2020 VISION FOR A SUSTAINABLE SOCIETY
MELBOURNE SUSTAINABLE SOCIETY INSTITUTE
The Melbourne Sustainable Society Institute (MSSI) at the University of Melbourne, Australia, brings together researchers from different disciplines to help create a more sustainable society. It acts as an information portal for research at the University of Melbourne, and as a collaborative platform where researchers and communities can work together to affect positive change. This book can be freely accessed from MSSI’s website: www.sustainable.unimelb.edu.au.
Cite as: Pearson, C.J. (editor) (2012). 2020: Vision for a Sustainable Society. Melbourne Sustainable Society Institute, University of Melbourne Published by Melbourne Sustainable Society Institute in 2012 Ground Floor Alice Hoy Building (Blg 162) Monash Road The University of Melbourne, Parkville Victoria 3010, Australia Text and copyright © Melbourne Sustainable Society Institute All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior permission of the publisher. A Cataloguing-in-Publication entry is available from the catalogue of the National Library of Australia at www.nla.gov.au 2020: Vision for a Sustainable Society, ISBN: 978-0-7340-4773-1 (pbk) Produced with Affirm Press www.affirmpress.com.au Cover and text design by Anne-Marie Reeves www.annemariereeves.com Illustrations on pages 228–231 by Michael Weldon www.michaelweldon.com Cover image © Brad Calkins | Dreamstime.com Proudly printed in Australia by BPA Print Group
Foreword
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he last two centuries have seen extraordinary improvements in the quality of human lives. Most people on earth today enjoy access to the necessities of life that was once available only to the elites. Most people enjoy longevity, health, education, information and opportunities to experience the variety of life on earth that was denied even to the rulers of yesteryear. The proportion of humanity living in absolute poverty remains daunting, but continues to fall decade by decade. The early 21st century has delivered an acceleration of the growth in living standards in the most populous developing countries and an historic lift in the trend of economic growth in the regions that had lagged behind, notably in Africa. These beneficent developments are accompanied by another reality. The improvements are not sustainable unless we make qualitative changes in the content of economic growth. The continuation of the current relationship between growth in the material standard of living and pressures on the natural environment will undermine economic growth, political
stability and the foundations of human achievement. The good news is that humanity has already discovered and begun to apply the knowledge that can reconcile continued improvements in the standard of living with reduction of pressures on the natural environment. The bad news is that the changes that are necessary to make high and rising standards of living sustainable are hard to achieve within our current political cultures and systems. Hard, but not impossible. That is a central message from this book, drawn out in Craig Pearson’s concluding chapter. This book introduces the reader to the many dimesions of sustainability, through wellqualified authors. Climate change is only one mechanism through which current patterns of economic growth threaten the natural systems on which our prosperity depend. It is simply the most urgent of the existential threats. Climate change is a special challenge for Australians. We are the most vulnerable of the
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developed countries to climate change. And we are the developed country with the highest level of greenhouse gas emissions per person. There are roles for private ethical decisions as well as public policy choices in dealing with the climate change challenge. This book is released at the time of ‘Rio+20’, a conference in Brazil to review the relatively poor progress we have made towards sustainability in the past 20 years, and soon after the introduction of Australia’s first comprehensive policy response to the global challenge of climate change. Australia’s emissions trading scheme with an initially fixed price for emissions permits comes into effect on 1 July 2012. The new policy discourages activities that generate greenhouse gases by putting a price on emissions. The revenue raised by carbon pricing will be returned to households and businesses in ways that retain incentives to reduce emissions. Part of the revenue will be used to encourage production and use of goods and services that embody low emissions. The policy has been launched in controversy. Interests that stand to gain from the discrediting of the policy argue that it is unnecessary either because the case for global action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and the associated climate change has not been proven, or that the new policy places a disproportionate burden on Australians. The health of our civilisation requires us to bring scientific knowledge to account in public policy. Everyone who shares the knowledge that is the common heritage of humanity has
