Naked Punch Asia: issue 03

issue 03 Rs. 50

Naked Punch

ASIA

INDIAN ELECTIONS SPECIAL + ARABIC POETRY FAWZIA AFZAl-KHAN

Pritam Singh

Álvaro García Linera

Vijay Prashad

Pradeep Jeganathan

Srinivasan Ramani

NAzim Hikmet

Nizar QABBANI

CREDITS: Editorial Committee: Vijay Prashad Fawzia Afzal Khan Qalandar Bux Memon Picture Editor: Peter Eramian Editorial Assistant: Muhammad Usman Farooq Illustrator: Sara Khan Poetry Editor: Ali Mohsin Design: Q.alandar Bux Memon We welcome submissions contact us at: info@nakedpunch.com .

Cover art: Shezad Dawood TITLE: ‘Gun’ 2008, production still from ‘Feature’, 55 mins, courtesy of Paradise Row, London

Art work above: Sajjad Hussain, Untitled.

CONTENTS iSSUE

03

situations - Pakistan +++Fawzia Afzal Khan Scarific.

p. 3 +++ Qalandar Bux Memon A love Renounced.

p. 8

situations - India = +++ Srinivasan Ramani Understanding the mandate of 2009. +++ Pritam Singh

p. 9

Charting a Progressive Third Alternative in Indian Politics: hurdles and potentialities.

p. 15 Electoral Relevance, Left Unity and Political Identity under Neoliberalism

p. 19

situations - Sri Lanka +++ Pradeep Jeganathan Sri Lanka’s Common Future.

p. 27

ARABIC POETRY SPECIAL +++Featuring Nazim Hikmet and Nizar Qabbani, .

p. 30

FROM THE COMMUNARDS

+++ Vijay Prashad Introduction to Alvaro Garcia Linera.

p. 41

+++ Alvaro Garcia Linera Socialism of the 21st Century.

p. 43 +++ Alison L. Nolan

An Annotated Bibliography Concentrated on Muslim Women in Music

p. 48 +++ Nazim Hikmet: To writers of Asia and Africa

p. 49

Illustration by Sara Khan

Sacrifice for Pakistan Ode I see Odyssey when blood curdles to speckle the skin’s dis/ease who can say how deep the mottled hue Lies in the underbelly of the beast sacrificed annually a rite of passage entering the New Year

with tears and screams of self-flagellation exotic blood of beautiful boys bursts through the tears of mothers and lovers deep inside somewhere lost to this manly ritual of torture on display.

Fawzia Afzal-Khan

A LOVE RENOUCNED

by Qalandar Bux Memon

Art Work by Sajjad Hussain, Istiraahat -1.

I

Come let us ask all oppressed souls To give voice to their wounds Our secret is not merely ours Let’s share it with the entire world

Sahir Ludhianvi

Habib Jalib and Faiz Ahmed Faiz are back with us. Laal band have successfully converted their poems to music and performed them in some of the major cities of Pakistan. Geo Television, meanwhile, had been showing documentaries on the life and times of Habib Jalib and Faiz Mela is again an annual fixation on the cultural horizon of Lahore. Further, when on November 3th 2007 Musharaf declared emergency a symbol of resistance emerged which took the form of one word: bol.

The word itself comes from the famous poem of Faiz Ahmad Faiz of the same name. Yet, despite this reemergence, little has been said about the organizations they created and the concepts (in politics and the philosophy of art) and ideals which motivated their work and life. Faiz, Jalib, Manto, Sahir Ludhianvi, Ahmad Faraz, Ali Sardar Jafri, among others all belonged to and were influenced by the Progressive Writers Association [Anjuman Taraqi pasand Musaniffeen]. In understanding this movement we would better understand these writers.

Naked Punch ASIA issue 03.

II THE BIRTH OF PROGRESSIVE POETRY The Progressive Writers Association [henceforth, PWA] began life in a Chinese restaurant in 1934, in London. Indian intellectuals gathered over dinner where Sajjad Zaheer circulated the one page draft document that, once polished with the advise of intellectuals in India, was to form the manifesto of the PWA. Here I want to outline two of their aims. Namely, their resistance to imperialism and feudalism and related to this their ‘aesthetics of the people’.

The manifesto states that in a time when ‘radical changes are taking place in Indian society’ and yet ‘the spirit of reaction’ though ‘moribund and doomed to ultimate decay, is still operative and making desperate efforts to prolong itself’, the writers duty is to ‘give expression to the changes taking place in Indian life and to assist in the spirit of progress in the country’. In his autobiography,Roshnai, Sajjad Zaheer elaborates, he writes, ‘it was our desire to enhance the kind of culture and literature that would promote the freedom seeking, enlightened, scientific, and rational leanings of the diverse races that inhabit our vast homeland…we wished to end the poisonous effects of superstition and religious hatred that stemmed from outdated era of feudalism, because they are the ideological foundations of imperialistic and feudal power’. Poetics provided the arena for change.

Progressive writers made culture a realm of resistance to British imperialism and later American imperialism. Indeed, Zaheer notes that British imperialist sponsored culture aimed to ‘implant in the minds of all Indians the certainty that Englishmen were superior to them in every way, and that the British rule over India was not only appropriate and legitimate, but it was also a blessing from God’. Zaheer has a telling list of those who were ‘sponsored’ to propagate such ideas, besides government and semi-government schools and colleges, these views were promoted by ‘Christian missionaries, paid mullahs, pundits, government officials, potentates, big landowners’ and those ‘whose livelihood was controlled

by British capitalists and their institutions’. He goes on in his analysis, ‘the imperialists encouraged and tried to continue those traditions and ideas which contributed to discord and distance between different religious, sectarian, and racial groups, and which promoted superstition, fatalism and

other feelings of helplessness’. The imperialists, in order to rule, had to keep the Indian people, ‘spiritually and mentally paralyzed, disunited, and [thus] enslaved’. A challenge to the sponsored culture then was seen as one prerequisite to gaining independence and beginning the process of decolonialisation and with it progress. In this respect the Progressive writers were not alone. The Negritude movement led by poets such as Aime Ceasaire and Senghor and the Harlem renaissance also aimed to counter colonial discourses as a way of challenging imperialism and preparing the way for independence. Edward Said has noted that just as discourse/ culture prepares one nation for conquest of another (imperialism) likewise culture also prepares the grounds for independence. To put it simply, until the discourse of inferiority was not overcome by the Indian people the British rule would continue.

III RECASTING BEAUTY To challenge feudalism, fatalism, imperialism, to repose confidence in peasants and workers, to promote the best in indigenous culture and history the progressives set out what we may call a ‘aesthetics of the people’. The manifesto states that they wished to, ‘rescue literature and other arts from the priestly, academic and decadent classes in whose hands they have degenerated so long; to bring the arts into the closest touch with the people; and to make them the vital organs which will register the actualities of life, as well as lead us to the future’. It goes on, ‘we believe that the new literature of India [Pakistan] must deal with the basic problems of our existence today – the problems of hunger and poverty, social backwardness and political subjugation’. Indeed, Sahir Ludhianvi puts it well when he states, ‘the art that doesn’t reach the poor, has not achieved its potential’ [fan jo naadaar tak nahin pahuncha, apne meyaar tak nahin pahuncha]. And it is in this context that we must read Jalib’s famous poem Dastoor:

A lamp that sheds light only on palaces, That caters to the whims of a chosen few That flourishes in the shadow of compromise

situations - pakistan

This system, this light starved morning I do not accept! I do not know!

[deep jis ka mahallah hi mein jale Chand logon ki khushiyon ko le kar chale Voh jo saaye mein har maslehat ke pale Aise dastoor ko, sub-e benoor ko

sion that is to blame. For, behind those wilted lips and withered cheeks reside sacrifice, devotion, and endurance’. This is a historical shift. Not only must writers, for Premchand, no longer serve the elite as had Ghalib and other court poets but they must side with the people and their struggles. Beauty in turn is no longer to be seen in the ‘poetic ecstasy and sighing over the coyness, perverseness, and vanity of the fair sex’ but in the sweat strained brow of workers and peasants.Love was to no longer be directed at a single beloved. Instead, the beloved are the workers and peasants and those who fight with them for a fairer society. Faiz’s poem, Don’t ask me, my love, for that love again’ [Mujh say Pehli see Mohbat meray], embodies the ideals that were set out by Premchand.

I present it in full below:

Main nahin manta! Main nahin jaanta!]

That which was ours, my love, The agenda for this aesthetics was set by the renowned short story writer Munshi Premchand of Benares. Premchand was courted by Zaheer and Faiz Ahmad Faiz (who headed the Punjab chapter of the Association) to preside over as president of the first All India Conference of the Progressive Movement.

The conference was held in Lucknow two years after the draft manifesto had been circulated. Premchand’s speech is a landmark in aesthetics of the Third World. Its central theme is the desire to recast beauty andlove. Premchand famously stated, ‘we will have to change the standard of beauty’ [Hamen husn ke meyaar badalne honge]. He went on to tell the gathered writers, ‘if you cannot see beauty in apoor woman whose perspiration flows as, laying down her sleeping child on amound along the field, she works in the field, then, it is your own vi-

Don’t ask me for that love again, but there were other sorrows, comforts other than love.

The rich had cast their spell on history: Dark centuries had been embroidered on brocades and silks.

Bitter threads began to unravel before me As I went into alleys and in open markets Saw bodies plastered with ash, bathed in blood.

Naked Punch ASIA issue 03.

I saw them sold and bought, again and again.

This too deserves attention. I can’t help but look back When I return from those alleys – what should one do?

And you still are so ravishing – what should I do?

There are other sorrows in this world,

have to be created that work for the majority of the people.

This is the task of artists and writers today as it was yesteryear – to dignify the majority of our people, battle against interest that oppress and degrade them and with them build structures and systems that work for the them, only then will beauty and love truly be manifest in this land. We need again to recast beauty and love and with Faiz renounce our old love.

Comforts other than love.

Don’t ask me, my love, for that love again.

Lahore, July 2009.

Grudgingly, the poet had to turn away from the old beloved and towards the collectivity of the people [the true beloved] and the struggle against, I quote Premchand, ‘capitalism, militantism, and elitism’. Further, Premchand advised that the writer not be ‘satisfied with creating on paper, but will create a system that will not be incompatible with beauty, good taste, dignity, and humanity’. Here it should be noted that Faiz, Jalib, Faraz, Zaheer and others broke with the old mould of the court poets and were active members and organizers of left wing political parties. Premchand ended his address with the following words: On our touchstone, only that literature will be judged genuine which embodies thought, the desire for freedom, the essence of beauty, the spirit of progress, and the light of reality; the literature that will produce movement, restlessness, and atumult within us, that will not put us to sleep…

Such aesthetics is again demanded. Feudalism, militanism, imperialism and with them the continuation of obscurantist ideas are vested in Pakistan. Economic and social inequality is rampant – government estimates put those living below the poverty line at around 40 per cent. The colonial structures of power, today in the hands of our political elite, continue to exploit the majority of the people. To rephrase Zaheer, ‘Landlords implant in the minds of all peasants/worker the certainty that Landlords are superior to them in every way, and that their wealth and rule over them was not only appropriate and legitimate, but it was also ablessing from Allah ’-these are some of the discourses that promote inequality today. Taliban, US imperialism, and our local elite need to be challenged at the level of discourse and new structures

situations - pakistan

INDIAN ELECTION SPECIAL

Understanding the mandate of 2009

By Srinivasan Ramani

Belying expectations of a fragmented verdict at the national level, the mandate of the 15th Lok Sabha elections has been decisive in favour of the Congress party led United Progressive Alliance (UPA). The alliance has managed to win 261 seats, with the Congress itself winning 206 seats, its best tally since the 1991 elections when the party had won 244 seats. A mix of local state-level factors and a preference for the UPA alliance nationally can be seen as responsible for the victory, from initial observations. The UPA managed the win defeating not only the Left anchored “Third Front- TF” coalition of regional parties and the opposition Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) emphatically, but despite the breaking away of several partners (who formed the Fourth front -FF) from the alliance before elections.

The UPA alliance won the most number of seats in 17 out of 29 (including the National Capital Territory of Delhi) states. Excepting the Biju Janata Dal (BJD) in Orissa, the performance of the regional and left parties in the Third Front ranged from underwhelming to disastrous. The NDA won overwhelmingly in Bihar, Karnataka and Chattisgarh but was defeated in many a major state by the UPA in direct fights.

