture$ end$APR$2014$
61(NIB(
7(Tk(
138(MRB(
28(MRB( 98(Abn(DIV(
25(MRB( 76(Abn(DIV(
22(MRB( 9(MRB(
2(SF( 216(SF(
2(DIV(
45(SF( 21(MRB(
79(MRB(
4(Tk(DIV(
103(Air(Asl(
336(NIB(
(5(MRB(
23(MRB(
19(MRB(
7(MRB(
6(MRB(
15(MRB(
218(Rec( 13(MRB(
120(MRB( 11(MRB( 50(MRB(
10(MRB(
106(Abn(
38(Air(Asl(
106(Abn(
6(Tk( 1(Arm(
39(MRB( 27(MRB(
30(Mech( 51(Mech(
169(Mech(
BRIGADE$TYPES$
16(SF(
106(Abn(
Infantry$ Marine$
169(Mech( 92(Mech(
24(Mech(
Mechanized$
20(MRB( 93(Mech(
56(Aslt(
Mountain$
25(Abn(
Maneuver$Brigades$ Ready$for$Combat$
Air$Assault$
80(Abn(
(Mili;a(
72(Mech(
Separa1st$Area$
Airborne$
52(Mech(
TN(Grp( 28(Mech(
79(Air(Mob(
Spetsnaz$
34(MRB(
18(MRB(
205(MRB(
(3(SF( 31(Aslt(
BATTALION$ GROUPINGS$
100(Rec(
Belarus$ Ukraine$
(22(SF(
17(Arm(
No$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$Yes$
Russian$
Armored$
95(Air(Mob(
128(Mech(
7(Abn(DIV( 810(NIB(
10(SF( 33(Rec(
19(MRB(
77(NIB( 8(MRB(
136(MRB( 693(MRB( 13(MRB(
Mechanized$
17(MRB(
Armored$ Spetsnaz$
Russian'Mobilization'&'Deployment'vs.'Ukraine' 200,000%
Manpower%for%Ukraine%Con4ngency%
150,000% Western#Strategic#Direc6on# Ready#Forces# 100,000%
50,000%
2nd#Echelon#
1st#Echelon# Feb.%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%Mar.%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%Apr.%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%May%
BaIalion%Deployment% in%Echelon% %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%1st%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%2nd%%% % Tank %15 %32% % Mech %24 %68% % Airborne %26 %10% % Spetnaz %9 %13% NOTE#–#weakness#in#Infantry# with#2#Divisions#&#10#Brigades# leaving#half#their#BaTalions#at# home#bases.#
Implications'of'Russian'June'Troop'Withdrawal' Need%to%Understand%their% Original%Deployment:% QQ%LeS%65%BaIalions%in%bases:% Q Q Q Q
Not%ready;% Conscripts%&%troop%rota4on;% DiďŹƒcult%to%train%on%border% Logis4cs%expensive%on%border.%
QQ%Forward%Units%(76%Bn)% problems:% Q Sanita4on;% Q Boredom;% Q Discipline%(drinking).%
QQ%Rebasing#actually#increases# Capability# %
Prelude&to&a&War&(1!Mar.!to!24!May!2014)!
