Top Attraction 10
River bus. Take a river bus down the Sumida River or across Tokyo Bay towards the man-made island of Odaiba for a different perspective on this port city. For more information, click here. Corbis
Editor’s Choice
Setting priorities, saving money, unique attractions… here, at a glance, are our recommendations, plus some tips and tricks even the locals won’t always know.
Richard Nowitz/Apa Publications
Breathtaking views from Mori Tower observation deck.
Best Tokyo views
Bar Six. The wide balcony outside the sixth-floor bar at the Amuse Museum provides a grand circle view across the temple compound of Asakusa’s Senso-ji and beyond to Tokyo Skytree. www.asakusabarsix.com.
Mori Tower. Not only do you get to stand on the roof of this 54storey tower to enjoy heart-stopping 360-degree views of the city, but there’s also one of the city’s best galleries up here. For more information, click here.
Tokyo Metropolitan Government Office. The free observatory on the 45th floor has splendid views of city landmarks, the bay and – if the weather plays ball – Mount Fuji. For more information, click here.
Tokyo Skytree. This vertiginous communications tower and complex, opened in spring 2012, provides the city’s highest observation platform. For more information, click here.
Yebisu Garden Place. The restaurant plaza on the 38th floor offers great views of the bay and westwards towards Shibuya and Shinjuku. For more information, click here.
Statue at Gokoku-ji, one of the few surviving Edo temples.
Ming Tang Evans/Apa Publications
Best temples and shrines
Asakusa Kannon (Senso-ji). Tokyo’s most visited temple hosts dozens of annual events and festivals. For more information, click here.
Gokoku-ji. Off the beaten path, this magnificent 17th-century temple has survived earthquakes and fires. For more information, click here.
Kanda Myojin. This shrine is especially lively on Saturdays when weddings, rituals and festivals are held. For more information, click here.
Meiji-jingu. An amazing setting in the centre of a forest in the middle of Tokyo. Gravel paths lead to the shrine, an example of pure Shinto design. For more information, click here.
Tsukiji Hongan-ji. An architectural curiosity, this large and imposing temple is based on the ancient Buddhist monuments of South India. For more information, click here.
Yushima Tenjin. Associated with learning and wisdom, and known for its annual plum and chrysanthemum festivals. For more information, click here.
A mind-boggling array of toys at Kiddyland. Ming Tang Evans/Apa Publications
Best for families
Ghibli Museum, Mitaka. Fans of the animated Studio Ghibli movies will not want to miss this charming inventive complex. For more information, click here.
Origami Center. Learn about this fun and creative paper-folding craft at the place it was invented. For more information, click here. Kiddyland. Five floors stuffed with a vast array of toys and cute characters like Hello Kitty and Pokémon.
Mega Web. Part of Odaiba’s Palette Town complex; enjoy a giant Ferris wheel, the Toyota City Showcase and a car museum. For more information, click here.
Tokyo Disney Resort. Mickey and co. are all present at this replica theme park, which also includes the separate water-themed DisneySea Park. For more information, click here.
Tokyo Dome City. A hyperactive amusement park in the heart of the city with a giant roller-coaster, a Ferris wheel and a play area packed with toys. For more information, click here.
Ueno Zoo. Children will enjoy getting close to small animals in the petting zoo. For more information, click here.
Strolling along Cat Street. Ming Tang Evans/Apa Publications
Best walks
Cat Street. A river long since filled in provides a traffic-free amble from Harajuku to Shibuya past cafés, boutiques and a few old houses. For more information, click here.
Imperial Palace Gardens. Cut through the heart of the city via the parkland that surrounds its enigmatic palace. For more information, click here.
Omotesando. Head to Tokyo’s premier shopping avenue to admire its collection of modern architecture. At Christmas, the zelkova trees are also strung with twinkling lights. For more information, click here.
Tsukiji to Tsukudajima. This bayside stroll takes you from the frantic fish market to a tiny enclave of the city that evokes the Tokyo of centuries ago. For more information, click here.
Yanaka’s back streets. Start anywhere among the maze of narrow, winding streets that take you through one of the oldest surviving districts of Tokyo – speckled with a cemetery, temples and old houses. For more information, click here.
The Edo-Tokyo Museum. iStock
Best museums and galleries
Edo-Tokyo Museum. The giant exhibition space in Ryogoku recreates Old Tokyo and documents its evolution into the modern metropolis. For more information, click here.
Japan Folk Crafts Museum. A beautiful wood and stone building that is home to an exemplary collection of folk crafts. For more information, click here.
Miraikan. Tokyo’s best science museum, explaining cutting-edge technology in a way that’s accessible to all ages, is appropriately located in futuristic Odaiba. For more information, click here.
Mori Art Museum. Superior quality art exhibitions, which change every three months or so, are mounted in this massive gallery in Roppongi Hills. For more information, click here.