The broad geographical distribution of mandate for the UPA points toward an undercurrent favouring the Congress party in general, but local issues have also mattered significantly. It is also important to point out that there is no reversal of the political trend in India over time – national elections being decided as a derivative of individual state contests across the country (Yadav, Palshikar 2009). This election is also in a way conforming to the trend.

Naked Punch ASIA issue 03.

Mix of factors for UPA victory The Congress, in its manifesto as well as during its campaigning emphasised the implementation of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA), the Bharat Nirman programme and other social and welfare measures, not to mention the farmer loan waiver scheme. From the indications available, this has elicited a favourable response, which has played out well in different states, irrespective of whether the Congress party (or the UPA) has been in power. Also, minorities have voted for the UPA enthusiastically, explaining the wins for the Congress party and its allies in states such as West Bengal, Kerala and Uttar Pradesh. The performance of the party in states such as Gujarat - the Congress won 43% of the vote as compared to the 39% it garnered in the 2007 assembly elections– and in Madhya Pradesh – 40% as compared to 32% in the assembly elections in 2008) suggests the resonance of its national agenda. But having said that, the Congress benefitted immensely from the political dynamics of the state level contests.

In Andhra Pradesh, for example, the implementation of populist and welfare measures by the state government has meant that the alliance has been victorious for a second consecutive Lok Sabha election. The state assembly elections’ results has given a majority mandate for the Congress party. The Congress party was also helped by the greater fragmentation of the popular vote in the state, with the presence of the newly formed Praja Rajyam Party led by film actor Chiranjeevi. The PRP managed to win nearly 16% of the votes in both the state and Lok Sabha elections thwarting the “Grand Alliance” of the opposition Telugu Desam, the left parties and the Telangana Rashtra Samiti, in its

bid to topple the Congress.

In the left ruled states, highhandedness in administration, the unpopular industrialisation and subsequent land acquisition drive, and the unity of the opposition in West Bengal, and the perception of inadequate levels of governance by the state government and factionalism in the ruling Communist Party of India (Marxist) in Kerala has helped the UPA. In Tamil Nadu, the ruling Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam has done particularly well, on the might of its populist schemes while the incidents in northern Sri Lanka have complicated the verdict – resulting in some losses to senior Congress candidates. Also significantly, the presence of the Desiya Murpoku Dravida Kazhagam (DMDK), a political party led by another actor Vijayakanth dented the opposition’s hopes significantly, by garnering 10% of the vote share.

The presence of the Maharashtra Navanirman Sena acted to the detriment of the BJP-Shiv Sena alliance, particularly in the saffron and chauvinist parties’ urban strongholds in Mumbai and its neighbourhoods. This helped the UPA in Maharashtra, which managed to win despite being in power for a very long time and to overcome anti-incumbency as well.

Fragmentation also helped the Congress defeat the opposition in Haryana in a more rousing fashion than expected. Here too, the presence of the Haryana Jan-hit Congress (which won 10% of the vote) helped divide the opposition enough to let the Congress win 9 out of 10 seats in the state.

In other states, the “honeymoon period” (Ravishankar 2009) enjoyed by the Congress governments in Rajasthan and Delhi has meant big wins for the party. In Uttarakhand and Punjab, the Congress has managed to defeat the ruling BJP and Shiromani Akali Dal(SAD)-BJP alliance (possibly facing anti-incumbency) respectively, garnering the majority of the votes.

The most surprising results in favour of the Congress Party was in the major state of Uttar Pradesh.

The Congress party’s decision to go it alone in Uttar Pradesh after being unable to arrive at a seatsharing understanding with the Samajwadi Party paid unexpected dividends. The party was able to cache in not only on the popularity of the UPA government in the state, but also on the withering away of the solid aggregate social base that the ruling Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) had attained in the 2007 assembly elections. The Congress party has garnered 21 seats (vote share of 18%), its highest tally for years in the state. Preliminary estimates from the National Election Survey of the Centre for Study of Developing Societies1 (CSDS) suggest that the underwhelming performance of the (BSP) is due to a shift of some of its targeted social base - particularly the upper castes and the Muslims - to the Congress Party.

Overall, the Congress party managed to increase its vote share from 26.4% in 2004 to 28.5% nationally in 2009 and a seat increase from 145 to 206. The UPA presented its credentials to the electorate as a alliance focussing on welfarist policies related to the livelihoods of peasants, ordinary workers and the 1

The Hindu published a supplement, “How India voted” with the CSDS’ National Election Survey 2009 information from all the major states in the country. The survey results are hosted in The Hindu’s homepage at http://www. hinduonnet.com/nic/howindiavoted2009/ howindiavoted2009.htm

situations - India

State wise Seats Tally Vote Share of major parties, Lok Sabha Elections 2009

Andhra Pradesh Arunachal Pradesh Assam Bihar Chattisgarh NCT of Delhi Goa Gujarat Haryana Himachal Pradesh Jammu & Kashmir Jharkhand Karnataka Kerala Madhya Pradesh Maharashtra Manipur Meghalaya Mizoram Nagaland Orissa Punjab Rajasthan Sikkim Tamil Nadu Tripura Uttar Pradesh Uttarakhand West Bengal Andaman & Nicobar Daman & Diu Chandigarh Puducherry Lakshadweep Dadra & Nagar Haveli

Total

UPA NDA TF FF Others 34 8 2 8 5 2 32 4 1 10 7 1 1 11 15 9 1 3 5 1 8 6 19 3 16 4 12 16 1 25 20 2 2 1 6 8 20

5 4

27 21 5 25

1 1 1

261

15 1 1 1

1

15

12 2 20

1 2

1 1 5

3

1

1 1

23

15

157 80 27

1 1

18

Party Contested Congress allies �Congress �JKNC �MUL �KCM �NCP �DMK �Trinamool Cong �JMM �RPI �IND(Congress) NDA �BJP �AGP �JD(U) �INLD �Shiv Sena �NPF �SDF �RLD �Akali Dal Left �CPI �CPI(M) �FBL �RSP �KEC �IND(Left) BSP Fourth Front �SP �RJD �LJNSP Others Total

Seats

526 440 3 2 1 23 22 27 5 2 1 512 433 6 27 5 22 1 1 7 10 175 56 80 21 16 1 1 500 343 193 44 106 6021 8070

Won

261 206 3 2 1 9 18 19 2 0 1 159 116 1 20 0 11 1 1 5 4 24 4 16 2 2 0 0 21 27 23 4 0 51 543

Vote %

36.22 28.56 0.12 0.2 0.1 1.78 1.83 3.19 0.21 0.12 0.11 24.11 18.81 0.43 1.42 0.31 1.51 0.2 0.04 0.43 0.96 7.61 1.43 5.33 0.32 0.38 0.08 0.07 6.17 5.15 3.43 1.27 0.45 20.74 100

(source: Election Commission Web Site, www.eciresults. nic.in ) Source: Source: Computations by CSDS, Delhi, based on Election Commission data. Obtained from Palshikar (2009). Abbreviations – JKNC- Jammu & Kashmir National Conference, MUL- Muslim League, KCM- Kerala Congress (Mani), NCP – Nationalist Congress Party, DMK- Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, JMM- Jharkhand Mukti Morcha, RPIRepublican Party of India, IND- Independent, AGP – Asom Gana Parishad, INLD- Indian National Lok Dal, NPF- Naga People’s Front, SDF- Sikkim Democratic Front, RLD- Rashtriya Lok Dal, FBL- Forward Bloc, RSP – Revolutionary Socialist Party, KEC- Kerala Congress, SP- Samajwadi Party, RJD- Rashtirya Janata Dal, LJNSP – Lok Janshakti Party

Naked Punch ASIA issue 03. poor. Nowhere were issues related to “economic reforms” - the liberalisation, privatisation, globalisation agenda – or that related to the new foreign policy aligning India closer to the western bloc (such as the Indo-US nuclear deal), presented prominently to the electorate to gain its mandate. The verdict, even if complicated by the aggregation of state-level factors and fragmentation, is indeed for a social democratic and welfarist orientation of the government.

The BJP thwarted again The BJP tried to focus on “national security” as its core issue and attempted to make the elections a referendum between personalities pitting its prime ministerial candidate L.K.Advani against the UPA leadership and prime minister Manmohan Singh. The NDA since 2004 had shrunk and the BJP was left only with the Janata Dal- United (JDU), the Shiv Sena the SAD and other minor parties as its allies. The erstwhile NDA allies - the Telugu Desam Party, the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK), the Biju Janata Dal (BJD) had all left the NDA citing the communal politics of the BJP. This had made the NDA’s

prospects dimmer even before the elections and expectedly, the NDA managed a tally of only 159 seats, way behind in second place to the UPA. The BJP’s overall tally was reduced to 116 (18.8%) from 138 (22.2%) in 2004. Both the defection of erstwhile partners as well as the reduction in the party’s overall vote share is indicative of the lesser resonance of the party’s communal Hindutva agenda, which came again to the fore in the run up to the elections.

Madhya Pradesh, but won handsomely in Chattisgarh and Karnataka. The performance of the BJP’s coalition partner JDU was most significant as Lalu Prasad’s Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) and Ram Vilas Paswan’s Lok Janshakti Party were trounced badly. It is too early however to suggest that the politics and efficacy of caste alliances in the state has been overcome, as many claim to be the reason for the JDU-BJP alliance which pitched its state government’s “development record” as the agenda for the The “Third front” was unable to im- elections. Having said that, the JDU plement its stated aim of forming a managed to enlarge its aggregate non-Congress, non-BJP government social base to include disaffected but it did ruin the chances of the sections of other backward classes BJP presenting a credible and win(OBCs) and dalits. nable alliance before elections. The BJP was a non-factor in several of the states where the contests were The Left’s limited to parties in the Third front worst performance in and the Congress, such as Tamil years Nadu, Kerala, Andhra Pradesh and West Bengal. With this tremendous The “third front” - an assorted set disadvantage, the only hope for the BJP to form a government post of regional parties, and anchored elections was through the weaning by the Left Front (LF) performed dismally. Though the BJD shrugged away of regional parties from the off its alliance with the BJP and third front. In any case, the dismal managed to win the majority of performance of the parties in the seats both in the Assembly as well “third front” in general rendered as in the Lok Sabha elections in that option moot.

Orissa and the AIADMK managed to improve its tally (from zero previThe BJP managed to win with ously) in Tamil Nadu, the defeat reduced margins in its “saffron” of the left parties in Kerala, West strongholds such as Gujarat and Bengal and the underwhelming performance of the BSP dragged the TF’s tally down. The TF contested directly against the Congress and its allies in most of the states where the front was “viable”.

In West Bengal, the left suffered a historic defeat, polling much fewer votes than in the 2006 Assembly elections and wilting against the united opposition of the Congress and the Trinamul Congress. Reduced to merely 15 seats (43.3%) from a previous tally of 35 (50.7%), the left’s loss could be attributed much to its state government’s series of policy and governance disasters since 2006 as the opposition fought the elections considering it as a referendum against the long

situations - India

standing Left Front government.

Issues such as the land acquisition for industrialisation, high handedness of the administration, minority angst after the Sachar committee findings are the discernible reasons, apart from the fact that the idea of a “third front� did not really appeal to voters. The Lok Sabha election results point to a possible defeat of the left front for the first time in 35 years in the upcoming assembly elections in 2011.

Infighting in the left and governance issues resulted in a UPA victory which was also bolstered by minority support in Kerala. The BSP was not able to replicate its 2007 assembly election performance managing a reduced vote tally, suggesting the non-realisation of the “wider castes and minority support� that the party hoped to garner.

The idea of a “third front� before elections was pressed by the left parties to halt the trend of the two largest parties – the Congress and the BJP heading the national governments over the past 11 years.

This flowed from the fact that both the Congress and the BJP had a consensus on major economic and foreign policy issues, which was supported by the big bourgeoisie and richer sections of the population. Yet, in its endeavour to forge a “third alternative�, the left only managed to stitch an amorphous alliance of motley regional and left parties without a common agenda beyond an anti-Congress, anti-BJP position. This expediency driven approach did not help the left or the parties in the third front in substantial transfer of votes through social/electoral bases to each other.

