AICS Intelligence Report
Fight against the Islamic State. Morocco a particular case
December 2014
INDICE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................................................................. 3 POLITICAL FACTOR ........................................................................................................................ 5 The breeding ground ................................................................................................................. 5 Harakat Sham al-Islam............................................................................................................... 6 SOCIAL FACTOR ............................................................................................................................. 8 SECURITY FACTOR ....................................................................................................................... 10 Round trip................................................................................................................................ 10 Involuntary contributors ..................................................................................................... 11 THE RETURN ................................................................................................................................ 12 The theory of the lone wolf ..................................................................................................... 13 INTERNATIONAL POSITIONING ................................................................................................... 15 CONTACT ..................................................................................................................................... 17
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The rapid progress in the field that has experienced the Islamic State, the jihadist group that was born from a change of name, ISIS to simply IS, but whose deep roots lie in the surroundings of the Complex Al-Qaeda, has caused a division among countries of the so called Arab World. On the one hand those countries, openly and actively, fighting the men of al-Baghdadi; on the other those others, trying to stay in the background, wary of the consequences of adopting a clear position in either direction. When Barack Obama gave the green light to air strikes over the positions of the Islamic State in Iraq, decision brought more by international pressure rather than for personal or political conviction itself, seems that he did not analyze the support needs from the Arab countries to his new intervention in the heart of the Islamic world. It seems quite reasonable to base that mistake, more political than military, in an underestimation of the capabilities of al-Baghdadi and his followers to resist air strikes. Subsequent developments, with a continual challenge by the Islamic State to the West, staged in the murders of journalists and civilians live broadcasted, merely think that another factor which influenced or caused the downward valuation of Jihadist capabilities was the lack of Intelligence to support decisions. But this was not the only mistake made by the United States to decide military action. Carry out an armed action in Iraq, and by extension in Syria, cannot be limited only to the armed aspect, as it seemed initially thought the US administration, but must take into account other factors inherent to the Arab world that determine any political decision of the countries involved. Indeed, the very existence of the Islamic State, is the result of these intrinsic factors of the Arab countries. Its self-designation as current Sunni jihadist group is its justification for carrying out the atrocities hitherto known, and those that have yet to arrive. It is likely that, if he had enjoyed the support of Intelligence, and especially the political acquiescence of the most important nations in the region, how to address the conflict would have been different, perhaps more decisive but certainly more cohesive. This uncoordinated start and almost unilateral actions against the cancer emerged in Syria and Iraq (beyond the Syrian civil war itself), has brought to the fore the two speeds within the Arab world when fighting jihadist groups . While there are countries that have been placed on the front line in combating the spread of the Islamic State, others have not taken such a firm stance, relegating their collaborative work in support of second order. However, as discussed later in this document, some of these countries of second order, that may be or are in the crosshairs of Jihadist groups that orbit around the Islamic state, cannot be considered as true allies but, as defined in certain circles, of commitment undetermined.
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While there are several countries that could join this group, perhaps one of the most worrying is Morocco. Blur from the government of Rabat, which is to say of King Mohamed VI, it is a clear evidence of the power concealed and fear that the jihadist threat is expanding. Its mere participation in intelligence and logistics, with no direct involvement in armed actions, can become more of a problem than a solution for a country that, for the moment, has handled with enviable success whooping Arab Spring, despite to take the chairmanship of an Islamic party government.