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a responsibility to explain the realities to others wherever and whenever they can. The argument that the new policy places a disproportionate burden on Australians can be answered by seeking honestly to understand what others are doing. The critics of Australian policy argue that the world’s two largest national emitters of greenhouse gases, China and the United States, are doing little or nothing to reduce emissions, so that it is either pointless or unnecessary for us to do so. China has advanced a long way towards achieving its target of reducing emissions as a proportion of economic output by 40 to 45 per cent between 2005 and 2020. It has done this by forcing the closure of emissions-intensive plants and processes that have exceptionally high levels of emissions per unit of output, by imposing high emissions standards on new plants and processes, by charging emissionsintensive activities higher electricity prices, by subsidising the introduction of low-emissions activities, and by new and higher taxes on fossil fuels. China has introduced trials of an emissions trading system in five major cities and two provinces. This adds up to a cost on business and the community that exceeds any burden placed on Australians by the new policies – bearing in mind that the revenue from Australian carbon pricing is returned to households and businesses. The US Government has advised the international community of its domestic policy target to reduce 2005 emissions by 17 per cent by 2020. President Barack Obama said
to the Australian Parliament that all countries should take seriously the targets that they had reported to the international community, and made it clear that the United States did so. United States efforts to reduce emissions are diffuse but far-reaching. They now include controls on emissions from electricity generators, announced in March 2012, effectively excluding any new coal-based power generation after the end of this year unless it embodies carbon capture and storage. From the beginning of next year they will include an emissions trading system in the most populous and economically largest state, California. The United States is making reasonable progress towards reaching its emissions reduction goals, with some actions imposing high costs on domestic households and businesses. Australia has now taken steps through which we can do our fair share in the international effort, at reasonable cost. It would be much harder and more costly to do our fair share without the policies that are soon to take effect. What Australians do over the next few years will have a significant influence on humanity’s prospects for handing on the benefits of modern civilisation to future generations. This book will help Australians to understand their part in the global effort for sustainability. Ross Garnaut University of Melbourne 15 April 2012
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Contents Foreword by Ross Garnaut Table of Contents
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Author Biographies
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Drivers
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1 Population Rebecca Kippen and Peter McDonald
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2 Equity Helen Sykes
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3 Consumption Craig Pearson
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4 Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Climate Change David Karoly
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5 Energy Peter Seligman
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People
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Ethics Craig Prebble
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Culture Audrey Yue and Rimi Khan
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Awareness and Behaviour Angela Paladino
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Local Matters Matter Kate Auty
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10 Public Wisdom Tim van Gelder
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11 Mental Health Grant Blashki
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12 Disease Peter Doherty
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13 Corporate Sustainability Liza Maimone
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14 Governance John Brumby
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Natural Resources
123
15 Ecosystem-Based Adaptation Rodney Keenan
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16 Water Hector Malano and Brian Davidson
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17 Food Sunday McKay and Rebecca Ford
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18 Zero Carbon Land-Use Chris Taylor and Adrian Whitehead
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Cities
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19 Changing Cities Peter Newman and Carolyn Ingvarson
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20 Affordable Living Thomas Kvan and Justyna Karakiewicz
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21 Built Environment Pru Sanderson
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22 Infrastructure Colin Duffield
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23 Transport Monique Conheady
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24 Adaptive Design Ray Green
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25 Handling Disasters Alan March
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Outcomes
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26 Twenty Actions Craig Pearson
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Further Reading
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Index
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01 Population Rebecca Kippen and Peter McDonald
T
he population of Australia and the world almost tripled from 1950 to 2012. Australia’s population increased from 8 million to 23 million, while the global population rose from 2.5 billion to 7.1 billion. National and global population will continue to increase for at least several decades to come, a reality that must be met with policies for sustainable population. The 2011 Laxenburg Declaration on Population and Sustainable Development notes that levels of consumption internationally will rise as populations grow and efforts to reduce poverty continue, particularly in developing countries. The Declaration further argues that growth must be properly managed to avoid placing additional strain on the natural environment.