National Museum of Modern Art. This impressive museum boasts an extensive collection of Japanese art from 1900 to the present day. For more information, click here.
Nezu Museum. As if the elegant collection of Japanese and Chinese arts and crafts isn’t sufficient, this lovely museum also has one of Tokyo’s best gardens. For more information, click here.
Tokyo Museum of Contemporary Art. On the east side of the Sumida River this mammoth gallery is a great place to get to grips with the contemporary art scene. For more information, click here.
Find cats galore at the Nekobukuro Cat’s House. iStock
Only in Tokyo
Cat’s House. Nekobukuro in Ikebukuro’s Tokyu Hands allows you quality time in a room packed with pedigree kitties. For more information, click here.
Design Festa Gallery. A visual explosion of colourful art in the backstreets of Harajuku that has taken over a series of old apartment blocks. For more information, click here.
Maid Cafés. Role-playing waitresses dress up in wacky costumes to serve besotted geeks and curious tourists in Akihabara. For more information, click here.
Meguro Parasitological Museum. A museum dedicated to those creepy body invaders; the highlight is an 8.8-metre (29ft) tapeworm removed from a human intestine. For more information, click here.
Oedo Onsen Monogatari. A giant, fun bathhouse complex in Odaiba, where you can soak in authentic thermal spring water. For more information, click here.
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on the intrenchments and blockhouses on the hills to the left. The regiment was deployed on both sides of the road, and moved forward until we came to the rearmost lines of the regulars. We continued to move forward until I ordered a charge, and the men rushed the blockhouse and rifle pits on the hill to the right of our advance. They did the work in fine shape, though suffering severely. The guidons of Troops E and G were first planted on the summit, though the first men up were some A and B troopers who were with me.
"We then opened fire on the intrenchments on a hill to our left which some of the other regiments were assailing and which they carried a few minutes later. Meanwhile we were under a heavy rifle fire from the intrenchments along the hills to our front, from whence they also shelled us with a piece of field artillery until some of our marksmen silenced it. When the men got their wind we charged again and carried the second line of intrenchments with a rush. Swinging to the left, we then drove the Spaniards over the brow of the chain of hills fronting Santiago. By this time the regiments were much mixed, and we were under a very heavy fire, both of shrapnel and from rifles from the batteries, intrenchments, and forts immediately in front of the city. On the extreme front I now found myself in command with fragments of the six cavalry regiments of the two brigades under me. The Spaniards made one or two efforts to retake the line, but were promptly driven back.
"Both General Sumner and you sent me word to hold the line at all hazards, and that night we dug a line of intrenchments across our front, using the captured Spaniards' intrenching tools. We had nothing to eat except what we captured from the Spaniards; but their dinners had fortunately been cooked, and we ate them with relish, having been fighting all day. We had no blankets and coats, and lay by the trenches all night. The Spaniards attacked us once in the night, and at dawn they opened a heavy artillery and rifle fire. Very great assistance
was rendered us by Lieutenant Parker's Gatling battery at critical moments; he fought his guns at the extreme front of the firing line in a way that repeatedly called forth the cheers of my men. One of the Spanish batteries which was used against us was directly in front of the hospital so that the red cross flag flew over the battery, saving it from our fire for a considerable period. The Spanish Mauser bullets made clean wounds; but they also used a copper-jacketed or brass-jacketed bullet which exploded, making very bad wounds indeed.
"Since then we have continued to hold the ground; the food has been short; and until today [July 4] we could not get our blankets, coats, or shelter tents, while the men lay all day under the fire from the Spanish batteries, intrenchments, and guerrillas in trees, and worked all night in the trenches, never even taking off their shoes. But they are in excellent spirits, and ready and anxious to carry out any orders they receive. At the end of the first day the eight troops were commanded, two by captains, three by first lieutenants, two by second lieutenants, and one by the sergeant whom you made acting lieutenant. We went into the fight about 490 strong; 86 were killed or wounded, and there are about half a dozen missing. The great heat prostrated nearly 40 men, some of them among the best in the regiment."
Annual Reports of the War Department, 1898, volume 1, part 2, page 684.