Slovansk$
Russian'Supply' to'Proxy'Forces'
Kramatorsk$
MayOJune(2014( Luhansk(
Debal’tseve$
Kamensk'Shakh6nsky$ Rail(Transfer( Assembly(Area(
Horlivka$
Separa2st'Controlled'Area' Donetsk(
Shakhty$ Rail(Transfer( Assembly(Area(
Kuzminka$ Training(Area( Neklinovskiy$ Training(Area(
Routes$of$Supply( May2June$ Crea1on$of$Supply$$ $$&$Training$Depots$
Rostov$on$Don$ Rail(Transfer( Assembly(Area(
Novocherkassk$ Training(Area(
Russian$Tank$column$crossing$border$into$Ukraine$14$June$
Russian$Tank$in$Donetsk'12$June$
Destroyed$TO64(in$Snezhnoye$13$June$
Russian)CombinedDarms)BaMalion)moving)thru)Luhansk)(7)July)2014)) DD40)152mm)Gun)
BMPD3)Infantry)Figh&ng)Vehicle)
TD64)Tanks)
BMD21)122mm)“Grad”)MRLS)
Putin'Mobilization'Order$ UKAZ([EXECUTIVE(ORDER]( OF(THE(PRESIDENT(OF(THE(RUSSIAN(FEDERATION( Appealing$for$[male]$ci1zens$of$the$Russian$Federa1on$$ in$the$[military]$reserves,$for$military$training$in$2014$ (In(conjunc;on(with(federa;on(laws(from(31(May(1996(No.(61OFZ( “On(Defense”(and(from(28(March(1998(No.(53OFZ(“On(Military( Responsibility(and(Military(Service,”(it(is(decreed:( (1.(An(appeal(in(2014(that([male](ci;zens(of(the(Russian( Federa;on(in(the(reserves(report(for(military(du;es(for(up(to(two(months( in(the(Armed(Forces(of(the(Russian(Federa;on,(in(the(troops(of(the( Ministry(of(Internal(Affairs(of(the(Russian(Federa;on,(in(the(offices(of(state( protec;on,(and(in(the(FSB.( $2.$Confiden1al.$[literally'“for'official'use”]$ $3.$Confiden1al.$[literally'“for'official'use”]$ (4.(The(terms(of(military(spending([i.e.$line'item$military$spending$ power](will(be(decided(by(the(execu;ve(authori;es(of(the(Russian( Federa;on,(with(the(excep;on(of(check(fees([the$base$payments$made$to$ ci6zens$in$the$reserves],(which(will(be(determined(by(the(Ministry(of( Defense(of(the(Russian(Federa;on.( (5.(The(Government(of(the(Russian(Federa;on(and(the(execu;ve( organs(of(the(Russian(Federa;on(will(provide(for(the(execu;on(of(ac;vi;es( related(to(the(calling(of(Russian(ci;zens(in(the(reserves(to(undergo(military( training(and(carry(out(these(du;es.( (6.(This(execu;ve(order(will(enter(force(on(the(day(of(its(official( publica;on.( President(of(the(Russian(Federa;on,(V.(Pu;n( Moscow,(Kremlin( 27(June(2014( [Ukaz](No.(471(
Ukrainian'“Plan'B”' Stanytsia$Luhanska$
July(OO(Aug.(2014(
Luhansk(
(95(
(80(
(92( 128(
Debal’tseve$
(25(
Separa2st'Controlled'Area' Kamensk'Shakh6nsky$ Rail(Transfer( Assembly(Area(
(93( Donetsk( (30(
(72(
(24(
(79( (51( (28(
Shakhty$ Rail(Transfer( Assembly(Area(
(17(
Volnovakha$
Kuzminka$ Training(Area( Neklinovskiy$ Training(Area(
Ukrainian$Thrusts( UKE$July2Aug.$ $$“Plan$B”$Thrusts$ Mariupol’$ RUS$New$Routes$ $$to$Staging$Areas$
Rostov$on$Don$ Rail(Transfer( Assembly(Area(
Novocherkassk$ Training(Area(
Ukrainian Satellite Photography
Russian)BMD21)“GRAD”)Missile)launches)
Russian'Fire'Strikes' Prelude'to'Invasion'
Valuyskoye$ Kolesnykivka$ (JUL(24)( (JUL(15)( Stanytsia$Luhanska$ Kolesnykivka$ Sabivka$ (AUG(27)( (AUG(6)( Yuhanivka$ Krasna$Talivka$ Luhansk( (JUL(25,(27,( (JUL(15)( AUG(22,(27)(
JulyOAug.(2014(
Ukraine$
Debal’tseve$
Separa2st'Controlled'Area' Lisne$ (AUG(6)(
Malaysian$Flt$17$ Shot2down$ (JUL(17)$$