Also in states such as Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, vote fragmentation by newer parties such as the PRP and the DMDK frustrated the third front’s chances.

This idea of a “third front� did not cut much ice even in left strongholds, leave alone in states such as Andhra Pradesh or Tamil Nadu, where the third front’s expecta-

tion was for a victory for grand alliances against ruling parties part of the UPA. In hindsight, the left could have focussed on an independent or at-least a more coherent programme-based alliance, consolidating its electoral bases and looking for building a viable opposition to the Congress and the BJP in the medium term. That of course depends upon the continuing popularity and efficacy of the left led governments in the country in presenting an alternate model of governance and policy regimes favouring the traditional classes that the left seeks to represent.

Conclusions The increased tally of the UPA despite the division in “secular votes� because of the presence of the “third front� and the improved performance in the Congress even in BJP strongholds are pointers toward a good conjuncture of local and national issues favouring the UPA. The UPA contested the elections on its national record of initiating programmes such as the NREGA and other social and welfare measures and pitched its state governments’ populist record. The BJP failed to inspire confidence in its national security and personality based platform among the electorate, while the alliance of convenience that forged the third front did not materialise in any gains for the parties in it.

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References: Palshikar, Suhas (2009), “Tentative emergence of a new and tentative coalition?�, Economic and Political Weekly, May 23 Ravishankar, Nirmala (2009), “The Cost of Ruling: Anti-Incumbency in Elections�, Economic and Political Weekly, March 7 Yadav, Yogendra and Palshikar, Suhas (2009), “Principal State Level Contests and Derivative National Choices: Electoral Trends in 200409�, Economic and Political Weekly, February 7

ar is sometimes taken to stand for “alternative radio.� a better reading would be “authentic� or “autonomous� radio - free from constraints of concentrated power, state or private, responsive to needs and concerns of the communities it reaches and open to their participation. insofar as it achieves those goals, ar is a fundamental component of authentic democracy and individual selfrealization. long may it flourish!

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CHARTING A PROGRESSIVE THIRD ALTERNATIVE IN INDIAN POLITICS: HURDELES AND POTENTIALITIES The identity of the third PRITAM SINGH alternative: class, caste The central question facing any third-front alternative is the need to define its identity, which is distinctly different from the long-term visions of Congress and BJP politics in India. How can we theorise the long-term visions of Congress and BJP politics?

The election of 2009 set-back the dynamic for the creation of a third alternative in Indian politics. The reversals at the ballot box have not, however, altered the vital necessity of such an alternative for the future of India. Neither the Congress Party nor the Bharatiya Janata Party is capable of offering a genuinely just path for the people of so vast a country as India.

The third alternatives that have emerged since the 1980s, with or without the Left, have been combinations of regional parties representing either regional nationalisms or middle castes. The third front that went to the people in 2009 remained inchoate, unable

to offer a proper philosophic perspective for its combination. It appeared an unwieldy portmanteau.

The third front combined the class egalitarianism of the Left, the devolutionary perspective of the regional parties and the caste egalitarianism of the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP).

What it did not have was a mechanism to show how these three dynamic postures are actually part of a progressive tendency in the Indian polity. It is the purpose of this essay to sketch out the potential for a third alternative that builds on the ideological ground of this last third front.

and nation

The central question facing any third-front alternative is the need to define its identity, which is distinctly different from the long-term visions of Congress and BJP politics in India. How can we theorise the long-term visions of Congress and BJP politics? There are three key aspects that are central to understanding the political visions of these two main national parties in India: conception of India as a nation, the place of class and caste in the political perspectives of these parties, and the class/caste composition of their leadership and social base. Their conception of India as a nation has implications for their political approaches to the regional parties, especially those that are articulators of regional nationalism.

Naked Punch ASIA issue 03.

Their perspective on class has implications for their relationship with the Left parties, and their caste perspectives and the caste composition of their leadership and social base have implications for relationships with the parties representing middle and lower castes.

activists and leaders that articulated the reformist aspirations of industrial labour. That segment has become increasingly marginalised and is now totally ineffective in shaping the politico-economic vision of the Congress party. The party has now become an unambiguous champion of the interests of big Indian capital.

Regarding the conception of India as There is certainly the influence of ina nation, both the Congress and the ternational capital on the economic BJP visions represent two versions agenda that is articulated by Conof one perspective on Indian nation- gress, but that influence is largely alism. Both stand for one unified compatible with the global aspiraIndian nationalism in opposition to tions of big Indian capital. The overthe vision of multiple nationalisms all class perspective of the Congress that is articulated by some of the re- and the BJP in favour of big Indian gion-specific parties. Both stand for capital puts them in direct opposistrengthening the Centre and the tion to the egalitarian perspective forces of centralisation against the of the Left parties, and their support regions and the forces of decentrali- for an integrated Indian capitalist sation. One (the Congress) repre- market also creates tensions with sents the secular/semi-secular, and the region/state-based parties.2 the other (the BJP) represents the Hindu version of the perspective of In terms of their political perspecone unified Indian nationalism built tives on caste and the caste compothrough a strong Centre.1 sition of their leadership and mass base, both the Congress and the In terms of class perspectives, both BJP are predominantly upper-caste the Congress and the BJP support parties. Historically, the Congress the vision of Indian big capital whose had a substantial base amongst the class interests demand a unified In- lower castes, which had ensured dian market without the various ad- the emergence of lower-caste leadministrative, legal and financial hur- ers in the organisational set up of dles created by the provincial/state the party. That base has been very boundaries. There is a small trader/ seriously eroded in the past few petty bourgeois segment that has decades by the emergence of para small pressure group power in ties representing the middle castes the BJP and, therefore, a more vis- and the lower castes. The erosion ible presence in the political calcu- of that caste base has resulted in lations of the BJP at a local level the further marginalisation of parthan in the Congress. However, this ty leaders representing the lower segment has a marginalised role in castes and even middle castes. The shaping and influencing the overall BJP has been a much more upperclass orientation of the BJP, which caste-oriented party than Conis overwhelmingly in favour of big gress. This has been mainly due capital. to the Brahminical-oriented influence of Hindutva ideology and orIn the Congress party, historically ganisations (such as the Rashtriya there has been a segment of political Swayamsevak Sangh). In the past couple of decades, some sections 1 For a further elaboration of the link in the BJP leadership have tried to between the political economy of centralisation in India and the two versions (secu- build some social base amongst the middle castes (e.g. in UP), and even lar and Hindu) of Indian nationalism, see Pritam Singh, Federalism, Nationalism and amongst the lower castes and tribDevelopment: India and the Punjab Economy (London: Routledge, 2008); and Pritam Singh, ‘Hindu bias in India’s “secular” constitution: probing flaws in the instruments of governance’, Third World Quarterly, Vol 26, No 6, 2005, pp 909-926.

2

For a politico-economic focus on the Third Front politics, see Pritam Singh, ‘Political Economy of the ‘third front’ in India’, Contemporary South Asia, Volume 16, Issue 4, December 2008.

als (e.g. in Gujarat and Chattisgarh).

However, the upper-caste-oriented Hindutva ideology of the BJP creates a structural barrier in expanding its social base beyond the upper castes. Although there are interstate differences in the caste social base of both the Congress and the BJP, both the parties remain primarily upper-caste parties in terms of the composition of the leadership.

This upper-caste dominance in both the Congress and the BJP pits them in opposition to the parties representing the lower castes and even middle castes. UP and Bihar are the two states in India where the emergence of caste-based regional parties have successfully challenged the earlier dominance of both the Congress and the BJP. Electorally, the Congress has been the main sufferer from the rise of these castebased parties because the middlecaste and lower-caste support base the Congress party had previously has shifted substantially to these caste-based regional parties. The Congress has lost substantial base even amongst the upper-caste social groups (e.g. Brahmins and Rajputs) who have significantly shifted their allegiance to the BJP.

Components of the third front The three components of the possible third front—the Left, the regional nationalist parties and the BSP—have one common and several different reasons in opposing the Congress and the BJP. The Left is primarily opposed to the class politics of both these parties. In addition to that, the Left is opposed to the Hindu nationalist ideological vision of the BJP. Although the Left’s vacillating positions towards the integrationist and centralising political perspective of the Congress party’s Indian nationalist vision is an obstacle in its articulation of a clear oppositionist stance towards the Congress, the fact that the Congress is its main electoral opponent in the three states of West Bengal, Kerala and Tripura, where the Left

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some aspects of their respective programmes.

The Left and the devolutionary perspective

has its main base, does force the Left to sharpen its anti-Congress politics. In one sense, one can say that in these three states, the Left acts as a progressive articulator of the regional interests and identities in these states.

The regional parties are opposed to the BJP and the Congress primarily because they are both ideologically supportive of a strong centre. Some of these regional parties (e.g. the Akali Dal in Punjab and, at an earlier stage, the Telugu Desam in Andhra Pradesh) have allied themselves with the BJP not because of the proximity of their politics to those of the BJP, but because the Congress is their main electoral opponent.3 If 3 The unresolved tension in the Akali-BJP relations in Punjab is a relatively less explored phenomenon. There is a constant pressure on the top Akali leadership from its lower and middle ranging leadership to severe relations with the BJP for several reasons but particularly on the Ram mandir issue, the anti-minority politics of the BJP and the attempts by the RSS to Hinduise Sikhism. It is this pressure which led the top ranking Akali leader Sukhdev Singh Dhindsa to openly declare that Akali Dal had nothing to do with the re-emphasis on Ram mandir issue in the recent BJP politics. If a third front were to emerge as a successful alternative to the Congress, the main rival of the Akalis in Punjab, the pressure on the Akali Dal leadership for severing ties with the BJP and joining the third front will intensify. The BJP’s state unit in Punjab is also unhappy

there is a viable non-BJP and nonCongress third front, almost all regional allies of the BJP (except the Shiv Sena in Maharashtra) will walk out of their alliance with the BJP.4 The recent decision of the Oriya nationalist party BJD to break its ties with the BJP is a pointer in this direction.5 All regional nationalist parties see the Congress and BJP’s centralising agendas as a threat to their region-based identity and strength. They are, therefore, natural components of a possible third alternative that advocates decentralisation, diversity and recognition of multiple regional nationalisms in India. However, for these regional parties and the Left to become programmatic allies of each other, both the Left and these regional nationalist parties have to reconfigure with the Akalis’ attempt to expand their electoral base among the urban Hindu groups. On Akali Dal (Badal)’s expanding electoral base among the Punjabi Hindus and the attempts by the Akali party to rebrand itself as a Punjabi regional party, see Pritam Singh, ‘Punjab’s Electoral Competition’, EPW, Feb 10, 2007.

4 Shiv Sena is the only regional party in India that continuously aims to overcome the contradiction between regional nationalism and the Hindu - hegemonic Indian nationalism by projecting compatibility between Marathi regionalism and Hindu nationhood.

5 For a very perceptive piece on this see Biswamoy Pati, ‘Biju Janata Dal: Signals for Change’, EPW, Feb 28, 2009.

The Left will have to articulate very clearly a devolutionary perspective that recognises the multiple regional nationalisms in India. If the Left remains integrationist in its perspective (as, for example, the Communist Party of India [CPI] has been more inclined towards), it will not be able to forge a sustainable alliance with the regional nationalist parties. The Maoist strand in Indian Left politics has always been critical of one integrated Indian nationalism and has been supportive of the nationality struggles in India.6 The overemphasis by the Maoists on armed struggle has tended to overshadow the Maoists’ more advanced views on the nationality question in India. If the parliamentary Left can show imagination and intellectual courage in articulating a vision of multiple nationalisms and federal devolution, it will not only be very conducive to building a broader left unity and sound alliance with the regional nationalist parties, it will also expand the political influence of the third front.7 The regional national parties, for their part, will have to embrace some egalitarian aspects of 6 See P.V. Rao, ed. Symphony of Freedom: Papers on Nationality Question, Hyderabad, All India Peoples Resistance Forum, 1996.

For a critical review of this book and of the general Maoist and other left positions on the nationality question in India, see Pritam Singh, ‘Marxism, Indian State and Punjab’, International Journal of Punjab Studies, Vol 4, No 2, JuneDec 1997, pp. 237-250.

7 A very fine example of left unity is the recent coming together of CPI, CPM and CPI (M-L) (Liberation) to form a combined front to jointly contest the coming parliamentary elections in Bihar.

