Ethics | 2020 Vision for a Sustainable Society

Page 1

2020 VISION FOR A SUSTAINABLE SOCIETY

MELBOURNE SUSTAINABLE SOCIETY INSTITUTE


The Melbourne Sustainable Society Institute (MSSI) at the University of Melbourne, Australia, brings together researchers from different disciplines to help create a more sustainable society. It acts as an information portal for research at the University of Melbourne, and as a collaborative platform where researchers and communities can work together to affect positive change. This book can be freely accessed from MSSI’s website: www.sustainable.unimelb.edu.au.


Cite as: Pearson, C.J. (editor) (2012). 2020: Vision for a Sustainable Society. Melbourne Sustainable Society Institute, University of Melbourne Published by Melbourne Sustainable Society Institute in 2012 Ground Floor Alice Hoy Building (Blg 162) Monash Road The University of Melbourne, Parkville Victoria 3010, Australia Text and copyright © Melbourne Sustainable Society Institute All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior permission of the publisher. A Cataloguing-in-Publication entry is available from the catalogue of the National Library of Australia at www.nla.gov.au 2020: Vision for a Sustainable Society, ISBN: 978-0-7340-4773-1 (pbk) Produced with Affirm Press www.affirmpress.com.au Cover and text design by Anne-Marie Reeves www.annemariereeves.com Illustrations on pages 228–231 by Michael Weldon www.michaelweldon.com Cover image © Brad Calkins | Dreamstime.com Proudly printed in Australia by BPA Print Group


Foreword

T

he last two centuries have seen extraordinary improvements in the quality of human lives. Most people on earth today enjoy access to the necessities of life that was once available only to the elites. Most people enjoy longevity, health, education, information and opportunities to experience the variety of life on earth that was denied even to the rulers of yesteryear. The proportion of humanity living in absolute poverty remains daunting, but continues to fall decade by decade. The early 21st century has delivered an acceleration of the growth in living standards in the most populous developing countries and an historic lift in the trend of economic growth in the regions that had lagged behind, notably in Africa. These beneficent developments are accompanied by another reality. The improvements are not sustainable unless we make qualitative changes in the content of economic growth. The continuation of the current relationship between growth in the material standard of living and pressures on the natural environment will undermine economic growth, political

stability and the foundations of human achievement. The good news is that humanity has already discovered and begun to apply the knowledge that can reconcile continued improvements in the standard of living with reduction of pressures on the natural environment. The bad news is that the changes that are necessary to make high and rising standards of living sustainable are hard to achieve within our current political cultures and systems. Hard, but not impossible. That is a central message from this book, drawn out in Craig Pearson’s concluding chapter. This book introduces the reader to the many dimesions of sustainability, through wellqualified authors. Climate change is only one mechanism through which current patterns of economic growth threaten the natural systems on which our prosperity depend. It is simply the most urgent of the existential threats. Climate change is a special challenge for Australians. We are the most vulnerable of the

v


developed countries to climate change. And we are the developed country with the highest level of greenhouse gas emissions per person. There are roles for private ethical decisions as well as public policy choices in dealing with the climate change challenge. This book is released at the time of ‘Rio+20’, a conference in Brazil to review the relatively poor progress we have made towards sustainability in the past 20 years, and soon after the introduction of Australia’s first comprehensive policy response to the global challenge of climate change. Australia’s emissions trading scheme with an initially fixed price for emissions permits comes into effect on 1 July 2012. The new policy discourages activities that generate greenhouse gases by putting a price on emissions. The revenue raised by carbon pricing will be returned to households and businesses in ways that retain incentives to reduce emissions. Part of the revenue will be used to encourage production and use of goods and services that embody low emissions. The policy has been launched in controversy. Interests that stand to gain from the discrediting of the policy argue that it is unnecessary either because the case for global action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and the associated climate change has not been proven, or that the new policy places a disproportionate burden on Australians. The health of our civilisation requires us to bring scientific knowledge to account in public policy. Everyone who shares the knowledge that is the common heritage of humanity has

