Bridging the Atlantic Divide A policy roundtable on China Washington, D.C. May 26, 2022
Bridging the Atlantic Divide: A Policy Roundtable on China BY GRÁINNE MCEVOY
“We must recognize that our economic choices have consequences for our security. Freedom is more important than free trade. The protection of our values is more important than profit.” —NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg (May 24, 2022) “The Chinese Communist Party assumes that trading with a state credibly accused of genocide will be more important to the UK than defending the values we cherish. They are fundamentally mistaken.” —Lord David Alton of Liverpool (March 26, 2021)
In late May, a group of diplomats from the European Union and select European countries met with former senior United States officials in Washington D.C. for a roundtable discussion on China in the transatlantic relationship. The event was funded by the Nanovic Institute for European Studies and organized by the American Foreign Policy Council (AFPC). Founded in 1982, the AFPC is a non-profit organization dedicated to bringing information to those who make or influence U.S. foreign policy. The gathering was designed to generate a conversation about how the U.S. and Europe can collaborate to address an increasingly powerful, aggressive, and authoritarian China. Participants identified a tipping point in Europe, which, after pursuing openness and cooperation with China in recent decades, now favors a more cautious and critical approach. The roundtable participants shared their perspectives and analysis and ultimately concluded that on a range of China-related issues, there is increasingly more that unites than divides the U.S. and Europe.
Bridging the Atlantic Divide: A Policy Roundtable on China
A Tipping Point for Europe To open the conversation, the facilitators outlined some of the issues or developments that had fostered this tipping point and the evolution in European thinking on China. The rise of China’s security state looms large as a concern for China watchers across the globe. Policy experts on China have observed that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is no longer the de facto structure in charge of the country, but has conceded that role to a draconian and all-encompassing security apparatus. One indication of this shift has been the way in which the security state has expanded into the private sector, and outside of Party control, to an unprecedented degree. Policy analysts are less certain on whether President Xi Jinping, although head of the Party, maintains control of the security state or — likened to a “bald eagle” — is controlled by it. Other key factors in this perceived shift in European thinking revolve around China’s position on aggressive territorial ambitions, whether its own or that of its close ally, Russia. China’s fulsome support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine could hardly be more at odds with the unanimous condemnation of this extra-territorial aggression by European leaders and policymakers. Although cautious in its statements intended for a foreign audience, China’s support for Russian ambitions has been clearly signaled by a surge in trade between the two nations since February, by its strident support through its domestic media channels, and by the suppression of Chinese citizens who have criticized Russia. Relatedly, European and American eyes are now on China’s threat to Taiwan and the ways in which Russian aggression might embolden its East Asian ally to move against its own southern neighbor. The question now is whether the liberal Western values that underpinned a unified Western opposition to the attack on Ukraine will generate the same response to any future attack on Taiwan. The European needle also seems to have shifted on China in ways that reflect a realization of divergent value systems and that each holds worldviews that are increasingly difficult to reconcile. Experienced diplomats and policy analysts now recognize that the days of mirror imaging — the Nanovic Institute for European Studies | Keough School of Global Affairs | University of Notre Dame
2
Bridging the Atlantic Divide: A Policy Roundtable on China
understanding that their Chinese friends see the world as they do — are over. Western policymakers have realized that their impressions of where China stood on particular issues, largely informed by assurances from their Chinese counterparts, have been incorrect. This breakdown in trust has fed into another issue fostering the tipping point in Europe: a shift in China’s relationship with Western academia. After many years of robust student exchange between Chinese and Western universities, China is preventing its citizens from obtaining student visas or even leaving the country for European, American, or other study abroad opportunities. At the same time, there is evidence that knowledge and research developed in American and European universities and labs are being used to innovate the People’s Liberation Army.
