Beyond Politics Spring 2019 by Beyond Politics

beyond politics

Acknowledgments The 2019 edition of the Beyond Politics journal was a collaborative project made possible by several dedicated individuals. First and foremost, we would like to thank Carolina Arroyo, Associate Director of Undergraduate Studies in the Department of Political Science. As our faculty advisor, Ms. Arroyo provided invaluable support and advice throughout all stages of the journalâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s creation this year. We appreciate greatly her commitment to give undergraduates a platform to share their research. Furthermore, we wish to extend our thanks to all the students who submitted their work. We believe their work reflects the intellectual creativity of Notre Dameâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s undergraduate students, which we strive to exhibit and encourage. Lastly, many thanks to the editorial board for all their work this year. Though a small team, the editors worked hard to make the journal happen, and for that we are grateful.

2019 Editorial Board Editors-in-Chief Lauren Lemaignen – Economics and Political Science, 2020 Alex Yom – Political Science, 2020 Associate Editors Una Cooper – History and Political Science, 2021 Eleanor Gamble – Political Science and Spanish, 2021 Katie Malik – Political Science and Economics, 2021 Michael Marotta – Political Science, 2021 Michael Sitzer – Political Science, CDT, and Business Economics, 2021 Andrew Slattery – Program of Liberal Studies, 2020 Ryan Vazza – Political Science and Business Economics, 2021 Ursula Yu – Political Science and Economics, 2021

Table of Contents Post-Soviet Media: Russia’s Gradual Authoritarian Crackdown on Journalists Evan DaCosta……………………………………………………………….4 Transitional Justice Mechanisms: Can Mexico Overcome Organized Crime? Marcela Baquerizo Coello…………………………………………………..9 Cleaning Up Our Act in Space Lisa Michelini……………………………………………………………….13 A Complicated History: U.S.-U.K. Relations Sana Sherali…………………………………………………………………15 The Impact of Rural Consciousness in Illinois State Politics Collin Gortner……………………………………………………………….21 Religion in the Public Square: A Tocquevillian Response to Rawls John Henry Hobgood………………………………………………………..29 A Seed that Never Grew: An Essay Against Abortion Maura Bradley………………………………………………………………37 The Voice for Choice Anonymous…………………………………………………………………39 The Impracticable War John Hale …………………………………………………………………..41 The Myth of the Chosen Nation and American Foreign Policy Nicholas Grandpre…………………………………………………………44 Challenging International Stereotypes: The Italian Mafia Maria Palazzolo……………………………………………………………52 Interview Megan Gallagher…………………………………………………………..60

Post-Soviet Media: Russia’s Gradual Authoritarian Crackdown on Journalists Evan DaCosta Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the treatment of journalists and censorship of the press has been an issue of contention in Russia. Russian journalists regularly turn up dead under suspicious circumstances, and the incidents often make international headlines. However, in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet collapse, the news media had an unprecedented degree of freedom in reporting the news. In this paper, I will argue that despite early journalistic freedoms in the contemporary Russian state, there has been a trend towards authoritarianism and government repression of the news media, especially when it comes to criticism of the state and government officials. When studying Russian journalistic practice, “the stifling of press freedom is the dominant framework of these analyses.”1 I will analyze legislation aimed at the news media, Russian government reaction to events such as the murder of Russian journalist Anna Politkovskaya, and case studies of Russian journalists who have been killed. In order to understand the authoritarian trends in Russian journalism, we must first have an idea of what, exactly, the term “authoritarian” means in this context, especially when compared to what a theoretically “democratic” free press would look like. For the purposes of this paper, I define authoritarianism (in a journalistic context) as a government that actively works to silence journalists, represses criticism of the state and its leaders, and has a direct or indirect role in what journalistic outlets publish (or don’t). Journalism in a democratic context would mean a free press and free speech, uninhibited by the state, where journalists are free to criticize both the state and its leaders without fear of retribution or retaliation, and where the government has no role in determining what journalists choose to publish. I will argue that despite early advancements towards democratic journalism, Russian journalism today is subject to quasi-authoritarian rule by Putin, and this trend will continue in the foreseeable future. I will also argue that even though contemporary Russian journalism is more democratic than it was in the Soviet period, that fact is fast changing. The Yeltsin Period: the Aftermath of Communism Following the collapse of the communist system, the Russian media had an unprecedented degree of freedom. As journalists could suddenly choose what to publish, they became the “fourth estate” in post-Soviet Russia. As a result, journalists began digging into issues that mattered to the Russian people, namely abuse of privilege by the nomenklatura during the Soviet years. One of the earliest codifications of freedom of the 1

Chupin, I., & Daucé, F. (2017). The Practice of Political Journalism: Comparing Russia, France, and Germany. Laboratorium. Russian Review of Social Research,9(2), p. 5.

press in Russia came with the 1993 constitution under Yeltsin, “officially banning censorship and granting freedom of expression.”2 This new freedom to criticize was a long stretch from the old Soviet-style journalism, in which newspapers served primarily to spread Communist Party talking points, propaganda, and Party-related news. While this new freedom was welcome news for many journalists, it came with a caveat: the state no longer funded media outlets. “As is well known, the privatization of mass media in Russia coincided with a protracted economic crisis and a prolonged period of political instability and uncertainty.”3 Instead of closing down, however, new media owners turned to the few businessmen who did make significant money for funding: the oligarchs. Because of this lack of funding, “one could claim that in the 1990s there was no real need for a separate organization to censor the Russian mass media, inasmuch as there were no longer any printed mass media at all, so precipitously had print runs decline, especially after shock therapy began in January 1992.”4 As a result, journalists became political tools of the oligarchs looking to secure their own political power. As far as the state was concerned, Boris Yeltsin slowly began restricting journalistic freedoms in response to media coverage of the Chechen wars. While “the Russian press was relatively independent between 1993 and 1995 . . . this chapter came to a close when the Chechen campaign demonstrated the way in which media can put uncomfortable pressure on the government.”5 Yeltsin responded to unflattering coverage of the Chechen campaign with Federal Law No. 7-FZ, “On Rules for Coverage by State Mass Media of the Activity of Bodies of State Power”, which obligated “state-owned media to disseminate in full reports and statements by government officials.”6 At this point, it would be unfair to say that the Russian government displayed authoritarian characteristics towards the media, as it was still on a democratic trend, especially given its recent Soviet history. However, this trend came to a halt when Vladimir Putin came to power in 2000. Vladimir Putin: Authoritarian Restrictions of the Press When Vladimir Putin assumed office, he began an immediate crackdown on dissident journalists. He pushed through several laws that allowed mechanisms for the Russian state to shut down newspapers and media outlets (see: Federal Law 114-FZ) 2

Jackson, C. (2016). Legislation as an Indicator of Free Press in Russia. Problems of Post-Communism,63(5-6), p. 358. 3 Roudakova, N. (2009). Journalism as “Prostitution”: Understanding Russias Reactions to Anna Politkovskayas Murder. Political Communication,26(4), p. 418. 4

Dewhirst, M. (2002). Censorship in Russia, 1991 and 2001. The Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics,18(1), p. 26. 5 Jackson, C. (2016). Legislation as an Indicator of Free Press in Russia. Problems of Post-Communism,63(5-6), p. 358. 6

Jackson, C. (2016). Legislation as an Indicator of Free Press in Russia. Problems of Post-Communism,63(5-6), p. 359.

early in his tenure, and has openly admitted that the popular Russian news media outlet, Russia Today, “is funded by the government, so it cannot help but reflect the Russian government’s official position.”7 After Putin’s first year in office, “the Glasnost Defence Fund reported on 13 January 2001 that 16 journalists died in Russia in 2000 as a result of their professional activities, five had disappeared and 73 had been physically attacked for defaming the ‘wrong’ people.”8 A prominent characteristic of authoritarianism includes government control of the media as its own propaganda service and intimidation of journalists; the Russian government has a direct role in RT, Rossiskaya Gazeta, and other media outlets. It is well known in Russia that criticism of Putin’s Kremlin can land an outlet in hot water. In fact, Novaya Gazeta, “one of the last independent news outlets in Russia,”9 recently received a severed goat’s head and funeral wreath addressed to the reporter and “traitor” Denis Korotkov, a critic of Putin’s government. Following the antigovernment protests in Russia between 2011-2012, internet and press censorship has steadily increased, indicating a trend towards authoritarianism.10 According to Roudakova, “the Russian state under Putin has shown no interest in protecting journalism as a group: this includes silent approval of a growing number of lawsuits against journalists, continued support of criminal punishment for libel, the passing of new laws that make incriminating journalists easier . . . and lack of enthusiasm for solving the crimes already committed against journalists.”11 Although Putin may not directly control every media outlet, his disregard for crimes against journalists coupled with legislation targeting free press points to his authoritarian tendencies. Case Studies One of the most prominent examples of the murder of a Russian journalist was the infamous killing of Anna Politkovskaya. Politkovskaya had been covering government action in Chechnya, and had been “threatened, jailed, forced into exile, and poisoned during her career, CPJ research shows” before she was found gunned down in her Moscow apartment in 2006.12 Vladimir Putin’s reaction to the murder was particularly chilling, and he stated “Anan Politkovskaya’s political influence was quite insignificant inside Russia. I believe her murder did more damage to the Russian authorities than her

Jackson, C. (2016). Legislation as an Indicator of Free Press in Russia. Problems of Post-Communism,63(5-6), p. 361. 8

Dewhirst, M. (2002). Censorship in Russia, 1991 and 2001. The Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics,18(1), p. 29. 9 Committee to Protect Journalists, Oct. 18, 2018. 10

Nisbet, E. C., Kamenchuk, O., & Dal, A. (2017). A Psychological Firewall? Risk Perceptions and Public Support for Online Censorship in Russia*. Social Science Quarterly,98(3), p. 960. 11 Roudakova, N. (2009). Journalism as “Prostitution”: Understanding Russias Reactions to Anna Politkovskayas Murder. Political Communication,26(4), p. 425. 12

Committee to Protect Journalists, Anna Politkovskaya

publications ever did.”13 According to Roudakova, there was a minimal reaction from the Russian public over the murder of Politkovskaya, despite international protests in front of Russian embassies; “other journalists . . . went almost as far as to lay the blame for the murder on Politkovskaya herself.”14 Considering the history of Soviet journalism, this type of self-censorship and desire to stay out of trouble is very prominent in Russian journalism today. I count self-censorship as a characteristic of journalism repressed by authoritarianism, as journalists self censor in a self-preservation effort. Another example of a murdered Russian journalist who was killed under mysterious circumstances is the case of Mikhail Leslin. Officially considered to be an accident, the death of Leslin was considered very suspicious among international journalistic scholars. Found dead in his D.C. hotel room, the FBI ruled that he had died from a drunken fall, despite “blunt force trauma to the head” and injuries to his neck, arms, torso, and legs.15 Leslin had been widely considered to be Vladimir Putin’s “media czar” before falling out of favor with the leader. While these two cases are obviously not concrete evidence for authoritarianism in Russian journalism, if we consider these cases alongside Russian censorship laws as well as the Soviet history and tradition of repression of the free press, we can begin to form a clear picture of the true state of journalism in Russia today. Counter Arguments Despite censorship and state control of media in Russia, some argue that there is, in fact, a democratic trend and reason for hope for journalists in Russia, especially when taking into account the history of journalism in the Soviet Union. Compared to Stalin’s gulags, contemporary Russian repression of critical journalists seems to offer hope for a possible democratic tendency in the field. Independent, individual blog authors are free to publish their blogs online and circulate their ideas on the Internet. Similarly, Russians have access to social media platforms like Twitter, which are often seen by contemporary scholars as vehicles for information dissemination. However, despite this relative freedom compared to the Soviet era, I still believe that the free press, as an institution, is subject to authoritarianism. While blog authors are free to publish their blogs, they must register with the government if their viewership exceeds 3,000 readers a month.16 The newfound freedom that journalists experienced in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet collapse is being fast erased, as “legislation tightening regulations over media outlets has 13

Roudakova, N. (2009). Journalism as “Prostitution”: Understanding Russias Reactions to Anna Politkovskayas Murder. Political Communication,26(4), p. 412-413. 14

Roudakova, N. (2009). Journalism as “Prostitution”: Understanding Russias Reactions to Anna Politkovskayas Murder. Political Communication,26(4), p. 413. 15 Simon, S. (2018, April 21). Why Do Russian Journalists Keep Falling? Retrieved from https://www.npr.org/ 2018/04/21/604497554/why-do-russian-journalists-keep-falling 16

Jackson, C. (2016). Legislation as an Indicator of Free Press in Russia. Problems of Post-Communism,63(5-6), p. 361.

become more frequent and more consistently the norm”.17 It is for these reasons that the argument for democratic trends in Russian journalism should not be taken seriously. Conclusion While the Russian press is certainly more democratic than it was before 1991, there has been an increasing trend towards authoritarian treatment of journalists and media outlets, especially throughout the Putin years. I predict that this trend will carry on as Putin continues to consolidate power and Russian journalists continue to turn up dead. In the wake of Saudi Arabian journalist Jamal Khashoggi’s death, “Moscow has sought to downplay the case and largely refused to go beyond acknowledging official Saudi statements.”18 This apparent impartiality and refusal to condemn the Saudi Arabian government involvement in the murder of a dissident journalist seems to be in line with historic Russian treatment of dissident journalists, including Anna Politkovskaya. All things considered, Russian journalists will continue to deal with authoritarian trends despite having more freedom than they once did under Soviet rule.

Jackson, C. (2016). Legislation as an Indicator of Free Press in Russia. Problems of Post-Communism,63(5-6), p. 361. 18

Richard Hall Beirut @_richardhall. (2018, October 24). Russia refuses to criticise Saudi Arabia in wake of Jamal Khashoggi's murder. Retrieved from https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/jamal-khashoggirussia-putin-saudi-arabia-murder-latest-turkey-consulate-istanbul-a8597646.html

Transitional Justice Mechanisms: Can Mexico Overcome Organized Crime? Marcela Baquerizo Coello Mexico has a complex history of political violence and organized crime. The years of War on Drugs (2006-2012), and the previous years of political violence (1968-2005), are periods characterized by atrocities and gross human rights violations. With the aim of overcoming this, nations have developed a variety of mechanisms to ensure truth, justice, reparation, and non-recurrence. Nevertheless, only few states have implemented the right combination of strategies that has allowed them to achieve long-term results and to maintain stability. The fact that Mexican state officials have initiated dialogue to put forward a transitional justice process already signifies a major breakthrough towards peace, but its intention to ratify amnesty laws is worrying. Based on the analysis of two Latin American countries that struggled with high levels of criminality, I argue that the implementation of amnesty laws leads to an increase in crime, and that it is necessary to prosecute those involved in the criminal underworld. Those who favor the adoption of an amnesty program believe it serves as a shortcut toward decreasing the level of criminality in a nation. After a truth commission has identified and made public the perpetrators of gross atrocities, some governments implement amnesty laws to encourage victims to forgive and forget, letting go of a turbulent past and moving forward with a â&#x20AC;&#x153;clean slateâ&#x20AC;?. This is supported by the idea that such mentality fosters a peaceful attitude so that the state can overcome such violent times. It is without a doubt an easier process, with the additional benefit of less resources being invested to achieve a peaceful means and create a truth commission. As beneficial as amnesty laws may appear, their cost, however, is much greater. The implementation of amnesty laws is synonymous with an increase in organized crime and political violence. Escaping from any legal consequences, the perpetrators of gross human rights violations adopt the idea that disrespecting the law of justice will not be punished, which ultimately incentivizes wrongdoers to continue to commit atrocities. Additionally, past truth commissions in other Latin American countries have proved that military officers, members of the government, and members of the judicial system are involved in gross human right violations. An amnesty program allows government and state officials to keep atrocities in the dark and avoid being held accountable while maintaining their high-level positions. The consequences of this institutionalized impunity are critical; corrupt authorities continue to taint the system by engaging in organized crime, leading the country into the gray zone of criminality, a scenario where Organized Criminal Groups (OCGs) thrive. This clearly showcases the real intention of authorities who implement amnesty laws: to deny any responsibility for past crimes. Allowing prosecution would permit trials and the imprisonment of authorities involved in gross human right violations, which comes in hand with the !9

abstraction of probable state allies to the criminal underworld. Such denial of justice is used to protect government officials from being prosecuted, since derogating amnesty laws would mean to acknowledge the atrocities they have committed.1 There is empiric evidence of Latin American countries that have been impacted by an amnesty program. El Salvador is a typical case that reveals how the functions of truth commission have been hindered by amnesty laws. Between 1980 and 1992, El Salvador experienced years of political violence and organized crime. During this conflict, 75,000 murders, 8,000 disappearances, and countless cases of torture, sexual crimes, and forced displacement took place. It was crucial for the government to take immediate action to transition the state into a stable and peaceful one. Unfortunately, the transition that El Salvador underwent relied entirely on impunity and the absence of reparations. Although the Commission on the Truth for El Salvador was established in July 1992 with a mandate to investigate gross human rights violations, it passed two amnesty laws: a partial amnesty and a blanket amnesty.2 According to the truth commission’s recommendation in its report, all judges responsible for impunity should be examined, and the Complete Supreme Court should be resigned. However, the ratification of amnesty laws prevents the truth committee from achieving this resolution. Nowadays, not a single person has been convicted for the gross human rights violations committed during the armed conflict. Most victims still lack recognition and redress, creating and retaining an atmosphere of silence, intimidation and complicity.3 On the contrary, Peru is an emblematic case that displays the benefits that prosecution brings to the table. Peru is a country fairly similar to El Salvador: they both suffer from high levels of inequality, relative poverty, a weak government infrastructure. Nevertheless, the significant distinction between the two is that Peru has managed to achieve low levels of criminality and to be placed under the threshold of 10 homicides per 100,000, transitioning away from a violent authoritarian regime which applied amnesty laws. The government of Alberto Fujimori, elected in 1990, decided to counteract armed insurgent groups by overlooking civil liberties and eroding political accountability fundamentally: it “passed legislation enacting a blanket amnesty to security forces personnel involved in violations of human rights.”4 In response, human rights organizations initiated investigations that exposed the corruption of fujimorismo. This political scandal attracted international attention and promoted the public to pressure Fujimori into resigning his mandate, ultimately leading to a collapse of the authoritarian 1

