Pushing the Limits of ORM:
The Cross-Country That Took an Extra Week By Maj. Jesse Janay, USMC
t wasn’t a CAVU day, but we had 1000/3 to launch on our four-day, cross-country from New River, N.C. to Yuma, Ariz. Our squadron planned to launch six AH-1Ws and four UH-1Ns on a ferry flight for the fall WTI (weaponstactics-instructor) class. Our section was the “tail end charlie” with the maintenance detachment and parts. Everyone else had launched a day earlier, and we were gearing up to go. As we prepped to launch, a flurry of activity surrounded our aircraft, and everyone felt a perceived pressure to launch. I recognized this pressure and wondered, “What’s the hurry? Is someone’s life in danger?” Once I realized it was a self-induced stress and critical items possibly could be skipped, I told everyone to stop, take a breath, and proceed in a safe, expeditious manner. We launched without a hitch. As we pushed westward to our first stop, the weather didn’t develop as forecasted. The conditions had dropped to 500/1, and we recognized the hazards of IMC, low altitude, and obstacles. We slowed down to mitigate the risks and called out all towers. We also just had passed a small civilian airport and identified it as a divert option, in case conditions worsened. As we pressed on, though, the weather improved. The next 22
two days through Nashville, San Antonio, and Midland went without a hiccup, except for an engine chip light on deck at Knoxville (it just was fuzz). On day four’s first leg, from Midland to Las Cruces, our aircraft decided it didn’t want to fly anymore. As we crossed the vast expanses of nothingness in central Texas, a torque split that was within limits went out of limits. Within one minute after we recognized, troubleshot, and discussed our plan, the combininggearbox-pressure gauge fluctuated 30 to 40 psi and out of limits. We had rough terrain off the nose, so I turned away from it, and my co-pilot broke out the pocket NATOPS —there are no immediate action items. While troubleshooting the emergency, I told lead we had a problem and requested a steer to the closest airport. NATOPS states this was a “land as soon as possible” emergency, which is defined as “the first site at which a safe landing can be made.” Well, there were no roads, no houses—nothing in sight. Our emergency had no secondaries, and I thought about that small quote at the beginning of the NATOPS, “… it (NATOPS) is not a substitute for sound judgment… available facilities… adverse terrain… may require modification of the procedures contained herein.” Approach