vi

a responsibility to explain the realities to others wherever and whenever they can. The argument that the new policy places a disproportionate burden on Australians can be answered by seeking honestly to understand what others are doing. The critics of Australian policy argue that the world’s two largest national emitters of greenhouse gases, China and the United States, are doing little or nothing to reduce emissions, so that it is either pointless or unnecessary for us to do so. China has advanced a long way towards achieving its target of reducing emissions as a proportion of economic output by 40 to 45 per cent between 2005 and 2020. It has done this by forcing the closure of emissions-intensive plants and processes that have exceptionally high levels of emissions per unit of output, by imposing high emissions standards on new plants and processes, by charging emissionsintensive activities higher electricity prices, by subsidising the introduction of low-emissions activities, and by new and higher taxes on fossil fuels. China has introduced trials of an emissions trading system in five major cities and two provinces. This adds up to a cost on business and the community that exceeds any burden placed on Australians by the new policies – bearing in mind that the revenue from Australian carbon pricing is returned to households and businesses. The US Government has advised the international community of its domestic policy target to reduce 2005 emissions by 17 per cent by 2020. President Barack Obama said


to the Australian Parliament that all countries should take seriously the targets that they had reported to the international community, and made it clear that the United States did so. United States efforts to reduce emissions are diffuse but far-reaching. They now include controls on emissions from electricity generators, announced in March 2012, effectively excluding any new coal-based power generation after the end of this year unless it embodies carbon capture and storage. From the beginning of next year they will include an emissions trading system in the most populous and economically largest state, California. The United States is making reasonable progress towards reaching its emissions reduction goals, with some actions imposing high costs on domestic households and businesses. Australia has now taken steps through which we can do our fair share in the international effort, at reasonable cost. It would be much harder and more costly to do our fair share without the policies that are soon to take effect. What Australians do over the next few years will have a significant influence on humanity’s prospects for handing on the benefits of modern civilisation to future generations. This book will help Australians to understand their part in the global effort for sustainability. Ross Garnaut University of Melbourne 15 April 2012

vii


Contents Foreword by Ross Garnaut Table of Contents

v viii

Author Biographies

x

Drivers

1

1 Population Rebecca Kippen and Peter McDonald

2

2 Equity Helen Sykes

10

3 Consumption Craig Pearson

17

4 Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Climate Change David Karoly

27

5 Energy Peter Seligman

37

People

47

6

Ethics Craig Prebble

48

7

Culture Audrey Yue and Rimi Khan

57

8

Awareness and Behaviour Angela Paladino

64

9

Local Matters Matter Kate Auty

70

10 Public Wisdom Tim van Gelder

79

11 Mental Health Grant Blashki

86

12 Disease Peter Doherty

94

13 Corporate Sustainability Liza Maimone

104

14 Governance John Brumby

114

viii


Natural Resources

123

15 Ecosystem-Based Adaptation Rodney Keenan

124

16 Water Hector Malano and Brian Davidson

132

17 Food Sunday McKay and Rebecca Ford

141

18 Zero Carbon Land-Use Chris Taylor and Adrian Whitehead

150

Cities

161

19 Changing Cities Peter Newman and Carolyn Ingvarson

162

20 Affordable Living Thomas Kvan and Justyna Karakiewicz

170

21 Built Environment Pru Sanderson

177

22 Infrastructure Colin Duffield

184

23 Transport Monique Conheady

192

24 Adaptive Design Ray Green

200

25 Handling Disasters Alan March

210

Outcomes

221

26 Twenty Actions Craig Pearson

222

Further Reading

234

Index

241

ix


06 Ethics Craig Prebble

S

ustainability is a moral issue that is global rather than confined to a community or region. As such we can think of it as a moral singularity, a point at which our ‘business as usual’ moral norms break down and no longer hold good, just as the atomic bombs in 1945 have punctured the world’s moral fabric. There are two aspects to this moral singularity. Firstly, we have already seen ‘the end of nature’. Because of global climate change, we can no longer speak of there being ‘wild nature’ anywhere, that is, nature untouched by human hand. As Bill McKibben wrote in The End of Nature in 1989, humans have ‘overpowered in a century the processes that have been slowly evolving and changing of their own accord since the earth was born’. Secondly, we now live with a new burden of global responsibility for our actions. The concept of an ecological footprint vividly presents each of us with a planetary equivalent: ‘If everyone lived as I do’. The lifestyles of most Australians, for example, far exceed earth’s capacity to sustain. The call to action is: ‘Think globally, act locally’. But thinking globally is not only difficult, it runs counter to human experience for the last 200,000 years. If the

48

scientist James Lovelock has convinced many that the earth is a self-regulating, complex system, how deeply is this vision of Gaia as a fragile and finite system really sinking in? In our predicament, facing this singularity, should we devise a totally new ethical system? Should we renounce all past and present moral theories as having failed us? Possibly. But sustainable ethics allow for a creative recycling of theories that can ‘close the loop’ that lets us evade our global responsibility.