Stepne( (AUG(15)(
Volnovakha$
Izvaryne$$ (JUL(9,(11,(16,( AUG(1)( Provallya$ (JUL(16)( Chervonopartyzans’k$ (JUL(22)( Krasnopar6zansk(( JUL(10,(21O22)( Panchenkove$
Krasnyi$Yar$ (AUG(6)(
Ivanivak$ (AUG(10)( Ivanivka$
Miusynsk$ (AUG(10)( (AUG(9)( Illinka$ (JUL(22)( Stepanivak$ Kozhevnya$ (AUG(15)( (JUL(26)( Dyakove$ (JUL(23O24)( Zelenopillya$ Biryukove$ (JUL(11)( (JUL(23O24,( (JUL(16)( Marynivka$ AUG(1,(4O5)( ((JUL(21,(25O26)( Kutenykove( Chervonyi$ Hryhorivak$ (AUG(15)( (JUL(26.( ((JUL(23)( Dolzhanskyi$ AUG(5)( Voikovs’kyi( Amvrosiivka( Oleksiivs’ke$ (JUL(9,(12,(22,(26,( ((AUG(18)( (JUL(11)( AUG(1)( (JUL(17)( Petropavlivka( Vasylivka( Manych$ (AUG(5)( (JUL(17)( ((JUL(19)( Vasylivka( (AUG(4)(
Donetsk(
Berezove( (JUL(22O24)(
Kamensk'Shakh6nsky$ Rail(Transfer( Assembly(Area(
Shakhty$ Rail(Transfer( Assembly(Area(
Solntsevo( (JUL(21O22)(
Kuzminka$ Training(Area( Tel’manov e( (AUG(20)(
Neklinovskiy$ Training(Area(
Markyne( (AUG(22)( Novazovsk$ (JUL(4O5,(12,(22,(26,(28,( AUG(22O24,(27O28)(
SEA(ATTACK(
Novocherkassk$ Training(Area(
RUSSIAN$ACTIVITY$(1$July231$Aug)$$ Rostov$on$Don$ Rail(Transfer( Assembly(Area(
RUS(UAV( Mariupol’$
Russia$
Ar1llery/MRLS$strikes$ Reported$Russian$$ $$$$$$$$$firing$posi1ons $$$$$JUL$$$$$$AUG$ Russian$Staging$Bases$ Russian$over2flight$paths$ $$$$$$$$by$Drones$&$Helios$
Kryms’ke$ Kramatorsk$ Stanytsia$Luhanska$ Artemivs’k$
Luhansk'
Ukraine#
Russia# Debal’tseve$
Proxy#Controlled# Donbas#
Donetsk'
Volnovakha$
Mariupol’$
Russian)Buildup,) Invasion)&)Minsk)I)
August8October$2014$ MAY8JUNE:!! !Russia!began!implemen:ng!“Military! Op:ons”!in!the!Donbas!first!by!training!&! arming!proxy!troops.! JULY8AUG:!! !Russia!conducts!crossDborder!“fire!strikes”! &!surprise!invasion!with!with!BaKalion! Tac:cal!Groups!in!north!&!south;! !Ukrainians!defeated!at!Illovaisk!DD!can’t!stop! Russian!armor!due!to!!lack!of!modern!An:D tank!Guided!Missiles!–!request!US!Javelin.! SEP8OCT:$$ !Europe!brokered!Ceasefire!&!OSCE! introduced!to!“monitor!it;”! !Russian!proxies!launch!aKacks!to!take! Mariupol!port!&!gateway!to!Crimea.!
Russian'Invasion' Main'Thrusts' 24(Aug(to(5(Sept.(2014(
(80( Luhansk(
(55(
(95(
(92( 128(
Stanytsia$Luhanska$
(25(
Separa2st'Controlled'Area'
Debal’tseve$
Kamensk'Shakh6nsky$ Rail(Transfer( Assembly(Area(
(93(
(30(
Donetsk(
(79(
(28( (51(
(24(
(72(
Shakhty$ Rail(Transfer( Assembly(Area(
(17( Volnovakha$
Kuzminka$ Training(Area( Neklinovskiy$ Training(Area(
Rostov$on$Don$ Rail(Transfer( Assembly(Area( Mariupol’$
Novocherkassk$ Training(Area(
$Russian$Invasion$ RUS$Main$Thrusts$ UKE$Overrun$Bdes.$ Es;mates(based(on(Open(Source(repor;ng( &(Personal(Observa;on(
Light&Infantry&Dilemma! On!an!Open!Front!in!the!Absence!of!LongHRange!ATGM! the!Challenge!of!Defending!Sta3c!Strong!Points! • • • • •
$UAV$real9:me$Target$Acquisi:ion$$ $Massive$Ar:llery/MLRS$Suppression$ $Nigh$:me$Infantry$Infiltra:on$ $Armored$Overrun$ $OuMlanked$&$Surrounded $$
Reac%ve'Armor'requires'Dual2Tandem'Warheads'to'defeat'Tanks'
T"90%Tank%Column%near%Luhansk%
Luhansk(
(Airport(Siege(((Sep(’14)( (photos&confirmed& (Ba8le(of(Pocket((Sep(’14)( (reports&.&unconfirmed( Debal’tseve( (Ba8le(of(Pocket((Feb(’15)( (report&.&unconfirmed(
TM90(SighPngs(in(Ukraine(
