Tolle Lege

tolle LEGE

Mount St. Mary’s University Emmitsburg, Maryland Volume XIV 2021

Staff Editors-in-Chief Harry Scherer Lexi Zambito

Editorial Board Julia Baer Nathaniel Bald Emily Jansen Savannah Laux Rachel Lyter Olivia Prevost Matthew Pugsley Glennamarie Rivers

Faculty Advisors Dr. Thane Naberhaus Dr. Luis Vera

Table of Contents Editors’ Note .............................................................................................3 Contributors ...............................................................................................4

Humanae Vitae’s Implications for Family Size

Rachel Lyter ....................................................................................................5 Comparing Boethius and Hick on the Problem of Evil Julia Cool ...................................................................................................... 13 I Miss Smiles Nathaniel Bald ............................................................................................. 24 The Catholic Priesthood as the Fulfillment of the Spousal Meaning of the Body Michael Pray ................................................................................................. 38

Harry Potter and the State of Nature

Betsy Busch ................................................................................................... 48

Humanae Vitae: How it Failed to Reach the Church in the Modern World Timothy Ruflin .............................................................................................. 54

The Ethics of Nationalism and the Role of the Nation State Rebekah Balick............................................................................................. 60 The Angelic Intellect Ranil Weerackoon ......................................................................................... 69

Why “Tolle Lege ”?

The title of this journal is a reference to an extraordinary moment of conversion in the life of St. Augustine, the great philosopher and theologian of the early medieval period. The story begins with St. Augustine sitting beneath a fig tree, weeping in distress over his inability to leave behind his life of sin and follow God faithfully. Amid his tears he hears the distant voice of a child chanting the words “Tolle, lege!” or “Take up and read!” Aroused from his pitiable state and taking this as a sign from God, he goes to his house, picks up the first book he finds, and reads the first chapter. The book contained the letters of St. Paul, and the verse that Augustine read spoke to his heart with such force that he was convinced beyond any doubt of the truth of God; he was converted on the spot.

This journal of philosophy and theology is meant to embody a spirit of truth-seeking—on the part of both the contributors and you, the reader. Like St. Augustine, we are all faced with the choice between complacency and continual conversion toward truth. We hope that this journal will serve as an aid in the discovery of truth, and thus we exhort you in all earnestness to “Take up and read!”

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Editors’ Note “Tolle, lege”—these words inspired St. Augustine to embark on a journey of faith in pursuit of truth. In 2007, these two words became the cornerstone of our journal. For fourteen years we have inspired students through masterly essays in theology and philosophy written by their Mount peers. With this new issue we continue to offer you, our readers, an opportunity to take up your journey toward truth. This year, our editorial board selected eight fantastic essays on a variety of topics. The prize essay, Humanae Vitae’s Implications for Family Size, written by Rachel Lyter, offers a detailed examination of Paul VI’s famous encyclical, which shocked both the Church and the modern world, and exemplifies the thoughtful, complex, and truth-seeking work to which this journal is dedicated. As in previous years, the editorial board selected essays through a blind review process. The essays that appear in the pages that follow stood out to our editors for their contemporary relevance and clarity of argument.

We would like to thank our editorial board for their genuine consideration of each of the submissions, and for their dedication in selecting the essays included in this volume. We will never cease to be amazed by the zealous pursuit of truth exhibited by our peers. May we follow St. Anselm, not understanding in order that we might believe, but believing in order that we might understand.

Publication of this volume would not have been possible without the support of many members of the Mount St. Mary’s community.

We would like to thank the provost, Dr. Boyd Creasman, and the dean of the College of Liberal Arts, Dr. Peter Dorsey, for their financial support. Furthermore, we owe special thanks to our faculty advisors, Drs. Thane Naberhaus and Luis Vera, for their encouragement and guidance. Finally, we want to thank all those students whose submissions made this volume possible.

So tolle, lege—take up and read! We hope that through this journal, you will be inspired to participate in a community conversation directed toward the discovery of truth and its revelation to others.

Harry Scherer and Lexi Zambito Editors-in-Chief

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Contributors Nathaniel Bald is a triple major in economics, French and German.

He will graduate from Mount St. Mary’s in May 2021, after which he plans to continue his studies in economics with a specialization in behavioral economics and development economics.

Rebekah Balick is a double major in international studies and history with a minor in Spanish. She will graduate from Mount St. Mary’s in May of 2022, after which she hopes to keep writing and one day work in international relations and foreign policy.

Betsy Busch is a junior studying English, French, and music.

Julia Cool graduated magnum cum laude from Mount St. Mary’s in the spring of 2020 with degrees in psychology and philosophy. Since graduating, she has gotten married and moved to Germany. She is using her time in Germany to experience the culture and find ways to continue her education for her future.

Rachel Lyter will receive her B.S. in business with a concentration in management and a minor in theology in May 2021. She begins work as a category analyst in Lancaster, Pennsylvania, in June.

Michael Pray is a seminarian of the Diocese of Harrisburg in his first year of theological study. He will be graduating with a Master of Arts in Philosophical Studies in May of 2021 and a Master of Education in Instructional Leadership in May of 2022.

Timothy Ruflin graduated from Mount St. Mary’s in the spring of 2020 with a degree in theology and minors in philosophy and communication. He is now attending the University of Notre Dame, where he is pursuing a Master of Arts in Theology through the Echo Graduate Service Program. As part of the program, Timothy is serving as a catechetical leader in the Diocese of Meath, Ireland.

Ranil Weerackoon is in his first year of Theology at Mount St. Mary’s Seminary. Prior to attending the Mount, he graduated from California State University, Long Beach, with a degree in mathematics and from the University of Nebraska, Lincoln, with a master’s in statistics. He then attended St. Gregory the Great Seminary in Nebraska, where he obtained a degree in philosophy. God willing, Ranil will be ordained as a priest for the Diocese of Lincoln in May 2024.

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*** PRIZE ESSAY ***

Humanae Vitae’s Implications for Family Size

Rachel Lyter

T

“

he transmission of human life is a most serious role in which married people collaborate freely and responsibly with God the Creator. It has always been a source of great joy to them, even though it sometimes entails many difficulties and hardships.”1 These first two sentences of Pope Paul VI’s Humanae Vitae, published in 1968, create a great impact. The world had anxiously awaited for the pope to release an encyclical which would modify the Church’s teachings to be more with the times on the matter of using artificial birth control. In fact, many priests were advising their spiritual flock to use birth control without remorse, because the Vatican would surely be updating their policies on this in the near future. R. Patrick Homan, affiliated with the Couple to Couple League, in his lecture given at Princeton University, recounts the tale of his well-meaning priest who advised that “[the pill] is a wonderful thing that is going to come out.

The Church is going to approve it; it has already been approved by a papal commission. All it does is to suppress ovulation; it is a very natural fact. You have nothing to worry about.”2 But, contrary to the belief of this priest and many others, Humanae Vitae only served to strengthen the clarity of the truth of the Church’s teachings: it condemned all forms of artificial birth control used to prevent the possibility of procreation within the marital act.

This essay will address the concept of responsible parenthood, as introduced by Pope Paul VI. Moreover, it will seek to answer the question: what is the rationale behind determining family size? To do this, first, a background of the institution of marriage will be established, to include some common attitudes towards children themselves.

Pope Paul VI, Humanae Vitae (25 July 1968), §1.

R. Patrick Homan, Marital Chastity: A Blessing for Marriage, Family and Spiritual Life (Princeton: The Pope John Center, 1988), 137.

1 2

Marriage and Children Of course, marriage has been seen commonly throughout many different cultures and ages, as the sexual act is to be credited for sustaining the population of the human race. But Catholics see marriage as more than just a societal convenience or a reason to have a cute little party in a barn with friends and family. Dietrich Von Hildebrand characterizes “spousal love” in the following way: Let us be existential; let us see that the love between man and woman is a . . . beautiful and glorious reality which is destined

by God’s will to play a fundamental role in man’s life, and that this love is the classical motive for marriage, and that marriage is precisely the fulfillment of this love. And it is this love which we call ‘spousal love.’3 Von Hildebrand seeks to contrast the reigning practice of Catholic theologians to only see agape as worthy of recognition of love within a marriage.4 He also counteracts the other extreme of seeing love only as the desire for the sexual act, not a “fully human” act of both spirit and flesh, as Pope Paul VI puts it.5 This spousal love is allencompassing of self and desires union: “not [only] . . . of bodily union, but of the union of two individual lives. Surely it is an awesome thing that two human beings want to lead one life, that they wish to live together, to carry one name, that they unite their lives and share everything with each other!”6 It is by the power of God that this seeking of union is made holy: the couple declares before Him that they are entering into what God has declared as being a permanent one-flesh bond.7 Further, Christ in His time on earth raised this union to a sacrament of His Church, and “only in Christ and through Christ can the spouses live up to the full glory and depth to which this love by its very nature aspires.”8 The sanctification which comes from Christ does not declare the spousal act as unworthy, but, as grace perfects nature, that act achieves increased greatness.9

Dietrich Von Hildebrand, Love, Marriage, and the Catholic Conscience (Manchester: Sophia Institute, 1969), 18.

4 Ibid., 17.

5 Ibid., 18; Humanae Vitae, §9.

6 Von Hildebrand, Love, Marriage, 25.

7 Ibid., 34.

8 Ibid., 36.

9 Ibid.

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In his section on “Married Love” in Humanae Vitae, Pope Paul VI gives married love the following characteristics: fully human, an act of the free will, total, faithful, and fecund.10 He emphasizes that the free and total spousal love grows “so that husband and wife become in a way one heart and one soul, and together attain their human fulfillment.”11 Similarly leading to human fulfillment, fidelity “is the source of profound and enduring happiness.”12 Lastly, Pope Paul VI addresses the fecundity of marriage by drawing from the Second Vatican Council. This passage is of utmost importance, as the encyclical is written to those who may be confused about the righteousness of the fecundity of marriage. It says: “Marriage and conjugal love are by their nature ordained toward the procreation and education of children. Children are really the supreme gift of marriage and contribute in the highest degree to their parents’ welfare.”13 It is so common to meet those in today’s society who certainly do not share in this thought that children are not only the best aspect of marriage, but also aid the most in increasing the wellbeing of the parents. Young married couples are known to delay having children to keep advancing in their careers, or even to enjoy their youth with extra vacations to Bora Bora. Environmentalists will shout that it is selfish to have children as they contribute to consumption and pollution. Families of a rather moderate size are seen as a burden when participating in public life, with unwarranted stares coming from all directions, in a restaurant, perhaps.

In contrast to this view, Most Rev. Cormac Burke once commented that when comparing an African family with 18 children and no car to an American family with 18 cars and no children, the African family was “about 18 times” happier.14 He goes on to explain that these modern attitudes of family limitation are a privation of the marital good of children, and that those who hold this view fail to see it as such. Married couples who choose to have less children than what their resources allow do not realize “the goodness of what they are thus depriving themselves of.”15 They do not realize they are hurting themselves in that while they may gain more material goods, “material Humanae Vitae, §9.

Ibid.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.

14 Cormac Burke, Children and Values (Princeton: The Pope John Center, 1988), 368.

15 Ibid., 360 (emphasis added).

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goods cannot hold a marriage together; [only] matrimonial goods, especially the ‘good’ of offspring, can.”16 The couple’s offspring serve as this immense aid because “if married love is to grow, it has to contemplate, and be contemplated by, other eyes—many pairs of eyes—born of that very love.”17 If a couple is to only focus on the other, they will “stare the love out of each other’s eyes.”18 In conclusion, not only are children increasing the well-being of each parent, but they are the “supreme gift of marriage.”19 They are “the most personalized fruit of [parents’] own conjugal love, and are, therefore, the greatest gift they can make to one another, being at the same time God’s gift to both of them.”20 The Church teaches that a marriage must be fecund, therefore, not only because she never advocates separating the unitive and procreative aspects of the marital act, but also because she advocates for a married couple to experience to the fullest extent the gifts with which God wants to bless them in their very own children.21 Responsible Parenthood But, where the dream of a faith-filled Catholic couple may be to have resources enough to let their large family roam on something like the von Trapp estate, often this is just not the feasible case. There are reasons that may allow or even make prudent the couple’s actions to delay pregnancy for a set or indefinite amount of time.22 This section will aim to explore paragraph 10 of Humanae Vitae: “Responsible Parenthood,” followed by an examination of the work of Janet E. Smith on the topic. As studies related to Humanae Vitae are broad and deep, this paper does not intend to address in depth how using the natural cycles of a woman’s body is just in itself, but rather the attitudes which direct discernment of the married couple in having another child.

First addressed in paragraph 10 is that the couple must be aware of the obligations they take on as part of marriage, but in the correct sense. The term “responsible parenthood” can be lauded all over the Ibid.

Ibid., 362.

18 Ibid.

19 Humanae Vitae, §9.

20 Burke, Children and Values, 365.

21 Humanae Vitae, §12.

22 Ibid., §10.

16 17

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place nowadays without this correctness. For example, Maida recounts Planned Parenthood star Dr. Alan F. Guttmacher’s take on the issue: “whenever sex relations take place in or out of marriage, they are patently immoral if the most effective birth control technique is not used.”23 The Church’s teaching directly contradicts this, and instead argues that using contraception within or outside of marriage is always immoral because the marital act will not be fecund or open to life.

It is never right to see sex as unifying or pleasing without allowing the potential for fecundity; this empties the act of its true identity.24 Instead, there must be “an awareness of, and respect for” the “proper functions” of sex, where the reason takes this information into account when the couple discerns the appropriateness of the present time being conducive to a new child.25 Additionally, there must be control from the will over the “innate drives and emotions” to refrain from acts which would demean the sexual act.26 Lastly, the couple must see the procreative act as within the providence and control of the moral order which God has established.27 As God has established the woman’s cycles to have periods of fertility and infertility, the couple can use natural family planning to work within these. Those who “prudently and generously decide” to be open to bringing life into the world are following the moral order of God, but those who “decide not to have additional children” in the present time are also making a prudent decision if they are submitting to the will of God through what “physical, economic, psychological, and social conditions” are present in their lives.28 The couple in this situation is also taking into account “keeping a right order of priorities [and] recogniz[ing] their own duties toward God, themselves, their families, and human society” in following what God reveals his will to be for the particular situation.29 There will eventually come a time over the lifespan of a woman where she is no longer capable of bearing children naturally. At this time, she will have born a set number of children and there will be no more potential for her and her husband’s family size to increase other Adam J. Maida, Responsible Parenthood in the Writings of Pope Paul VI and Pope John Paul II (Princeton: The Pope John Center, 1988), 251.

24 Ibid.

25 Humanae Vitae, §10.

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid.

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than through, for example, adoption. But before this window closes, the number of children her and her husband will produce is determined by how often they will be in periods of life where they are hoping to conceive or hoping to avoid conception. So, a family size, then, flows from the degree of openness to life in each small month of the passing time of the family’s life.

Is it necessary that the mother see these fertile years as a hustle of constant hope of maximizing the number of children she could have borne? Probably not. This is the basis of Janet. E Smith’s work in examining reasons for limiting family size. It is important to note that this work does hinge on Smith’s belief “that the common rendering of some of these phrases [found in Humanae Vitae], such as ‘serious reasons’ or ‘grave reasons’ may suggest weightier reasons are required as necessary. [Smith] believes the phrase ‘just reasons’ to reflect more precisely what is meant.”30 Some theologians see Humanae Vitae as only defending the decision to postpone children when there is a lifethreatening condition. In contrast, Smith qualifies that for a just cause, “trivial reasons will not do, but reasons less than life-threatening conditions will.”31 She believes that these reasons need to be “defensible . . . not selfish . . . [but] directed to a good beyond their own comfort and convenience.”32 She emphasizes Humanae Vitae’s acknowledgement that “‘external’ factors, as well as the physical and psychological condition of the spouses, may make the spacing of children necessary.”33 This view may differ from a more rigid view that sees postponing pregnancy as only appropriate in a dire need and which does, in fact, consider it necessary to maximize the size of the family. Smith’s statements may seem to contradict the thoughts of those who find themselves not wanting to put any limits on their faith in God’s providence. But, “John Paul II counsels that it is a moral necessity for some couples to limit their family size,” because it “is certainly true that some couples may be physically able to have more children than they can care for.”34 Because we are humans given an intellect and will through our rational nature, we are expected to use our reason, and, in many cases, it may be wise to plan.

Janet E. Smith, “The Moral Use of Natural Family Planning,” in Why Humanae Vitae Was Right: A Reader, ed. Janet E. Smith (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1993), 461.

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid.

33 Ibid.

34 Ibid., 463.

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Smith presents the argument that not every family is supposed to be of a sizable number, but those whose life conditions allow it should do so, while those who do not find themselves called to this should not cling to the notion of being obligated to stretch every resource to welcome a multitude. By being open to life, the couple has fulfilled their obligation to have children, and having a plethora of children would be a welcome gift to God above the mere obligation. She compares this to fulfilling the obligations of other vocations. Since these obligations are filled in a positive manner, they can never reach the maximum level of being fulfilled. For example, if all a priest was doing was hearing confessions at every waking moment in all hours of the day, this would be unreasonable. Similarly, Smith uses the example that a priest who was appointed president of a university would have a modification of his responsibilities to celebrate the sacraments.35 Just because there could be a maximum level of devoting all time to fulfilling an obligation of vocation does not mean that this is the way it should be. (Is not virtue the mean between extremes?)