Cerqueira, Daniel, and Leonor Arteaga. “Challenging the Amnesty Law in El Salvador: Domestic and International Alternatives to Bring and End to Impunity.” Due Process of Law Foundation, June 2016. 3 Cerqueira, Daniel, and Leonor Arteaga. “Challenging the Amnesty Law in El Salvador: Domestic and International Alternatives to Bring and End to Impunity.” Due Process of Law Foundation, June 2016. 4

Gonzales Cueva, Eduardo. “The Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Challenge of Impunity.” Cambridge University Press, 2010.

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regime and weakening its ability to protect perpetrators. After Fujimori’s resignation President Paniagua took over the new mandate and announced that he would eradicate amnesty laws, which facilitated the country to pursue a combination of truth and penal justice. Under this incredibly beneficial context, The Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CVR) was created. Consequently, political figures were prosecuted for human rights violations, and this accountability shock successfully prevented Fujimori’s dictatorship from turning into a criminal underworld.5 The contrast between El Salvador and Peru, which highlights the difference between a weak transition process and a robust transitional justice mechanism, should call for Mexican state officials to recognize the necessity of holding perpetrators accountable for gross human rights violations. Specifically, in the case of a weak transition process such as El Salvador, which consists of the combination of a truth commission and an amnesty program, atrocities do not face legal consequences; it allows for the institutionalized impunity of state officials that are perpetrators and who will likely continue to be involved in the criminal underworld. On the other hand, according to Trejo et al, a robust transitional justice mechanism, such as Peru, involves processes that combine truth commissions and domestic trials in order to expose, prosecute and punish gross human rights violations perpetrated during the authoritarian era. Furthermore, it has been supported by concrete data that with domestic prosecution in the context of truth commissions, the homicide rate has dropped from 10.75 to 6.67 homicides per 100,000 populations. 6 Evidently, this mechanism has the capability of eliminating state impunity and of deterring and removing criminality. To successfully develop this robust mechanism, rather than a weak transition process, the disorderliness in Mexico’s systematic judicial prosecution is an important factor that must be taken into account. The presence of corruption and the extent of the Mexican territory raise the question of whether the Mexican judicial system is prepared to handle prosecutions of this magnitude. Regarding corruption, the roots of organized crime and Mexico’s legal authorities are deeply intertwined since the years of political violence in 1968. However, this obstacle does not make successful prosecutions impossible. There are effective measures that help to make up for possible unreliability and allow for the coordination of extensive trials. One of the most effective measures is to involve an objective third party that offers legitimacy to the process, like the United Nations. For instance, the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) was established to assure

Gonzales Cueva, Eduardo. “The Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Challenge of Impunity.” Cambridge University Press, 2010. 6

Trejo, Guillermo, et al. "Breaking state impunity in post-authoritarian regimes." Journal of Peace Research, 2018, pp. 2-23.

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compliance with the agreements throughout the peace process.7 These efforts can be applied to the prosecutions, known as the second stage of the Mexican transition, having the UN be involved in the process to support funding, and assure transparency and compliance. If it is the case that the Mexican state officials are completely reluctant to remove the amnesty program, the UN can pressure for amnesty to be decided on by a judge on a case-by-case basis. By allowing only limited amnesty, impunity is lowered. Nevertheless, leniency in the sentencing process, referring to the lessening of the legal charges, must also be considered . This proposal is more adequate as it continues to hold the wrongdoers accountable, and it simultaneously serves as an incentive for perpetrators to cooperate with testimonies. In conclusion, Mexico has a complex history of political violence and organized crime. The creation of a truth commission is the first step Mexico needs in order to transition into a state of peace. Nevertheless, if state officials implement an amnesty program, the benefits of the truth commission will lose their value. In order to successfully overcome criminality, there needs to be judicial changes in law that allow Mexico to move from truth to prosecution and accountability.

Cerqueira, Daniel, and Leonor Arteaga. â&#x20AC;&#x153;Challenging the Amnesty Law in El Salvador: Domestic and International Alternatives to Bring and End to Impunity.â&#x20AC;? Due Process of Law Foundation, June 2016.

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Cleaning Up Our Act in Space Lisa Michelini When our satellites are in danger, so are our men and women in uniform. The GPS in every vehicle, communications between commanders and their units, and the reconnaissance imagery that informs their operations all fundamentally rely on accurate information from satellites in orbit. Thus, it makes sense that our adversaries have taken concerning steps to weaken our warfighting ability in space. There is plenty of room for debate over whether or not a separate Department of the Space Force is the most effective way to counter Russia and China in space, but what has yet to be discussed is that there is, in reality, a bigger threat facing our satellites than that posed by our adversaries. This other threat may seem less menacing, but it is far more likely to cause damage to our assets in space than an attack from an adversary: thousands of pieces of junk. Ever since the launch of Sputnik in 1953, pieces of spacecraft debris have been breaking off and orbiting the Earth. Over the last 65 years of space travel, satellite launches have broken apart into smaller and smaller fragments until they formed the veritable cloud of debris that currently rings the Earth, and more debris is created every day. The United States meticulously tracks hundreds of thousands of these pieces of space debris in Earth’s low orbit, and for good reason. The force of a 1 cm piece of space junk (roughly the size of an acorn) hurtling through space could disable a satellite that keeps military systems coordinated or provides mission critical intelligence. A collision with a 10 cm (softball-size) piece would “catastrophically damage” it.1 Every time one of these objects is on course to hit our satellites, the only effective way to mitigate the danger is to move the spacecraft out of the way. These evasive maneuvers shorten the spacecraft’s lifetime, cost fuel, and may disrupt the continuity of service and data provided by the satellite. 2 Seeing that the vast majority of objects that can harm our assets in space are not enemy satellites but rather rouge pieces of scrap metal, I find the President’s choice to spend $8 billion on further weaponization of space misguided. If the President truly wants to promote American leadership in space, his best bet is to embrace two phenomena antithetical to Trump’s political brand: international collaboration and investment in cutting-edge technology.

Hildreth, Steven A. and Allison Arnold (2014). Threats to U.S. National Security Interests in Space: Orbital Debris Mitigation and Removal (Congressional Research Service Report No. R43353). Page 2. Retrieved from Congressional Research Service website. 2

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Some of that 8 billion would be better spent expanding existing bilateral “Space Security Dialogues” with other spacefaring nations, including our adversaries, that establish codes of conduct and promote transparency in space. One important measure that could arise from these talks is the universalization of “25 year rule” that limits how long decrepit spacecraft can be left in orbit as they disintegrate into orbital debris. These types of guidelines have been in the works for years, and continuing to expand diplomatic partnerships in space through the State Department is a cost effective way to promote US security interests. Furthermore, a portion of the 8 billion should be invested in innovating a way around the space junk problem. This is the cutting edge in space technology, and the US is currently losing the race to lead on this issue to the European Space Agency, who are pioneering methods to actively remove debris from orbit. The way forward in space today, as it always has been, is apply our best minds to our biggest problems. Investment in NASA to solve space debris will go much further toward demonstrating American prowess than a bombastic new military service. Cleaning up space is only part of achieving this goal, but it would improve our operating ability in space more dramatically and more effectively than would a Space Force. A Space Force may be a catchy solution, but in space, as in all domains, nuance and evidence must triumph over bluster and militarism in order to protect our armed forces.

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A Complicated History: U.S.-U.K. Relations Sana Sherali The United States of America gained its independence from Britain in 1776. However, it was not until 1946 that Winston Churchill, statesman of Britain used the term ‘special relationship’ in his famous ‘The Sinews of Peace’, i.e. ‘Iron Curtain’ speech to describe US – UK relations.1 ‘Special relationship’ is an unofficial term used to describe “the exceptionally close political, diplomatic, cultural and historical relations between the United States and the United Kingdom.”2 However, scholars and analysts have expressed their concerns about this so called ‘relationship’, some of them concerned that it does not exist at all. Scott Lucas, a professor at the University of Birmingham, describes the special relationship as a “Churchill public relations exercise.”3 He goes on further to say that it was an attempt on Churchill’s part to “whip up American support for the British position over Europe and therefore over the Soviet Union” in his highly publicized ‘Iron Curtain’ Speech.4 Lucas thinks that the term special relationship has been used as a “PR device” because the “British have always needed the Americans more than the Americans have needed the Brits.”5 Therefore, it only made sense that the British prioritized this relationship more than the Americans did, especially at points in time when the Americans were far more economically and militarily advanced than the British. Although some of Lucas’s opinions are supported by occurrences which have taken place between Churchill’s initial use of the term and the present day, it would be extreme to suggest that a unique relationship never existed between the United States and the United Kingdom. Currently, the special relationship between the US and the UK seems a little unsteady, but after the Second World War, it seems as if the interests of the United Kingdom have been factored in to a smaller extent in US foreign policy. During the Second World War and the first few years of the Cold War, the US and UK developed a “unique combination of defense and intelligence linkages.”6 In January 1942, Winston Churchill told King George VI that Britain and the United States were now “married after many months of walking out.”7 This “marriage” lasted into the Cold 1

Churchill, Winston. ‘The Sinews of Peace’. Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri. March 5, 1946.

“Definition of 'Special Relationship'.” Special Relationship Definition and Meaning | Collins English Dictionary, www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/special-relationship. 3

Soussi, Alasdair. “The UK and US: The Myth of the Special Relationship.” UK | Al Jazeera, Al Jazeera, 27 Feb. 2017, www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/02/uk-myth-special-relationship-170221082834995.html. 4 Ibid. 5

Ibid. “The US–UK 'Special Relationship' in a World Twice Transformed. “Cambridge Review of International Affairs, vol. 17, no. 3, 2004, pp. 437 www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/0955757042000296946? scroll=top&needAccess=true 6

Ibid. (pp. 438)

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War years, when between the years 1947 and 1948, the two countries signed the US – UK agreement, which gave London the opportunity to share valuable intelligence with Washington. In 1958, the sharing of information intensified when London demanded access to important American nuclear data. “The British nuclear deterrent (at best, semiindependent) was fairly dependent on American technology.”8 “The 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement, which was later due for renewal in 2004 set the stage for an extended era of mutual intermeshing of defense technologies and policies.”9 All of these agreements seemed well and represented progress, but there were times when the US and the UK did not see eye to eye. There were disagreements over the Suez Canal in 1956, and the United States’ growing role in the Vietnam War.10 The flow of information between the two countries was surprisingly unaffected by these disagreements. If anything, it was the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 which marked the first sign of the deterioration of the relationship.11 This event marked the thaw of the Cold War, which meant that if the threat of the Soviet Union was no longer looming over Britain, they were not as reliant on American support and cooperation as they once were. “For John Dickie (1994), the termination of the Cold War involved the inevitable destruction of close relations.”12 The once close relationship the US and UK once had where they took each other’s interests into consideration would gradually disintegrate. “The United States Ambassador to London Raymond Seitz (1998) saw Anglo – American cooperation in the 1991 Gulf Conflict as the ‘last hurrah in the old regime.’”13 During the latter half of the twentieth century, it seemed like the downfall of the special relationship was inevitable, and herculean gestures would be required on the part of both countries to maintain the ‘special’ part of the relationship. In part, the ‘special relationship’ came about because Britain was eager to seize the opportunity of working with the United States, which had ceased to practice its policy of isolationism. “Before the war’s conclusion, British policymakers had tentatively established two critical parameters of foreign policy that have since survived international systemic change and even America’s transition to hyper power status: Britain’s ultimate security and wellbeing depended on close ties to the US, and the principal objective of British policymakers within this was to steer American policy in British interests.”14 Although Britain had emerged from the war as one of the strongest countries in Europe, she needed support in the form of political alliances and resources to 8

Ibid. (pp. 438)

10 11 12 13

Ibid. (pp. 438) Ibid. (pp. 438) Ibid. (pp. 438) Ibid. (pp. 438)

Marsh, Steve, and John Baylis. “The Anglo American Special Relationship: The Lazarus of International Relations.” Diplomacy and Statecraft, vol. 17, no. 1, 1 Apr. 2006, pp. 173–211., pp. 173.