Finding Western Strategic Unity The roundtable participants agreed with the premise that there has been a shift in how European policymakers are approaching and viewing China. Participants acknowledged some naïvety in terms of how Europe had opened up to China in the past, trusting it to follow mutually agreed “rules of the road,” whether in trade, diplomacy, or the protection of human rights. Europeans at the table said that various factors and experiences in recent years have opened their eyes, to the point where Europe and the U.S. are now much closer as regards their analyses of China’s strategy and ambitions. The roundtable discussed examples of European diplomatic strategy that signaled a less cooperative relationship with China and which suggest more common ground with the U.S. The EU’s support for Lithuania, which is being subjected to economic coercion from China in response to seeking closer ties with Taiwan in 2021, demonstrated the strength of a unified Western community. China’s unabashed bullying of a significantly less powerful European state provoked the EU to file a complaint with the World Trade Organization in January 2022 and to express support for Lithuania at an EU-China summit in April. Participants agreed that this strong show of Western unity (inclusive of the EU and the U.S.) behind Lithuania was vital to showing China that these Nanovic Institute for European Studies | Keough School of Global Affairs | University of Notre Dame
3
Bridging the Atlantic Divide: A Policy Roundtable on China
instruments will not work if they try them against other nations. Other examples that participants felt signaled fertile common ground between the U.S. and Europe on China included the EU’s decision to halt their investment agreement with China in December 2020 and NATO SecretaryGeneral Jens Stoltenberg’s statement at the 2022 World Economic Forum in Davos that global relations should be driven not by trade but by values and freedom. While Stoltenberg’s statement was geared towards relations with Russia, the roundtable saw this commitment to values as applicable to China. The discussion did, however, reflect the many obstacles that stand in the way of a full and unified European disengagement from cooperation with China. The EU’s China policy remains based on a 2019 strategic document.1 This acknowledged that the growth of China’s political influence and economic power entailed a shift in the balance between the opportunities and challenges presented by cooperation. As a result, Europe’s China policy today focuses on a careful blend of competition and cooperation, particularly as regards climate change, security issues, and strategic rivalries. Participants gave some examples that reflect the challenges of striking a balance between a more guarded but not entirely disengaged relationship with China. In the area of Artificial Intelligence (AI), the EU is working closely with the U.S. through the Trade and Technology Council, which was established in June 2021 to demonstrate how democratic and market-oriented approaches to trade, technology, and innovation can improve the lives of citizens and be a force for prosperity. At the same time, Europe cannot disconnect overnight from China on AI or technology, in terms of either application or research infrastructures. A second example relates to trade and sanctions, particularly as regards the challenge of securing policy agreement within a 27-member union. While the EU has responded to the treatment of Uyghurs in Xinjiang by imposing human rights sanctions, some member states are much more exposed in terms of trade and therefore 1 European Commission, EU-China — a strategic outlook, 12 March, 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/communication-eu-china-a-strategic-outlook.pdf.
Nanovic Institute for European Studies | Keough School of Global Affairs | University of Notre Dame
4
Bridging the Atlantic Divide: A Policy Roundtable on China
reluctant to threaten links with Chinese partners.2 According to European roundtable participants, this challenge has provoked more reflection at the EU level on how to use the sanctions tool going forward, paying attention to the potential collateral damage or self-harm that might also result from attempts to hurt China. In each of these cases, European policymakers place paramount importance on their system of values, rather than any other ambitions or priorities, as the framework that dictates the rules of the road. One participant highlighted how Britain — no longer in the EU but still an important player in the realm of European diplomacy — has made policy changes based on new “risk versus opportunity” assessments. These could serve as a model for what the EU could pursue in the future. The policies include the new framework for investment security and decision making, a strategy of educating British academic institutions about the challenges of having China and Chinese students as part of their business model, and the high-profile ban and scrutiny of Huawei.