What this eventually comes down to is the priority of the family in the life of the marriage. Smith spends a good amount of time discussing how the couple may have other commitments and obligations which are also good things in and of themselves. Of course in our day and age, it has come about that more and more things are vying for our attention, but are any of them worthy of treating one’s family as less than the most important work to be done in love for Christ? The compromise on family size that Smith condones is reflective of the promotion of a personal call in the situation, that “surely all Christians are called to be generous, but they are called to be generous in different ways . . . having a large family is the generous act that God asks of some spouses; he will ask other kinds of generous acts of other spouses.”36 But, each married person has the call placed on them by entering into the vocation, and if one were to see living his vocation fully as the path to sainthood, would this generosity not come about naturally? Consecrated religious and celibate priests forgo children in order to fully give their lives to God in their works of ministry. Are not lay people fully giving their lives to God through the ministry to their domestic Church? Are not saints made through the ultimate sacrifices? What Smith never gets around to saying is that surely it is a higher good for the personal vocation of each spouse to 35 36

Ibid., 458–61.

Ibid., 465.

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give God this gift of a truly Christian family. Saints are those who heroically live as if this life only mattered in context of the next. The comforts of this world will look as dust from the glory of the next, and married couples who forgo these comforts in order to increase their charity and sanctify themselves will surely be rewarded.

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Comparing Boethius and Hick on the Problem of Evil Julia Cool

B

oethius and John Hick each attempt to answer the problem of evil, the former in The Consolation of Philosophy and the latter in Evil and the God of Love. Boethius says that evil has no power and does not exist and that all events that happen are good. Hick says that evil doesn’t have power but instead is a tool we can use to develop our soul and fulfill our purpose. These answers are very similar, and they answer the problem of evil with the same basic premises, but with different emphases. They both say that God is the source of true happiness, that evil has no power, that evil is a tool for good, and that growing in virtue will bring us to true happiness. However, Boethius’s answer to the problem of evil fails to account for human emotion, making it incomplete. Hick’s answer, the Soul-Making Theodicy, does account for human emotion, making it a more complete version of Boethius’s answer to the problem of evil.

Introduction The problem of evil is the main topic in book IV of The Consolation of Philosophy by Boethius. In this book he attempts, through Lady Philosophy, to provide us with an answer to this philosophical problem. The character of the prisoner was falsely accused of crimes he did not commit and is internally suffering. Among his suffering, he is struggling with why God would let these injustices happen to him.

The prisoner lived a good life and was a good person, so why did God, if He is an Omni-God, cause him to unjustly suffer? The prisoner also wonders how it is that wicked people and evil deeds go unpunished, but virtuous people get punished.1 In this paper, I will argue that the Soul-Making Theodicy presented by Hick is a more fully developed and complete version of Boethius’s answer to the problem of evil. To Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy, trans. Joel C. Relihan (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2001), 91; IV.1.

1

do this I will first present Boethius’s answer to the problem of evil as presented in The Consolation of Philosophy. Then, I will explain the SoulMaking Theodicy and how it attempts to answer the problem of evil.

Finally, I will show that the two answers to the problem of evil are essentially the same, with Boethius’s being incomplete, and how the Soul-Making Theodicy is a more complete version of Boethius’s answer.

Boethius’s Answer Boethius uses the character of Lady Philosophy to provide the prisoner and the reader with an answer to the problem of evil. In Lady Philosophy’s attempt to console the prisoner amid his suffering, she reminds him that God never lets an evil deed go unpunished, nor does He ever let virtue be forgotten. She then uses the nature of happiness to show why evil has no power. She says that everyone strives to obtain true happiness “and that is the good thing: Once people have secured it, they cannot desire anything beyond it. It is in fact the highest of all good things and it contains all good things within itself.”2 If true happiness did not contain all good things, then it could be added upon. Therefore, it could not be the highest good. People try to obtain the highest good by many different routes, such as money, honor, power, etc. They are all striving for the highest good but are failing. These different routes cannot lead us to true happiness, “nor do they themselves bring it about that people are perfectly happy.”3 This leaves the prisoner and Lady Philosophy with the question of what makes someone truly happy.

To tackle the question regarding what can bring a person to true happiness, Lady Philosophy and the prisoner discuss what the imperfect and perfect good are. The prisoner defines perfect good as “self-sufficient, powerful, preeminent, acclaimed and full of delight.”4 The prisoner is partially correct with his definition. Lady Philosophy corrects him by adding that true happiness cannot be obtained by means of earthly things. Earthly things give us a glimpse of true happiness, but they do not bestow it on us. Now that they know what a perfect good is, they know that imperfect goods lack in one or more of those qualities. For something to give us true happiness it must be the highest and most perfect good since true Ibid., 51; III.2.2–3.

Ibid., 66; III.8.12.

4 Ibid., 70; III.9.26–27.

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happiness is the highest, most perfect good. Lady Philosophy argues that this highest, most perfect good is God, for: reason shows that God is good in such a way that it also proves that the perfect Good exists within him. For if the good in him were not of this sort, he could not be the ruler of all things; for there would then be something more excellent than God, possessing the perfect Good, a thing that would seem to be prior to and more ancient than God; for it has been made clear that all things that are perfect are prior to things that are less whole. And for this reason we must agree, to keep this line of reasoning from regressing to infinity, that God is the highest and is the most full of the Good that is highest and perfect; but we have established that true happiness is the highest Good; therefore it is necessary that true happiness is located in the highest God.5 God is the highest, most perfect good and is the only thing that can give us true happiness. Any other method of trying to obtain true happiness will fail because only God can give us true happiness.

In book IV of The Consolation of Philosophy, Lady Philosophy now uses what she and the prisoner have learned in book III to show why evil has no power. First, they define what it means to be powerful and weak. A strong person is a person who is able to act in regard to will and ability, and a weak person is one who cannot act in accordance with will or ability.6 Both good and wicked people seek true happiness, but people only become good by achieving the good. Good people are successful at achieving the good, which gives them power since they can act. However, wicked people are not successful at achieving the good. If they were then they would not be wicked, but instead good. Wicked people also are not able to act, which makes them weak.

For “should you see someone desiring to secure for himself that which he does not secure for himself at all, you would not be able to doubt that he lacked the strength necessary to make what he wanted his own.”7 Since wicked people cannot obtain true happiness, they are weak and have no power. Wicked people are seeking happiness by means of earthly goods, but these goods do not satiate our desire for true happiness. We end up in vice and are left feeling empty. Evil people are excluded from achieving true happiness and consequently Ibid., 73–74; III.10.8–10.

Ibid., 94; IV.2.

7 Ibid., 94; IV.2.7.

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are excluded from all that really exists. Any earthly power they have isn’t power at all because they cannot achieve the only thing that has value in this life (true happiness). By striving for these earthly goods, wicked people lose their power and humanity.8 After Lady Philosophy provides the prisoner with this answer, he has difficulty accepting it. He still laments over the fact that wicked people do harm to good people and they go unpunished. He also still doesn’t understand how God could allow evil in the world. Lady Philosophy tells the prisoner that the wicked do receive punishment. The wicked are punished by turning into beasts. Their failure to obtain the good causes them to cease to be human. They have the appearance of a human, but they have lost their human nature. According to Lady Philosophy, “anyone who has ceased to be a human being by deserting righteousness, since he has not the power to cross over into the divine condition, is turned into a beast.”9 The lack of the good which the wicked seek is their punishment. They may not be punished externally, but they are being punished internally.

Lady Philosophy then attempts to answer the prisoner’s second challenge, which is why God would let evil into the world. She uses the providence of God to further answer the prisoner’s challenges. She explains that all events on earth, for God, happen simultaneously. Since humans are temporal beings, and God is not, he will not be able to fully understand God’s perception of the universe. However, she still attempts to help the prisoner. She starts by saying, “The coming-into-being of all things, each and every development of natures that are subject to change, . . . all these things are allotted their causes, their order, and their appearances from the immutability of the divine mind.”10 This means that the creation and development of all things are ordered, caused and designed by God. This plan is what is referred to as providence. Providence is God’s foreknowledge of all things and is the divine way in which the world is ordered. Since God orders all things, he directs them toward the good, because he is the good. Therefore, there is no evil in anything within God’s providence.11 Lady Philosophy applies this to fortune by saying that “[s]ince every fortune, be it delighted or calamitous, is Ibid., 96–98; IV.2.

Ibid., 102; IV.3.21.

10 Ibid., 113; IV.6.7–8.

11 Ibid., 120, IV.6.

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handed down sometimes for the sake of rewarding or training the good, sometimes for the sake of punishing or correcting the unrighteous, then every fortune is good.”12 Anything that happens to you, good or bad, is good. If something bad happens to you, then that can test you and direct you toward virtue; therefore, it is inherently good. This solidifies the fact that evil has no power on earth.

In summary, Boethius’s answer to the problem of evil is that evil has no power in this world. Wicked people, because they are unsuccessful at attaining their goal, are weak and therefore have no power. Wicked people are punishing themselves by keeping themselves from true happiness, and all the evil things and events that happen in your life are not bad but good. God orders all things; therefore, they must be good. Any evil thing that happens to you can be used toward virtue, so it is inherently good.

The Soul-Making Theodicy The Soul-Making Theodicy, introduced by John Hick, provides us with a substantial response to the problem of evil. It states that the reason that there is evil in the world is because God has good reason to allow it so we can develop morally. In this theodicy, instead of God creating humans (as personal and moral beings) in a finished state, we are still enduring the process of creation. Instead of humans being considered as finished and then falling disastrously away from our finitely perfect state, we are incomplete and working toward being finitely perfect. Humans already exist in the image of God but have not yet been formed into the likeness of God. By likeness, we mean “a certain valuable quality of personal life which reflects finitely the divine life.”13 This is a representation of the perfecting of human beings and the fulfillment of God’s purpose for humanity.

People created in the image of God are only raw material meant for further development in God’s creative work. As free autonomous beings, humans are guided though their dealings in the world God created for them, toward becoming finite likenesses of God. The transition from the image to the likeness of God is categorized by the movement from an animalistic life to an eternal life which transcends the animalistic life. The fall of humanity is seen as a failure in the second part of creation (entering eternal life). Humans need to go through an evolutionary process to fulfill God’s purpose for them 12 13

Ibid., 122; IV.7.3.

John Hick, Evil and the God of Love (Thetford: Lowe & Brydone, 1975), 290.

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because God cannot, with His power, make them complete. This is not saying that God does not have the power to complete creation; instead, God cannot complete creation because He made humans as free and self-directing beings. Therefore, creation cannot “be perfected by divine fiat, but only through the uncompelled responses and willing co-operation of human individuals in their actions and reactions in the world in which God has placed them.”14 Humans may eventually become perfect, but they cannot be created ready-made.

Another reason why God does not complete creation is because of value-theory. A person who has attained goodness by mastering temptations and learning to make responsible/virtuous choices is more valuable than a person initially created as virtuous. In the former case, “the individual’s goodness has within it the strength of temptations overcome, a stability based upon an accumulation of right choices, and a positive and responsible character that comes from the investment of costly personal effort.”15 In the eyes of God, this case would be more favorable than that of the individual who was inherently given virtue. This justifies God’s second phase of creation (the soul-making process), although it is long and arduous.

Humans are in the process of becoming the perfected beings God has designed and is seeking to create. This is happening through a “hazardous adventure of individual freedom” and is a “pilgrimage within the life of each individual.”16 For this to happen, there must be an accumulation of both good and evil so that individuals can be tested and earn their virtue. Millions of souls have already been through this experience of soul-making, and with each soul, God’s purpose is gradually moving toward fulfillment.

Another interpretation by Hick says that the reason God wants us to work for our virtue is because He is our Father. Loving parents want the best for their children. They want their children to grow up to be the best kind of people they can be. Sure, parents want pleasure and ease for their children, but not to the extent to which it inhibits their growth as individuals. Parents wish values such as courage, selflessness, moral integrity, compassion, and love upon their children more than pleasure. Any child brought up solely around pleasure will not likely develop into a mature adult. To most parents, “it seems Hick, God of Love, 291.

Ibid., 291–92.

16 Ibid., 292.

14 15

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more important to try to foster quality and strength of character in their children than to fill their lives at all times with the utmost possible degree of pleasure.”17 The analogy of God as our Father is the best for explaining the purpose for humans. He is all-loving, and He loves us like His own children because we are His children. So, He treats us like any other parent would. He recognizes that the presence of pleasure and the absence of pain is not the end He wants for us. Rather, He wants us to grow into ethically moral and virtuous people. Therefore, this world must be designed for soul-making. The value of this earth should be judged on the fitness of its purpose and not on the quantity of pleasure and pain.

In summary, the Soul-Making Theodicy states that evil exists in the world because it is needed for our soul-making. God did not create humans as complete moral beings, but instead as incomplete beings.

The act of creation is still ongoing, and through the act of free will, humans are able to partake in His creation. God did not want to create us as complete beings because then we would not be free. Humans are free autonomous beings, and if He completed us, then we would not have a choice in our moral decisions but instead would automatically do the moral thing. Not only would creating humans as complete beings take away our free will, but there is also more value in choosing to be virtuous. There is more value and praise given to the person who struggled and overcame temptation than to the person to whom virtue was given naturally. God is also our Father, and He wants what’s best for us. He knows that what’s best for us is not a life of leisure and pleasure, but instead a life where we become the best versions of ourselves, and the best people we can become. In order to develop our virtue, we must have evil in the world. Without evil, humans could not choose between right and wrong. Humans could not be tested by temptations without evil. Humans’ love for God could not be tested without evil. Lastly, humans would not appreciate the good in their lives if they didn’t have evil.18

Ibid., 295.

Critics such as Kane claim that the Soul-Making Theodicy does not account for or justify the existence of natural evils such as natural disasters, pains, and diseases. G. Stanley Kane, “The Failure of Soul-Making Theodicy,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6, no. 1 (1975): 1– 22.

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Boethius’s Answer Is an Incomplete Version of the Soul-Making Theodicy Now I will argue that the Soul-Making Theodicy is a more fully developed and complete version of Boethius’s answer to the problem of evil. I will do this by first showing how the two are the same. Then I will show why Boethius’s answer is not complete and how the SoulMaking theodicy is complete in comparison.

In both Boethius’s answer and the Soul-Making Theodicy, God is the true happiness that is being sought after. The prisoner and Lady Philosophy came to this conclusion in book III of The Consolation of Philosophy. They determined that God was the highest and most perfect good because He is the creator of everything and there is nothing more excellent than Him. This leads Lady Philosophy and the prisoner to establish that God is the source of true happiness because “we have established that true happiness is the highest Good; therefore it is necessary that true happiness is located in this highest God.”19 Hick says in Evil and The God of Love, when presenting his Soul-Making Theodicy, that the purpose for humans on earth is for them to be completed in the soul-making process. This completion will bring humans to God, which is God’s ultimate purpose. For “God has set man in a creaturely environment, and the final fulfillment of our nature in relation to God will accordingly take the form of an embodied life within ‘a new heaven and a new earth.’”20 The ultimate telos for humans is to join God in heaven, and we must go through this soul-making process before we can achieve that. Fulfilling our telos will provide us with true happiness. Since God is our telos, He is also the source of true happiness. Therefore, both Boethius’s and Hick’s answers to the problem of evil both have God as the source of true happiness.

Another reason why the Soul-Making Theodicy and Boethius’s answer to the problem of evil are the same is because they both claim that evil has no power. Lady Philosophy says that evil has no power because the wicked are weak. They are weak because they lack selfcontrol from vice, they are unable to achieve their goal, or they abandon the goal. Because of this, they “cease even to exist at all; after all, those who abandon the common goal of all the things that are also quit existing as well.”21 Since wicked people are weak and do not exist, Consolation, 74; III.10.10.

God of Love, 296.

21 Consolation, 97; IV.2.32.

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evil has no power. Hick doesn’t directly say that evil doesn’t have any power. However, evil’s fictitious power can be inferred. Evil has no power on earth because humans have the power. On earth, we are taking part in creation and developing our virtue. Evil is a tool which we can use to develop our virtue. Evil per se has no power, but humans have the power to use it in whatever way they want. Thus, the Soul-Making Theodicy and Boethius’s answer believe that evil has no power.

The last and most crucial reason why both answers to the problem of evil are the same is that both claim that evil is a tool for good. They both claim this because of the development of virtue. Lady Philosophy says that nothing is bad because anything that happens to you can be used to punish you, train you, reward you, or correct you. So, any event that seems evil is not evil. This is because that event is being used to bring you closer toward virtue and toward the good. The good is God and He is the only thing that can give us true happiness.

Therefore, in order to obtain true happiness, we must grow in virtue. Likewise, the Soul-Making Theodicy also says that evil is a good. Evil is the tool which humans use to develop morally. Humans must develop morally and virtuously, through the process of soulmaking, in order to fulfill their purpose in God’s creation and to join with God. The completion of creation and the reunion with God bring about true happiness for people. Therefore, evil must be good because it helps with this soul-making journey. Both answers to the problem of evil share this basic plan for humans. They both believe that evil helps us with the development of the soul and virtue. This, in turn, leads us to true happiness.

Now that we have established that the Soul-Making Theodicy and Boethius’s answer to the problem of evil are essentially the same, we can establish why Boethius’s answer is incomplete and why the SoulMaking Theodicy is a more complete version of Boethius’s answer. Although Boethius’s answer to the problem of evil is logically satisfying, it is not emotionally satisfying. The prisoner is still unsatisfied with the provided answer. He is unsatisfied because the answer does not appeal to human pathos, and we feel as though evil holds a vast bearing on our lives. Ask anyone who has had a catastrophic event happen to them (such as a loved one dying, or their home being destroyed due to a tornado) if evil has power in the world.