See Chirashree Dasgupta, ‘The United Left Bloc in Bihar’, EPW, March 7, 2009.

A true left unity in India would, however, mean going beyond this three party bloc and a negotiated inclusion of all left currents in India including the ones rooted in the Indian socialist tradition.

Naked Punch ASIA issue 03. the Left’s vision. Any such attempt by the regional nationalist parties to radicalise their political programme towards social justice might lead to internal divisions in these regional parties. Such divisions, if they do take place, will have to be accepted as a part of the necessity of reconfiguring the politics of regional nationalism for forging a sustainable third front.

ing located mainly in the Hindi region, and this region has historically been supportive of increasing centralisation. The ambivalence of the lower-caste parties on devolution manifests itself in not pro-actively advocating increased centralisation but simultaneously also not supporting decentralisation. For building a robust alliance with the regional nationalist parties, the lower-caste parties need to end this ambivalence and argue clearly for devolution of The lower-caste parties (BSP being powers to the states. The regional the most prominent of them) will nationalist parties, in turn, need to also need to re-orient their existing develop a radical vision on ending politics in two domains—egalitari- caste discrimination if their alliance anism and devolution of power—if with the lower-caste parties is to be these parties are to build solid foun- built on secure grounds. dations for forging a third front with the Left and regional nationalist par- Although there is a positive potenties. Although the social groups in tial for building a viable third front India that suffer discrimination on in India, there are also great hurcaste grounds also suffer economic dles in calibrating the politics of the discrimination because the lowest three currents of this potential third caste groups are also the poorest, it front—the Left, the regional nationis important that the analytical dif- alist parties and the lower-caste ference between these two forms parties. If a progressive third front of discrimination is recognised not does not emerge in India, and the only for theoretical clarity but also BJP and the Congress remain the for an effective social policy and only two alternative poles of polipolitical strategy. A wider egalitar- tics, the centre of gravity of Indian ian perspective than the one merely politics will move towards more focused on caste would facilitate Hindutva-oriented politics than it is a clearer and consistent basis for today. The task of opposing the BJP alliance between the lower-caste and winning over some sections of parties and the Left. This would the BJP support base will force the also demand that the Indian Left Congress to adopt some elements re-evaluates its old politics, which of Hindutva politics. From the ophave not given enough space for posite side, the BJP—in order to the accommodation of the aspira- expand its electoral appeal—might tions of oppressed castes for libera- moderate its Hindutva agenda. As tion from specifically caste oppres- a result of this two-party competision. The lower-caste parties have tive political scenario, each party been ambivalent on the question of will influence the other’s politics. centralisation and decentralisation. However, since the BJP is ideologiThis is partly a continuation of the cally more committed to a longDalit leader B. R. Ambedkar’s own term vision of building a Hindu India ambivalence on this question. On than the Congress is committed to the one hand, he thought and advo- a long-term vision of secular India, cated that centralised policy instru- the net result of the Congress-BJP ments would be more effective for competition will be a shift towards reducing caste discrimination but, some version of Hindutva politics in on the other, he visualised dangers India. A third front can subvert this to democracy from the concentra- scenario of Hindu-oriented political tion of economic and political pow- culture. A third front based on an er that results inevitably from cen- agenda of egalitarianism and decentralisation. The lower-caste parties’ tralisation can decisively change ambivalence on devolution is partly the terms of political discourse and also due to their political base be-

mobilisation away from this possible drift towards Hindutva-oriented politics. A third front in Indian politics is a historic necessity and has a reasonable chance of success if it is forged on a deeper foundation than expediency.

Notes

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Electoral Relevance, Left Unity and Political Identity under Neoliberalism

By Chirashree Dasgupta In its three decades of ideological primacy, neoliberalism has been ‘a benevolent mask of wonderful-sounding words like freedom, liberty, choice, and rights, to hide the grim realities of reconstitution of naked class power, locally as well as transnationally, but more particularly in the main financial centers of global capitalism’.1 Electoral Democracy under Neoliberalism The vacuous social culture of neoliberalism works to divert the majority of the social classes from the information, access, and forums necessary for meaningful participation in decision making.2 The ruling class penchant in ‘neoliberal democracy is to reduce the political to trivial debate over minor issues’ by parties pursuing the same policies towards big capital regardless of formal differences in campaign debate. Democracy is permissible as long as the extent of mobility of finance capital is off-limits to popular scrutiny.

Neoliberalism’s greatest ideologue, 1 David Harvey, 2005, A brief history of Neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford University.

2 Robert McChesney, 1999, Rich Media, Poor Democracy: Communication Politics in Dubious Times, The New Press

Milton Friedman, had laid down the basis of democracy under neoliberal principles: any government that pursues anti-market policies is being anti-democratic, regardless of how much informed popular support it might enjoy. Democracy should restrict governments to the job of protecting private property, enforcing contracts, and restrict political debate to minor issues so that the real matters of resource production, distribution and social organization can be determined in subservience to finance capital.

Under neoliberalism, state policy making is itself market driven with a shift of power from voters to capital that results from trans-border capital mobility.3 In the metropolitan centers of capital, neoliberalism developed out of a rightward shift in the balance of class forces with the political defeat of the social democratic Left’s alternative agenda to extend public control and socialization of capital.

During the Reagan-Thatcher era, the shift in class power in favor of capital could be ruthlessly carried out without formal subversion of electoral democracy. Outside the metropolitan centers, however, when neoliberalism was being 3 Colin Leys, 2003, Market-driven Politics: Neoliberal Democracy and the Public Interest, Verso, London

conceived as the ideology of late twentieth century imperialism, revolution was in the air in Mozambique, Vietnam and Nicaragua.4 The first neoliberal experiment in the Third World could only be pushed through with the toppling of popular democracy in Chile in 1973.

With the prospect of revolution brutally nipped in imperialism’s sore spots in the Third World followed by the implosion of ‘actually existing socialism’, the final triumph of neoliberalism since the 1990s led to either retreat or confinement of the Left as a relevant political force in electoral democracy.

Electoral Relevance Internationally of the Left under Neoliberalism The twenty-first century however began with ‘local’ resurrections of the Left in the electoral arena. It also saw intensification of struggles against war, resource grab and theft, livelihood threats and environmental destruction. Within a decade, when the ‘global’ neoliberal structures are imploding, and the declaration of ‘end of ideology’ rings hollow, the questions around a relevant legitimate Left agenda 4 Gregory Albo, 2002, Neoliberalism, the State and the Left, Monthly Review, May

Naked Punch ASIA issue 03. and Left identity in electoral democracy has become central to praxis. Both are products of specific historical material processes either in societies attempting transitions to capitalism hoisted from above without any revolutionary change or those that nurture the heart of the system in its most ‘advanced’ form. Electoral democracy, in both cases, has reflected political struggles which are mainly seen in the domain of the ‘local’. On the other hand, the structural changes in late capitalism since its so-called Golden Age and subsequent triumph over ‘actually-existing-socialism’ are often looked upon as the ‘global’. This ‘global-local-glocal’ rhetoric of ‘globaloney’ becomes a quagmire when specific political struggles in ‘local’ contexts articulate universal aspirations whose epitaph had been prematurely written by neoliberalism’s triumph.

But such struggles against the neoliberal onslaught while forming the specific material basis for Left resurgence has unleashed both historically contingent possibilities and constraints on Left identity and Left unity relevant to electoral democracy.

Die Linke’s rise in Germany is illustrative. With the formal transition to electoral democracy in unified Germany under neoliberalism, the Linkspartei, emerging out of the remnants of the East German Communist Party (SED), consolidated a mass base in the East with organizational structures that despite ideological turmoil could ensure electoral relevance with significant numbers of elected representatives. However, it could not make any inroads in the West where anti-communism was rabid and suffered a crushing defeat in the 2002 federal elections. The emergence of the WASG in the West, after a Left opposition was expelled from the SPD in opposition to Gerhard Schröder’s rabid anti-working class Agenda 2010, opened up the terrain of Left unity based on a common agenda against neoliberalism.5 5 The German version of neoliberal

In 2005, the Linksbuendnis (Left Alliance) between WASG and Linkspartei accounted for a vote share of 8.7 percent on appearance in the Federal elections. The 52-seat-gain of Linkbuendnis in the Bundestag forced the conservatives and the social democrats to form the government of the Grand Coalition. This class consolidation of the parties of the Right on a political agenda underwritten by neoliberalism spearheaded the process of Left unity. WASG and Linkspartei merged in 2007 to form the Linkspartei. While the ‘Grand Coalition’ sang peons to economic growth and a reduction in official unemployment figures, ordinary working class people lived in the precarious materiality of declining real wages and the intensification of casualization. Die Linke’s call for a national minimum wage resonated with the political expression of discontent in a wave of strikes in the public sector. Criticism of big business and increasing inequality under capitalism became rampant after scandals involving some top CEOs. This social unease with neoliberalism started finding political expression. While rising sale of Das Kapital volumes and the turn out in January 2009 to commemorate the 90th anniversary of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht’s murder were one set of pointers to the growing relevance of the Left, in three state elections, in Hessen, Lower Saxony and Hamburg, Die Linke passed the 5 percent threshold required to get seats. Recent opinion polls project Die Linke registering 30 percent support in the East and at least 10 percent nationally. Die Linke’s electoral relevance lies in its proposed agenda in keeping with the lived social experience of a significant section of the working class in Germany under neoliberalism. The contradictions of being in government in Berlin city has been a source of inner-party tension, along with the ideological conflict on the extent of opposiprogrammes around fiscal policy, curtailing social security and imperialist expansionism in the world market

tion to privatization that the various trade union constituents of its political base represent. There are debates in certain ‘radical fringes’ to project ‘Luxemburgism’ as an alternative to Leninism. But Die Linke has emerged as a ‘worker’s party’, filling the political vacuum created by the consolidation of class power in favor of capital.

The Nouveau Parti Anticapitaliste, (NPA) in France, founded in February 2009 and constituted on an anti-capitalist, anti-racist, internationalist, feminist and proenvironment agenda was formed after a large national strike based on a joint declaration of Left constituents in France on January 29, 2009 in which 2.5 million people participated. Since 1995, regular waves of workers’ struggles, an overall broadening of anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist sentiments, with the Socialist Party’s (PS) diligent implementation of neoliberal policies, the legitimacy of the Left agenda of the Communist Party of France (PCF) and that of Green radicalism came under scrutiny as both had been part of coalition governments with the PS in furthering neoliberal policies and subsequently lost their independence from the PS to set electoral agenda. Thus ideological positions on a legitimate Left political identity came under the scanner. In this crisis of Left praxis, the Revolutionary Communist League (RCL), bearing the legacy of a particular strand of Trotskyism and the 1968 uprisings, started gaining legitimacy from the mid-1990s with membership expansion and pockets of influence in the traditional support base of the PCF, a development that had been hitherto impossible.

The NPA emerged out of the dissolution of the RCL recognizing a need to address a much broader range of opposition to neoliberalism after the presidential elections of April 2007, which confirmed Besancenot as the most preferred option to the left of the PS with 4.1% of votes, much ahead of the

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PCF, the Greens and individual Left campaigners. The aim of the NPA was to translate the social and electoral support for Besancenot into an organized ideological force.

Independence from social-liberal governments and the PS has been the basis of its current legitimacy as a party among Left voters.6 It holds a possibility of Left unity through engagement with sections of the French Left which are willing to do so.

In the formation of the Die Linke and the NPA, the Left has regained electoral relevance in two metropolitan centers through formation of ‘umbrella’ parties which have reinvented their Left identity. Die Linke bears the legacy of two socalled ‘Old Left’ identities in the changing Left praxis in electoral democracy under neoliberalism in the German political context. The NPA is a ‘New Left’ response to erosion of legitimacy of those Left parties in France that have made strategic compromises with neoliberalism when faced with the prospect of being in coalition with social liberals. Both have broadened the Left agenda in engaging with modes of oppression that do not overtly conform to a class agenda but has anti-capitalism as its core ideology.

However, in the metropolitan centers of capital with the restructuring of the labor force under neoliberalism with a racist division in the hierarchy of labor, the ‘White Left’s’ ability to engage and build up a support base among the non-white working class remains limited.

