Getting Tool Control Under Control

Getting Tool Control

Under Control

By Dan Steber

The stories begin to sound the same: Missing tool is found after an aircraft is recalled from mission. Lost tool causes an NJP and loss of rank. Tool FODs engine. And the list goes on. We can and must do better.

Lost tools cost us money, time and readiness. I’m not going to bore you with specific passages from a host of manuals and instructions. Rather, I simply want you to know the costs we incur each year in missing, lost, broken, and worn tools. Some estimates say that each year we lose thousands of tools, tens of thousands of manhours searching for lost tools, and spend more then $1 million hunting for and replacing tools. The fact that we discuss it a lot, worry about it regularly, and train for it frequently doesn’t mean we can back off or take it easy.

This issue of Mech has several stories that relate to tool control. Some of them are not the typical situations, but they show how broad the program is and demonstrate the problems maintainers face each day. Read the MO’s story on the next page. He offers great insight from his nearly 30-year career.

I also ask you to look at photos of damage done in the past and continue to happen each year. The next time you get ready to pencil whip an ATAF, think twice, and remember these photos, stories and lessons learned in the past. The crime isn’t losing a tool…it’s in not reporting it or following through until you find it. Do your part to maintain positive tool control, and you’ll save time, money and lives. Tools can bring down aircraft, like this hex wrench found in the wreckage of an A-6 Intruder.

Missing tools end up in the strangest places. Can you fi nd them all?

Tool Control and Safety: How I Lost My Hair

By Cdr. Bert Ortiz

During my maintenance-officer tour at the Naval Safety Center, I have visited and worked with many Navy and Marine Corps aviation units around the world—both organizational and intermediate levels. Providing safety surveys and culture workshops gives me a unique perspective on positive and negative trends, as well as a feel on how units perceive safety in the work place. I want to share some experiences and thoughts as we enter the New Year. Before addressing tool control specifically, I need to explain the view I get through our safety surveys—not the online type that some people confuse with my team visits. The command safety assessment (CSA) and maintenance climate assessment survey (MCAS) are online and provide a totally different but nonetheless important feedback to a unit’s CO. A safety survey provides the unit with a one-day, objective snapshot of safety posture in a command. These are direct, physical surveys of units that my senior men and women do about 150 times each year.

We cover a unit’s operations, maintenance, training, NATOPS, and aeromedical programs, and each area is assessed objectively and directly. I truly believe these surveys help not only the unit’s leadership but also the men and women actually fixing stuff. Why do I believe it? Your feedback tells me it’s good and effective.

Tool control is a specific area of the survey, and my analysts closely look at it. This issue of Mech features various stories on the topic. Some stories are typical, and we read about them regularly. Others are different, like checking in and out hazmat, or counting dummy rounds, as we do tools.

I have my own stories, like the time I had to recall my skipper on his last flight before his change of command. A tool had been lost the previous day, but we could not trace it to a tool box or to a JCN or MSN. We had no idea where it could have been used. The aircraft already was flying when it was reported missing. After an all-hands, thorough search, we stopped everything. A technician found it at home in a dungaree pocket.

During my white-hat days, a long time ago, I found an open-end wrench stuck in a rib of an aircraft while doing maintenance on flight controls. Because it had been etched, I knew it was from a depot where the aircraft had been reworked. No record of that lost tool was found! I often think about the disastrous effects it could have had if the tool had migrated to the wrong area. That’s what the tool-control program is about. We must know about missing and broken tools to keep them from causing mishaps.

The tool-control program continues to haunt us all. I am amazed at the amount of issues we find in every unit with this seemingly difficult-to-manage program. But what is so difficult? The secret is controlling our tools, and I’ll be blunt: You HAVE to lead by example on this one. If you do not inspect your tool box religiously, or lick and stamp the CDI/supervisor’s tool inspection and shift inventory, maintainers will develop bad habits. What do I mean by inspecting tools? Don’t just see if they are missing; pick them up to make sure nothing is broken. Many controls exist to help you, including inventory sheets and logs. They are integral parts of the program. Don’t deviate from accepted practice, or it becomes engrained, and bad behavior develops, or becomes “cultured.” “Johnny never checks, so why should I?” Or, “I’m just the new guy and don’t want to rock the boat, even though I know to check before and after every job.” “I’ll just do it when I think it’s really important, or just before I leave on liberty.” Too often, it’s forgotten then, too.

