National Yemen Issue 32

Independent journalism, objective insight

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The Facts As They Are

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Daily Demonstrations and Media Blackout in Aden

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“Yemen, Ancestral Home of Osama bin Laden”

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Sana’a Governor and Hamid al-Ahmar Locked in Tribal Battle

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SUNDAY , Feb 13 , 2011 I ISSUE 32 PRICE : YER 30 WWW . NAT IONALYEMEN. COM

Special: Food Security in Yemen

Thousands Rally in Sana’a Anti-government protesters inspired by Egypt's revolution call on Saleh to step down as president.

Thousands of protesters have taken to the streets in the Yemeni capital, calling on President Ali Abdullah Saleh to step down.

Clashes broke out in Sanaa between groups supporting and opposing the government after men armed with knives and

sticks forced around 300 anti-government protesters to end a rally, the Reuters news agency quoted witnesses as saying on Saturday.

The Associated Press news agency reported that troops beat some anti-government protesters. Inspired by the Egyptian uprising which toppled Hosni Mubarak, protesters chanted "After Mubarak, it's Ali's turn" Continued on Page (4)

GPC and the JMP Agree on Excluding Sa’ada from Rallies

By Abdullah al-Salimi Throughout the last few weeks, most governorates of Yemen have witnessed various public events organized by the GPC, and rallies and marching protests by the opposition parties represented by the blocs of the JMP. Although slogans of the JMP and GPC oppose each other, both agreed to exclude Sa’ada governorate from any rally or demonstration.

In a statement to National Yemen, the general secretary of the local council in Sa’ada, Mohammed Eidah Alimad, had confirmed that the governorate was about to host a mass rally for the GPC on the twelfth of

this month.

Yet the general committee of the GPC headed by the president Ali Abdullah Saleh called to freeze all planned protests, rallies and sit-ins, aiming at providing a positive atmosphere for the resumption of dialogue between the GPC and its allies on one hand, and the JMP and its partners on the other hand.

Alimad said that the GPC is fully able to hold rallies that can be attended by thousands of people. He also denied the idea that JMP have many supporters in Sa’ada.

Continued on Page (3)

Southern Movement leader Tariq al-Fadhli pariticpates in a protest against the government on Friday

Doctors Without Borders Plans to Leave Radfan The local council of Radfan directorate, Dalea governorate, is working on convincing the French organization Médecins Sans Frontières, “Doctors Without Borders,” not to leave the directorate and is urging the medical staff who left the local hospital a few days ago due to the existing disputes in the area to return.

Miss Caroline, the delegation’s chairman in Yemen, said that the idea of leaving the directorate and withdrawal of the medical crew came as a result of many obstacles the team had faced, including the consistent gunfire near the hospital and having the MSF ambulance exposed to fire more than once by the combat-

ants.

In addition, there were reportedly threats made to the medical crew, who are not able to adequately treat the people inside the hospital due to security issues.

The MSF expressed their desire to present medical support, but that the current conditions rendered their work impossible.

It also clarified that each person has the right to be cured and to receive medical help no matter which side the person belongs to, because MSF is not biased.

Mohammed Naser Ghaleb, services committee chairman of the local council, said, “we are ready to stand with MSF and

help them to provide medical help to the society and to both disputed sides as a humanitarian gesture.”

Next Thursday was marked out for a meeting in order to address all the issues which are considered to be threatening the MSF’s work as well as setting rules and resolutions which could guarantee the crew’s safety to enable it to working again in the Radfan hospital.

Saleh Saeed Barjeelah, a local council member, said “all Radfan directorates respect to MSF and its medical staff and they appreciate their efforts.

They also agree on having the crew work inside the hospital without having field treatment.”

He added that the MSF

Radfan Commander Denies Army Withdrawal official denied the news on the army’s withdrawal from their military sights on Monday morning in Lahj governorate.

The military units deployed in the region were imposing a tight siege on suspected southern movement elements for about a month and a half.

Radfan Mahmud, directorate general said that military has not withdrawn from the sights they were manning until now, but that mobile units

remain in full force.

He refused to discus about news dealing with a mediation committee led by government officials to end the siege.

Sources close to the southern movement had reported that army started withdrawing from as a result of the officials’ mediation which led to the reduction of the military presence from the west side of Continued on Page (3)

Zine al Abidin ben Ali is followed by Muhammad Hosni Mubarak. Which Arab leader will fall next?

should not be enveloped in disputes taking place in the area, and that if gunfire takes place outside the hospital, or in the streets, it is due to external disputes and the MSF is not targeted.

Mahdy Saeed requested the MSF chairman rethink its decision to leave the governorate and convince its medical crew to return.

MSF has been working in Radfan public hospital since July 2010 and has provided medical help in many sections of the hospitals including the emergency room and has moved many emergency situations to Ibn khaldun hospital and al-Jomhoriyah educational hospital in Aden.

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Sunday, Feb. 13, 2011 Issue 32 www.nationalyemen.com

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National Yemen

National Yemen Yemen’s Hunger: a Bargaining Chip

Yemen has different concerns surrounding its stability than Tunisia and Egypt.

Food and poverty are the weapons to mobilize the street and bring people to such protests or a rallies in Yemen. This has been seen in several governorates throughout the country in the last few days, including in the capital city of Sana’a.

Last Friday, Mubarak stepped down, which gave the protest movement in Yemen new wind, in which people had a chance celebrate the success of the Egyptian demands to end three decades in power of President Mubarak.

Yemen is a different case entirely, and its characteristics makes such a scenario unlikely. Here, demonstrations are a political game which is a fight for power, not for people.

The majority in Yemen do not care much of who is ruling or how he is ruling and for how long.

The major challenge here is how to eat, and this a goal people will pursue by any means necessary.

The rich people along with government decision-makers are fighting to steal freedom, rights, and basic needs from the community in order to keep them as slaves and fodder for their wars.

The gatherings last Saturday in al-Tahrir Square by the ruling party has proved the need of people to eat. The same idea applied for Hamid al-Ahmar’s tribe, which hailed mainly from Al-Ousimat and which came to Sana’a for the purpose – to please their food

sponsor.

Yemen is not the ideal example for the right to protest, because the people do not even have the rights to a good standard of so living even coming close to that enjoyed Egypt or Tunisia.

People there have managed to oust their presidents, but the competitors in Yemen’s political game are missing part of the story. The ongoing duels are driving Yemenis into markets to purchase necessary foodstuffs on an emergency basis for double the price.

Both sides are doing their best to make the situation worse, and even business people have started to feel the effects of the upcoming food crises, and are looking for ways to capitalize on it.

These empty battles can only have the Yemeni people as their victim. Only a serious and comprehensive understanding and dialogue on the issues facing average Yemenis, foremost among them food prices and shortages, can give the people what they want.

Professionals, businessmen, and employees in both government and private sectors do not think like those who lack good opportunities and have no jobs.

The strategy of the government is to create opportunity to keep this bourgeois segment of society happy, because they traditionally hate revolutions and changes because it affects their generally adequate lifestyles.

It is in their interest to keep the situation calm, as their way of life and their business relationships depend on it.

Crises which would make them take to the streets can be kept far away with enough scheming by government and opposition patrons.

Yemen would have smooth political situation for President Saleh only if all the concerned parties immediately turn their attention to the urgent crises plaguing citizens’ lives.

Continued From Page (1) NY learned from sources in Sana’a that Sa’ada governorate was at the bottom of the list among the rallies held from Taiz governorate on the fifth of January.

They also mentioned that the prime minister, minister of the local administration Rashad Alalimi along with Shura Council member and the GPC member of Sa’ada governorate Salah Ala’jam were planning a rally in Sa’ada.

But representatives of the GPC refused to join them due to the security situation in Sa’ada, but they were welcoming of participation in any other rallies in other governorates.

Spokesman of the JMP Dr. Mohammed al-Qobati in a press statement last week

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referred to the exclusion of the JMP blocs from Sa’ada as what he called “a preliminary measure taken based on the security and the political situation which Sa’ada has faced since 2004.”

Al-Qobati also added that the second phase of JMP blocs will include Sa’ada.

Spokesman of Houthi group Mohammed Abdul Salam expressed his willingness to coordinate with the JMP to undertake rallies and marches in most directorates of Sa’ada, but at the same time he considered that the Houthis had “transcended demonstrations against the regime,” pointing that their position is “the strongest among all the elements opposing the regime.”

Fakhri Hassan Al-Arashi Publisher & Chief Editor

Noah Browning Deputy Editor

LOCAL

Sunday, Feb. 13, 2011 Issue 32 www.nationalyemen.com

Socialist Party Membership Divides Southern Movement

US Drone Crashes in Abyan Last Monday morning a spy plane wreck was found in Lawdar directorate of Abyan Monday morning. “Aden Tomorrow” sources learned that the “Predator” spy plane, deemed to be American, had fallen next to al-Hujain area, after a huge crash next to a group of family homes.

Tuesday morning people from the area moved the plane’s wreck to the capital of the directorate in order to turn it to the authorities yet armed men suspected to be from al-Qaeda stopped them and took the plane’s wreckage.

Spy planes have resumed flights in the sky above the region after they had apparently stopped for about a month. The phenomena had terrified local citizens, who had avoided large gathering in the region for fear of attack.

According to the Ministry of Interior, for two months the Yemeni army had been locked in severe clashes with the armed al-Qaeda organization throughout the country, in which 173 soldier have died and another 1000 have been wounded.

Sources close to the Southern Movement reported that two leaders of the “Hirak,” Salah al-Shanfarah and Naser al-Khabji withdrew last Thursday from an expanded meeting of Hirak leaders in lab’ous ,Yafe’ headed by Hasan Ba’um after the outbreak of a dispute on submitting official resignation letters to the Yemeni Socialist Party.

