RUSSIA’S (DIS-) INFORMATION ACTIVITIES AGAINST UKRAINE AFTER THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE SYRIAN CAMPAIGN EXECUTIVE SUMMARY PREPARED BY THE NATO STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE
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The executive summary highlights the main conclusions of the study Russia`s (dis-) information1 activities against Ukraine after the commencement of the Syrian campaign, commissioned by the NATO StratCom Centre of Excellence. The study was conducted by two research centres: Center for International Studies, Latvia and Centre for Russian Studies, Ukraine.
Main conclusions from research “The Dynamics of Russia’s Information Activities Against Ukraine during the Syria Campaign”: This report argues that the strategic goals of the Russian government’s propaganda are the following: - to promote Russia as a crucial player in the polycentric world in the process of international peace; - to claim Russia’s superiority over the US; - to prevent Ukraine’s transformation into being part of the external border of NATO and the European Union (EU); - to soften and, in the nearest future, achieve the lifting of the sanctions regime against Russia. The analysis reveals intensive propaganda signalling activity in English-speaking audio-visual platforms and a much lower level of propaganda in Russian-speaking media. Furthermore, the research found out that the news about the EU extending its sanctions against Russia (17th June 2015) was not covered in the Russian-speaking audio-visual platforms at all, while Englishspeaking media reached the highest level of signalling.
The overall aim of this study is to identify narratives and themes employed by Russia against Ukraine, assess the change of intensity of information activities and identify similarities/ differences with regard to intensity and topics of Russian information activities in Ukraine and in other countries of the region. The both researches covers the time period since the military engagement of Russia in Syria (30th September, 2015) and measures the intensity of Russia’s information activities as well as their content in comparison with both, the period ante and in other countries in the region. “The Dynamics of Russia’s Information Activities Against Ukraine during the Syria Campaign” Author: Center for International Studies (Latvia) Methodology: Qualitative and quantitative analyses - case study approach: content analysis and narrative analysis.
The level of dynamics of Russia`s propaganda against Ukraine2:
Sources: Audio-visual platforms - RT, Pervy kanal, Sputniknews, and information provided by EEAS Disinformation Review. Period under study: From February 2015 to March 2016.
1 Term “(dis-)information activities” is used in order to emphasize that information might be specially constructed based on lies, mixed truth, propaganda and manipulative techniques with intention to mislead audience.
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2 The interim goals of propaganda are coordinated and nonconflicting, and they manifest themselves in the following levels of dynamics: Messaging; Signalling; Engagement. Messaging is the lowest level of propaganda, and it involves the whole range of traditional communication media, to include pictures, text, and video, and all messaging technology: print, radio television, mobile phone, portable digital assistant, two-way pager, and so forth. Signalling is the next level of propaganda, and it is characterised by actions that also send messages. Signalling includes nonverbal messages that transmit signals about the intended course of action or attitude towards a particular issue or event.Engagement is the highest level of propaganda, and it shows a clear action that demonstrates a strong determination to achieve certain goals to make an impact on those who are being imposed on in order to be influenced. As the highest level of propaganda, engagement includes both previous levels – messaging and signalling. Russia’s information activities are analysed by indicating low (1), medium (2), or high (3) intensity of a particular level of propaganda in each case during the selected time-period.
Level of Russia’s propaganda against Ukraine. Russian - language media. 15 February 2015 – 15 March 2016 *
Level of Russia’s propaganda against Ukraine. English - language media. 15 February 2015 – 15 March 2016 *
* The charts show aggregated data of the levels of Russia’s propaganda appearing in the news during every month within the selected time period. The narrative of protecting Russia’s interests in Syria was used only by RT (English language); Pervy Kanal promoted Russia as a strong world player without which terrorism couldn’t be defeated and peace achieved.
Russian propaganda predominantly portrays the US to the Western audience as an enemy. However, for the Russian-speaking audience the US is portrayed as a neutral country that potentially can become an ally to resolve new global issues – the conflicts in Ukraine and Syria. An even more complex blurring of the boundaries between allies, neutrals and enemies was observed with regard to European countries, e.g., France.
In addition, the research traced remarkable differences in total propaganda activities for Russian and English speaking audiences. The finding that propaganda activities have decreased for the users of Russian-language audio‑visual platforms is significant. It indicates that Russia regards this audience as already won over, and that the highest level propaganda activities are no longer necessary for this region. With regard to the dynamics of strategic narratives, two main discursive strategies were traced: endarkenment of the audience and goal-oriented propaganda strategies. These strategies reveal a conflation of apparently conflicting facts, falsifications and repeated statements on geostrategic interests. The analysis reveals increased dynamics of strategic narratives towards the English-speaking audience. In regard to Ukraine, the main strategic narrative is related to the image of Ukraine as a weak, unsuccessful and dependent state.