Global Population It is estimated that the world reached 1 billion people in 1804, that it took another 118 years to add the second billion, and only 37 years to hit the three billion mark in 1959. Since then, each billion has been added in 15 years or less; in fact, it took only 12 years to increase from 6 to 7 billion. This phenomenal rise in population has resulted largely from declining death rates. In
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1900, the average world citizen could expect to live for around 30 years. By the middle of the 20th century, life expectancy had increased to 48 years, and by the early 21st century, the average life span is almost 70. Most of the decrease in mortality has occurred at younger ages, so that more babies are surviving to adulthood to have children of their own. Concerns in the mid-20th century that rapid population growth would threaten global security led to the introduction of familyplanning programs by international agencies and national governments. These programs successfully reduced the high birth rates of many developing countries. However, although birth rates have fallen dramatically in many countries, the world population will continue to grow as a result of young population age structures caused by past high birth rates. Growing populations are like large, heavy freight trains: they take a long time to stop once the brakes are applied. This is known as population momentum. It is projected that, globally, births will continue to exceed deaths for most of this century. The United Nations projects that the world’s population could peak at around 10 billion by the end of the century. Bongaarts and
Population
Bulatao estimated that population momentum itself will be responsible for 56 per cent of population growth over the 21st century, with declining mortality contributing 27 per cent, and continuing high birth rates only 16 per cent. Growth is highly segregated by region. Developing countries with recent or continuing high birth rates will continue to experience rapid population growth, while many European and East Asian countries are facing or are already experiencing population decline due to past low birth rates. Sixty-one per cent of developed countries reported in the 2009 United Nations survey of World Population Policies that their national fertility rates are too low, and 55 per cent reported that they have policies in place to increase fertility rates. These countries do not consider their low birth rates, and the prospect (or reality) of population decline, to be sustainable. High population growth in some regions, while others face population falls, will almost certainly create an increased market for international migrants from the former to the latter. However, this shift will not be a cureall for either sending or receiving countries. Population growth in some regions will be so large that only a small proportion will be absorbed by countries prepared to increase their immigrant intake. In addition, political realities mean that most receiving countries will not accept large numbers of immigrants to the extent that they fundamentally change the ethnic composition of the population. Barring catastrophe, the world’s population will continue to grow through the 21st century,
perhaps grinding to a halt by the century’s end if average birth rates continue to fall. Policy should continue to focus on reducing high birth rates in developing countries, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and the Pacific. However, this is not a short-term solution. As stated previously, most global population growth over the current century is already built into the age structure of the world’s population. Policy must deal with the reality of continuing rapid population growth in many developing countries, and overall global growth.
Australia’s Population In Australia, population growth since 1950 has resulted from a combination of relatively high levels of net migration, the post-World War II baby boom, and, to a lesser extent, increases in life expectancy. Levels of net overseas migration between 1950 and 2010 are shown in Figure 1. Evidently, net migration is subject to considerable fluctuation from year to year. The low points of migration to Australia tend to coincide with economic downturns in Australia, but the high points, while generally occurring in good economic times, are less directly associated with the economic cycle. Since 2005, net migration to Australia has rapidly increased, due to a rise in temporary residents consisting mainly of international students and temporary skilled workers. The Department of Immigration and Citizenship projects that net overseas migration over the five years from 2010 will stabilise at a lower level of around 180,000 to 190,000 per annum.