You may laugh, but these scenarios do happen, and you are kidding yourself if you think it doesn’t. We see it daily. And the fix really is simple: You must have tight control of these items while working on aircraft or in your spaces. I’d include it as a hazard item and add it to your deliberate ORM list. Make it expected practice. The alternative is wasted time, money and, potentially, lives.

Cdr. Ortiz is the Naval Safety Center’s maintenance officer and has served the Navy for nearly 30 years.

Who’s the Dumm y Now?

By AME1 (AW) Jason Deeken

Flight ops aboard USS John C. Stennis (CVN-74) had been going smoothly for nearly three months in the Gulf of Oman. Flight-deck personnel had fallen into a good daily and nightly routine—one that made for safe and successful operations. It stayed that way until a simple but different tool-control issue struck.

One regular, routine action is uploading and downloading ordnance from our Hornets parked on the flight deck. Anytime ordnance is involved, the job is regimented and attention to detail is critical because no room for error exists. The A1-F18AE-LWS-000 is the publication used for airborne weapons and stores. When followed, it leaves no room for misinterpretation.

Our problem had started several months ago, when a gun made its way to AIMD, with rounds still in the drum, causing the command to have a QAR present during downloads to make sure the gun is empty. On this particular night, I was present for a gun download on elevator No. 2. The night’s flight schedule was done, and the AOs had had to transfer 500 rounds from the gun of aircraft 314 to a transporter. After the gun was emptied, the transporter was moved away, and technicians started the download verification. They placed

Who’s the Dumm y Now?

one dummy round in the transfer unit, closed the gate, and began to cycle the gun.

When I had witnessed gun downloads in the past, two dummy rounds always had been used, which is what the pub said to use. I asked the AO night-shift supervisor what dictated whether one or two rounds were used for verification. He said sometimes one was used, sometimes two, but no real logic existed. It didn’t seem to make any difference to me, either. One or two rounds, what did it matter? It was obvious the gun was empty.

However, the LWS-000 states, “The use of two dummy rounds will ensure gun system is completely empty of ammunition when cycled completely through the gun system.” I raised this point with the QALPO the next day, asking for input from him and my fellow QARs. It was clear and unanimously decided that the procedure in the pub was what we should be using. We passed that info to the AO LPO, who also agreed.

Then a problem arose; the other dummy round could not be found.

After an extensive search of the shop, all 12 of our aircraft’s guns, and AIMD, the round still was MIA. A survey of the missing tool began, training on tool control was administered, and the importance of using pubs was stressed.

Downloading the gun seemed to be a no-brainer to the Blue Diamond QARs and the technicians who actually performed the task. However, had all of us been familiar with the procedures in the publication, we would have saved ourselves dozens of man-hours in a search for a tool that still remains missing. This situation made us all realize the importance of getting into the MIMs, knowing the details of every job, and doing good maintenance, no matter how easy a job seems.

Petty Officer Deeken works in quality assurance at VFA146.

Wrenched

Into Trouble

By AM2(AW) Brandon Green J ust another day in Afghanistan: I arrived at work and found we had three downed jets. That left only one jet for the flight schedule, but we needed to have at least two to make our flights scheduled for the next day. We got busy. Before the day was done, me and two of my guys would learn a lesson that I thought never would happen to me.

Aircraft 523’s engine was out, and my shop was trying to fix a leak in the wishbone panel on the keel. I had a couple guys working that gripe, and another person doing dailies and up gripes. On another jet, all we had was an all-shops turn, and then it would be operational. I was running around trying to keep track of all the gripes and the job on aircraft 523. Shortly before the all-shops turn on the first aircraft, my guys finished the maintenance on 523. The only work that remained on that job was doing a quick leak check and installing a panel.

Navy photo by PH2 Casey Hutchens

Just as I was going out to leak check 523, maintenance called for the all-shops turn. I decided I could complete the leak check before running out for the all-shops turn. I did that check and looked inside the panel. I told my guys to have QA look at the panel before installing it, then ran out to the line for the all-shops turn.

When I got back from that turn, my two guys were done with 523, and they had put away all their tools. I trusted that someone had looked at their tools. I didn’t think anything else of the job. I told maintenance that 523 and the all-shops turn were done. I then sat down and signed off the two MAFs.