The decreasing activity of strategic narratives spread by Russia to the Russian-speaking population in the region rather proves that it considers this part of society as won, and the propaganda struggle of the highest level continues for the Western audience. For the regional Russian-speaking audience, the image of the US, the EU and Ukraine as an enemy is already entrenched, and it ideologically splits the EU and non-EU societies. These processes are nurtured by the desperate wish of the West to quickly and peacefully solve the conflicts in Syria and Ukraine, because Russia uses this wish as a tool in its propaganda and global foreign strategy. 3
Russia’s propaganda on Ukraine. Regional audience. Frequency of strategic narratives. (Feb 2015 - Mar 2016)
Russia’s propaganda on Syria. Regional audience. Frequency of strategic narratives. (Feb 2015 - Mar 2016)
* Russian-speaking media was monitored. The chart shows aggregated data of the frequency of the five strategic narratives of Russia’s propaganda Russia’s propaganda on Ukraine. Western audience. Frequency of strategic narratives. (Feb 2015 - Mar 2016)
Russia’s propaganda on Syria. Western audience. Frequency of strategic narratives. (Feb 2015 - Mar 2016)
* English-speaking media was monitored. The chart shows aggregated data of the frequency of the five strategic narratives of Russia’s propaganda appearing in the selected time period. “Russia as one of the main players globally” “Russia’s superiority over the US” “Prevent Ukraine’s transformation into being part of the external border of NATO and the EU” “Ukraine as a bargaining object at the expense of eventual peace in Syria” “Necessity to soften and abolish the sanction regime” 4
c. drew different connections between Ukraine and the war in Syria and especially DAESH;
“Russian propaganda Concerning Ukraine During the Syrian Campaign: An Innovative Approach to Assess Information Activities”:
d. repeated a previously widely spread narrative about the illegal nature of Maidan, and the fascist government in power in Ukraine.
Author: Centre for Russian studies (Ukraine)
Narratives aimed at countries of the European Union strove to increase tension among European countries and between European countries and the United States of America, and to create the impression of growing sympathy towards and support for Russia in the region. Additionally, the narratives aimed at creating ideological clashes and distrust among countries within the European Union and painting a negative image of Ukraine.
Methodology: Qualitative and quantitative analyses, accompanied by innovative methodology of (dis-)information activities’ assessment - Bohush Pyramid of Influence method. Sources: EEAS Disinformation Review (October 2015 – March 2016); Russia Today; R24, Vesti.ru; Aif.ru; Ria.ru. Period under study: From June 2015 to May 2016.
It was revealed that according with the methodology of Bohush Pyramid of Influence (specific method of (dis-)informational assessment, which allows to assess different levels of the (dis-)information attempts and impact) the strongest impact is from (dis-) information activities at the first, ground level. At the same time the propaganda machine is constructed in a way which enables it to influence even well educated people, with logical and analytical ability and experience.
Main conclusions from research “Russian Propaganda During the Syrian Campaign: An Innovative Approach to Assess Information Activities”: During the Syrian campaign the (dis-)information activities of the Russian Federation concerning Ukraine dropped significantly. Key narratives and topics employed by Russia vis – a –vis Ukraine:
Before the period under research Ukraine occupied more than 30% of information flow for some of the analyzed sources (rt.com) and more than 20% from most of the others. With the official beginning of the Syrian campaign these numbers significantly dropped, up to three times compared with the 3 months before the
a. aimed to worsen relations between Ukraine and countries of the European Union; b. repeated and added new details to a previously actively exploited narrative on the illegal, outrageous, violent and aggressive behavior of Ukrainian battalions in the Donbas region; L4 Archetypical (group instincts, culture)
Implies the clash of cultures and identities. It is the level of architypes, cultural disputes, group and mass instincts stereotypes.
L3 Semantic (new stereotypes, manipulation of history)
Historical books and evidences are rewritten from the earliest times to nowadays. New maps are drawn, new historical evidences are fabricated and located in different “trustworthy”. Implies specific set of arguments and interpretations for every event. Specifically constructed arguments for each activity.
L2 Rational (argument picture) L1 Instinctive and emotional (fear, anxiety, shock)
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This level is obligatory and vital to any information influence. Murders, shock and fear are the key accents in the media. The critical thinking is absent or minimum.
Intensity of (dis-)information concerning Ukraine in the overall information dynamic from June 2015 - May 2016
Such (dis-)information policy creates a new paradigm where Russia is the new European ally, peacemaker and defender of democracy, unlike the USA.
Syrian campaign. The intensity of news with old narratives had dropped even more. The intensity of (dis-)information activities towards Ukraine increased after the termination of Russian Federation activities in Syria, taking a stable position of around 11% (average). Previously this average intensity number was around 22 %, which meant that every fourth (dis-) information entry in the sources under study was about Ukraine, but on May 2016 only every tenth one is.
Current research shows that decreased intensity of the (dis-)information activities against Ukraine is not a result of Russia failing to realize its goals in Ukraine. The decrease in intensity numbers is almost the same for every analyzed source, which would not be possible if free media forces were at work. Such similarities in the (dis-)information intensity highlight the controlled and systemic character of the (dis-)information activities, and serve as an explicit indicator of the lack of free speech in Russian media.
Despite preliminary assumptions, Ukraine should still be seen as one of the key targets of Russia’s information activities. The quantitative intensity of (dis-)information activities against Ukraine has decreased, but quality and diversity of the propaganda narratives have increased accordingly. Thus, Ukraine remains and, in the foreseeable future will remain among the main targets of Russian propaganda.
Russian propaganda is an almost completely independent process that does not rely on any external factors either in Ukraine or countries of the European Union. The Russian Federation can step up and tone down its (dis-)information activities at will – with its grip on media and resources at its disposal it is in an advantageous position compared to the targets of these activities.
The study revealed that the refugee crisis is not an independent narrative, but one of the key themes used by Russian Federation to increase tension between different countries within Europe and to create and strengthen negative attitudes towards the USA and countries of the Muslim world.
The NATO StratCom Centre of Excellence, based in Latvia, is a multinational, cross-sector organization which provides comprehensive analyses, advice and practical support to the alliance and allied nations. This is a product of the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence (NATO StratCom COE). It does not represent the opinions or policies of NATO. Š All rights reserved by the NATO StratCom COE, Riga November 2016 Cover photo: Christopher J. Fraser Flickr creative commons licence
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