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2020
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Figure 1. Annual net overseas migration, Australia, 1950–2010 Figure 2. Total fertility rate, Australia, 1950–2010 Figure 3. Life expectancy at birth, Australia, 1950–2010
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The peak in Australia’s fertility rate since 1950 was 3.6 children per woman in 1961 (Figure 2). The rate fell in the second half of the 1960s and then again in the second half of the 1970s to reach 1.9 children per woman by 1979. Since 1980, Australia’s fertility rate has remained relatively constant at between 1.7 and 1.9 births per woman. Although these birth rates are relatively low, they are sufficient to maintain growth in Australia’s population for several decades to come because of the high proportion of young, child-bearing people. Life expectancy in Australia rose during the 1950s, but levelled out in the 1960s (Figure 3). At that time, analysts speculated that we had come close to the limits of the human life span. However, since the 1960s, expectation of life in Australia has increased significantly, to 80 years for males and 84 years for females in 2008–10. More than 80 per cent of this increase is due to declines in mortality over the age of 50 years, since mortality at younger ages was already close to zero. Death rates under the age of 50 are now so low that complete elimination of mortality would have no noticeable effect on the size of the population at those ages. Figure 4 shows the age–sex structure of the Australian population in 2010, with each bar representing a single year of age. The large population at age 63, as compared to age 64, indicates the beginning of the post-World War II baby boom. The ‘bulges’ around 40 and in the late 40s result from peaks in births in the early 1960s and early 1970s. Recent high levels of net temporary migration of students and workers have caused the heaping centred
around age 25 years. And recent higher birth rates, combined with large numbers of people in the childbearing ages, have resulted in an increased cohort aged under five. Australia’s current ‘beehive’ age structure is healthy, with relatively high concentrations of people in the main working ages. Australia should seek to maintain the ‘beehive’ shape into the future. What it must avoid is the ‘coffin’ shape, which has wide shoulders (the older-age population) tapering down to a much smaller population at the base. This would result from very low birth rates and low levels of migration. It is the classic shape of a much older population that is decreasing in size, with declines particularly concentrated at the labour-force ages. This is the demographic future that many countries of Europe and East Asia are seeking to avoid by attempting to increase birth rates. As with the global population in general, Australia has a large momentum for population growth due to the relatively high proportions of people in younger age groups. Even if Australia experienced zero migration and maintained its birth rate at 1.9 births per woman (slightly below replacement level), the number of births would continue to exceed the number of deaths until at least 2040.
Australia’s Future Population Quantifying an optimum population for Australia is a national pastime. In 1999, the authors of this chapter examined various nominated optimum-population targets – from 12 million to 50 million – to determine
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2020
Age (years)
if they were achievable. We found that both extremes of high and low population were ‘sheer demographic nonsense’, due to constraints of the population drivers of fertility, mortality and migration. Aside from the fact that nominated targets are often demographically unachievable, there is the problem of shifting goalposts. As stated in the Australian Government’s ‘Sustainable Population Strategy’, 2011: ‘It is clear that any perceived “optimum” population is likely to change in the future due to changes in the way resources are used and developments in technology.’ The report also notes that no Australian government-sponsored population
inquiry over the past 40 years has set a population target or identified a national carrying capacity. The Australian Government Treasury’s 2010 Intergenerational Report projects an Australian population of 36 million in 2050. This estimate is based on expected inputs – maintenance of Australia’s fertility rate at 1.9 births per woman, a net overseas migration rate of 0.6 per cent, and continuing increases in life expectancy – rather than a nominated ideal population. It is worth noting that the projection of 36 million in 2050 is much larger than the projection of 29 million in 2050 that the Treasury made only three years earlier, based on lower fertility and lower
95 90 85 80 75 70 65 60 55 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0
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Population (thousands) Figure 4. Population by age and sex, Australia, 2010
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migration inputs. This illustrates the volatility of population projections. Our view is that we can make reasonable estimates of the size, growth rate and age structure of the Australian population 10 years from now, and – with a little less certainty – 20 years from now. However, the population of 2050, for example, is simply a hypothetical number. Births in the 2040s will be to women who are not yet themselves born, and migration of the 2040s will be driven by the labour demand of that period – we simply have no way of knowing now what these levels will be. Based on current trends, Australia’s population is projected to increase to 26 million in 2020 and 29 million in 2030. It is likely that Australia’s age structure will maintain a ‘beehive’ shape to 2030, with relatively high proportions of people in the main working ages. However, the population will become considerably older, with the proportion aged 65 years and over projected to increase from 13 per cent in 2010 to 19 per cent in 2030. Continued population ageing in Australia over the next two to three decades will result largely from three factors: increased life expectancy, leading to more Australians surviving well into old age; the fall in the birth rate over recent decades, resulting in proportionately fewer people at younger ages; and the effect of the large cohort of post-World War II baby boomers reaching retirement age. This ‘baby-boomer bulge’ is the population aged from the mid-40s to the mid-60s in 2010 in Figure 4.