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POLITICAL FACTOR The political structure of Morocco is officially based on the form of parliamentary monarchy, but the reality is quite different. During the reign of Hassan II, father of the present King, the Government was entirely in the hands of the monarch, however, after his death, and the subsequent proclamation of the new king, Mohamed VI, a series of changes occur, to mode undeclared political transition, culminating in one of the opposition party in Government (Socialist Union of Popular Forces). But this process of change will reach its peak when IN the general elections of 2011, Abdelilah Benkirane, from the Party of Justice and Development, wins the elections and is appointed as Head of Government (official name of the post). The Justice and Development Party, AJP, marks a milestone in the renovating maneuvers of Mohamed VI, being the first Islamic party who takes responsibility of government. For the King, this change represented a major challenge because, not to keep the situation under control, could take the country to a dangerous drift and move towards radical positions that nothing would favor his pro-European policies. The PJD is considered a non-revolutionary Islamic party. However, this tag is not set to the history of the political group, which counts among its ranks with radical elements, such as requiring the introduction of so-called religious crimes. The most critical time to the survival of the PJD was just after the jihadist attack in Casablanca (May 2003). While the party was in no way involved in the attack, much of the population accused the political formation of being indirect instigator, by advocating anti-Western ideas. These criticisms forced the PJD to soften its political discourse, clearly marking the distances with violent radical currents. But this political openness promoted by Mohamed VI, or the rise to power of the Justice and Development Party, have not been sufficient to say that the jihadist threat has disappeared from Morocco. This false impression of absence of radical elements that could destabilize the country, is favored by the skillful propaganda machinery of the State, understood Royal House, while a strict internal control by the security services of the State. However, as stated, this perception is wrong and the proof is the positioning that the Alawite kingdom has taken with regard to the Islamic State and the military decision of the West. The problem that prevents considering Morocco a remote country from Jihadist ideology, lies in the people themselves, especially the lower classes and rural. The breeding ground Despite the changes introduced by Mohamed VI, promoting democratic processes, authorizing and legalizing opposition political formations, or favoring a more active role of women in social and political life, the base population remains mired in old lifestyles.
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At the time the political openness, the general population did not quite understand the meaning of concepts such as democracy or political transition. For them, then and now, political power is not perceived to be close. The weight of their own history prevents them from conceiving the state institutions as system elements available to citizens; probably because it is not. Disadvantaged population, lower class, especially the rural, representing almost 50% of the national census, identified political power in form of legislative body, with the King and the known as Makhzen. The bottom line is that this perception is not far from reality. To a large swath of the population, political power in Morocco is reduced to the figure of Mohamed VI, which proves that the changes introduced by the monarch had no success. This lack of social understanding of what constitutes the concept of democracy, is one of the elements that influence the emergence of a sense of alienation from political parties, seeking refuge in the regional Islamist groups. These groups of refuge will be used by radical organizations to penetrate the Moroccan society, seeking social support and, most dangerous, volunteers for their struggle (jihad). This situation, known by national authorities, can be said to be beyond their control and dangerously threatens the stability the country. Harakat Sham al-Islam Harakat Sham al-Islam (Islamic Movement of Levant), is one of many jihadist groups operating in Syria, ranked mainly by Moroccans. It is considered that, in addition to terrorist attacks, it is involved in the kidnapping of civilians and very close, in the beginning, to the Jahbat al-Nusra, representative of Al-Qaeda in Syria. The September 24, 2014, the group was described as a terrorist organization by the United States Department of State. Although it is not a group of long life, since it was established in August 2013, there are reports that evidence its high activity in Syria. Harakat Sham al-Islam participated in the offensive of Latakia in 20131, and there are numerous reports of its presence in Aleppo. Although initially the group remained close to Jahbat al-Nusra (al-Nusra Front), during 2014 its alliances suffered a turn, aligning with the Islamic State, which produced that its potential danger increased. But the goal of the group, formed among others by the Moroccan Shakaran bin Ibrahim, died in Syria in April 2014, did not focus only on fighting the Syrian government forces, but regardless this fight to its homeland, Morocco. The growth of the jihadist group has, since its inception, spectacular. From the roughly 200 members in 2013, it has increased the number of components to about two thousand. Of these, 1
The offensive of Latakia is the name given to the action of rebel forces to reach the Mediterranean coast of Syria. The aim was to control the city to use its port as an entry point for weapons smuggling. On the offensive took part the following jihadist groups: Jahbat al-Nusra, Ansar al-Sham, Harakat Sham al-Islam and part of the Free Syrian Army.
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a small but significant percentage corresponds to Spanish Muslims, mainly from Ceuta and to a lesser extent Melilla. Regarding its implementation in Morocco, the jihadist group has established a support network which is in charge of the collection and transfer of new members to the Syrian front. In cases when new components have no military training, some reports suggest the existence of training camps near the Moroccan town of Fnideq.