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so much weight over their lives. Boethius’s answer fails to account for human emotions and expects humans to be completely rational. Lady Philosophy even shows her aversion to emotions in The Consolation of Philosophy. When she sees the muses or passions around the prisoner she becomes outraged and says, “they do not tend to his pains with any sort of a remedy; not only that, but they actually encourage them, adding their own sweet poisons. For these are the women who choke out the rich fields of reason’s fruit.”22 Lady Philosophy thinks that the muses, which are ways to express emotion, are poisonous and could make the prisoner’s depression worse. She also thinks that expressing emotions cuts out all reasoning. Later, she even refers to them as a tumor.23 Lady Philosophy, and by extension Boethius, thinks that it is unhealthy to recognize emotions and that it’s best if you ignore them completely. However, humans are not completely rational beings; humans must embrace their emotions. Therefore, Boethius’s answer is unrealistic and incomplete.

The Soul-Making Theodicy does account for human emotions.

Instead of putting an emphasis on the idea that evil has no power, the Soul-Making Theodicy puts an emphasis on the purpose of evil. Both views say the exact same thing, so why should emphasis matter? It matters because the emphasis changes our perceptions and emotions towards these views. Most people will not agree that evil has no power, and most will want to fight back and provide examples showing that evil has power. However, if someone says that there is a purpose to evil, most people are not as eager to fight back. Instead, people will want to listen to what that person has to say about the purpose of evil.

We can all think of a time in which something bad happened to us and it ended up being good for us in the long run—for example, being broken up with by someone you love. At first, this can seem like a horrible thing. But several months from that point the person could realize that that relationship was toxic, and that they are better off without the other person. That relationship could have taught them necessary things they needed to learn in order to be with their future husband or wife.

Evil having a purpose appeals more to our pathos. We may not like what we are going through, but we understand that it is for a reason.

This understanding of the event considers our human emotions. Since we are human, we cannot ignore our emotions. It is extremely 22 23

Ibid., 3; I.1.8–9.

Ibid., 17; I.5.

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unhealthy and detrimental to our physical and mental health if we suppress or ignore them. Hick understands this, which is why he is incorporating the emotional response into his answer. Think of an example of when you had to do something to achieve a goal but didn’t have the drive to do it, even knowing that doing that task would help you get to your goal. You may not want to do it, but the purpose behind the task is a motivator to accomplish the task. That motivator makes it just a little easier to do the task. Providing a purpose does not eliminate our emotional reactions but instead makes the emotions we are experiencing a little easier to deal with. The same mindset applies to evil. If we know the reason why we are experiencing evil, then it will make it easier to endure it. The Soul-Making theodicy recognizes that humans are not completely rational and that they have strong emotions. Through the concept of purpose, this emotional side of humans is satisfied and not ignored. Therefore, the SoulMaking Theodicy is both logically and emotionally satisfying. This makes it a more complete version of Boethius’s answer to the problem of evil.

Conclusion In conclusion, The Soul-Making Theodicy and Boethius’s answer to the problem of evil are similar views, with the latter being an incomplete version of the former. They both share the same beliefs and views but put an emphasis on different points. Boethius puts an emphasis on the fact that evil has no power, whereas the Soul-Making Theodicy puts an emphasis on purpose. The difference in emphasis changes our perceptions of the views and thereby changes our emotional responses toward them. Boethius ignores emotion and discourages it. This makes his answer off-putting to most. Hick, however, puts his emphasis on purpose, which restores emotion. He does not claim, as Boethius does, that emotions are destructive.

Instead, he recognizes that we need to embrace them and face them head-on. Therefore, Boethius’s answer to the problem of evil is an incomplete version of Hick’s Soul-Making Theodicy.

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I Miss Smiles Nathaniel Bald

T

hroughout the coronavirus pandemic, we have sacrificed much of our daily, comfortable lives for the sake of the common good. Or so we have been told. To what extent this pandemic has actually given us reason for alarm is often muddled by misinformation, miseducation, and highly politicized responses from politicians, business leaders, and others who hope to use this time of despair, desperation, and uncertainty as a vehicle to drive their own agenda in the face of a frightened and fractured world. The fact of the matter is that there will be long debates ranging from tradeoffs in public health and personal freedoms to whether online communities can really be considered communities at all. I have a great fear that this pandemic, like all times of tribulation, will cause mankind to lose hope such that we sink further into a hyper-individualized world that values self-preservation and personal gain over the dignity of the common good and of other human persons. I found it strange that, when this whole pandemic began and governments rolled out the first waves of social distancing protocols, their main appeal to us was that new measures, extreme or otherwise, were for the sake of preserving and protecting the weak, the vulnerable, and above all else, the common good. The common good argument, as I have come to call it, puzzled me. In a society like that of the United States, which believes in hyperindividualization and personal liberty at the expense of community, commitment, and communal obligation that all constrain and restrain the individual from acting freely as if in a void deprived of all consequences, it perplexed me that the government and the World Health Organization relied so heavily on appealing to what they believe to be the universal inward desire to serve the common good above one’s own self-interest. I was generally surprised and slightly excited to see that such an appeal had any effect, for it has demonstrated that not all of humanity has lost a sense of greater and nobler causes external to oneself. Nonetheless, I was confused as to

why such an appeal would be made to a culture that often preaches community and common good, but in practice only realizes a form of radical individualism. Thus, I would like to hypothesize something which gives me hope. It is not much of a solid argument as much as it is a personal observation that I desperately hope others have made. In short, I miss smiles. I miss them dearly, and it pains me to walk down the street seeing many people covering their faces with masks, bandanas, and sometimes very innovative contraptions all designed to mitigate the chances of proliferating the virus. My hypothesis, therefore, is that somehow, when all of this is over, the loss of humanity, of community, of personal and intimate relationships, a sort of saudade we can perhaps call it, will in some way stir a greater desire to live in the fellowship of one another in a deeper and more meaningful way, one which speaks to that part of our human nature that calls us to live in community, that we may journey toward the kingdom of peace as one, unified human race that lives for one another and lives ultimately for God in a divinely intimate relationship of faith, hope, and charity.

Just under a year ago now, I began to write an essay titled The Culture of Isolation. In it, I detailed my observations that the world had become increasingly isolated since the emergence of the internet and the rise of social media connections. Ironically, what was meant to bring humanity together and make communication easier has really made us more distant, less compassionate, and increasingly tolerant of verbal falsities, physical violence in response to undesired consequences, and blatant slander. Paradoxically, the more we are able to communicate with one another from anywhere in the world, the further apart we have grown. Deep, intimate relationships are a rarity and an anomaly in the contemporary dating world. Traditional courtships are irregular exceptions in a world that now accepts online dating apps, spontaneous and sexually driven hookups, and impulsive decisions of imprudent and unjust rage as the standard and rule. The expectations of being in a relationship have shifted drastically since the rise of the internet. Even before then, there were monumental changes due to the sexual revolution. But the internet and the culture of isolation sink their venomous fangs far deeper into our society than just courtship. Indeed, unlike The Culture of Isolation, which I never finished, the effects of this venom actually materialized in our society.

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an artificial medium of communication and relationship as a faux alternative to real, physical, and present community.

The internet has provided places for digital communities to exist.

Robert Putnam predicted in the late 1990s that the ability to easily find those who are like-minded and ideologically homogenous would rapidly increase the rate at which we would self-segregate, particularly on the internet.1 Prophetically, Putnam was right. Many groups, most notably those with extreme ideologies, found a safe haven in internet chat rooms and social media outlets that allowed them to discover friends and fellows of similar worldviews. In many ways, more extreme groups were pushed to the darker parts of the internet by rival parties in a sort of internal social media tribal conflict. Irshad Manji goes so far as to argue that the feminist movement’s apathy and intolerance of men on the internet accelerated the white supremacist movement’s migration to these darker and deregulated parts of the internet.2 In a stroke of irony, Manji suggests, feminists poured gasoline on an already violent and raging inferno of anger and hatred.

The response, naturally, was a greater level of violence and hateful rhetoric.

This story highlights the idea that the internet has caused us to accept a cultural shift and transformation that promotes and normalizes solitude, isolation, and, to a certain degree, islanding.

Islanding is a Western concept that further developed after contact with Polynesian cultures. It is the idea that we in the West have a tendency to “island” anything and everything. That is, we like to place things in certain categories that can be differentiated and set apart from things which surround them. A mountain looks like an island surrounded by forest. A city is like an island in a plain. We even have islands which separate our roads, dot our kitchens, and, obviously, settle on the waves of the ocean. We could also call this process of islanding “labeling” or “compartmentalizing.” It is, as one can imagine, a precursor to the dominant identity politics of our day. But islanding is more appropriate for our purposes because, unlike labeling and compartmentalizing, when one islands something, it becomes distant, foreign, and, dare I say, exotic.

The Polynesian view of islands is completely different. Unlike their Western counterparts, Polynesians see a continuity between islands. In other words, the ocean does not separate islands; it 1 2

Robert Putnam, Bowling Alone (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000).

Irshad Manji, Don’t Label Me (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2019).

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connects them and, to a certain extent, is part of the whole. The purpose of raising this distinction is that we have very much adopted an islanding approach to humans and human connection. People have slowly become islands which can only be reached by means of digital telecommunication or through social media outlets. At first there seems to be little to worry about here, as it appears to be merely a change in the medium by which we communicate. At the same time, the medium of anything is fundamentally important because the medium affects the outcome in substantial ways.

For instance, if we take Howard Gardner’s notion of Multiple Intelligences seriously, then we know that not all people learn the same way. If we try to force someone who learns best through music to watch lecture video after lecture video, the fault is not necessarily in the student, but potentially in the teacher who employs the improper medium of communication in the attempt to teach something new.

Similarly, it is much easier to communicate human emotion, feeling, and context if we are able to physically see the person. Physical body language is essential to our medium of communication and it is an aspect of our interpersonal activity that is irreplaceable through digital technologies, despite the introduction of emojis as a possible substitute.

In a similar way, the online digital community has very much attempted to replace or substitute our physical community and physical relationships. More and more people are abandoning the difficulty of going out, spending time in someone’s physical presence, and dedicating the necessary full attention required to hold a conversation in person without becoming tired or bored of the other person’s face. A real and personal conversation requires substantial physical and mental investment from both parties. By contrast, the internet and social media allow us to continue conversation at our own convenience. It is much easier to carry on several superficial conversations all at once without the overbearing necessity of commitment. And I would very much identify the ability to put a conversation down only to come back to it much later as a primary culprit that explains why physical community and physical, personal relationships now struggle. Indeed, I would argue that the internet and social media’s digital medium are what has made us incapable of forming and maintaining these relationships. In other words, it highlights the notion that the medium we use to communicate and the modes through which we operate may have underlying foundations VOLUME XIV (2021)

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that affect how we form and maintain relationships and are irreplaceable by a digital alternative. I think the coronavirus pandemic has demonstrated such a hypothesis to be true, and I would dare argue that the loss of smiles is the strongest evidence against the digitalization of our interpersonal communication, which has sucked the soul out of our relationships between each other and the greater and lesser communities in which we live and work.

Before the coronavirus pandemic, the internet and social media were already trying to replace our physical communication. Social media such as Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, Snapchat, and others quickly took younger and older generations by storm with their new approach to sharing lives and expressing one’s thoughts, opinions, art, and talents. In a way, social media outlets created a new, broader platform through which we could share with the world who we are and what it is we can do. Yuval Levin claims that these institutions, for that is what social media is, fulfill a performative role in the sense that they allow us to perform or showcase ourselves rather than play a formative role intended to expand our horizons, foster character, and mediate meaningful dialogue.3 In my personal opinion, social media a vehicle for vanity, and I would argue that those generations being raised in the thick of the social media revolution are most affected by social media’s influence and its promotion of self-serving and egotistical avenues which make Youtubers famous and Instagram models the buzz of juicy gossip and scandal. Levin explains this as our growing celebrity culture in which one is no longer famous for success or for real feats but rather for simply being known. What are the Kardashians known for? Well, they are well-known for being wellknown.

This should be alarming and concerning for society because, as James Davidson Hunter points out, the moral education and formation of our young is increasingly being assumed by popular culture.4 In this case, YouTubers, TikTokers, and others who obtain their celebrity status via social media have unknowingly, or knowingly in some instances, presented youth with a particular world view.

Because youth, particularly young teens who tend to value peer approval at higher rates than other ages, are the primary consumers of social media in these modes, the content of these internet videos, memes, vlogs, and blogs is becoming increasingly more influential in 3 4

Yuval Levin, A Time To Build (New York: Basic Books, 2020).

James Davidson Hunter, The Death of Character (New York: Basic Books, 2001).

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how our youth view the world and how they believe they should act.

That is, there are new expectations set by pop culture which, in most instances, conflict with one another and only offer small pieces rather than a comprehensive worldview. I have seen many videos on Instagram with captions that run, “Girls, find yourself a man who [insert something desirable about men].” Or, “Boys, she’s a keeper if [insert something desirable about women].” Although Hunter was not writing in the age of TikTok and Instagram, he would most likely agree with the statement that these videos, especially considering how numerous they are, diffuse into our youth culture certain ideas about what love is, how relationships are meant to work, and what proper conduct is.

This convoluted whirlwind of opposing views is exacerbated by the fact that pop culture actively promotes conflict and drama between individual content creators. Even the seemingly most outcast in the nerd-dominated gaming world cannot escape the artificial drama created by social media and streaming services. Moreover, YouTuber influencer feuds add more fuel to the flames of a quickly rising platform of fame, money, and success. With monetary and vain incentives underlying the context of all social media content, it is hard to imagine that many pop-culture figures would stray from what they know will earn them the most views, most likes, or biggest paycheck.

That is not to say that all content creators are sellouts. I would, however, argue that these underlying conditions are always a factor to consider when trying to discern the intentions of anyone, whether on social media or mainstream media.

What we can derive from this instinctually hostile environment is that the moral formation of the youth via celebrity culture is inherently fractured and uncohesive, and more often than not hypocritical and extremely individualistic. Indeed, the individualistic aspects of moral formation through pop-culture and mediated through social media outlets find their roots in Hunter’s observations that if morality is strictly subjective and individualized, which has become the dominant assumption in moral education in schools, then it is impossible to achieve consensus on how to best frame society and distinguish moral from immoral action. Thus, when an appeal to the common good was made at the beginning and throughout the coronavirus pandemic, I was surprised to see appeals to an idea and value as if they were objective and universal. In other words, I found it strange that a system which promotes a subjective and individualistic view of moral VOLUME XIV (2021)

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standards and norms actively tried to appeal to an objective and universal truth of placing the common good above oneself and one’s own desire. But the internet as a medium of communication has other problems that pertain to community and identity that we should consider.

Hundreds of thousands of online communities emerged with the internet. Each one had its own sense of identity and provided members with a sense of belonging. If one does not fit in with an online community, one only needed to continue searching until landing the perfect match. This has allowed us to select the communities in which we participate and to which we contribute.

Rather than being forced to live in the physical community which could be filled with people who we do not agree with, who are mean, or who discriminate against us, the internet and social media offers us a digital community that we can select for ourselves, even creating a whole new digital identity if we so desire. When we become unhappy or dissatisfied with this digital community or identity, it is not hard to drop it altogether, delete or block those contacts, and migrate to a new digital community that better fits our personal needs.

Similar to the common maxim, “You can pick your friends, but you can’t pick your family,” digital platforms and social media appear to have said, “Now you can choose your community, and if you don’t like it, buy a new one—no strings attached.” No strings attached indeed! It is much easier to drop an online community than it is to pick up and leave a physical community. Unlike an immaterial digital community, one cannot easily escape the physical community to which one is bound. That is, we are often stuck with our physical communities, much like we are stuck with our family unless we somehow acquire enough resources to displace ourselves.

When placed into this kind of living condition, there are several possible results. First, one could become a social outcast and be banished from participation in the community. As awful and terrible as this is, it is an all-too-frequent reality. For instance, in the years following desegregation, and even into our modern times, it is not unusual for a black family to be excluded from a predominately white community if the white community is inclined toward prejudice and racist sentiments. The consequences of such isolation degrade the human dignity of the victim as well as the perpetrator. Any act that degrades the dignity of the human person equally degrades the offender, although the material, social, and emotional results are 30

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unequally distributed. Similarly, many high school students become social outcasts. Most notable are the nerds and geeks, often perceived as quirky, socially inept, or simply freakish. Is it any surprise that these individuals have a significantly lower accumulation of social capital, human capital, and non-cognitive skills, when they are socially forced out of the public sphere? It may be true that they do this to themselves.

But the voluntary choice of the outcast to live outside of mainstream society can often be made under the influence of underlying social pressures. I, too, would not want to participate in or contribute to a community which disdains and labels me an undesirable. The only solace for these kinds of social outcasts is the comfort of online communities because they provide what Robert Fogel calls “spiritual resources” which consist of that sense of meaning, purpose, and belonging, however misguided or misdirected they may be.5 This leads to our second option, which is for our social outcast to continue existing within but without the physical community. That is, one can persist within a physical community and subsist without having to participate or contribute to that community because one has found another community via a digital platform. In this regard, the internet, social media, or online gaming communities have offered a substitute for social interaction for our forlorn subjects. It is often that these digital communities become one’s only real sense of fellowship and fraternity. In other words, it is online that our unfortunate victims of social isolation have found a sense of meaning and belonging. As much as this auxiliary appears to be a positive substitute for a physical community, online communities do not often form bonds as strong as physical communities or physical relationships. One can become intensely emotionally invested and involved in an online community.

Indeed, it is not hard to find lost souls on the internet simply looking for someone to comfort and accompany their lonely hearts. This kind of emotional substitute, I would argue, is dangerous not only for the emotional psyche, but for the soul in general.

This is because there is something absent in the medium of the digital world, which cannot replace the real and physical connection that is required when forming and fostering deep and intimate relationships with others in a physical community. As romantic as it sounds, the physical connection of the soundwaves generated from one person’s vocal cords and reaching the ears of another person in 5

Robert Fogel, The Fourth Great Awakening (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000).