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get back on her feet, both of which were things the United States could provide her with. Some politicians were naively confident when it came to Britain’s power in the Western Hemisphere, thinking that Britain would soon dominate the United States. The Labor Foreign Secretary Bevin claimed in private confidence that “if [Britain] only pushed on and developed Africa, [Britain] could have the United States dependent on [her], and eating out of [her] hands in four or five years.”15 While Bevin had grossly overestimated the time it would take Britain to bounce back from the war, he was not completely wrong for believing in Britain’s military, economic and political strength. Britain had “redeemed most of its losses incurred to its empire during the early years of World War II.” 16 It was also in a “strategically viable position, exercised critical political influence in Western Europe, the near East and South-East Asia, and retained an influential economic position at the center of the Commonwealth and the Sterling Area.”17 In contrast, the United States emerged from the war with “enormous selfsufficiency, a monopoly over the atomic bomb, the world’s most advanced industrial military complex and a preeminent global economic position in which it held $20 billion of the world’s $33 billion gold reserves, manufactured over half of the world’s goods, and controlled over half of the world’s shipping.”18 Despite Britain’s relative superiority in Europe, in comparison to the United States, it “emerged economically exhausted and dislocated by its sustained war effort and dependence on overseas trade and investment.”19 ”By 1945, Britain’s exports were 30% of the 1939 total, import prices had risen by 50%, its gold and dollar reserves had more than halved, and it had liquidated £1,118,000 of its overseas assets and incurred huge debts – including £2,143 million to the Sterling Area alone.”20 As a result, Britain’s initial economic recovery was tied to the American economy. “Britain’s wartime dependence on the American Lend – Lease Program continued into peacetime through the highly controversial American loan in 1946, and it was clear that the whims of American foreign policy would impact profoundly upon British economic fortunes.”21 Britain was awarded $3.2 billion under the Marshall Aid program, which only served to emphasize that the British economy was at the mercy of the United States.22 Unfortunately for the British, their security was closely linked to their economy. “British policymakers struggled with the problems of imperial overstretch and how to 15 16

Ibid (pp. 175) Ibid (pp. 175)

Ibid (pp. 175)

Ibid (pp. 175) Ibid (pp. 176)

19 20 21 22

Ibid (pp. 176) Ibid (pp. 176) Ibid (pp. 176)

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provide for territorial defense in the face of a perceived deepening threat from the East.”23 Getting the US involved was the only way this problem could be resolved, because American atomic monopoly would keep the Soviets at bay. Given the rapid weakening of the sterling in postwar years, the British were happy to comply with the Americans, because their economies were essentially linked together. In order to “escape economic dependence from the US, the British knew they needed to reconnect the trade routes which were the arteries to Britain’s industrial heart, and to protect overseas assets such as the Anglo – Iranian Oil Company which was critical to the British balance of payments.”24 The British needed the Americans for economic and security purposes, and American politicians were fully aware of this. ‘In March 1950, American Under – Secretary of State Dean Rusk said: “Since it is clear that the British cannot recapture a sound economic, or for that matter, political and strategic position without the support of the US or even maintain their present position, they must accept wholeheartedly the necessity for collaborative action.”’25 Rusk’s view of the situation accurately summed up the challenges postwar Britain faced, and how the most efficient solution available to Britain was to work with the Americans. The American response to Britain’s economic situation in postwar years suggests that the special relationship between the two countries was not the stable and agreeable relationship Churchill hoped it would be. Rather, it was a relationship where the two countries did not always see eye to eye, but since close cooperation produced positive outcomes for both countries, the relationship continued. Perhaps the most ‘special’ of relationships Britain was successful in developing with the United States were in the fields of intelligence and defense. “A primary objective of successful postwar British governments was to overturn the American ‘nuclear betrayal’ of World War II.”26 Unsurprisingly, the 1946 McMahon Act came as a shock to the British government at the time because it stipulated that “the United States would no longer share information concerning atomic weapons.”27 “Secretary of State Acheson noted that during the Truman administration, the lack of Anglo – American nuclear cooperation was ‘poisoning [the US’s] relation of mutual trust, and if continued, could jeopardize [the Anglo – American] alliance.’”28 After a long negotiation process, Britain succeeded in having the Act repealed. As a result, Britain was kept well informed of the design and material being used for American nuclear weaponry, which as a result “set the scene for the intimate nuclear relationship that was to follow.”29 Britain benefitted further 23

Ibid (pp. 177)

Ibid (pp. 177) Ibid (pp. 177)

26 27

www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/cabinetpapers/themes/co-operation-competition-testing.htm. Marsh, Steve, and John Baylis. “The Anglo American Special Relationship: The Lazarus of International Relations.” Diplomacy and Statecraft, vol. 17, no. 1, 1 Apr. 2006, pp. 173–211., pp. 178. 28

Ibid (pp. 178)

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from this agreement when in 1982, it was able to secure the US Trident 2 system “in exchange for just 5% ($116 million) towards its research and development costs.”30 Furthermore, in 1984, the “Anglo – American agreement provided for the controversial deployment in Britain of cruise missiles.”31 Although the war reduced Britain’s global standing to a medium – sized power in international relations, it was still more powerful than other countries in Western Europe, which meant that in this postwar world, it was the most helpful ally the United States could have, in terms of political and military influence. Providing Britain with this information and technology would give rise to a stronger Britain, which would ultimately benefit the United States, as they would have a stronger ally. The special relationship between the United States and Britain has remained similar since the beginning of the twenty – first century. Although the situations the countries faced over time were different, their responses to these events were fairly standard. A major occurrence of the early twenty – first century in the United States was 9/11. As a result of this event, “British officials undoubtedly saw opportunities to reaffirm Anglo – American relations, and to influence American policy at a crucial moment.”32 Tony Blair publicly expressed his desire to stand “shoulder by shoulder” with the US in its difficult time, and claimed that the British “would not rest until this evil is driven from our world.”33 This proclamation was no different from what British politicians had been saying all along. Sir Robin Renwick, former British Ambassador to the US said in 1996 ‘that a prime British objective should be “to help ensure that the United States is not left alone to respond to crises in which the interests of the West are generally engaged.”’34 In the aftermath of 9/11, Tony Blair urged the Bush administration towards an “international coalition evidently sought to steer the Bush administration towards a multilateral and proportionate response to September 11.”35 The idea was to eliminate terror attacks in the Western world in general, and Blair believed if the two strongest Western powers worked together, they could minimize terrorism, at the very least in these two countries. Their plans may have been well – intentioned, but the Blair – Bush partnership was unpopular in both countries, and only served to “further radically imbalance an already unbalanced relationship.”36 At this point, London and Washington had already clashed about the decisions the US made regarding the Afghanistan campaign, i.e. for instance, “the US poppy eradication program was seen by the British as an attempt to alienate Afghan 30

Ibid (pp. 178)

Ibid (pp. 181) Ibid (pp. 181)

33 34 35

Ibid (pp. 181) Ibid (pp. 181)

Dumbrell, John. “The USA-UK Special Relationship: Taking the 21st-Century Temperature.”The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, vol. 11, no. 1, 2009, pp. 64-78, pp. 67

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‘hearts and minds.’”37 As the US and UK began to disagree more and more with one another with regard to foreign policy, ‘Victor Bulmer – Thomas argued that “there will no longer be unconditional support for US initiatives in foreign policy.”’38 In any case, British loyalty to the United States did not reap the benefits it once did. Bulmer – Thomas further stated that there was “very little … that the US government can do to reward the UK without rewarding other states.”39 The early 2000s marked a more prominent separation of the two countries, which were not as dependent on one another as they once were. The special relationship was strained even further under the Obama administration. According to journalist Dan Stewart, Obama “threw the diplomatic equal of shade” at British Prime Minister David Cameron in an interview in The Atlantic.40 The White House hastily put out a statement, claiming the relationship was as ‘special’ as it had ever been, but the damage was done. The article further goes on to say that the relationship “does not come even close to carrying the significance that it did in 1946”; “it has been in question since 1970.”41 It would be challenging to point to a single thing which would account for America’s disenchantment with the special relationship, other than an accumulation of disagreements and strained exchanges between the two countries in the late twentieth century. As time has gone by, the political leaders have made less of a conscious effort to disguise their true feelings about the other country. We can see this in Obama’s attempt to publicly mock the special relationship, and Britain’s withdrawal of unconditional support from US foreign policy. Moving past the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, and looking at the past seventy years at a glance, we can say that the special relationship began to lose its ‘special’ element shortly after the term was coined. In 2008, the United States and the United Kingdom no longer needed one another as desperately as they did in 1946. They had recovered from the worst of the war, and were ready to assert their individual influence in the Western Hemisphere. Today, relations remain cordial. However, when it comes to implementing critical foreign or military policy, it is clear that each country puts itself first, and the term ‘special relationship’ is simply taken at face value by both nations.

37 38

Ibid (pp. 66) Ibid (pp. 66)

Ibid (pp. 67) Stewart, Dan. “Why the US - UK Relationship Is Less Special than Ever.” TIME, 11 Mar. 2016, time.com/ 4256202/why-the-u-s-u-k-relationship-is-less-special-than-ever/ 40

Ibid.

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The Impact of Rural Consciousness in Illinois State Politics Collin Gortner I. Introduction In the 2014 Illinois gubernatorial election, 101 out of 102 counties voted for the Republican candidate Bruce Rauner while Cook County, where Chicago is located, supported Democrat Pat Quinn. The result of this election is indicative of the political divide that separates urban and rural Illinois. This urban-rural divide is a national trend in American politics. In fact, political scientist Katherine J. Cramer identified a parallel trend in Wisconsin in her 2016 book, The Politics of Resentment. She coined the term “rural consciousness,” to describe a unique identity held by rural people that is rooted in geographic location, based on a perception that political decision makers overlook rural communities, and the belief that rural lifestyles are qualitatively different than lifestyles of urban dwellers. Rural identity can be thought of as a type of group identity which shapes the sense of self and is formed through socialization. It is increasingly common that being from a rural or urban location is viewed as a group identity that is intertwined with political identity, ideology, and partisanship. Rural consciousness dictates certain social and political leanings—including a conservative Republican political inclination. Rural consciousness contributes to political polarization and social tension along the urban-rural divide. This trend manifests itself in the state of Illinois in that rural consciousness contributes to the hostile dynamic between residents of downstate Illinois and Chicago. This urban-rural fracture can be seen in election results, policy debates, and proposals to divide Illinois into two states. II. Group Identity and Rural Consciousness Rural consciousness is a group identity held by rural citizens in Illinois which greatly influences state politics in the Land of Lincoln. A group identity can be thought of as “a self-awareness of one’s objective membership in a group and a psychological sense of attachment to the group.”1 People have a group identity if they share a meaningful and commonly held characteristic. Traditional examples of group identity include race, sex, ethnicity, religion, and social class. These qualities are significant in determining an individual’s self-conception and how he or she is viewed by others. Group identities matter in politics because an individual who has a strong group identity “blends together one's self-image with that of the group.”2 This results in conflation of the interests of the group with one’s personal interests even if these interests are opposed because “the group’s interests take on a personal significance for the 1

Conover, Pamela Johnston. “The Influence of Group Identifications on Political Perception and Evaluation.” The Journal of Politics 46, no. 3 (1984): 760–85, p. 761 https://doi.org/10.2307/2130855. 2

Conover, p. 764

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individual.”3 Appealing to these group identities to gain political support is known as identity politics. Importantly, different group identifications take on different levels of importance based on the connection between the political environment and the interests and beliefs of the group. For example, red-headed people may share a group identity, but that identity may not be politically relevant unless policies or political rhetoric affect people with red hair because of their shared identity as red-heads. Partisanship is the most important group identity when it comes to politics. When focusing on politics, “partisan attachments become highly influential, whereas more fundamental social identities such as sex, religion, or social class tend to have less predictive power.”4 When a partisan group identity influences the political preferences of an individual, the interests of that specific person tend to become intertwined with the interests of his or her preferred party. This phenomenon helps explain why it is not uncommon for voters to support politicians and policies that contradict their self-interest. Partisanship is not the only important group identity when it comes to politics, as it has long been acknowledged that different political parties are more popular in certain regions of the country. Regional differences in partisanship are particularly stark if the political environment calls on voters to consider the group identity of their region when making a political decision. For example, in the decades following the Civil War, the Democratic party had a monopoly in the South because of a fusion of partisanship and regional identity. Voters’ shared group identification as Southerners was a major determinant of their loyalty to the Democratic Party in that era. In contemporary politics, geography continues to influence partisanship. There is increasing evidence that there is also an urban-rural divide in party affiliation. In the The Politics of Resentment, Cramer determined that citizens of rural Wisconsin shared a group identity rooted in their status as rural residents and possessed a rural consciousness that contained “perceptions of the distribution of power, values, and resources”5 and manifested itself in political, economic, and social issues. Rural consciousness has three primary elements: “a belief that rural areas are ignored by decision makers, a perception that rural areas do not get their fair share of resources, and a sense that rural folks have fundamentally distinct values and lifestyles.”6 An urban-rural divide is possible because “it is by the means of the social experiences and institutional opportunities of the places that they inhabit that people construct the reasons and emotions that either encourage or

Conover, p. 764

Green, Donald P., Bradley Palmquist, and Eric Schickler. Partisan Hearts and Minds: Political Parties and the Social Identities of Voters. Yale ISPS Series. New Haven, Conn. ; London: Yale University Press, 2002, p. 2. 5 Cramer, Katherine J. The Politics of Resentment: Rural Consciousness in Wisconsin and the Rise of Scott Walker.Chicago Studies in American Politics. Chicago ; London: University of Chicago Press, 2016, p. 32 6

Cramer, p. 12.

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inhibit particular identities and interests.”7 Place and geography clearly matter when it comes to group identity, whether it be regional differences or variations in population density. Rural group identity exists because there are substantial economic, social, and cultural differences between urban and rural communities. Increasingly, people in rural areas are becoming less financially well off than their urban counterparts. 8 Also, rural communities lag behind the national average in terms of education.9 The educational and economic deficits plaguing rural areas, along with cultural and social differences, make rural citizens unique and the distinction between rural and urban more prevalent in recent years. III. Ideological Sorting, Rural Consciousness, and the Republican Party Rural consciousness is a type of group identity which political parties and other groups are able to tap into by catering to commonly shared interests and beliefs. Different entities have achieved varying amounts of success activating rural consciousness to win the loyalty of rural voters. In recent years, the Republican Party has achieved success using identity politics to garner the support of rural voters as rural consciousness has become intertwined with them. For a variety of political and social reasons across the United States, the Republican Party has succeeded in appealing to the interests and beliefs of rural voters. When a voter identifies with a party it is because he or she has the perception that “one of the parties took special pains to look after the day-to-day interests of a significant grouping in the population with which he identified.” 10 If rural voters identify strongly with their rural group identity, then a political party will be rewarded if the perception exists that it is protecting the interests and beliefs of that group. Out of a representative sample of rural voters in 1998, 45% self-identified as Democratic and 44% identified as Republican. In 2017, only 38% of rural voters self-identified as Democratic while 54% identified as Republican.11 Rural voters overwhelmingly support the Republican Party because Republicans have represented the interests and beliefs of this group better than Democrats. Since the Gingrich Revolution in 1994, the parties have become increasingly 7 Agnew,

John A. Place and Politics in Modern Italy. University of Chicago Geography Research Paper ; No. 243.Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002, p. 218. 8 Thiede, Brian, Lillie Greiman, Steven C. Beda, and Tessa Conroy. “The Divide Between Rural and Urban America, in 6 Charts.” US News & World Report, March 20, 2017. https://www.usnews.com/news/national-news/articles/ 2017-03-20/6-charts-that-illustrate-the-divide-between-rural-and-urban-america 9

Soergel, Andrew. “In America’s Rural-Urban Divide, Age, Earnings and Education Are Prominent.” US News & World Report, December 8, 2016. https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2016-12-08/in-americas-rural-urbandivide-age-earnings-and-education-are-prominent. 10 Campbell, p. 219. 11

Parker, Kim, Juliana Horowitz Menasce, Anna Brown, Richard Fry, D’vera Cohn, and Ruth Igielnik. “How Urban, Suburban and Rural Residents’ View Social and Political Issues,” May 22, 2018. http:// www.pewsocialtrends.org

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ideologically distinct. Republican candidates have become more conservative and Democratic candidates have become more liberal with a loss of moderate candidates on both sides of the aisle.12 Along with this trend, Americans are choosing to live in politically homogeneous communities. This phenomenon “reinforces political similarities within communities and as a result accentuates political differences across dissimilar communities. This finding is of particular importance to rural-urban polarization.”13 Communities that are politically homogeneous result in ideologically similar voting blocs. When these ideologically consistent communities have a binary choice between a conservative Republican and liberal Democrat their preference becomes predictable. Rural areas have become associated with conservative Republicanism over the course of the past two decades. Urban and rural places have substantial political, economic, religious, racial, and cultural differences that influence which party voters are more likely to support. In rural areas, “a traditional way of life still exists...and the values of these residents provides a sharp contrast with the positions embraced by urbanites.”14 The socially conservative positions of the Republican party are more consistent with the values of rural America when it comes to abortion restrictions, LGBTQ rights, marijuana legalization, and other social issues. In Republican primaries, candidates attempt to position themselves as the representative of rural voters. This is what Senator Ted Cruz was trying to accomplish when he accused Donald Trump of having “New York values” during the 2016 presidential primaries.15 Though unsuccessful, Cruz was trying to convince rural voters that Trump’s values were more urban-like than rural-like. The line of attack used by Cruz assumes that there is a fundamental difference between values in rural and urban areas. Cruz was trying to tap into rural consciousness to win support from Trump’s rural supporters. Trump managed to hang on to enough rural votes to win the nomination and did very well among rural voters in the general election. Largely because of the more socially conservative tenets of the ideology of Republican ideology, Trump won 60% of votes in small-town and rural areas compared to 34% for Hillary Clinton.16 Along with social differences, rural group identity is affected by economic circumstances and resource distribution within a state. Cramer argues in The Politics of Resentment that Wisconsin citizens who live outside Madison and Milwaukee have a “sense of distributive injustice associated with their geographic location outside major 12

Coppins, McKay. “The Man Who Broke Politics.” The Atlantic, November 2018. https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/11/newt-gingrich-says-youre-welcome/570832/. 13 McKee, Seth C. “Rural Voters and the Polarization of American Presidential Elections.” PS, Political Science & Politics; Washington 41, no. 1 (January 2008): 101–8, p. 106. 14

Mckee, p. 106 Zurcher, Nick Bryant, Anthony. “What Are ‘New York Values?,” January 15, 2016, sec. US Election 2016. https:// www.bbc.com/news/election-us-2016-35328924. 15

Balz, Dan. “Rural America Lifted Trump to the Presidency. Support Is Strong, but Not Monolithic.” Washington Post, June 17, 2017.

