DEFINITION AND AREAS OF ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY by Muhammad Amin Samad

PROF. T. IZUTSU

ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY (397-703 A)

Term-Paper

By Muhammad Amin A. Samad * * Montreal, December 16, 1974

* * INSTITUTE OF ISLAMIC STUDIES McGILL UNIVERSITY

CONTENTS Page I.

II.

III.

DEFINITION AND AREAS OF ISLAMIC PHILOSOPY ………………………………….

EXISTING THINGS ………………………….. a. Substance and Accident ……………………. b. , , and …….

2-8 2 7

c. Sensible and Known by Reason ……………. d. General and Particular ……………………… e. and …………………………………

8 9 9

WORD, CONCEPT, AND DENOTATUM ….. 10-13 a. (Word or Term) …………………………. 10 b.

(Concept) ……………………………

(Denotatum) ………………………….

(Univocal) and

(Analogos) …….

(Scepticism) …………………………….

and

……………………………….

12 13

ENDTNOTES ……………………………………………

BIBLIOGRAPHY ……………………………………….

THE DEFINITION AND THE AREAS OF ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY Philosophy is acting to bringing the human soul to perfection through the knowledge of realities of the existing things as they are according to the degree of human ability. Philosophy, then, is the study of the realities of existing things as they are (not as they should be) as much as human possibility. Its goal is to bring the human soul to perfection. Islamic Philosophy is divided into three areas: a. Logical matters, logica ( or which is a means (a tool) to obtain the other areas of philosophy. b. Physical matters, phisica or c. Divine science or divine matters or . It is the knowledge of what is beyond nature. It is divided into two categories: 1. , divine matters in more general meaning which is also called (general matters), i.e., metaphysics, ontology, and science of existence. 2. , divine matters in the more particular meaning, theology. In Islam it is called , “the knowledge of argumentation”. It is the study of the existence of God and what we call His “attributes”. It does not discuss the Essence of God , but it discusses the Essence of God

as qualified with (e.g.,

“the science of

, and and

, (e.g., ( . So,

), and

is also called

”.1

II. EXISTING THINGS Existing things can be divided into many categories, among which are as follows: A. Substance and Accident i. Substance

Al-Sāwī gives the definition of substance as follows: He puts (“in the concrete world”) to exclude God as substance. Qut.b al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī gives the following definition: (“Substance is something which is standing by its own self). There are peculiarities of substance, i.e.: a. It has no opposite , e.g., Socrates is not an opposite of Plato. b. It has no difference in degree and gradation , e.g., a man is not more or less human than another man. c. It can be pointed with physical pointing , e.g., this is a chair. d. It has substantial movement according to Mulla S.adra, e.g., the apple was a seed, then it became a green apple, then a red apple. According to other philosophers there is no substantial movement and there is no gradual process. At the stage of seed it is a seed and nothing but a seed. Substance can be divided into (material or physical) and (non material). a. Material substance and

2. Both

b. Non-material substance 1.

is divided into: is divided into:

. It needs (matter) in its function. It can manifest its activity only through the body. . it does not need in its activity. and

belong to the highest genera

Qut.b al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī divided substance into:

a. b.

(the very essence) which is divided into:

, and

c. d. Descartes divided substance into: a. Divine Essence distinguished in His absolute perfection . b.

. Its distinguishing mark is the extension

, either

The sequence of substance according to al-GhazÄ lÄŤ is: , then

, then

, and then

ii. Accident According to Aristotle there are nine categories of accident. They are: 1. or (quantity). It is an accident which accepts equality and non-equality by nature. In other words it is dividable. There are two types of this category: a. (continuous quantity). If we divide it into two parts we shall find

(the common limit), e.g.,

g 1A 2. A is (the common limit), the end and the beginning of the segment g1 and g2 respectively. It has two types: 1. (fixed), e.g., ____.____.____.____.____ 2.

(unfixed), e.g., the division of time into past and future. We only know and can actualize the past, while the other part (future) is unknown. past . future

(separable quantity), where there is no common limit between them, e.g., o o o o . o o o o o 2. or (quantity). It is immovable state of substance which does not accept equality or non-equality essentially. For example, the redness of a piece of paper does not admit being divided by dividing the paper. There are four types of this category: a. (sensible quality), which is grasped by any of the five senses. It is either (deep-rooted, solidly established), e.g., the sweetness of sugar, the hotness of fire, or , (easily disappeared), like the redness of face in anger. b. (mental quality), either (disappears easily) like a sudden burst of anger, or a which is deeply rooted, like knowledge, and envy to whom who was born envious. c. or (natural proneness), i.e., inborn quality of something by which one strongly resists to be affected, e.g., illness or easily affected . d.

. It deals with quantity, e.g., the straightness

and the bend

of something.