The failures of experiments with Left Unity in the metropole are of equal importance in underscoring the relationship between broadening of the Left agenda and ideological differences on the class basis of ‘new’ movements. The collapse of the Socialist Alliance in Britain after its failure to make any significant mark in electoral outcomes since the late 1990s was followed by the formation and then split in 6 Sam Wainwright, 2009, France: New Anti-capitalist Party Founded, Green Left Weekly, Issue # 783, 18 February

Respect between 2004 and 2007, the party that emerged out of the anti-war movement in Britain. Large anti-war mobilizations of crossclass discontent in themselves were not sufficient condition for Left unity and electoral relevance.

While Respect gained pockets of influence in East London’s migrant working class area split along community lines, the Left leadership could not overcome the ‘original sin’ of the anti-war movement’s inability to convert the mass upsurge against the Iraq War into a more cohesive Left agenda against war, imperialism, neoliberalism, and Islamophobia. The tussle over Left praxis since 2001 not only led to a split in Respect, but to ideological crises inside the two dominant constituents of the Left leadership of the anti-war movement - the Socialist Workers’ Party (in 2008) and the Communist Party of Britain (in 2004).

Outside the imperial core, in Venezuela, where the opposition to imperialism and to the ruling class pledged to neoliberalism could transcend into a revolutionary struggle for democracy and socialism, the premise of defining Left identity and electoral agenda has been more coherent despite ideological strife. The United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) in Venezuela has emerged out of a qualitative transformation of a struggle of ‘a popular movement to shift from simply opposing the established order to constructing a new political power to create a new system’.7 In Venezuela, the PSUV was formed as a mass revolutionary party in 2008 to unite the Chavista activists to advance their collective class interests and chart the democratic path forward. It aimed to bring the various fragmented social movements and political groups that back the Bolivarian revolution into an organization. Apart from forging a unified Left identity to 7 Federico Fuentes, 2008, Venezuela: The struggle for a mass revolutionary party, Green Left Weekly, Issue #737, 30 January

address race, class and gender, this was perceived as necessary to resolve the issues around the leadership’s dependence on one person – Hugo Chavez, and the tendency within the administration to compromise with careerist bureaucratic tendencies. The recent electoral triumphs of the Left in Bolivia and El Salvador where radical social movements and the ‘political Left’ have historically overlapped have similarly led to Left political identity that have effectively addressed the ‘local’ and the ‘global’ in going beyond relevance to electoral triumph uniting the ‘social movements’ and the ‘political left’ to effectively overcome the anti-democratic vacuous social culture of neoliberalism and dig holes in the armor of global capitalism in imperialism’s old ‘backyard’.

So can any conclusions be drawn from these ‘factual’ accounts when the agency of the Left is contingent on the specific histories of disparate social relations and nation-states? Leftists, wherever they have a presence, have been engaged in ‘debates’ on Left Unity and Left identity in the last decade.

The success and failure of agencies that have gained electoral legitimacy as Left formations derive from the historical trajectories of Left movements in each of these countries. However, the specificities point to a general pattern of electoral legitimacy as a Left identity being a sine qua non of uncompromising principled opposition to neoliberalism reflected in demands that resonate with the lived experience of its working class base and a willingness to widen the Left agenda. Questions around tactics and strategy derive from this ideological principle and form the basis of Left Unity or lack of it.

The Indian Left and the United Left Bloc in Bihar In India, multi-party electoral democracy within semi-feudal and nouveau bourgeois structures has contributed to overall democratiza-

Naked Punch ASIA issue 03. tion of the polity since the 1970s reflected in higher share of voter turn outs of people in the lower rungs of the caste-class-gender hierarchy in social relations and political apathy towards electoral democracy among the upwardly mobile sections of the middle and upper classes. The thrust of ruling class machinations since 1991 when India officially embraced neoliberalism through the aegis of a Congress government, and largely endorsed by the corporate media is towards alternating between the Congress and the BJP led political coalitions as the proffered choice to the electorate as long as they share a consensus on bipartisan approach to further neoliberal ‘economic reforms’. The political effectiveness of the united Left opposition consisting of four parties, of which the Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI (M)) is the largest, lay in putting brakes on this process through its parliamentary presence and mobilization through trade unions in crucial sectors like banking and insurance. However, parties like the CPI (ML) (Liberation) which consider electoral democracy as a tool of struggle have not been part of this ‘united’ Left nationally.

The Left parties which had a contingent of 60 plus MPs in 2004 went to polls nationally in 2009 with loss of legitimacy due to its limited parliamentary strength deriving mainly from two states – West Bengal and Kerala where Left-led governments faced a crisis of credibility due to policies acquiescing to neoliberalism in recent years. The political developments in Singur and Nandigram since 2007 in West Bengal not only revealed the fault lines of this agenda but also the contradiction of a Communist Party led government pitted against its historical support base of the peasantry on the question of land acquisition for industrialization on behalf of big capital.

It was in this ‘national’ scenario

of going to polls faced with a loss of credibility of the Left that the Communist Party of India (CPI), the Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI (M)) and the Communist Party of India (Marxist Leninist) Liberation (CPI (ML) (L)) constituted the United Left Bloc (ULB) in Bihar India’s ‘weakest link’ in neoliberal integration, in January 2009 to conduct joint struggles and contest the parliamentary election as a Bloc. In this, Bihar saw a departure from the ‘national’ strategy of the CPI (M) and CPI to forge an electoral alliance for a ‘Third Alternative’ in opposition to the Congress and the BJP led coalitions with various parties of the so-called ‘regional bourgeoisie’ whose credentials as junior partners in the neoliberal order in India when heading state governments is compromised to say the least, and, the CPI (ML) (L)’s strategy of going it alone and remain electorally insignificant.

The electoral rationale for Left unity in Bihar had existed for over a decade. The splitting of the Left vote had been one of the reasons why there was no Left MP from Bihar in the Lok Sabha in 1998 and 2004 and dwindling number of Left MPs from Bihar from nine in 1991 to one in 1999 in a period marked by the rise of the CPI (ML) (L) in Bihar.

But the strategic aim of pooling of Left votes through an electoral alliance could reach fruition only in the run-up to the 2009 general elections. We need trace the specific political basis of the alliance in the materiality of Bihar’s polity within the overall national context.

1977 marked the electoral resolution of a decade of social upheaval in Bihar with a distinct mandate for a shift away from the Congress. Bihar played an important role in the formation of the two landmark non-Congress governments at the centre in 1977 and in 1989. Each marked a culmination of social churning, one traced to

the longer political history of land struggles in Bihar and the other to the aspirations for social justice that emerged out of caste oppression.8 The two were not unrelated; but the socialists moved towards caste-based identity politics while the CPI remained mired in a mechanical economistic primacy of class at the cost of the ‘social’.

The JP movement with its call for the ‘end of ideology’ and the popular reaction to the intense repression of the Emergency sounded the death-knell of Congress monopoly that had been challenged since the late 1960s in electoral politics at the centre and in Bihar. But the Left, mainly represented by the CPI in Bihar became quite redundant in national electoral politics at a time when Bihar’s polity became crucial for political equations of the non-Congress governments at the centre. This was in keeping with the broader national pattern of the CPI paying the price for its alliance with the Congress between 1971 and 1977. It failed to return a single MP from Bihar in 1977.

The decades of the 1980s were years of further decline with the rise of Maoist movements eating into the traditional base of the Left in Bihar. The intensification of caste and class confrontations with the rise of the private armies of upper-caste landlords, and a gradual democratisation embodied in the emergence of a new rank of political leaders in Bihar through the political assertion of ‘backward castes’ on the plank of social justice, took the wind out of Left mobilisation.

The early 1990s however led to a change in the situation. The material basis for Left struggles had re-emerged in Bihar with a government that was a challenge to upper-caste hegemony and yet 8 Kumar S, 2004, New Phase in Backward Caste Politics in Bihar,19902000, in Shah G (ed) Caste and Democratic Politics in India, Permanent Black, New Delhi, 315-355.

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no visible empowerment of the small and marginal peasants who were mostly Dalits and other ‘backwards’. The CPI, though still the largest Left Party, went back to mobilisations around land reform.

So did the CPI(M) and the newly formed CPI(ML) (L). The land struggles were led separately by the three parties in different parts of Bihar. This led to an uproar in the state legislature when the BJP warned the Janata Dal government led by Laloo Prasad Yadav of dire consequences if it failed to check the struggles. The Congress sided with the BJP. For the first time in several decades the floor was split on a class basis between the Left and the Right. This forged a tacit understanding among the three Left parties on land issues. However it soon broke down when the CPI(ML) (L) gave a call for nationalisation of land in contrast to the CPI and CPI(M)’s call for implementation of existing legislation to ensure ‘land to the tiller’. The movement then lost momentum but there are Left pockets in North and Central Bihar even today where peasants have retained their kabza on the land acquired through the struggle.

were aligned nationally and the CPI (ML) (L). While formulations on imperialism, neoliberalism and communalism were paramount in determining national strategies for all three parties, there is a gulf between the CPI(ML)(L)’s assessment and the CPI and CPI(M)’s as Left allies, of national priorities reflected in electoral strategies in each successive election since 1996. Programmatic differences of the three parties that go back to their historical legacy of the two decisive splits in the Communist movement in India in 1964 and 1967 due to ideological difference on the character of the Indian ruling class and the state, were important in how each looked at the class character of Bihar’s ‘regional parties’ that had gained national stature like the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) and the Samta Party and later the Janata Dal (United) (JD(U) and the Lok Janshakti Party (LJP) and their relationship with the two major parties of the ruling class – the Congress and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). While all three Left parties have a history of alliances with the different contending factions of what has been termed the ‘cockney elite’ in Bihar,9 the disagreement on the question of

However, the national priorities since 1998 had significantly diverged for the CPI /CPI (M) which

9

Gupta S, 2006, Nine Months of Nitish, Bihar Times, http://www.bihartimes. com/articles/shaibal/ninemonthsofnitish. html, Viewed on 9 Feb 2009.

Source: Election Commission of India, Statistical Reports, Various Years

Year

Seats (Bihar)

Seats (Bihar)Share of Votes Share of Votes in in Bihar: Bihar: CPI(M) CPI(ML)(L)

1991 1996 1998 1999 2004 2009

9 3 0 1 0 0

9 3 0 1 0 0

1.41 0.84 0.4 0.98 0.77 0.51

2.11 2.12 2.47 2.41 1.90

non-Left allies stood in the way of a Left alliance in previous elections.

Since then, all three parties had reviewed their alliances at the state level and separately come to the conclusion that the respective alliances have only led to erosion of political bases. With the four Left Parties’ withdrawal of support to the UPA at the centre, on antiimperialist grounds over the IndoUS Nuclear Deal also led to convergence with CPI(ML)(L)’s position of ‘a meaningful and effective ‘Third Camp’ with a resurgent Left at its center’. The Left Bloc reached a seamless agreement on seat sharing and contested in 33 out of the 40 parliamentary constituencies in Bihar in 2009.

Since the early 1990s, after the new spate of land struggles in various parts of Bihar led separately by the three parties, the expansion of the social base of the CPI (ML) (L), and the consolidation of the CPI and the CPI (M) in pockets were partly reflected in the total vote shares of the three parties in elections between 1991 and1996 when it was marginally higher than the national average at a time when the Left in India faced the ideological offensive unleashed internationally against Marxism and socialism, the embracing of

Total Vote Share of the Three Parties in Bihar

All India Vote Share of the CPI, CPI(M) and CPI(ML) (Liberation)

8.96 8.03 5.92 6.14 4.35 3.80

8.66 8.09 7.16 7.21 7.4 -

Naked Punch ASIA issue 03. neoliberalism by the Indian bourgeoisie and the meteoric rise of neofascism and Hindu nationalism in India. The vote share of the CPI and the CPI (M) in Bihar however continued to diminish in each successive general election in this period except in 1999 when the CPI (M) won a seat for the second time after 1989. This decline of the two parties while the CPI (ML) (L) held on to its electoral share led to a much faster decline in share of Left votes in Bihar compared to the national share (Table 1). This decline was also visible in the two state elections between 1995 and 2000.

After the pooling of the Left electoral base in 2009, the vote share of the CPI increased from 1.17 percent in 2004 to 1.40 percent in 2009. But the CPI (ML) (L) has seen a substantial decline in its shares (Table 1). This is a reversal from not just the last elections, but the reversal of a more long term trend of the CPI (ML) (L) holding on to its electoral support base in successive election since the mid 1990s.