Sources also mentioned that al-Shanfarah and al-Khabji objected on the distribution of some written forms during the meeting which obliged all members to submit their resignations and abandon any relations which bonds them with the Yemeni Socialist Party.

Al-Shanfarah and al-Khabji left the sight of the meeting in the presence of Hirak leaders in the governorate and with the participation of 40 social officials from the southern governorate.

Some resolutions were adopted in the meeting such as the expansion of the scope of the Supreme Council of the Southern Movement and renewing the call to execute a protest march in Aden for Friday.

A prominent leader and the general secretary of Socialist party in Yemen Yaseen Noman had launched a strong attack on the leaders of the southern movement, accusing them of trying to undermine his party and its historical achievements and to

Daily Demonstrations and Media Blackout in Aden

By Abdulqader Almahwari The youth demonstrations which have been taking place in al-Mansoura directorate in Aden governorate every night have caused tension among the security forces and the certain other citizens.

Observers have noticed the increase in the frequency of these demonstrations and the growing number of participants day by day.

The protests are apparently proceeding apart from the JMP and the southern “Hirak” movement. It is considered an

extension of the riots in Tunisia and Egypt which have made history in the two nations and throughout the Arab world.

Although security forces are dealing strictly with these demonstrations for now, it remains to be seen what the official reaction will be to them in the coming days, especially when these demonstrations are following peaceful sit-ins despite a consistent media blackout

Security Man Commits Suicide in al-Dalea

By Saleh Almansoub A 33 year-old member of the security forces named Mohammed Ahmed al-Daeri died in al-Haza directorate, Dalea governorate last week, sources told the National Yemen.

Last Saturday he hanged himself on tree amidst a qat field.

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establish an exceptional leadership at the expense of the party.

Many attempts at unifying the Hirak’s ranks were hampered due to the membership of many of its leaders in the socialist party.

During those recent protests, many voices started to rise again from the old officials who took part in the southern government prior to the Yemeni war of separation in 1994 like Hasan Ba’um and Naser al-Nowbah.

Since then, the southern movement has started to have leaders calling for sit ins, peaceful demonstrations, and rallies.

Later, when the southern Hirak became more present in media, the exiled former president of South Yemen Ali Salem al Beidh chose the timing of celebrating the 19th anniversary of the Yemeni unification between south and north on May 22, 1990 and declared his backing and support to the southern hirak in a press conference held in Munich.

After fifteen years of political silence, al-Beidh accused Ali Abdullah Saleh and the Yemeni government of betrayal and treachery.

The Yemeni government has accused the Southern Movement of committing acts of violence and killing, as well as allying with elements of al-Qaeda, and it says it is seeking a confrontation of Hirak only in order to re-impose law and order.

The sources reported that the cause of the suicide was the cessation of his salary and pension at his work.

The deceased used to work in the public security in Shabwa governorate, the sources noted, and is originally from the al-Arzaq directorate.

Continued From Page (1)

the al-Habilayn area in Radfan.

Mediation committee formed between the army and southern movement Local sources in al-Habilayn mentioned that there has been a breakthrough in the initiative to alleviation in the crisis in Radfan.

The mediation committee consists of a delegation from the southern movement and the Mohammed Al-Asaadi Editorial Consultant

army under the major Thabet Jawwas and Abdulqader Hilal.

It was also reported that the agreement between both sides requires upholding certain agreements signed in 2008 which demand lifting the army interventions and security checkpoints, as well as the withdrawal of gunmen from the streets of the city of al-Habilayn and the overlooking mountains.

Fuad Al-Qadhi Business Editor

Shukri Hussein Abyan Correspondent

The breakthrough initiatives commenced when communications between the two sides in Radfan after being dormant for more than a month and after the lifting of some military checkpoints which were along the road between al-Habilayn and Milah in Radfan.

Last January, Radfan directorates witnessed tensions and clashes between army units

Jihan Anwar Staff Journalist

and armed men of the movement when the army tried to storm Al-Habilayn, which left six civilians’ dead and thirty wounded.

This clash caused many citizens to move from al-Habilayn for fear of being wounded or killed, harmed many peoples’ interests as well as paralyzed the city completely for more than a month.

Naila Bamehriz Translator & Coordinator

The Facts As They Are

Mohammed Abdalaleem Shabwah Correspondent e-mail: info@nationalyemen.com website:www.nationalyemen.com address:al-qiada st.

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“Yemen Without Qat” Discusses Options

VACANCIES

By Saddam Alashmory Recent statistics indicate the increase in the total acreage of Qat cultivation, which already exceeds more than 100 thousand hectares in Yemen and its cultivation over other crops.

The Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) estimated the acreage cultivated with Qat in Yemen as a quarter of the irrigated land area including nearly 650 million Qat trees that occupy vast tracts of arable land.

The “Yemen without Qat” organization held a press conference on Monday, under the slogan of “a better life for us and our generations” which is coming along with the inauguration to be held next Thursday.

In the conference, Hameed Ziyad one of organization’s founders, discussed the damages caused by chewing in various regards, and what consumption of the plant has wrought medically, socially, and psychologically.

He also introduced a special program on ways of to quit chewing which focused on self-esteem and will-power to break out of this crisis he described.

Ziyad also said that the Qat cultivation and its spread in many of the governorates is equivalent to the rate of other

agricultural crops, without the distribution of any income and without any benefit whatsoever for the financial interest of the country.

The organization is going to contribute in the reduction and a promising end of this crop by 2020, evidencing the China, which it said got rid of its addiction to drugs and opium in seven years.

“Yemen will take 10 years due to the slowness of a cultural campaign, which will hopefully exclude Qat from being a part of social life.”

“Yemen wont reach a high level of economic prowess if Yemenis wont quit Qat ” comment Ziyad.

Abdulwase Hael Saeed Anam, the organization’s CEO, said that Yemenis were capable of reaching the progress achieved by other countries where Qat doesn’t exist in all aspects in other countries.

He also added that his organization will develop alternatives by giving membership for those wishing to quit chewing and open forums to fill the afternoon “chewing time.”

There will be categories in the organization depending on career specializations, for instance educators without Qat, Students without Qat, etc., he added.

Many international organi-

zations promised to provide agricultural support if Yemeni farmers would neglect Qat cultivation and will grow other plants and will import Yemeni crops to encourage more constructive Yemeni agrictulture.

The institution is moving forward until this plant is removed from Yemeni land and banning its importing at any price.

Noting that the spread of the administrative and economic corruption inthe country was based on the use of this plant, where all the delay in work, waste of time, and being late to work is caused by Qat which was estimated at billions of hours and billions of riyals.

“Nowadays there is no room to chew in a successful work,” he claimed.

From another side, Abdulaziz al-Tarb , a noted business man, confirmed that this organization will contribute in many fields of sustainable development so Yemen can prosper, thanking the founding committee for their valuable efforts to assist the Yemeni citizen to get rid of this drug and replace it with other crops that benefit the country financially, medically and economically, asserting the sponsorship of civil and international organizations to reduce this phenomena.

Continued From Page (1) and "A Yemeni revolution after the Egyptian revolution."

Eyeing protests elsewhere in the Middle East, Saleh, in power since 1978, last week promised to step down when his term ends in 2013. He has also promised not to pass power to his son.

His move followed sporadic anti-government protests, and the opposition has yet to respond to his call to join a unity government. The opposition wants talks to take place under Western or Gulf Arab auspices.

Yemeni authorities detained at least 10 people on Friday night after anti-government protesters in Sanaa, the capital, celebrated Mubarak's downfall, US-based Human Rights Watch said.

The group said the celebrations turned to clashes when hundreds of men armed with knives, sticks, and assault rifles attacked the protesters as

security forces stood by.

Also on Friday, the separatist Southern Movement said police broke up hundreds of Yemenis celebrating in the streets of Aden, where police had been heavily deployed since morning to clamp down on planned separatist protests earlier in the day.

Around 3,000 protesters across southern Yemen protested on Friday afternoon to demand secession, though most of the protests were quickly broken up by security forces.

Unconfirmed reports said police had opened fire on demonstrators, killing at least one person.

Pay raise discussed Reports said Saleh held a meeting with his senior defence, political and security officials on Friday night.

They discussed plans to raise salaries for civil servants and the military - a second

National Yemen

SOCIAL

Sunday, Feb. 13, 2011 Issue 32 www.nationalyemen.com

planned wage increase since last month, when Saleh planned a raise of about $47.

Opposition leaders said Saleh's latest efforts could not quiet discontent.

"This is a quick move to try and get rid of popular anger, but Yemenis are not mad about a lack of spending on wages," Mohamed al-Sabri, a leader of Yemen's opposition coalition, said.

"This decision misreads the situation and is a simplification of what's happening in Yemen."

About 40 per cent of Yemen's 23 million people live on less than $2 a day, while a third face chronic hunger.

Tens of thousands of demonstrators turned out on February 3 to protest against Saleh's rule.

An equal number of pro-government demonstrators also took to the streets on the same day.

Later on, supporters of the ruling party took over the square and distributed food and qat to its partisans. Over twelve tents were erected for the demonstrators, who made sure that no opposition members inhabited the area.

By night on Saturday, the area witnessed music, dancing, and oud performances, while speakers addressed the crowd.

The government apparently was making sure that Hashid tribesmen loyal to Hamid al-Ahmar would not gather in the space and clash violently with government supporters.

