Husserl’sLegacy
Phenomenology,Metaphysics, andTranscendentalPhilosophy
DanZahavi
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Preface
IhavedrawnonanddiscussedHusserl’sideasinmanypublications,but onlyafewofmybookshavehadhisworkastheirprimetarget.Myvery firstbook, IntentionalitätundKonstitution (1992),wasananalysisof somecentralthemesinHusserl’ s LogischeUntersuchungen.Mydissertation, HusserlunddietranszendentaleIntersubjektivität (1996),offered anextensiveinterpretationofHusserl’saccountofintersubjectivity,and HusserlsFænomenologi (1997)wasageneralintroductiontoHusserl’ s philosophy.Fromthelate1990sonwards,however,andespeciallyafter publicationoftheEnglishtranslationoftheintroductorybook(Husserl’ s Phenomenology,2003),Ibecameincreasinglyinvolvedinmoresystematicworkattheinterfacebetweenphenomenology,philosophyofmind, andcognitivescience,andstartedtowriteontopicssuchasphenomenal consciousness,self-consciousness,selfhood,empathy,socialcognition, socialemotions,and,mostrecently,collectiveintentionality.While engagedinthissystematicendeavour,Ididn’tentirelyceaseworkingon Husserl,butcontinued,ontheside,towriteondifferentaspectsofhis philosophy.Overtheyearsthisresultedinquiteafewarticles,and eventuallyIstartedtothinkofwaysinwhichtopullthismaterialtogether andtoreworkitintoabook.
Husserl’sLegacy:Phenomenology,Metaphysics,andTranscendental Philosophy returnsinparttoathemethatwasalreadythefocusofmy firstbook:whatistherelationshipbetweenphenomenologyandmetaphysics,andtowhatextentdoesHusserl’sturntotranscendentalphilosophyaffectthatrelationship?Italsoalignsitselfwiththeoverarching interpretationIofferedin HusserlsFænomenologi,butdeepensand expandsitbydrawingonandengagingwiththeinterveningtwenty yearsofHusserlscholarship.
Istartedplanningthepresentbookin2012,andcommencedwritingit in2014.Whilecontainingmuchnewmaterial,thebookalsodrawson andincorporatesideasfromsomeofmypreviousarticles.Everything has,however,beenthoroughlyrevisedandrewritten,andnoneof theoriginalarticlesreappearsintheformofseparatebookchapters. Relevantpreviouspublicationsinclude: ‘Àproposdelaneutralité
métaphysiquedes LogischeUntersuchungen’ , Revuephilosophiquede Louvain 99(4)(2001),715–36: ‘Merleau-PontyonHusserl:areappraisal’ , inT.ToadvineandL.Embree(eds), Merleau-Ponty’sReadingofHusserl (Dordrecht:KluwerAcademic,2002),3–29; ‘Phenomenologyandmetaphysics’,inD.Zahavi,S.Heinämaa,andH.Ruin(eds), Metaphysics, Facticity,Interpretation (Dordrecht:KluwerAcademic,2003),3–22; ‘Mind,meaning,andmetaphysics ’ , ContinentalPhilosophyReview 36 (3)(2003),325–34; ‘Phenomenologyandtheprojectofnaturalization’ , PhenomenologyandtheCognitiveSciences 3(4)(2004),331–47; ‘Husserl’ s noemaandtheinternalism-externalismdebate’ , Inquiry 47(1)(2004), 42–66; ‘Killingthestrawman:Dennettandphenomenology’ , PhenomenologyandtheCognitiveSciences 6(1–2)(2007),21–43; ‘Internalism,externalism,andtranscendentalidealism’ , Synthese 160(3)(2008),355–74; ‘Philosophy,psychology,phenomenology’,inS.HeinämaaandM.Reuter (eds), PsychologyandPhilosophy:InquiriesintotheSoulfromLateScholasticismtoContemporaryThought (Dordrecht:Springer,2009),247–62; ReviewofE.Thompson, MindinLife:Biology,Phenomenologyandthe SciencesoftheMind, HusserlStudies 25(2)(2009),159–68; ‘Phänomenologie undTranszendentalphilosophie’,inG.FigalandH.-H.Gander(eds), HeideggerundHusserl:NeuePerspektiven (FrankfurtamMain:Vittorio Klostermann,2009),73–99; ‘Naturalizedphenomenology’,in S.GallagherandD.Schmicking(eds), HandbookofPhenomenologyand CognitiveScience (Dordrecht:Springer,2010),2–19; ‘Life,thinkingand phenomenologyintheearlyBergson’,inM.R.Kelly(ed.), Bergson andPhenomenology (Basingstoke:PalgraveMacmillan,2010),118–33; ‘Husserlandthe “absolute”’,inC.Ierna,H.Jacobs,andF.Mattens (eds), Philosophy,Phenomenology,Sciences:EssaysinCommemoration ofHusserl (Dordrecht:Springer,2010),71–92; ‘Naturalizedphenomenology:adesideratumoracategorymistake?’ , RoyalInstituteofPhilosophy Supplement 72(2013),23–42; ‘Phenomenologyofreflection’,inA.Staiti (ed.), CommentaryonHusserl’sIdeasI (Berlin:DeGruyter,2015),177–93; ‘Theendofwhat?Phenomenologyvs.speculativerealism’ , International JournalofPhilosophicalStudies 24(3)(2016),289–309; ‘Brain,Mind, World:Predictivecoding,neo-Kantianism,andtranscendentalidealism’ , HusserlStudies,inpress.