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SOCIAL FACTOR The presence of jihadist elements in Moroccan territory has become since a year and a half, the main concern of Mohamed VI. His openness policies described above sought precisely as ultimate goal, to prevent a significant part of the population from seeking support on local Islamist groups. His forecasts to what seemed inevitable succeeded preventing the Arab Spring affected the country, however, it seems that they have not been so efficient in limiting the penetration of jihadist groups. But the basis of the problem now facing Morocco, is much more difficult to control, and is linked to social support that is being observed in certain segments of the population. Given this covert support, the measures taken so far have been preventive, looking not make public the presence of radical elements. The main objective of Mohamed VI, is to prevent Morocco to be included in the list of countries with strong jihadist presence. Otherwise, his approach to Europe, the military support he receives from the United States, or the consideration of moderate Islamic country, could be badly damaged. Among the measures taken are to highlight those affecting the religious establishment, directly under the command of the King himself. The measures are intended to serve several purposes as detailed below.
Prohibition to religious to carry out activities that suspend or prevent the exercise of religious rituals. With this measure, it seeks to avoid places of worship, mosques, and socio-religious organizations, can serve to expand the Islamist propaganda. Prohibit the religious leaders carry out any activity for profit. The aim is to avoid creating avenues to fund jihadist groups. Instruct those same members of the religious body to wear the traditional Moroccan way, while urging them to respect the fundamentals of the nation, including the figure of King as Commander of the Faithful. With this law, Mohamed VI seeks to end the growing presence of bearded on the streets.
In the political field, Mohamed VI also reacted forcefully. Among the measures taken, the main one has been the official position contrary to the Arab uprisings. Following this policy, the Moroccan government considers Syrian rebels a hazard that must be tackled. To this end, and according to statements by members of the Government itself, both the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Endowments, and the Interior Ministry are developing combined plans aimed at halting the proliferation of jihadist groups. However, neither the adoption of these measures, and with an increase in the operations of state security bodies, it seems that the jihadist threat has decreased. Moreover, the latest information from Morocco mark a step forward in the maneuvers of penetration by radical elements in state structures. These mining operations would be focusing on the military. However, there does not seem to be looking for create Intelligence Report: Fight against the Islamic State. Morocco a particular case AICS S.L. (B-86868825) Ferraz 39 4º izqda. 28008 Madrid - Spain
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active cells in the country, but to recruit individuals with the necessary military training to fight in Syrian and Iraqi fronts. The approximate number of Moroccans fighting under the banner of Harakat Sham al-Islam or the Islamic State, would exceed 2,000 troops. Although this information is very difficult to achieve, an amount as expressed would put Morocco as the North African country that provides more fighters for jihad in Syria and Iraq. But the concern of the Moroccan government, it is not focused only on those who can join jihadist ranks, but upon return of those who have been in the Syrian or Iraqi theater.
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SECURITY FACTOR We have talked before about one of the problems that soon could face Morocco: the return of those who are now fighting in Syria or Iraq; and certainly they are a severe blow to the country's stability and, by extension, of the region. The presence of Moroccans in the ranks of the jihadist groups operating in the Syrian conflict, although it is very difficult to achieve, it is considered to be one of the greatest of all the foreigners who struggle against the forces of Bashar al-Assad. Moreover, this issue has been the fastest growing in the last two years. In 2012, for example, it was estimated that Moroccan fighters, both those coming directly from Morocco and those living outside the country, did not exceed 200 troops. In late 2014, this figure would exceed 2,000, while it is true that there have been numerous casualties, estimated in late August of that year at 90, according to jihadists sources, and 200 according to the Syrian government. In any case, the number of those who are expected to return to their place of origin or to the diasporas around Europe, remains alarmingly high. Round trip There is a fundamental premise for understanding the enable alert in Morocco: Moroccan traveling to Syria do it but to return home. The idea of being able to settle permanently in a hypothetical case of victory over the troops of al-Assad, is something only be contemplated by 5% of those now are engaged in the conflict. However, the severity of the problem should not be associated only to the fact, already important, of the return; but the reasons for the departure which, moreover, can condition or justify the aggressive behavior more than likely when back home. As has happened in some European countries with large Muslim communities in their territories, the call to jihad by radical groups fighting in Syria, and later reiterated by the leader of the Islamic State, has been one of the factors that has led many Muslims to join the rebel ranks. However, Morocco has observed the existence of another factor that, willing to compare with the above mentioned, may have been as decisive or maybe more. Analyzing the origin of a majority of Moroccans whose presence in Syria is confirmed, it is reported that many of them have undergone periods of imprisonment, in Moroccan prisons and in other countries that then have them extradited. Another group is of those who, having already fulfilled their periods of detention, have been released without possibility of achieving the reintegration into society, because of the rejection of population to their cause. Finally, the third group would consist of those who have never been in prison but are under tight control by state security services. In any of the three cases, the feeling of rejection and oppression they experience, instead of making them to change their ideas, produces a radicalization of them, a fact that is used by radical cells to attract them to the armed cause. It is, at this time of capture, when the term jihad appears more strongly as justification for fighting. According to Intelligence Report: Fight against the Islamic State. Morocco a particular case AICS S.L. (B-86868825) Ferraz 39 4ยบ izqda. 28008 Madrid - Spain