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cities.”17 Scott Walker, former Republican governor of Wisconsin, made the feeling of economic injustice a major piece of his 2010 campaign. A sense of distributive inequality became a focal point of Walker’s campaign when he repeatedly criticized a proposed $810 million high-speed rail system between Madison and Milwaukee that would primarily benefit residents of those two cities.18 Additionally, Walker used Madison and Milwaukee as symbols of government waste, corruption, and inefficiency. The strategy of stimulating rural consciousness helped propel Walker to a gubernatorial victory. Nationally, Republican candidates have campaigned on restoring rural areas by ending free trade deals and bringing back manufacturing. Additionally, it is common for Republicans to criticize big government and wasteful spending that is perceived to be concentrated in urban centers. The social beliefs, economic positions, and policy priorities of the Republican Party have resonated with rural voters. Rural consciousness is a newly recognized type of group identity that is based on social and economic factors that are particularly prevalent in rural communities. It was made possible by residential sorting and the ideological polarization of political parties in the United States. In states where a strong rural identity exists, there is substantial Republican support in rural areas. Urban-rural identity politics will continue to make a difference in national and state elections as urban-rural differences become increasingly stark. IV. Rural Consciousness in Illinois The prevalence and consequences of rural consciousness vary across states. By examining rural consciousness in Illinois, one can see that the points that Cramer makes about Wisconsin in The Politics of Resentment are more broadly generalizable. Further, Wisconsin and Illinois have differences which may affect the nature of rural consciousness and identity politics in these states. The urban-rural divide in Illinois is essentially a fracture between Chicago and the rest of the state, which is often referred to as “downstate Illinois.” Much like Wisconsin ruralites, citizens of downstate Illinois exhibit rural consciousness. In Illinois, rural citizens feel as if state resources are not distributed evenly and harbor anti-Chicago sentiment. Rural consciousness in Illinois becomes evident when examining voting patterns, policy debates, and political rhetoric. In Illinois, voting patterns and citizens’ attitudes are evidence that an urban-rural divide exists. J.B. Pritzker, the Democratic candidate for governor in 2018, performed very well among voters in urban areas but he fared poorly among rural voters. He won the counties where Chicago, East St. Louis, Peoria, Champaign, and the Quad Cities are located.19 The most votes for Pritzker came from Cook County where he beat his 17 18

Cramer, p. 140. Cramer, p. 204.

“Illinois Governor Election Results.” The New York Times, sec. U.S. 2018 election. Accessed November 18, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/elections/results/illinois-governor.

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opponent by nearly 800,000 votes in a statewide race that he won by only around 500,000 votes. An even more dramatic example of this same voting pattern occurred in the 2014 gubernatorial election when the Democratic candidate only lost by 5% but did not win a single county except for Cook County.20 Similar to the national trend, rural Illinois is heavily Republican while Chicago is very Democratic. Politicians in Illinois know this and capitalize on identity politics to win support. There are many disagreements in the Illinois State Capitol about how resources will be divided between Chicago and the rest of the state that exemplify the urban-rural divide. Recently, Illinois debated and passed K-12 education reform. In this debate, different geographical factions were fighting to ensure that they benefited from the new school funding formula. One of the most controversial portions of the education overhaul included the allocation of state funds to pay for a large share of Chicago Public School’s teacher pension costs. Bruce Rauner, a Republican who was the governor at the time, detested this portion of the bill and repeatedly referred to it as a “bailout” of the Chicago Public Schools. The Chicago Tribune noted that this rhetoric was often employed in downstate Illinois speeches “where such rhetoric plays well.”21 Rauner went beyond rhetoric and vetoed the first version of the education reform bill citing the allocation of funds for Chicago Public School pensions as unacceptable. Rauner tried to gain political support for his bill for education reform by appealing to rural consciousness. He characterized Chicago Public Schools as being financially irresponsible. This action echoes the anti-public sector union political actions taken by Scott Walker in Wisconsin. Rauner’s rhetorical attack on Chicago Public Schools indicates that bashing Chicago institutions is popular among downstate voters. This type of political maneuver is successful because there is a lot of anti-Chicago sentiment in downstate Illinois. Further, this incident proves that rural consciousness matters when it comes to fundamental issues related to state politics in Illinois. Feelings of negativity and hostility towards Chicago are commonly voiced by downstate residents and political officials. As Rock Island Republican Party chairman Drue Mielke said, “Chicago is really directing the whole course of the state and it doesn’t seem equitable.”22 As one downstate Illinois resident said, “The state is governed by Chicago and Springfield and no, I don’t really feel like we have a voice.” 23 Crime, violence, and corruption are often associated with Chicago by residents of downstate 20

“Illinois Election Results.” The New York Times, sec. U.S. 2014 election. Accessed November 18, 2018. https:// www.nytimes.com/elections/2014/illinois-elections 21

Garcia, Rick Pearson, Monique. “Rauner Win on Schools Bill Comes at a Price.” chicagotribune.com, August 31,2017. https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/politics/ct-bruce-rauner-school-funding-met-0901-20170831story.html. 22 “Chicago vs. Downstate: Illinois’ Urban-Rural Divide Plays Big Role in Politics, Upcoming Election.” WGN-TV (blog), October 19, 2018. https://wgntv.com/2018/10/18/chicago-vs-downstate-illinois-urban-rural-divide-plays-bigrole-in-politics-upcoming-election/ 23

“Chicago vs. Downstate.”

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Illinois. Rural people and urban people view themselves as being fundamentally different; this sets a dangerous precedent of anger and hostility which feeds into a dysfunctional and bitter political process. The hostility that rural people feel towards the city of Chicago is not unidirectional. A blog about the urban-rural divide in Illinois says, “Chicagoans have always thought of downstate—when they’ve thought of it at all—as an irrelevant agricultural appendage full of Baptists and gun owners who’d just love to turn Illinois into North Kentucky.”24 While this description is likely an exaggeration, there are legitimate feelings of resentment that characterize the relationship between Chicago and downstate Illinois. Politics may be the most salient point of disagreement, but there are economic, moral, and cultural differences between these two areas. At various points in history, the political and cultural differences between Chicago and the rest of the state have resulted in proposals to split the state in two. During a heated debate about funding for a mass transit bill in 1981, a Democratic state senator from Chicago proposed a bill that would make Cook County a separate state. The bill quickly passed in both chambers with the next step being consideration by the United States Congress. After realizing the seriousness of the situation, Democratic Illinois House leadership nixed the bill with a procedural tactic.25 More recently in 2011, two downstate Republican lawmakers introduced a resolution that would separate Cook County from the rest of Illinois. As Bill Mitchell, one of the state representatives said, “Chicago can run its own affairs and leave the rest of Illinois to govern itself, based upon our shared downstate values.”26 This quote encapsulates the effect that rural consciousness can have on politics. Though these proposals may seem humorous, they illustrate the deep-seated divide between the rural and urban areas of the state. It is apparent that rural consciousness and an urban-rural divide are present in Illinois politics. There is a great deal of resentment between the urban and rural factions in both Wisconsin and Illinois which leads to an acrimonious political environment. The evidence from Illinois confirms the idea that rural consciousness is a broadly applicable social phenomena that can be found in states across the country. Though there are many similarities, two primary differences exist in the urbanrural divide in Illinois compared to the urban-rural divide described in Cramer’s study of Wisconsin. Firstly, in Illinois the urban-rural divide runs parallel to stark racial divisions

McClelland, Edward. “Downstate Hate: A History of the Bitter, Nearly 200-Year Rivalry between Chicago and the Rest of Illinois.” Chicago Reader, November 15, 2017. https://www.chicagoreader.com/chicago/downstate-illinoissecession-history/Content?oid=34519694. 25 Miller, Rich. “The endless debate.” Capitol Fax.com. Accessed November 20, 2018. https://capitolfax.com/wpmobile.php?p=14978&more=1 26

Vorel, Jim. “Mitchell, Brown Call for Chicago Split from Illinois.” Herald-Review.com, November 23, 2011. https://herald-review.com/news/local/mitchell-brown-call-for-chicago-split-from-illinois/ article_96c4d6ac-15a1-11e1-88a0-001cc4c002e0.html

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within the state. Chicago is 65% minority, while Illinois as a whole is 28% non-white.27 Although there is a much higher proportion of minorities in Milwaukee than the rest of the state, the racial demographics of Madison are not much different than statewide demographics.28 Hence, the urban-rural divide in Wisconsin is less racially disparate than in Illinois. The racial element of the Chicago-downstate divide likely affects rural consciousness and the urban-rural divide. Secondly, Madison is the capital city of Wisconsin and is viewed as an urban center. In Illinois, Springfield is usually associated with the rural portion of the state. This alters the dynamics of the urban-rural divide and changes the political calculus of politicians trying to appeal to rural consciousness. One consequence of the capital city not being an urban center is that state leaders often clash with city officials from Chicago. This political conflict is driven by a combination of the urban-rural divide and partisan differences. The extent to which the urban-rural divide contributes to this disunion is an important piece of information to solve. V. Conclusion In summary, rural consciousness is a type of group identity which is becoming increasingly important in American politics. Real differences in the economic, social, and political makeup of rural and urban areas have contributed to the fortification of a rural group identity. The ideological polarization of the political parties and residential sorting of American communities into more politically homogeneous communities has contributed to the partisan divide between cities and rural areas. The social and economic positions of the Republican party are more consistent with the beliefs and interests of rural citizens. Just the opposite is true in urban areas, where the Democratic party is more aligned with dominant urban political attitudes. The Politics of Resentment identified rural consciousness in Wisconsin and introduced this concept into the field of political science. It is evident that rural conscious also exists in Illinois where it contributes to the divide between Chicago and downstate. This points to the generalizability of the urbanrural divide and rural consciousness. Studying the racial component of the urban-rural divide as well as the split between Springfield and Chicago may be fruitful areas of future research. Additionally, doing research on the urban-rural divide in other states and countries could be elucidating. Overall, rural consciousness is a politically relevant type of group identity which is important in contemporary American politics. This was confirmed by the urban-rural voting split that occurred in the 2016 Presidential election and the 2018 midterms. Today and in years to come, understanding this phenomenon will be crucial to understanding the political environment in the United States.

“Illinois Population 2018.” World Population Review. Accessed December 9, 2018. http:// worldpopulationreview.com/states/illinois-population/. 28

“Wisconsin Population 2018.” World Population Review. Accessed December 6, 2018. http://worldpopulationreview.com/us-cities/madison-population/.

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Religion in the Public Square: A Tocquevillian Response to Rawls John Henry Hobgood In his lecture Idea of Public Reason Revisited, political philosopher John Rawls boldly remarks that “Political liberalism accepts Tocqueville’s view” regarding the separation of church and state as the reason for “the basis of peace among comprehensive doctrines both religious and secular.”1 While Rawls aligns himself with Tocqueville on this particular point, he rejects some of Tocqueville’s ideas regarding the importance of religion in democratic societies. Such a contrast deserves inquiry. As such, this essay will explore the role that comprehensive doctrines, specifically religion, play for Rawls and his proposed bracketing of those beliefs. It will also examine Tocqueville’s recognition of and advocacy for religion’s importance in mitigating democracy’s maladies. It will finally demonstrate areas where Tocqueville shows a more complete understanding of religion and the inadequacies that result from Rawls’ system. In recognizing the fact of reasonable pluralism, Rawls attempts to establish a political conception of justice that is “presented as independent of comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines.”2 He further declares that the political society should not affirm a comprehensive doctrine because such a decision “leads to the systematic denial of basic liberties and may allow the oppressive use of the government’s monopoly of (legal) force.”3 Rawls states that “accounts of human nature we put aside and rely on a political conception of persons as citizens instead.” 4 While the state cannot endorse a comprehensive view, an overlapping consensus allows citizens from vastly different comprehensive doctrines, both religious and secular, to agree on basic constitutional essentials and matters of political justice. These comprehensive doctrines “support a political conception of justice underwriting a constitutional democratic society.”5 They also fulfill the idea of reciprocity and the idea of equal rights and liberties that political liberalism professes. In proffering the overlapping consensus, Rawls differentiates it from a modus vivendi and proffers three reasons. The first is that “the object of consensus” is “a moral conception.” The second is that “it is affirmed on moral grounds, that is, it includes conceptions of society and of citizens as persons, as well as principles of justice, and an account of the political virtues.”6 The third reason entails stability: “those who affirm the various views supporting the political conception will not withdraw their support of it” if 1

John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 478 FN. 76.

ibid., 144. ibid., 146 FN. 13.

3 4 5 6

ibid., 482. ibid. ibid., 147.

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their comprehensive doctrine should become dominant in society.7 This distinction is important because it supports Rawls’ claim that overlapping consensus prevents exploitation of the government for certain doctrines and maintains stability. Within the overlapping consensus resides the political conception of justice, upon which many groups should agree on, even from differing comprehensive doctrines. As for deciding matters of “‘constitutional essentials’ and questions of basic justice,”8 citizens should utilize something called public reason. Public reason, according to Rawls, is “the reason of citizens as such, it is the reason of the public; its subject is the good of the public and matters of fundamental justice; and its nature and content is public, being given by the ideals and principles expressed by society’s conception of political justice, and conducted open to view on that basis.”9 As the for limits or interference of public reason with comprehensive doctrines, Rawls declares: “plainly, religious, philosophical, and moral considerations of many kinds may hear properly play a role,” but the ideal holds that citizens in the public square as well as “members of political parties and for candidates in their campaigns and for other groups who support them” use public reason.10 Simply, public reason must serve as the chief guide for dialogue in the public square. Rawls goes even further, however, and remarks that denizens should vote based on public reason, or else “public discourse runs the risks of being hypocritical.”11 He also specifies the actions and speech of representatives. Public reason and its restrictions apply to “legislators when they speak on the floor of parliament, and to the executive in its public acts and pronouncements.”12 It likewise applies to the judiciary because judges must explain their decisions on “their understanding of the constitution and relevant statutes and precedents.”13 In short, citizens and public servants must bracket comprehensive doctrines, including religious ones, from the public square. In addressing counter arguments to public reason, Rawls attempts to mitigate confusion regarding unreasonable versus reasonable comprehensive doctrines. He states that “comprehensive doctrines that cannot support such a democratic society are not reasonable.” 14 Divine right monarchists as well as proponents of aristocracies would not fit under the umbrella of reasonableness. Moreover, “a reasonable comprehensive doctrine is one in which they are not overridden; it is the unreasonable doctrines in which 7 8 9

ibid., 148. ibid., 214. ibid., 213.

10 11 12 13 14

ibid., 215. ibid. ibid., 216. ibid. ibid., 483.

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reasonable political values are overridden.”15 The political overriding the comprehensive constitutes reasonability for him, and he deems comprehensive doctrines outside the common political values to be unreasonable. Within the discussion of public reason, Rawls adduces that “reasonable comprehensive doctrines” can be introduced “in public political discussion at any time, provided that in due course proper political reasons―and not reasons given solely by comprehensive doctrines―are presented that are sufficient to support whatever the comprehensive doctrines introduced are said to support.”16 He coins this occurrence the proviso and also acknowledges the beneficial importance of it: when doctrines accept it, “the commitment to constitutional democracy is publicly manifested.”17 This public manifestation, in turn, induces a reciprocal commitment to civility, which results in “a positive ground for bringing out such doctrines.” 18 He cites the example of public support for parochial schools as proof of how the proviso would facilitate ambiguity. Citizens on opposites sides are likely to “doubt one another’s allegiance to basic constitutional and political values.” 19 Therefore, he declares it wise for these people to “introduce their comprehensive doctrines” to “explain to one another how their views do indeed support those basic political values.20 Rawls draws from the issue of the separation of church and state―specifically, the debate between Patrick Henry and James Madison regarding the public funding of ministers. In this debate, both founders argued “almost entirely by reference to political values alone.”21 He also draws upon the separation of church and state argument given by Madison, to which Rawls declares that the reason for the separation is that it “protects religion from the state and the state from religion; it protects citizens from churches and citizens from one another.” 22 While this part of the history is correct, he neglects to mention the influence of natural rights philosophy on this separation, which was a comprehensive doctrine influencing political foundations at its core.23 It is at this intersection that Rawls remarks that his view regarding separation of church and state is consonant with that of Tocqueville’s, which now leads us to the exploration of Tocqueville’s thought on religion in the public square. In his journey through America, Tocqueville explored maladies that plague both America and democracies more broadly. Among such ailments is the love of materialism. 15 16 17

ibid., 483. ibid., 462. ibid., 463.

ibid., 464.

ibid. ibid.