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National Yemen

ANALYSIS

Sunday, Feb. 13, 2011 Issue 32 www.nationalyemen.com

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Mubarakism Without Mubarak Why Egypt’s Military Will Not Embrace Democracy

By Ellis Goldberg* Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak gave into the demands of the protesters today, leaving Cairo and stepping down from power. That came hours after a speech, broadcast live across the world yesterday, in which he refused to do so. Earlier that day, the Supreme Military Council released a statement -labeled its "first" communiqué -- that stated that the military would ensure a peaceful transition of Mubarak out of office.

In practice, it appears that power has passed into the hands of the armed forces. This act was the latest in the military's creep from applauded bystander to steering force in this month's protests in Egypt.

Since the protest movement first took shape on January 25, the military has, with infinite patience, extended and deepened its physical control of the area around Tahrir Square (the focal point of the protests) with concrete barriers, large steel plates, and rolls of razor wire.

In itself, the military's growing footprint was the next act in a slow-motion coup -- a return of the army from indirect to direct control -- the groundwork for which was laid in 1952.

The West may be worried that the crisis will bring democracy too quickly to Egypt and empower the Muslim Brotherhood. But the real concern is that the regime will only shed its corrupt civilians, leaving its military component as the only

ing Egyptian legal experts to write a new basic document, was a failure. The experts' draft had provisions for a strong parliament and limited presidency, which the officers deemed too liberal. They literally threw it into the wastebasket and started over, writing a constitution that placed immense power in the hands of the president.

Such an arrangement would prove to work out well for the military, as every Egyptian president since 1953 has been an army officer. For two generations, the military was able, through the president, to funnel most of the country's resources toward national security, arming for a series of ultimately disastrous wars with Israel.

These defeats, combined with the government's neglect of the economy, nearly drove the country to bankruptcy.

Popular revolt erupted between 1975 and 1977 over the government's economic policies. To regain control, the military turned its attention away from war and toward development.

It gradually withdrew from direct control over politics, ceding power to domestic security forces and the other powerful backer of Egypt's ruling party -- small groups of civilian businessmen who benefited from their privileged access to government sales and purchases to expand their own fortunes.

In the 1990s, Mubarak waged a domestic war against

player left standing.

Indeed, when General Omar Suleiman, the recently appointed vice president to whom Mubarak entrusted presidential powers last night, threatened on February 9 that the Egyptian people must choose between either the current regime or a military coup, he only increased the sense that the country was being held hostage.

The Egyptian political system under Mubarak is the direct descendant of the republic established in the wake of the 1952 military coup that brought Gamal Abdel Nasser and the Free Officers to power.

Nasser and the officers abolished Egypt's limited parliamentary monarchy and ousted an entire generation of civilian political and judicial figures from public life. They created their own republic stocked with loyal military figures.

Their one experiment with technocratic governance, allow-

Islamists, and the role of the military evolved further. As the government became dependent on an expanded domestic police force, the army was reduced in size and importance. Over time, the police and the Ministry of the Interior supplanted the armed forces and Ministry of Defense as the keystone of the regime.

Meanwhile, the factions of the business elite that fed on the state, such as the now disgraced steel magnate and former ruling party leader Ahmed Ezz, grew more powerful. Mubarak gave them privileged access to the ruling National Democratic Party, which they convinced to open the Egyptian economy to world trade -- enriching them even further.

The officer corps was appeased to some degree, however, by its own economic good fortune. Throughout the 1990s, the army expanded its involvement in the economy.

By this decade, industries

owned by the military were estimated to control 5 to 20 percent of the entire Egyptian economy; likewise, army officers receive a variety of benefits, such as special preference in access to goods and services.

Today, the army presents itself as a force of order and a neutral arbiter between contending opponents, but it has significant interests of its own to defend, and it is not, in fact,

neutral. The basic structure of the Egyptian state as it now exists has benefited the military.

The practical demands of the protesters seem fairly simple: end the state of emergency, hold new elections, and grant the freedom to form parties without state interference. But these demands would amount to opening up the political space to everyone across Egypt's social and political structure.

That would involve constitutional and statutory changes, such as reforming Egypt as a parliamentary rather than a presidential system, in which a freely elected majority selects the prime minister (who is now appointed by the president).

These changes would wipe away the power structure the army created in 1952 and has backed since.

A freely elected parliament and a reconstituted government would weaken the role of the

presidency, a position the military is likely to try to keep in its portfolio. Moreover, open elections could hand the new business elites power in parliament, where they could work to limit the role of the army in the economy.

This would put the army's vast economic holdings -- from the ubiquitous propane cylinders that provide all Egyptian homes with cooking gas to clothing, food, and hotels -- in jeopardy. Moreover, the army has always preferred that the country be orderly and hierarchical.

It is uncomfortable with the growing participatory festival on the streets, and even if the officers were to tolerate more contestation than their grandfathers did in the 1950s, they would likely try to limit participation in politics to those whose lives have been spent in the military by retaining the system of presidential appointment for government ministers.

Indeed, instead of pursuing institutional change, leading military figures will likely try to satisfy the public with symbolic gestures. They would surely investigate the most corrupt businessmen and their ministerial associates for the misuse of public funds and public property. At the same time, there will likely be an investigation of the former minister of interior for deliberately murder-

ing demonstrators during the crisis.

If the military takes further control, two of the players currently on the scene will be crucial. First, Suleiman, who has strong ties to the military, is at the center of every negotiation among the opposition factions and is almost constantly on television.

Unsurprisingly, he has made it clear that he has no intention of reforming the presidential system. Playing for time, he has consistently insisted that even negotiations should be strictly limited to changing the three articles of the constitution that deal with elections.

Second, although Egypt's defense minister, Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi, has been much less visible, he is no less important. He is behind the army's announcement that it would not, unlike the hated security police, fire on Egyptians. In fact, the army fired on neither the demonstrators nor on the thugs who attacked them, and even went so far as to announce that the protesters had legitimate demands.

I have heard accounts of the army arresting some protesters and members of human rights groups. Some of those who have been arrested and released report that a faction of army officers remain sympathetic to Mubarak's appeals that he has a mission to carry out. Still, under

Tantawi, the army will likely try to at least appear neutral while negotiating with the rest of the opposition to manage a transition, even as Suleiman works to ensure that reform is limited.

The Mubarak regime as it has existed for the last decade -an increasingly corrupt and incompetent government that has conferred immense economic advantages on a handful of politically connected businessmen -- has been shattered.

A more open political system and a responsive government that ensures its own safety by trimming back the power and privileges of the military could still emerge. And the army may step in as a transitional power and recognize that, as much as it might like to, it cannot return to complete control.

The Egyptian military is far more professional and educated than it was in the 1950s, so many officers may recognize the benefits of a democracy.

More likely, however, is the culmination of the slow-motion coup and the return of the somewhat austere military authoritarianism of decades past. *ELLIS GOLDBERG is Professor of Political Science at the University of Washington and at the American University in Cairo. Courtesy of Foreign Policy Magazine.

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REPORT

National Yemen

“Yemen, Ancestral Home of Osama bin Laden” In a multi-part series, National Yemen examines the ways in which international news describes Yemen and its current challenges. Appealing to readers generally unfamiliar with the country, analysis of Yemen is more often then not accompanied with a repetitive series of labels (“Yemen is the

poorest country in the Arab World, “Yemen is the ancestral home of Osama Bin Laden, “Yemen is largely ungoverned”) that provide a hasty and often inaccurate snapshot.

Here, these claims are dissected and the news and political agendas that lie beneath them are explored.

By Noah Browning Some time around the twilight of the twentieth century, Muhammad Awad bin Laden was born in a small village in Yemen’s distant East. In that long gone era, in which Turks and British vied for South Arabia, and the Kaiser and the Tsar still reigned, the progenitor of a famous, now infamous, family was born.

Date Palm agriculture and beekeeping, those traditional professions in the still largely forlorn and impoverished Wadi Hadramawt, provided a scant livelihood to the young man and his family.

His decision to seek better fortunes in the nascent Saudi Kingdom is the true beginning of the bin Laden story.

Unfortunately, a Western press and reading public almost completely ignorant of Yemen, and searching for ways to make some sense of the place which will resonate with their audience, have seized upon this obscure provenance.

The Western world’s foremost boogey man is serially associated with this complex country of 24 million, with a vibrant history stretching back four millennia.

But nuance can have no place in the spastic attention given by the news media to a far-away land – especially when the peerless bête noire of al-Qaeda is involved.

When the recurrent, inept bomb plot is revealed, whether in undergarment or overstuffed print-cartridge form, the trite formula is inevitably recycled.

Lacking much in the way of substantive explanations for these phenomena, or perhaps realizing that their audience will be annoyed or perplexed by such details, journalists invoke the old refrain, “Yemen is the Ancestral Home of Osama bin Laden.”

In reality, almost nothing

about the advent of Osama bin laden, or the al-Qaeda organization – even its current Yemeni branch – can be illuminated by referring to Muhammad Awad’s few adolescent years in Wadi Hadramawt.

Far more can be learned about the phenomenon from his father’s adoptive home of Saudi Arabia, in which he worked his way from dock porter to billionaire construction magnate.

The Kingdom’s official version of puritanical Islam is unmatched in its strictness.

Massive oil wealth, complemented by preferential economic and political relationships with United States, is what really allowed the bin Laden family to rise from obscurity.

‘‘

How the personality and choices of Osama bin Laden was shaped by anything related to Yemeni culture or politics, past or present, is completely negligible.

Finally, funds and fundamentalism coalesced disastrously in the joint US-Saudi military project in Afghanistan.

Subsidized by the countries’ intelligence agencies, a small group of radicalized and armed “mujahideen” triumphed, but quickly

shifted about aimlessly, and mostly rebelled against their former backers.