Husserl’sLegacy waswrittenattheCenterforSubjectivityResearchat theUniversityofCopenhagen.Ihaveprofitedfrommyinteractionand discussionwithbothstaffmembersandvisitors.Iamalsogratefultothe
DanishNationalResearchFoundation,whoseinitialsupportallowedme toestablishandruntheresearchcentre.
Someoftheideasfoundinthisbookwereinitiallypresentedat lecturesatPennStateUniversity,theChineseUniversityofHong Kong,ÉcoleNormaleSupérieure(Paris),PekingUniversity,theUniversityofTromsø,theCatholicUniversityofAmerica(Washington,DC), theUniversityofBern,RitsumeikanUniversity(Kyoto),theParisSorbonneUniversity,theUniversityofEssex,theHebrewUniversity (Jerusalem),theUniversityofFreiburg,theUniversityofLeuven,the UniversityofWürzburg,theUniversityofWesternEngland,Rochester InstituteofTechnology,theUniversityofHeidelberg,CharlesUniversity Prague,BostonCollege,SödertörnUniversity(Stockholm),Helsinki University,theUniversityofVienna,andUCBerkeley.Iamgratefulto thevariousaudiencesfortheirvaluablecomments.
Overtheyears,Ihaveprofitedfromanongoingdiscussionwith variousfellowHusserliansincludingDavidCarr,StevenCrowell, JohnDrummond,JimHart,SaraHeinämaa,S renOvergaard,Tony Steinbock,andEvanThompson.ThatIstilloweadebtofgratitudeto myformerteachersKlausHeldandRudolfBernetshouldbeevident fromreadingthebook.IamalsoparticularindebtedtoLiesbetdeKock, SophieLoidolt,LouisSass,GalenStrawson,TakuyaNakamura,and PhilipSchmidtforvariousincisivecommentsondifferentpartsofthe text.IamgratefultoJamesJardineandThomasSzantoforhaving providedinvaluablehelpintranslatingsomeofthequotationsfrom HusserlintoEnglish.SpecialthankstoSophieLoidoltforonceagain organizingaworkshopinViennawhereanadvanceddraftofmostofthe manuscriptwasdiscussed.Letmealsoacknowledgemydebttotwo anonymousrefereesforOxfordUniversityPresswhoprovidedsome veryhelpfulcomments.
Finally,thankstoJuanToroforcompilingtheindexandtoPeter Momtchiloffforhisexemplaryeditorship.
Introduction
HowshouldoneassessHusserl’slegacy?Onepossibilityistostudythe influencehehasexertedonthedevelopmentoftwentieth-centuryphilosophy.Thattheinfluencehasbeenimmensecanhardlybedisputed. Thisisnottosay,ofcourse,thateverybodyagreedwithhim;butthe factthatsubsequentphenomenologists,includingHeidegger,Ingarden, Schutz,Fink,Sartre,Merleau-Ponty,Levinas,Gadamer,Ricœur,Derrida, Henry,andMarion,aswellasleadingtheoristsfromawholerangeof othertraditions,includinghermeneutics,criticaltheory,deconstruction, andpost-structuralism,feltaneedtoreactandrespondtoHusserl’ s projectandprogramtestifiestohisimportance.Wecan,however,contrast thismorebackward-lookingapproachwithamoreforward-looking appraisalofHusserl’slegacy,onethatbasicallyasksthefollowingquestion: ‘WhatarethefutureprospectsofHusserlianphenomenology?’ Orto putitdifferently, ‘DoesHusserlianphenomenologyremainrelevantfor philosophyinthetwenty-firstcentury?’ Theseare,ofcourse,hugequestions,andthereareagaindifferentwaysonemightgoabouttryingto answerthem.
OneoptionistoinquireintothewayinwhichHusserl’sworkcontains specificanalysesofenduringvalue.Onecould,forinstance,investigatewhetherhisdetailedanalysesofintentionality,embodiment,timeconsciousness,self-consciousness,intersubjectivity,etc.hassomethingto offercurrentdiscussionsincontinentalphilosophy,analyticphilosophyof mind,orcognitivescience.Inshort,onewaytoargueforthecontinuing relevanceofHusserl’sphenomenologyisbyshowingthattherestillismuch tolearnfromhispainstakinginvestigationsofvariousconcretephenomena.Thisisacompletelyrespectablewayofapproachingthequestion; moreover,itisanapproachthatiscurrentlyquiteinfluential.
ButwouldHusserlhavebeensatis fiedwiththiskindoflegacy?Inhis eyes,wouldtheabsorptionandintegrationofmanyofhisspeci fic
analysesintootherresearchprogramshavebeensufficienttodemonstratethehealthystateofphenomenology?Isuspectnot.IthinkHusserl wouldhavebeenmoreconcernedwiththequestionofwhetherhis phenomenologicalprogramandprojectcontinuedto flourish.
InarecentcriticalexchangewithDennett,Siewerthasdefendedthe relevanceandsignificanceofwhathecalls ‘plainphenomenology’,which iswhatoneispractisingif(1)oneismakingandexplainingmentalor psychologicaldistinctions,(2)oneshowswhythosedistinctionsare theoreticallyimportant,(3)onereliesonasourceof first-personwarrant, anddoesso(4)withoutassumingthat first-personwarrantderivesfrom somesourceofthird-personwarrant(Siewert2007:202).Whateverthe meritsofsuchanenterprise,itoughttobeclearthatthisisnotwhat Husserlhadinmindwhenhecharacterizedphenomenologyasthe culminationandfulfilmentofWesternphilosophy(Hua6/195).