Donetsk(
(Airport(Siege((jan(‘15)( (reports&confirmed& ((Airport(Siege((Mar(‘15)( (reports&confirmed( (Breakout(Ba8le((Mar(‘15)( (reports&confirmed( Mariupol( (Novoazvs’k(&(Sjedove( ( ( ( (((((Sep(’14)( (reports&confimed& (Novoazvs’k((Feb‘15)( (report&unconfirmed( (Novoazvs’k((Mar(‘15)( (reports&confirmed( Ternove( (Gunnery(Range((Mar(‘15)( (report&unconfirmed& (
September&‘14& Jan/Feb&‘15& March&‘15& Unconfirmed& Confirmed&
Fall)Russian)Buildup)&) Problematic)CeaseGire) November$–$December$2014)
NOV8DEC:$$ !OSCE!surveillance!UAV’s!downed!&!it!fails! to!monitor!either!incoming!weaponry!or! major!combat!at!Donetsk!airport;! !Arrival!of!Large!“humanitarian!convoys”! associated!with!spikes!in!aKacks;! !Russia!introduces!over!800!items!of!heavy! military!equipment,!including!some!unique! to!their!forces.! DEC:$$ !USDRussian!brokered!reDcommitment!to! ceasefire;!&!exchange!of!Prisoners!of!War;! !Ceasefire!holds!through!holidays!but!with! escala:ng!aKacks.!
Russian'Supply'Lines' to'Proxy'Forces' SeptODec.(2014(
Kamensk'Shakh6nsky$ Rail(Transfer( Assembly(Area(
Shakhty$ Rail(Transfer( Assembly(Area(
Kuzminka$ Training(Area( Neklinovskiy$ Training(Area(
Rostov$on$Don$ Rail(Transfer( Assembly(Area(
Novocherkassk$ Training(Area(
Russian&Humanitarian&Convoys&=&total&of&13& A&Direct&Correlation&between&Arrival&&&Increased&Violence&
“Terrorists$AZacks’$Escalate$a]er$Russian$‘Humanitarian$Convoy’$Invades$Ukraine,”$ Ukraine$MoD,$(9$Jan.$2015)$at$<$hZps://www.facebook.com/uacrisis/photos/a.604933032908789.1073741828.604241389644620/760413540694070/$>$
Russian&Heavy&Weapons&introduced&into&Donbas&&
Russian&Rail&Reinforcement&of&Armor&
2H3!Trains!military!trains!reported!headed!toward!Donbas!per!day!
Russian'Proxy'Resupply' during'Cease3ire'
Stanytsia-Luhanska-
Sept%Dec.)2014! Luhansk!
Debal’tseve-
Separa&st)Controlled)Area) Kamensk<Shakh=nskyRail!Transfer! Assembly!Area!
Donetsk!
ShakhtyRail!Transfer! Assembly!Area! Volnovakha-
KuzminkaTraining!Area! NeklinovskiyTraining!Area!
Routes'of'Supply! Rostov-on-DonRail!Transfer! Assembly!Area!
Mariupol’-
NovocherkasskTraining!Area!
JulyTAug.' SepTDec.' Humanitarian' ''Convoys'
Russian'&'Proxy'Force'Levels'Deployed'against'Ukraine' (as$reinforced$thru$21$January$2015)$ Within Donbas
In Russia
TOTAL
Proxy
Russian
UKE Border
Crimea
10
16
24
2
52
31,430
12,000
42,920
24,500
107,250
Tanks
340
340
260
30
970
IFV/APC
329
720
1256
266
2571
Artillery
372
173
422
100
1067
MLRS
472
92
113
46
723
4
4
Battalion Tactical Group (BTG) Troops
Flame Veh Cmbt Aircraft Attack Helio Warships Subs
8
150
80
230
78
48
126
30
30
2
2
Winter$Offensive$&$Minsk$II) January$–$February$2015$
JAN:$$ !Proxy!forces!recons:tuted!and!rearmed;! !Ajer!24!hour!standDdown,!RussiaDProxy! forces!launch!major!offensive!on!six!major! axes;! !Ukraine!“cyborg”!defense!of!Donetsk! airport!fails!ajer!240!day!siege;! !Russia!brings!in!addi:onal!BaKalion! Tac:cal!Groups!along!with!HighDcommand! to!oversee!&!coordinate!opera:ons.! FEB:$$ !Debal’tseve!under!siege!&!heavy!aKack;! !French!&!German!leaders!nego:ate! Minsk!II!ceasefire!with!Pu:n;! !Russia!exploits!“ceasefire”!talks!while! their!TD90!tanks!used!to!seize!Debal’tseve.!