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the same room has some sort of spiritual power which amplifies and deepens the connection being made. Physically present conversation and connection demand attention, patience, and solidarity. We have all been in conversations in which the person listening, or even we ourselves, were not truly present in our words, our emotions, or even our body language. I do not have much evidence to support the notion that there is a spiritual power embedded in the proximity of one’s physical conversation. Indeed, I do not think there could be empirical evidence to support the claim that a certain physical radius determines how intimate a conversation truly is. However, I believe that if we were to look at two seemingly identical relationships between which the only difference is the medium through which they are expressed, we would find that there is something intrinsically superior in the medium of physical relationship and something intrinsically inferior in digitally mediated relationships.

As mentioned above, the internet and social media have tried for many years to incentivize consumers to see the value of online platforms as a means of amplifying and streamlining our means of communication and relationships. The rise of the coronavirus has artificially forced most of the world to adopt a digital means of communicating to others. In fact, for many of us, digital communication is the only means by which we can communicate with anyone. These strange circumstances, I believe, have given us the incredible opportunity to study how the medium of digital communication has altered our personal relationships with each other and within our communities. If we look at our physical relationships before social distancing guidelines and mandates determined our means of communication, and compare them to our digital relationships now that this seems to be the only means afforded us to communicate, we may be able to determine whether physical communication as a medium has any intrinsic quality that ameliorates our interpersonal relationships which may be absent in a digital medium.

I cannot help but propose the idea that such physical communication not only is vastly superior to digital communication, but that it points to something in our human nature which longs for deep, intimate, and vulnerable fellowship with one another within the context of a physical community. My argument here is that no digital platform, no matter how realistic, how accessible, or how closely it can imitate its natural counterpart, will ever be able to replicate and 32

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produce that necessary fellowship of trust, companionship, and solidarity which only exists in a physical community of human persons. David Brooks argues that community is built in a place and that it is in this place that people come together, share a common story, and push forward with a vision for the future.6 Community, in his opinion, is actually the by-product of a committed collective that comes together to build something. Hence, part of my reasoning is that the digital medium exacerbates and enables hyper-individualism to dominate our personal relationships. That is, because digital relationships are easy to enter, just as easy to leave altogether, and extremely convenient in the sense that we may put them down for as long as we desire, they lack the true investment that incentivizes us to commit to profound interpersonal relationship. In other words, there is a lack of personal commitment made easy, something which is much more difficult to accomplish in a physical community.

Digital relationships, in this regard, become utilitarian in the sense that individualism reigns as king on the internet. If I do not like a group or if a person on the internet has made me upset, I have all the power in the world to block them because it is in my interest. There is no reason to resolve the conflict or to try to alleviate tension. The digital medium of the internet and social media allow for us to quickly cut ties for our own personal reasons. On the contrary, a physical community encourages and sometimes forces communication and resolution. This is not always the case, of course, such as in instances of violence or extreme discrimination, which are common enough to be mentioned as not infrequent exceptions and not improbable anomalies. Nonetheless, I am speaking of less tense situations of minor disagreements or conflicts. These instances of small peacemaking give us the foundational skills and integrity when dealing with larger situations that command more gravitas. The underlying argument here is that living in a physical community does not allow us to escape tension and conflict so easily without first trying to resolve it, whereas the internet enables our hyper-individualized culture to flourish in a medium very well designed for self-centered and fragile individuals who are uncomfortable with confrontation. On the other hand, the internet is very often ruthless and relentless, and it holds nothing to be sacred. For those who are physical social outcasts,

6

David Brooks, The Second Mountain (New York: Random House, 2019).

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sometimes the internet can only amplify their isolation and pain.

Unfortunately, this is also part of the internet’s seductive draw.

The anonymity of the internet allows for verbally violent and aggressive behaviors to flourish. In The Swedish Cavalier, Leo Perutz follows the story of the unnamed thief who becomes a brigand leader, then poses as a Swedish knight, and then dies a man with no identity.7 Throughout the novel, our unnamed character remains cowardly until his face is covered by the cloak of anonymity. That is, he only speaks when he is hidden in the shadows, when his face is covered by a mask, or when his listeners believe him to be someone else. In other words, anonymity gives him a false sense of courage to do things he would otherwise not do at all. In a similar way, the internet gives “internet trolls,” aggressive activists, and other unfriendly users the ability to abuse others without any social consequences. In a way, the anonymity of the internet gives deviants a ring of Gyges. During the current pandemic, we see this in the crude and unusual behavior of “Zoombombers,” who maliciously seek out Zoom meetings and conferences to interrupt them with disruptive noise, images, or even worse distractions. What comes to mind is how a meeting of international Islamic leaders and even a local Catholic Mass were rudely disrupted with the sudden appearance of pornographic videos shared by a malicious visitor. It is rather heartbreaking that such behavior persists in a country which, ironically, appealed to the common good as the primary driving argument for social distancing protocols. In short, anonymity is not quite so easy to obtain when living in a physical community. Indeed, it appears that digital communities, despite much fighting, have not proven to be suitable substitutes for real, tangible communities where anonymity is rare and where conflicts must be resolved on a personal level.

Anonymity points me back to the beginning of what led me down this long meditation on our current state of affairs, and it seems that I should really get to the full conclusion after having discussed hyperindividualism, mediums of personal relationships, anonymity, and other subjects that all intersect at what I am trying to propose here.

That is, I really do miss smiles. I like to smile at strangers with whom I make eye contact. I like to smile at the cashiers, wait staff, and receptionists. I like to smile at friends I see on the side of the street and when I see children playing in the park. There is something about Leo Perutz, Le Cavalier Suédois, edited by Martine Keyser (Paris: Union Générale D’Éditions, 1964).

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a smile that is irreplaceable. It is personal, welcoming, uplifting, and above all, human. Yes, “human” is the word I want to use, and I plan to use it quite liberally and without any remorse. This is because a smile is utterly human. To smile is to make a human connection, not because humans are the only species that smile—there are animals that smile— but rather because the human smile reveals something so deep and profound in the one who smiles. Namely, a smile reveals the humanity in the other person.

A smile connects us. It breaks down barriers, places the first stone of a new bridge, and opens our hearts to receive love. Smiles are vulnerable, warming, and revealing. The internet and social media cannot replace a human smile, something which I assume can really only be seen within a certain physical radius. I simply do not believe that it will ever be able to do so. No amount of technology or Facetiming graphics will ever be able to substitute our ability to see the humanity of another person when our mouths bend, lips open ajar, and teeth show and shine for all to see. Indeed, smiles build communities in ways that I do not think we could have imagined until we were forced to wear masks. I cannot tell you how many times I have wanted to smile only to realize that the person I walked past could not have seen it because I was socially compelled to wear a mask.

These masks cover our faces and our smiles. In a way, they cover our humanity, which tries so very much to burst forth from the artificial barrier we have built around it. I cannot imagine a community which thrives without smiles, for a community without smiles is a community that has surrendered its humanity.

I am aware that building an argument for physical community on the foundation of smiling is not to make a very strong case; that is beside the point for me. In truth, what I believe this pandemic has demonstrated is that our digital representations of our communities and interpersonal relationships will never be able to replace the physical communities and relationships we have because the internet and social media will never be able to replicate humanity. Zoom, Facebook, Google, Twitter, Snapchat, Instagram, and all the other companies and social media platforms may be able to express what we believe others want to see. But they will never replace the humanity that can only be manifested in the real, physical presence of a true relationship or intimate community. This is because we were not meant to live in isolation. We were not meant to be islands who communicate with one another from a distance. No, we were called to VOLUME XIV (2021)

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live in a deep, intimate, and vulnerable relationship with one another, with our community, and with God, one that is founded in trust and love. As the German theologian Dietrich Bonhoeffer believed, to be truly human is to live and share in the humanity of others, and our personal free will and freedom give us the unique opportunity to choose, by our own desire, to abide in the divine intimacy of Jesus Christ and each other.8 No internet platform can mediate that intimate connection the same way one’s physical presence can.

I do not believe that the correlation between the rise of mass online communication and the decline in the prosperity and value of our physical communities and relationships is an accident. Indeed, I strongly argue that the medium of social media and the internet is a driving and underlying force behind the suffering of physical communities and why our personal relationships within those physical communities are frail, brittle, or non-existent altogether. The rise in deaths of despair, of alcoholism, drug overdose, and suicide, is unfortunately sufficient evidence. When God created the Garden of Eden, it was no mistake that mankind lived so close with one another, with God, and with nature. Only when our trust of God’s love was broken did we begin to separate and fall apart. Furthermore, the lack of communication between Cain and Abel contributed to Cain’s envy and wrath toward his brother. I wonder what would have been different had they been able to trust one another and live in a more vulnerable and intimate community. Even afterwards, the cities that Cain’s descendants built did not last or flourish. In Revelations, we are told that the New Jerusalem will be a magnificent city where there are no temples because God will be truly present with each one of us. Is it so farfetched to believe that we, made in His image and likeness, also find value in the presence of one another? Moreover, it seems to me that because we are embodied beings, our physical presence is infinitely more valuable than the falsity of a digital medium. It is, dare I say, almost as if we were made to be physically present with one another and that if we try to replace this physical intimacy of community and interpersonal relationships with a medium that creates physical or social distance, there should be negative consequences not only for individuals but for society and humanity in general. Perhaps there is something innately, intrinsically, and uniquely human about

8

Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Ethics (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1949).

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physical presence which cannot be replicated by a digital representation of our humanity.

Thus, it is my hope that after all this, we will appreciate our physical communities just a little more than we have in the recent past.

If we do not, the current cross we have been called to endure will have been carried for nothing, for a cross dragged without courage or joy is a cross wasted.9 Rather, we should embrace the cross of social distancing with joy and hope that one day we will fortify and more firmly believe in our calling to fellowship with one another and with God. And if this does not come to pass, at least I will be happy to see the smiling faces of people again because it is within those smiles that I see the humanity of my brothers and sisters. Yes, in their smiles I see Christ Himself.

Basil Moreau, Basil Moreau Essential Writings, edited by Kevin Grove C.S.C. and Andrew Gawrych C.S.C. (Notre Dame: Ave Maria Press, 2014).

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The Catholic Priesthood as the Fulfillment of the Spousal Meaning of the Body Michael Pray

S

ince the beginning of creation, marriage has been the bedrock of human society. Despite their primal fall from grace in committing Original Sin, Adam and Eve obeyed God’s command to “go forth and multiply” and their descendants came to rule over all the earth. When Jesus Christ was incarnate of the Blessed Virgin Mary, His incarnation elevated the state of the human body from one of feeble concupiscence to divine grace. Jesus Christ came into the world to institute a new law and provide a perfect example by which billions of Christians have sought to live since His death and resurrection over two millennia ago. One of the things He taught His apostles and that has been carried on in the tradition of the Church is the practice of celibacy for members of the ordained presbyterate.

Celibacy is an important and ascetical practice that allows a priest to dedicate the time he normally would devote to a family to God’s holy people in service to them as a spiritual father. Although natural fatherhood is vitally important for the continued propagation of the species, spiritual fatherhood holds a special place in the life of Christian society as an eschatological mirror for the promise of eternal life with God in heaven in the Beatific Vision. Pope St. John Paul II wrote extensively about the nature of the human person, sexuality, and marriage and coined the phrase “spousal meaning of the body” to denote the special significance each person gained through Christ’s participation in human nature. Of course, spousal meaning denotes marriage, but John Paul II also pointed out that the celibate priesthood manifests itself as a fulfillment of the spousal meaning of the body in a special way. As such, I will explore how the priesthood manifests the spousal meaning of the body, the role of natural and spiritual fatherhood in Christian society, why celibacy is vital for priests, and how it reflects the eschatological promise for each person.

Before a deeper exploration of the celibate nature of the priesthood, John Paul II’s concept of the “spousal meaning of the

body” is owed more attention to properly frame the discussion. Given the newly elevated nature of human flesh from the incarnation, Christ’s teaching included a deepened clarification of marriage, one in which monogamy, dignity, and respect for both were paramount.

Thus, as Karol Wojtyła (the future John Paul II) explains, Christ taught that “this love is realized in one way in the exclusive self-giving to God alone, and in another way in marriage through the reciprocal self-giving of human persons.”1 The self-giving of one spouse to the other is a vitally important component of the spousal meaning of the body, a component that is also reflected in the priest’s gift of himself to the Church and God. Without such a gift of self, marriages devolve from the deeply formed sacramental bonds they represent into utilitarianism and mutual use, which is contrary to the dignity of the human body as Christ taught. Such a self-gift, when realized fully, reflects the unity of the Most Holy Trinity as the foundation of communion between persons in the family unit and forms the most essential building block of society. Parenthood is a gift proceeding directly from God that allows mothers and fathers to pass on their social, cultural, and religious beliefs to the next generation and is integral to maintaining a strong Christ-centered culture in our perilous world.

Fatherhood is an essential feature of any healthy family and, by extension, community, and although priests cannot themselves be natural fathers, they exercise an important function as supernatural fathers to all of the people for whom they are charged to provide pastoral care. Natural fatherhood is an obvious necessity for the propagation of the species and is a complementary component to marriage. Rightly ordered, fathers are charged with teaching their children everything they need to be successful in life, but spiritual needs are often best addressed by a spiritual father. As such, “Spiritual paternity will only come to fruition if (a priest) pours himself out generously . . . [a priest’s heart] should expand when he grasps his own genuine paternity and the responsibility that it entails . . . the priest is prompted to make a radical gift of himself on behalf of his people.”2 The generous self-gift of a priest to his people reflects Christ’s total self-gift to his disciples and for every person by his Karol Wojtyła, Love and Responsibility, trans. Grzegorz Ignatik (Boston: Pauline Books & Media, 2013), 79.

2 Carter Griffin. Why Celibacy? Reclaiming the Fatherhood of the Priest (Steubenville: Emmaus Road Publishing, 2019), 129–30.

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sacrifice on the cross and when lived well is an inspiration for the faithful. By pouring himself out for his people, a priest develops a genuine love and care for them like a natural father does for his children, but in a manner unique to the priesthood. Accordingly, “we can observe various manifestations of this spiritual fatherhood and various crystallizations of the love connected with it, e.g., the love of souls by priest and the religious, or the love of pupils by teachers.

Spiritual kinship based on the bonds of souls is often stronger than the kinship that results from the bonds of blood alone.”3 Although spiritual fathers are never meant to replace natural fathers, a strong presence of both in a young person’s life will lead to a nurturing relationship that is grounded in virtue and filled with love. Since priests cannot have their own children, having the chance to love a multitude of spiritual children helps them to fulfill their inherent desire to nurture and love others through their role as spiritual fathers. Griffin furthers this idea by saying, “The Book of Genesis affirms that man is made for communion. The celibate is a reminder that all people are called to deep, meaningful relationships in the human and ecclesial family.”4 Since love is such an essential human condition, it is appropriate to ask: Why are priests required to be celibate? The imitation of Christ, however imperfect it may be, is always the goal of an ordained priest, as he serves as an alter Christus during the Mass and at other liturgical functions for his spiritual family. As such, witnessing to Christ’s celibate life is a necessary attribute of the priesthood as has been observed for almost as long as the Church has existed. Christ lived the three evangelic counsels of poverty, chastity, and obedience, all of which are enshrined in the solemn promises a priest makes at his ordination. Consequently, “‘the holiness of the Church is fostered in a special way by the observance of the counsels proposed in the Gospel by our Lord to his disciples. An eminent position among these is held by virginity or the celibate state. This is a precious gift of divine grace given by the Father to certain souls, whereby they may devote themselves to God alone the more easily, due to an undivided heart, in virginity or celibacy.’”5 An undivided priestly heart is at the nature of caring and appropriate pastoral ministry. If a priest were to have his Wojtyła, Love and Responsibility, 246.

Griffin, Why Celibacy? 145–46.

5 John Paul II, Man and Woman He Created Them: A Theology of the Body, trans. Michael Waldstein (Boston: Pauline Books & Media, 2006), 73:4.

3 4

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own family, he could not possibly devote the care and attention that his flock needed to minister to their spiritual needs. A priest, however, does not give up intimacy completely by accepting a celibate life, but rather embraces a different kind of intimacy that is radically different from the norm experienced in marriage. Such a witness is a profound example, and, “a priest who lives a contented, enthusiastic celibate life challenges some strong cultural prejudices without raising his voice.”6 Celibacy lived well reflects a love that is largely absent from modern culture and one that is dedicated to a higher purpose. Such an example is often inspirational for the faithful who need strong, celibate priests to guide them in their spiritual journeys, guidance that would undoubtedly be impossible without the total dedication of celibate priests. Undoubtedly, celibacy requires a special charism and an overabundance of grace from God. This is possible since “through celibacy priests ‘cling to Christ with an undivided heart and dedicate themselves more freely in him and through him to the service of God and of men . . . in this way they become better fitted for a broader acceptance of fatherhood in Christ’.”7 The love and happiness that a celibate priest can experience in fulfilling his role as a spiritual father is contagious and is an essential component for any healthy Christian society and is therefore necessary.

Still, another question must be asked and is addressed by the most influential theologian in Catholic history, St. Thomas Aquinas: is the celibate state unnatural? As I noted earlier, the conjugal act, fittingly accompanying marriage, is essential for the survival of the human race.

Therefore, on the surface, it seems that celibacy runs counter to this most basic biological requirement to continue the species in perpetuity. Of this, Aquinas says, “he who completely abstains from the act of generation seems to act against divine ordinance.”8 Without more careful introspection, it seems as if Thomas points out that celibacy is not only dangerous to the human race but also contrary to God’s natural law and divine revelation. Aquinas further notes, “to resist these feelings of concupiscence fully and, as it were, to wage a continuous fight against them produces more disturbance than if a man indulges moderately in concupiscent activities.”9 In this passage, Griffin, Why Celibacy? 141.

Ibid., 126.

8 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, trans. Vernon J. Bourke (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2012), III.136.2.