There have been much contradiction and controversy concerning some of the orders by which the battle of San Juan was directed. The following are the conclusions on that subject of a civilian observer who seems to have seen and investigated with impartiality:
"The orders under which the battle of San Juan was fought were given by Adjutant-General McClernand to General Kent, commanding
the Infantry Division consisting, in addition to the organizations already mentioned (Wikoff's and Pearson's brigades), of the First Brigade, including the Sixth and Sixteenth United States Infantry and the Seventy-first New York, under General Hawkins at about nine o'clock in the morning. There is no question fortunately as to the exact wording of the orders. A little green knoll to the left of the Santiago road and half a mile short of the San Juan Heights was pointed out as the point which was to be the extreme limit of the forward movement of the Infantry Division. Once there, further orders would be given. The orders under which General Sumner advanced from El Pozo would appear to have been more specific, and certainly more clear than the orders which General Kent received for the Infantry Division a few minutes later. At the same time, it is true that these orders were also based upon a complete misconception of the situation and a total ignorance of the Spanish position and the lay of the country beyond El Pozo. General Sumner's orders were to advance along that branch of the Aguadores Creek which runs parallel with the Santiago road from El Pozo, until it joins the main stream of the Aguadores at the angle subsequently known as the 'bloody angle,' where the creek makes a sharp turn to the left, and then runs a general southerly course toward the town of Aguadores and the sea. This creek General Sumner was instructed to hold until the result of Lawton's attack upon Caney became known, and he received further orders. Once the creek was reached, Sumner, under the most unfavorable circumstances of a heavy fire, and the thick and pathless jungles which his men had to penetrate, deployed his whole division, and then sent back word to McClernand, the adjutant-general of the corps, acquainting him with the actual conditions by which he was confronted, and asking whether his orders contemplated an attack upon the enemy's intrenched position, setting forth at the same time the utter impossibility of keeping his men inactive for a long time under such a heavy fire as was being poured in upon them.
"Had it been proposed to carry out the plan, as discussed and agreed upon at General Shafter's headquarters the night before, to advance along the right flank of the Spanish position, keeping in touch with Lawton, obviously these two divisions, or a large part of them, should have been directed to take the direct road which ran north from El Pozo to Marianaje and thence to El Caney, leaving in front of San Juan only force sufficient to retain the Spaniards in their position. But the divisions were ordered to proceed along the Santiago road, and in a very few minutes came under fire. The original plan may have been changed at the last moment, of course; but as every movement that was subsequently made was in the line of carrying this plan out, until finally, on the 12th, General Lawton succeeded in completely investing the town on the north and west, this does not seem likely. The more probable explanation of the movement and of what followed, and the one accepted by general officers, is as follows: That it was still intended to follow Lawton's advance on the right, but that owing to our failure to develop the Spanish position in our front, and our complete ignorance of the lay of the land, the flank movement was not begun until too late not until the troops had been led into a position from which they could be extricated only by wresting from the Spaniards the block-houses and the trenches from which, unexposed and unseen, they were delivering such a galling fire upon our men, engaged in wandering aimlessly about in an almost trackless tropical jungle. At this moment of great confusion and uncertainty, when the road was choked with the regiments of both the cavalry and infantry divisions, mutually hindering one another in their struggles to advance, and having to sustain a heavy and destructive fire which could not be answered, an ordeal even for the veteran soldier; at this moment, when something might still have been done to mislead the enemy and cover our advance, the war balloon was sent up directly behind our columns. This mistake betrayed the exact
location of our advance, and the Spanish fire became heavier and better directed, and our losses more severe."
S. Bonsal,
The Fight for Santiago, chapter 6 (New York: Doubleday, Page & Company).
The same writer gives a sickening account of the sufferings of the wounded after the battle and the miserable failure of provision for any kind of succor or care of them. "Of course:" he says, "in view of the perilous situation which the two divisions now occupied upon the crest of the hill, and the great anxiety which was felt at headquarters for the safety of the whole army, and the preparations which had to be made against the expected night attack of the Spaniards to drive our men back and retake their lost position, the search for the dead and wounded this evening had to be confined to a very limited area, and was only as thorough as the shortness of the time for which men could be spared from the colors permitted. The jungle and the great fields of long grass were not searched, and thus many of the wounded were not discovered until the following day; and quite a number, indeed, not until the armistice was declared, on the third day after the battle, when the men had time to ransack the hill-side and the valley for the missing. And there were some those who had the strength when they fell to crawl through the cactus, the Spanish bayonet, and all manner of prickly and trailing plants into the deeper and more protected recesses of the jungle who were never discovered at all until days, many days, had passed; and the gathering of the vultures told where some poor fellow had died without care and without food, of his wounds or from starvation. Of such an one, when his place of hiding was discovered, there was, as a rule, only left a whitened skeleton and pieces of the uniform he had worn. The last resting place of not a few was never discovered at all.