Kryms’ke$ '95'
Winter'Offensive'
'24'
'80'
Kramatorsk$
Stanytsia$Luhanska$ Artemivs’k$
Week'1' 216'Major'ASacks'
Luhansk'
Ukraine#
'128'
'93'
Debal’tseve$
Proxy#Controlled# Donbas#
'25'
Kamensk;Shakh9nsky$ Rail'Transfer' Assembly'Area'
'79'
Donetsk' '30'
Shakhty$ Rail'Transfer' Assembly'Area'
'72'Volnovakha$ Kuzminka$ Training'Area' Neklinovskiy$ Training'Area'
'28' Rostov$on$Don$ Rail'Transfer' Assembly'Area'
Mariupol’$
Novocherkassk$ Training'Area'
Russia#
MLRS'“:ire'strike'on'Volnovakha'kills'Civilians' Impact#craters#of#incoming#MLRS#“fire#strike”#(13#Jan.#2015)#
' '
Volnovakha#
Photo#taken#from#highway#Checkpoint#video_cam# <$hLps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AzbU090TTFM$>$
Ukraine’s#lack#of#Long_range#Counter_baJery#radar#encourages#Russian#“fire#strikes”#
Ukraine’s!Price!of!Unenforced!Ceasefire!
Donetsk)Airport)%%)from)Newest)to)Complete)Destruction) MAY'
DEC.'
$400'million'investment'aZer'4'months'of'con4nuous'RussianTProxy'Assault'
Ukraineâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s'Alamo'
held'out'for'240'days'of'siege'
Kryms’ke( '95'
Donbas&SitRep&
'24'
'80'
Kramatorsk(
Stanytsia(Luhanska( Artemivs’k(
3RD'WEEK' '254'Major'Abacks'
Luhansk'
Ukraine(
'128'
'93'
Debal’tseve(
Proxy(Controlled( Donbas(
'25'
KamenskCShakhDnsky( Rail'Transfer' Assembly'Area'
'79'
Donetsk' '30'
Shakhty( Rail'Transfer' Assembly'Area'
'72'Volnovakha( Kuzminka( Training'Area' Neklinovskiy( Training'Area'
'28' Rostov(on(Don( Rail'Transfer' Assembly'Area'
Mariupol’(
Novocherkassk( Training'Area'
Russia(
Ukrainian'Territory'Lost'since'Cease:ire'Implementation'
Lessons(of(“Cease7ire”( • Minsk-I-Protocol-(Sep.%Jan.)-Failed-–-Repeatedly!• Cause-of-Minsk-Failure?– Lack-of-Successful-Monitoring-by-OSCE• • • • •
Control-of-Border-Impotent350-People-too-FEW-need-3,500Observe-but-lack-All-Source-Intel-–-UAV-shot-downRussian-presence-–-disrupt-consensus,-spiesLag-Jme-in-processing-–-too-slow-for-Defender-to-rely-on-
– Lack-of-IncenJve-for-Russian/Proxy-Observance– SancJons-are-NOT-a-useful-enforcement-instrument-
• Minsk-II-will-Fail-unless-ENFORCEMENT-added• Ukraine-is-the-only-country-that-can-ENFORCE-Ceasefire– UAV,-ATGM,-Counter%Btry-Radar,-Covering-Force,-&-Secure-C3– IF-West-wants-successful-Ceasefire-must-supply-those-ASSETS-
Minsk)II)“limited(&(denied(access”(Zones! RestricQons$on$OSCE$Monitoring$&$requirement$to$withdraw$ArQllery$ gives$aggressor$opportunity$&$incenQve$for$large8scale$deep$offensive.! Contact!Line!! !(487km)!
Ar:llery!Withdrawal!Zone! OSCE!Monitoring!Hubs! OSCE!SelfDrestricted!Access! DPR/LPR!“No!access”!to!OSCE! DPR/LPR!25%!access!to!OSCE! DPR/LPR!50%!access!to!OSCE! Ukraine!“No!access”!to!OSCE!
Russian'Battalion'Tactical'Group'(BTG)! 11!April!2015!at!Bezimenne!(47.112382!!37.936069)!! 22km!east!of!Mariupol,!8km!from!separaBon!line!