The CPI (M)’s declining vote share since 1999 continues.

State level aggregates can be misleading because a concentrated shares of the Left votes came from five constituencies – four in North Bihar and one in Central Bihar where the ULB polled a vote share of 9 percent or more. In Arrah, the CPI (ML) (L) polled 20.8 percent of the votes and came a distant third. In Begusarai, the CPI polled 23 percent of the votes and came a distant second. Both these parliamentary constituencies have a committed Left support base due to a history of land struggles, visible mass front activism and organizational presence. Thus the pooling of prospective Left votes through an electoral alliance at a statewide level has not prevented the erosion of vote shares of the Left except in two pockets of visible influence.

It points to signs of erosion of the electoral support base of the

CPI(ML)(L) which had been expanding through the late 1990s organizationally unlike the other two parties whose political reach had frozen for a long time.

The National Democratic Alliance (NDA) swept the polls in Bihar with 34 seats, out of which, the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP), the flagship party of the neofascist Sangh Parivar, has won more than a third of the seats, the majority going to its major partner - the Janata Dal (United) (JD(U)), with the rout of the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) and the Lok Janashakti Party (LJP).

There is a larger political context to this outcome beyond the usual issue-based analysis.

petty crime in Bihar have declined since the NDA came to power, but, high-value crime retains its importance, and rape, the traditional instrument of display of upper-class might, has increased under NDA rule. Caste based organizations of the upper castes are being actively organized and promoted by the Hindu right in the last one year. The Sangh Parivar is concentrating its efforts against alleged ‘Bangladeshi infiltrators’ in Kishanganj, Bihar’s only Muslim majority district since September 2008.

On the other hand, the RJD, LJP and the JD (U) with their wider social support base carved out on caste alliances are now faced with the challenge of single-leader led The power tussle in Bihar since the parties with no organizational base 1980s had been reconciled beand an extensive patron-client nettween the traditional upper-caste work to be oiled. This puts a limit landed ruling class and the emergon their political maneuverability. ing sections of the ‘backward’ nou- The JD(U) to create more space veau elite in the wake of the caste for maneuverability is actively based social justice movement implementing neoliberal policies in of the 1980s through the poweralliance with the BJP while at the sharing arrangements reached by same time trying to carve a space the Congress and the RJD and LJP beyond its usual caste constituenin the UPA, and the BJP and the JD cies through accordance of ‘most (U) in the NDA in the last five years. oppressed status’ (Mahadalit) With the break of the RJD and LJP status to 20 Dalit castes and promcombine from the Congress led ises of ‘development with social coalition before the 2009 elections, justice’. the consolidation of class power in favor of the NDA worked to the However, with the direct espousal advantage of the JD (U) by opening of neoliberalism at the state level, up channels of renegotiation with the dichotomy between the ‘social both the BJP and the Congress on justice’ agenda and the economic a plank of ‘pride in Bihari identity’ struggle is blurring. The month long coupled with promises of neolibstrike of state government employeral ‘good governance’. ees in Bihar against casualization in January 2009 was the immediate The BJP as a junior partner in the political context in which the ULB state government is facilitating the was formed. In a state where govre-assertion of the traditional rulernment jobs are the only source ing class constituted by the upperof livelihood security, the JD (U) caste big land-owners along with reneged on its electoral promise the appeasement of the nouveauand previous agreement of the rich urban upper class. While using government with trade unions on the state for primitive accumulaimplementing central pay scales for tion through rentier means had non-gazetted employees. It instituaccelerated in urban areas powtionalised recruitment of teachers ered by real estate and finance, the and health workers on consoliclass logic of ‘good governance’ is dated pay and contractual employclear under the NDA. Most types of ment services. After the first round

situations - India

of recruitment to fill vacancies under contractual employment, it has stopped further recruitment of teachers. Fourth grade employees, daily rated workers, ASHAs, Anganwadi workers came together with all other trade-unionised nongazetted employees over a sevenpoint charter of demands based on these issues. The state government refused to negotiate with the unions on the charter. This led to a 34 day strike that started on 7 January 2009. The government still refused to negotiate. Instead, a covert BJP-affiliated citizens’ forum filed a PIL against the strike.

The strike ended after a High Court intervention directed the government to go to the negotiating table.

This strike formed the material basis of the ULB. The neoliberal onslaught in Bihar started on a systematic basis at the state level after the installation of the Nitish Kumar led NDA government. Both propaganda and policy in its ‘good governance’ agenda is in keeping with the arguments for ‘neoliberalism with a human face’ and is a mixed package of ‘development with social justice’ appealing to both the neoliberal takers and the proponents of social justice, the struggle and aspiration for which has been the leitmotif of Bihar’s polity since the 1970s.

Not just the Left, Bbt also the RJD and the LJP failed to gauge the effectiveness of this strategy while breaking with the Congress and their leaders are now relegated to oblivion for at least a few years.

Beyond electoral equations, the complete and absolute surrender to neoliberalism by the successive governments at the centre has created a material basis for joint struggles at the state level. Nationally, this remained confined to the trade union movement led by the Left since the 1990s in the series of joint actions and strikes since 1991. The trade unions affiliated to the three Left parties in Bihar had been part of these struggles with

state specific dimensions.

In this conjuncture, when the Left nationally is introspecting the question of its ‘identity’, the erosion of the United Left in the electoral battle in Bihar points to the urgency of forging political unity through joint struggles that had been the other premise of the formation of the ULB. Will that be possible in a situation where nationally the Left has faced its worst electoral defeat since independence ironically at a time when the neoliberal project itself is crumbling in the metropolitan heart of capital? Can the ULB in Bihar formulate a cohesive agenda as a principled opposition both in the State Legislature where it does have a small but significant presence and outside given the dwindling support base and organizational problems of all the three constituents? Most importantly, is it possible for the ULB to survive the ideological consequences of the erosion of the the largest constituent of the Indian Left – the CPI(M)’s electoral legitimacy in its strongholds as the agency representing the interests, struggles and aspirations of India’s peasants, workers and the non-affluent pettybourgeoisie? The materiality of the possibilities in the ‘weakest link’ is cause of optimism. The materiality of lack of agency in addressing the question of Left political identity is cause of despair. In the contradiction, lies the hope.

Sri Lanka’s Common Future Pradeep Jeganathan.

(Senior Consultant Social Anthropologist, Consortium for Humanitarian Agencies, Colombo, Sri Lanka).

“Every prospect pleases, but only man is vile” goes the racist, colonial refrain, which is still the dominant ‘international’ framing of ‘news’ of the coveted pearl that seems to hang from India’s ear. In this colonial story a ‘model colony’ become a ‘troubled paradise’ after the British left it kindly and quietly.

In the hands of the natives, a pearl is but a frozen tear.

An anti-colonial narrative sees the not so hidden hand of identify, classify, divide and rule, in the making and managing ‘community,’ little different from a series of British colonial violations that have left ‘ethnic’/‘communal’ partitions or simmering, half-resolved resolutions in their wake. Ireland, India/ Pakistan/Bangladesh, Israel/Palestine, Cyprus, Fiji, Singapore/Malaysia. It’s a long list; differences apart, the heritage of colonial identify and divide is shared.

“Ceylon” was fractured as it was born in the early nineteenth century. Beginning in the 1830s, and with growing intensity throughout the nineteenth century, colonial orientalism reconstructed an ancient, multi-millennia deep, a ‘kings and battles’ history of “Ceylon,” of “Sinhala” glory and South Indian/“Tamil” invasions, and inscribed it on the island with archaeological excavations. At the same time, pauperized south Indian labor, lured with false promises, dragged in chains, to toil on massively profitable colonial plantations, were constructed as latter

day successors of previous “Tamil” invading hordes. The terrain of elite politics was constructed through competing “communities” with the logic of token representation of the colonial legislature being “Sinhala,” “Tamil and “Moor;” one strand of subaltern politics was only a creative mimesis of militant missionary Christianity, producing a separatist militant Buddhism.

But another, secular strand of subaltern politics was as important. A strong, militant, organized working class struggled for their rights, shattering these colonial boxes through the early part of the twentieth century. Plantations workers were at its vanguard and it was no surprise that the bourgeoisie, united across other ‘communal’ divides, disenfranchised them at ‘independence.’ The King of England, sovereign over his dominion of ‘Ceylon’ did not object. Militant unions didn’t help the profits of tea plantations, still largely owned by British companies.

The Left, its base shattered, slowly but surely crept back into the colonial, communal boxes that had now become electoral vote banks. Three bourgeois parties, led by anglicized capitalists emerged. The two Sinhala dominated parties, fought each other to keep the Tamil bourgeois party away from the milk rice cake made by the labor of plantation workers. Language came first, ‘Sinhala Only’ was endorsed at the polls, and implemented viciously.

University admissions came next, quotas were designed to keep

Tamil admissions in check; and throughout it all ‘development’ from irrigation schemes to factories were about strengthening Sinhala vote banks.

Despite all this, there continued to be glimmers of a new, non-parliamentary, non racist, anti-colonial Left. It’s often forgotten that in the late 1960s Rohana Wijeweera, who later led the racist JVP in two violent insurrections, was part of a Maoist Communist party, led by a Tamil, Shanmuganathan, which was struggling against Hindu caste oppression in Jaffna, in the north, at the time. In the late 1960s, militancy, Sinhala and Tamil, south and north, had the same roots in radical youth movements that spat time and time again at the averted face of the promise of modernity. But the pull of colonially constructed, now bourgeois driven communal identities proved too strong, and militancy diverged.

Northern Tamil militancy, small, chauvinist, narrow, feeding off the cries of separatist nationalism by vote bank seeking Tamil politicians, grew after brutal army repression, and a series of unprecedented antiTamil atrocities in the early 1980s – the burning of the Jaffna library, and repeated pogroms culminating in the massive one of ‘July ’83’— facilitated by President J. R. Jayewardene’s regime (1977-1989).

Yet, even against that darkening sky, there were attempts by some northern militant groups to forge links with Sinhala militants in the south. The southern Left, re-

thought the ‘national question,’ and for the first time in its history, sided with Lenin. But the single minded nationalist chauvinism of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) would have none of that.

The dramatic rise of the LTTE, in opposition to radical democratic struggles cannot really be understood without stepping back into the cold war context of the early 1980s. India’s alliance with the Soviets was set off by the ill-considered alliance of Jayewardene with the US and Israel. As Shinbet and Mossad were added to Jayewardene’s game, together with a British mercenary outfit, torture and innumerable civilian massacres became routine. Indian intelligence agencies, in turn, provided the large number of young, angry Tamil men, violated by the 1983 pogrom, with direct training and arms. Tamil militant groups grew exponentially, with no need to draw sustenance from the ‘people’ they claimed to represent; any progressive tendency was foreclosed, countermassacres and civilian-directed bombings proceeded apace. The LTTE then eliminated other groups and dissenting Tamil leaders. Rajiv Gandhi’s failed attempt as peace maker, in 1987, which was really an attempt to tame his mother’s beast, led not only to his own death - (the parallel with Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale and Indira Gandhi should not escape us) – but also to a brutally suppressed Sinhala ‘patriotic’ insurrection in the south. The LTTE continued cult like expelling Tamil speaking Muslims from the north, refusing repeated offers of peace and compromise from the Center and the Sinhala south, in 1990, 1995 and 2002 – making inevitable its final destruction at the hands of a military force more powerful than its own, by the middle of May 2009.

While there were terrible casualties on both sides of this battle, the human tragedy was far smaller than

it might have been. The howls of protest emanating from the “international (read: neo-imperial) community” and its associated press barons at the destruction of the LTTE’s military power, their refusal to appreciate what The Hindu editor N. Ram has recently described as an “astonishing feat of rescuing by military means close to 275,000 civilians who were… confined by the Tigers for use as a human shield,” can only be understood in a fresh geopolitical frame that includes Sri Lanka’s new alliance with China and its continuing one with India, that leaves some room for US maneuvering, but little for the European Union or United Kingdom, which had, geopolitically, like Norway, tied its relationship with ‘Sri Lanka’ to the continued existence of the LTTE. Nor has the outpouring of assistance, from medicines, cooked food and clothes to the survivors of the war, sent north from the south of the country warranted any coverage ‘internationally’ as it does not fit easily, it seems, with the neo-imperial frame of ever hateful natives. Indeed, the conditions in the camps seem to be improving daily, and there is every reason to believe that restrictions on freedom of movement will be temporary. The project of de-mining and re-building the lands devastated by years of war will be challenging but will proceed apace.