20 21 22 23

ibid., 474. ibid., 476. For instance, see James Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance, paragraph one.

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This ill carries citizens away to “no longer notice the close bond that unites the particular fortune of each one of them to the prosperity of all.”24 This passage perhaps best summarizes the dangerous effects of materialism for Tocqueville: Democracy favors the taste for material enjoyments. This taste, if it becomes excessive, soon disposes men to believe that everything is only matter; and materialism, in turn, finally carries them with an insane fervor towards these same enjoyments. Such is the fatal circle into which democratic nations are pushed. It is good that they see the danger and restrain themselves.25 That is, materialism, as in the excessive attachment to goods, induces in denizens a belief in materialism, that “everything is only matter.” And that latter materialism reinvigorates the enjoyment in material things, only to then reinduce the latter materialism. For Tocqueville, these different forms of materialism manifest form a “fatal circle.” Tocqueville’s antidote for such a problem―namely, professing the immortality of the soul―would clearly run antithetical to Rawls’ reasoning because it employs a comprehensive doctrine. Tocqueville adduces that “legislators in democracies and all honest and enlightened men who live in democracies must apply themselves without respite to lifting up souls and keeping them pointed towards heaven.” 26 However, democracies―with the aim to mitigate materialism―need not necessarily profess a Christian creed. Rather, Tocqueville holds that “there is none [no religion] so false or so bad that it would not still be advantageous for a democratic people to profess” because “most religions are only general, simple and practical means to teach men the immortality of the soul.”27 He also suggests that men who profess that “everything perishes with the body” are “the natural enemies of the people.”28 Tocqueville’s belief regarding the restraint that religion provides democracy is so strong that he even fears a transition of religions: “do not try to tear men away from their ancient religions” because “love of material enjoyments comes to spread and fill the soul entirely” during the brief moment bereft of religious beliefs.29 Finally, in a humorous fashion, he argues that it would be better for a democracy to profess metempsychosis than materialism because “citizens risk becoming brutalized less by thinking that their soul is going to pass into the body of a pig than by believing that it is nothing.”30 Although this section is possibly filled with irony, one should not dismiss Tocqueville’s ideas. He clearly sees materialism―both the metaphysical body-soul relationship and the excessive attachment to goods―as a 24 Alexis

De Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. James T. Schleifer (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2010), 951.

ibid., 958.

ibid., 957. ibid., 958.

27 28 29 30

ibid., 957. ibid., 958. ibid.

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problematic phenomena for democracies. Religion, he sees, is the best means to constrain those phenomena. While Tocqueville believes that democracies should profess an immortality of the soul, he does recognize a problem with this proposition: who will profess that maxim. He remarks that “it is not easy to say what those who govern democratic peoples must do for those opinions to reign.”31 He further states that he does not harbor a belief in state religions as they “always sooner or later become fatal to the Church.32 Nor does he profess it to be beneficial to “grant indirectly to its [religion’s] ministers a political influence that the law refuses to them.”33 Tocqueville’s dedication to the separation of church and state is such that he “would prefer to chain priests within the sanctuary than to allow them out of it.”34 If the religion itself should not profess the immortality of the soul through the state, then only the state and its members are left: What I am going to say is going to do me harm in the eyes of politicians. I believe that the only effective means that governments can use to honor the dogma of the immortality of the soul is to act each day as if they believed it themselves; and I think that it is only by confronting scrupulously to religious morality in great affairs that they can claim to teach citizens to know, love and respect religious morality in little affairs.35 This is precisely why he declares that legislators and “all honest men who live in democracies must apply themselves without respite to lifting up souls and keeping them pointed towards heaven.” 36 It is necessary that all denizens of democracy unite and propagate “the sentiment of the grand and the love for non-material pleasures.” 37 After proffering the idea of comprehensive doctrines (religion, specifically, for Tocqueville) and its intersection with the public square, a dichotomy is evident. Tocqueville, on one hand, recognizes the malady of materialism for democracy and proposes the use of religion to mitigate its effects. Rawls, on the other hand, would explicitly oppose such use of religion.38 There also seems to exist a dichotomy in the reasons for study between the two thinkers. Whereas Tocqueville seems to recognize the importance of examining the social realities underlying and coinciding with democracy (like materialism and religion), Rawls appears to differ. He states that “while a conception of public reason must recognize the significance of these social roots of 31 32

ibid., 961. ibid.

ibid.

ibid., 962. ibid.

35 36 37

ibid., 957. ibid.

See, Rawls, p. 216: public reason applies to “legislators when they speak on the floor of parliament, and to the executive in its public acts and pronouncements.”

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constitutional democracy and note how they strengthen its vital institutions, it need not itself undertake a study” of them. 39 Although he neglects a study of the religious and social roots of liberalism, Rawls does recognize democratic problems. He contends that materialism, particularly “market-strategic advertising,” which occurs in “imperfect and oligopolistic markets dominated by a relatively few firms” induces deleterious effects and is “socially wasteful.”40 Rawls proposes that society limit such advertising “through taxes or government-sponsored agreements among firms, thereby releasing funds ‘for investment or other useful social ends.’”41 Another dichotomy is evident, though: Tocqueville sees religion serving as an organic restraint on democratic ills, whereas Rawls foresees a state institution as the best means. While Rawls would believe using Tocqueville’s strategy to be a betrayal of core precepts of liberalism, a closer study in liberalism from Rawls would perhaps reveal a more intricate and complicated relationship between comprehensive doctrines and the state. As David Schaefer argues: Although Rawls’s endeavor to promote consensus by bracketing the problem of the good was prefigured by Hobbes’ and Locke’s denials of the existence of a summum bonum and their elevation of the principle of consent over that of wisdom, both thinkers surely do represent their doctrines as accounts of what is by nature good for human beings (or how to avoid what is naturally bad for them).42 That is, early liberal thinkers, such as Hobbes and Locke, employ a more robust moral, and perhaps even metaphysical, conception of politics. They do not restrict the good as severely as Rawls does. There are other ideas from Tocqueville that reveal an inadequacy in Rawls’ system, specifically the use of public reason bereft of comprehensive doctrines, especially religion. After infamously declaring that “America is one of the countries of the world where the precepts of Descartes are least studied and best followed,” Tocqueville begins an examination of the sources of belief in democracies. Tocqueville posits that a society cannot “prosper without similar beliefs” because commonality in ideas is a prerequisite for common action.43 In addition to holding common beliefs, citizens should draw “opinions from the same source.”44 That source often serves as an intellectual and moral authority for democracies. “The question,” Tocqueville continues, “is not to know if an intellectual authority exists in democratic centuries, but only to

Rawls, 464 FN 52.

ibid., 364-365. David Lewis Schaefer, Illiberal Justice: John Rawls vs. the American Political Tradition (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2007), 259. 41

42 43 44

ibid., 281. Tocqueville, 713. ibid.

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know where its repository is and what its extent will be.”45 For Tocqueville, religion best serves as that authority. In answering deep philosophical questions, religion “leaves the mind the strength and the leisure to proceed with calmness and with energy in the whole arena that religion abandons to it.”46 Instead of religion serving as a lodestar of morality, Tocqueville fears that the majority will usurp that moral authority in democratic societies and will hinder “the free development of thought in the United States.”47 “After escaping from the interest of class and traditions of family,” he continues, “the human mind would chain itself to the will of the greatest number.”48 Tocqueville acknowledges the inability to completely abolish the effects of a moral majority in democracies and instead would elect to “moderate its use and work hard to get it to limit itself after overturning all rival powers.”49 As such, the inadequacy in Rawls’ theory lies in its placement of moral authority in overlapping consensus which citizens debate solely through public reason. It is true that contemporary liberal societies are replete with pluralism in a way wholly different from Tocqueville’s era. But as Tocqueville admonishes, all societies have a moral authority. With Rawls’ system, this moral authority manifested in a political force derives from the overlapping consensus, is debated through public reason, and inherently brackets religious language and ideas due to contours of the public reason. Rawls does establish the proviso, but this simply means that citizens can introduce religious language qua political but not religious qua religious. Citizens simply must translate the religious language into a political one. By bracketing these comprehensive doctrines and concomitant language, Rawls removes the benefits of religion, like its impact on materialism. Moreover, he risks placing moral authority strictly in the overlapping consensus, which could simply represent the majority, sans institutional restraint. Therefore, those outside the overlapping consensus, those deemed unreasonable, would risk social consequences as they would be the minority. Tocqueville’s desire for legislators to proclaim the immortality of the soul does not fit within the contours of the proviso because that type of invocation is explicitly religious. The distinction, however, between secular and religious does not appear to bear the same significance for Tocqueville as it does for Rawls. Religious authority does the best job of restraining materialistic vices in democracies, so it should be used. The insignificance of the secular-religious distinction is evocative of Michael Perry, where he says regarding the use of the Good Samaritan passage in political discourse: Such a narrative practice, which may not even draw on a religious tradition or traditions not one’s own, is not sectarian nor any more divisive, in our pluralistic 45 46 47 48 49

ibid., 717. ibid., 716. ibid., 721. ibid., 722. ibid., 723.

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context, than ‘secular’ narrative about how it is good or fitting for human beings to live their lives.50 That is, religious narratives framed for public discourse can have an important role that is not more divisive than secular narratives. Rawls’ concern regarding comprehensive doctrines exploiting government force is a legitimate one. But he does not emphasize the benefits that comprehensive doctrines, particularly religion, can serve for democracy. Tocqueville’s sociological and historical study of materialism and its deleterious effects render Rawls’ system and notion of the common good deficient. Rawls holds the common good to be citizens making “use of their liberties.”51 But materialism encourages the belief that “the exercise of political rights seems to [citizens] a tiresome inconvenience that distracts them from their industry.”52 It is only through religion and its consequent restraint of materialism that liberty and its connection to the common good are fully manifested. Rawls’ system is devoid of a means to restrain democratic vices, like materialism, whereas Tocqueville recognizes the importance of religion to fulfill that role. Finally, religion provides responses to many complicated metaphysical and philosophical questions and so allows society to better explore “the whole arena that religion abandons to it.”53 In a contemporary context, we could say that religion has an important role in answering bioethical questions―concerning gene therapy, artificial intelligence, and the like―because it serves in an intellectual capacity for democracy. Tocqueville’s insistence on the importance of religion is a valuable idea to hearken back to, at least for more legitimate inquiry and comparison to modern thinkers like Rawls.

Kent Greenawalt, Private Consciences and Public Reasons (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 91. Rawls directly cites Kent Greenawalt’s book Private Consciences and Public Reasons, where this quote appears, on page 463 in Political Liberalism. 51

Bernard G. Prusak, “Politics, Religion, and the Public Good: An Interview with Philosopher John Rawls,” Commonweal Magazine 125, no. 16 (1998), http://www.nlnrac.org/node/276. 52 Tocqueville, 951. 53

Tocqueville, 716.

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A Seed the Never Grew: An Essay Against Abortion Maura Bradley The pro-life movement is one that stands against all attacks on human life from conception to natural death. The intentional taking of life —as in the case of abortion—is murderous and harmful to all those involved. As a result, the movement calls individuals to protect the right to human life when it is threatened. It maintains that abortion is not the only answer for pregnant women in crisis, as society often asserts, and that other viable, realistic options exist, like adoption. Most importantly, pro-lifers strive to protect life in the name of love by defending the most marginalized among us—unborn children, women, minorities, refugees, the homeless, those with disabilities, and more. All of our lives have worth simply because we are human persons; this movement seeks to promote that view. As our society continues to normalize the routine killing of human life, it is important to call attention to the sheer number of lives lost since Roe v. Wade. Since the 1973 decision, over 60 million unborn children have been aborted in the United States according to the CDC. That’s approximately the entire population of Italy. Today, about 1 in 4 women will have an abortion by age of forty-five as claimed by the Guttmacher Institute. Similarly, according to the previous source, nearly a fifth of pregnancies ended in abortion in 2014. This research shows that the procedure is extremely common in the US, despite recent declines in the number of abortions per year. Personally, my belief in the pro-life movement is rooted strongly in my Catholic faith. Throughout my upbringing, I have learned that all life is sacred and should be treated as such. I believe it is inhumane to take innocent life, particularly of unborn children. Therefore, I am opposed to abortion on the principle that all life has worth. I am particularly unsupportive of late-term abortions, which crush and dismember unborn children in the womb. At that point during the pregnancy, the child is capable of feeling pain as it has a developed nervous system. Although these inhumane procedures compromise a small percentage of the overall number, around 13,000 late-term abortions are performed each year. Furthermore, as prenatal care and technology advance, fetuses become more viable outside the womb early on, exacerbating the tragedy that is abortion. My pro-life stance is also rooted in the American belief that everyone in this nation has the right to life. As stated in the 14th Amendment, no one person should be “deprive[d] any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” Such a clause clearly instills respect for human life in our Constitution and, as a result, our nation’s attitude toward personhood. The 14th Amendment also notes that the state cannot “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” In other words, no one person’s life is worth more than another. If our Constitution has such a high regard for life and equality, why, then, are the unborn seemingly excluded? We should seek to !37

protect the lives of those whose lives are threatened, including the unborn, because prolife values are inherently American. In the words of Fr. James Martin, SJ, â&#x20AC;&#x153;I am not only for the dignity of the human being from the moment of conception, but also for the dignity of the human being until the natural end of life. For life does not end with birth.â&#x20AC;? As an aspiring lawyer and politician, I long for policies that promise care for the unborn, the poor, the aged, and the infirm. I want the candidates that I vote for to tend to the marginalized among us, including refugees, the homeless, those with disabilities, and minorities. The pro-life movement represents helping those in need from conception to natural death through any means necessary. Such is the cause that I have come to know and vehemently support.

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The Voice for Choice Anonymous Growing up on the West Coast, I was surrounded by a predominantly liberal culture. I attended progressive schools with no practice of religion and no dress code, and I even called teachers by their first names. So, as you can imagine, the transition to Notre Dame was a huge jump. Holding pro-choice beliefs, I have felt and still feel like an outcast on campus, taking the side of an incredibly unpopular opinion. It goes without saying that the pro-life position is undoubtedly the majority position at Notre Dame, with over 800 people attending the D.C. March for Life in January. However, at 4:00 a.m. on January 18th, 55 students filed onto a bus and started their own journey to our nation’s capital. The Women’s March began in 2017 as a worldwide protest in response to the inauguration of Donald Trump. The Women’s March is multi-faceted, combatting issues of authoritarianism, misogyny, white nationalism, racism, homophobia, classism, ageism, sexism, and much more. However, the most prominent debate between the Women’s March and the March for Life is abortion. Prochoice activists emphasize the right of women to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy, whereas the pro-life movement emphasizes the right of the embryo or fetus to gestate to term and to be born. It is a moral issue, concerning commencement of human personhood, the rights of a fetus, and a woman’s right over her own body, and here is my argument for the pro-choice side. First, there is no clear definition of when life commences. There are signs at March for Life rallies ranging from “Heartbeats detected must be protected” to “Human being at conception.” Those are two different times in pregnancy. Catholics preach abstinence, but now you want to talk scientifically about defining when life starts once a woman is pregnant? If we are going to become so scientific, I urge pro-lifers to invest their efforts in teaching sexual education more than abstinence. Not all women can practice safe sex and avoid getting pregnant, or have sufficient sex education. Why doesn’t society talk openly about procreation and proper sexual education? Studies have repeatedly shown that abstinence-only education increases rates of teenage pregnancy and STDs, while comprehensive sex education lowers such risks. Education and knowledge helps to prevent rape, sexual abuse, STDs, HIV, and abortions. Although, even with comprehensive sexual education, remember that no contraception is 100% effective, most birth control pills being only approximately 91% effective. Secondly, consenting to sexual intercourse does not mean consenting to 9 months of pregnancy and having a child. If you believe that choosing to engage premarital sex or intercourse makes a woman responsible for having a child, your pro-life stance has everything to do with my behavior and not the value of a life. A fetus is not a human being because it cannot survive on its own. It is fully dependent on the mother’s body, !39

unlike born human beings. Therefore, a fetus does not have a right to life when it is dependent upon someone else’s body for its existence. For instance, people donate organs, such as kidneys and livers, to save lives. But, they also have the right to refuse to donate their organs because of personal autonomy. Abortion is the termination of a pregnancy, not a baby. Lastly, please stop trying to defund Planned Parenthood. Planned Parenthood does more than perform safe and legal abortions. They have more than 600 health centers, offering birth control, cancer screenings, STI testing, and more resources to over 2.4 million people across the country. They provide affordable and accessible health care, as well as information and education. In 2017, the breakdown of services was the following: 48.7% STI Testing and Treatment, 27.1% Contraception, 13.4% Women’s Health Services, 6.3% Cancer Screenings and Prevention, 3.4% Abortion Services, and 1.1% Other Services. Abortions will always exist, so it just depends if they are safe and legal. Outlawing abortions does not stop abortions. It will only increase the number of unsafe abortions performed. Data suggests that women will seek abortions regardless of whether or not they are legal. An estimated 68,000 women die every year from back-alley abortions, which are more common when abortion is illegal or inaccessible. Yet, when birth control and contraceptives are more widely accessible, abortion rates go down. Women will resort to extreme measures if abortion is made illegal. Picture a coat hanger or nearly anything that could be used to induce a miscarriage, not to mention the consequences that follow: uterine perforation, infections, infertility, and deaths of women. Does that sound pro-life? Signs at the March for Life claim pro-lifers are also pro-woman. Yet, they care more about the life of an unborn child than the health and safety of the mother. Prowoman is about fighting for the social, political, and economic equality of the sexes, but pro-lifers treat the fetus as more important than the woman and her personal medical decisions. What I decide to do with my own body is no one else’s business because it is not yours. Pregnancy lasts nine months, disrupting one’s body, education, employment, and family life and jeopardizing a woman’s ability to achieve full equality with men. Abortion is never an easy choice, sometimes the best choice, but always a woman’s choice. If you identify as pro-choice, I promise you are not alone, and there are people at Notre Dame similar to you. This year, registration for the Women’s March filled up in 9 minutes and over 200 people expressed interest in attending. I look forward to even greater attendance in the future. Overall, though, whether you identify as pro-life or prochoice, I encourage you to educate yourself, to avoid getting caught up in politics, and to be informed before you take a stance. Knowledge is power, and your voice matters.