RatherthandelvingintoadetailedexplorationofsomeofHusserl’ s manyconcreteinvestigationsofintentionality,temporality,empathy, etc.,theaimofthefollowinglinkedstudiesistopursueamoremethodologicalandmetaphilosophicalobjectiveandofferaninterpretation ofthemoreoverarchingaimsandambitionsofHusserlianphenomenology.Whatisultimatelyatstakeinhisphenomenologicalanalyses? AreHusserl’sphenomenologicalanalysesprimarilytobeunderstoodas investigationsofconsciousness,andifso,musttheythenbeclassi fied aspsychologicalcontributionsofsomesort?IfHusserlisengagedina transcendentalphilosophicalproject,isphenomenologicaltranscendentalphilosophythendistinctiveinsomeway,andwhatkindofmetaphysicalimport,ifany,mightithave?IsHusserlianphenomenologyprimarily descriptiveincharacter isitsupposedtocapturehowmatters seem tous, orisitalsosupposedtocapturehowthingsare?
Thequestionstobeaddressedaresomeofthemostcontestedand debatedinphenomenology.Theyhavebeendiscussedeversincethe publicationofHusserl’ s LogischeUntersuchungen in1900–1901,andas weshallsee,thereisstillnoconsensusintheliterature.Centraltomy interpretiveeffortswillbeanattempttounderstandHusserl’ s transcendentalidealism .Whatdoesitamountto,andwhydidHusserladoptit? Isitametaphysicalposition,doesitcommithimtoaformof(sophisticated)phenomenalismorsubjectiveidealism,orisHusserlonthe contraryengagedinasemanticorepistemologicalprojectthatinvolves asuspensionofmetaphysicalquestionsaltogether?
DespitetheimpressivequalityofrecentscholarlyworkonHusserl, severalfundamentalmisunderstandingsarestillwidespreadinthelarger scholarlycommunity misunderstandingswhichcontinuetoimpedea soundgraspofthecentralaimsandambitionsofhisphenomenology.To mentionjustoneexample,considerasauthoritativeavolumeas The OxfordDictionaryofPhilosophy,wherewecanreadthatHusserl’stranscendentalidealisminvolvesabracketingofexternalquestionsandthe takingof ‘asolipsistic,disembodiedCartesianego’ asthestartingpoint, andthatHusserlconsequentlyconsideredit ‘inessentialthatthethinking subjectiseitherembodiedorsurroundedbyothers’ (Blackburn2016: 229–30).
Takingissuewithreadingssuchasthis,IwillarguethatHusserl wasnotasophisticatedintrospectionist,noraphenomenalist,noran internalist,noraquietistwhenitcomestometaphysicalissues,andnot opposedtoallformsofnaturalism.Onamorepositivenote,Iwillargue thatapropergraspofHusserl’stranscendentalidealismwillrevealhow fundamentalaroleheascribedtoembodimentandintersubjectivity. Ultimately,Iwillarguethathehasmoreincommonwithcontemporary enactivismthanwithtraditionalinternalistrepresentationalism.Indeed, ifanythingmyinterpretationwillseektoshowthatHusserl’sphenomenologyisasmuchabouttheworldasitisaboutconsciousness.
Husserl’sLegacy isintendedasacontributiontoHusserlscholarship. TheprimaryaimofthefollowinginvestigationsistoclarifyHusserl’ s positionandtosuggestwaysinwhichtomakesenseofvariouscentral claimsofhis.Althoughtheaimisnottoofferanindependentdefenceof transcendentalidealism,Ihopetoshowthattherearewaysofinterpretingthelatterthatwillmakeitfarmoreakintodominantpositionsin twentieth-centuryphilosophythanonemightinitiallyhaveassumed.
AfewwordsaboutthematerialIwilldrawonareinorder.Iwill primarilymakeuseoftextspublishedinthetext-criticalHusserliana edition.Asiswellknown,thefewbooksthatHusserlmanagedtopublish duringhislifemakeuponlyaverysmallpartofhisenormousproduction.Husserlhadthehabitofwritingeveryday,andwhenhediedin 1938,hisliterarylegacyamountedtomorethan40,000pages.Howthese manuscriptsweresecretlybroughttosafetyinBelgiumbeforetheoutbreakofWorldWarIIisanexcitingstoryinitsownright(seevanBreda
1959).ButoneoftheprincipaltasksoftheHusserlArchivesinLeuven, foundedin1939,wastocommenceacriticaleditionofHusserl’sworks. Bynow,theHusserlianaconsistsof42volumes,andcontainsnotonly neweditionsofworksthatwerepublishedduringHusserl’slifebutalso, andmoreimportantly,text-criticaleditionsofhispreviouslyunpublishedworks,articles,lectures,andresearchmanuscripts.
ThedecisiontobaseaninterpretationpartiallyonHusserl’sresearch manuscriptsfacesamethodologicalobjection.Isitnotproblematicto makeuseofbookmanuscriptsorresearchmanuscriptsthatHusserlkept backfrompublication,andwhichhemightevenhavewrittenforhimself alone?Husserl’sdailywritingwaspartiallyanattempttotryoutnew ideas(Hua13/xviii–xix),andthereasonthesetextswereneverpublished mightpreciselyhavebeenbecauseHusserlwasdissatis fiedwiththe result.Isitconsequentlynotbettertobaseaninterpretationexclusively onthewritingspublishedbyHusserlhimself?