The mechs were working hard to install the engine in 523, so we could try to have it turned before day check came in. As the night went on, they did finish, and we got the turn done on 523. We felt good because we had three jets up for the next day’s flight schedule. When day check came in, we checked the tools and did

pass down as usual. After the maintenance meeting, the night checkers and I headed back to camp to get some sleep before we started the whole routine over again.

It seemed like I just had gotten to sleep when someone started yelling my name and saying we were missing a tool. I thought I was having a bad dream, but it was worse. I arose, got dressed, and started walking to work. On my way in, I tried to remember everything we had done the night before. How could I have lost a tool and missed it at our morning ATAF?

When I got to work, my LPO pulled me out of the shop and told me they had found the tool, but only after they had recalled all the airborne jets from combat missions. When 523 returned, the mechs removed the tailpipe door, pulled back the heat shield in the area where we had worked, and found the wrench. It was a one and a quarter-inch bonnie wrench. That moment marked one of the worst days in my life.

My division chief, the QAS, and the QAO counseled me. They pulled my CDI qualification for 30 days, wrote up my first report chit, and assigned me EMI. It was an excruciating long waiting game to see if the command was going to send me to captain’s mast or handle it at the chief level.

They decided to let my chief handle it, but the harshest penalty was that I recognize that I had sent a By AD1 Patricio Florendo

This story is going to read like many others in this magazine—it sounded familiar as I wrote it. That’s the funny part about naval aviation maintenance. There are no new mistakes, just the same ones, with different people making them over and over again. I know because I made a simple and stupid one.

Our squadron was preparing for an upcoming detachment to the Japanese island of Iwo Jima. It was crunch time, and the maintenance pace was hectic. Part of our workload included removing two engines, with the potential for two more later that day. The jet flying with a tool on board. The fact the aircraft were on a combat mission to protect ground troops killed my pride.

Ever since this incident, I have been a tool freak. I check tools all the time. If my guys leave tools lying around or have more tools in the jet then they have hands, I give them a really hard time and make them fix the problem before I walk away. I also no longer trust anyone with tools—no matter who they are. If they open a box, I make sure it gets checked when they are done using it. Even if they put it away when I’m not around, I go back, pull out the tools, and check them.

I was one of those people who said “nothing bad ever will happen to me.” This mistake has helped me, in a weird way, because I no longer am complacent. I don’t think I ever will lose another tool because that pain is something I don’t want to face again.

This incident put me in the spotlight where no maintainer wants to be. Like other stories in Mech, I learned the hard way. Take my lesson to heart. Make sure you are doing required tool checks, and don’t trust anyone, even if they are senior to you. It’s your reputation and the safety of the aircrew on the line.

Petty Officer Green works in the airframes shop at VAQ

Lost, Missing, Broken, or Worn

142. engine changes were made more difficult because the supporting activity had only one engine trailer (ETU110 E/F) and adapter. To make matters worse, our sister squadron in the air wing already had checked out that piece of ground support equipment (GSE). I called them and arranged to get the trailer after they were finished.

Later that afternoon, I picked up the engine trailer and gave the sister squadron a tool tag. I did this because they originally had checked it out from AIMD, and I simply was borrowing it. The first shortcut had occurred because I was in a hurry.

Although not really a tool, the crank handle for this engine trailer must be accounted for before and after use.

To make matters worse, I didn’t do a preoperational inspection on the engine trailer. Of course, I didn’t have an SE license for this piece of gear, either.

As is true in most other stories, we initially weren’t having any problems. However, when we nearly were finished removing the engine, the spider crank was very difficult to turn. This turning is necessary to align the engine aft mount pin with the aft engine support— even if only minor adjustments are required. That tightly turning crank should have been our first clue that something was wrong, but we continued. Again, this part sounds too familiar.

One of my AD3s broke off the handle while trying to turn it, another clue that things weren’t right. Again, though, we pressed on. We ignored better judgment because of a desire to get the job done.

Another AD3 took over and started to adjust the spider, and the next thing we heard was the sound of another handle breaking. At this point, common sense finally prevailed. We came to a complete stop to make sure we had all the parts accounted for. A spider crank has four handles, and we had broken two of them, accounting for the broken parts. However, we noticed that a third handle had been broken on the spider, and that handle was missing. I asked the two AD3s if either one knew where the third broken handle was. They said it already was missing when I had accepted the trailer. Of course, that skipped pre-op inspection would have highlighted that fact…another strike.