Where Yemen fits into this story clear: it simply does not.

How the personality and choices of Osama bin Laden was shaped by anything related to Yemeni culture or politics, past or present, is completely negligible.

Yet treatment of Saudi Arabia in the press seldom inoculates its readers with a phrase like, “Saudi Arabia, home of the bin Laden family.”

Justifiably, this would caricature a place whose history and challenges transcend the deeds of one man or one family.

In fact, there is no evidence that Osama bin Laden ever set foot on Yemeni soil. Still, even Interpol’s official “Most Wanted” page lists his alternative birthplaces as “Jeddah, Yemen” – which is as unsubstantiated as it is baffling.

The Yemen connection was most flagrantly abused in the chaotic days after the September 11th attacks, when it seemed the established norms of not just diplomacy and war-making, but also journalism, were eagerly forgotten.

This frantic period witnessed the venerable BBC reporting, in late 2002, “SAS 'hunting Bin Laden in Yemen.’”

Predictably, no independent verification of bin Laden’s actual presence or active relationship to the country was offered– only the whispers of unnamed “intelligence officials.”

By way of example, the association of bin Laden with Yemen has been likened to associating domestic Ameri-

can terrorist Timothy McVeigh with Ireland.

American news stories would never prefix an article on the Emerald Isle with the facile assertion that at some point, the island nation produced an individual, who, generations later and thousands of miles away, took the lives of innocents.

That would clearly do a disservice to Ireland, the journalistic craft, and the intelligence of all concerned.

The same scruples clearly do not apply to Yemen.

Much like Ireland, Yemen has a contemporary history wracked by hardship and political violence.

The complexity of such a conflict cannot be responsibly reduced to “terrorism,” abstractly defined, or indeed any individual.

Rather, violence in Yemen

should be traced back to competing groups with discordant interests – all with certain legitimate grievances and claims – as well as poverty, poor governance, and even heavy foreign interference in domestic conflicts.

Fundamentalist terrorism originating from Yemen poses a certain infinitesimal threat to international security, and a rather larger danger, if not even a paramount one, to the Yemeni state.

A massive sectarian war recurring in six phases, which took on an international dimension with the entrance of Saudi Arabia into the fray, has devastated the country’s North.

Neighboring Somalia, ravaged by invasion and infighting, continues to send hundreds of refugees, when they don’t arrive as drowned

corpses, to lives of desperation on Yemeni shores.

A secessionist movement threatens to rend the nation in twain and to create a devastating civil war which would consume countless towns and villages. As it stands now, the skirmishes already regularly claim dozens of lives.

These are the real challenges of Yemen in the realm of security. However, urgent humanitarian catastrophes can never compete with the likes of al-Qaeda and bin Laden for the attention of a Western press audience.

The attention deficit of this population, and the marketdriven system of journalism dictates that only the most accessible, and in this case, totally misleading, connections can be drawn by those producing the news.

National Yemen

POLITICS

Sunday, Feb. 13, 2011 Issue 32 www.nationalyemen.com

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Sana’a Governor and Hamid al-Ahmar Locked in Tribal Battle A bystander was killed and another was injured during an exchange of fire between the armed bodyguards of Hamid Al-Ahmar, a prominent businessman and one leading member of the opposition party, and Sana'a governor Noman Dowaid’s security forces.

The exchange occurred on last Saturday in the upscale Hadda neighborhood in Sana'a.

Eyewitnesses said that the exchange of fire happened on Saturday night after the governor had said during a political rally of the ruling party that Hamid Al-Ahmar had gained his wealth from the looting of public funds.

“I am not afraid of Hamid Al-Ahmar and he knows well my rank as well as his rank,” Dowaid said.

“Patriotism is not in looting kids’ parks or exploitation , and he who wants to be a patriot should instead provide kids’s parks from his wealth."

For these critical comments, Sheikh Yahia Dowaid with his sons and other VIPs apologized, and sought arbitration with the al-Ahmar tribe.

But the situation got critical after several incidents of gun battles between the two parties.

It extended to repeatedly exchanged insults and the condemning of the aggression between Duwaid and Al-Ahmer.

The Hashid and Bakil tribes, the higher confederacies above the two competing subtribes, were involved in the mediation.

Both parties have denied that responsibility for starting the exchange of fire.

Dowaid, who belongs to Bakil tribe, said that Al-Ahmar’s men attacked his house’s security detail and he has the evidence, as his men allegedly seized one of the assailants’ cars.

While Al-Ahmar, who belongs to Hashid tribe, said that Dowaid security forces attacked the house guards around his house.

Tribal Mediation Invoked These are the stories the two tribes have adhered to while the case awaits mediation.

Al-Ahmar gave eight guns to a tribe in Khawlan to help settle the dispute.

The case has taken on a vast political dimension pitting the government against the opposition. It is now coming to be seen as attempts of political assassination rather than a mere personal dispute.

Both interpretations will complicate national reconciliation and hinder the reconvening of dialogue which the president has recently offered to the opposition coalition.

Meanwhile, MP Abdu Bashir, described in Monday’s parliamentary session what happened between Al-Ahmar and Dowaid as a “personal problem.”

He denied what official and opposition media have written about this case and denied the killing of a bystander who belongs to the Wasab tribe in Dhamar governorate.

Abdulaziz Jubari also criticized Al-Ahmar and Dowaid for their resort to weapons. “these events came to prove that Yemen people cannot dispute politically in a peaceful way as elsewhere in the world,” he said.

Jubari noted that the political disputes in Yemen are dominated by the presence of weapons, which means the absence of political awareness.”

Back to the Tribe The dispute comes at a time when the relationship between

the tribe and the State still surrounds the political and social, and there is an open competition for influence, domination, and loyalty between the two institutions.

Although Dowaid is a governor and has authority and power, he preferred returning back to the tribe. Thousands of Khawlan and Bakil tribal sheikhs are coming to support him.

Dowaid said that AlAhmar’s actions are not new or extraordinary. He said many of his violent actions have no relation to the law or tribal customs.

At the same time, Security procedures in Sana'a has been upgraded, especially after the arrival of thousands Hashid tribesmen to support Hamid Al-Ahmar.

Al-Ahmar also gave guns to a Wasab sheikh in Dhamar to arbitrate in case it was proved that his armed men killed one of Wasab tribesmen.

In addition, he sent a personal letter to the Khawlan sheiks in which he complained of the offence he suffered from Duwaid.

He wrote, "Your generous visit to Sheikh Sadiq Al-Ahmer house is enough to let that offence pass, but some people were not satisfied, and tried transform a verbal offence into violence.”

Al-Ahmar further claimed that government cars to pursued him while he was on his way home in Sana'a and opened fire on some of his guards, resulting in the death of an innocent bystander and the wounding of another.

His car was damaged and his armed men were “miraculously saved from the heavy rain of bullets fired by over 30 armed men.”

Tribes’ Political Role Criticized The tribe represents the basic form of society and the most effective social and political actors, according to a recent social study, prepared by a group of Yemeni researchers.

The study, inaugurated in Sana'a in a workshop executed

by The Yemeni Observatory for Human Rights in cooperation with The International Development Research Center in Canada, noted that the political role of tribal sheikhs has resulted in curbing citizens participation in the political field in general and has undercut citizens’ ability to pressure the government to make substantive reforms.

It has created what can be called a “political commitment system” and the average citizen’s submission to compound repression – political repression by the state and social repression by prominent tribal personalities.

The study, which was prepared by a group of researchers under Prof. Adel al-Sharjabi in a book titled "Al-Qasr wa al-Diwan: The Political Role of the Tribe in Yemen,” noted that the factors that contributed in promoting the political power of the tribe are represented in the weakness of the state’s structure.

Its security apparatus, the weakness of the state’s permeation into rural areas, weakness of law, criminal impunity, the weakness of civil alternatives, the violence of tribal custom, and the patronage of regional states have all been blamed for the current state of affairs.

The study showed that the tribe is a pre-state structure, and it is supposed to theoretically lose its political importance as a strong national state grows.

The Relationship with the Authority The relationship between the authority and tribes has varied widely with the successive presidents since the sixtees.

Even President Ali Abdullah Saleh was known for embracing alliance with many tribes. He constructed “The Tribal Affairs Authority” as a means of organizing his relationship with the tribes. This authority has paid out a monthly salary for many sheikhs whom the State asked for help in the 1994 Civil War and the Houthi war.

The study considers that the tribal sheikhs have dominated legislative power since the unity until now, and that they remain the real authority behind law-making.

Tribal sheikhs, the findings continued, through their domination on the legislative power, are merging most of the tribal customs with established legislative structure.

The study showed that the sheikhs have contributed to the disequilibrium between the legislative and executive powers and under the undeclared agreement have resolved to divide the authority between the State leadership and traditional, i.e. tribal, authority.

Professor Adel Al-Sharjabi, during a discussion of the study’s conclusions, asserted that the most important changes of the tribe were that the sheikh has represented historically the tribe against the State and recently he represents the state against the tribe.

He said today that the sheikh oversees the repression of the state against the citizen and the state overlooks the sheikh, who also represses the citizen. He said there are many examples in which the sheikh has denied citizens their rights in which the state took no meaningful action.

“The tribe is not able to protect the citizens and the citizen is not able to express his opinion in the audience of the sheikh – only to praise the sheikh or stop talking,” al-Sharjabi noted.

“The Yemeni tribal structure is responsible for the phenomenon of inheritance in political life.” He said that parliamentary representatives are inevitably sheikhs or their sons for at least 30 years, with few exceptions.