"I believe I am giving a moderate estimate when I say that at
least one-third of the men wounded on July 1st received no attention, and were not brought back to the division hospital until the afternoon of Ju]y 3d. This night we knew nothing, and had not even the slightest suspicion, of how numerous the undiscovered wounded were. … Only about half of the wounded men who were discovered this evening and been brought back to the dressing station when the moon rose above the dark forest line, and lit up the battlefield and the heights of San Juan as clearly, and, indeed, more clearly than day, for there was now not the dazzling force and the confusing mirage of the pitiless sunlight to blind the sight. The majority of these men had had their wounds dressed where they fell, or soon after falling, with the first-aid bandages. There were very few indeed to whom it had been possible to give any further attention than this, as the regimental surgeons, for want of transportation, had been unable to bring their medical chests, and those who were best provided carried with them only small pocket cases. …
"When the first-aid bandages were applied, the wounded man and those who helped him were, as a rule, under fire, which made any but the most summary methods of wound-dressing quite impossible. Fortunately these bandages, so simple and practical, lent themselves excellently well to this procedure. The first thing the soldiers or the hospital attendants would do when they came upon a wounded man was, in the case of a wound in the body, to tear off his shirt, or in the case of a wound in the leg, tear off his trousers, and then wrap around the wound the first-aid bandage. The wound-dressers were generally in such haste, and the wounded men usually so helpless to assist in any way, and their shirts and trousers so rotten from the drenching rains in which they had been worn without change day or night, that the taking off of the clothing was literally what I call it tearing, and the garment came off so rent as to be quite useless for further wear. Consequently the soldiers were carried half-naked, or, if they had been wounded in both the body and the lower limbs, as was so
frequently the case, entirely naked, to the army wagons and so down to the hospital, where there was not a scrap of clothing or bedding forthcoming to cover them with. These who were stripped in this way during the daytime were baked and blistered by the fierce sunlight, only to shiver with the penetrating cold and dampness after the rain had ceased to fall and when the chill night came on.
"Knowing that he was totally unprepared to clothe or cover the wounded that would probably be brought in, the chief surgeon of the corps issued an order, the evening before the battle, that all wounded men should be brought in with their blankets, halves of shelter-tents, and ponchos when possible. This was certainly a step in the right direction, even if it was but a frank confession by the authorities that no preparation had been made by them for the emergency which it cannot be said was suddenly thrust upon them, but which they might have foreseen and should have been preparing against for many weeks previous.
{608}
While the attending soldiers, realizing how serious for their wounded comrades it would be to have to lie in the hospitals uncovered to wind and weather, made great efforts to find their packs, these efforts were not often successful, and a great majority of the wounded reached the hospital half naked, and had thereafter only the covering and the bedding which their comrades and the hospital attendants were able to 'rustle' for them, and this was little enough and not seldom nothing at all.
"Had this expedition been provided with a greater number of surgeons and hospital attendants, had the ambulances been at hand which we left in Tampa or upon the transports, ambulances without which it is reasonable to suppose at least we had supposed no civilized power would enter upon an aggressive war, much less upon a campaign in which we had the advantage of choosing both our own time and the field of operations, the
outrageous treatment which our wounded suffered, and the barbarous scenes which we were called upon to witness upon this and the following days would never have occurred."
S. Bonsai,
The Fight for Santiago, chapter 8 (New York: Doubleday, Page & Company).
The troops which had carried San Juan Hill were intrenched, that night, in the positions they had gained, and those which had taken El Caney were brought into connection with them, Lawton's division on their right and Bates's brigade on the left. The battle was renewed by the Spaniards soon after daylight on the morning of the 2d, and raged with more or less fury throughout the day. That evening, about 10 o'clock, a fierce attempt was made to break through the American lines, but without success. Again, on the morning of the third, the Spaniards reopened battle, but with less vigor than before. General Shafter then sent the following letter to General Toral, the Spanish commander: "I shall be obliged, unless you surrender, to shell Santiago de Cuba. Please inform the citizens of foreign countries, and all women and children, that they should leave the city before 10 o'clock to-morrow morning." In reply, General Toral wrote; "It is my duty to say to you that this city will not surrender, and that I will inform the foreign consuls and inhabitants of the contents of your message." Several of the foreign consuls at Santiago then came into the American lines and persuaded General Shafter to delay the shelling of the town until noon of the 5th, provided that the Spanish forces made no demonstration meantime against his own. This established a truce which was renewed, in a series of negotiations until the 10th. "I was of the opinion," reported General Shafter, "that the Spaniards would surrender if given a little time, and I thought this result would be hastened if the men of their army could be made to understand they would be well treated as prisoners of war. Acting upon this presumption I determined to offer to return all the
wounded Spanish officers at El Caney who were able to bear transportation, and who were willing to give their paroles not to serve against the forces of the United States until regularly exchanged. This offer was made and accepted. These officers, as well as several of the wounded Spanish privates, 27 in all, were sent to their lines under the escort of some of our mounted cavalry. Our troops were received with honors, and I have every reason to believe the return of the Spanish prisoners produced a good impression on their comrades. The cessation of firing about noon on the 3d practically terminated the battle of Santiago." General Shafter goes on to say that when the battle was fiercest, on July 1st, he probably had no more than 12,000 men on the firing line, not counting a few Cubans who assisted in the attack on El Caney, and who fought with valor. They were confronted by about equal numbers of the enemy, in strong and intrenched positions. "Our losses in these battles were 22 officers and 208 men killed, and 81 officers and 1,203 men wounded; missing 79. The missing, with few exceptions, reported later." Up to this time, General Shafter had been unable to complete the investment of the town with his own men, and had depended upon General Garcia with his Cubans, placed on the extreme right of the American lines, to watch for and intercept reinforcements. They failed to do so, and 2,800 Spaniards, under General Escario, entered the city on the night of the 2d. The American commander now extended his own lines as rapidly as possible and completed the investment of the town.