The Circle Of Moral Concern Traditionally, ethical theory describes a moral circle as an area encompassing those whom we accord moral considerability. Environmental philosophy, informed by the science of ecology, has advocated for extending the scope of moral considerability to: a) all individual living things; b) a community of life-forms; c) collective entities, such as a species or an ecosystem; or d) nothing short of Gaia Herself. In any case, what does the circle itself say about us? The singularity of humans acting not only in but also on the world singles us out as


Ethics

a community of moral agents. We now form a global citizenry. In terms of considerability, then, there are three moral challenges to be met.

Cosmopolitan The citizen should be cosmopolitan. Here, this term refers to the idea that the peoples of all nations belong to a single moral community. Whatever local allegiances we may have, we are part of a global village and ought to be good villagers. Before the forming of virtual communities on the internet, theologian Karl Barth (1886–1968) spoke of the ‘distant neighbour’, the foreigner with whom we share the planet, along with our nearer compatriots.

Ecological The sustainable citizen should also be ecological. We should understand ourselves to be but one species, among myriad others, within ecosystems that together comprise an integrated biosphere. But this way of thinking also goes against the cognitive grain. The default tendency of thought is still to see ourselves as the central and most important species.

Intergenerational The sustainable citizen should be intergenerational, and show concern for those who come after. This has become crucial due to the delayed effects of present actions, such as carbon forcing that will raise temperatures

Extending the circle of moral concern.

49


2020

decades into the future, even if we reduce our greenhouse gases (GHGs) today. If we can say that our young people today have the right to a good future, can we also say that an unborn person also has this right? The legal philosopher Richard Hiskes argues for a ‘human right to a green future’, specifically an ‘environmental entitlement to clean air, water, and soil’. He argues, however, that we can only recognise this right for the descendants of our own community. But what about the global community? The sustainable citizen must do, and must be, better than that.

The Virtuous Circle Of Ethics Do I have to be cosmopolitan, ecological and intergenerational? Why? These are questions of normative ethics – the ethics that prescribe behaviour and stipulate what one ought to do. In the philosophical tradition, there are three main types of normative theories: deontological theories (duty-based, for short) consequentialist theories (outcome-based) and virtue theories (character-based). I will outline each type as it relates to sustainability ethics.

Duties Duty-based theories identify our rights and duties as encapsulated in moral rules. These rules are obligatory and must be obeyed irrespective of the value of their consequences. But even if duties and rights theories work for humans, they will not necessarily work when we consider non-human entities. An animal or an ecosystem is not a moral agent, bound with us in bonds of reciprocity. A more fundamental

50

drawback lies in seeing moral problems in terms of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’. Many moral problems involve choosing between the ‘lesser of two evils’ or between different actions that each have good arguments in their favour. It would not be permissible, according to a strict ‘duty to not destroy’, to destroy something of lesser value (say, a pest species) in order to save something of greater value (such as a native species). But environmental dilemmas often demand that we make such choices. Finally, duty theories stake out the minimal requirements only. A duty tells us that to do any less is blameworthy. It is silent about those actions that are morally good to do without it being bad not to do them.

Outcomes Outcome-based ethics has recently been recycled by philosophers. Australian Peter Singer opts for a modified form called preference utilitarianism. Here, the good in any situation is that which leads to the greatest net satisfaction of preferences, namely, the preferences satisfied minus the preferences unsatisfied. Singer simply extends moral concern beyond humans to include, for example, animals, arguing for impartiality and consistency. But what ‘preferences’ can we attribute to, say, a tree or an ecosystem or a species? It seems a stretch. Outcome-based theories do have strengths: they are adaptable and they can readily tackle the fine details of moral quandaries. But what if the consequences are not fully known or not fully foreseeable due to uncertainty? This is the case with the challenge of climate change.


