Fire of Unknown Origin Leads to 3-engine Landing By LT Ryan McFeely Simultaneous, unrelated emergencies put training to the test

FIRE OF UNKNOWN ORIGIN LEADS TO 3-ENGINE LANDING

BY LT RYAN MCFEELY

ow-altitude, antisubmarine warfare (ASW) missions are the most rewarding and exciting for P-3 Orion aircrews. The missions also present the most challenging and critical regime of flight when dealing with emergencies and malfunctions. Proximity to water (as close as 200 feet) and intricate crew interactions throughout the entire plane intensify a sudden emergency or malfunction.

As a community, we train for these situations. We an NTS INOP light, indicating that our negativetailor our regular training events and qualification syltorque sensing system (which prevents the propellabi so that we can handle complex scenarios during ler from dangerously driving the engine) had failed critical phases of flight. Pilots and flight engineers are in some capacity. In accordance with NATOPS, we introduced early on to complex scenarios that test their secured the engine via the emergency-shutdown ability to prioritize aviating, navigating and communichecklist. Smoke and fumes continued to build in the cating. This is done all the while conducting concise cabin, and our TACCO called for us to continue with troubleshooting. In the back of the plane, NFOs and the FOUO checklist. Our original FOUO was now sensor operators are trained to quickly tackle emergencombined with an emergency shutdown. cies that demand robust crew resource management. To make matters worse, the aging P-3 threw a curve

The fire of unknown origin (FOUO) stands as the ball into the scenario. After we had secured the No. 1 most challenging of these emergencies, especially when engine and continued to handle the FOUO, the next operating down low. The P-3 is a labyrinth of electronic step on the checklist was securing main AC bus A. As racks with a multitude of buses and energized equipmy flight engineer secured it via its bus-monitoring ment. The key is quickly finding the source of the fire switch, we lost our monitorable essential AC (MEAC) and securing power to it. and start essential AC (SEAC) buses. We subsequently

One day my crew, Combat Aircrew 3, was conlost our heading indications, shaft horsepower (SHP) ducting an ASW training mission along the Gulf of gauges and TIT gauges among numerous other items on Oman. We’d been on-station for 45 minutes, with the those buses. We had lost more buses than we expected No. 1 engine secured for loiter. My TACCO (tacti– something else was amiss in the plane. cal coordinator, the senior NFO on board) saw fumes We were still in our climb, heading towards the building in the tube and initiated the FOUO checkStrait of Hormuz for an RTB. With the loss of navilist. With two coalition helicopters working with us at gation equipment, I put the plane into an orbit and a lower altitude, I initiated a climb to a safe altitude leveled off at 10,500 feet. The aircrew in the cabin and instructed my copilot (2P) and flight engineer to continued to investigate the source of the smoke and don their smoke masks. Passing 2,000 feet and at an fumes. They isolated them to the overhead section near acceptable speed of 200 knots, I called for my flight the stations for the TACCO and the navigator-commuengineer to restart the No. 1 engine. nicator, junior NFO (NAVCOM).

The FOUO wasn’t the only emergency we were P-3s are known for complex and complicated systems going to be faced with. During the restart we observed that demand thorough systems knowledge to diagnose

Smoke and fumes continued to build in the cabin, and our TACCO called for us to continue with the FOUO checklist.

Editor’s Note: This photo is for illustrative purposes only and does not depict the actual day of actual events.

and troubleshoot inflight malfunctions and emergencies. Therefore, one must have extensive knowledge of the aircraft to understand what to do when something goes wrong. As I concentrated on the flying the aircraft and my copilot handled the checklists, the flight engineers quickly diagnosed the culprit behind the surprise losses of the buses. A stuck relay did not allow back-up power sources to energize once the primary source was secured. By resetting a few circuit breakers, they quickly got the relay to de-energize. We regained the lost buses and associated navigation equipment.

Our troubles weren’t over. We were still flying with one engine secured and an unresolved FOUO. With main AC bus A secured, the crew in the cabin saw the smoke dissipating, so my TACCO called for the smokeand-fume-elimination checklist followed by the restoring-electrical-power checklist. Shortly thereafter, smoke began building again, and we did the FOUO checklist once more. Smoke and fumes built and dissipated several times; our crew executed procedures. The source was finally identified as the HF1 cooling fan. All power was then secured to HF1, and we saw no more smoke or fumes for the duration of the flight.