Al-Sharjabi has criticized the recent administrative divisions, and has said that it is a “tribal division not a developmental division. Constituencies have been distributed in a way to benefit the sheikhs.”

He showed that there is such a multiplication in the number of deputies that there are more deputies than there are districts, and all of them are the sons of sheikhs.

A great part of corruption resulted from tribal structure and inefficient State apparatus because, in his words, “the sheikh is the merchant, his son is the officer and his other son is the company owner, so we are faced with a compound structure of corruption.”

He said that the standards of competition do not depend on qualifications in Yemen, because of endemic monopolization which makes the basic structure of society uncompetitive.

Al-Sharjabi added that there are deformities in the State structure and corruption which guarantees the perpetrators of poor governance stable employment. He showed that there is a kind of symbiotic relationship between the Sate and corruption and that the ruling classes act freely with the state’s financial budget not for the administrative whims, but for personal uses.

Tribes’ Role in Society Remains Unassailable In the other side, Sheikh Sultan al-Samee, Parliament council member, claims that the problem is not in the system of sheikhs but in the mentality on which the system depends.

He said we cannot say that the tribal system is a corrupted system only through its deeds, but is but one malfunctioning institution among many in the country.

In a statement to the National Yemen newspaper, he said that the role of the tribe in Yemen and other Arab countries is great, and in the past decades in Yemen the State tried to weaken and eliminate the role of tribe.

He accused the state of coddling the sheikhs. He said that the State has created the sheikhs who were not sheikhs at all, but were “thugs out of jails and some of them are smugglers known to have committed criminal acts.”

Al-Samee caimed that the state is the one which creates problems and wars among tribes, aiming at reducing the role of the tribe politically.

Many tribesmen have expressed their worry over this study and have worked to solidify their position in society, especially in their relationship with the State, which is sometimes characterized by conflict, but most of the time by alliance.

The basic role of the tribe is not by a product of their intrinsic power, but the persistent weakness of the state.

In the last ten years, many areas in Maareb have become areas of conflict between the state and tribes. The tribes have kidnapped hostages and bargained with the state to release the hostages at great cost.

The tribes have wanted to monopolize jobs in oil companies, and often characterize themselves to their constituents as the only legitimate means of advancement, and lead average citizen to think that they are the only available way to improve their state of affairs.

Mohammed Al-Zaidi, a social worker in the Development Foundation in Maareb and a member of the Bani Jaber Tribe, said the point view that the tribe is an obstacle in development is not correct, based on his own experience.

He showed that kidnapping has happened from time to time

because the tribes have sought to apply the law and reclaim property and compatriots. “If there were any organized justice, nothing like this will happen,” he said.

“We in the tribes are eager to apply the law for all and treat all people equally under the law.

The tribesman can get his rights when he seeks the assistance of the tribe after he discovers that only the tribe can bring him justice.

“Malaysia and the Emirates are sheikhdoms and sultanates.

They are united under a fair system ruled by sheiks to work for the people’s demands, and the ruling mentality determines whether the ruler is successful or unsuccessful.”

Bloody conflict continues to persist in Yemen. Will this study impact the future of tribal alliances with each other and with the state?

Tribe and State: a Symbiotic Relationship The political effect in the tribal system revolves around the role of sheikhs in the political scene and their ownership for weapons, with which they have faced the state, as well as the tribe’s domination of the army establishment.

According to the study "The Ruling Personalities in Yemen" which was prepared by the researcher Belqis Abu-Osba, the tribal representation in the army has reached 52.6%, 26.2% in the Judiciary, and 10.5% claim to be Sayyids belonging to the Prophet Muhammad’s family.

The tribes were able to prevail over the state in many positions and occasions. They suceeded in assassinating the president Ibrahim Al-Hamdi in 1977 after he tried to attack the tribes and used air bombardments to suppress a tribal rebellion, but he became their victim.

The tribes represent 85% of 23 million strong population of Yemen. Some of them have even heavier weapons than small arms, which are, of course, universally possessed.

There are tribes owning mortars, machine guns, bombs, and RPG missiles. The weapon is the symbol of manhood and it never before has any Yemeni administration dared to disarm the tribes. The estimates showed that their numbers among the tribes have reached more than 50 millions weapons.

The Hashid and Bakil tribes are the greatest tribes in Yemen, while the Madhaj tribe is concentrated in the East and Al-Zaraneeq tribe is spread about Tahama. Although Bakil tribe number is the most numerous, the Hashid tribe remains the most powerful because the president Ali Abdullah Saleh and Sheikh Abdullah Hussein Al-Ahmar, the leader of Islah party and sheikh of the Hashid belong to it.

The Madhaj tribe is the tribe with the greatest geographical extent, and spreads from the middle area throughout Yemen.

It is subdivided into a large number of smaller tribes which are mostly engaged in agriculture.

The Hashid tribe is the largest of the three tribes and is located in the North under the leadership of sheikh Sadiq Al-Ahmar. It is considered the tribe of the political and economic class, engaged in commerce and politics.

The Bakil tribe is larger than the Hashid, but smaller than the Madhaj. It spreads in the western area and next to the al-Yafra tribe in a part of North.

It consists of warrior tribes living in harsh mountain areas, which colors the personalities of its members, despite recent, significant advancements in infrastructure.

Discrimination Continues The tribe is still the practical face of the legal system. Some people consider it a part of the state. The basic components of political gatherings and conferences and the state systems have been built according to the tribal affiliation.

Senan Abu Lihoom, one of the prominent sheikhs of Bakil tribe, considers that civilization and progress threatens the tribe.

All Yemeni citizens belong to tribes, at least in name, including the presidents. The tribal system imposes guardianship by the tribal sheikh and it is difficult to leave behind or get out of the tribe.

Customs, traditions, and disputes are all addressed with reference to the tribe in Yemen.

Despite twenty years of unity (1990 – 2010), Yemen has failed to achieve equality among social groups and geographical areas.

The discrimination remains on the basis of the social affiliations, and this failure reflects the general lack of national political progress.

The Tribal Authority in Yemen, as was clearly revealed in a symposium it held in Sana'a in 2008, is a project for importing wealth. The tribal sheikh in the northern area were capable of accumulating large sums through their presence in the government systems.

This indicates that sheikhs are also preponderant in the economic field, and the government allocates money to support them.

Al-Khetat Before the Republican coup d'etat in 1962, The Yemeni rulers has ruled by "Al-Khetat."

When the tribe rebelled against the State, the Imam granted rival tribes to perform "Al-Khetat."

This meant simply that attacks on the rebelling tribe were sanctioned. In case the attacking tribe wins, it has the right to take money, women, children, and other forms of compensation.

This practice continued for decades which enabled the ruler to impose his domination on the tribes without throwing his army into the fray.

Last year, a famous weapon merchant, Faris Mana'a, was arrested. His brother, Hasan Mana'a, tried to release him according to the tribal customs.

The first party in his case was the president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, representing the state, and the second party was the al-Mana'a tribe.

This effort was brought to an end by offering cows and camels which the tribe slaughtered in front of the Presidential Palace as an arbitration to end the problem and release him.

The arbitration was accepted but he was not released.

Sometimes arbitration comes in the form of guns given by the one demanding reconciliation as evidence of the release of his fate into the opponent’s hands.

Al-Wasla When a disagreement between two tribes is raised, it can be solved by what known as "al-Waslah". The tribe in error gathers and goes to the other tribe with many cows, which are slaughtered in front of the sheikh house.

In this occasion, a lot of bullets are fired into the air in celebration.

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Sunday, Feb. 13, 2011 Issue 32 www.nationalyemen.com

SPECIAL: FOOD SECURITY National Yemen Sa’ada

Food security in Abyan

By Abdullah Alsalimi

By Shukri Hussein/Abyan

One third of the population in Yemen suffers from hunger and 57% of children suffer from malnutrition. 32% of the population of Yemen lack food security, according to the draft report of National Yemeni Strategy on food, which is prepared by the government in cooperation with the International Institute for Research on Food.

Thus, the developmental future of Yemeni society and its economy is negatively affected.

Overall, we can say that Yemen

is considered one of the bottom ten countries in the world with regard to food access.

Therefore, some important questions need to be answered about food security, people’s lack of awareness on the issue, and on the ways to solve the crisis.

Most of the people are unaware about the concept of food security, possibly due to the low level of education and a general unawareness of what's happening in the world.

Actually, food security is a

challenge faced the world round.

In general, Yemeni families lack serious means of food production at the same time they lack money for purchasing food.

Few people are aware that food security is related to several factors, the most important is the food supply, employment, and basic services such as education, health, sanitation, clean water, housing, and security.

A majority of the population in Yemen has not heard of “food security,” though a majority has clearly suffered its effects. In this regard, few families, especially in impoverished Abyan, have escaped its effects.

Currently, there is a significant increase in food prices compared to 15 years ago, and as a result the majority of the population will suffer a lot in order to obtain the necessary materials such as wheat, flour, rice, sugar, fish and other staples.

According to the internal trade national compan , Abyan branch, there is an enormous differences between the prices of food in the recent past and now.

The price of wheat was only YR 151 per bag, while the price

today is more than YR 5 thousand. The price of a bag of flour equaled YR 205, while the price today is estimated at YR 5200. The price of "Dano" powdered milk was YR 40 per packet, and now it has reached more than YR 3300.

The price of European sugar was YR 520 and currently it costs more than YR 10000.

Therefore, the raise of prices is expected to plunge the country into further crisis.

In fact, the average Yemeni citizen depends entirely on the State to secure staple foods especially in light of rising prices and the difficulty of obtaining necessary funds.