Annual Reports of the War Department, 1898, volume 1, part 2, pages 155-157.
As stated above, permission was given on the 3d for non-combatants to leave the city. "They did leave in the following days to the number of perhaps 20,000, filling the neighboring villages and roads with destitute people, mostly women and children. It then seemed to fall to our lot to see that these people did not starve in a desolate country, and to
be as much our duty to take care of these people, whom our policy had driven from their homes, as it was for Spain to feed the reconcentrados, whom they drove from their homes under their war policy. The task was not insignificant."
Report of Inspector-General
(Annual Reports of the War Department, 1898, volume 1, part 2, page 596).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (July). Annexation of the Hawaiian Islands.
See (in this volume) HAWAIIAN ISLANDS: A. D. 1898.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (July 1). National Bankrupt Law.
After years of effort on the part of its advocates, a national bankrupt law was enacted by both Houses of Congress and received the President's signature on the 1st of July, 1898.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (July 3). Destruction of the Spanish squadron at Santiago.
On the morning of July 3, Admiral Cervera, convinced that Santiago would be taken by the American forces, and acting under orders from the Captain-General at Havana, made a desperate attempt to save his squadron by escaping to sea. The result was a total destruction of the Spanish ships, in an engagement with the blockading fleet, of which Admiral Sampson gave the following account in his official report:
"The enemy's vessels came out of the harbor between 9.35 and 10 a. m., the head of the column appearing around Cay Smith at 9.31 and emerging from the channel five or six minutes later. The positions of the vessels of my command off Santiago at
that moment were as follows: The flagship 'New York' was 4 miles east of her blockading station and about 7 miles from the harbor entrance. She had started for Siboney, where I intended to land, accompanied by several of my staff, and go to the front to consult with General Shafter. {609}
A discussion of the situation and a more definite understanding between us of the operations proposed had been rendered necessary by the unexpectedly strong resistance of the Spanish garrison of Santiago. I had sent my chief of staff on shore the day before to arrange an interview with General Shafter, who had been suffering from heat prostration. I made arrangements to go to his headquarters, and my flagship was in the position mentioned above when the Spanish squadron appeared in the channel. The remaining vessels were in or near their usual blockading positions, distributed in a semicircle about the harbor entrance, counting from the eastward to the westward, in the following order: The 'Indiana' about a mile and a half from shore, the 'Oregon' the 'New York's' place being between these two the 'Iowa,' 'Texas,' and 'Brooklyn,' the latter two miles from the shore west of Santiago. The distance of the vessels from the harbor entrance was from 2½ to 4 miles, the latter being the limit of day blockading distance. The length of the arc formed by the ships was about 8 miles. The 'Massachusetts' had left at 4 a. m., for Guantanamo for coal. Her station was between the 'Iowa' and 'Texas.' The auxiliaries 'Gloucester' and 'Vixen' lay close to the land and nearer the harbor entrance than the large vessels, the 'Gloucester' to the eastward and the 'Vixen' to the westward. The torpedo boat 'Ericsson' was in company with the flagship and remained with her during the chase until ordered to discontinue, when she rendered very efficient service in rescuing prisoners from the burning' Vizcaya.' …
"The Spanish vessels came rapidly out of the harbor, at a speed estimated at from 8 to 10 knots, and in the following order: 'Infanta Maria Teresa' (flagship), 'Vizcaya,'
'Cristobal Colon,' and the 'Almirante Oquendo.' The distance between these ships was about 800 yards, which means that from the time the first one became visible in the upper reach of the channel until the last one was out of the harbor an interval of only about 12 minutes elapsed. Following the 'Oquendo,' at a distance of about 1,200 yards, came the torpedo-boat destroyer 'Pluton,' and after her the 'Furor.' The armored cruisers, as rapidly as they could bring their guns to bear, opened a vigorous fire upon the blockading vessels, and emerged from the channel shrouded in the smoke from their guns. The men of our ships in front of the port were at Sunday 'quarters for inspection.' The signal was made simultaneously from several vessels, 'Enemy ships escaping,' and general quarters was sounded. The men cheered as they sprang to their guns, and fire was opened probably within 8 minutes by the vessels whose guns commanded the entrance. The 'New York' turned about and steamed for the escaping fleet, flying the signal, 'Close in towards harbor entrance and attack vessels,' and gradually increasing speed, until toward the end of the chase she was making 16½ knots, and was rapidly closing on the 'Cristobal Colon.' She was not, at any time, within the range of the heavy Spanish ships, and her only part in the firing was to receive the undivided fire from the forts in passing the harbor entrance, and to fire a few shots at one of the destroyers, thought at the moment to be attempting to escape from the 'Gloucester.'