The northern province will be recapitalized and physical quality of life should improve.

The real challenge lies in the content and form of the political process that will emerge in the wake of the LTTE’s destruction. On the one hand, for the first time in decades, multiple Tamil voices can emerge, engendering healthy debate within the community. Non-northern Tamils might find that the implementation of the neglected provision of the constitution that made their language an ‘official’ one, in 1987, and the quasi-federal provincial councils that devolve some power away from the center, satis-

fies their aspirations for dignity and self-respect. But many northern Tamils, both in Sri Lanka and Diaspora, who feel a deep melancholia, after the defeat of the LTTE for the loss of a ‘nation,’ that never was, never will be, may still argue, as they did before, for some kind of confederal self-rule, for a larger region.

Ultimately, such nationalist arguments will be met by other nationalist arguments within the country, leaving ‘stability’ and ‘governance’ to the heavy hand of law and order, as exemplified by Singapore or Malaysia. Real democracy and social justice can flourish in Sri Lanka only when its citizens manage to transcend the colonially constructed communal boxes that have governed their political processes after the decline of the Left, and form new alliances across such divisions, as we try to move, slowly and painfully, into our common future.

situations - Sri Lanka

poetry section

Arabic poetry special

special

An Introduction to Álvaro García Linera

by Vijay Prashad.

Taking the name Qhananchiri (Clarifying Light), García Linera published his first major text, Critica de la nación y la nación critica naciente, a 49 page polemic on nationalism and Amerindians (La Paz: Ediciones Ofensiva Roja, 1990). The next year, using the same name, and the same publishing house, García Linera published a text on Marxism and revolution, De demonios escondidos y momentos de revolución: Marx y la revolución social en las extremidades del cuerpo capitalista.

Caught trying to demolish electricity towers in

Illustration by: Robert Der Arakelian

Álvaro García Linera was born in Cochabamba, Bolivia in 1962.

While studying at the San Agustin High School, a private, technicaloriented institution, García Linera moved toward radicalism. The illusions of the creole middle-class did not detain him, as the very harshness of the dictatorship of General Hugo Banzer (1971-78) put paid to any sense of affiliation with the forces of order. The only order in his life was in mathematics, and he took his advanced degrees in that subject from the Mexico’s UNAM (1981-85). It was in Mexico City that García Linera tested his political commitments, here with solidarity work on behalf of those guerrilla groups being vanquished by Ronald Reagan’s allies, the Death Squads. After Mexico, García Linera returned to Bolivia to work among the radical tin miners in northern Potosí. In time, García Linera’s outfit joined the “ayllu rojos” (ayullu, an extended kinship group, a commune), the Red Ayullu. Then, historian Forrest Hylton points out, García Linera and his band merged with the high-plains Aymara peasant movement to form the Tupac Katari Guerrilla Army in 1990. At 28, then, this mathematician from an established family found himself as a gunman alongside the long-dispossessed Amerindians of Bolivia.

rural La Paz, García Linera served five years in the notorious Chonchocoro Maximum Security Prison. He claims to have read a book a day in prison, even devouring Marx’s Capital between the bleak walls (he wrote an additional theoretical Marxist tract while in prison, this published in 1995 as Forma valor y forma comunidad; aproximación teórica-abstracta a los fundamentos civilizatorio).

García Linera read as much Gramsci as he did the Bolivian scholar René Zavaleta, drawing from the heritage of Marxism and from Bolivian history.

Prison prepared him for what was to come when an amnesty freed him in 1997.

García Linera took advantage of his release to throw himself deeper into his studies, this time of the state of the Bolivian working-class. He also cultivated a great interest in the Spanish translations of Marx, traveling to Amsterdam’s International Institute for Social History to assess Marx’s writings on China and India, the worlds outside Europe. Teaching at the Universidad Mayor de San Andrés in La Paz put García Linera in touch with the new currents of protest that had engulfed Bolivia during the 1990s. The emergence of radical indigenous movements staffed by retrenched radical tin miners and those willing to defend their modest rights and dignity to the death provided the creative nudge to what García Linera called the “popular slumber” of the people.

The water wars, gas wars, coca wars, and rights wars that would engulf the country from 2000 onward were prefigured in the small acts of the 1990s. García Linera and his comrades traced some of the intellectual contours of these developments from their group, Comuna, in La Paz. García Linera’s contributions would stream forth in books edited by the Comuna group, such as Tiempos de rebelión and Pluriverso: teoría politica boliviana. Working alongside such intellectuals as Felipe Quispe Huanca and Luis Tapia, as Raquel Gutiérrez Aguilar and Raul Prada, García Linera developed the concepts to understand the sudden burst of popular activity.

The election of 2002 showed that liberalism and neo-liberalism were both vulnerable, with Bolivia’s Movement for Socialism (MAS) coming in second, and with the US Embassy warning that a MAS victory would be deleterious for Bolivia.

MAS was led by Evo Morales, born 1959, a labor leader and Amerindian who is charismatic and bold, able to draw together a variety of people and articulate a common vision that does not exceed the major constraints that Bolivia faces.

Morales and García Linera became close friends

and associates. García Linera played a crucial role after 2002 drawing all the various strands of resistance to neo-liberalism into a mega-coalition for the MAS (and, as some has churlishly put it, on behalf of Evoism). His work from this period, including the 2004 Sociologia de los movimientos sociales en Bolivia and the 2005 Democracia en Bolivia, provided the intellectual foundation for the widest political alliance of the masses into MAS. In 2006, MAS won the election, Morales ascended to the Presidency and García Linera became his Vice President.

It is in this context that García Linera quite precisely said,

The MAS is in no sense seeking to form a socialist government. It is not viable because socialism is built on the basis of a strong organized working class. Socialism is not constructed on the basis of a family economy, which is what dominates in Bolivia, but on large industry. What is the model for Bolivia? A strong state, and that is capitalism.

It isn’t even a mixed economy. What I do as a Marxist is evaluate the actual potential for development in a society.

What MAS can do is to create a social democratic response to the onslaught of globalization, and to prepare the terrain for a leap to another social formation, but one that is not clearly in sight at present. That is García Linera’s studied consideration. It is something to take seriously.

The speech below was given by García Linera in October 2006, after MAS had been in power for less than a year. It lays out the broad thinking of a creative Marxist thinker from South America, heir to people like the Peruvian Marxist José Carlos Mariátegui (1894-1930), the Bolivian Revolution of 1952 and the powerful indigenous movement of the present.

The Communards were members and supporters of the short-lived 1871 Paris Commune. For NP, they are supporters from across history and the world who contribute to move our societies towards equality, liberty and justice.

From the Communards

Socialism of th Translated by W. T. Whitney Jr.

This version was initially published in Political Affairs, from where it is reproduced with permission.

e 21st Century Alvaro Garcia Linera Vice President of the Republic of Bolivia

October 29, 2006.

Companeros and Companeras: Permit me to bring you the most affectionate and fraternal greetings from our president Evo Morales. He has followed this continental gathering step by step, has followed your discussions with rapt attention.

Because of complicated work - pending negotiations on petroleum and minerals – he could not be here with you. He sends a grateful, fraternal, and affectionate greeting to all of you.

Allow me to cover three areas with you: how to distance ourselves from neo-liberalism, how the state relates to social movements, and socialism.

1. The four pillars of neo-liberalism Over the past five - seven years, peoples on the continent, worthy people, working people, oppressed people have slowly begun to initiate processes of mobilization, struggle, and confrontation against what we call neo-liberalism. Latin American people without a doubt are in the vanguard of the struggle against neo-liberalism that has materialized and taken root all over the world in the last 25 years.

Paraphrasing Marx, one can say that the specter of anti-neoliberalism or of post-neo-liberalism is stalking the continent, from Oaxaca in Mexico, through Venezuela, Ecuador, Brazil, Bolivia, etc, to Tierra del Fuego in Chile. The continent serves as the vanguard of reflection and planetary mobilization responding to neo-liberalism and its effects. To look into this, to know why we are fighting, it’s important to remind ourselves of the 3-4 main points as to what neo-liberalism is.

First off, neo-liberalism signifies a process of fragmentation - structural disintegration - of support networks, solidarity, and popular mobilization. Throughout the whole world, especially in Europe, Latin America, and Asia, neo-liberalism has grown out of the pulverization, fragmentation, and disintegration of the old workers’ movement, the old peasant movement, and the urban mobilizations that developed in the fifties and the eighties.

The fragmentation of society and the destruction of both solidarity networks and the fabric of cohesion have fostered

the consolidation of neo-liberalism.

Secondly, neo-liberalism has taken form, advanced, and imposed itself on the world through privatization, i.e. private appropriation of collective wealth and public properties, including public savings, land, minerals, forest, and pension funds. Neo-liberalism developed through privatizing those resources.

Thirdly, The introduction of neo-liberalism was accompanied by reducing the state and deforming it, especially that aspect of the state relating for better or worse to the collective or to ideas of commonwealth. Neo-liberalism set out to destroy this notion of the state as collective or commonwealth in order to impose a type of corporate ideology calling for appropriation and squandering of collective wealth accumulated many times over by two, three, four, or five generations.

Fourth, the implementation of neo-liberalism led to limitations on people’s political participation; democracy was ritualized into casting a vote every four years. The citizen voter no longer takes part in decision-making. Tiny circles of the political elite take it upon themselves to represent the people. These then are the four pillars of neo-liberalism - fragmentation of the laboring sectors and worker organizations, privatization of public resources, the diminished state, and impediments to people’s decision making.

How to dismantle the four pillars of neo-liberalism - what to substitute If there are four items, four pillars of neo-liberalism that have created so much poverty, marginalization, and misfortune in the country, then clearly we have to remove them. We must substitute other structures, other mechanisms, by which society, nations, and poor working people might regain the right to decide their own destiny.

Bolivia exemplifies the workings of social fragmentation.

But we can also look at Mexico, Ecuador, and Argentina.

The best way to resist neo-liberalism is through consolidation of the social movements. These include popular networks and autonomous organizations of men and women, youth, workers, peasants, professionals, students, and indigenous peoples. Organization, i.e. the re-establishment of civil, popular, peasant, and indigenous society,

From the Communards

political power than two, three, or four states together. The purpose of consolidating a state with economic, cultural, and political strength is to provide a protective shield for the social movements, an international armor for growth of the social struggles. Yes, reinforce the state, but not in the sense of the old state capitalism, which was a way to privatize public resources. It’s a subordinated state that has to be strengthened, one always controlled and permeated by the demands, activities, and insurgency of the social movements, which exist to keep the state from serving as an alibi for new entrepreneurs and new privateers.

becomes our first pillar for dismantling the neo-liberal regimen. That means organizing the hardest hit sectors of the last 25 years, the working class, women workers, the indigenous, peasant, and youth sectors, all of them, fragmented, weakened, and marginalized, their rights abused. The task today is to devise new methods of worker organization that correspond to the prevailing style of fragmented production work, work that is no longer concentrated in big production centers, organization also of peasants and indigenous people defending their rights to take back land. Young people need to be mobilized to pursue real citizenship, so that they no longer turn into economic exiles in Europe or North America. This work – reconstruction from below, from the base – is the first great task we have to undertake to bring down the neo-liberal regimen. We have taken steps along these lines here in Bolivia, and we are very pleased. We look to the world in a direct, respectful way as we offer a body of experience toward remaking the social fabric – less now in the workplace, and more where people live - around quite specific issues, water, land, hydrocarbon. These are the vital, basic points of unification essential for reforming networks of popular, worker, peasant, and indigenous groups that have been dismantled over the last 25 years.

Secondly, struggle against neo-liberalism implies a return to socialization of the collective wealth, restoring to the rightful owners what belonged to all before it was privatized over the last decades by small family groupings. And that means recovering natural resources, hydrocarbons, water, land, and forests. Only by means of social re-appropriation of wealth common to us all can we go about dismantling the neo-liberal core. Experiences throughout the continent and in Bolivia particularly indicate this to be the road by which people will be standing up for themselves. People at the base have been thinking and pondering in directed, independent ways. Here in Bolivia, mobilization was based on defense of the coca leaf, defense of water, of land, and gas and oil. These were the axes around which society recovered confidence and regained capacity for mobilization, leadership development, and building networks to unify city and country. Thanks to that we can now say that in Bolivia we have a government of social movements.