Ifthisreasoningseemscompelling,thenconsiderforinstancewhat Wittgensteinscholarshipwouldcurrentlylooklikeifithadfocused exclusivelyon TractatusLogico-Philosophicus,theonlyworkthatWittgenstein publishedduringhislifetime.IfwetakeacloserlookatHusserl’sworking methodandpublicationplans,itwillinanycasebecomeclearthatthere aremanyreasonswhyitwouldbeunwisetoadheretothemethodological principleinquestion.
Husserloftenexpressedreservationsandmisgivingsabouthispublishedworkssoonaftertheyappeared.Insomecases,hespentconsiderabletimerevisingsubstantiveportionsofthetexts.Inhis Nachlass,one can,forinstance, findrevisionsofboth LogischeUntersuchungen and CartesianischeMeditationen revisionsthathavesubsequentlybeen published(seeHua20/1–2andHua15).
Inhislateryears,Husserlmadedifferentattemptstowriteadefinitivesystematicpresentationofhisphilosophy.Manyoftheseattempts remainedunsuccessfulanddidnotresultinpublishedbooks.Butthe reasonforthiswasnotthatHusserlwasparticularlydissatis fiedwiththe results,butratherthathehaddifficultiesmaintainingfocus,andkept gettingdistractedbyandabsorbedinotherprojects(Hua15/xvi,lxi).
Preciselybecauseofhisrecurrentproblemswithcompletingasystematicandcomprehensiveaccount,Husserleventuallystartedtoworkquite explicitlywithhis Nachlass inmind(cf.Hua14/xix,15/lxii,lxvii–iii).As hefrequentlyremarkedinletterstofriendsandcolleaguessuchasPaul
NatorpandAdolfGrimme,hismostdecisivecontributionwascontained intheunpublishedmanuscripts.AsHusserlwrotein1931: ‘Indeed,the largestand,asIactuallybelieve,mostimportantpartofmylife’swork stillliesinmymanuscripts,scarcelymanageablebecauseoftheirvolume’ (HuaDok3-III/90,cf.3-V/151).
ThecontinuingpublicationofHusserlianahasmadeanincreasing numberofHusserl’sresearchmanuscriptsavailable,andastudyofthese hasmadeitnecessarytoreviseandmodifyanumberofwidespreadand dominantinterpretations.Thisissonotonlybecausethenewmaterial hasofferedaplethoraofanalysesanddescriptionsthatallowforamore precisegraspofHusserl’sphenomenologicalcoreconcepts,butalso becausetheyhavedisclosedaspectsofhisthinkingthatitwouldhave beendifficult,ifnotimpossible,toanticipatethroughastudyofthefew workswhosepublicationwereauthorizedbyHusserlhimself.
WhereasearlyHusserlscholarshipprimarilyfocusedonclassical volumessuchas LogischeUntersuchungen, IdeenzueinerreinenPhänomenologieundphänomenologischenPhilosophieI, CartesianischeMeditationen, and DieKrisisdereuropäischenWissenschaftenunddietranszendentale Phänomenologie,thisisnolongerthecase.Indeed,thereiswidespread consensusamongHusserlscholarsthatitisnolongeradmissibletobase acomprehensiveinterpretationonsuchanarrowrangeofpublications. ThefocusandscopehaveexpandedtoincludealloftheHusserliana volumes,and,apartfromthetextsalreadymentioned,volumessuch as IdeenzueinerreinenPhänomenologieundphänomenologischenPhilosophieII, ErstePhilosophieII, ZurPhänomenologiedesinnerenZeitbewusstseins, AnalysenzurpassivenSynthesis,and ZurPhänomenologie derIntersubjektivitätI–III havehadaparticulardramaticimpact.This changeoffocushasbroughtaboutanewtypeofinterpretation,whichis notonlycharacterizedbyanemphasisonthedimensionsoffacticity, embodiment,sociality,passivity,historicity,andethicsinHusserl’ s thinking;ithasalsoenabledreinterpretationsoftheclassicalvolumes, thusrevealingaunityandconsistencyinthedevelopmentofhisthinking thatwouldotherwisehaveremainedconcealed.
1
Introspectionandreflection
DamithängtdiegrundverkehrteAnsichtzusammen,alsobessich beiderPhänomenologieumeineRestitutionderMethodeinnerer BeobachtunghandleoderdirekterinnererErfahrungüberhaupt.