9 Ibid., III.136.6.

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Aquinas suggests that fighting against concupiscible desires is contrary to a man’s very nature. However, Aquinas often raises objections to disputed questions before firmly answering his questions with more well-reasoned responses. It is worth noting that such objections are commonly held opinions by individuals who do not understand the need for celibate priests or who wrongly associate celibacy with the sexual abuse crises of 2002 and 2018. Of course, celibacy works 100% of the time when practiced effectively and is the best state for a priest to live in to give himself fully to God and his people. Regarding ethics, Aquinas notes, “to abstain from all sexual pleasures, without reason, is called the vice of insensibility. But, if it be done in accord with reason, it is a virtue which surpasses man’s ordinary way of life, for it makes men share somewhat in the divine likeness; hence, virginity is said to be related to the angels (Matt. 22:30).”10 For priests to be models of the virtues the Church espouses in her teaching, a priest must live those virtues fully. Living the virtue of chastity helps to reflect a supernatural condition, a preview of the eternal life with God that is meant to witness to the higher calling a priest lives every day.

Following Christ’s example of celibacy is an essential characteristic of the priesthood, but what is the thing that replaces the family in the life of a priest other than the people to whom he is a spiritual father? The answer is simple: the Church. It is often said that a priest “marries” the Church at his ordination, and this is an apt analogy, especially since Christ considers the Church his “bride” and naturally, He is the “bridegroom.” Therefore, a priest’s commitment to the Church reflects this relationship and it is important, “to clarify what the kingdom of heaven is for those who choose voluntary continence for its sake, the revelation of the spousal relationship between Christ and the Church, has particular significance.”11 Giving oneself up for a supernatural institution, in this case, the Church, is a calling that surpasses marriage on earth. Although Christ died for all of mankind, He also died for His Church and although priests are not usually asked to make such a sacrifice, those who do are instantly considered martyrs and often canonized as saints. To live a life of continence for the sake of the Church and her people is a divinely inspired gift and gives birth to the important concept of “continence for the kingdom” which each priest expresses through his ministry.

10 11

Ibid., III.136.11.

John Paul II, A Theology of the Body, 79:7.

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To that end, what does continence for the kingdom mean? It is not something that married couples experience, even if they are continent since their covenant requires the conjugal act to propagate the species. Accordingly, Continence “for the kingdom of heaven,” the choice of virginity or celibacy for one’s whole life, has become in the experience of the disciples and followers of Christ that act of a particular response to the love of the Divine Bridegroom, and therefore acquired the meaning of an act of spousal love, that is, of a spousal gift of self with the end of answering in a particular way the Redeemer’s spousal love; a gift of self, understood as a renunciation, but realized above all out of love.12 As a seminarian, I often hear that I have made a “career choice” when people find out that I study in a seminary. However, priests and seminarians are not simply branch managers and manager trainees for a large, multi-national corporation. Accepting God’s call in the life of a priest or seminarian is the most solemn and important decision any man has ever made. The love that priests feel for God and Christ is far deeper than can be sufficiently expressed in writing.

The dignity afforded a person by the spousal meaning of the body is why the self-gift of marriage is such a vitally important component for man and woman to be in full communion with each other. When a priest practices continence for the kingdom, his spousal meaning of the body is realized by reflecting the self-giving of a married couple by instead giving himself fully over to God and the Church. Regarding this choice, “the one who consciously chooses such continence chooses in some sense a particular participation in the mystery of the redemption (of the body); he wishes to complete it in a particular way in his own flesh, finding in it also the imprint of a likeness with Christ.”13 The imprint of Christ on the heart of each priest is deeply profound and ontologically significant. As at baptism and confirmation, the imposition of hands and oil at priestly ordination changes the nature of the soul ontologically and can never be undone.

A priest’s mission throughout life is to conform himself to Christ in all aspects. John Paul II continues, “Continence for the kingdom of heaven, as the fruit of a charismatic choice, is an 12 13

Ibid., 79:9.

Ibid., 76:3.

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exception concerning the other state, that is, the state in which man came to share ‘from the beginning’ and still does share during his whole earthly existence.”14 The allusion to the importance of this choice cannot be overstated, for Christ taught in the gospels that marriage is an institution that only exists on earth and, that in heaven, there will be no husbands and wives. What then will be the nature of those relationships that were formed so closely on earth? Christ indicates that there is a higher relationship with God that awaits all of those blessed enough to see Him in the Beatific Vision and that by living the celibate life now, the priest is a reflection of that perfect beatitude and he is, therefore, a herald of the eschatological destiny of each person.

Accordingly, the eschatological dimension of the ministerial priesthood comes into full light and helps to reflect how the priesthood, while different from the sacrament of marriage, reveals the spousal meaning of the body for the priest in a full and supernatural sense. The most important component of the spousal meaning of the body is the love that is freely given between the man and woman in the covenant of marriage. Without this love, the relationship is at best superficial, and at worst, utilitarian. As a man and a woman begin a relationship, their friendship moves forward into affection, care, and ultimate love for each other. When they get married, they choose to give themselves fully and completely to each other and, most importantly, will the good for each other to enhance the reciprocity of their commitment, in a sacramental way, to show the communion that exists within the most Holy Trinity. Similarly, a priest gives himself fully and completely to God so that his life may be given over fully and completely to Him. This total self-gift is of paramount importance. “The possibility of reciprocal spousal love appears: the human soul, being the bride of God, gives itself to him exclusively.

This exclusive and total self-giving to God is the fruit of a spiritual process accomplished inside the person under the influence of grace.

It constitutes the essence of virginity: virginity is spousal love directed to God himself.”15 Virginity in spousal love may appear as a contradiction of terms, but it is perfectly appropriate in the light of Christ’s continence throughout His life and the purity shown through the virginity of the Blessed Virgin Mary.

14 15

Ibid., 73:4.

Wojtyła, Love and Responsibility, 237.

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Mary is often referred to as the mother of God and the spouse of the Holy Spirit. In this way, the priest seeks to give himself fully to God in a manner commensurate with Mary’s most holy witness and example. It is through Mary that the priest can more fully commit to a life of celibacy while maintaining the dignity of his masculinity.

Instead of giving himself completely to another woman, a priest can love, cherish, and celebrate the femininity of the most perfect woman that ever lived—Mary. In so doing, the priest makes room for God and gives himself over fully to Him to reach the fulfillment of the life to come. A priest willingly submits to “total concentration of created, redeemed, and glorified subjectivity and God himself will not take man away from this fulfillment, but— on the contrary—will introduce him into it and consolidate him in it.

One can say, finally, that in this way the eschatological reality will become the source of the perfect realization of the ‘trinitarian order’ in the created world of persons.”16 Submission to God’s will, although difficult given our concupiscible nature, is the preeminent command of Christ for our lives to lead us to eternal salvation. Instead of giving himself to another person, a priest gives himself over fully and completely to God in a manner that is consistent with Christ’s teaching about eternal paradise with God in heaven.

To be ordered to God in such a way now is a signal of the future promise for eternal beatitude in the Beatific Vision and is a foretaste of the happiness that awaits those who properly orient their lives in contemplation of God’s divine plan for mercy. Accordingly, by accepting God, the priest receives Him in the most magnificent gift, and thus, “In this reciprocal gift of self by man, a gift that will become completely and definitely beatifying as the response worthy of a personal subject to God’s gift of himself, the ‘virginity’ or rather the virginal state of the body will manifest itself completely as the eschatological fulfillment of the ‘spousal’ meaning of the body.”17 A priest’s witness in this life shows what everyone else can willingly expect if they love God and live his commandments on earth. While this may be a difficult teaching for married people, considering the love they share for each other, it is important to note that they must never worship their spouses or families above the source of all creation and wisdom, God. In heaven, the love that God will share with each person in the Beatific Vision is so complete that every desire, love, and 16 17

John Paul II, A Theology of the Body, 68:4.

Ibid., 68:3.

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joy will be fulfilled in the fullest measure, beyond all comprehension.

This is the eschatological meaning of the body that the priest’s celibate witness shows in this life.

Thus, the priesthood reflects the spousal meaning of the body in a way that fully realizes the nature of the human person that God intended when he created Adam and Eve in his likeness and image. By creating two equals in man and woman, God effectively communicated His divine essence in two equal parts, parts that necessarily long for each other to achieve the completeness of their being by joining two persons into one in marriage. A priest’s spiritual union with God also reflects this necessary desire to be joined with the “other” part that makes a being complete. With regard to the full realization of the priesthood as the spousal meaning of the body, John Paul II states, “The words of Christ reported by the Synoptics open before us the prospect of the body’s eschatological perfection fully submitted to the divinizing depth of the vision of God ‘face to face,’ which is the inexhaustible source of both perpetual ‘virginity’ (united with the spousal meaning of the body) and perpetual ‘intersubjectivity’ of all human beings who will share . . . in the resurrection.”18 When Jesus fulfilled His promise to lead us to eternal life through His resurrection and manifested His resurrected body before His Ascension, He showed us what future lies before us. To expect anything less is foolhardy and fails to accept His divine teaching to their fullest extent. It is also critical to consider the important aspect of the choice a priest makes to live a celibate life. While it is true that God calls a man to Himself to become a priest, the priest must willingly accept that call and vow to live it fully every day of his life despite the difficulties it poses. Jesus recognized the importance of this choice and said, “Not all can understand it, but only those to whom it has been granted. For there are eunuchs who were born this way from their mother’s womb; there are some who were made eunuchs by men, and there are others who made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven. Let anyone understand this who can” (Mt 19:11–12).19 Therefore, the priesthood is a perfect fulfillment of the spousal meaning of the body because the choice a man makes when he becomes a priest fatefully echoes Christ’s most selfless choice of the Cross and suffering for the salvation of the whole world. Although no priest is Christ, each tries to imitate and model His virtue to bring the 18 19

Ibid., 71:5.

Ibid., 73:3.

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light of His face to the world. In this way, sacrificing oneself for the sake of the spiritual flock, to show the way toward the glorious kingdom of heaven, and the everlasting joy and unity with God is but a small sacrifice for a priest to make in order to imitate Him who came into the world to save it and in so doing, to save others.

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Harry Potter and the State of Nature Betsy Busch

J.

K. Rowling’s Harry Potter series ruined literature when it debuted by filling children’s minds with pulp about wizards and magic and card games that explode. Now, not only do children see this work, which has no value beyond mediocre entertainment, as a paragon of literary excellence, but adults have also put away the much more useful tomes of Shakespeare and Dickens for the works of a British author whose corruption of Latin would make Cicero cry.

While some people may hold this perspective if they have never read more than an online comment section on the Harry Potter books, most people who have taken the time to read and seriously reflect on the series find true merit in them. The books display many features of good literature, including well-rounded, evolving characters, symbols, and plots that function on multiple levels. Much like their famous predecessors, they also contain many ties to other works. While the connection to these philosophers is not explicit, one can find traces of John Locke and Thomas Hobbes in the last book in the series, Harry Potter and the Deathly Hallows. After the fall of the Ministry of Magic, the main characters must survive in a modified version of the Lockean state of nature until they can reclaim the government.

Both Hobbes and Locke write about the state of nature, the condition in which people exist when they do not live in organized societies. In his work Leviathan, Hobbes describes the state of nature as a horrible place largely because justice is not inherent in human nature. Peace does not exist in this state; war goes on at all times. This war is not typical but rather is “such a war, as is of every man, against every man.”1 There are no nations warring against each other in which people can unite with their fellows against a common enemy. Rather, everyone must fear everyone else. While people are essentially equal, Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, excerpted in Philosophy in the Modern Age: PHIL 203 (Acton: XanEdu, 2016), 69.

1

this equality is not the reflection of an ingrained sense of human dignity but rather the logical result of the fact that “the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest.”2 This equality does not create peace but leads to “equality of hope in the attaining of our ends” and from the resulting struggle to get what one needs to “diffidence of one another.”3 People can kill each other, so they fight for each other’s goods and must worry that the people they encounter will try to murder them. However, actions such as murder do not have the same connotations in Hobbes’s state of nature as they do today, since “the notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice have there no place.”4 Killing a person is not wrong because it completely disrespects human dignity; rather, it is not wrong at all. Hobbes creates a picture of a world in which no one would want to live because there is no hope for true safety or happiness.

While Locke’s state of nature bears some resemblance to Hobbes’s, Locke’s includes the idea of justice. Locke does not emphasize the misery of this state. He notes that the state of nature is “a state of perfect freedom” and “a state also of equality.”5 People are able to control their own lives and generally have the same rank.

However, Locke’s equality differs from that of Hobbes because this equality is not based on the power that comes with the ability to kill.

Instead, “no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions” because they are all equal under God.6 Locke calls this principle “a law of nature.”7 Even without a monarchy or other form of government, people are responsible to a power besides themselves.

However, without an organized authority, upholding this law can be challenging. While in the state of nature, “every one has a right to punish the transgressors of that law to such a degree, as may hinder its violation.”8 Locke writes that while people must administer consequences for crimes, they often struggle with the fact that “selflove will make men partial to themselves and their friends: and on the other side, that ill nature, passion and revenge will carry them too far in punishing others.”9 People may become so enraged by a minor Ibid., 67.

Ibid., 68.

4 Ibid., 71.

5 John Locke, Second Treatise of Government (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1980), 8.

6 Ibid., 9.

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid., 12.

2 3

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crime, such as the theft of a piece of food, that they administer a punishment, such as disfigurement or even execution, which is suitable for a far more serious crime. Despite this bias, the state of nature is much more regulated than the one presented by Hobbes.

Locke believes that the principles of justice that govern modern societies have their origins in people’s earliest condition.

While people may have trouble comprehending the state of nature because it rarely, if ever, occurs in the modern world, one can find examples in literature, including The Deathly Hallows. The final installment of the Harry Potter series follows Harry, Ron, and Hermione as they search for and destroy Horcruxes, the evil magical objects that contain pieces of their enemy Voldemort’s soul. Once they have killed all of the pieces of soul in each Horcrux, they can kill Voldemort himself. However, in the midst of their quest, the wider British wizarding world falls into chaos as the Ministry of Magic succumbs to Voldemort’s power. While the Ministry continues to function outwardly as a legitimate government, Voldemort’s henchmen have infiltrated it and it ceases to carry out justice. Now that they can no longer rely on the government, Harry, Ron, Hermione, and the Order of the Phoenix must win the war against Voldemort’s forces and reestablish the Ministry. In the meantime, they must take justice into their own hands in order to maintain their rights, as in Locke’s state of nature.

Morals still govern the main characters’ actions even after the Ministry falls, reflecting a sense of justice that goes beyond the existence of government. For example, Harry, Ron, and Hermione struggle to get enough food, since they are outlaws and cannot risk being seen in a communal location such as a grocery store. However, one night, Harry and Hermione manage to eat a full meal in the following manner: “Hermione had been to the supermarket under the Invisibility Cloak (scrupulously dropping the money into an open till as she left).”10 Even though her government is trying to find and imprison or execute Hermione for unjust reasons, she still feels obligated to pay for the food she needs to sustain herself. She believes in a moral law that applies even in the midst of a situation without just legislation. One could argue that since Hermione is visiting a Muggle supermarket and the Muggle Ministry remains intact, she still must follow the laws of the Muggle community. However, these laws do 10

J. K. Rowling, Harry Potter and the Deathly Hallows (New York: Scholastic, 2007), 315.

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nothing to protect her. Her own government, the magical one, does not exist, and yet she still chooses to uphold justice.

One could object to this continued existence of morals despite the state of nature by noting that some characters violate major wizarding rules without repercussions. Under normal circumstances, using the three Unforgivable Curses—the Cruciatus Curse, the Imperius Curse, and the Avada Kedavra—leads to a life sentence in the prison Azkaban.

However, Harry and his companions use them multiple times in their struggle against Voldemort. He even uses the Cruciatus Curse, which causes torture, out of temper. When he and his friends return to Hogwarts to find the last Horcrux, he enters Ravenclaw Tower under the Invisibility Cloak. A Death Eater, Amycus Carrow, realizes that Harry is there and insults Professor McGonagall. Harry uses the Cruciatus Curse on Amycus and then declares, “I see what Bellatrix meant . . . you need to really mean it.”11 He shows no remorse and indeed feels justified in his use of the curse. One could point to this immoral action as a sign that morals do not apply in the state of nature, as Hobbes argues. However, Harry does not claim that he has acted morally; he probably would not argue with someone who suggested that a different spell could have been used. One could also point out that Amycus has tortured innocent students and that his horrific behavior partially justifies the torture he receives from Harry.

Harry’s actions toward Amycus and throughout the novel resemble another key aspect of Locke’s philosophy: the idea that people take vigilantism too far, even when they have the right to exact punishment. Kreacher the house-elf brings Mundungus Fletcher, a smuggler and member of the Order, to Grimmauld Place under Harry’s orders. Mundungus has committed an injustice; he has stolen items from the house, all of which belong to Harry, including one which may be a Horcrux. As Harry interrogates him, he reflects on the experience: “It felt wonderful to have something to do, someone of whom he could demand some small portion of the truth.”12 With his wand pointing at the thief, Harry acknowledges that his threatening manner has less to do with Mundungus’s actions and more with Harry’s frustration about his cooped-up existence. In Locke’s view, Harry does have the right to exact some punishment on Mundungus for taking Harry’s property, since Locke includes 11 12

Ibid., 593.

Ibid., 220–21.

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“possessions” in the list of things which cannot be harmed by another person.13 However, Harry admits to himself that he does not act so violently because of the loss of his property. He uses this excuse as a way to express his annoyance, but in doing so, he forgets his purpose.