(where). A physical body needs a certain quality

which is called called

. This body occupying a certain place is

. It is either:

where there is no room for the other body , e.g., water in the cup (full of water), or b. where the body occupies only a small room, e.g., I live in Canada. 4 (when). It is something occupying a certain point of time. It is called

. It is either:

a. , i.e., a portion of timed whose both ends exactly coincide with the appearance and disappearance of something, e.g., one’s span of life: time . span of life . , or b. , i.e., larger portion of time which comprises a small portion of time which is in question, e.g., He lived in the 10th century: time . 10th century ._______ He lived 5. (position), i.e., the internal relation between the component parts, also in term of positional relationship of the components with the outside of the body, e.g., laying down, standing, leaning, upside down, facing something else, etc. 6. or (possession). This is still ambiguous for Ibn Sīnā, but he gives his definition: “Possession is being of a substance (A) which covers it (B), and moves (A) with its (B’s) moving, like somebody being clothed.” It may be partial, e.g., ….. or impartial, e.g., ………….. 7. (action), i.e., an action of influence of something upon something else, e.g., fire exercises influence upon water until it boils. 8. (passion), i.e., action of influence upon something from something else, e.g., water receives influence from fire until it boils (the opposite of (. 9.

(relation), i.e., if we have something in our mind we have to produce something else which is essential and related to it. It has two types: a. (bilateral relation), e.g., if A resembles B, B also resembles A. Therefore, it applies to mutual resemblance , opposition , and facing one another

(unilateral relation). It is the relation between

(cause) and (effect), e.g., relationship between father 3 and son. In order to apply these accidents in one substance, if we take as our substance, his being grown up is , his being darker or the change of his figure is father and he might have a son is is

, having a

, being in his house

, his working today or he worked yesterday is

being standing or sitting is and wearing his clothes is

, being armed to the teeth , being reading or writing is .4

, and his being slapped or beaten is

Sahrfawardi reduced this nine categories into four: 1. 3.

(including

(including ,

B. 1.

and

, and

( , and

and is whose existence is necessary

whose non-existence is absurd

and

Plato called it

. According to al-Kindi the existence of decided matter outside reason and imagination.5 There are two kinds of : a.

is a

,i.e., an existence exists by itself (essence), ens per se. b. , ens per aliut, an existence exists by other than itself. Since its existence depends upon other than itself it is also called , e.g., the world.6 2.

. It is divided into 2 categories:

which is also called here means

, since

which is also called

Al-GhazÄ lÄŤ gives four meanings of as follows: a. i.e., what is not , which includes . b.

, i.e., what is equal in both non-impossibility and unnecessary of its existence or non-existence. c. i.e., its existence is not necessary , e.g., writing with regard to man. d. It is applied to the present non-existence, whose presence is not impossible in the future. Its existence is e.g., the existence of the world before it exists.9 3.

. It is divided into two categories: a.

, e.g., the impossibility of the union of blackness and whiteness in something. b. , e.g., the supposition of the occurrence of the day of resurrection today which is impossible not be its essence, but because God knew that He would not make it happen today. If God wanted to happen (which is ( it would happen, and it would become . So, every presence of C.

will become

with the

.10

(sensible) and

(known by reason)

are things known through our five senses. are things known through reason, e.g., the existence of ability, knowledge, willingness, fear, shame, love and anger. Most of existing things belong to this category. 11 The best

kind of existence according to al-Kindī is the existence of God, and he believes that it is the object of absolute knowledge and reason alone is the only way to know God.12 D.

(general) and

(particular)

The existing things in their relation to each other can be divided into four categories: a. (more general), e.g., is than ‫……… ا‬ b.

(more particular), e.g.,

c. d.

(equal), e.g.,

‫ ا‬is with

than

…..

.13 ……….

(more general on one side, and more particular on the other side), e.g., the whiteness of animals. On one side whiteness is more general, as it includes white paper, chalk, and many other things which are not animals. On the other side it is more particular, as it excludes many non-white animals, e.g., black people, black horses, crows, zebra, etc.14 and

Existing things can be divided into: 1. ‫( القديم‬eternally pre-existent) which is divided into: a. , i.e., there is no beginning of the time of its existence. b. , i.e., there is no beginning and cause ) ( for its essence. 2. (incidental) which is also divided into: a.

, i.e., there is a beginning for the time of its existence.

, i.e., there is a beginning for its essence by which it is existent.

According to philosophers the world is

and

, while God the creator of the world is .15 III. WORD, CONCEPT, AND DENOTATUM A.