The compound emergency scenario was under control. The aircraft was stable with the malfunctioning engine secured and the source of the cabin fire located and secured. We opted to re-energize the secured main AC bus A to regain the monitored systems with it secured. We returned to base and had no further trouble, executing an uneventful 3-engine landing.

In a span of just a few minutes, my crew had handled a complex scenario consisting of simultaneous and unrelated emergencies. We had executed the FOUO and subsequent checklists multiple times, and we had handled an emergency engine shutdown accompanied by unexpected bus losses all while initially operating at low altitude.

As the P-3 airframe continues to age, new and complex malfunctions appear, demanding effective CRM and training that ensures aircrews are as prepared as possible for complex emergency scenarios. This is why we train for worst case scenarios that make every pilot think, “This will never happen to me.”

LT MCFEELY FLIES WITH VP-1

NO CALL , makes for a NMAC CLOSE CALL

BY ARMANDO DEGUZMAN

’m comfortable flying in Class D airspace, knowing that air traffic controllers have my 6 o’clock covered in helping to avoid a midair collision with another aircraft. You should be comfortable, too. Air traffic controllers deliver a valuable service by monitoring aircraft to provide aviators with radio calls notifying them of aircraft traffic in the immediate vicinity. This increases the pilot’s situational awareness.

Getting multiple helicopters and jet aircraft on the ground to sequence them into the GCA pattern is a challenge, especially at airbases where air traffic controllers receive their initial training and learn to sequence and maintain separation between dissimilar aircraft with different approach speeds in the GCA and landing pattern.

On one particular flight I didn’t feel comfortable with our controllers. The weather was broken layers at 4,000 to 6,000 feet with visibility at 8 to 10 miles. I was on a proficiency flight with the squadron XO and was supposed to acquire annual instrument and PAR/ ASR approach minimums. We were on final approach to decision height on my third approach when the GCA controller asked us to switch to tower.

With the aircraft at 100 feet AGL and 100 knots, I switched to the tower frequency. I notified the tower controller I was a GCA hand-off for a touch-and-go. The tower controller instructed me to fly runway heading. Then I was instructed to climb to 800 feet and at 2 DME, turn left to 240 degrees. After that, I was to climb to 1500 feet and contact departure control.

I read back the instructions to the tower controller. When I read, “Contact departure control,” the tower controller said “Read it back correctly, and then contact departure.” So I repeated it, switching to departure control. Upon departure contact, I notified the controller I was missed approach off the duty runway passing 500 feet for 800 feet. The departure controller acknowledged.

At 1 DME I thought I felt and heard a rumble on the right side of the aircraft. I figured that the aft cabin door had somehow opened and was vibrating in the wind stream. I asked the XO to take controls of the aircraft so I could turn around to check the door. When I turned, I saw the belly of a T-38 with about a 30-degree right bank. It turned away at about 150 feet and went into a wings-level climb.

U.S. Navy Air Traffic Controller 3rd Class Nichole Kitts surveys the airfield from the air traffic control tower at Naval Air Station North Island, Calif., Oct. 16, 2013. (Photo by MC3 Bradley J. Gee) Editor’s Note: This photo is for illustrative purposes only and does not depict the actual day of events.

My copilot was more vocal about the near-midair collision with expletives I have no clue how to spell. I asked the departure controller if they had the aircraft that had just passed us on our starboard side. The controller mentioned that there was a radar signal about a mile ahead of our position, but that he wasn’t in contact with the aircraft.

The XO took over communications and expressed to the controller he will call the tower supervisor when we landed. Further discussions revealed the T-38 aircraft was on tower frequency and was performing touchand- go landings and had requested a departure to the training area. On his departure he was not made aware of the GCA traffic. The pilot fortunately made visual contact with our aircraft and immediately banked to the right to avoid collision.

The controller was under training and the tower supervisor acknowledged the event and ensured us training would be conducted with emphasis on communication and dissimilar aircraft spacing.

This could have been our last flight, a fatal midair collision with an aircraft coming from behind us. But it wasn’t our last flight due to luck and, a superlative scan, quick thinking and reactive maneuvering of the T-38 pilot.

My advice to pilots: anytime you fly, (and especially when in the Class D airspace) keep your head on a swivel and scan the horizon to avoid a NO CALL, NMAC CLOSE CALL.

ARMANDO DEGUZMAN IS THE SAFETY MANAGER OF HX-21.