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The Impracticable War John Hale Since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, China has been growing rapidly both economically and militarily. The country, on pace to rival the long-standing hegemony of the United States, has been expanding its security in the South China Sea and becoming more aggressive with its policies and military operations. Though war is always technically possible, China’s recent growth and modernization efforts are not likely to result in conflict with the United States. Globalization has increased the importance of international trade by intertwining economies and giving states a stake in each other, making cooperation easier and more beneficial than war. Since fighting would mean that both China and the United States would lose significant chunks of their mutually reliant economies, the costs of war today are higher than ever before. China’s rise is not likely to result in a war with the United States because the profound interdependence of modern international trade and rising costs of international conflict have rendered combat obsolete and inefficient. Economic interdependence decreases the likelihood of war between China and the United States. As Richard Rosecrance argues, the growing interpenetration of economies in today’s world means that the economy of one state owns part of another. He writes that after 1945, “one country slowly developed a stake in another.”1 China and the United States, therefore, have incentive to facilitate, or at the very least not harm, each other’s economic productivity. Such mutual reliance between the two countries has invalidated Kenneth Waltz’s argument that states’ competing desires to survive make war inevitable. With the interpenetration of today’s markets, Chinese and American survival are codependent rather than competing interests. As Thomas Wright notes, China and the United States are the two largest economies in the world and extensive, deep-seated interdependence will reduce tensions between them. For example, Chinese President Xi Jinping recently called for more trade while Hillary Clinton, as U.S. Secretary of State, affirmed solidarity with China by stating that one country cannot succeed without the other.2 Such deep commitment and mutually beneficial economic ties between the United States and China greatly reduce the likelihood of a war between them. China’s dependence on exports makes war with the United States infeasible. China’s current account surplus has soared to eleven percent of the country’s gross domestic product, up from low single digits just ten years ago. This means that China relies on other countries, especially the United States, to import Chinese products. No

Richard Rosecrance, “Trade and Power.” Betts, Richard K. Conflict After the Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War and Peace, (New York, Routledge, 2017), 315. 2

Thomas Wright, “Sifting Through Interdependence.” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Fall 2013), 9.

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countries leave “as large a footprint on the world’s marketplace”3 as China and the United States. Economic globalization has made China’s economy deeply reliant on the United States, which makes war between the two unlikely as China depends on American consumers to purchase their products. Jennifer Lind argues that China’s recent economic centralization, such as the establishment of $100 billion New Development Bank headquartered in Shanghai, threatens the United States.4 By suggesting that China’s trend toward regional hegemony threatens global stability, however, Lind overlooks the fact that Chinese exports would drop sharply if China were to pick a fight with the United States. While some argue that interdependence does not affect the likelihood of war, there is much evidence to suggest otherwise. Many people who argue that globalization does not decrease the likelihood of war point to World War I as an example since the United States fought Germany despite their economic ties. This argument, however, is invalid because as Rosecrance suggests, “the prevalence of the trading option since 1945 raises peaceful possibilities” 5 that were not possible during the first two World Wars. China can not afford to lose its biggest trading partner, nor could the United States afford to lose such a significant chunk of its imports. Growing economic interdependence between China and the United States thus decreases the likelihood of a war between the two. The costs of a war between the United States and China today would outweigh any potential benefits. As John Mueller points out, “war’s physical costs have risen”6 since the catastrophic World Wars. This is because nuclear proliferation and the widespread permeation of other deadly non-nuclear weapons today has made war more destructive than at any other point in history. While it is true that many states have chosen to fight wars despite costliness, such as the American involvement in Vietnam, no previous conflict could compare to the potential destruction of a war between China and the United States. The devastating capabilities of modern weapons have led the developed world to regard war as more repulsive, uncivilized, and immoral than ever before. No potential gains, therefore, could justify a war of such magnitude. The prospect of a war between China and the United States is so intimidating that neither side would be willing to act first because the destruction would be great and the gains minimal. War between the United States and China would be largely counterproductive and neither side would be willing to strike first. Today, deliberation about war is different than it was before military modernization. Carl Kaysen affirms this by observing that

Dani Rodrik, “A Sane Globalization.” Art, Robert J. and Robert Jervis, eds. International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues, 13th ed. (New York, Pearson, 2017), 365. 4

Jennifer Lind, “Life in China's Asia: What Regional Hegemony Would Look Like,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 97, No. 2 (Mar/Apr 2018), 72. 5 Rosecrance, “Trade and Power,” 310. 6

John Mueller, “The Obsolescence of Major War,” Betts, Richard K. Conflict After the Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War and Peace, 5th ed. (New York, Routledge, 2017), 176.

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“profound changes in economics and politics in the last century and a half”7 have changed the terms of the calculation of war. He argues that making war almost never contributes positively to the goals of economic well-being and social peace. In fact, most states that have initiated wars in the last century, such as Germany in World War II, have lost. Better communication, more powerful weapons, and the more effective organization of armies have made modern warfare more destructive than at any other point in history. Technological advancements in weaponry and communication have increased the intensity of war, making it the all-consuming, economically draining struggle. Robert Jervis backs up this sentiment by stating that “modernization has increased the pains of war”8 to the point that large scale conflict in the nuclear age would produce no clear winner. Before World War II, and especially before the Industrial Revolution, wars were shorter, gains were greater, and fewer people were needed. Military modernization has changed this by intensifying war to the point of counterproductivity. Non-nuclear war would be devastating enough, but the nuclear capabilities of both China and the United States raise the costliness even higher. As Jervis points out, mutual second-strike capability means that both sides would lose by destroying each other. Nuclear war between the United States and China would be characterized by mutually assured destruction far surpassing that of any previous conflict. Even reckless leaders, Jervis affirms, would “be restrained by the unimaginable loss of worldwide life.”9 Any Chinese or American leader who values the large society they govern would be very reluctant to engage such a powerful opponent in war. John Mearsheimer also argues that nuclear weapons are a “powerful force for peace.”10 The bigger the nuclear stockpile, according to this logic, the lower the chances of war are because mutually assured destruction fosters peace by disincentivizing combat. The intensity and costliness of modern warfare, therefore, decrease the likelihood of a conflict between the United States and China. War between China and the United States is as inconceivable as it is improbable. Both countries economic interdependence yields a path of cooperation rather than conflict. Modern war is more destructive than ever, and its rising costs span economic and social boundaries. Overall, mutual economic reliance, combined with the deadliness of modern warfare, make peace between the United States and China more likely than war.

Carl Kaysen, “Is War Obsolete? A Review Essay,” International Security, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Spring 1990), 49.

Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon, (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1989), 25. 9 Jervis, 5. 10

John Mearsheimer “Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War,” Betts, Richard K. Conflict After the Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War and Peace, 5th ed. (New York, Routledge, 2017), 19.

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The Myth of the Chosen Nation and American Foreign Policy Nicholas Grandpre Introduction The belief in a special relationship between God and America is hardly new. In 1630, John Winthrop famously evoked Jesus of Nazareth’s Sermon on the Mount, proclaiming that the Massachusetts Bay Colony was to be “a city upon a hill.”1 This spirit of Puritan providentialism and America’s founding documents—primarily the Declaration of the Independence and the U.S. Constitution—combined to comprise the foundation of what Robert Bellah would later deem “American civil religion.” According to political scientist Ellis West, “a civil religion is a set of beliefs and attitudes that explain the meaning and purpose of any given political society in terms of its relationship to a transcendent, spiritual reality.”2 Bellah conceived of American civil religion as “[a] public religious dimension [which] is expressed in a set of beliefs, symbols, and rituals.”3 This set of beliefs, symbols, and rituals is not overtly Christian though it does place its faith in the existence of a higher Being “actively interested and involved in history, with a special concern for America.” 4 Thus, a cornerstone of American civil religion is the belief that America was and is God’s chosen nation—a new Israel. From Winthrop to Bush, American civil religion has enforced the myth that America is the sole possessor of a special covenant with God—a chosen nation destined and even required to do God’s will on Earth. The chosen nation myth has endowed U.S. foreign policy with a purpose broader than the procurement of the strict national interest. To be sure, this myth has not informed every foreign policy decision. However, it has, at times, led the United States to think in dangerously grandiose, sometimes Manichean thinking. Such thinking has led to the implementation of a hubristic interventionist foreign policy that has cost taxpayers billions, fermented further anti-American sentiment, and, most importantly, resulted in the needless deaths of both American service members and civilian bystanders. Theological Roots of the Chosen Nation Myth At multiple points, the Old Testament establishes the covenant between God and the nation of Israel. In Genesis 17:6-8, God makes a promise to Abraham: “I will give you a lot of descendants, and in the future they will become great nations… I will give you and them the land in which you are now a foreigner.” In Exodus 3:8, God says to 1

The American Yawp Reader, “John Winthrop Dreams of a City on a Hill, 1630,” accessed April 23, 2018.

Walter McDougall, The Tragedy of U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven, Yale University Press, 2016), 30-1. Robert N. Bellah, “Civil Religion in America,” Daedalus 117, no. 3 (1988): 100, accessed April 19, 2018. http:// www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/04/20020430-5.html 3

Ibid., 104.

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Moses, “I have come down to rescue [my people] from the hand of the Egyptians and to bring them up out of that land into a good and spacious land, a land flowing with milk and honey.” In 2 Samuel 7:10, the Lord Almighty speaks to the prophet Nathan, telling him to relay a message to King David: “I will provide a place for my people Israel and will plant them so that they can have a home of their own and no longer be disturbed.” The above passages, along with many similar Old Testament texts, establish an explicit covenant between God and his people, Israel. God tells his chosen people that one day he will deliver them from their state of affliction and persecution into a promised land. The Puritans, who came to the New World to escape Old World corruption and persecution, saw themselves as a new Israel. As William Cavanaugh notes, “[s]ettling in a new land suggested a parallel with the Israelites leaving bondage in Egypt and claiming the Promised Land.”5 Increase Mather, a 17th century Massachusetts Puritan minister who would become President of Harvard College articulated the Puritan belief that they were God’s chosen people in a 1674 speech: “God hath called out a people, even out of all parts of a Nation, which he hath also had a great favour towards, and hath brought them by a mighty hand, and an outstretched arm, over a greater than the Red Sea, and here he hath planted them.”6 The conception of the Puritans as God’s new chosen people served as the foundation of American exceptionalism, which William Cavanaugh considers to be “an explicitly theological notion, based in the doctrine of election. Just as God chose the Israelites to accomplish God’s special purpose on earth, so God has chosen the United States.”7 American exceptionalism, based on the assumption that America is preordained to carry out God’s will, predates the political founding of the United States. In 1776, the Continental Congress commissioned Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, and John Adams with the task of designing a seal for the nascent nation. Jefferson “proposed the Children of Israel in the wilderness, led by a cloud by day and a pillar of fire by night,” 8 while Franklin proposed “Moses standing on the Shore, and extending his Hand over the Sea, thereby causing the same to overwhelm Pharaoh who is sitting in an open Chariot, a Crown on his Head and a Sword in his Hand.”9 Both Jefferson and Franklin sought to include the imagery of Exodus on one of America’s founding symbols in order to conflate America with Israel. While neither design came to fruition, the Latin phrase “annuit coeptis,” which translates to “God has favored our

William T. Cavanaugh, “Messianic Nation: A Christian Theological Critique of American Exceptionalism,” U. St. Thomas L.J. 3, no. 261 (2005): 263, accessed January 26, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/13/politics/textof-president-bushs-press-conference.html. 6 Nicholas Guyatt, Providence and the Invention of the United States, 1607-1865 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 48. 7

Cavanaugh, “Messianic Nation,” 262. Derek H. Davis, Religion and the Continental Congress: 1774-1789: Contributions to Original Intent (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 138. 8

Ibid., 138.

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undertaking,” sits atop the reverse side of the Great Seal.10 The myth of the chosen nation is an ancient one, with its roots in Old Testament stories of Israel. Brought to the New World by the pilgrims, the myth permeated the founding fabric of the American Republic, creating a nation conceiving of itself as “set aside for providential works.”11 The Chosen Nation Myth in the Early American Republic Since the early years of the Republic, the United States’ foreign policy has morphed from a reserved, non-interventionist posture into an aggressive, crusading one bent on shaping the world according to its will. The reservation of Washington and Jefferson’s foreign policy was no doubt partially a product of America’s geopolitical situation. As historian Walter McDougall argues, westward expansion also played a part in formulating a neutral foreign policy since “no sane American wanted to risk the nation’s Manifest Destiny by picking ideological quarrels with overseas monarchs.”12 A relatively powerless nation, the youthful republic simply did not have the wherewithal to exert any significant influence in the international arena. At the end of his presidency, Washington delivered his now famous Farewell Address, in which he called on the United States to “cultivate peace and harmony with all” while “[steering] clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world.”13 Washington’s relatively reserved message does not imply that he did not conceive of America as Providentially blessed. In his first inaugural address, Washington proclaimed that “no people can be bound to acknowledge and adore the Invisible Hand which conducts the affairs of men more than those of the United States. Every step… seems to have been distinguished by some token of providential agency.”14 Jefferson was like Washington in both his conservative diplomacy and faith in Providentialism, writing that “we wish not to meddle with the internal affairs of any country, nor with the general affairs of Europe,” while also “[congratulating] the people for ‘acknowledging and adoring an overruling Providence.’”15 Jefferson, in his Second Inaugural Address, explicitly links the United States and Israel: “I shall need, too, the favor of that Being in whose hands we are, who led our fathers, as Israel of old, from their native land and planted them in a country flowing with all the necessaries and comforts of life.”16 In this analogy, as Bellah explains, “Europe is Egypt; America, the 10

Bellah, “Civil Religion in America,” 111.

George McKenna, The Puritan Origins of American Patriotism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 356.

McDougall, The Tragedy of U.S. Foreign Policy, 31. George Washington to Friends and Fellow Citizens, September 19, 1796, in Yale Law School: The Avalon Project.

13 14

George Washington, “First Inaugural Address of George Washington” (speech, New York, NY, April 30, 1789), Yale Law School: The Avalon Project. 15 McDougall, The Tragedy of U.S. Foreign Policy, 54-55. 16

Thomas Jefferson, “Second Inaugural Address of Thomas Jefferson” (speech, Washington, DC, March 4, 1805), Yale Law School: The Avalon Project.