"The Spanish vessels, upon clearing the harbor, turned to the westward in column, increasing their speed to the full power of their engines. The heavy blockading vessels, which had closed in towards the Morro at the instant of the enemy's appearance, and at their best speed, delivered a rapid fire, well sustained and destructive, which speedily overwhelmed and silenced the Spanish fire. The initial speed of the Spaniards carried them rapidly past the blockading vessels, and the battle developed into a chase in which the 'Brooklyn' and 'Texas' had, at the start, the advantage of position. The
'Brooklyn' maintained this lead. The 'Oregon,' steaming with amazing speed from the commencement of the action, took first place. The 'Iowa' and the 'Indiana' having done good work, and not having the speed of the other ships, were directed by me, in succession, at about the time the 'Vizcaya' was beached, to drop out of the chase and resume blockading stations. These vessels rescued many prisoners. The 'Vixen,' finding that the rush of the Spanish ships would put her between two fires, ran outside of our own column and remained there during the battle and chase.
"The skillful handling and gallant fighting of the 'Gloucester' excited the admiration of everyone who witnessed it, and merits the commendation of the Navy Department. She is a fast and entirely unprotected auxiliary vessel the yacht 'Corsair' and has a good battery of light rapid-fire guns. She was lying about 2 miles from the harbor entrance, to the southward and eastward, and immediately steamed in, opening fire upon the large ships. Anticipating the appearance of the 'Pluton' and 'Furor,' the 'Gloucester' was slowed, thereby gaining more rapidly a high pressure of steam, and when the destroyers came out she steamed for them at full speed, and was able to close to short range, while her fire was accurate, deadly, and of great volume. During this fight the 'Gloucester' was under the fire of the Socapa Battery. Within twenty minutes from the time they emerged from Santiago Harbor the careers of the 'Furor' and the 'Pluton' were ended, and two-thirds of their people killed. The 'Furor' was beached and sunk in the surf; the 'Pluton' sank in deep water a few minutes later. The destroyers probably suffered much injury from the fire of the secondary batteries of the battle ships 'Iowa,' 'Indiana,' and the 'Texas,' yet I think a very considerable factor in their speedy destruction was the fire, at close range, of the 'Gloucester's' battery. After rescuing the survivors of the destroyers, the 'Gloucester' did excellent service in landing and securing the crew of the 'Infanta Maria Teresa.'
"The method of escape attempted by the Spaniards, all steering in the same direction, and in formation, removed all tactical doubts or difficulties, and made plain the duty of every United States vessel to close in, immediately engage, and pursue. This was promptly and effectively done. As already stated, the first rush of the Spanish squadron carried it past a number of the blockading ships which could not immediately work up to their best speed; but they suffered heavily in passing, and the 'Infanta Maria Teresa' and the 'Oquendo' were probably set on fire by shells fired during the first fifteen minutes of the engagement. It was afterwards learned that the 'Infanta Maria Teresa's' fire main had been cut by one of our first shots, and that she was unable to extinguish fire. With large volumes of smoke rising from their lower decks aft, these vessels gave up both fight and flight and ran in on the beach the 'Infanta Maria Teresa' at about 10.15 a. m. at Nima Nima, 6½ miles from Santiago Harbor entrance, and the 'Almirante Oquendo' at about 10.30 a. m. at Juan Gonzales, 7 miles from the port.
{610}
"The 'Vizcaya' was still under the fire of the leading vessels; the 'Cristobal Colon' had drawn ahead, leading the chase, and soon passed beyond the range of the guns of the leading American ships. The 'Vizcaya' was soon set on fire, and, at 11.15, she turned inshore, and was beached at Aserraderos, 15 miles from Santiago, burning fiercely, and with her reserves of ammunition on deck already beginning to explode. When about 10 miles west of Santiago the 'Indiana' had been signaled to go back to the harbor entrance, and at Aserraderos the 'Iowa' was signaled to 'Resume blockading station.' The 'Iowa' assisted by the 'Ericsson' and the 'Hist,' took off the crew of the 'Vizcaya,' while the 'Harvard' and the 'Gloucester' rescued those of the 'Infanta Maria Teresa' and the 'Almirante Oquendo.' This rescue of
prisoners, including the wounded, from the burning Spanish vessels, was the occasion of some of the most daring and gallant conduct of the day. The ships were burning fore and aft, their guns and reserve ammunition were exploding, and it was not known at what moment the fire would reach the main magazines. In addition to this a heavy surf was running just inside of the Spanish ships. But no risk deterred our officers and men until their work of humanity was complete.