In some rural provinces like Abyan people depend on the produce of their agricultural lands, such us vegetables and grains. And those who can't obtain their food, they rely on the State to provide them with necessary food.

The crisis which occurred during the war in the summer of 1994 had an influence on the people of Abyan, and it became increasingly difficult to get necessary food. Therefore, people mostly depended on what was stored to eat, brought food from nearby areas or depended on their agricultural lands.

Yemeni people, in light of these circumstances. Much of the dissent in al-Dalea can be traced to the fact that standards of living have plummeted, and earning a decent living is becoming increasingly difficult.

Still though, in this epicenter of the Southern Movement, many local sheikhs believe that a revolution against regime would lead the country to disaster: Yemen would be split into two parts of the Houthis in the North and the Southern Movement in the South. Fears that any viable state existing

between these two vacuums are well-founded.

In the mean time, some other people are opposed to the idea of change through free and fair elections. They deem elections a fraud perpetrated by the authorities’ to extend its maintenance and power. They also believe Islah party is a cause of the current problems, and it will help riot and chaos persist among the people. They also attributed the war of summer 1994 to the Islah party.

In the southern regions, members of JMP support the

fundamental change of the current situation while the supporters of al-Hirak demand a new southern country, pointing out what is happening these days in doesn’t concern them.

Their sole concern is corruption, which they say mars both official parties.

Notably, the JMP held a rally here on Thursday. Clashes occurred between the two sides were carried out between the two sides, as Southern Movement militants sought to disrupt the course of opposition marches.

Al-Dalea

By Saleh al-Mansub/ al-Dalea People in Yemen generally suffer from hunger and malnutrition, not least in al-Dalea governorate. Food insecurity refers to the lack of access to enough food to fully meet basic needs due to lack of financial resources and peoples’ fundamental understandings about food security.

The inhabitants of the governorate work hard to obtain what they need. Some secure food by daily or monthly wages, trade in qat or by agricultural subsistence.

Generally, the average citizen does not have a high enough wage to regularly obtain products like pasta and meat. What makes the situation worse, food prices are on the rise.

For example, the price of the wheat has increased to YR 5000 riyals and 1 Kg of wheat is YR 50 riyals, as well as the ghee’s price is YR 5800 riyals, and the sugar’s price is YR 9500 riyals, 1Kg of sugar is (50) riyals.

On the other hand, what happened in Tunisia and Egypt has had significant influence on

Rarely is the term "food security" used in traditional society, and Sa’ada in no exception. However, providing the basic requirements of nourishment and nutrition is common to everyone in the world.

Many citizens of Sa’ad are forced to subsist on low-quality food which does not fulfill nutritional standards, and does not provide the requisite nutrients for children’s growth.

And considering a loaf of bread is the main ingredient for any meal for the citizens in Sa’ada, as in most areas of Yemen, then getting enough of the bread became associated with the availability of white flour, as well as wheat – both of which are imported to the governorate.

There is some local production of cereals in the province of all kinds of wheat, corn, and barley.

Rural areas of Sa’ada had been until recently producing this grain in abundance and exporting it to supermarkets in the capital of the province even faraway provinces.

Other than the loaf of bread there are other types of vegetables and legumes that are essential components of food in Sa’ada.

It can be said that the capital of the governorate is maintaining a decent level of supply for food supplements, in addition to the canned food available at the supermarkets as well as the grocery stores in the countryside.

As for the two types of meat, beef and lamb, and in spite of the fact that the majority of the residents of Sa’ada, are raising animals in varying numbers, this type of food is rarely eaten due to its high prices, and citizens replace it with local chicken, as frozen chicken is not suitable for rural areas, owing to the lack of refrigeration.

It is important to note the increase of qat cultivation in the province, which threatens

food security of the citizens, wastes water reserves, and claims land which could be cultivated with food grains, and other desperately-needed staples.

However, there is a growing feeling among the citizens in Sa’ada who have agricultural lands of the importance of their dependence on what they grow to ensure a measure of self-sufficiency of their food needs.

Perhaps this feeling has emerged through the periods of warfare, six in total, between the government and the Houthis experienced since 2004, and which has not been totally defused ever after.

Large areas of Sa’ada were besieged during the wars, and citizens were not able to bring the basics of food from outside the province, especially wheat and white flour, as well as legumes, vegetables and canned goods, rice, sugar, and so on.

On this basis, citizens in Sa’ada went through various stages of food crisis during the conflict, and had to make temporary solutions, such as opening risky new pathways of smuggling food from neighboring provinces.

On the other hand, citizens tended remarkably to the cultivation of wheat, corn and several varieties of vegetables to survive the period. Sa’ada is famous for cultivation of many fruits, pomegranates, grapes and oranges, despite the current troubles.

There is a growing trend which understand the need to reactivate the effectiveness of the countryside as a main contributor in the production of basic foods.

And maybe the Huthi group in Sa’ada and the surrounding areas might adopt this approach by asserting among his followers the importance of food independence and self-reliance

Like Egypt, Yemen Suffers from High Food Prices

By William Lambers* We've already seen the protests in Egypt where hunger, poverty, and high food prices have taken their toll on the population, to a point where the people could take no more.

Yemen is also reeling from high food prices. There have been small protests in the country. No one knows what lies around the corner. But you can be sure that nothing good will happen when people live in

such horrible impoverished conditions.

Georgia Warner, a World Food Programme officer in Yemen, says that "WFP is seriously concerned about the recent spike in food prices. One in three Yemenis are already food insecure."

WFP has a plan to distribute rations to help Yemeni families under this heavy strain. The cost is about $77 million total

and it would provide interim aid to millions of Yemenis, boost child nutrition levels, and support Food for Work projects aimed at improving agriculture and roads.

One of the biggest parts of the Yemen missions is a plan to distribute rations to 1.8 million people across 14 food-insecure governorates.

These are families needing relief from the strain of high food prices.

Without the funding, though, nothing can go forward.

In Yemen, our interests lie in a strong, stable ally who can resist Al Qaeda’s menace. A population struggling with hunger and malnutrition is certainly not in our national security interest. Such suffering also goes against our humanitarian traditions.

We must prioritize the fight against hunger in our foreign

policy strategy and build an international coalition to go along. For Yemen it can start with funding the emergency safety net program to counter

high food prices. Food security is national security for all nations. *courtesy Blogs and Critics

National Yemen

SPECIAL: FOOD SECURITY

Sunday, Feb. 13, 2011 Issue 32 www.nationalyemen.com

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Food Security in Yemen: a Constant Struggle

By NY Staff

The National Yemen discusses the many challenges Yemen faces in feeding its people with World Food Program representative in Yemen Gian Carlo Cirri.

NY. Would it be fair to say that there is a food crisis in Yemen?

Yes, of course.

NY. What are the causes of this crisis in your view?

Well, it’s a combination of causes.

When it comes to cereals, which is the staple food in Yemen, the country is importing between 80-90% of its food requirement.

Yemen is very much exposed to any shock or fluctuation of prices in the international market. The trends are not positive at all. We are approaching the 2008 peak in food prices.

The relatively high level of food prices in the international market is one of the main causes.

The dependence on imports and the relatively weak agricultural market, this is not helping, neither is the overall prevalence of poverty. To be food secure as a country, you don’t need to produce; Switzerland is a good example.

But the lack of purchasing power in Yemen is a major cause of the crisis.

Also, the gender gap, drought, and water scarcity are aggravating factors.

When you look at markets in Yemen, when it comes to rural areas, you have many places where markets aren’t functioning well.

NY. To what extent do you think that the food issue in Yemen relates to wider unrest in the Arab World, in terms of high food prices, subsidies, and dissatisfaction with governments?

There is an obvious link between high food prices and unrest. We saw this in 2007 and 2008.

It is said that one of the factors in Tunisia was high food prices. In Yemen, there are no food subsidies; these were removed in the nineties I believe.

The subsidies in Yemen are about fuel, not food.

But there is a correlation, if fuel prices increase, then you have an increase in the price of food.

NY. Is there anything about Yemen’s geography or demographics that make food security more difficult?

The population growth is definitely an aggravating factor.

When you look at the population density, especially in the highlands, it’s extremely high.

The pressure on natural resources is increasing, and the pressure on the land is great.

If you look at the recent Small Arms Survey, they try to document the increase in what

along the main supply routes is very high, so there’s a problem there.

The second issue is that the access of World Food Program and our partners beyond Sa’ada town is not sufficient. We are asking for an increase in access to those affected.

We can serve the internally displaced persons – it’s not ideal, but we can serve them from Sa’ada town, but we would like to be able to serve them closer to their place of residence.

they call social violence due to this pressure on water and land.

This social violence is increasing, and related deaths and casualties are pretty high.

The death toll as a result, in the Northern conflict and the Southern conflict is a result of these pressures.

NY. Do you feel that the WFP, or the UN in general, is doing a job which the government could, or should, be doing itself?

It’s not a competition, and it’s not a substitution – it’s a cooperation. The government is the main actor when it comes to policies and strategies across all sectors.

For food security, recently a strategy has been approved, which I think is a good one. It is very comprehensive and broad and the government is definitely doing what it can.

Now, we have to acknowledge the fact that because of the relative decrease of oil prices, the capacity of the government is decreasing as well, because their revenue is on the decline.

Oil eevenues are 70-80% of the government’s revenues.

Here again, you have the strong exposure of the government to one single element.

What we do is try to support and complement them.

‘‘

Yemen is very much exposed to any shock or fluctuation of prices in the international market. The trends are not positive at all NY. But isn’t there enough food in the world to support the hungry? Are food shortages essentially a question of politics?