1.1Methodologicalworries
Husserlstartshislecturecourse PhänomenologischePsychologie from 1925withthefollowinghistoricaloverview(Hua9/3–20).Duringthe nineteenthcentury,psychologyunderwenttremendousdevelopment. ThroughthecollaborativeeffortofscientistslikeMüller,Helmholtz, Hering,Fechner,andWundt,psychologyestablisheditselfasatruly scientificenterprise.Althoughexperimentalpsychologyquicklygained results,itwasapsychologythatlookedtothenaturalsciences,especially tophysiology,forguidance.Itwasapsychologythat inHusserl’ s words couldnotwithstandthetemptationofnaturalism.Itapproached consciousnessasifitwereanobjectintheworld,onethatcouldbe investigatedandexplainedbymeansofthestandardmethodsofnatural science.Thisapproachwassoonmetwithcriticism.Couldpsychologyof thiskindreallydojusticetotheexperientialdimension?Wasitatallable tocapturesubjectivity?In IdeenübereinebeschreibendeundzergliederndePsychologie from1894,WilhelmDiltheyarguedthatpsychology hadbecomemuchtooinfluencedbythenaturalsciences,andthatit shouldtoalargerextentorientitselftowardsthehumanities.Dilthey wishedtopreservethedifferencebetweentheexplanationofferedbythe naturalsciencesandtheunderstandingprovidedbythehumanities,and distinguishedanexplanatoryorconstructivepsychologyfromhisown descriptiveoranalysingpsychology.Theformerwascommittedtothe
idealsofnaturalscience.Itwasatomisticandbasedonhypothesesand inferences.Butbyproceedinginsuchamanner,italsoproveditself incapableofgraspingthelifeofconsciousness.Itfailedtorealizethatthe unityofpsychiclifeisanexperiencedunityandnotsimplyaninferred andpostulatedone.However,Dilthey’scounterattackwasnotaltogether successful.Ontheonehand,hisownalternativeremainedtooweddedto anintrospectivemethodology.Itonlydealtwithparticularities,andwas unabletoofferuniversalinsightsandformulateproperpsychological laws.Ontheotherhand,itscriticismofexperimentalpsychologywasnot sufficientlyworkedout,anditwascounteredin1895byabrilliantand devastatingarticlebyHermannEbbinghaus,whohadpioneeredthe developmentofexperimentalmethodsforthemeasurementofrote learningandmemory.Attheturnofthecentury,thebattleconsequently seemedtohavebeenwonbythenaturalists.Then LogischeUntersuchungen (1900–1901)waspublished,andasHusserlremarks,thisradically changedthesituation(Hua9/20).
LogischeUntersuchungen heraldedthebirthofanewmethodfor studyingconsciousness,amethodcalled ‘phenomenology’ (Hua9/28, 302).Oneofitscentralaimswastoexploretheintentionalityofconsciousness,thefactthatourperception,thinking,judging,etc.isaboutor ofsomething.Theveryattempttoofferacarefuldescriptionofour psychologicallife,theveryideathatintentionalitymustbeappreciated asadistinctivefeatureofmentalstates,werehoweverideasalready foundintheworkoftheprominentViennesepsychologistandphilosopherFranzBrentano,whoselecturesHusserlhadattendedintheearly 1880s.ItisconsequentlynaturaltoaskwhetherHusserlwasnotsimply continuingtheprojectcommencedbyBrentano.Husserl’ sownanswer tothisquestionisunequivocal.AsheremarkedinalatelettertoMarvin Farberfrom18June1937:
EventhoughIbeganinmyyouthasanenthusiasticadmirerofBrentano,Imust admitIdeludedmyself,fortoolong,andinawayhardtounderstandnow,into believingthatIwasaco-workeronhisphilosophy,especially,hispsychology.But intruth,mywayofthinkingwasatotallydifferentonefromthatofBrentano alreadyinmy firstwork[ ... ].Inaformalsense,Brentanoasksforandprovides apsychologywhosewholetopicisthe ‘psychicphenomena’ whichheonoccasionsdefinesalsoas ‘consciousnessofsomething’.Buthispsychologyis anythingbutascienceofintentionality,theproperproblemsofintentionality neverdawneduponhim.Heevenfailedtoseethatnogivenexperienceof
INTROSPECTIONANDREFLECTION
consciousnesscanbedescribedwithoutadescriptionofthecorrelated ‘intentionalobject “assuch”’ (forexample,thatthisperceptionofthedeskcanonlybe described,whenIdescribethisdeskaswhatandjustasitisperceived).Brentano hadnoinklingofintentionalimplication,ofintentionalmodifications,ofproblemsofconstitution,etc.(HuaDok3-IV/82)
Inhisownpioneeringanalysisofintentionalityin LogischeUntersuchungen,Husserlhadargued(1)thateveryintentionalexperienceisan experienceofaspeci fictype,i.e.anexperienceofperceiving,judging, hoping,desiring,regretting,remembering,affirming,doubting,wondering,fearing,etc.;(2)thateachoftheseexperiencesischaracterizedby beingdirectedatanobjectinaparticularway;and(3)thatnoneofthese experiencescanbeanalysedproperlywithoutconsideringtheirobjective correlate,i.e.theperceived,doubted,expectedobject.WhydidHusserl engageinthisanalysisofintentionalityinthe firstplace?Becausehe wantedtoprovideanewfoundationforlogicandepistemology(Hua18/7).
Butwhyshouldaclarificationoftheformerleadtoanunderstandingofthe latter?Infact,isnottheveryproposalthatitdoestantamounttosomeform ofpsychologism theverypositionthat LogischeUntersuchungen isalso supposedtohavecriticizedsodevastatingly?
Howtocharacterizepsychologism?Itsmainlineofargumentationisas follows.Epistemologyisconcernedwiththecognitivenatureofperceiving, believing,judging,andknowing.Allofthesephenomena,however,are psychicalphenomena,anditisthereforeuptopsychologytoinvestigate andexploretheirstructure.Thisalsoholdstrueforourscientificandlogical reasoning,andultimatelylogicmustthereforeberegardedaspartofpsychologyandthelawsoflogicaspsycho-logicalregularities,whosenatureand validitymustbeempiricallyinvestigatedandestablished(Hua18/64,89).