Despite the novel’s greater resemblance to Locke, one can find some traces of Hobbes in it. When Voldemort’s forces take over the Ministry of Magic, his enemies experience the “diffidence of one another” that Hobbes associates with the state of nature.14 In the case of the Order, the mutual distrust comes not only from the ability to kill one another but also from the magical means of concealment and deception that they have available. Harry, Ron, and Hermione hide in Grimmauld Place for a while after the Ministry falls, and one ally, Remus Lupin, visits them. Rather than rejoicing to see his former teacher and one of his father’s best friends, Harry must maintain an antagonistic attitude until Lupin proves his identity by stating, “I am Remus John Lupin, werewolf, sometimes known as Moony, one of the four creators of the Marauder’s Map, married to Nymphadora, usually known as Tonks, and I taught you how to produce a Patronus, Harry, which takes the form of a stag.”15 Harry is closer to Lupin than almost any other adult, but he needs extensive proof before being sure that the man standing before him is not an imposter. While they are not competing for goods, as people in Hobbes’s state of nature are, their mutual distrust reflects the need for a governing body to give them security.

Throughout The Deathly Hallows, the characters face situations that share similarities with both Locke’s and Hobbes’s states of nature, although the resemblance is greater to the former. While Rowling may not have intended to create a version of the state of nature in her conclusion to the Harry Potter series, the development of one suggests the truth behind these philosophers’ ideas. Abstract theories carry more weight when popular culture and modern people reflect them.

Some may wonder what the point of the links between these three works is since the state of nature does not exist outside of fiction today. All three works highlight, at least to some extent, the value of a higher authority, which people may quickly forget in times of peace when they think that the government is too involved in their lives.

They also underline the importance of justice, either by promoting an Second Treatise, 9.

Leviathan, 68.

15 Deathly Hallows, 204.

13 14

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inherent sense of right and wrong, as with Rowling and Locke, or by attempting to argue that justice is not natural to people, as with Hobbes. Ultimately, even if justice accompanies human existence, people are much happier when they can leave behind the state of nature for a more civilized way of life.

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Humanae Vitae: How it Failed to Reach the Church in the Modern World Timothy Ruflin

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erhaps no other magisterial document has raised more controversy in modern times than Pope Paul VI’s encyclical, Humanae Vitae. Condemning all forms of artificial birth control, this encyclical from Paul VI reaffirmed and clearly stated the Church’s long held position on these matters. Humane Vitae stands clearly within the tradition of the Church, presenting no break or discontinuity from what the Catholic Church has always taught about the evil of contraception. If, then, this encyclical says nothing new about this issue, why was it received so poorly and why did it arouse so much controversy? What has provoked such a backlash from Catholics and non-Catholics alike? Of course, there are the usual arguments about the Church being stuck in the past or that Pope Paul VI ignored the recommendations made by his own birth control commission established to study the issue of contraception.1 However, I would argue that there are two other significant reasons for the poor reception of Humanae Vitae. The first is precisely because the encyclical says nothing new. In a time where much change was happening and the Church was looking at the signs of the times, this encyclical brings nothing new to the table. While the 20th century produced a number of magisterial documents concerning marriage and the issue of contraception, such as Casti Connubii and Gaudium et Spes, Humanae Vitae says nothing that these documents do not already say. The second reason I suggest for its poor reception is its reliance on natural law arguments to defend the Church’s position on contraception. Rather than taking a new approach, Humanae Vitae returns to the same defense the Magisterium has habitually turned to in arguing against contraception. While this approach is certainly sound, the signs of the times called for a new approach in presenting the Church’s teaching on this controversial subject. Had Humanae 1

Paul VI, Humane Vitae (25 July 1968), §5–6.

Vitae avoided these two pitfalls, it could have gone a long way in building on the Church’s long held teaching on contraception and better addressed the Church in the modern world.

The twentieth century was filled with many cultural and technological developments that led to a growing change in the attitude toward human sexuality and the way in which it was lived out.

Amidst the growing changes and shifting cultural perceptions, religious denominations began reexamining their teachings on marriage and specifically on contraception. It was the Lambeth Conference of 1930, the gathering of bishops in the Anglican communion, that set the ball rolling in this debate. Up until this conference, every Christian denomination had uniformly taught that using contraception was wrong. However, at this conference, the bishops voted in favor of allowing the use of artificial birth control, becoming the first Christian denomination to break from this universal Christian teaching.2 In response to this conference, Pope Pius XI issued the encyclical Casti Connubii, which discussed Christian marriage at large while specifically condemning the use of contraception. Much of the document expounds on the three blessings of marriage as laid out by St. Augustine, that of offspring, conjugal faith, and sacrament.3 In its condemnation of contraception, Casti Connubii relies primarily on natural law arguments. The document asserts that “no reason, however grave, may be put forward by which anything intrinsically against nature may become conformable to nature and morally good.”4 The encyclical goes on to say that any marital act that in any way frustrates its natural power to generate new life is fundamentally against the law of God and of nature.5 Standing in stark contrast to the growing shift in cultural moral understanding of the time, Casti Connubii provided a firm base within the tradition from which later magisterial documents on contraception would draw.

At the dawn of the Second Vatican Council, the debate around contraception had continued to grow, even within the Church. Specifically, at issue was the debate around the new birth control pill, which many argued was not an artificial Charles Rice, “Champions of the Culture of Life,” Human Events 55, no. 49 (1999): 6.

Pius XI, Casti Connubii (31 December 1930), §10.

4 Casti Connubii, §54.

5 Casti Connubii, §56.

2 3

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contraceptive. Although many bishops at the Council wished to discuss birth regulation, this was not supported by either John XXIII or Paul VI. Rather, they established a separate commission to “advise the pope on the recently developed anovulant pill.”6 Although discussion of the Church’s teaching on contraception was rejected by both the conciliar popes, this teaching was still ultimately spoken on in the Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, Gaudium et Spes. In Part II of this document, the Council Fathers speak specifically on problems of “special urgency,” of which marriage and the family takes precedent. This section on marriage builds “upon many of the premises of [Casti Connubii],” containing “substantive teaching on the natural and sacramental dimensions of marriage.”7 In many ways, the document rearticulates many of the same ideas of Casti Connubii but presents them in a different light, situating them within the modern world. Among one of the most noticeable shifts that Gaudium et Spes makes is a fuller discussion of the significant challenges that married couples face in the modern world, especially with regard to the decision of prudent family planning. The document asserts that in such cases where marital intimacy is broken off in order to practice responsible parenthood, “its faithfulness can sometimes be imperiled and its quality of fruitfulness ruined, for then the upbringing of the children and the courage to accept new ones are both endangered.”8 However, while adequately addressing and acknowledging the very real problems facing married couples, Gaudium et Spes remains firm in the teaching of the Church on contraception. The document declares that “sons of the Church may not undertake methods of birth control which are found blameworthy by the teaching authority of the Church in its unfolding of Divine law.”9 One of the greatest strengths of this section of the document is the way in which it situates a reaffirmation of the Church’s teaching within an acknowledgment that this teaching is hard and demanding. In a time of much dissent and growing objection to the Church’s teaching on contraception, Gaudium et Spes does not push Gerald Coleman, “Discerning the Meaning of Humanae Vitae,” Theological Studies 79, no.4 (2018): 865.

7 Matthew Lamb and Matthew Levering, “Gaudium et Spes,” in The Reception of Vatican II (Oxford Scholarship Online, 2017), 18.

8 Second Vatican Council, “Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, Gaudium et Spes, 7 December, 1965,” in The Documents of Vatican II (Strathfield: St. Paul’s Publications, 2009), §51.

9 Ibid.

6

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those objections to the side, but rather, acknowledges them without wavering from the Church’s teaching. In this way, Gaudium et Spes provides a more pastoral and personalistic approach to the discussion of contraception than previous magisterial documents on this subject. While softening in tone and situating a conversation of contraception within the developments of the modern world, Gaudium et Spes nonetheless “stands in continuity with the Church’s prior doctrinal teaching,” presenting a firm and unwavering condemnation of contraception.10 Three years after the promulgation of Gaudium et Spes, Paul VI published his controversial encyclical letter, Humanae Vitae. In the time leading up to this encyclical, there was a “growing consensus among Catholics that it was time to reconsider the church’s teaching on birth control.”11 Growing speculation that the Church was going to change its long held teaching was brought about when four documents from the papal birth control commission were leaked to the press, revealing that the majority of members supported a change in the Church’s teaching on birth control.12 Despite the majority support of changing the Church’s teaching, Paul VI ultimately stood with the minority. In his encyclical Humanae Vitae, he reaffirmed the Church’s firm position on contraception. The encyclical draws much on the work of Gaudium et Spes, affirming the goodness of sexual acts in marriage and echoing the teaching that “marriage and conjugal love are in themselves oriented to the procreation and education of children.”13 Given the growing desire amongst Catholics for a change in traditional teaching, Humanae Vitae was a much-needed reaffirmation of the Church’s stance on the evil of artificial methods of birth control.

While the encyclical remained firmly rooted in the tradition of the Church and served as a much-needed response to the times, the approach it took was not what was needed given the signs of the times, which ultimately contributed to it being rejected by many Catholics.

One reason for this shortfall is that Humanae Vitae did not say anything that had not already been said before by the Church. Much of the document simply restates what Gaudium et Spes had said just a few Matthew Levering, “Pastoral Perspectives on the Church in the Modern World,” in Vatican II: Renewal Within Tradition, eds. Matthew L. Lamb and Matthew Levering (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 168.

11 Coleman, “Meaning of Humanae Vitae,” 865.

12 Ibid.

13 Humanae Vitae, §9.

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years early, and what Casti Connubii had said before that. Rather than a simple iteration of teaching, this encyclical should have expounded on the Church’s teaching. The Catholic faithful were ready for a new approach to the debate around contraception. Rather than finding a way to engage the teachings of the Church in the modern world, Humane Vitae stepped back into the past instead of looking forward. Paul VI was absolutely right to reaffirm what the Church had always taught, but his encyclical failed to reach the audience of the times. Faithful Catholics were already familiar with the age-old teaching of the Church. They desired a new way of looking at this debate, and Humanae Vitae failed in delivering a contemporary approach to this teaching. Gaudium et Spes had been a point of progress in the way the Church approached this question. While reaffirming the teaching of the Church, it did this in acknowledging the challenges faced by married couples. This document took on a pastoral approach and engaged married couples in the modern world. Humanae Vitae, rather than continuing this trajectory, stepped back, and returned to the same arguments that had always been used.

The main point of regression in Humanae Vitae was the arguments on which it was based. Relying on traditional arguments, this encyclical hinges mainly on an argument appealing to natural law. The argument from natural law had always been the primary way in which the Church approached the question of contraception and is found clearly in the previous encyclical, Casti Connubii. Although there is nothing wrong with this argument, the Church needed to push further into a new line of thinking. Even many conservative theologians critiqued Humanae Vitae for its reliance on the natural law argument. When asked about the encyclical, Pope Emeritus Joseph Ratzinger responded: “Humanae Vitae was a difficult text for me. It was certainly clear that what it said was essentially valid, but the reasoning . . . was not satisfactory. I was looking out for an anthropological viewpoint.”14 Cardinal Karol Wojtyla, who would go on to become Pope John Paul II, also echoed these sentiments. He sent Paul VI a memorandum before the encyclical was published, emphasizing a “new framework for understanding the church’s classic position on conjugal morality and fertility regulation . . . starting with the human person.”15 Yet despite this letter from Wojtyla, the encyclical followed the traditional line of argument based on natural law. As a result, “Humanae Vitae’s failure to 14 15

Peter Seewald, Benedict XVI: Last Testament (London: Bloomsbury, 2016), 157.

Coleman, “Meaning of Humane Vitae,” 869–70.

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explicate a personalist context for a Catholic sexual ethic led to serious ramifications for the church’s efforts to enunciate a compelling Christian humanism in the modern world.”16 Of course, Wojtyla would go on to complement the natural law viewpoint with a more personalistic vision. However, by the time he did this, many had already become disillusioned with the Church’s teaching. The failure of Humane Vitae to introduce new arguments with a personalistic approach led it to be rejected by many, even though the natural law arguments were valid. This encyclical fails to adequately address the person, and therefore, was deemed irrelevant by even many faithful Catholics.

There is no doubt that Humanae Vitae is firmly rooted in the teaching tradition of the Church on the evil of artificial contraception.

At a time when there was growing pushback against the Church’s long held teaching, the Magisterium needed to speak with a strong voice to uphold what the Church had always taught. However, the encyclical, while remaining firmly rooted in the tradition of the Church, fails to add to it. Humanae Vitae fails to build on what Casti Connubii and Gaudium et Spes had already done, and instead rearticulated what had already been said. The signs of the times called for a new approach to the debate around contraception. The Second Vatican Council had called for the Church to scrutinize “the signs of the times and interpret them in light of the Gospel.”17 Humane Vitae does not adequately do this. While nonetheless being an important piece of moral theology and remaining relevant even today in articulating the Church’s teaching on artificial both control, it failed to produce the desired impact because of the narrow and limited approach it took.

16 17

Ibid.

Gaudium et Spes, §4.

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The Ethics of Nationalism and the Role of the Nation State Rebekah Balick

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he phenomenon of nationalism is experiencing a major rise in nations around the world. From bigger regions like the United States and Eastern Europe, where there is fear of the results of mass migration, to small ethnic communities desiring their own state, the reasons for this rise are endless. Even countries such as Italy, whose unification is incredibly recent, have experienced the tides of this phenomenon through figures such as Mussolini. Given its widespread nature, examples of nationalism’s dark side are not hard to find. Yet though most can agree that extreme nationalism presents clear dangers, the line between its dangerous extent and a more admirable, praiseworthy love of country is not clearly defined. A tension exists between one’s inclination to value king and country and one’s recognition that this sentiment has led to countless atrocities.

Therefore, an ethical question is presented: does nationalism in some form still have a place in the modern world, or should it be vilified in its entirety? In order to prevent the good of patriotism from transforming into the danger of excessive nationalism, one must first understand the proper end of the nation—or, more specifically, the nation-state—as an institution. Once this end is understood, one can see how nationalism either supports or supplants the nation-state’s ability to fulfill its purpose and thereby make a judgment regarding its ethical nature. This understanding reveals that nationalism can be beneficial so long as it does not usurp more important loyalties such as God and one’s family.

For nearly the entire length of history, humanity has organized itself into groups in order to increase its chances of survival and quality of life. This organization is not random; rather, these groups perform specific functions that allow the population to thrive. The modern nation-state is a relatively new type of organization, but it still fulfills a similar purpose or end goal that defines its creation. In this context, the end goal of a nation-state, as one recent analysis puts it, is “to

provide security for its people” and promote their happiness.1 This can be further specified as protecting the people from outsiders and from each other, as well as providing a community in which they can flourish. The ability to protect from outsiders is one of the most fundamental responsibilities of a nation-state; after all, people enter them in the first place because that state promises to “secure their persons and free them from fear.”2 Organizing a nation-state allows for the formation of formal armies and borders, which protect citizens from invasion by outside forces. In fact, this ability to provide security is so crucial to the responsibility of a nation-state that any weakness of a state’s ability to do so is considered concrete evidence that the state will soon collapse.3 In addition to providing protection from outsiders, nation-states are also useful in protecting citizens from each other by establishing institutions for internal development, a political system, and the rule of law. Nation-states “exist to deliver political goods” such as “security, education, health services, economic opportunity . . . and fundamental infrastructural requirements such as roads and communications facilities.”4 In addition, nation-states are expected to set up “a legal framework of order and a judicial system to administer it” in order to ensure that the actions of citizens within the nation’s borders are properly monitored.5 One of the most important measures of a state’s effectiveness is the extent of their control over “rural towns, roads, and waterways” and their ability to effectively handle threats of “civil war,” “intercommunal hostility,” the “growth of criminal violence,” and the possibility of states’ “[preying] on their own citizens.”6 These are the kinds of functions that would be difficult for societies to handle if left on their own in the wilderness. In addition, since citizens give up their total freedom in exchange for these goods, providing them must be considered a fundamental end of the nation-state.

The third way that a nation provides for its population is by creating a sense of community which helps individuals flourish. On a “The Purpose of Today’s Nation State” (The Bassiouni Group, 2016), bassiounigroup.com/the-purpose-of-todays-nation-state.

2 Robert I. Rotberg, “The New Nature of Nation-State Failure,” Washington Quarterly 25, no. 3 (2002): 87.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid., 86–87.

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purely practical level, the nation fulfills this role through the establishment of schools, parks, and other public amenities that foster community growth. However, the nation-state also provides a more abstract notion of community by creating an identity. In an article discussing the importance of symbols and rituals in creating tight-knit Italian communities, one commentator describes a nation as a “construction by which [the people] give meaning and coherence to their collective histories.”7 A nation in this sense creates security by naturally tying members to their fellows and giving them reason to trust each other.8 Like the roles described above, failure to provide this connectedness often results in the failure of a state; there are “no failed state[s] without disharmony between communities.”9 The reason for this lies in the fact that without fulfilling the psychological need for belonging, the nation has not created an environment within which people can flourish. Thus, providing this sense of identity is integral to a state’s duties.

The true role of a nation, therefore, is not to consolidate power for power’s sake, nor to enhance the well-being of a particular part of the population, nor even to merely protect against outsiders. It is to provide “positive goods to their people,” and when it can no longer or will no longer do so, the “nation-state itself becomes illegitimate.”10 However, nations cannot provide the things they have promised to provide without help from their people, who also have roles and responsibilities that they must fulfill. To reap the benefits of living in a nation-state, people must be willing to “make sacrifices for anonymous outsiders whom [they] do not know.”11 These sacrifices can include certain freedoms that are set aside to abide by laws, personal property such as income to fund government programs through taxes, and time to participate in government and civic education. Without citizen cooperation, a nation-state would cease to exist. Agreeing to be a member of a nation-state “confirms special Erick Castellanos, “The Symbolic Construction of Community in Italy: Provincialism and Nationalism,” Ethnology: An International Journal of Cultural and Social Anthropology 49, no. 1 (2010): 65.