The third mechanism for struggle against neo-liberalism relates to empowerment of the state. Why the state? Why is it important to build up the state now? Situations of adverse international context and state take-over go together, especially when political regimes that disregard national borders are involved, or foreign companies with more economic and

And a fourth feature of this struggle against neo-liberalism is the introduction and unfolding of democracy in ways that place personal destiny in one’s own hands. Democracy is not just casting a vote every four years. Rather it’s having the capacity to participate in what’s happening in the country, from the matter of municipal investments to deciding if a petroleum contract should be signed or not signed. And in Latin America we are full of experiences of democracy at the base, what with our indigenous communities, urban neighborhoods, workers’ districts, and groups of unemployed.

There are many seeds of real democracy, direct democracy, democracy in the community, and participatory democracy.

These are the necessary settings for development, initiatives,

proposals, and realization of rights. People have to fight for their rights in order that rights sanctioned by law and the state can gain legitimacy. .

So this struggle against neo- liberalism is based on four fundamentals: varying forms of democratic expression (community-based, territorial-based, direct, and participatory), the recovery by society of its collective wealth, the reinforcement of the state – subordinated to society – for the sake of international protection, and, lastly, unification of the social movements. Country and city come together, also indigenous people and peasants, young and old workers, the unemployed and the homeless, and the landless and the destitute.

Latin America – the vanguard of the construction, discussion, and organization of post- neo-liberal societies.

Naked Punch ASIA issue 03.

Having taken these four items into consideration, I don’t have the least doubt that the consolidation of whatever follows neo-liberalism, or replaces it, will take place initially on this continent, and from there extend to other continents, if we have the strength and capacity. May Latin Americans stay in the vanguard of the construction, discussion, and organization of post- neo-liberal societies.

sional sectors that aren’t mobilized, indeed how to win over 90% of society. If we can do that, Companera Silvia, success is guaranteed, because not only will there be a government of social movements but there will also be a State of social movements able to articulate and unite the homeland in its entirety, society in its entirety. (Garcia is addressing Silvia Lazarte, President of the Constituent Assembly)

2. Dialectic between state and social movements.

After Neo-Liberalism – Socialism of the 21st century

But a question arises here, one implicit in the name of this gathering: how does the relation between state and social movement work? At first glance they appear to be contradictory notions. The idea of state implies the concentration of decision making; the state has a monopoly in that area. The term social movement signifies diffusion of decision-making, socialization of the process. This is a tension that we have to deal with, and that will take practice. State as centralization, movement as socialization: it’s a permanent tension.

The question remains; what comes after struggle against neo-liberalism; what does post neo-liberalism have to do with socialism? Does post neo-liberalism necessarily imply a type of socialism? That is another discussion, among social movements, intellectuals, and leaders – and a discussion too inside our government.

And I am describing the experience of our own government, that of permanent tension between mandates from the social movements – choosing a person for the state bureaucracy, for example, or the elaboration of a law – and, on the other hand, decisions to be imposed upon opposition forces in society. This is an old discussion that goes back to the Paris Commune, is taken up by Lenin’s soviets, by the Hungarian Councils in Europe. Here in Bolivia there’s a long experience from Catavi, from the “’52”, and is being repeated now.

How to build a state managed and led by social movements would seem to be contradictory. But no. Perhaps it’s this very tension, between socialization and concentration, between democratization of decision making and monopoly, through which revolutions of the 21st century will have to proceed.

The social movements here bear significant responsibility. In resolving this tension we Latin Americans may even become able to conceive of and propose other social movements elsewhere in the world.

Until the year 2003, the discussion was about social movements being separate from the state. Or, as the old left would have it, the state had to be under the control of one party separated from the social movements. The 21st century would seem to be setting off on another route, one derived from our experience as Latin Americans, that of permanent tension and ongoing dialectic between the state and social movements, between socialization and concentration. Here the social movements take on the challenge of how to achieve social leadership. Because it’s not enough to be part of the state and make decisions. For those decisions to gain legitimacy you have to depend upon backing from other sectors in society, not solely from social movements, workers, and indigenous people.

And in Bolivia the challenge for our indigenous movement is being able to appeal to, attract, and win over the unorganized middle classes, how to attract the profes-

It’s clear that socialism, understood as a society of overall well being, where the people recover control of their economic, cultural, and political decision making in a community-based way is not something built up in a year, or ten years, or even 50. Nor is socialism anything defined by decrees. It’s part and parcel of the struggle against neoliberalism. We revolutionaries have to transform tendencies into practice and deeds, not just on paper. Within our own society we have to strengthen the organizing capacity of indigenous communities. They are besieged, fragmented, and oppressed by colonialism, but internally have the potential for incorporating wealth, production, the use of land, water, skills, and materials into the community. Revolutionaries have the duty to harness the struggle against neo-liberalism with the movement toward a socialism based fundamentally upon the collective and social re-appropriation of our wealth. This movement is embedded in our indigenous communities in Mexico, Ecuador, Guatemala, Chile, Peru, and Bolivia. We need to waken it, propel it, and expand it into a proposition that extends far beyond simple neo-liberalism.

The new workers movement and the indigenous – peasant movement could generate on the continent the potential for real socialism of the 21st century.

There are two other considerations. The old workers movement based on unionization of big companies is gone, but the working class has not disappeared. There are more new workers now than ever before, but most of them are young people and women, their rights gone; they are unorganized, unassociated, fragmented, and dispersed among tiny work places. Finding a new discourse, revolutionaries have to re-articulate a new workers movement composed of women and young people that have other perspectives. They have to be grouped by neighborhoods, districts, and occupation, no longer by work place. Now there are five workers here, ten there, 20 there, 30 over there. They don’t make up a tight community. We have to devise methods to empower a powerful continent-wide workers movement. It appears that on the Latin American continent the virtual union of the indigenous-peasant movement together with the new workers movement may be able to generate here the social potential for a socialism of the 21st century.

say? (Silvia Lazarte) – We are obliged to globalize the struggles in order to be able to win where we are. And there has to be an articulation of the social movements and progressive states to allow ties of solidarity to keep on expanding.

And it’s very important, companeros, that we understand your struggles. It’s very important you are here and teaching us what you are doing – what’s going on in Ecuador, Argentina, Mexico, and in France. We need to learn, and we’ll be able to share it not with just a few intellectuals. We have an obligation today to each peasant, indigenous person, and worker who are eager to learn and eager also to collaborate with projects in the future. Companeros and companeras, in the name of the President of our Republic, in our name, we thank you for your presence here.

We ask you not to abandon us. And be assured that we will not abandon you in any one of your initiatives, or your struggles, or any one of your victories.

The Socialism of the 21st Century as a planetary structure There is then, companeros and companeras, a lot to do. We undertake these tasks in one’s own country, district, union, or university. But the struggle of one person alone is not enough. For one district, one region, one province, one state, or one country to fight alone is not enough either. That’s because neo-liberalism, and capitalism even more so, is a planetary construct. And the only way to transcend a worldwide system is to invoke another one, specifically an expanding worldwide struggle for rights and for making good on basic needs.

Your struggle is also ours Your presence here provides cheer. We are not alone. And we are grateful that you came to our country to tell us: “Bolivians, You are not alone.” Thank you very much for coming.

Everyone knows that your struggle is also ours. We know ourselves that we won’t be winning if you don’t triumph – and you, and you! Either we all win or we all lose. That’s the plan for the 21st century. That’s why – What does the Companera

All images: Stills from Desaguadero (drain) by Francisca Bancalari.

Muslim Women in Music

ANNOTED BIBLIGRAPHY

BY Alison L. Nolan

ZEB & HANYIA  "Zeb & Hanyia." 2007. 30 May 2009 <http://www.zebandhaniya.com/index.html>.

Aitebar (< http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qBQrPG1kYNs>)  Paimana Bideh <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gIi6vf4433A>  Sacrificefak http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K0YzOfG_7c0 Ani: Singing for the Soul of Islam. 2009. 2 Jun 2009 <http://www.a-ni.net/home.html>.  Ani, "Just Like Khadijah." [One Nation Many Voices: Muslims in America Stories not Stereotypes] . Link TV. Web.3 Jun 2009. <http://www.linktv.org/onenation2007/films/view/98>.

Worth, Robert F. "As Taboos Ease, Saudi Girl Group Dares to Rock ." New York Times 23 Nov 2008 Web.3 Jun 2009. <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/24/world/middleeast/24saudi. html>.  Levit, Briar. "Sisterhood of Muslim female MCs and singers." 21 July 2008. Bitch Magazine.Web.1 Jun 2009. <http://bitchmagazine.org/post/sisterhood-of-muslim-femalemcs-and-singers>.  "Pressure on Muslim women to stay out of music." 18 Aug 2008.

Freemuse: Freedom of Musical Expression. 2 Jun 2009 <http://www.freemuse.org/sw29495. asp>.  Wadud, Amina. "A’ishah’s legacy ." May 2002. New Internationist. 3 Jun 2009 <http://www.newint.org/features/2002/05/01/aishahslegacy/>.

Muslim Men in Music

FUN-DA-MENTAL  2002. Fun-da-Mental. 27 May 2009 <http://www.fun-da-mental.co.uk/>.  "Aki Nawaz from Fun-Da-Mental talks about imperialism and his album All Is War." 5 Aug 2006. Socialist Worker Online. 4 Jun 2009 <http://images.google.com/imgres? imgurl=http://www.socialistworker.co.uk/chimage.php%3Fimage%3D 2006/2012/aki_nawaz.jpg&imgrefurl=http://www.socialistworker.co.uk/art. php%id%3D9369&usg=__osTD5Jdp7g_aTdfVQ1mb36WNOGw=&h=180&w=200&sz=12&hl=en&start=2&um=1&t bnid=Ny31mpV7l4_BQM:&tbnh=94&tbnw=104&prev=/images%3Fq%3DAki%2BNawaz%26hl%3Den%26rlz%3D 1G1GGLQ_ENUS331%26sa%3DX%26um%3D1>.  "I Reject." FUN-DA-MENTAL; All is War; (the benefits of G-had). 2006. Fun-da-mental. 61Jun 2009 <http://www.fun-da-mental.co.uk/>.  Junoon[Dot]com; The Official Website. 2005. Junoon. 28 May 2009 <http://www.junoon.com/>.  "Junoon featuring Salman Ahmad: The U2 of the Muslim World."

Magnatune. 1 Jun 2009 <http://www.magnatune.com/artists/junoon>.  Nateejeh bala shughol (Stormtrap) <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=86OVicIQV9Y>  Haven. Paul. "Pakistan's city of culture whirls with fervor of Islamic mystics ," Associated Press 26 March 2004. Kenai Peninsula Online. Web.12 Jun 2009. <http://www.peninsulaclarion.com/stories/032604/rel_032604rel003001.shtml>.  "Papu Saeen Dhol Sayarts.com." 2009. YouTube, LLC. 1 Jun 2009 <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yOcvIHAKphY>.

To Writers of Asia and Africa Nazim Hikmet translated by Leo Halepli

Disregard that my hair is blond I am of Asian soil Disregard that my eyes are blue I am of African soil Where I’m from the trees don’t shadow their shed just like where you are from where I’m from... bread is in the lion’s mouth dragons lie by the fountains and you die before you reach fifty just like where you are from Disregard that my hair is blond I am of Asian soil Disregard that my eyes are blue I am of African soil Reading and Writing is unknown to eighty percent of mine (tribe) Poems travel from mouth to mouth, becoming song they (poems) can become flags where I’m from just like where you are from my brothers: our poetry should run beside the thin oxen to plow our ground

Naked Punch ASIA issue 03.

enter the swamp in rice farms to its knees. able to ask all the questions able to uncover all the lights stopping by the roadside like milestones, our poetry (our poetry should) see the approaching enemy before anyone be able to hit the tamtams in the jungle and until on the earth a single captive homeland, a single captive man until on the sky a single cloudâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s atoms remains must be able to give its property, wit, ideas, life, whatever it has to the greater freedom, our poetry.

From the Communards

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