AsHusserlshowed,thisargumentis flawed.Forone,itdoesnot distinguishsufficientlybetweenthe object ofknowledgeandthe act of knowing.ThebirthdaycakethatIperceiveisquitedifferentfrommy perceptionofit.Thebirthdaycakeweighsthreekilograms,canbeeaten, andcanbeusedinaclownact.Myexperienceofthecakebycontrast doesnotweighanything,cannotbeeaten,andcannothitanybodyinthe face.Andwhereasthecakeisnotoforaboutanything,theperceptionof thecakeisexactlyaboutsomething,namelythecake.Suchaprincipled differencebetweenactandobject,betweentheseeingandtheseen,the hearingandtheheard,alsoobtainsinthecaseoflogic.Whenonespeaks ofalawoflogicorreferstologicaltruths,theories,principles,sentences,
andproofs,onedoesnotrefertosubjectiveexperienceswithtemporal duration.Althoughtheprinciplesoflogicaregraspedandknownby consciousness,weare,accordingtoHusserl,consciousofsomething ideal whosenatureisquiteunlikethepsychicalprocessofknowing. Despitetheirreducibledifferencebetweentheactandtheobject,however,wearestillconfrontedwiththepuzzlingfactthatobjectivetruths areknowninsubjectiveexperiencesofknowing.AndasHusserlinsists, itisthisrelationbetweentheobjectiveandthesubjectivethatmustbe investigatedandclarified,ifwewishtoattainamoresubstantialunderstandingofthepossibilityofknowledge(Hua18/7).
DespiteHusserl’scriticismofpsychologism,hisinterestinthefundamentalproblemsofepistemologyconsequentlymadehimreturnto consciousness.Andalthoughthismovemightnotconstitutearelapse intopsychologism,itcouldstillbesuggestedthatphenomenologyultimatelyamountstoanewpsychologicalmethod.Suchaproposalcould find somesupportinHusserl’sowntext,sinceinthe firsteditionof Logische Untersuchungen hechosetocharacterizephenomenologyasa ‘descriptivepsychology’ (Hua19/24[I/176]).
Initsinvestigationofintentionalconsciousness,phenomenology highlightsthesignificanceofthe first-personperspective.Butisthat notpreciselywhattheintrospectionistpsychologistswerealsodoing? Soperhapsphenomenologyoughttobeclassi fiedasaformofintrospectionism.AsHusserlremarksinamanuscriptentitled PhänomenologieundPsychologie from1917,bythenthislineofthoughthadbecome sowidespreadthattheveryterm ‘phenomenological’ wasbeingused inallkindsofphilosophicalandpsychologicalwritingsasalabelfora directdescriptionofconsciousnessbasedonintrospection(Hua25/103).
Thisusageliveson.Consider,forinstance,theassessmentofDennett, whoinexplainingthedifferencebetweenHusserl’sphenomenologyand hisownheterophenomenologyhasinsistedthat,whereashehimselfseeks todeterminethenotionalworldofanotherfromtheoutside,theclassical phenomenologistssoughttogainaccesstotheirownnotionalworldby somespecial ‘introspectionistbitofmentalgymnastics’ (Dennett1987:153). Indeed,asDennettputsitinanoften-quotedpassagefrom Consciousness Explained,theaimofthephilosophicaltraditionfoundedbyHusserlwasto: findanewfoundationforallphilosophy(indeed,forallknowledge)based onaspecialtechniqueofintrospection,inwhichtheouterworldandallits
implicationsandpresuppositionsweresupposedtobe ‘bracketed ’ inaparticularactofmindknownastheepoché.Thenetresultwasaninvestigativestateof mindinwhichthePhenomenologistwassupposedtobecomeacquaintedwith thepureobjectsofconsciousexperience,called noemata,untaintedbytheusual distortionsandamendmentsoftheoryandpractice.Likeotherattemptstostrip awayinterpretationandrevealthebasi cfactsofconsciousnesstorigorous observation,suchastheImpressionistmovementintheartsandtheIntrospectionistpsychologiesofWundt,Titchener,andothers,Phenomenologyhas failedto fi ndasingle,settledmethodthateveryonecouldagreeupon. (Dennett1991:44)
Whyisthephenomenologicalmethodologyunreliable,andwhydidit failtogenerateaconsensus?Onereasonisthatintrospection,according toDennett,islessamatterofobservationthanoftheorizing.Infact,itis preciselybecausethereissolittletoseethatthereissomuchroomfor fabricationandconfabulation(Dennett1991:68,94;1982:173).In addition,Dennetthasrepeatedlycharacterizedclassicalphenomenology asan ‘autophenomenology’ (Dennett1987:153).Forclassicalphenomenology,thesubjectandtheobjectoftheinvestigationcoincide,since theautophenomenologist,ratherthaninvestigatingthementallifeof others,isconcernedwithhisorherownmentallife.Infact,classical phenomenologyisultimatelycommittedtoaformof ‘methodological solipsism’—atermoriginallycoinedbyPutnam(1975:220)todesignate apositionaccordingtowhichnopsychologicalstatepresupposesthe existenceofanyindividualotherthanthesubjecttowhomthestateis ascribed.Classicalphenomenologyconsidersthesubjectadetached andself-sufficientexistentandtherebyfailstorecognize,forinstance, towhatextentconsciousnessislanguage-dependent.Thephenomenologistshaveconsistentlyemphasizedtheimportanceofthe first-person perspective,andhavetriedtodevelopa first-personscience;butinthe endtheirintrospectionistandsolipsisticmethoddoesnotqualifyasa soundscientificmethod,sincepropersciencerequiresathird-person method(Dennett1991:70;1987:154–8).Arealscientificinvestigationof consciousnessshouldfocusontheactualgoings-oninthebrain,and thosesubpersonalmechanismsarenotintrospectivelyavailable,butare onlyaccessiblefromtheoutside.