ASSETS:!16!x!BTRI80,!3!x!TI64B,!4!x!TI72B,!31!x!Trucks,!1!x!1RL232!“Leopard”!ArBllery!Radar
!!
T,64B$&$T,72B$Tank$Park$
APC$&$Truck$Park$
Taken$by$Dnepro,1$Reg.$Surveillance$Drone$
Bezimenne,$April$2015$$
Russian'Battalion'Tactical'Group'(BTG)'
T,64B$&$T,72B$Tank$Park$&$1RL232$Counter,BaDery$Surveillance$Radar!
T,64B$
T,72B$
Bezimenne,$April$2015$$
Russian'Battalion'Tactical'Group'(BTG)' BTR,80$APC$&$Truck$Park!
BTR,80$
What)comes)next?) MAR:$$ !Minsk!II!gives!both!sides!opportunity!to! regroup!&!recons:tute!exhausted!forces;! !Minsk!II!requires!both!sides!to!withdraw! heavy!ar:llery!50km!behind!the!lines!DD!! without!modern!An:Dtank!weapons,!this! leaves!the!defender!to!sudden!aKack;! !OSCE!neither!has!the!assets!nor!access!to! effec:vely!monitor!inflow!of!equipment!or! insure!withdrawal!of!heavy!weapons.! APR:$$ !Russians!conduc:ng!a!major!buildup!of! units!on!the!Ukrainian!border;! !Russian!&!proxy!forces!in!the!Donbas! reorganizing!for!offensive!opera:ons!with! addi:on!of!new!Corps/Brigades!commands.! !Western!leaders!&!observers!warning!of! poten:al!for!renewed!deeper!offensive.!
4%$ Rump$Ukraine$ Given$to$West$as$ â&#x20AC;&#x153;Compromiseâ&#x20AC;?$
Pro2Russian$ Government$ Member$of$ Federa1on$
8%$
24%$
Russian$Incorpora1on$ &$Occupa1on$
55%$ Ukrainian$Popula1on$ %$Ethnic$Russian$
Russian'Objectives?''
Current Situation II
II II
II II
II
SUMY
II II
BELGOROD
II II
II
II
II
II
II
II
KHARKIV II
POLTAVA
STAROBELSK
II
II
II
II
II II
II
II
II
II
I
IAG
LUHANSK II
I
DNIPROPETROVS'K
II
156 зрп II
I
IAG
ZAPORІZHZHYA II
II
IAG
II
MARIUPOL
II II
IAG II
IAG
II
I
KHERSON
II
II DONETSK
II
IAG
IAG IAG
I
1248
MELITOPOL
IAG
II
IAG
II
II II II
II I
ROSTOV-ON-DON
II
Situation Development – Version 1 II
II II
II II
II
SUMY
II II
II
BELGOROD
II II
II
II II
II II
KHARKIV II
POLTAVA
STAROBELSK
II
II
II
II
II II
II
II
II
II
I
IAG
II LUHANSK
I
DNIPROPETROVS'K
II II
I
IAG
ZAPORІZHZHYA II
II
IAG
II
MARIUPOL
II II
IAG II
IAG
II
I
KHERSON
IAG
I
IAG
IAG
II
II DONETSK
II
MELITOPOL
IAG
II
IAG
II
II II II
II I
ROSTOV-ON-DON
II
Situation Development – Version 2 II
II II
II II
II
SUMY
II II
II
BELGOROD
II II
II
II II
II II
KHARKIV II
STAROBELSK
POLTAVA IZYM
II
II
II
II
II
KRAMATORSK II
II
II
II
II
I
IAG
II LUHANSK
I
DNIPROPETROVS'K
II II
I
IAG
ZAPORІZHZHYA II
II
MARIUPOL
KHERSON
II
IAG
II II
IAG II
IAG
II
I
MELITOPOL
IAG
I
IAG
IAG
II
II DONETSK
II
ZAPORІZHZHYA
IAG
II
IAG
II
II II II
II I
ROSTOV-ON-DON
II
Novorossiya'Air'Force'
with#Combatant#Assets#IdenRcal#to#Russian#Systems#
SU_25#Frogfoot## aLack$aircrag$
With$Proxy$markings$ $