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promised land. God has led his people to establish a new sort of social order that shall be a light unto all the nations.”17 The Founders believed in Providentialism and conceived of America as a chosen nation enjoying a special relationship with God. However, they did not believe that America’s status compelled her to proselytize the good word of republican democracy at sword point; rather, they were content to let America exist as the city on a hill, a shining republican exemplar of civic virtue. Westward Expansion & Manifest Destiny During the 19th century, America began the lumbering transition from an exemplary land of milk and honey to a crusading state bent on imposing its will and its values on the rest of the world. The first step in this transition was westward expansion, partially driven by manifest destiny. Arguing in favor of manifest destiny, John O’Sullivan, a 19th century journalist generally considered to have coined the phrase, proclaimed that it is “[America’s] manifest destiny to overspread and to possess the whole of the continent which Providence has given us for the development of the great experiment of Liberty.”18 There is some debate as to how central manifest destiny was to westward expansion. Anders Stephanson, a historian of U.S. foreign policy, “stresses that the Puritan legacy of providence, sacred errand, and millennial progress… did more than anything else to motivate American expansion across [North America].”19 Others, like historian Frederick Merk, argue that manifest destiny “lacked national, sectional, or party following commensurate with its magnitude… it did not reflect the national spirit.”20 Even if it was a non-mainstream view during its day, the Providential spirit of manifest destiny is representative of a strain within American thought which became more prevalent during America’s transition from a provincial, non-interventionist republic to a growing power tempted by imperialism during the late 19th century. The Chosen Nation Myth During the Twentieth-Century Throughout the twentieth-century as the U.S. grew in stature and power, American providentialism continued to play an important part in formulating both national identity and foreign policy. The idea of America as a new Israel was at the forefront of many twentieth-century American leaders’ minds. At the turn of the century, Senator Albert Beveridge defended America’s flirtations with colonialism by “exhort[ing] Americans to realize that God had given to them a noble land with a glorious history but still a more 17

Bellah, “Civil Religion in America,” 104.

Encyclopedia of the New American Nation, “Exceptionalism – Manifest Destiny,” accessed April 23, 2018. http:// www.americanforeignrelations.com/E-N/Exceptionalism-Manifest-destiny.html. 19 Andrew Preston, “Bridging the Gap between the Sacred and the Secular in the History of American Foreign Relations,” Diplomatic History 30 no. 5 (2006): 798, accessed April 21, 2018, http://www.jstor.org/stable/24915047. 20

Frederick Merk, Manifest Destiny and Mission in American History: A Reinterpretation (New York: Knopf, 1963), 215.

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glorious future because the march of the American flag around the world was the fulfillment of God’s purpose.”21 A sense of American destiny was also very much alive in Woodrow Wilson’s progressive vision. In a 1911 speech, he argued that “liberty is a spiritual conception, and when men take up arms to set other men free there is something sacred and holy in the warfare.”22 A year later, he articulated his deep faith in America’s destiny: “I do believe in Providence. I believe that God presided over the inception of this nation; I believe that God planted in us the vision of liberty.”23 A sincere faith in American providentialism was present in both America’s colonial endeavors and in Wilson’s mission to make the world safe for democracy. The chosen nation myth alone did not cause America to conquer the Philippines or to enter the Great War; economic concerns and balance of power politics took precedence here. A realist concern for America’s interests was the primary factor of the vast majority of U.S. policymakers’ decisions. However, the chosen nation myth has filled Americans with a sense of transcendent importance. This has led America to be, at times, less likely to question its decisions once a sense of Providential destiny is fully imbued in the policy itself. No doubt many Americans believed they were doing God’s work when repelling the evil of Nazism and liberating Europe for a second time in a quarter-century. Roosevelt frequently made use of grandiose rhetoric: “our enemies are guided by brutal cynicism, by unholy contempt for the human race. We are inspired by a faith that goes back…to the first chapter of the Book of Genesis: God created man in His own image.”24 This is not an indictment on Roosevelt. Sometimes evil must be called by its name and fought to ends of the Earth. During the Second World War America was the only nation outside of Europe in a position to do so. During the latter half of the twentieth-century, U.S. foreign policy and national identity was not immune to the chosen nation myth. Leaders continued to use providential language as a rhetorical device. Eisenhower emphasized the importance of maintaining “our convictions, because fundamentally Democracy is nothing in the world but a spiritual conviction, a conviction that each of us is enormously valuable because of a certain standing before our own God.”25 During the Eisenhower administration, “under God” was inserted into the Pledge of Allegiance and “In God We Trust” was made the national motto—all in an effort to define American identity in Manichean terms against Godless communism. Kennedy ended his First Inaugural by calling on Americans to “go forth to lead the land we love, asking His blessing and His help, but knowing that here on

21 22

McDougall, The Tragedy of U.S. Foreign Policy, 122. Ibid., 142.

Ibid., 144. Franklin D. Roosevelt, “1942 State of the Union” (speech, Washington, DC, January 6, 1942), The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=16253. 24

Preston, “Bridging the Gap,” 783.

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earth God’s work must truly be our own.”26 Reagan frequently recalled Winthrop’s “city on a hill.” The explicit use of religious language by U.S. presidents was not generally used as an explicit justification for U.S. foreign policy, but, like Eisenhower’s usage, it undoubtedly framed American national identity as a force for Good throughout the globe. However, the tumult of Vietnam and Watergate led a generation to question American providentialism in a way that past generations perhaps had not. Specifically, the regional popularity of American providence shifted post-Vietnam: “[t]he Northeast, the birthplace of the Puritan myth, was now the region most hospitable to doubters… New England… was abandoning the whole idea of Providence in American life.”27 As the Puritan myth waned in the birthplace of Puritanism, Southern evangelicals and even some Catholics embraced American providentialism. The Chosen Nation Myth After September 11, 2001 Just three days after the attacks on 9/11, at a National Day of Prayer and Remembrance Service, President George W. Bush proclaimed, “we do not claim to know all the ways of Providence, yet we can trust in them, placing our confidence in the loving God behind all of life…may He guide us now, and may God continue to bless the United States of America.”28 “Continue to bless” implies an existing relationship between God and America. In a 2004 press conference at the White House, Bush argued that America “[has] an obligation to help the spread of freedom.…that is what we have been called to do, as far as I’m concerned.” 29 The use of the word “called” in the latter quotation implies a purpose bestowed by a higher power upon America. While perhaps the former is simply an example of symbolic language used to comfort a shaken, grieving nation and the latter a high-minded moral appeal, the language is unmistakably religious. In the aftermath of September 11, such language became an important rhetorical device for the Bush administration’s justification of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Bush’s use of religious language in addressing the nation after the attacks are characteristic of the way he viewed the War on Terror. Bush did not wage the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq solely because he thought doing so was in the national interest — though he certainly thought they were, as did the majority of both Congress and the

John F. Kennedy, “President Kennedy’s First Inaugural Address” (speech, Washington, DC, January 20, 1961), John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, https://www.jfklibrary.org/Research/Research-Aids/ReadyReference/JFK-Quotations/Inaugural-Address.aspx. 27

McKenna, Puritan Origins, 358-9. George W. Bush, “Remarks at the National Day of Prayer and Remembrance Service” (speech, Washington, DC, September 14, 2001), The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=63645. 28

George W. Bush, “Text of President Bush’s Press Conference” (speech, Washington, DC, April 13, 2004), The New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/13/politics/text-of-president-bushs-press-conference.html.

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public at the outset of both invasions. 30 Rather, Bush viewed the wars as critical to America fulfilling its mission in the world: to stand for liberty and justice for all, to fight evil, and to support the exportation of democracy.31 In a 2002 speech, Bush argued, “America has always had a special mission to defend justice and advance freedom around the world.”32 This sentiment was encoded into the administration’s 2002 National Security Strategy: “the United States must defend liberty and justice because these principles are right and true for all people everywhere.”33 Interestingly, the argument presented was not that the United States must defend liberty and justice because it is in the United States’ national interest to do so; it was that the United States must defend liberty and justice because it is the moral thing to do. Bush’s Manichean characterization of the War on Terror exemplifies the danger of believing that America is predestined to do God’s will not only in America but across the globe. As Senator J. William Fulbright brilliantly opined in 1966, “when some event or leader of opinion has aroused the people to a state of high emotion, our puritan spirit has tended to break through, leading us to look at the world through the distorting prism of a harsh and angry moralism.”34 The chosen nation mythology is, at times, a noble mythology: it has called America to fight Nazism and promote democratic values. However, it is a belief which, especially in times of national tragedy, can foment in the American consciousness a harsh, jingoistic sense of moral superiority, blinding American’s from seeing any negative consequences to a swashbuckling, ordained-by-God foreign policy. Conclusion The belief in American as a new Israel is approaching its 400th anniversary, if its origins are somewhat arbitrarily traced to Winthrop’s 1630 speech. Over that period of time, it has proven to be a resilient, seductive belief influencing clergy and laymen, constituents and representatives, Founding Fathers and Progressive reformers alike. American providentialism, as Arthur Schlesinger writes, “brought the republic from the 30

David W. Moore, Gallup News, “Eight of Ten Americans Support Ground War in Afghanistan,” last modified November 1, 2001, accessed April 23, 2018. http://news.gallup.com/poll/5029/eight-americans-support-ground-warafghanistan.aspx; Lydia Saad, Gallup News, “Top Ten Findings about Public Opinion and Iraq,” last modified October 8, 2002, accessed April 23, 2018. http://news.gallup.com/poll/6964/top-ten-findings-about-public-opinioniraq.aspx. 31 It should be noted that it is entirely possible that Bush simply viewed the use of such language as the most effective strategy to rally public support for the wars, though Bush’s sincere Evangelical faith and admirable altruism suggest otherwise. 32

George W. Bush, "President Promotes Compassionate Conservatism," (speech, Sacramento, CA, April, 30 2002), The American Presidency Project, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/04/20020430-5.html. 33 The White House, The National Security Strategy, Washington, DC, 2002. Accessed April 24, 2018. https:// www.nytimes.com/2002/09/20/politics/full-text-bushs-national-security-strategy.html. 34

Jim Lobe, “The Arrogance of Power,” Foreign Policy in Focus, last modified September 1, 2002, accessed April 27, 2018. http://fpif.org/the_arrogance_of_power/.

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original idea of America as exemplary experiment to the recent idea of America as mankind's designated judge, jury, and executioner.” 35 The appeal of buying in to the idea that one is part of a transcendent force for Good is obvious and, perhaps, inescapable. Unsurprisingly, American politicians have often found success selling such ideas to a domestic constituency looking for a higher purpose both in themselves and in their nation. Far too many great men and women of American history have bought into the chosen nation myth to be dismissed merely as fundamentalist tomfoolery. It is simplistic to identify American providentialism as the sole or even main force behind the implementation of a particular foreign policy. As the historian Gordon Craig noted, “to establish the relationship between ideas and foreign policy is always a difficult task, and it is no accident that it has attracted so few historians.”36 Any serious foreign policy decision is reached due to a myriad of factors generally including individual personalities, balance of power politics, economics, and ideology. It is perhaps even more simplistic to dismiss the chosen nation myth as solely bad. American providentialism has played a part in many decisions which students and scholars of international politics often deem to be mistakes—turn-of-the-century imperialism, Vietnam, and Iraq are the first to come to mind. With that said, American providentialism is a spirit which has intoxicated the American polity with a sense of altruism. This spirit has imbued the United States with a purpose greater than itself—to fight for liberty and equality under the law, and against tyranny and persecution. America has often failed to live up to its own lofty standards, both at home and abroad. As Robert Bellah notes, “the theme of the American Israel was used, almost from the beginning, as a justification for the shameful treatment of the Indians.”37 And yet, however trite, America has often been the beacon in a dark world, twice saving Europe, combatting the brutality of Soviet totalitarianism, and existing as an almost mythical idea in the minds of countless men and women living under the yoke of less forgiving political systems. In the creation of American providentialism, America chose for itself, for better or for worse, the role of purveyor of the democratic values it deems sacred.

35 Arthur 36 37

M. Schlesinger, The Cycles of American History (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1999), 16. Preston, “Bridging the Gap,” 789. Bellah, “Civil Religion in America,” 111.

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Challenging International Stereotypes: The Italian Mafia Maria Palazzolo The word mafia is virtually synonymous with Italy and its culture. The term was first introduced in 1863 while referencing crime in Sicily, but has adopted an even more significant meaning in the past century and a half.1 In general, the mafia can be described as organized crime. Writer Maurizio Catino describes organized crime as “crime that involves functional role division, planning, and cooperation.”2 Even as the mafia’s influence of organized crime increased in Italy, the political system denied its large-scale presence until the mid-1980s, especially because it was argued that the lack of a stable government created the perfect environment to foster the birth of a mafia-like group.3 The government wanted to believe the problem was situational and circumstantially based, rather than accept the truth - that the mafia had become a systematic disturbance to the State. Despite the government’s denials, the mafia gained enough power to have authority over more than 116 billion euros of revenue each year. 4 This example of attempting to acquire power is a key theme that runs throughout the Italian mafia. In Italian Organized Crime, author Letizia Paoli quotes a Palermitan prosecutor saying the following about the mafia’s maximization of power: Marino Mannoia [former mafia member now co-operating with law-enforcement authorities] once told me: ‘Many believe that you enter into Cosa Nostra for money. This is only part of the truth. Do you know why I entered Cosa Nostra? Because before in Palermo I was Mr.Nobody. Afterwards, wherever I went, heads lowered. And to me this is priceless.5 While maximizing profit is important to the mafia, money is more relevant because of its ability to create power.to power. Mafias also value some kind of initiation and a level of allegiance, although the extent of the demands vary among regions.6 Despite some of these consistent themes among mafia groups, there are great discrepancies among regions; however, the international community continues to view the mafia as a homogenous entity, particularly because of movies and entertainment. To most foreigners, the mafia simply describes Sicily's Cosa Nostra and nothing else. On the 1

Catino, Maurizio. “How Do Mafias Organize?: Conflict and Violence in Three Mafia Organizations.” European Journal of Sociology, vol. 55, no. 2, Aug. 2014, pp. 177–220. Cambridge University Press Journals, doi: https://doiorg.proxy.library.nd.edu/10.1017/S0003975614000095. 2

Catino, Maurizio. “How Do Mafias Organize?” Pp.179. Paoli, Letizia. “Italian Organised Crime: Mafia Associations and Criminal Enterprises.” Global Crime, vol. 6, no. 1, 8 Sept. 2010, pp. 19–31. Taylor & Francis Online, doi:https://doi-org.proxy.library.nd.edu/ 10.1080/1744057042000297954. 3

4 5 6

Ruggeri, Amanda. “Taking a Bite Out of Crime.” New York Times, 7 July 2013, p. TR9. Paoli, Letizia. “Italian Organised Crime.” Pp. 23 Catino, Maurizio. “How Do Mafias Organize?” Pp. 81.