"There remained now of the Spanish ships only the 'Cristobal Colon' but she was their best and fastest vessel. Forced by the situation to hug the Cuban coast, her only chance of escape was by superior and sustained speed. When the 'Vizcaya' went ashore, the 'Colon' was about 6 miles ahead of the 'Brooklyn' and the 'Oregon'; but her spurt was finished, and the American ships were now gaining upon her. Behind the 'Brooklyn' and the 'Oregon' came the 'Texas,' 'Vixen,' and 'New York.' It was evident from the bridge of the 'New York' that all the American ships were gradually overhauling the chase, and that she had no chance of escape. At 12.50 the 'Brooklyn' and the 'Oregon' opened fire and got her range the 'Oregon's' heavy shell striking beyond her and at 1.20 she gave up without firing another shot, hauled down her colors, and ran ashore at Rio Torquino, 48 miles from Santiago. Captain Cook, of the 'Brooklyn,' went on board to receive the surrender. While his boat was alongside I came up in the 'New York,' received his report, and placed the 'Oregon' in charge of the wreck to save her, if possible, and directed the prisoners to be transferred to the 'Resolute,' which had followed the chase. Commodore Schley, whose chief of staff had gone on board to receive the surrender, had directed that all their personal effects should be retained by the officers. This order I did not modify. The 'Cristobal Colon' was not injured by our firing, and probably is not much injured by beaching, though she ran ashore at high speed. The beach was so steep that she came off by the working of the sea. But her sea valves were opened and broken, treacherously, I am sure,
after her surrender, and despite all efforts she sank. When it became evident that she could not be kept afloat, she was pushed by the 'New York' bodily up on the beach, the 'New York's' stem being placed against her for this purpose the ship being handled by Captain Chadwick with admirable judgment and sank in shoal water and may be saved. Had this not been done she would have gone down in deep water and would have been, to a certainty, a total loss.
"I regard this complete and important victory over the Spanish forces as the successful finish of several weeks of arduous and close blockade, so stringent and effective during the night that the enemy was deterred from making the attempt to escape at night, and deliberately elected to make the attempt in daylight. The object of the blockade of Cervera's squadron was fully accomplished, and each individual bore well his part in it the commodore in command on the second division, the captains of ships, their officers, and men. The fire of the battle ships was powerful and destructive, and the resistance of the Spanish squadron was, in great part, broken almost before they had got beyond the range of their own forts. …
Several of the [American] ships were struck the 'Brooklyn' more often than the others but very slight material injury was done, the greatest being aboard the 'Iowa.' Our loss was 1 man killed and 1 wounded, both on the 'Brooklyn.' It is difficult to explain this immunity from loss of life or injury to ships in a combat with modern vessels of the best type, but Spanish gunnery is poor at the best, and the superior weight and accuracy of our fire speedily drove the men from their guns and silenced their fire. This is borne out by the statements of prisoners and by observation."
Annual Report of Secretary of the Navy, 1898, volume 2, pages 506-511.
Some particulars of the destruction of the "Furor," the "Pluton," and the "Infanta Maria Teresa," and of the rescue of
surviving Spaniards, including Admiral Cervera, are given in a report by Lieutenant Huse, executive officer of the "Gloucester," as follows: "The 'Pluton' was run on the rocks about 4 miles west of Morro and blew up. Our crew cheered at the sight of the explosion. The 'Furor' soon commenced to describe circles with a starboard helm, her fire ceased, and it became apparent that she was disabled. A white rag was waved from forward and we stopped firing. Lieutenants Wood and Norman and Assistant Engineer Proctor were sent to rescue the crews and to see if the prizes could be saved. These found a horrible state of affairs on the 'Furor.' The vessel was a perfect shambles. As she was on fire and burning rapidly, they took off the living and then rescued all they could find in the water and on the beach. The 'Pluton' was among the rocks in the surf and could not be boarded, but her crew had made their way ashore or were adrift on life buoys and wreckage. These were all taken on board. I have since learned that the 'New York' passed a number of men in the water who had doubtless jumped overboard from the destroyers to escape our fire. All these were probably drowned. While this work was going on several explosions took place on the 'Furor,' and presently at about 11.30 she threw her bows in the air, and turning to port slowly sank in deep water.
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"While one of our boats was still ashore, seeing heavy clouds of smoke behind the next point the ship was moved in that direction, the men being at quarters and everything in readiness for further action. On rounding the point two men-of-war were found on the beach burning fiercely aft, the majority of the crew being crowded on the forecastle and unable apparently to reach land, only 200 yards away. Our boats, under Lieutenant Norman and Ensign Edson, put off to the nearer vessel, which proved to be the flagship 'Infanta Maria Teresa,' and rescued all on board by landing them on the beach through the surf. Lieutenant Norman formally received
the surrender of the commander in chief and all his officers and men present, and as soon as all hands had been transferred ashore, brought on board this ship all the higher officers, including the admiral. Lieutenant Wood meanwhile rescued the remaining survivors on board the 'Oquendo,' the second of the burning vessels. The Spanish officers not feeling that the prisoners on shore were secure from attack by Cuban partisans, by your orders I directed Lieutenant Norman to land with a small force, establish a camp on shore, and hoist the United States flag over it. He took with him all the rations that could be spared from the stores aboard."