L_29#Maya## trainer$
With$weapons$hardpoints$&$bomb$on$wings$ $
Air'Assets'â&#x20AC;&#x201C;'Russian'modernization'&'atrophied'
MiQ24%AIack%Helio%
SUQ27%Fighter%
MiQ28%AIack%Helio%
MigQ29%Fighter%
SUQ24%Strike%
TUQ95%Bomber%
SUQ25%Ground%AIack%
MigQ31%Interceptor%
SUQ34%Strike%
TUQ160%Bomber%
TUQ22M%Bomber%
EXAMPLE#
Russian'Air'Force'Buildup'vs'Ukraine' Buturlinovka#Air#Base–#135km#from#Ukraine#Border# No#AircraE##
#(50.793256°##40.612718°)### 30#Fighters#&#FtrWBombers#
####2013########################################################2014#
Air#Order#of#BaTle# Russian#Air#Force# vs#Ukraine#
Situation Development – Version 3 BYELORUSSIA II
KURSK II II
II II
BELGOROD II
RUSSIA
II II
KYIV LVIV
II
KHARKIV POLTAVA
II II
NOVOROSSIYA
II II
II
LUHANSK
II DNIPROPETROVS'K
IAG II
DONETSK II
ZAPORІZHZHYA
MOLDOVA
II
II
II
II
IAG MARIUPOL
II
II II
II
II
MYKOLAIV II
II
ODESA
II
II
II
RUSSIA SIMFEROPOL
Decline'in'Russian'Military'Strength' 6$
$1985 $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $2015$
5$
Manpower(in(Millions(
OTHER( 4$ 3$
MVD( NAVY( AIR(FORCE(
2$
ARMY( 1$
STRATEGIC(
250
Soviet/Russian Maneuver Div vs. Independent Bde (1988-2013) 200
150 BRIGADES 100
50
0
DIVISIONS
Russian'Ground'Forces' 2(Motor(Rifle(Divisions(( 38(Motor(Rifle(Brigades( 5(Naval(Infantry(Brigades(
1(Tank(Division( 3(Tank(Brigades( 1(ArMllery(Divi(&(12(Bdes(
4(Airborne(Divisions( 4(Airborne(Brigades( 8(Spetsnaz(Bdes/Regt(
MAIN$GROUND$$FORMATIOSN$ (Motor.Rifle(Division( (Motor.Rifle(Brigade( (Tank(Division( (Tank(Brigade( (Airborne/Air(Assault(Div.( (Air.Assault(Brigade( (Spetsnaz(Brigade( (Naval(Infantry(Brigade( (ArMllery(Brigade(
Tajikistan(
Russian)Heavy)Mechanized)Brigade) II!
II!
ATGM!
II! Full$Manpower$=$4,500$ $typical$=$3,000$ Tanks$=$40880$ BMP$=$123$ Mort$=$18$ MLRS$=$18$ Med.$Arty$=$36$
II!
II!
II!
SP!122/152!
MLRS!
SAM/Gun!
II!
II!
Lessons(of(Asymmetric(War(in(Chechnya(&(Georgia( Problems,wit,has(ly,mobilized,Conscripts:, ,TT,Low,effec(veness, ,TT,Poor,morale, ,TT,High,casual(es, ,TT,Unpopular,losses,at,home,
Replace,Conscripts,with:,
TT,Highly,trained,professionals, ,T,Spetsnaz,&,Airborne,“tank,riders”, ,T,Contract,branch,specialists, TT,Expendable,Infantry, ,T,Mercenaries,(Chechens,&,Cossacks), ,T,Bonus,“volunteers”, ,T,Local,rabble,&,dra[ees, TT,Mo(vated,&,reTtrained,“Separa(sts”,
Battalion)Tactical)Group)(BTG)) Composite)CombinedYArms)Unit)
I!
I!
ATGM!
I! Manpower$=$4008700$ Tanks$=$10815$ BMP/BTR$=$30840$ Mort$=$6$ MRLS$=$6$ SP$Arty$=$6812$ SP$Air$Defense$=$4812$
I!
I! I!
I!
z! zz! SP!122/MLRS!
SAM/Gun!