8 Ibid., 66.

9 Rotberg, “Nation-State Failure,” 86.

10 Ibid., 85.

11 Will Kymlicka and Christine Straehle, “Cosmopolitanism, Nation-States, and Minority Nationalism: A Critical Review of Recent Literature,” European Journal of Philosophy 7, no. 1 (1999): 69.

7

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duties behind which stand a patriotic identity”—duties that include “acts of solidarity, engagement, and care.”12 Citizens, by virtue of being members of the nation, have a “loyalty to the community” that requires sacrifices of them.13 It is this notion of citizen loyalty, and the extent to which it is a civil obligation, that connects directly to nationalism and its ethics.

Nationalism as a concept is rather difficult to define because of the different ways it might present itself—as “sentiments, ideas, or political action.”14 Sentiments of nationalism usually emphasize a group’s “cultural and social history,” which define them as an exclusive and sovereign community, and the sentiment of nationalism is what drives its “emotional appeal” and sometimes “religious qualities.”15 Nationalism as an idea, by contrast, focuses more on a group’s intellectual history than on its cultural history, and nationalism as a political movement focuses more on the institutions that seek to solidify these ideas and sentiments into tangible power.16 Since the sentiment of nationalism is what drives the emotional vision of one’s homeland, this manifestation is most useful in the discussion of nationalist ethics and is the one that will be focused on here. With this in mind, nationalism is best summed up as a sentiment that exalts the national identity, promoting the state as worthy of admiration and love and conceptualizing its members in terms of an in-group versus an out-group.

Given this definition, one could claim that nationalism helps to fulfill the roles of a nation by establishing community, thus encouraging citizen cooperation with the ruling powers and the fervent fulfillment of civic responsibilities. Nationalism attempts to “ensure that states are indeed ‘nation-states’ in which the state and nation coincide,” and this unity helps to prevent conflict.17 The nationstate and its political order have the potential to “serve as the common denominator” uniting different groups of people within the same

Jürgen Habermas, “Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the Future of Europe,” Citizenship: Critical Concepts 2 (1992), 354–5.

13 Ibid., 356.

14 John Breuilly, “Risorgimento Nationalism in the Light of General Debates about Nationalism,” Nations & Nationalism 15, no. 3 (2009): 439.

15 Ibid., 439–40.

16 Ibid., 440.

17 Kymlicka and Straehle, “Cosmopolitanism, Nation-States, and Minority Nationalism,” 66.

12

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national borders, providing greater unity.18 Multiple areas of research suggest that states whose people believe in a firm national identity are far more willing to make the sacrifices required of them because they feel a “common identity . . . uniting donor and recipient.”19 By defining citizens as members of a group, nationalism encourages “trust” between members of society who will never meet, thus encouraging citizens to follow laws and contribute to the community.20 Others argue that nationalism provides choices and autonomy to members, stating that participation “in a national culture . . . is what makes individual freedom meaningful.”21 In other words, a national identity grants members of a society participation in something greater than themselves, linking them to a purpose and giving them the power to bring change and legacy. Clearly, this is useful to an institution whose existence is dependent on cooperation between rulers and citizens and requires the individuals’ fulfillment of responsibilities. If these responsibilities are presented as a choice which rewards the individual with a sense of belonging and trust in one’s fellows, the responsibilities are more likely to be fulfilled.

In addition to helping a nation foster a sense of internal community and encouraging citizen responsibility, nationalism can also help provide external security. To use a modern example, Italy has only recently been unified into a nation, and it still retains its fractured identity, with citizens feeling a deeper connection to their local communities than the nation of “Italy.”22 Despite their obvious suspicion of nationalist ideologies after the disaster of Mussolini, some scholars suggest that Italy would do well to employ “discourses that are intrinsically national” in order to finally unite the country.23 More openness to using nationalist dialogue and stirring nationalist sentiment would help the government fulfill its own roles and responsibilities by uniting Italy’s vastly divided political parties and granting more legitimacy to the central government and its rules.24 Italian legislatures would be better equipped to handle matters of Habermas, “Citizenship and National Identity,” 347.

Kymlicka and Straehle, “Cosmopolitanism, Nation-States, and Minority Nationalism,” 69.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid., 70.

22 Castellanos, “Symbolic Construction of Community in Italy,” 91.

23 Mark Donovan, “Nationalism, Democracy, and State-Rebuilding in Italy,” Perspectives on European Politics & Society 2, no. 2 (2001): 257.

24 Ibid., 247.

18 19

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foreign policy and international threats if they were inclined to see themselves as a united body, and their legislation would carry more weight if the people cared about a uniform national interest rather than just the interests of their local states or provinces.25 While this may seem unrealistic for Italy given its history of local identity and deepset fear of nationalism, the benefits of this sentiment could help to protect Italian future interests and improve the functioning of their government.

However, though nationalism can help both governments and citizens better perform their roles and functions, it also can wreak havoc on societies and uproot everything that they have tried to create.

One of the issues of nationalism is that it can occur at many different levels within the population. State nationalism often conflicts with the minority nationalism of smaller communities, and the differences can result in violent conflicts as ethnic nationalists clash with national leaders trying to unite all citizens within its borders.26 This disrupts the ability of citizens to perform their functions; members of a minority are less inclined to sacrifice for the good of the nation if they feel alienated from the whole, and violence between groups obviously does not allow for the growth of society. This conflict between different “nationalist” sentiments diminishes the nation-state’s ability to fulfill some of its primary roles—the protection of its citizens and the ability to provide for their flourishing.

Furthermore, nationalism presents severe ethical quandaries when the love of nation begins to undermine the true value of the human person. Nationalism under extreme regimes such as those of Hitler and Mussolini demands that its citizens place loyalty to the nation above all other loyalties. Mussolini exemplified this in his fascist regime with the sentiment that “culture must serve the aims and purposes of the state,” and he hoped to “substitute fascist ritual and symbolism” in place of long-standing Italian religious traditions.27 The pressure on citizens to accept a state identity can be frightening, as it shows an attempt by the state to determine which beliefs are most important—an artificial, state-led ranking of priorities. Such policing of belief is not one of the roles and responsibilities of the state and Ibid.

Kymlicka and Straehle, “Cosmopolitanism, Nation-States, and Minority Nationalism,” 66.

27 Philip V. Cannistraro, “Mussolini’s Cultural Revolution: Fascist or Nationalist?” Journal of Contemporary History 7, no. 3/4 (1972): 132–33.

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can easily prove detrimental to the people’s flourishing if this control over cultural sentiment begins to turn against their own well-being, as eventually did happen with Mussolini’s regime. Nationalism in this manner “appropriates sentiments of Catholicism, monarchism, and family” and weaponizes them to keep the population in line.28 While this might in theory motivate citizens to fulfill their roles and responsibilities, it is detrimental to their flourishing when it opposes other obligations to the family, community, or religion. Such an effort to sway the emotions of citizens so that they let the state determine their beliefs and loyalties limits individual freedom. Xenophobia is also a real danger when nationalism is considered, as research demonstrates that nationalist rhetoric in modern-day Europe is often connected to anti-immigrant and racist sentiments.29 In extreme cases, these can turn violent against those who are perceived as the “out-group” and result in discrimination and holocausts—a clear ethical wrong. Thus, nationalism threatens the well-being of citizens, which the nation had promised to protect in many ways: it manipulates emotion to limit citizens’ freedoms and beliefs, it seeks to subvert and replace the vitally important ties of family and local community, and it presents the very real possibility of becoming hostile toward certain members within the state and causing mass loss of life. Extreme nationalism puts the good of the “nation” as an idea above the good of individual citizens— something directly contrary to the nation’s ends and purposes.

Given this dichotomy, what is to be done with nationalism?

Should nations attempt to stifle it entirely? This seems dangerous, as healthy patriotism is necessary to motivate citizens to be contributing members of the society, and “some form of nationalism is unavoidable” in all states.30 However, letting nationalism run rampant may be just as dangerous. To achieve a balance, one must turn to the tools of ethics. A nationalist sentiment, fundamentally, is a passion.

While some, like Mussolini, may manipulate this passion for other purposes, the majority of people who feel and believe nationalist sentiments are simply passionate about their national identity.

Ethically speaking, passions in and of themselves are not bad; rather, passions, emotions, and desires are “fundamental to a just and loving Breuilly, “Risorgimento Nationalism,” 441.

Manuela Caiani and Patricia Kröll, “Nationalism and Populism in Radical Right Discourses in Italy and Germany,” Javnost – The Public 24, no. 4 (2017): 344.

30 Donovan, “Nationalism, Democracy and State-Rebuilding in Italy,” 257.

28 29

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vision of the world.”31 As discussed above, pride in one’s nation and culture provides a layer of meaning and purpose to one’s existence, and passionate love of country can compel citizens to participate in the society for the greater good of all. However, like all passions, love of country must be “directed towards the good” in order to produce good results.32 A nationalist sentiment directed toward a misunderstood or ill-formed vision of what a nation is can quickly turn unethical and become dangerous. In order to properly “use” nationalism, citizens must have an accurate moral vision of the purpose of a nation. Once they see that end correctly, their passion can be directed toward the true good of its people; they will have learned to “feel in the right way” about their national identity.33 Nationalism as a sentiment, therefore, should not be entirely abolished, but rather must be properly directed to fulfill its end.

Other tools of an ethical life also have a role in moderating nationalism, particularly the virtues of prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance. Prudence—defined as the ability to “[see] the good” and create a plan for how to “achieve the good end”—may be useful in helping nationalists realize what it is they truly seek.34 Without prudence, those who feel a strong patriotism may lose sight of what is really good for the nation and the people as a whole. Justice helps people “order [their] lives well in relationship to others” and create healthy relationships to nourish their identities.35 Applied to nationalism, this virtue would help a citizen cultivate a good relationship with his or her homeland and understand what he or she owes to the governing bodies and his or her fellow citizens. Justice helps a person discern that the nation, while deserving of one’s loyalty and devotion, should not be ordered above a person’s relationship to family or to God; in other words, the obligation to obey the nation does not overrule one’s obligation to family or to divine law. Justice also helps moderate sentiments of ethical purity by revealing the reality of every person’s inherent dignity. Another appropriate virtue is temperance, the virtue of “ordering [oneself] to the reality of things,” which may be employed to help passionate patriots moderate their David McCarthy and James Donohue, Moral Vision: Seeing the World with Love and Justice (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing, 2018), 64.

32 Ibid., 55.

33 Ibid., 64.

34 Ibid., 48.

35 Ibid.

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fervor.36 Finally, fortitude—which includes the ability to “[accept] suffering for the sake of a good greater than [oneself]”—is useful in helping citizens sacrifice for others and be brave in fulfilling their obligations to each other and to the nation-state.37 Applying this virtue can also help citizens combat nationalism that has turned unethical or violent and stand up for rightly ordered nationalism within their borders. All the virtues that are useful in maintaining balance in one’s life can also be efficiently employed in understanding nationalism.

Nationalism is a powerful sentiment with multiple connotations, but above all, it is a phenomenon that seeks to define one’s nation as something unique and superior and use that identity to unite its people. Nationalism can either fulfill or upend the duties of a nation depending on how it is employed, and in order to strike a balance that reaps the goods of nationalism while avoiding its unethical extremes, one must take care to shape the correct moral vision of the purpose of the nation. An understanding of how to properly mediate this passion for one’s nation and a knowledge of the virtues helps to harness this sentiment in useful ways. The nation is not a god to be worshipped; it is a tool to assist in human flourishing and should not be weaponized in a way that is detrimental to the lives of other human beings. The loyalty that one owes to the nation is important, but not more so than the loyalty a person owes to God or to his soul. Thus, nationalism can be an ethical sentiment to cultivate only if it is rightly ordered to the ends and goods of a nation and does not seek to usurp the role that God and personal obligation play in one’s life. Despite the countless historical examples of the evils of nationalism, it is clear that if people took the time to properly orient their vision, the passion used to fuel detrimental nationalist sentiments could be repurposed into passion that helps better the human experience across the nations.

36 37

Ibid.

Ibid.

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The Angelic Intellect Ranil Weerackoon

I

t is clear that the Divine Intellect far exceeds the angelic intellect since God “perfectly understands [His] own essence, and knows all that is knowable about itself.”1 However, the intellect of an angel is higher than that of the most intelligent man because the angelic nature is more excellent.2 Thus, human reason is not “competent to take in all that an angel understands of his own natural ability.”3 Nevertheless, we will endeavor in this paper to achieve a better understanding of the angelic intellect by examining the integral relationship between faith and reason. First, we will examine the contributions from philosophy in understanding the angelic intellect. Next, we will expound on how theology sheds light on the knowledge acquired through reason regarding the intellect of the angels. Finally, we will synthetically examine how faith and reason complement each other with regard to the angelic intellect.

In order to understand the angelic intellect, it is first imperative to provide a proof for the existence of angels. Philosophy provides a framework for such, as there is a continuous series in the hierarchical perfection of being. Specifically, nonliving things are the most corporeal and material because they do not have a soul. Plants and animals are living things that possess souls and are thus not only material. Humans are partly spiritual and partly corporeal as man possesses an immortal soul and thus has an immaterial nature ascribed to him. However, since God is pure spirit, the hierarchy of beings implies the existence of angels as an intermediate step to go from the multiplicity of bodies, as seen with man, to God, who is pure spirit and perfectly simple.4 Moreover, the perfection of the universe Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, trans. James F. Anderson (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1956), I, 1, para. 3.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.

4 Etienne Gilson, The Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 2002), II, 2, 192–93.

1

requires an incorporeal substance whereby the effect (i.e., an angel) bears a similitude to its cause (i.e., God). In addition, philosophy aids the understanding regarding the existence of angels since they are “prior in nature” to souls which can subsist without bodies (i.e., the rational soul) as this subsistence is “an accidental competence on the part of souls.”5 Furthermore, the order of nature requires that something be perfect in a genus. Forms existing in matter (i.e., souls in bodies) are imperfect acts since they lack completeness in kind while intellectual substances are perfect since they are complete acts and subsist through themselves.6 Thus, a probable proof regarding the existence of angels can be ascertained from philosophy.

Philosophers throughout the centuries have contributed to an understanding of the angelic intellect through the use of reason. Plato ascribed certain forms that he termed “secondary unities” and which participate in the primary unity (i.e., God) for their understanding and goodness.7 Plato specifically contributed to the philosophical thought on the angelic intellect by explaining that an intellect is higher the closer it is to the first intellect because an intellect “is higher which shares more perfectly in the first unity.”8 Aristotle also believed that intellectual substances receive intelligible species from their participation of the First Intelligible, which is God.9 Both Plato and Aristotle held that higher intellects have a providence over lower intellects and that the intellects have a providence above the souls and lower orders.10 John Damascene further expanded on this notion by defining an angel as an intelligent essence who is thus intelligent by nature.11 Thus, angels do not have matter because the operation of intellectual substances is understanding and consequently immaterial.12

Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, II, 91, para. 2.

Ibid., II, 91, para. 5.

7 Thomas Aquinas, Treatise on Separate Substances, trans. Rev. Francis J. Lescoe (West Hartford: Saint Joseph College, 1959), para. 6.

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid., para. 82.

10 Ibid., para. 17.

11 St. John of Damascus, De Fide Orthodoxa: An Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith, II, 3, http://www.documentacatholicaomnia.eu/03d/06750749,_Ioannes_Damascenus,_De_Fide_Orthodoxa,_EN.pdf.

12 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Westminster, MD: Christian Classics, 1981), I, q. 50, a. 2.

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From these philosophical contributions over the course of history, philosophy can provide a more detailed explanation regarding the nature and essence of the angelic intellect. It is clear that the essence of an angel consists only of form, since the form of the angel is the intelligence itself.13 However, angels are limited in their being because they receive their being from God.14 Thus, angels are subsistent and each one can conduct its operations “in its own right,” as it has power over its actions.15 With regard to the angelic intellect, “the angel is a being endowed with knowledge, and therefore we do not know his proper nature if we do not know the method by which he knows.”16 In other words, philosophy cannot immediately access the essence of the angelic nature since metaphysical principles are needed to define the hierarchy of beings. However, from reason alone, it is possible to ascertain that the angelic intellect is far superior to the human intellect since it is full of knowledge and wisdom.17 Thus, the angelic intellect can grasp the whole of a subject in an instant, unlike the human intellect which has to reason from principles to conclusions. It is thus fitting to describe angels as intellectual creatures because they can simply apprehend terms whereas man requires three acts of the mind whereby man apprehends, forms judgments (i.e., composes and divides terms), and then reasons to a conclusion. Angels, on the other hand, see all the consequences stemming from a principle and all the possible aspects from a truth.18 Philosophy shows that angels know the secrets of nature, possess all natural knowledge, and know all the sciences in “their most absolute perfection” because of their status as intellectual substances.19 Therefore, the knowledge of angels is “clear, certain and free from all possibility of error.”20 Since demons are also intellectual substances, they cannot err in natural knowledge because it is a part of their nature.

Thomas Aquinas, On Being and Essence, trans. Armand Maurer (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1968), 57.

14 Ibid., 62.

15 Adolphe Tanquerey, A Manual of Dogmatic Theology, trans. Rev. Msgr. John J. Byrnes, vol. 1, (New York: Desclee Company, 1959), 372.