(word or term) Word or term is divided into two categories: 1. , i.e., it denotes to a single thing, e.g., Zayd, this tree, that horse. 2. , i.e., it may denote to many things of its kind, e.g., man, the tree.16

(Concept)

It is the meaning we understand from the word. There is no word without meaning. It is also divided into: 1. , i.e., it applies to a single thing, it refuses participation of more than one thing (denotatum, ), e.g., Socrates, Plato. 2. , i.e., it does not refuse participation of more than one thing, e.g., ‫ ا‬, it is applicable to Ali, Ahmad and Zayd (more denoteta). C.

(denotatum)

, denotatum (pl. , denoteta) is the thing denoted by the meaning of the word, though it does not actually exist in the external world, e.g., if we say “dragon” the denotatum presented in our mind is a creature like a crocodile or snake, with wings and claws, able to breathe out of fire, often guarding a treasure, as we used to read in the Eastern myth.

(univocal) and

(analogos)

Considering the quality and the difference of degrees of the denoteta of a , it is divided into two categories: 1.

, i.e., it is applied to denoteta equally, without

making any discrimination, e.g., the word â&#x20AC;Ť Ř§â&#x20AC;Źis applied to infinite number of denoteta equally; it is applied to Hasan, John, Ali, and none of them is more man or less man than the others. The other example is the table; there is no table more table than other tables. 2. , i.e., it is applied to denoteta not equally, but in various degrees, e.g., light may be attributed to the light of the sun which is strong, and the light of the lamp which is weak (dim). The word means that which makes us doubtful. It refers to the fact that which we do not know to which degree it is being applied. The concept puts us in doubt to the degree applied to it. This phenomenon is called , and the phenomenon of analogical gradation is called

. Muslim philosophers give us seven

principles for the

of the

as follows:

(priority), e.g., the hotness of fire has a kind of priority before the hotness of boiling water, because the hotness of fire is (cause) of the hotness of boiling water. b. (appropriation), e.g., the existence of the Creator is more appropriate than that of the creatures, because the former is , while the latter is . c.

(temporal priority), e.g., by comparing the existence of father and son; father is is

.17

, while son

(principal of being stronger). The classical example is the concept of being white as applied to snow and ivory. The whiteness of snow is (stronger) than the whiteness of ivory. e. (quantity), e.g., if A is 5 meters long, and B is 3 meters long, A is f. g.

than B, and B is

(numbers), e.g., ten is more than six. (independence and lack of independence), e.g., the existence of . God is

than the existence of

which means that He is independent

upon others, while the creatures are dependent. The existence of existence of E.

than A.

, as they are

depends upon the

(scepticism) It has three elements: 1. , i.e., a concept which is applied to all denoteta, e.g., man, stone; the words share in common in the existence. 2. , i.e., the existence of element of difference among denoteta, e.g., father and son is different in 3.

, e.g., the

of the father compared to his son.

There are three kinds of 1. 2.

which is understandable to the common people..

which is understandable only to the highly educated people (ĂŠlite). 3. which is understandable only to the ĂŠlite of the elite, e.g., the mastery of the absolute reality, the essence

of existence, which is according to Ibn ‘Arabī is nothing but . F.

and

Ibn Sahlan al-Sawi gives the definition of follows:

and

Another definition is: . is the essential constituent element of the concept. It is something essentially required by something else, while is not the essential constituent element. It is not essentially required by something else. has four basic features. The lack of any of them will not become 1.

. They are: ‫ا‬,

i.e., inseparability, e.g., in always

; so,

separable from

is ; so,

‫ا‬,

. In is not

‫ ا‬is ‫ ا‬is

or , i.e., there is no particular cause, as cannot be causally explained, e.g., there is no cause why ‫ ا‬is in ‫ا‬.

, i.e., self-evidence, where proof is not needed, as it is

self-evident that ‫ ا‬is . The other example is that the triangle has three lines is self-evident. 4. (rational precedence), i.e., precedes rationally, e.g., if we say of

‫ ا‬the rational concept

‫ ا‬precedes rationally the concept of

There are two technical terms for

, i.e.,:

, i.e.,

2. ( “ 3.

as explained in the Eisagogé,

, Introduction to Theory of Logic), and we call it in the first system.”

, i.e., as explained in the which contains analytica priore (theory of syllogism without reference to its contents), and analytica posteriora which deals with contents of reasoning.

ْ According to this system (which we call the second system) some in the first system is . It is, in fact, or

, i.e., inseparable proportion of

If we way “four is an even number”, being even is according to the first system (as we can think of number four without thinking of its evenness), but it is according to the second system, as it belongs to or

(the evenness if four is inseparable from four).

The same case is

with regard to the

As there are two kinds of

(i.e., the first and the

second system), there are also two kinds of a.

which is and

. :

according to the first system,

according to the second system.

which is according to both the first and the second system. According to the Theory of Predicables there are five in the sense of

, i.e.,

(the five

predicables). Three of them belong to ; the other two belong to 1.