Russian'Battalion'Tactical'Groups'from'Brigades' 1((of(2)(Motor(Rifle(Divisions(( 20((of(38)(Motor(Rifle(Bdes( 3((of(5)(Naval(Infantry(Bdes(
1((of(1)(Tank(Division( 3((of(3)(Tank(Brigades( 7((of(12)(ArMllery(Bdes(
4((of(4)(Airborne(Divisions( 2((of(4)(Air(Assault(Brigades( 5((of(8)(Spetsnaz(Bdes/Regt(
PARENT$FORMATION$ (Motor.Rifle(Division( (Motor.Rifle(Brigade( (Tank(Division( (Tank(Brigade( (Airborne/Air(Assault(Div.( (Air.Assault(Brigade( (Spetsnaz(Brigade( (Naval(Infantry(Brigade( (ArMllery(Brigade(
Tajikistan(
What)is)Needed)to)save)Minsk)II?) • !Western!appeals!to!Pu:n!seem!to!encourage!his!arrogance!DD!have!not! inhibited!his!military!buildup!or!restructuring!for!deeper!offensive!op:ons;! • !Economic!sanc:ons!are!a!crude!instrument!–!exDpostDfacto!punishment!is! not!a!subs:tute!for!deterrent!effect!of!ceasefire!enforcement;! • !The!OSCE!is!wrong!organiza:on!&!poorly!equipped!to!monitor!ceasefire;! •! !The!only!ins:tu:on!capable!of!enforcing!the!Minsk!II!ceasefire!is!the! Ukrainian!Army,!but!it!needs!American!help!with!defensive!systems:! !DD!An:Dtank!Guided!Missiles!(Javelin!&!TOWDII)!capable!of!stopping!Russian!tanks;! !DD!UpDarmored!reconnaissance!vehicles!(HUMVEE)!to!patrol!ceasefire!line;! !DD!Secure!communica:ons!(Harris!digital!radios);! !DD!LongDrange!counterDbaKery!radar!(ANTPQD36)!to!keep!Russian!ar:llery!at!bay;! !DD!HighDal:tude!UAV!for!deep!surveillance!and!strategic!warning.!
• !Providing!hundreds!of!defensive!systems!is!neither!provoca:ve!nor! escalatory!–!it!offers!the!only!means!of!saving!Minsk!II;! • !Ukraine!is!a!already!a!“proxy!war”!–!one!which!Pu:n!is!learning!from!&!his! success!there!will!only!embolden!further!ac:on!against!NATO!members.!
Dr. Phillip A. Karber President, The Potomac FoundaRon & Professor, Georgetown University Phillip Karber graduated from Pepperdine College , has a PhD from Georgetown University and cerPficates from Wharton Business School, the JFK School and Harvard Business School. A former US Marine, in 1968 Karber was brought to Washington by Admiral Arleigh Burke to serve as NaPonal Security Assistant to the Ranking Republican Member of the Congressional Joint CommiHee on Atomic Energy (JCAE) In 1974 Karber was named Director of the PresidenPal mandated Na(onal Security Study Memorandum 186 -‐-‐ the NaPonal Security Council inter-‐ agency study of U.S-‐Soviet mulPpurpose forces. In 1981 Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger recruited Karber to serve as “strategy advisor” -‐-‐ reporPng directly to the Secretary and JCS Chairman. Subsequently, he served as an external advisor to BriPsh Prime Minister Thatcher, the Secretary General of NATO, and CEO of Ford Motor. As a senior execuPve of the BDM CorporaPon, Karber was responsible for internaPonal business in 28 countries and in 1990-‐91 organized, trained and delivered the Free Kuwait Army in support of Desert Storm. With a technical background in internaPonal transportaPon, he has led major efforts in air traffic control, aviaPon infrastructure and studying the terrorist threat to global aviaPon. For seven years, Karber served as Chairman of JFK Interna(onal Air Terminal -‐-‐ the internaPonal consorPum selected to privaPze, rebuild and operate New York’s Kennedy Airport InternaPonal Arrivals facility. An Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University since 1978, Karber’s latest academic wriPngs have appeared in the Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, Journal of Diploma(c History, and Proceedings of the American Society of Interna(onal Law. His most recent publicaPon is the 2013 monograph “Net Assessment for Sec Def.” In March 2014, at the request of the Ukrainian government, Karber joined Gen. (ret.) Wesley Clark in conducPng a series of assessments of the security situaPon in Ukraine and evaluaPng their military requirements for a successful defense. These have been presented to several commiLees and senior members of the US Congress. Over the last year, Dr. Karber has made eight trips to the front lines, and this report is based on his latest visits in both January and February of 2015.
Gen. (ret.) Wesley Clark & Dr. Karber, presenPng their bi-‐parPsan assessment to the House Armed Services CommiLee (Jul. 2014).
Karber with front line troops of the Dnepr-‐1 volunteers in eastern Ukraine at the start of the Russian Winter Offensive (Jan. 2015).