I returned to our sister squadron and retrieved the third handle. I then returned the broken piece of GSE to AIMD. Needless to say, they were very surprised when I showed up with an ETU-110, carrying three broken handles. They also weren’t too happy because our squadron hadn’t checked out that piece of gear through them. As I left AIMD, the supervisor told me they would be submitting a misuse-and-abuse report.

My mistakes were obvious. First, I went to check out a piece of SE that I was not licensed to use. Second, I did not perform a proper pre-operational inspection. Had I done a static inspection and functional test, I would have seen that the ETU-110 already was damaged. Finally, I acquired a piece of SE without using proper issuing and transfer procedures. The support activity owns the ETU-110. Giving a tool tag to our sister squadron to take possession of that piece of gear doesn’t keep AIMD informed of the whereabouts of their gear and doesn’t properly update the transfer paperwork.

Bypassing established maintenance procedures jeopardizes equipment, safety, and your reputation. It is easy to lose sight of the big picture when we get so focused on accomplishing the task. Shortcuts or laziness, even on routine tasks, leads to bad maintenance or worse. In this case, it would have been only a matter of time before the engine would have rolled off the trailer. I was lucky and escaped with a report and damaged reputation. Learn from my mistake; it’s the easiest way to learn.

Petty Officer Florendo works in the power plants shop at VFA-27.

Paint Burns

By AE2 Mike Tano

The work shift quickly was coming to an end, and it was time for an ATAF. I was assigned to return some hazmat (paint) to the tool-room counter. I noticed the lid on one of the cans was not closed. I was wearing the required gloves but no goggles when I decided to force the lid closed.

I soon realized that wasn’t a good idea—after a drop of paint flew into my right eye. I ran to the closest eyewash station and flushed my eye for more than 15 minutes. A few minutes later, I grabbed the MSDS and went to the hospital for medical attention.

Since that incident, I have had time to think about what I should have done differently. From now on, I always will wear my PPE, no matter how minor the work seems. As the adage goes, “It is better to be safe than sorry.”

I have learned my lesson, and, in the future, I will do whatever it takes to educate my shipmates, as well as my family and friends. Looking back on the situation, I realize I could have lost my vision. My view on the importance of ORM has changed completely. I’m thankful safety programs are in place to prevent similar situations. Yet, it is up to the individual to make the right decision and wear the right PPE.

Petty Officer Tano works in the AE shop at HS-2.

Crane Gets the on Maintainers

By AD1(AW) Jude Ezedike

It was a cold day aboard NAS Jacksonville, Fla. We mustered at 0645—the usual time, held the maintenance meeting, and did a FOD walkdown on the flight line and in the hangar. That’s were normalcy stopped.

Red Lion 615 was in PMI. The NADEP crew needed to remove the No. 2 input module to repair panels beneath that area. Maintenance control tasked us to remove it, so I gathered my crew and headed to the PMI hangar. Because of the aircraft spot, the CAT III crane in the hangar could not reach it. We ended up having to use the utility crane—more commonly known as the seat crane.

I did a pre-operational inspection on the crane, and everything looked good. I signed the 52 card and got to work. We unbolted the input module, strapped it, and hooked it up to the crane. The component was lowered to an awaiting pallet on the hangar deck. We checked tools and removed the FOD from the work area.

We now were ready to stow the crane. I was the only person qualified to operate it, and none of us had used this support equipment since 2004. We followed all the necessary stowage procedures but missed one simple step: The cable remained in tension and hooked to the bar. As soon as we pulled the pin to the lower bar, the boom immediately came crashing down. The pin bracket on the bottom was bent and had created a large dent on the bar assembly. I never thought such a thing could happen. I was very thankful no one was hurt.

Clearly, the accident could have been prevented had we done some refresher training before using the equipment. We should have asked questions about the proper stowage of the crane. After reading the publication, I found out the cable should be completely out of tension while lowering the bar. I further learned the pin should not be pulled whenever the cable is in tension.

We all learned valuable lessons that day. As the supervisor, I should have made everyone read the book and review the requirements for the equipment, since none of us had used it for a long time.

Petty Officer Ezedike works in the power plants shop at HS-15.