Ethics

Virtues The third type of normative theory, and arguably the oldest, virtue ethics, has also been recycled in recent decades. It asks the key question: ‘What kind of person should I be?’ A virtue is a disposition to behave in a certain way where this is a character trait considered to be morally excellent. This was given its classical formulation by the ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle. He considers the point of all virtue to be eudaimonia, a word best translated as ‘human flourishing’. We flourish when our lives are aligned with what is good for us, so that we behave well and we fare well. Virtues refer you not to immediate selfinterest but to your life. Our virtues function as moral habits that stake out the parameters of what it is good to do. Crucially, in the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle defines virtue as ‘a state of character involving choice’, rather than obedience to a rule or the operation of a calculus of outcomes. It wasn’t a rule-based or outcome-based argument that ended slavery. It was moral sentiments and society’s questioning of its own values. It ended when people said in their hearts, ‘I am simply not the kind of person who could bear to own a slave, or who will condone slavery.’ What if, in practice, we can’t be motivated to extend the circle of moral concern? In what sense is the claim that we should extend it morally binding? Considering outcomes can help where we need compromise or harm minimisation but outcomes can be difficult or even impossible to determine. What can guide us then? Both outcome-based and duty-based

Switching off can be habit-forming, and character-building.

theories tend to run into a limit when it comes to future generations, and also when trying to consider nature separately from human interests and needs. For this reason, virtue ethics is necessary if we are to respond to the moral singularity. In this way, the three types of normative ethics oscillate in a ‘virtuous circle’, reinforcing their respective merits and optimising their applications. Consider the components of a moral action: Component: Example: a value ‘old-growth forests are beautiful’, or ‘they are vital carbon sinks’, etc. an action/behaviour ‘trying to save an old-growth forest’ your intention ‘to actually save that old growth forest’ your motive ‘saving it for its intrinsic value’, or ‘so as to receive the praise of others’, etc. the outcome ‘the forest is saved’, or ‘parts of it are saved’, or ‘it is all clearfelled’ a rule ‘you ought always (at least try to) save old-growth forests’

51


2020

Cultivate virtues and develop your character in order to flourish.

INTENTIONS & MOTIVES

virtue ethics

outcome-based ethics

Do what results in the best, or least worst, outcomes. RULES

OUTCOMES

Conform to a moral law: do your duty and respect rights.

duty-based ethics The virtuous circle: generating ‘oughts’ for sustainable ethics.

For duty-based ethics, if the rule is upheld, the outcomes will look after themselves. What good are motives in the absence of a rule to guide your decision to act? For outcome-based ethics, the intention is to maximise the outcome. What good are good motives, or the following of a rule, if they only lead us to a poor outcome? Virtue ethics, however, is able to harmonise intention and motive. It asks: ‘What does it say about you as a person if your motives are unvirtuous?’ The virtues are therefore necessary in order to provoke behaviour change subsequent to a value change. This is paramount when we consider the gap between endorsing sustainability values and the behaviour that would put these into action.

52

Sustainable Virtues So what are the virtues that promote sustainability? Ronald Sandler in 2007 offered a useful typology of 26 virtues within five categories. And Louke van Wensveen’s survey in 2000 compiled a seemingly exhaustive catalogue of some 189 ecological virtues, plus 174 vices. She claims that she has ‘yet to come across a piece of ecologically sensitive philosophy, theology, or ethics that does not in some way incorporate virtue language’. This can be shown, I believe, when we unpack the processes of virtuous reasoning. I follow Aristotle in identifying not only moral virtues but also intellectual virtues. The voice of conscience can be gagged but never


Ethics

silenced: you ought to dispose of litter properly. So too, the call to get things right is one we can’t help but hear: 2 + 2 ought to make 4. Intellectual virtues are extremely important for sustainability ethics. Take the example of climate change science. The findings of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change would have us pursue a course of GHG mitigation. Yet the science is complex. There is, however, a norm in operation that compels us to be as informed as we can be about the science, or at least to recognise a convergence towards consensus on the science. The inferences we make should then be consistent. If the earth is warming, and anthropogenic GHGs are largely responsible, then we ought to try to reduce these. I argue that the norms of justice are the link between the intellectual virtues and the moral

virtues. This is because the principle of equality translates into both consistency of thinking and consistency of behaving. It would be unjust to accept the urgency of greenhouse gas mitigation and then expect someone else, or some other nation, to do something about it. Here, justice is not a function of positing rights and corresponding duties. Rather, it’s an influence directly on one’s character. Any new environmental rights, then, will need the aid of new virtues if they are to be respected and upheld. But there are two dilemmas that seem to create an impasse here. The ‘tragedy of the commons’ can occur whenever there is a resource that is commonly shared but not owned by anybody. The classic case is of common grazing land that is shared by farmers: each farmer is tempted to increase the size of his/her own herd, to make more money;

NORMS of knowledge eg ‘Get informed.’

NORMS of moral value eg ‘Respect and love what is good.’

beliefs ‘I think that things are such-and-such.’

values and tastes ‘I like this. I admire this.’