That’s not necessarily the issue. The issue is access most of the time. When you study surveys of food security, in many instances, producing areas are often the areas where food insecurity is the highest.

When you talk about food security, there are three levels.

The first one is availability; if there is no food, that’s obviously a problem.

The availability exists on the international market, but it’s decreasing – that’s why prices are increasing.

‘‘ The main issue is access: it’s the capacity of the people to buy this food and to bring this food home. That’s where poverty is playing the crucial role .

NY. But surely unfair global trade agreements and even authoritarian governments affect access and affordability of food?

When it comes to agricultural products, of course this is an issue. If there is something in global trade that does not flow freely, it is agricultural products.

Why? Because you have so many interferences here and there.

Almost all countries are subsidizing their production.

This is an issue for poor countries to market their product. There is a certain level of unfair competition, definitely.

NY. Do you see that as the ultimate, permanent solution to food insecurity and food shortages in the developing world? Or are safety nets like those provided by the WFP adequate?

That’s a complex question, and I do not think I have the answer. When it comes to many developing countries, yes, a system that is more equitable and fair would definitely benefit these places.

One of the problems is that they do not have the same means to subsidize production.

Therefore, the end price of their products tends to be higher than the international price.

But the international price is not a reflection of what the price should be, because it is subsidized.

For a poor, producing

country, a more equitable system would be beneficial.

NY. How do you regard the role of the private sector in alleviating food issues, and helping those who are starving and also those who are just trying to get by?

First, this is not the private sector’s job. These companies exist to make a profit.

What we know is that the food industry in Yemen is for processing, not production. For many commodities, what these companies are doing, is they are importing food, processing it, then exporting it.

When we look at the evolution of the international prices, and the ones at the national level, it matches. There are no major discrepancies.

However, it would be of some benefit to have a higher level of competition among the companies in Yemen.

But again, it’s not a monopolistic situation where a couple of groups can determine the price level.

The main actors are five to seven, if I remember correctly.

The World Bank, the IFPRI, and our market survey are all indicating that it would good to have an injection of extra competition, and that this would be good for the Yemeni consumers.

NY. We understand that Sa’ada is a major focus of the WFP’s work, and that you paid a recent visit there.

Could you give us an impression of what you saw?

I think our main obstacle is access, definitely.

Our first immediate concern is to ensure the regular delivery of food to Sa’ada town. The insecurity

Qat is a cash crop. If we look at food insecurity, one result we consistently find, is that qat producers are food secure

Some of them are labeled returnees, even though they are in fact going and coming.

Again, the conditions for their return are not yet there – that is the reason that these people are trying to restore their livelihoods. But the situation is not yet good or conducive to that.

We would like to really contribute to what could be the early recovery process.

The feeling is that a ceasefire agreement is really not enough to look confidently into a longlasting settlement. The parties would need an increased political dialogue on such a settlement. To my knowledge, we are not yet there.

The Qatari mediation is very helpful in this context, but it is a very slow process, and when this translates into our capacity to better reach the effected, it is not enough.

NY. Your literature spoke of funding shortfalls. Is this an especially grave situation for you?

Last year, the first half of the year was very, very bleak. We had to reduce rations and for many months we were fearing that it would at one point have to be completely discontinued.

Luckily, we received support from donors, and now the situation is a bit better, to the extent that we can increase the ration to 75% and we do have some months of supply that are guaranteed, but again, not enough.

This is insufficient for IDPs and basic nutritional requirements. Our assessments are pretty clear on that: the dependence of IDPs on external aid is still very important.

NY. Do you see the cultivation of qat being a major issue with regard to food security?

Again, it’s such a difficult question. Of course, the net effect of qat is not positive. I don’t think it is positive on the nutritional status on the population, it is not positive on the use of water, and after all it’s an addiction.

However, it’s a cash crop. If we look at food insecurity, one result we consistently find, is that qat producers are food secure.

This is logical, if you have a cash crop, you receive revenues which increase your purchasing power. The revenues you could get from alternative crops are less.

It looks like a very difficult issue, and to an extent it compares to coca production in Latin America. What you can offer as a substitute is not really attractive to cultivators.

I think it’s a mix of incentive and regulations that would help, but you have to move gradually.

If you look at qat production and consumption as something totally illegal, and cultivation drops significantly, then the first result would be that the poverty rate would increase significantly.

NY. What other challenges are you facing?

The food that we distribute is costing us much more than it was some months ago because of the increase in prices. On the other hand, food prices are increasing the number of food insecure people.

We are getting close to the situation we were in during 2007-2008, where there is this double effect which creates a deeper food crisis.

Also, funding shortfalls are affecting our aviation operations.

These measures are crucial to our activities, and they are jeopardy.

The current situation absolutely requires that our safety net is carried out. What we are trying to do with the Social Welfare Fund is to stock up food-deprived people with resources for a seasonal intervention.

It should start sometime in May and continue till October, which is the hunger season.

This intervention targets the poorest people in Yemen in the most insecure places.

10

Sunday, Feb. 13, 2011 Issue 32 www.nationalyemen.com

Seven Artists in Yemen Exhibition of Yemeni paintings at l’Institut du Monde Arabe in Paris, France By

On Thursday the 3rd Feburary an inaugural reception was held for the exhibition “Seven Artists in Yemen” with an inaugural address given by Mr. Badr Eddine Arodaky, Deputy Director General of l’Institut du Monde Arabe.

This event followed the Yemen Tourism Ministry’s initiative in inviting eight European artists to Sana’a to paint for three weeks during the summer of last year. At the completion of their three week tour, the artists put on a short exhibition at the Bab Al-Yemen Gallery in the context of the 2010 Sana’a Summer Festival.

After their return to Europe the artists began organising exhibitions of their work produced in Yemen in order to present to a European public a view of Yemen not generally put forward by Western media.

The exhibition held in the Café littéraire of l’Institut du Monde Arabe showed work by 7 of the 8 artists who visited Sana’a, and was the second in a series of planned exhibitions around Europe, the first took place for the French artist participants in Toulouse this past January. The exhibition continues until the 27th of February 2011.

The artists showing work at the exhibition were Philip Braham from

Scotland, Charles FosterHall from England, Stephanie Ledoux, Philippe Bichon, Aurelie Pedrajas and Charlotte Jaunez, all from France, and David Gonzalez-Carpio Alcaraz from Spain.

All the artists were greatly inspired by their visit to Yemen and it was not only an opportunity to show their work, but to share their enthusiasm for Yemen with their guests and correct many of the negative perceptions created by media coverage of the country.

The reception was very well attended by about 200 guests, including some who know Yemen well and others who were pleased to learn more about a country about which they had only heard about in the news.

The work on view included many portraits of the people that the artists had met in Sana’a, reflecting the warmth and hospitality that the artists found in Yemen and also paintings of landscapes and architecture for which Yemen is renowned for. l’Institut du Monde Arabe is the foremost Arab cultural centre in Europe and the Café littéraire is visited regularly by many of the artists, writers and other intellectuals from Arab countries now living in Paris as well as those interested in Arab culture.

REPORT

National Yemen

National Yemen

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Sunday, Feb. 13, 2011 Issue 32 www.nationalyemen.com

11

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The Higher Education Quality Improvement Project

The Higher Education Quality Improvement project signed new agree-

ments financed through the World Bank for the Improvement of higher

education in Yemen last week.

The organization is a new project which aims at capacity-building for the careers of doctors and professors.

The agreement was signed by Dr. Muhammad Muhammad Mutaher, deputy minister of higher education, Mr. Kamal Burhan from the World Bank, and Dr. Muhammad Mikhlafi, director of the project in the presence of other doctors and professors.

12

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Sunday, Feb. 13, 2011 Issue 32 www.nationalyemen.com

National Yemen

Move up?

Move to OMV.

Vacancies for Yemeni Nationals only OMV Exploration & Production GmbH is the independent operating division of OMV AG, the leading oil and natural gas group in Central and Eastern Europe. We RSHUDWH RYHU RLO DQG JDV ÂżHOGV ZRUOGZLGH ERWK RQVKRUH DQG RIIVKRUH 2XU DPELWLRQ LV WR EHFRPH D VLJQLÂżFDQW LQWHUQDWLRQDO XSVWUHDP SOD\HU E\ VHHNLQJ QHZ EXVLQHVV RSSRUWXQLWLHV DQG WDUJHWLQJ SURGXFWLRQ JURZWK OLNH RXU RLO ÂżHOG RSHUDWLRQV LQ 6KDEDZK JRYHUQRUDWH 5HSXEOLF RI <HPHQ

Public & Government Relations Superintendent General Sections Responsibilities: Manage and provide day to day direction and directives to the section staff in the performance of their duties, establishing work priorities, and in achieving management initiatives. Streamline EXVLQHVV SURFHVVHV WR PD[LPL]H HIÂżFLHQF\ DQG HIIHFWLYHQHVV within the section; Responsible for analyzing and directing all function-related activities within the scope of the PR & GR Management System. :RUN ZLWK +5 35 *5 PDQDJHU WR GHÂżQH WKH 35 *5 JRDOV and objectives, Participates on committees, and special projects and seeks additional responsibilities.

Manages and Leads initiatives to formulate the yearly and long-term workforce plans and develops plans and strategies as they relate to OMV Yemenization commitments in consultation with the various stakeholders including OMV managers, EP-HR (Vienna), Ministry of Oil & Minerals etc.

etc. Build and maintain a healthy and cooperative network of peer counterparts in other organizations for gathering information and sharing ideas regarding PR & GR related issues. Create impactful LQWHUQDO DQG H[WHUQDO FRPPXQLFDWLRQV LQĂ&#x20AC;XHQFLQJ DQG LQVSLULQJ others to take action and ensuring broad-based support for a healthy PR & GR strategy. Represent the company in public forums to improve stakeholder relations and corporate reputation.

