Legislating for Institutional Investors Post-Crisis

requiring housing developments which contain greater than 15 units should contain 20% affordable units. (Williams, 2019)

Beyond S106 avoidance, Silver points towards financial aid granted to institutional investors in the form of “various loans provided by local or national government [sic] to stimulate construction.” (Silver, 2018:6) This financing amounted to “£215 million [...] from Greater Manchester Housing Fund (GMCF) which has provided a series of loans to developers over the last three years [2015-2018].” (Silver, 2018:12) With a separate £50 national government loan, the total “amounts to £265 million, supporting the construction of 5,330 units with average financial support at £29,719 per unit, none of which are designated for affordable or social housing.” (Silver, 2018:12) As national government conditions for financing GMHF disallows the use of local government loans for the construction of affordable housing. (Silver, 2018) Instead, financing was directed towards the Build-to-Rent (BtR hereafter) sector, following the demise of the owner-occupier market, where “the number of residential units in the [owner occupier] development pipeline reached a high of over 4,000 units in 2006 before dropping to less than 500 units in 2010, 2011 and 2012.” (Silver, 2018:5) BtR projects have therefore “emerged from the local and national government focus on remaking the private rented market [...] institutionally friendly” (Silver, 2018:5).

The Manchester Model of production reconfigures housing as a spatial fix and a site of extraction (Rolnik, 2019) through providing State guarantees to entice and secure institutional funding. Where the effectiveness is evidenced through an investigation of a specific institutional arrangement, Manchester Life Development Corporation, and the transformation of a formerly derelict neighbourhood of north Manchester, Ancoats.

Global Landlords in Post-Crisis Manchester

Deployment of the Manchester case study through revelation of operative shells ignites an analysis of a specific institutional arrangement which reinforces claims of post-crisis radicality of

housing financialisation. So far, charting the emergence of institutional investors has revealed their emergence from conditions formalising capitalist urban (re)production by neoliberal governance. This case study of Manchester Life Development Company exemplifies how these conditions materialise as a crystallised, state-backed housing ‘solution’ perpetuating extractive rental hegemonies. This case study has been chosen due to the visibility of the legislative procedures and manipulations, in addition to the clarity of the architectural materialisation.

The Manchester Life Development Corporation (henceforth referred to as Manchester Life) was founded by Abu Dhabi royalty, Sheikh Mansour Bin Zayed Al Nahyan, and then leader of MCC, Sir Howard Bernstein in 2014. (Jupp, 2014) The partnership employs a property-led regeneration approach to create a ‘flagship’ neighborhood revival scheme in Ancoats, (Silver, 2018) strategically announced as The Eastlands Regeneration Framework, involving the construction of “more than 6,000 new homes.” (Jupp, 2014:online)

“A planning consultant described this [using regeneration frameworks] as “the Manchester way”. He claimed that to fast-track desired developments, the council tended to include controversial proposals in regeneration frameworks, which are not subject to the same scrutiny as local plans.” (Collins, 2019:online)

Controversy nessicating tactics for scrutiny avoidance arises from the involvement of Manchester Life’s partner, Abu Dhabi United Group (ADUG henceforth), which was “originally formed as the investment vehicle for the takeover of [Manchester] City [FC] in September 2008.” (Jupp, 2014:online) Tracing the organisational structure using financial reports via Companies House reveals the first financial maneuver performed, as the controlling shareholder of Manchester Life is a subsidiary of ADUG named Loom Holdings holding a 51% share. Majority ownership of Manchester Life by Loom Holdings, a limited company, (Manchester Life Development Company 2, 2020) grants financial benefits through commercial confidentiality clauses (Silver, 2018) despite the fact that a democratically elected public body is supposedly an equal partner. Writing in 2019, Collins states:

“Manchester Life has developed six big blocks in Ancoats and New Islington, and is building three more. The total value of the schemes will be about £330m-plus, according to property experts. Manchester Life said it did not recognise that number and that the valuation was commercially sensitive. Abu Dhabi invested £165m in building the first six