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the precepts established by the first Caliph, Abu Bakr, among other constraints that can make a call to jihad there is when declared only in defense of the cause of Allah. The approach that radical groups give to their cause, and especially to get new members, is based precisely on this concept. Incarceration, social rejection and isolation, are understood not as a reaction to the person, but as an affront to these basic precepts of Islam. This perception also is accentuated with every action of security forces against jihadist cells. Thus, with individual interpretations of the situation on one side; and an interested manipulation of reality, on the other, the result is recruiting new fighters ready to fight against the infidel. If are observed the numbers of arrests in Europe and North Africa, from individuals close to radical groups (those that have not yet been integrated in the group), and the estimated number of fighters from each of those countries that are fighting in Syria, the result is that in those nations with more policing, the number of volunteers is greater. Moreover, this difference grows precisely in Muslim countries, where the pressure is incomprehensible to the radicals. Involuntary contributors In parallel to the efforts of radical groups to recruit new members, there is a phenomenon that acts as a multiplier of the jihadist propaganda: media. When developed the Social Factor of this problem in Morocco, it has spoken of the greater penetration of radical networks on the population of lower and rural classes. Following this statement, Morocco has a serious problem of slums, with authentic villages in the suburbs of large cities, where thousands of people live in unsanitary conditions and virtually abandoned by the government. However, next to the houses of wooden planks and plastic roofs, there is an incredible and amazing proliferation of satellite dishes. With their televisions illegally connected to the electrical distribution poles, the inhabitants of these Moroccan slums have the opportunity to discover each other's lives and Morocco, while consuming propaganda launched from East narrating oppression allegedly suffered by defenders of Islam. Each news of atrocities in Syria or Iraq is a grain that fills the barn where radicalism feeds from. The images of members of jihadist groups with more or less sophisticated weaponry, the list of its victories over the battlefield and the explanation of its expansion plans are the basis for action on the consciences of that population with very high levels of illiteracy, who are governed by the principle of action reaction, ie graphic symbol and representation in their everyday lives. To this television phenomenon must be added the social networks and the Internet in general. Aware of this powerful propaganda tool, jihadist groups have learned to use the offered possibility with great skills.
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THE RETURN The most critical moment that will face Morocco is the return of those who have been fighting on the Syrian front. It has been specified above that not all Moroccans who fight primarily under the banner of Harakat Sham al-Islam, come from Morocco; diasporas established in many European countries have also generously contributed to increasing jihadist ranks. However, at the time to return after months of struggle, must be considered the possibility that they do not seek the reintegration into the social colonies, but they decide to return to their homeland, Morocco. This decision, which is considered highly probable, would be encouraged by the difference in security measures in Europe compared to those presented by Morocco. In turn, the permeability of the Moroccan borders, especially in its southern part, favors the entry into the country without serious risk of being detected. Once in Morocco it is easier to move up to their hometowns. Over 80% of these fighters come from Tangier, Tetouan and Fnideq, which represents a threat not only for Morocco, but to Spain and specifically for the autonomous cities of Ceuta and Melilla. Those returning from Syria have two characteristics that give them an the implicit danger. On the one hand, for a long time they have managed to acquire a military experience that, in many cases, can be higher in comparison to those who have to face them in Morocco. Moreover, this period in Syria has also served as a time of indoctrination, with a constant bombing of radical propaganda, supported by the successes in the battlefield. These two factors have caused, without any doubt, a change in their mindset and a radicalization in their beliefs that inevitably will try to apply in their new environment. For the return, the is generally used Turkish route as a point of departure from Syria, and then integrated into logistics networks deployed along Europe and North Africa. These same networks, perfectly organized, provide fake passports with which to travel to their destinations. Those who have been more committed to the jihadist cause, are usually selected to continue their fight once in their destination countries. Another aspect that influences the selection, is related to the militant group who have been fighting with. Generally, Moroccans tend to swell the ranks of Harakat Sham al-Islam, basically due to affinity of origin (remember that 90% of its members come from Morocco), although it has been detected the presence of individuals of this nationality in other groups such as the Islamic State, Ahrar al-Sham or Jahbat al-Nusra. In 2013, for example, a Moroccan, Abu Ayman al-Gharbi, carried out a suicide attack in Homs under the flag of Jahbat al-Nusra. On another occasion, in July 2013, a young Moroccan possibly from Tetouan, whose pen name was Abu al-Baraa al-Maghribi2,
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Termination al-Maghribi is common to many of Moroccan fighters, as a way of identifying their nationality.