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contrary, however, the Sicilian mafia is only one example of the mafia’s structure, power, and influence. After inspecting how the world, and North America in particular, views the mafia, this paper will analyze major structural and criminal differences between the Sicilian Cosa Nostra and the Campanian mafia, the Camorra, to show that the world’s singular understanding of the Italian mafia is flawed. International entertainment has created a romantic and one-dimensional perception of the Italian mafia. Because of The Godfather series and shows like The Sopranos, the world, and America in particular, are fascinated with the idea of the mafia.7 American films create scenarios where one almost sympathizes with mafia members and bosses.8 On the other hand, a study of Spanish, German, and Dutch newspapers and their reporting of mafia groups found that a much more violent perception of mafia members was held by the media and, therefore, the countries’ citizens.9 This idea of the mafia being an overwhelming presence of danger might stem from the fact that overstated and exaggerated data is common when discussing the mafia, especially since accurate demographic numbers are difficult to estimate due to the secrecy of mafia operations.10 Perhaps the most inaccurate opinion is the homogenous idea of the mafia. This opinion of the mafia is an obvious problem, as mentioned by a Sicilian teenager who studied in London for a summer. When he arrived in England, he “[remembered] that when [they] went away from the college everybody was talking about Mafia, machine guns, [and] murders.”11 Only associating the term “mafia” with organized crime in Italy could lead to the false assumption that the mafia is one organization, with one boss who employs only his family members at the top and controls the actions of the mafioso, or mafia members, below him. This scenario is simply not the case. To prove this point, below, two mafia organizations are discussed: Cosa Nostra in Sicily and the Camorra in Campania. To show how different these mafia groups are, two major characteristics are examined: structure and types of crime (i.e. approaches to murder and prostitution). 7

Hooper, John. “Move Over, Cosa Nostra: Public Bloodbaths, Assassinations, Brutal Feuds - the Calabrian Mob 'Ndrangheta Is Bigger, More Deep-Rooted and More Powerful Than the Mafia.” The Guardian, 8 June 2006, pp. 6. 8 Wade, Diana. "Fighting the Mafia through the Cinema: An Interview with Marco Amenta." Cineaste, vol. 36, no. 1, Winter 2010, pp. 4-9. EBSCOhost, search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=55609570&site=ehost-live. 9

Sarno, Federica. “Italian Mafias in Europe: Between Perception and Reality.” Trends in Organized Crime, vol. 17, no. 4, 19 June 2014, pp. 313–341, doi:https://doi.org/10.1007/s12117-014-9224-x. 10 Calderoni, Francesco. “Mythical Numbers and the Proceeds of Organised Crime: Estimating Mafia Proceeds in Italy.” Global Crime, vol. 15, no. 1-2, 21 Feb. 2014, pp. 138–163. Taylor & Francis Online, doi:https://doi-org.proxy.library.nd.edu/ 10.1080/17440572.2014.882778. 11

Di Blasi, Marie. “Growing in Mafia Territories.” World Futures, vol. 71, no. 5-8, 9 Dec. 2015, pp. 173–184. Taylor & Francis Online, doi:https://doi-org.proxy.library.nd.edu/10.1080/02604027.2015.1113772.

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Cosa Nostra means “our thing” and exists in the Sicilian region of Italy.12 This symbolic name is meant to show that Cosa Nostra is not a public affair. Rather, the workings of the organization are for only its members to know. Adriana Cerami summarized the Cosa Nostra as follows: “[The] basic unit of Cosa Nostra is referred to as “la famiglia” precisely because it is made up of families (cosche), with traditional “values” of honor, respect for blood relatives, loyalty and friendship.”13 Cosche in Cosa Nostra do not refer to blood families, but rather symbolic families. Certainly, however, a cosche could have grandfather, son, and grandson within its its membership. These mafia families contain their own structures, but all are united and coordinate to form Cosa Nostra as a whole.14 A kind of Sicilian pride exists within the Cosa Nostra, as only men from Sicily can become members.15 The initiation details of the Cosa Nostra have been released to the public in various ways, such as through testimonies in front of the U.S. Congress or former members breaking their code of silence. Initiation rituals for the organization are treated as a “second baptism,” with images of the Virgin Mary being a key focus of the event.16 Typically, individuals are asked questions to validate their loyalty in a series of questions. More dramatically, the men are asked to verify that they are willing to “kill on behalf of the family.”17 The image of the Virgin Mary is then burned as the men’s fingers are pricked to draw blood.18 The initiation ritual is meant to create a kind of family that is an impenetrable force against those who try to infiltrate and/or harm the Cosa Nostra. If the Cosa Nostra is symbolized by unification and organization, the Camorra represents the complete opposite. Camorra is characterized by clans constantly in competition with each other.19 With no initiation ritual, the Camorra’s estimated 99 clans operate independently and almost chaotically.20 This group can be dated back to the early nineteenth century in the Campania region, best known for the city of Naples, and has a strong emphasis on drugs, toxic waste, prostitution, counterfeiting, and violence.21 This 12

Catino, Maurizio. “How Do Mafias Organize?” Pp. 179. Cerami, Adriana Nicole. “The Mafia's System of Silence In Communication, Film and Literature: Perversions of Society and Transgressions of Omertà.” University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, N.C., 2009, pp. 1–45. 13

Scaglione, Attilio. “Cosa Nostra and Camorra: Illegal Activities and Organisational Structures.” Global Crime, vol. 17, no. 1, 2 Jan. 2016, pp. 60–78. Taylor & Francis, doi:https://doi-org.proxy.library.nd.edu/10.1080/17440572.2015.1114919. 15 Paoli, Letizia. “Italian Organised Crime.” Pp. 23 16

Cerami, Adriana Nicole. “The Mafia's System of Silence.” Pp. 12.

Jacobs, James B., and Lauryn P. Gouldin. “Cosa Nostra: The Final Chapter?” Crime and Justice, vol. 25, 1999, pp. 129–189. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/1147609. 18 Cerami, Adriana Nicole. “The Mafia's System of Silence.” Pp. 12. 19 20 21

Catino, Maurizio. “How Do Mafias Organize?” Pp. 194. Catino, Maurizio. “How Do Mafias Organize?” Pp. 195. Paoli, Letizia. “Italian Organised Crime.” Pp. 25.

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wide range of criminal interests and the flashy, brutal nature of the Camorra have led to a strong mafia presence in the region. For example, Francesco Calderoni found that the Mafia Presence Index, or MPI, was 61.21 in Campania, compared to 31.80 in Sicily (see Table 1).22 The MPI was created by Transcrime for the Italian Ministry of the Interior and represents an average of five variables at the city level: (1) reported successful and unsuccessful mafia murders, (2) people reported for mafia participation, (3) number of times a municipality was dissolved due to mafia corruption, (4) “assets confiscated from criminal [organizations],” and (5) groups reported by national organizations.23 Calderoni argues that the Camorra has a higher MPI because it is “traditionally characterised by numerous small groups and a high number of mafia murders.”24 Because of this high number of murders, which is addressed later in this paper, the Camorra significantly impacts the Campania region. Table 1: Mafia Presence Index

Source: Calderoni, Francesco. “Mythical Numbers and the Proceeds of Organised Crime: Estimating Mafia Proceeds in Italy.”

The structures of Cosa Nostra and the Camorra indicate clear differences in the two mafia organizations. According to Maurizio Catino, Cosa Nostra has a vertical structure, while the Camorra has a more horizontal structure.25 The structures impact the 22

Calderoni, Francesco. “Mythical Numbers and the Proceeds of Organised Crime.” Pp. 145.

Calderoni, Francesco. “Mythical Numbers and the Proceeds of Organised Crime.” Pp. 144. Calderoni, Francesco. “Mythical Numbers and the Proceeds of Organised Crime.” Pp. 145.

24 25

Catino, Maurizio. “How Do Mafias Organize?” Pp. 182.

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type of influence each has. As mentioned previously, Cosa Nostra is comprised of about 150 cosche, which contain their own type of hierarchy.26 The hierarchy, from bottom to top, is organized as follows: soldato (soldier), capodecina (“head of ten”), consigliere (advisor), and capo (boss).27 As one is promoted within the organization, the responsibility, respect, and reach increase. Typically, age, length of time served, displayed loyalty, and the presence of vacancies within the hierarchy lead to a promotion in the organization. The division of labor is key to Cosa Nostra operations and is vital to demand complete order and obedience from members. The soldato collects money and kills when necessary, while the boss makes managerial decisions that impact the entire cosche. The capodecina and consigliere are more administrative positions, but the consigliere advises the capo, while the capodecina advises the soldato. This order allows for more coordination and control and creates a systematic decision-making process. The main problem that arises from this structure is that the “Cosa Nostra is a pyramid...cut off the top of the pyramid by arresting its leader and it has big problems.”28 In 2007, a boss who lived near Palermo was jailed. He was a critical link between two cosche, and his jailing was detrimental to the communication between the two “families.” Therefore, despite the benefits of creating a unit with the Cosa Nostra structure, the cohesive hierarchy makes the Cosa Nostra vulnerable if capi are caught. Catino writes that Camorra has a horizontal structure due to an “absence of higher levels of coordination, distributed power, and clan based decision making skills.”29 Because there is no higher power to make decisions that unify the Camorra, the organization is clan based. Violence is constant as groups fight for power and control over territories. People who live in the area talk about not knowing if they will survive a day because the actions of the mafia in the Campania region are unpredictable and extreme.30 Many of the “soldiers” in the Camorra are teenagers who want to be “kings of the world” and are incredibly eager to join.31 It also can be unclear who is in charge, since, at all ages, members of the Camorra try to “imitate the behavior a boss has.”32 This lack of leadership, a uniting theme, and a list of rules for members to follow has resulted in the fragmented Camorra being involved in certain crimes and activities that Cosa Nostra simply is not. The difference in structure has contributed to the kinds of crime that each mafia organization commits. For example, the organization and unity within Cosa Nostra has 26

Catino, Maurizio. “How Do Mafias Organize?” Pp. 187.

Catino, Maurizio. “How Do Mafias Organize?” Pp. 189.

Hooper, John. “Move Over, Cosa Nostra.” Pp.6. Catino, Maurizio. “How Do Mafias Organize?” Pp. 182.

29 30 31 32

Di Blasi, Marie. “Growing in Mafia Territories.” Pp. 177. Cerami, Adriana Nicole. “The Mafia's System of Silence.” Pp. 15. Di Blasi, Marie. “Growing in Mafia Territories.” Pp. 177.

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contributed to its internal order. Soldati are only allowed to kill when directed by a higher authority. Unintentional murders do not occur in Cosa Nostra because any action taken impacts the entirety of the organization. Instead, there are few ordinary murders, and frequent high profile assassinations with strategic motives. In fact, Cosa Nostra has killed 79 prominent politicians, while the Camorra has only killed 9.33 Additionally, Cosa Nostra has killed 139 important institutional leaders, like judges.34 These killings have been strategic, for the betterment of the organization, and were made possible because of Cosa Nostra’s hierarchical structure and emphasis on obedience. Because the Camorra lacks this sense of order and is more of a fragmented organization with conflicting clans, the environment in Campania is incredibly dangerous. From 1983 to 2012, the Camorra was responsible for 3295 homicides. This number is almost double the amount of murders from Sicily’s Cosa Nostra that occurred in the same time frame (see Table 2).35 The kills are usually committed out of passion, anger, or annoyance, and are so frequent that the community has had to adapt. Policemen are killed so frequently that the people in Campania do not wear helmets while on motorcycles so as not to be mistaken for a cop at night.36 The Camorra are explained as a “theatrical and explicitly violent phenomenon: bakeries...blow up in broad daylight, [and guns fire] in the middle of people walking along the street at night.” 37 One teenager from Naples was quoted saying, “They kill people as if they were smashing ants.”38 Table 2: The Total Number of Homicides of the Three Mafias 1983-2012

Source: Catino, Maurizio. “How Do Mafias Organize?: Conflict and Violence in Three Mafia Organizations.”

Catino, Maurizio. “How Do Mafias Organize?” Pp. 209.

Catino, Maurizio. “How Do Mafias Organize?” Pp. 209. Catino, Maurizio. “How Do Mafias Organize?” Pp. 200.

35 36 37 38

Di Blasi, Marie. “Growing in Mafia Territories.” Pp. 177. Di Blasi, Marie. “Growing in Mafia Territories.” Pp. 177. Di Blasi, Marie. “Growing in Mafia Territories.” Pp. 177.

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The difference in how the Cosa Nostra and the Camorra approach murder is a clear distinction between the two organizations and directly shows that the international view of one specific type of mafia is flawed. The second type of crime that can differentiate the two entities is their approach to participating in and profiting from prostitution. Cosa Nostra has an explicit rule that no members can exploit prostitution. Ironically, the Cosa Nostra attempts to hold themselves to a higher moral standard by not engaging in prostitution and human sex trafficking, despite their crime in other fields.39 Even in the commandments presented to recruits at their induction, it is explicitly mentioned that the Cosa Nostra does not participate in the act.40 Womanizers and pimps, in the eyes of the Sicilian mafia, are seen as unreliable and impulsive. However, the Camorra has no qualms with involving themselves in the sex industry, especially because human sex trafficking has become one of the most profitable trades in the world.41 They continually sell women into sex slavery.42 Prostitution is seen as a low-risk opportunity, especially when compared to the selling of drugs and narcotics.43 This difference of values between the two organizations clearly depicts that the Italian mafia varies greatly from region to region. In conclusion, the Sicilian Cosa Nostra and Campanian Camorra are different mafia organizations with their own goals, structures, and criminal objectives. These facts challenge the one-dimensional view of the Italian mafia that the outside world has developed. As this paper has shown, there are stark contrasts between Cosa Nostra and the Camorra. In addition to the differences mentioned between the Sicilian and Campanian mafias, there are two other mafia organizations, the ‘Ndrangheta in the Calabria region and Sacra Corona Unita in the Apulia region. Both of these groups also have their own structures, focuses, strengths, and weaknesses. It is important to critically analyze the rhetoric from the media and what it says about crime around the world to ensure populations are safe from potential threats. Clearly, the world has misunderstood and incorrectly perceived the Italian mafia.

39 40

Paoli, Letizia. “Italian Organised Crime.” Pp. 23. Cerami, Adriana Nicole. “The Mafia's System of Silence.” Pp. 12.

Paoli, Letizia. “Italian Organised Crime.” Pp. 23. Manojlovic, Dragan. "Criminology and Victimology Aspects of the Criminal Activities of the Camorra." Megatrend Review, vol. 10, no. 2, Dec. 2013, pp. 209-227. EBSCOhost, search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx? direct=true&AuthType=ip,url,uid,cookie&db=bsu&AN=89498145&site=ehost-live. 42

Dickie, John. “Mafia and Prostitution in Calabria, c. 1880− C.1940.” Past & Present, vol. 232, no. 1, 21 July 2016, pp. 203–236. Oxford Academic, doi:https://doi.org/10.1093/pastj/gtw012.

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Interview Meghan Gallagher Professional Staff Member, House Committee on Foreign Affairs What was your first job after graduating Notre Dame, and how did you find it/apply? I was an intern at the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, and it was an unpaid, three month, summer internship. For Hill jobs in DC, you basically need to have some sort of intern experience, and I had never worked on Capitol Hill but really wanted to try it. The advice that I got was “you’ll either love it or you’ll hate it, and you’ll decide really quickly whether politics is for you”. I applied to several different offices and committees I was interested in, and eventually got my top choice at the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. How did you transition from an internship to a career? During the last month of my internship, I really started to ramp up my networking, getting coffee with many, many people and looking for committees and offices on the Hill that were hiring. Senator Flake’s office was looking for a legislative correspondent to cover foreign policy and international trade. I was hired and worked in his office for eight months and loved it, but a job opened up back on the House Committee on Foreign Affairs that I was encouraged to take. I transitioned back to the committee to head the Africa Policy portfolio. Can you describe your current job, and what your day-to-day work looks like? It’s always different, and that’s my favorite part. As the Committee on Foreign Affairs, we have broad jurisdiction over the funding that goes towards the State Department and USAID. Whenever these agencies want to spend money, they send a note over to the Hill outlining what they want to do, and we have oversight over that. I’m often in briefings with the State Department and USAID on specific programs and general policy. For example, tomorrow I’m meeting with both groups to discuss US policy towards South Sudan. We also have primary responsibility on clearing and moving legislation on foreign policy matters. The committee acts as a filter, deciding on what legislation advances to the House floor for a vote. A lot of my job consists of writing and revising legislation, working with the offices of our committee members as well as Senate counterparts, to move bills through Congress. Looking back on your past few years of work experience, what do you consider to be your greatest accomplishment? I was able to plan and attend a trip for seven members of Congress to four different countries in Africa. We had military escorts, and it was a big undertaking to plan a 10-day !59

itinerary. We met with heads of state and the focus was on conservation initiatives. It was a really meaningful experience, as I got to spend a lot of time with these members of Congress. What advice do you have for current Notre Dame political science students, in terms of preparing for a career post-graduation? Use the Notre Dame network—DC is a very networking-based city. An incredible gift of going to Notre Dame is that people love and associate with the school very strongly, and I’ve had nothing but kind alumni that are willing to help. Alumni remember being in your shoes, and that’s a huge asset to the job hunt. Also, don’t be afraid of an atypical path, like taking an unpaid internship, to try a different course to see what you’re interested in. Looking forward, where do you see yourself in the next 5-10 years? That’s tough to say, as my boss is retiring, but I’m currently looking at other jobs on the Hill, as well as in the administration. I’d like to stay on the Hill short-term, but long-term I’d like to stay engaged in Africa policy. I’d love to work at the State Department, USAID, or at the White House on the National Security Council eventually.

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