Confronting Territorial Aggression: Taiwan and Ukraine A significant portion of the conversation focused on the relationship between China and Russia. Specifically, participants were interested in the ways in which Russia’s war in Ukraine and the path that conflict might take could shed light on or anticipate Chinese strategy in Taiwan. The roundtable agreed that Europe and the U.S. must unify against any Chinese aggression toward the small island nation, mirroring their firm and joint opposition to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Taiwan, the participants agreed, must not become another Ukraine. At the same time, the discussion exposed potential obstacles to achieving and maintaining a unified Western position and participants expressed concerns about European capacity and willingness to defend Taiwan’s autonomy. Some of the American discussants questioned the idea that, were China to invade Taiwan, European leaders would both condemn the action and intervene on behalf of Taiwan. The U.S. 2 Council of the EU, “EU imposes further sanctions over serious violations of human rights around the world,” March 22, 2001, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/03/22/eu-imposes-further-sanctions-over-serious-violations-of-humanrights-around-the-world/.
Nanovic Institute for European Studies | Keough School of Global Affairs | University of Notre Dame
5
Bridging the Atlantic Divide: A Policy Roundtable on China
officials predicted that while the EU and other European voices would make strong statements and be forceful in their demarchés, there would be no European military or economic assistance to an embattled Taiwan. From this perspective, the joint effort between the U.S. and Europe in defending Ukraine would not be replicated in Asia. European voices around the table felt that Europe’s response to a Chinese invasion of Taiwan is difficult to predict. They disagreed with using European reactions to the invasion of Ukraine as a point of comparison because of the crucial differences between the two scenarios. Most obviously, Russia is a powerful neighbor to Europe, one that represents an existential threat to many European states. Some European participants acknowledged that a lack of cultural affinity with and geographical proximity to people in East Asia probably means that European citizens would not feel the same sense of responsibility to demand a defense of the Taiwanese people or make personal sacrifices to aid their cause. This disparity is already evident in how atrocities committed against Ukrainians in Bucha have resonated with ordinary Europeans far more than those against Uyghurs in Xinjiang. At the same time, some voices around the table argued that certain EU nations — such as Germany or France — may be more ready and willing than their smaller neighbors to provide military assistance to Taiwan. This discussion of the strength of European and American resolve on Ukraine also reflected some concerns that a waning of interest in the European conflict might anticipate a weaker resolve, on the part of both policymakers and the broader population, in the case of Chinese aggression in East Asia. Some participants were critical of the leadership of Germany, France, and Italy for suggesting that Ukraine finds ways to compromise with Russia, implying that Europe had already provided enough support. Others noted a waning of general interest in Ukraine in Western nations more broadly and expressed anxiety about how a fractious and polarized political landscape in the U.S. might undermine America’s strength within a volatile world order.
Nanovic Institute for European Studies | Keough School of Global Affairs | University of Notre Dame
6
Bridging the Atlantic Divide: A Policy Roundtable on China
Despite these hesitations, some members of the roundtable expressed optimism about Europe’s commitment to upholding the rule of law and to defending human rights and democratic values across the globe. Participants described European responses to Russia’s aggression in Ukraine as evidence of a “tectonic change” in the international order, noting the historic nature of Finland and Sweden (along with Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, and Ukraine) declaring their aspirations to NATO membership. The roundtable did agree that values, not capital or trade, must be the driving force in U.S. and European policy toward China. As regards the security of Taiwan, the participants agreed that preventing a Chinese invasion is crucial and the most effective deterrent will be a Ukrainian victory over Russian aggression. In this way, a fortified, unified U.S.-European defense of Ukraine will be critical to maintaining peace and defending democratic values in East Asia.
As a key institute within the Keough School of Global Affairs at the University of Notre Dame, the Nanovic Institute for European Studies views European issues as global issues, and questions about Europe as questions about the planet, our common home. The Institute contributes to the work of the Keough School by elevating the crucial role of the humanities within the realm of policy and politics. In situations where policymakers have to make decisions about diplomacy, healthcare, military intervention, or how to respond to a global pandemic, the Nanovic Institute insists that language, history, and culture matter. The Nanovic Institute seeks to enrich the intellectual culture of Notre Dame by creating an integrated, interdisciplinary home for students, faculty, and visiting scholars to explore the evolving ideas, cultures, traditions, beliefs, moral challenges, and institutions that shape Europe. Nanovic Institute for European Studies | Keough School of Global Affairs | University of Notre Dame
7