‘Think well.’

intellectual virtues

INTENTIONS EMOTIONS MOTIVES

moral virtues

character ‘Be a person who does good and lives well.’

thinking ‘Be a person whose thinking is justified.’

NORMS of inference eg ‘Be consistent.’

‘Act well.’

NORMS of justice eg ‘Treat equal cases equally.’

NORMS of disposition eg ‘Be frugal.’

Moral virtues, intellectual virtues, and the norms.

53


2020

54


Ethics

but this collectively overgrazes the land for everyone. Self-interest leads to a poor outcome for all. The moral singularity we face is a tragedy of the ‘global commons’, namely our air, water and soil. To the extent that everyone freely but unsustainably uses these, they are placed at critical risk. Secondly, there is the problem of the ‘free rider’. If people en masse do decide to act better by reducing greenhouse gas emissions, any given individual might opt out and yet still receive the benefits – get a free ride. This tends to undermine the goodwill of the group. In the international context, we have seen how this can undermine efforts to institute a multilateral mitigation treaty.

ACTIONS FOR 2020 The lesson of the tragedy of the commons is the paradox that self-interest is not always served by each of us directly seeking our own interests. Self-transcending concern can be promoted by cultivating the virtues. If you try to be altruistic in all contexts, and put aside your own interests even if no one is doing likewise, you risk being a martyr and a mug. Sometimes, though, we may need to take that risk in order to raise the moral tone and to inspire others, including free riders. Virtue ethics can account for this, and it can show that this inspiration can integrate the individual’s intentions and motives while promoting a moral community that will maximise each individual’s welfare. In this way, the virtues are a public good and they promote general flourishing. It’s the ethical obligation of national leaders to lead for the good of the global village on

issues such as climate change. But until they come to that consensus there are nonetheless actions that sustainable citizens can take right now, in Australia, to help sharpen our moral vision for the future. In meeting the challenge of the moral singularity of sustainability, a key action is to develop and introduce a subject of ‘Sustainability Ethics’ into secondary schools. This subject would explore sustainability topics from an ethics perspective and with a focus on the role of virtues. There are programs of ‘ethics education’ in schools – for example, the work of the James Ethics Centre in NSW – which might cover the moral virtues and how they function. And ‘critical thinking’, which develops the intellectual virtues, has long been on the list of aims across the curriculum, though seldom taught as a stand-alone subject. ‘Sustainability Ethics’ would be different, and novel in its way of returning to first principles. If intellectual virtues could be coupled with moral virtues, by means of the dual schema derived from Aristotle, this could integrate the learning of content in the wider curriculum – such as the sciences, business subjects and humanities – with the development of character. ‘Sustainability Ethics’ for year 10 or 11 students (15–17 year olds) could be introduced at a single school as a case-study before being trialled and expanded. CSIRO’s CarbonKids initiative is an example of how this might spread. The integrative nature of the proposal – intellectual and moral virtues explored in a cross-curricular setting and with real world sustainability examples – means that any existing environmental programs, such as

55


2020

the Australian Sustainable Schools Initiative (AuSSI), could readily incorporate the subject. If all we pass on to future generations are ossified rules or cold calculations of utility, how sustainable is our moral legacy? The greatest gift we could bestow on those who will inherit the consequences of our present unsustainable habits might be a new tradition of virtues: moral habits that both foster sustainability and bolster a sustainable ethics, a moral system that future generations can, in turn, renew. One generation plants the trees; another gets the shade. Keep a green tree in your heart, and perhaps a singing bird will come. – Chinese proverb

56


Further Reading Ethics Aristotle (2011). Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, transl. Bartlett, R.C., Collins, S.D., University of Chicago Press. Gardiner, S. (2011). A perfect moral storm: the ethical tragedy of climate change, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hiskes, R. (2009). The human right to a green future: environmental rights and intergenerational justice, Cambridge University Press. McKibben, W. (1989). The End of Nature, Random House. Partridge, E. (2012). The Online Gadfly offers papers and links on topics of environmental ethics. http://gadfly.igc. org/index.htm Sandler, R. (2007). Character and environment: a virtue-oriented approach to environmental ethics, Columbia University Press. Singer, P. (2002). One world: the ethics of globalisation, Text Publishing. Van Wensveen, L. (2000). Dirty virtues: the emergence of ecological virtue ethics, Humanity Books.


Turn static files into dynamic content formats.

Create a flipbook
Issuu converts static files into: digital portfolios, online yearbooks, online catalogs, digital photo albums and more. Sign up and create your flipbook.