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who fought in the ranks of the Islamic State, died during the fighting in the suburbs of Aleppo. Abu al-Baraa would be rated as the Moroccan martyr. There are cases of soldiers from Morocco who have come to occupy important positions within the jihadist groups in Syria. Such is the case of Abu Usama alMaghribi3, considered one of the leaders of the Islamic State, who died in Tel Jijan in March 2014, during fighting between the Islamic State and Jahbat al-Nusra. These examples are to illustrate the potential danger posed to Morocco, and by extension to its neighboring countries, especially Spain, on the massive return of fighters. The theory of the lone wolf For the West, and by extension for those countries suffering or who may suffer an uncontrolled return of combatants, the biggest threat could come from those who have been called lone wolves. Technically, these individuals who carry out suicide actions in their homes, do not belong to any organization or are part of any organized group; it seems that they only serve their ideological dictates. However, it is not considered that this definition is completely accurate, and less applicable for those returning from conflict zones. There is no doubt of the existence of individuals that unilaterally undertake specific terrorist acts, usually of suicidal nature, against targets considered sensitive. This type of terrorism, which is qualified as such by the means employed and the target chosen, is common to all types of criminal environment, not having to be necessarily linked to any organization or armed group. In the case of attacks following this modus operandi, that have been achieved so far (with radical religious base), all who have been involved have maintained some sort of relationship with radical groups or organizations. Periodically, these individuals have attended meetings and assemblies where doctrines of Islamist policy were given with arguments in defense of traditional Islam against Western oppression. There is no record, for obvious reasons, about the level of indoctrination that these individuals have suffered or the influence, direct or indirect, that such attendance at these meetings may have had in their final action but, undoubtedly, they have not finished running their criminal action by self motivation. Going deeper, it is easy to deduce the need for support, either logistical or of knowledge, which they have needed to prepare their deadly cargo. Similarly, the choice of target is not considered something casual or decided by the suicide himself. However, it is true, or at least considered appropriate, that these individuals had a serious lack of personality, which make them to be in a constant feeling of insecurity 3
Abu Usama was considered an influential person (with power) within the ranks of the Islamic State. In fact, there are pictures of him accompanying Abu Omar al-Chichani, leader of Caucasian fighters, Jaish alMuhajireen
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that would seek remedy within their religious circle. Individuals would be immerse in an inconsequential life, beset by a great desire of play an important role that is stopped by a high lack of initiative. Attendance at these venues is therefore the factor that pushes them to carry out their action, assimilating the fact of committing the attack as a public claim of their existence, produced by overfeeding their ego that triggers a feeling of superiority over those considered as enemies. In particular those who fought in Syria or Iraq are not considered that conform the option of acting under this pattern. The training received during their time in Syria, coupled with the indoctrination and acquired discipline, are factors that prevent these individuals from take action unilaterally. On the other hand, those who expressed a desire to continue the struggle, are quickly integrated into clandestine cells. Separate issue is that in certain cases, the possibility of a lone wolf is a solution to cover other deficiencies or errors in security. In the case of Morocco, the figure of the lone wolf is almost impossible to appear. The insight that radical groups have in the lower strata of the population, allows them to keep a close control on those seeking to carry out attacks individually, so that if the individual persists in his suicidal idea, this could work in the benefit of the organization. He will be integrated into a group and trained to prepare the action, instructing him about the target and timing of attack.