Annual Report of Secretary of the Navy, 1898, volume 2, page 542.
The following is a translation, from Admiral Cervera's report, as partly published in newspapers at Madrid, giving his description of the destruction of his flagship and his own rescue from death: "The enemy's fire produced terrible damages on board the 'Infanta Maria Teresa,' destroying the elements of defence among others, the net for protection against fire. In this critical moment the captain of the ship, Señor Concas, fell wounded, and it was necessary to withdraw him, I taking command of the vessel, because it was impossible to find the second commandant of the 'Maria Teresa.' Immediately afterwards they reported to me that my cabin was burning in consequence of an explosion. The fire soon became very great and ignited other parts of the ship. I gave orders to my aid to flood the after magazines, but it was impossible. Dense clouds of smoke impeded walking in the passages and practicing any kind of operations. In this situation I could only think of beaching the ship, and did so, running aground on Punta Cabrera. The contest was impossible on our side, and there was nothing more to be done but to save as much as possible. I thought to lower the flag, but that was not possible on account of the fire, which prevented all operations. In these anxious moments two boats came to the aid of the 'Maria
Teresa,' into which a number of us jumped. Those that were not dying were saved with nothing. The 'Teresa' lowered a small boat, which sank before it could be of any service. Subsequently they succeeded in launching a steam launch, but this also sank after making one voyage to the beach. I succeeded in saving myself with nothing, two sailors helping me, one named Andres Sequeros and the officer D. Angel Cervera, all of us arriving on board the American ship 'Gloucester' naked. At this time we were all naked."
Annual Report of Secretary of the Navy, 1898, volume 2, pages 558-559.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 July (4-17). The surrender of Santiago and of all the Spanish forces in eastern Cuba.
The following is a continuation of the report made by General Shafter of his operations at Santiago de Cuba, resulting in the surrender of the entire forces of Spain in eastern Cuba: "The information of our naval victory was transmitted under flag of truce to the Spanish commander in Santiago on July 4, and the suggestion again made that he surrender to save needless effusion of blood. On the same date I informed Admiral Sampson that if he would force his way into the harbor the city would surrender without any further sacrifice of life. Commodore Watson replied that Admiral Sampson was temporarily absent, but that in his (Watson's) opinion the navy should not enter the harbor. In the meanwhile letters passing between General Toral and myself caused the cessation of hostilities to continue; each army, however, continued to strengthen its intrenchments. I was still of the opinion the Spaniards would surrender without much more fighting, and on July 6 called General Toral's attention to the changed conditions and at his request gave him time to consult his home Government. This he did, asking that the British consul, with the employees of the cable company, be permitted to
return from El Caney to the city. This I granted. The strength of the enemy's position was such I did not wish to assault if it could be avoided. An examination of the enemy's works, made after the surrender, fully justified the wisdom of the course adopted. The intrenchments could only have been carried with very great loss of life, probably with not less than 3,000 killed and wounded.
"On July 8 General Toral offered to march out of the city with arms and baggage, provided he would not be molested before reaching Holguin, and to surrender to the American forces the territory then occupied by him. I replied that while I would submit his proposition to my home Government, I did not think it would be accepted. In the meanwhile arrangements were made with Admiral Sampson that when the army again engaged the enemy the navy would assist by shelling the city from ships stationed off Aguadores, dropping a shell every few minutes. On July 10 the 1st Illinois and the 1st District of Columbia arrived, and were placed on the line to the right of the cavalry division. This enabled me to push Lawton further to the right and to practically command the Cobra road. On the afternoon of the date last mentioned the truce was broken off at 4 p. m., and I determined to open with four batteries of artillery, and went forward in person to the trenches to give the necessary orders; but the enemy anticipated us by opening fire with his artillery a few minutes after the hour stated. His batteries were apparently silenced before night, while ours continued playing upon his trenches until dark. During this firing the navy fired from Aguadores, most of the shells falling in the city. There was also some small-arms firing. On this afternoon and the next morning we lost Captain Charles W. Rowell, 2d Infantry, and 1 man killed, and Lieutenant Lutz, 2d Infantry, and 10 men wounded. On the morning of July 11 the bombardment by the Navy and my field guns was renewed and continued until nearly noon, and on the same day I reported to the Adjutant-General of the Army that the right of Ludlow's brigade of Lawton's division rested on the bay. Thus our hold