Dennett’streatmentofthephenomenologicaltraditioncanhardly countasthoroughandexhaustive.Infact,itdoesnotreallyaddup tomorethanafewscatteredcomments.Thishasnotpreventedhim fromdismissingthetraditionrathercategorically,however.Inhisview,
Husserliansaredeeplyintoobscurantismforitsownsake,andreading theirworksisconsequentlylargelyawasteoftime(Dennett1994).But howfamiliarisDennettwiththetopicofhiscriticism?Somewhat surprisingly,onmorethanoneoccasionhehascalledattentionto whatheseesashisownHusserlianheritage.HestudiedHusserland otherphenomenologistswithDagfinnFøllesdalasanundergraduate, andlearnedaboutphenomenologyfromhisgraduateadviser,Gilbert Ryle,whomDennettconsidersamasterfulscholarofphenomenology (Dennett1994).Inreplytothosewhohaveaccusedhimofignoringthe resourcesofclassicalphenomenology,Dennetthasconsequentlyhada readyreply: ‘itispreciselybecausemydisregardhas not beencomplete thatithasbeen,andcontinuestobe,soconfident’ (Dennett1994).
ButDennetthasnotonlystressedhisfamiliaritywiththephenomenologicaltradition,hehasalsodefendedtheaccuracyofhisown Husserlinterpretationquiteexplicitly,andevenarguedthatifhisreading shouldturnouttobewrong,itwouldbesomuchtheworseforHusserl (Dennett1994).Thisisinmanywaysapuzzlingclaim.Giventhat DennettkeepsinsistingthatHusserlhasbeenemployingafatally flawed unscienti ficmethodology,itisdifficulttoseewhyDennett’sinterpretationshouldparticularlybenefitHusserl.
DennettisnotaloneinassessingHusserl ’sphenomenologicalmethod insuchbleakterms,however.In BeingNoOne,Metzingerarguesin asimilarfashionandconcludesthat ‘phenomenologyisimpossible’ (Metzinger2003:83).WhatkindofargumentdoesMetzingerprovide? Thebasicargumentseemstoconcerntheepistemologicaldifficulties connectedtoany first-personapproachtodatageneration.Ifinconsistenciesintwoindividualdatasetsshouldappear,thereisnowaytosettle theconflict.Morespecifically,Metzingertakesdatatobethingsthatare extractedfromthephysicalworldbytechnicalmeasuringdevices.This dataextractioninvolvesawell-definedintersubjectiveprocedure,takes placewithinascientificcommunity,isopentocriticism,andconstantly seeksindependentmeansofverification.Theproblemwithphenomenologyisthat first-personaccesstothephenomenalcontentofone’ sown mentalstatesdoesnotfulfilthesedefiningcriteriafortheconceptofdata. Infact,theverynotionof first-personaldataisacontradictioninterms (Metzinger2003:591).
WhereassomeinterpretershaveclaimedthatHusserl’sphenomenologicalmethodamountstoaformofintrospectionisminorderthereby
todiscredithisresearchprogram,thereareotherswhohavelikewise arguedthat ‘therearenomajordifferencesinactsbetweenphenomenological “ reflection” andpsycho-phenomenologicalintrospection ’ (Vermersch2009:25),butforwhomthisamountstopraise,sincethey considerHusserl ‘agreatunrecognizedpsychologist’ (Vermersch2011: 22).Thisparticularinterpretationhasrecentlygainedtractionduetothe workofadvocatesoftheso-called ‘elicitationinterviewmethod’—a methodpioneeredbyVermersch(Vermersch1994;Deprazetal.2003), andfurtherdevelopedbyPetitmenginandBitbol(Petitmengin2006; PetitmenginandBitbol2009).