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INTERNATIONAL POSITIONING In early November, Morocco stated its official support to the coalition of countries fighting the Islamic State, although this was reduced to intelligence work and logistic support. However, it was necessary to make this move from Rabat to keep the support of the European Union as well as US military aid, especially when Morocco is known present in the target list of the terrorist group of al-Baghdadi. Furthermore, the invitation received in Rabat from the Gulf Cooperation Council, also helped the Alawite kingdom being forced to position on the coalition side. Undoubtedly, Mohamed VI cannot afford to break his ties with the powerful Arab countries of the Council; political and economic reasons command. In this regard, it is to remember the injection of aid amounting to US$ 5 bn., received from the Cooperation Council in 2012, just after a tour of Mohamed VI by some member countries. In parallel, countries such as United Arab Emirates and Qatar have made great investments in Morocco, although Rabat feels more comfortable with the relations with Abu Dhabi, especially by their common interest in fighting the Muslim Brotherhood, than with Doha, who in addition to allegedly supporting Islamist groups, has made a coverage of the Sahara conflict through the television network al-Jazeera, which has not been welcomed by Mohamed VI. However, besides the political obligations undertaken by the King himself, when seeking financial aid for his country, also underlie other national interests at regional level that are more important to the Alawite kingdom. This national interest, can be seen behind the joint statements of total rejection of terrorism, made after the meeting of Arab Interior Ministers held in Marrakech in early March 2014. The fact that this rejection includes all types terrorism, will certainly be used by Mohamed VI when the situation demands. And, despite having suffered a blow of Al-Qaeda with several attacks, for the Alawite monarch, real and tangible danger is much closer. The problem of the Sahara, with the involvement of the Polisario Front, which for Morocco is a terrorist organization, and the support of Algeria to the armed group, are the main concern and surely, Mohamed VI will eventually include it in that spectrum as open and as defined such as all kinds of terrorism. However, despite this positioning in the background within the international block that attempts to curb the Islamic State, Morocco will have to make an effort to produce clearer results. The countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council may end by forcing its more active contribution, if Rabat wants to continue enjoying their aid. In fact, much as the King flaunt to be one of the few Muslim countries that has managed to slam the Arab Spring first and the radical groups after, what is certain is the fact that Morocco is one of leading supplier of fighters for the Salafist groups. The black triangle formed by the cities of Tangier, Tetouan and Fnideq, is the meeting point and departure for those who want to travel to the Syrian front. Most Moroccans Intelligence Report: Fight against the Islamic State. Morocco a particular case AICS S.L. (B-86868825) Ferraz 39 4ยบ izqda. 28008 Madrid - Spain
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who now are confirmed to fill the ranks of Harakat Sham al-Islam, the Islamic State or Jahbat al-Nusra, are natives of any of these three cities. But this triangle capture not only serves for nationals to join the jihadist groups, but is the entry point for foreigners seeking the same goal. This group includes the Spanish who have been arrested during their approach maneuvers to Jihadist environment. On the other hand, the existence of contacts between members of Harakat Sham alIslam and the Algerian Abu Abdellah (very close to the dome of Al-Qaeda) and the Libyan Abdelbaset Azzuz, makes the situation should be of great interest. Azzuz is supposedly who controls the transport networks of fighters between Syria and Morocco, through Algeria and Libya. It is not considered that currently Morocco is in danger of being involved in a wave of terrorist attacks, however, depends on how events unfold in Syria and, by reflex, Libya, so that the situation could worsen. At that time, the country can be found in an awkward position. If Libya, undergoing a process of splitting and breakage of cohesion as a country, eventually succumbing to the stakes of the Salafist groups, incidentally sponsored by the Islamic State, the next step may be to move towards the west. For these reasons, it is important that Rabat anticipates to these possible scenarios, and take more active measures. It should identify the real reasons that lead so many young people to join the ranks of Harakat Sham al-Islam, while it is imperative to destroy the core of social support that radical groups have in the country. Morocco is the last line of separation before a hypothetical approach to European by jihadists armed groups and should act as such.
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Intelligence Report: Fight against the Islamic State. Morocco a particular case AICS S.L. (B-86868825) Ferraz 39 4ยบ izqda. 28008 Madrid - Spain
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