Conducts benchmarking studies of similar nationalization programs by contacting other companies and gathering information on effective strategies and practices.

Ensures alignment of Yemenization development programs with other Company training programs and strategies by communicating regularly and working closely with the Heads of Training and their staff. looking (i.e. beyond the current job) in developing their employees.

Establishes annual budgets and objectives for each of the public and government relations areas and ensures annual targets DUH PHW RU H[FHHGHG $QG XSRQ ÂżQDO EXGJHW DSSURYDO DVVXUHV WKDW DOO IXQFWLRQV RSHUDWH ZLWKLQ DSSURSULDWHG DPRXQWV 9HULÂżHV D YDULHW\ RI VHFWLRQ H[SHQVH DQG LQYRLFHV DV SHU WKH GHÂżQHG OLPLW Advices, negotiate, manage, and administer any Public & government Relations-related contract. Ensures such contracts are effectively implemented.

Carries out other similar or related duties such as Maintaining good business and personal relationships with the Government's <HPHQL]DWLRQ GHSDUWPHQW DQG WKH /DERU RIÂżFH ZLWKLQ 020 DQG VRFLDO VHFXULW\ RIÂżFHV WR GHÂżQH DQ\ DUHDV RI LPSURYHPHQW $GYLV ing company management on civil issues such as strikes or 'go-slows', immigration laws, acting as interpreter in meetings EHWZHHQ H[SDWULDWHV DQG $UDE VSHDNLQJ RIÂżFLDOV SURFHVVLQJ DQG following up on visa applications for nationals travelling outside Yemen. Submits monthly reports on hires, promotions, changes in national employees including nationalized positions, in accordance with the approved Yemenization plan. Keeps apprised of labour laws and regulations in order to ensure Company compliance.

Ensure legal compliance as per local labour law as well as OMVâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s corporate standards for corporate social responsibility.

7KLV PD\ DOVR UHTXLUH EUDQFK RIÂżFH VSHFLÂżF SROLFLHV L H 5RWD policy, any Labour agreements, Grievance handling, Disciplinary action etc.

Supervisory Responsibility: Â&#x2021; 6XSHUYLVHV Â&#x2021; <HPHQL]DWLRQ 6XSHUYLVRU Â&#x2021; 35 *5 6XSHUYLVRU Â&#x2021; 2IÂżFH $VVLVWDQWV

Advises management and counsels employees and managers on a variety of subjects including but not limited to the formulation and administration of plans and policies for PR & GR activities, national employee relations matters, policy interpretation and labor issues, etc. Participating in disciplinary matters such as employee and applicant appeals. Moreover, investigating employee grievances and resolving issues with managers.

Minimum Requirements:

PR, GR , Yemenization and Immigration Responsibilities: Manages the Companyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s activities related to the immigration of personnel to Yemen. Includes reviewing documents such as SDVVSRUWV DQG KHDOWK FHUWLÂżFDWHV VXEPLWWLQJ GRFXPHQWV DV required to the Ministry of Oil and Ministry of Labour. Ensures that appropriate approval is obtained form Political Security, and VXEPLWV GRFXPHQWV WR WKH 0LQLVWU\ RI /DERXU IRU ÂżQDO DFFHSWDQFH of application and issue of visa. Applies to the Ministry of Labour and Immigration authorities for issue of Work Permits and Residence Permits and stamping. Obtains exit Visas for personnel wishing to leave the country. Liaises with Travel and Immigration section to ensure alignment on processes and procedures particularly with regard to immigration matters.

Resolves problems which arise such as expiry of passports and entry of specialist personnel on special request basis.

Includes the seeing of personnel through Immigration, Customs and Passport Control at Sanaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;a Airport.

Foster and maintain positive relationships with company constituents and customer base, serve as an interface between internal/external customers and functional team members to HQVXUH HIIHFWLYH GHÂżQLWLRQ RI DQG GHOLYHU\ RI <HPHQL]DWLRQ immigration, government related issues and provide overall prioritization of work assignments and management of functional team resources and their activities.

Coordinates government and public relations activities.

Includes establishing and maintaining relationships at senior level with government ministries, holding discussions with them on such topics as Yemenization, social affairs, economic matters, security and political issues etc which may affect the company DQG LWV VWDII DVVLVWLQJ HPSOR\HHV WR REWDLQ RIÂżFLDO DXWKRUL]DWLRQV e.g. driving licenses etc advising employees on social customs, traditions, legislation etc. affecting them, coordinating relations with the community when special events occur or are organized, making arrangements for parties, or special company celebrations.

Build strong, trusting relationships with key external stakeholders such as community groups, NGOs, policy-makers, media,

-

Bachelorâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Degree in Business Administration, Journalism, Law or equivalent.

10-12 yearsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; PR & GR and Immigration and labour relations experience in an oil industry environment including 2 years super visory experience.

Knowledge of Yemen immigration laws and procedures.

Experience in the travel industry particularly in international airline travel.

Government and/or Public Relations experience.

Strong interpersonal skills in a multi-cultural setting coupled ZLWK 06 2IÂżFH SURÂżFLHQF\ VNLOOV +LJK OHYHO RI SURÂżFLHQF\ LQ WKH XVH DQG FRPSUHKHQVLRQ RI WKH English language.

Deep understanding of immigration techniques concepts and WHUPLQRORJ\ DQG DELOLW\ WR DFFXUDWHO\ GHÂżQH DQG H[SODLQ immigration rules and processes across OMV. Fluent understanding of the compliance function within large corporate organization and the inter relation between immigration compliance and the Immigration Compliance, legal and HR functions.

Participate in the preparations, designing and distribution of the promotional items, greeting cards and any other publications that the Company produce and distribute to the government agencies and the community.

Carries out other similar or related duties as required, including updating Sanaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;a with current PR information, ensuring company representation at government functions, and keeping abreast of political activity within the area.

Minimum Requirements: Bachelorâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s degree in Public/Government Relations, Journal ism or equivalent .

Knowledge of business correspondences and report prepara tion.

4 - 6 years experience in Government/Public Relations. Excel lent communication skills and ability of quick understanding.

06 2IÂżFH SURÂżFLHQW VNLOOV High level of understanding and ability to work under pressure and tight deadlines.

Senior Immigration Coordinator Your Responsibilities: Coordinates the handling and processing of passports for immigration and residence purposes. Includes checking passports for compliance with government immigration requirements, expediting work permits from Sana'a, Aden or Shabwah and ensuring that all required formalities are complied with.

Directs Travel Representative in carrying out these formalities.

Coordinates the issuance, cancellation and renewal of work permits for expatriates. Includes coordinating with HR to ensure WKDW DOO UHTXLUHG GRFXPHQWV VXFK DV & 9 V HGXFDWLRQDO FHUWLÂż cates, work contract etc are available for the renewal of work SHUPLWV DQG FRRUGLQDWLQJ DUUDQJHPHQWV ZLWK +5 DQG /DERU 2IÂżFH for cancellations as applicable. Also directs and participates in the preparation of all related correspondences.

Assist the PR & GR Supervisor as required with various section tasks, such as preparing responses to government related agencies letters to immigrations and Yemenization.

Coordinates travel related matters such as passport validity, MRXUQH\ HOLJLELOLW\ XQGHU FRPSDQ\ SROLF\ LVVXH RI +,9 FHUWLÂżFDWHV availability of personal photographs and similar matters.

Maintains records for international and domestic travel, immigraWLRQ YLVDV DQG SDVVSRUW DQG /DERU RIÂżFH WDVNV DQG IXUQLVKHV WKH required weekly and monthly reports. Coordinates as necessary with H.R. Prepares weekly Immigration, yemenization status report relating to expatriate staff. Includes reviewing daily workload, assigning work and following up to ensure compliance with established procedures.

Minimum Requirements:

Public & Government Relations Supervisor Your Responsibilities: /LDLVRQ ZLWK YDULRXV *RYHUQPHQW DJHQFLHV 0LQLVWU\ RIÂżFLDOV that the Company deals with, setting up meeting appointments with the same and providing feedback to the HR Manager ,PR Superintendent about any issues or concerns raised.

Assisting PR & GR Superintendent in Visa processing, work permits. Liaise with Ministry of Labour and Immigration authorities as and when advised. &RRUGLQDWHV FRQĂ&#x20AC;LFW UHVROXWLRQ PHHWLQJV ,QFOXGHV DUUDQJLQJ meetings between appropriate company representatives and community or government authorities to discuss issues such as government policies, pipeline construction through a community, delays with ship loads, obstructing maintenance on a pipeline, oil on shore, etc.

Participate in the arrangements of the Companyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s special occasions and celebrations and document their activities including names of individuals hosting the same. Prepare and forward invitations to persons pre-approved to attend these functions.

Bachelorâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s degree in Business Administration or equivalent. \HDUV H[SHULHQFH RQ WKH VDPH SURÂżOH RU HTXLYDOHQW ([FHOOHQW FRPPXQLFDWLRQ VNLOOV FRXSOH ZLWK 06 2IÂżFH SURÂżFLHQF\ Self motivated, result oriented with a positive outlook and a clear focus on high quality performance.

Excellent report writing skills.

Positions are located in Yemen based on a local contract

Are you interested in joining us?

Please send your application to the following email address:

Info.recruitment.ye@omv.com

For position status please dial (+ 967) 01 433 111.

Notice to display until February 27, 2011.

OMV is an equal opportunity employer