, i.e.,

(genus). It is also called

, i.e., and

, and .

(natural universal). Its

denoteta are not individual things, but

(species). It

does not represent , but , i.e., the whole body has common elements in the denoteta, e.g., ) 2.

(

)

(

(species). It represents

)

(

of individual things, e.g.,

. It represents . It must fulfil two conditions: a. It must be a distinguishing factor. b. It must be , e.g., with regard to ‫ا‬.

4. (general or common accident). It is which is not peculiar to a single denotatum, but it is common to some others, e.g., with regard to ‫ ا‬, as there are many other ‫ ا‬. Another example is

white thing are not

in regard to

‫ا‬ 5. one

. It is

which is peculiar to only

which is usually

, e.g.,

in regard to

.18 Al-ūsī divided a.

, e.g.,

which is common to all mankind.

, e.g., ‫ا‬.(

into two categories: actually )

belongs to

( with regard to ).

ENDNOTES 1

Ibn Sīnā gives more details in the categories of philosophy:

1 2 See Taysīr Shaykh al-Ard., al-Madkhal ilā Falsafat Ibn Sīnā, 1st ed (Beirut: Dār al-Anwar, 1967), pp. 184-185. 2 Ibid., pp. 179-182 3 Al-Ghazālī, Maqās.id al-Falāsifah (Cairo, 1936), 2nd ed., pp. 235; idem, Mi‘yār al-‘Ilm, ed. Dr. Sulaymān Dunyā (Cairo: Dār al-Ma‘ārif, 1961), pp. 312-313. 4 Taysīr Shaykh al-Ard., Madkhal, pp.178-9. 5 , see Muammad al-Bahī, al-Jānib al-‘Ilāhī min Tafkīr al-Islāmī, (Cairo: ‘Isā al-Bābī alH.alabī, 1951), 2nd ed., p. 71. 6 Taysīr Shaykh al-Ard., Madkhal, pp.210-212; al-Ghazālī, Maqās.id al-Falāsifah, pp. 53ff; al-Ghazālī gives us the argument why is equal to as follows:

See al-Ghazālī, Mi‘yār al-‘Ilm. pp. 345-346. 7 Ibn Sīnā gives us two examples for this. He says:

. See Taysīr Shaykh al-Ard., al-Madkhal, pp. 210-1. 8 Dr. Jamīl alībā, Ta’rīkh al-Falsafah al-‘Arfabīya (Beirut: Dār alKuttāb al-Lubnānī, 1970), 1st ed., p. 221. 9 Al-Ghazālī, Mi‘yār al-‘Ilm. pp. 343-4. 10 Ibid., p. 34.

Ibid., pp. 89-90. Muhammad al-Bahī, al-Jānib al-‘Ilāhī, pp. 79-80. 13 By giving this example plants are considered having no sense at all, though it is said that certain plants have no sense of feeling. 14 Al-Ghazālī, Mi‘yār al-‘Ilm., p. 92. 15 Ibid., pp. 334-335. 16 Ibid., p. 73. 17 Many philosophers believe in the which is one of the three views which, according to al-Ghazālī lead to their believer to infidelity, see al-Ghazālī, al-Munqidh min al-D.alāl, ed. Dr. Jamīl S.alība and Dr.Kāmil ‘Iyā, 5th ed. ([Syria]: Mat.ba‘at al-Jāmi‘ah al-Sūriyyah, 12

1956), p. 79; Dr. Jamīl alībā, Ta’rīkh al-Falsafah, p. 365 ff. 18 For al-Ghazālī’s definition of each of , see al-Ghazālī, Mi‘yār al-‘Ilm, pp. 106-107.

BIBLIOGRAPHY Bahī, Muh.ammad al-. Al-Jānib al-‘Ilāhī min Tafkīr al-Islāmī. 2nd ed. Cairo: ‘Isā al-Bābī al-alabī, 1951. Ghazālī, Abū āmid al-, Maqās.id al-Falāsifah. 2nd ed. Cairo, 1936. _______, Mi‘yār al-‘Ilm, ed. Dr. Sulaymān Dunyā. Cairo: Dār al-Ma‘ārif, 1961. ________, al-Munqidh min al-alāl, ed. Dr. Jamīl alība and Dr.Kāmil ‘Iyād., 5th ed. [Syria]: Mat.ba‘at al-Jāmi‘ah al-Sūrīyah, 1956. alībā, Dr. Jamīl, Ta’rīkh al-Falsafah al-‘Arabīyah. 1st ed. Beirut: Dār al-Kuttāb al-Lubnānī, 1970. Shaykh al-Ard., Taysīr. Al-Madkhal ilā Falsafat Ibn Sīnā, 1st ed. Beirut: Dār al-Anwar, 1967.