16 Gilson, The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure, 231.

17 Paul O’Sullivan, All About the Angels (Rockford: Tan Books and Publishers, 1990), 32.

18 Ibid., 33.

19 Ibid., 34.

20 Ibid., 33.

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In addition, God chooses the extent of knowledge He wishes to give angels.21 Thus, angels only receive the knowledge that God deems to be necessary and fitting for their status. Specifically, lower angels do not have as perfect a nature and cannot grasp as much as the higher angels. The fact that higher angels can grasp things more simply and in fewer species is comparable to humans, as some men can grasp a truth easily in a few details while other men require detailed explanations because of their weaker intellect. As it pertains to angelic knowledge of things, an angel is always in the act of understanding.22 Time measures whether a thing is in act or potency, but the angelic intellect is not affected by time. An angel cannot be in the act of understanding only some of the time, so thus their understanding must be continuous. Therefore, it is clear philosophically that angels understand things which are intelligible through themselves and are in act.23 This is because their being is superior to the human intellect, whose object of understanding of intelligible objects comes from sense apprehension. While humans know singulars and universals through the sense and intellect, angels are simpler than humans and thus know singulars and universals more simply solely by their intellect.24 Angels also possess knowledge of God that surpasses the knowledge man has of the Divine Being. Angels cannot know the essence of God since He is infinite and there is an infinite gap between the Creator and creature.25 As a result, angels do not know God’s essence through their natural knowledge because their own substance is not capable of measuring to its cause.26 However, they can know God in the manner of angelic substance through their natural knowledge.27 Philosophy can explain this simply because God is the efficient cause of the angels and every effect bears a resemblance to its cause.28 Therefore, angels also know the perfections of their cause better than man because of their higher nature.29 Summa Theologiae, I, q. 55, a. 3.

Summa Contra Gentiles, II, 97, para. 2.

23 Ibid., II, 94, para. 4.

24 Ibid., II, 100, para. 3.

25 Gilson, The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure, 233.

26 Summa Contra Gentiles, I, 1, para. 3.

27 Ibid., I, 3, para. 49.

28 Ibid., II, 98, para. 6.

29 Ibid., I, 3, para. 49.

21 22

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By their very nature, intellectual substances are in act with regard to intelligible beings, so each angel knows itself through its essence.30 However, angels know each other according to the common nature of their genus since they all belong to the same genus, but angels do not know each other by the proper nature of the species since each angel is its own species.31 Thus, only God knows all the angels properly since He is their efficient cause.32 A proof can be devised philosophically that angels cannot understand each other through their own essence.

First, the perfection of the one who knows is evident through the thing known. In addition, lower substances are not the perfections of the higher angels, for lower substances are the perfections of their efficient cause, which is God. But this would imply that higher angels do not understand lower angels, which is false because higher angels know all that the lower angels know. Specifically, higher angels know all that the lower angels know in a simpler and more perfect manner because of their higher nature. Thus, from this philosophical lens, it is clear that angels cannot know each other in the same manner because they are not the cause of each other nor can they understand each other through their essence.

Angels have a will since they possess an intellect and an understanding of the good and an inclination to the good.33 Philosophy is able to distinguish the angelic intellect from the will since the intellect regards good and evil while the will regards only the good.34 Through their simple intuition, the will of angels is “certain and irrevocable” since they possess all the necessary information regarding what they will.35 Thus, the angels have no struggle in their will. In fact, angels have a free will since only substances that possess an intellect can make a free choice to determine and judge whether something is good.36 Their free will and exercise of it therefore must be more perfect than that of man’s because of their higher status as intellects. Similarly, the free will in the higher angels has a higher degree of perfection than it does in the lower angels.

Ibid., II, 98, para. 2.

Ibid., II, 98, para. 3.

32 Ibid., II, 98, para. 7.

33 Summa Theologiae, I, q. 59, a. 1.

34 Ibid., I, q. 59, a. 2.

35 O’Sullivan, All About the Angels, 34.

36 Summa Theologiae, I, q. 59, a. 3.

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We now will turn to the contributions that theology strictly provides pertaining to the intellect of angels. While we demonstrated a strong case for the existence of angels from a philosophical perspective, it needs the aid of theology to definitively prove angelic existence. The Catechism of the Catholic Church explicitly states that “the existence of the spiritual, non-corporeal beings that Sacred Scripture usually calls ‘angels’ is a truth of faith.”37 The existence of spiritual beings is also made abundantly clear in Scripture, as God “makes thy angels spirits” and Scripture abounds with numerous examples of angels ministering to men and Jesus in both the Old and New Testaments.38 Theology can also show that angels received their being and were created: “For in Him were all things created in heaven and on earth, visible and invisible, whether thrones, or dominations, or principalities, or powers.”39 In addition, faith allows philosophy to understand how angels participate in God’s nature. Since higher intelligences are closer to God because they possess more act and less potency, theology shows that angels participate in God’s nature “far surpassing all those thing which merely exist . . . for molding them selves intelligibly to the imitation of God . . . and longing to form the intellectual appearance of [God], they naturally have more abundant communion with Him . . . adapting themselves to this in a life wholly intellectual.”40 Thus, angels are endowed with far more knowledge and understanding than any other creature because of their higher nature.

Theology also details that angels communicate to God by “reading his mind” as God tells them what they need to know.41 In addition, angels know God naturally since God’s image is given to the angel’s nature and thus they know they are the image of God, unlike men, who know God through His image reflected in creatures.42 Moreover, God gives angels supernatural knowledge of Himself.43 Nevertheless, angels Catechism of the Catholic Church, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: United States Catholic Conference, 2000), 328.

38 Ps. 103(4):4.

39 Col. 1:16.

40 Dionysius the Areopagite, The Celestial Hierarchy, chap. 4, http://www.esoteric.msu.edu/VolumeII/CelestialHierarchy.html.

41Peter Kreeft, Angels and Demons: What Do We Really Know About Them (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1995), 67.

42 Summa Theologiae, I, 56, 3.

43 Ibid.

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possess a far greater desire to know and understand their cause more fully than man because of their proximity to God.44 Theology builds on philosophical reasoning, as faith can explain that angels know and “contemplate what they know,” meaning angels contemplate God, themselves, each other, and persons.45 Thus, angels know all things at once from what arises from the Beatific Vision as they behold the Divine Wisdom. Angels cannot know the mysteries of grace through natural knowledge, but they can know mysteries of supernatural knowledge, as revealed to them by God.46 Because higher angels have a more perfect union with God, they can communicate to lower angels by enlightening them on the mysteries of God, which may come at the beginning of their creation or can be revealed to them at a later point.47 For example, all angels were instructed in the general principle of the Incarnation from the beginning but did not know the specific conditions of what would happen or when exactly it would take place.48 In fact, higher angels only learned the specifics regarding the Incarnation after they received the Beatific Vision. Moreover, angels know more excellently what the prophets learned from revelation concerning the mysteries of grace.49 However, demons can err in supernatural knowledge since they are separated from God, who is the truth Himself and possesses all knowledge.50 While demons know truths through their own nature, theology explains that these truths are revealed to them by holy angels through the likeness in their intellectual nature and through experience.51 Faith also provides deeper insight regarding how the intellect of the angels differs within the angelic hierarchy. Their intellect is used to transmit ideas and the Divine Law from God to man.52 In fact, faith tells us that Jesus submitted Himself “obediently to the commands given by God the Father through Angels.”53 Dionysius posits three hierarchies of angels that are each composed of three choirs.54 As Summa Contra Gentiles, I, 3, para. 50.

Peter Kreeft, Angels and Demons, 63.

46 Summa Theologiae, I, q. 57, a. 5.

47 Ibid.

48 Ibid.

49 Ibid.

50 Summa Theologiae, I, q. 58, a. 5.

51 Ibid., I, 64, 1.

52 Dionysius the Areopagite, Celestial Hierarchy, chap. 4.

53 Ibid.

54 Ibid.

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mentioned earlier, the lower ranks of angels receive understanding of God’s works from the higher ranks in the manner God sees fit.

However, the higher ranks “reverently desire to receive the divine enlightenment in an intermediate manner” by asking one another about their respective knowledge of God’s works, particularly with regard to Redemption, because they do not expect to receive it from God without divine enlightenment.55 While the intellect of the angels in the higher choirs is “purified, illuminated, and perfected” by God, the lower choirs possess wisdom and knowledge in a subordinate degree.56 Thus, angels close to God give other angels the knowledge they receive directly from God and transmit it to the lower angels in a hierarchical process.

With regard to choice and will in the angels, faith explains that angels cannot repent due to their incorporeal nature, unlike man who comes to repentance due to weakness of the body.57 Angels cannot change each other’s wills since the operation of the will is an inclination of the person who wills something to the thing that is willed, which can only be done by God. However, an angel can induce another angel to love God through persuasion.58 The angelic choice and will provides greater clarity in coming to understand the sin of the angels and the angelic “war.”

Philosophically, it is evident that the angelic intellect has clear knowledge and thus could not be deceived.59 Faith illuminates this more deeply with respect to Lucifer, as he knew he could not be God. Nevertheless, Lucifer wanted to be like God in a way that was not befitting his nature, such as by creating things through his own power or achieving final beatitude from his own nature.60 In addition, angels are not naturally evil since the nature of their intellect tends to the good.61 From a theological standpoint, however, the higher angels had a greater motive for sinning since the sin of the fallen angels was due to pride, whose motive is excellence.62 Consequently, the sin of the Ibid., chap. 7.

Ibid., chaps. 9, 12.

57 St. John of Damascus, De Fide Orthodoxa: An Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith, II, chap. 3, http://www.documentacatholicaomnia.eu/03d/0675-0749, _Ioannes_Damascenus,_De_Fide_ Orthodoxa,_EN.pdf.

58 Summa Theologiae, I, q. 106, a. 2.

59 Ibid., I, q. 63, a. 3.

60 Ibid.

61 Ibid., I, q. 63, a. 4.

62 Ibid., I, q. 63, a. 7.

55 56

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higher angels influenced others to rebel and thus the choice of the other demons who rebelled happened at the same instant as Lucifer since they did not have to deliberate or think about their decision.63 Furthermore, theology explains that demons did not lose natural knowledge as a result of their fall since it belongs to their nature as an intellectual substance.64 However, the demons lost some of the speculative knowledge which comes about through grace as they only know the necessary secrets of Divine revelation as revealed to them through angels or through what God lets them know.65 With regard to their speculative knowledge, the demons still do not know to the same degree as the angels since the angels have more things revealed to them and in a more complete way by God Himself.66 Moreover, the demons lost all of their effective knowledge that belongs to wisdom because this requires a love for God, which the demons clearly lack.67 For example, all angels had some knowledge of the mysteries pertaining to God’s kingdom at the beginning but they didn’t fully or equally comprehend it, but demons possessed a far weaker understanding of the mystery of the Incarnation as a result of their fall.68 Theology further develops on angelic communication by explaining that the Thrones transmit the requisite illumination for knowledge of God’s decrees.69 Angels first speak to God by consulting His will and admiring His works.70 With regard to their communication amongst each other, angels are said to speak to each other by manifesting knowledge to each other, whereby their speech is a communication of their knowledge of a mental concept that goes from spirit to spirit.71 The lower angels can speak to higher angels by directing their thoughts so that it is made known by the other through the free will of the angel that is speaking. With regard to communicating with man, angels can enlighten men since they are superior creatures and they can strengthen man’s understanding by Ibid., I, q. 63, a. 8.

Ibid., I, q. 64, a. 1.

65 Ibid.

66 Ibid.

67 Ibid.

68 Ibid.

69 Gilson, Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, 202.

70 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, q. 107, a. 3.

71 Ibid., I, q. 107, a. 1.

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making truths apparent in sensible form.72 From a theological perspective, angels do not know man’s thoughts as they cannot force themselves into the mind of man, but man can will to reveal his thoughts to his guardian angel.73 In addition, angels can offer men holy thoughts and suggest things in man’s imagination.74 Similarly, demons cannot put thoughts in man but they can suggest things to man’s imagination in order to tempt and persuade man into committing sin.75 Thus, demons cannot act on man’s intellect or will since these powers are spiritual and can be moved only by God. We will now examine the integral relationship between faith and reason, specifically with regard to how each builds on the other and how the combination of the two areas aids our understanding of the angelic intellect. Philosophy is able to provide insights regarding the essence and existence of angels and deduce the nature of their intellect from the principles that stem from their quiddity and being, such as how angels know objects more universally and simply. Theology then builds on this by ascribing specific knowledge that angels accumulate and the degree to which angels know, such as what angels know regarding the Incarnation. This is also clearly seen with how the intellect of the angels differs in the angelic hierarchy. Theology first posits three hierarchies or degrees of angels. Reason in turn is able to deduce and recognize that the angelic hierarchies must decrease in simplicity and thus in knowledge.76 Using the principles established by philosophy, reason can ascertain that the first hierarchy is composed of “angels who know intelligible essences as proceeding from the first universal principle” which is God.77 Theology in turn expounds on this philosophical principle by ascribing qualities to each of these three choirs in the first hierarchy. Specifically, the highest choir (i.e., the Seraphim), contemplates the essence in God alone with respect to His goodness. The second choir consists of the Cherubim who contemplate the essence of God’s direct goodness through providence, while the Thrones are in the third choir and contemplate the essence of God through the disposition of divine judgments.78 Ibid., I, q. 111, a. 1.

Kreeft, Angels and Demons, 95.

74 Tanquerey, Manual of Dogmatic Theology, 383.

75 Summa Theologiae, I, q. 111, a. 2.

76 Gilson, Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, 200.

77 Ibid.

78 Ibid., 201.

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Similarly, reason can lead us to infer about the second hierarchy of angels, “who know intelligibles as subject to the most universal created causes.”79 Thus, the second hierarchy contemplates intelligible essences in universal causes of creation. Again, theology increases understanding of each of the choirs in this hierarchy. The Dominations are directors who command what the angels below them must do. Following the Dominations are the Virtues, who receive the commands of the Dominations and “multiply them and channel them according to the various effects to be produced” and govern the activities of the universe, including the movements of the heavenly bodies. The Powers consist of the last choir in the second hierarchy and preserve order in the universe.80 Finally, philosophy posits that the third hierarchy are “angels who know intelligibles as applied to singular things and dependent upon particular causes”, meaning they contemplate intelligible essences as particular effects.81 Theology explains that the highest choir in the third hierarchy is the Principalities, who govern the welfare of nations and cities. The Archangels have the goods that affect individuals and groups of people for their proper object, including messages from God, while the Angels in the lowest choir govern the individual good for each person.82 Faith and reason complement each other regarding how both contribute to an understanding of what angels know pertaining to the future. Philosophically, angels know events more universally and perfectly that proceed from necessary causes.83 For example, angels know that the sun will rise in the east and set in the west in the future as it proceeds from a necessary cause regarding the Earth’s rotation.

Angels also know events happening from causes with a strong likelihood. However, theology expounds on this by adding that angels do not know free events in the future or secrets unless it is revealed to them by God.84 Thus, angels do not know with certainty through their own nature who will win the Super Bowl in subsequent years or if a first-year seminarian will be ordained to the priesthood.

Ibid.

Ibid., 201–02.

81 Ibid., 201.

82 Ibid., 202.

83 Summa Theologiae, I, q. 57, a. 3.

84 Tanquerey, Manual of Dogmatic Theology, 377.

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Furthermore, philosophy and theology provide unique contributions regarding how angels understand each other. Theology sheds light on knowledge acquired through reason by explaining how angels enlighten each other. Aquinas defines enlightenment as “nothing else but to communicate to others the manifestation of the known truth.”85 Angels manifest the truth that they know to each other and hence superior angels strengthen the natural light of the inferior angels.86 The intellect of a lower angel is enlightened when a higher angel turns to him, just as bodily objects are strengthened when another object is brought closer to it, such as when an object becomes hotter when another object that is already hot comes next to it.

Furthermore, higher angels distinguish the truth he receives and knows universally and more perfectly so it can be understood by a lower angel who has less universal and more particular knowledge.

From faith, we can also ascertain that higher angels see God more perfectly and thus better know the works of God through which they can enlighten lower angels about the Divine works.87 Conversely, lower angels cannot enlighten higher angels since they grasp everything that is made known to them already and the higher angels already know what the lower angels know.88 This differs from man, because humans possessing less knowledge can enlighten other humans that know more since man has to reason in order to understand. Angels, however, know immediately without having to reason. Therefore, those angels nearer to God already have more knowledge. For example, we can ascertain from philosophy that the lower angels cannot perfectly receive all that is given to it by the higher angels and thus they never achieve the excellence of those higher angels, but theology builds on this by explaining that lower angels did not know the Mystery of the Incarnation as well as the higher angels.89 Instead, the angels advanced in their understanding of it after the Incarnation took place.90 However, with regard to demons, those of a superior nature cannot enlighten inferior demons since enlightenment means a manifestation of the truth, but demons have turned away from God, who is the Truth.91 Summa Theologiae, I, q. 106, a. 1.

Ibid.

87 Ibid.

88 Ibid., I, q. 106, a. 3.

89 Ibid., I, q. 106, a. 4.

90 Ibid.

91 Ibid., I, q. 109, a. 3.

85 86

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TOLLE LEGE

Both philosophy and theology provide unique contributions to the understanding of the nature of the angelic intellect. Guided by principles regarding the intellect that is most simple (i.e., God) to more complex beings, such as man, reason is able to come to several conclusions about the intellect of angels, who are simpler than man but more complex than God. For example, angels understand more universally than man and similarly higher angels grasp concepts simply and more universally than lower angels. Faith is able to shed greater light on the information provided by reason and thus faith can explain what concepts angels know more about. For example, theology explains what angels knew about the Incarnation and how that knowledge differs amongst the choirs of angels. While it is clear that theology can illuminate truths discoverable through reason, philosophy in turn helps explain insights gained from faith. Theology formulates the nine choirs of angels, but philosophy provides principles for how the choirs know intelligible essences and the principles from which their knowledge stems. Thus, both areas of study are heavily instrumental in building upon each other to provide a comprehensive view and understanding of the angelic intellect.

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