The 2010 Intergenerational Report highlights issues of population ageing, and the resulting dependence on a reduced proportion of paid workers. Government expenditure on health, aged care and age-related pensions is projected to grow substantially, largely as a result of the numerical and proportional growth in the population aged 65 years and over. The report suggests that increased productivity ‘through prudent investment in social and economic infrastructure, and policies to support skills and human capital development’ will ameliorate the economic impact of population ageing. These policies – if implemented – will also lead to a more sustainable society.
Regional Disparity Population is not simply a matter of an Australian total, and population distribution across the cities and regions is also very important. Over three quarters of Australia’s population lives in three states: New South Wales (32 per cent), Victoria (25 per cent) and Queensland (20 per cent). The remaining 23 per cent live in Western Australia (10 per cent), South Australia (7 per cent), Tasmania (2 per cent), the Australian Capital Territory (2 per cent) and the Northern Territory (1 per cent). Australia is highly urbanised, with twothirds of the population currently living in the capital cities, and three-quarters in major cities of 100,000 or more people. Recent international immigration has been disproportionately concentrated in the capitals and other major cities. As discussed in 2011 by
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2020
Top: Future population growth in Australia is likely to be concentrated in the larger capital cities. Bottom: Infrastructure can be directed into smaller towns that can share population growth.
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Population
McGuirk and Argent, the consensus is that this will continue, and so most future population growth will occur in the cities, particularly the larger capitals. At the same time, some rural communities are facing decreasing populations or loss of public services, threatening their long-term sustainability. Targeting infrastructure and migration at communities that can sustain high employment will help ensure their sustainability, and assist in managing overall population growth.
ACTIONS FOR 2020 It is inevitable that Australia’s recent high population growth will continue, at least in the short term. This is due to existing momentum for growth in Australia’s current age structure, a relatively high fertility rate, and relatively high migration driven by a strong economy and demand for labour. Rapid population growth implies significant upfront investment in new public infrastructure – for water, transport, ports, energy supply, housing and office space, and state-of-the-art communications – to meet the needs of both existing and new residents. This should be reflected in the budget planning of the Federal Government and the State and Territory Governments. There needs to be a partnership approach across all spheres of government to ensure that funding is provided for infrastructure required to support growth.
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Further Reading Population Australian Government (2010). Australia to 2050: Future Challenges. Intergenerational Report 2010, The Treasury, Canberra. Australian Government (2011). Sustainable Australia—Sustainable Communities: A Sustainable Population Strategy for Australia, Department of Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and Communities, Canberra. Bongaarts, J., Bulatao, R.A. (1999). ‘Completing the Demographic Transition’, Population and Development Review 25, 515–529. Laxenburg Declaration on Population and Sustainable Development (2011). http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/POP/ Laxenburg%20Declaration%20on%20Population%20and%20Development.html McDonald, P. (2001). Too many and too few: population dilemmas of the 21st century. Journal of Health, Population and Nutrition 19, 155–157. McDonald, P., Kippen, R. (1999). Population futures for Australia: the policy alternatives. Research Paper No. 5, Department of the Parliamentary Library, Canberra. McGuirk, P., Argent, N. (2011). Population growth and change: implications for Australia’s cities and regions, Geographical Research 49, 317–335.