Inhis TextbookofPsychology,whichoffersaclassicalexpositionofthe methodofintrospection,Titchenerprovidedadescriptionofwhathefelt whenreadingthesentence ‘Infinitybroodsoverallthings’ : ‘Themost prominentthinginconsciousnesswasablue-black,densearchedsky, whichpalpated,asifwithimmensewings,overasolidconvexsurface’ (Titchener1910:517–18).Apagelater,healsoofferedthefollowing descriptionoftheimageryevokedbythemeaningof ‘meaning’ : ‘the blue-greytipofakindofscoop,whichhasabitofyellowaboveit (presumablyapartofthehandle),andwhichisjustdiggingintoa darkmassofwhatappearstobeplasticmaterial’ (p.519).Ihopethat nobodywouldseriouslyproposethatthereisanyrelevantsimilarity betweenthesekindsofdescriptionsandtheanalysesprovidedbyHusserl.ButconsideranexamplegivenbyPetitmenginandBitbol:
Iamina café,absorbedinalivelyphilosophicaldiscussionwithmyfriendPaul. Atthebeginningoftheconversation,myattentioniscompletelyfocusedonthe contentoftheideas.Butasthediscussiongoeson,mymodeofattention progressivelychangesandIstarttobecomeawareofotherdimensionsofmy experience.I firstrealizethatwealsospeakwithourhands,andthatIwas initiallyunawareofourgestures.IthenrealizethatIamfeelingmanyemotions triggeredbytheideasweareexchanging,thattheseemotionsareexperienced inseveralpartsofmybody(especiallymychestandmythroat),andthatIwasnot clearlyawareofthis.Suddenly,Ialsobecomeawareofavagueanddiffuse,yet intenseandspecificfeelingwhichislikelytohavebeenwithinmefromthevery instantIwasinPaul’spresence:theenergy,therhythm,thespecial ‘atmosphere’ thatemanatesfromhim,hishighlypersonalwayofbeingpresent.Atthe momentIbecomeawareofthisfeeling,Ikeeponparticipatingintheconversation,butthe fieldofmyattentionisnowbroaderanddefocused.Idonottryto capturethisfeelingbutitimposesitselfonme.Itisasifinsteadoftryingtofetch it,Iamallowingittocometome,topervademe.WhileIadoptthisopenand
receptiveformofattention,Iampresentandawakebutlightlyso,effortlesslyand withouttension.(BitbolandPetitmengin2011:33)
Shouldphenomenologyconcernitselfwithreportsofthiskind?As BitbolandPetitmenginargue,anyreaderofaphenomenological descriptionshouldnotacceptthisdescriptionsolelyonHusserl’ sor anybodyelse’sauthority,butshouldinsteadseektore-enacttheprocess thatledtothedescriptioninquestion.Itispreciselythisre-enactment, this ‘anchoringinsingularexperience’,thatontheirviewmakesup the ‘truedifferencebetweenanabstracthermeneuticalworkandan active,lively,andembodiedphenomenologicaldiscourse’ (Bitboland Petitmengin2011:36).ShouldweconsequentlyappreciateHusserl’ s phenomenologicalworkasacollectionof fine-graineddescriptionsof thintime-slicesofexperiences,asPetitmenginandBitbolseemtoclaim (2013a:271,273)?Willatechnique(liketheelicitationinterview)that allegedlybroadensour fieldofattentioninsuchawayastoallowusto discoverhithertounre flectedandunnoticedaspectsanddetailsoflived experience(BitbolandPetitmengin2013b:181,194)makeusintobetter phenomenologists?Istheaimofthephenomenologicalmethodultimatelyto ‘detectlaterallyoccurrencesthatarenotinthemainfocusof attention’ (BitbolandPetitmengin2013b:179)?Isitaboutrevealingthe margins ‘ofourexperiencethatareoverlookedaslongasexclusive concernforobjectsprevails’ (p.179)?
Letusforamomentrespectthephenomenologicaldictumandreturn tothethingsthemselves,whichinthiscaseareHusserl’sactualwritings. LogischeUntersuchungen isarecognizedmilestoneintwentieth-century philosophyandindisputablyaworkofphenomenologicalphilosophy. Infact,itconstitutedwhatHusserlhimselftooktobehis ‘breakthrough ’ tophenomenology.Whatkindofanalysisdoesone findinthisbook?In additiontoHusserl’sattackonandrejectionofpsychologism,onealso findsadefenceoftheirreducibilityoflogicandtheidealityofmeaning; ananalysisofpictorialrepresentations;atheoryofthepart–whole relation;adevelopmentofapuregrammar;asophisticatedaccount ofintentionality;andanepistemologicalclarificationoftherelation betweenconceptsandintuitions,tomentionjustafewofthemany topicstreatedinthebook.Isthisaworkofintrospectivepsychology? Doesitprimarilycontainrefineddescriptionsofinnerexperiences? Ithinkanybodywhohasactuallyreadthebookwouldanswerno.Should
wethenconcludethatthebookisafterallnotaworkinphenomenology, orshouldwereconsiderourhastyidentificationofphenomenologyand introspectivepsychology?Ithinktheansweroughttobestraightforward. ItisnocoincidencethatHusserlcategoricallyrejectedtheattemptto equatethenotionofphenomenologicalintuitionwithatypeofinner experienceorintrospection(Hua25/36),andevenarguedthatthevery suggestionthatphenomenologyisattemptingtorestitutethemethodof introspection(innererBeobachtung )ispreposterous(grundverkehrt) (Hua5/38).ItissignificantthatHusserl’sstanceonthisissuewasfully sharedbytheotherphenomenologists,whoallopenlyandunequivocally deniedthattheywereengagedinsomekindofintrospectivepsychology andthatthemethodtheyemploywasamethodofintrospection.Not onlydidHeidegger(totakeoneexample)denythathisownanalysisof theexistentialstructuresofDaseinisapsychologicalanalysis(Heidegger 1996:42–7),healsowrotethattheattempttointerpretHusserl’sinvestigationsasakindofdescriptivepsychologycompletelyfailedtodo justicetotheirtranscendentalcharacter.Infact,asHeideggeradded, phenomenologywillremainabooksealedwithsevenormoresealsto anysuchpsychologicalapproach(pp.15–16).
Phenomenologicaldisputesaswellasdisputesamongphenomenologistsarephilosophicaldisputes,notdisputesaboutintrospective findings.AlthoughitwouldbeanexaggerationtoclaimthatHusserl’ s analysesin LogischeUntersuchungen founduniversalapprovalamong subsequentgenerationsofphenomenologists,Idonotknowofany instancewhereHusserl’spositionwasrejectedbecauseofanappealto ‘better’ introspectiveevidence.Onthecontrary,hisanalysesinthis milestoneworkgaverisetoanintensediscussionamongphenomenologicalphilosophers,andmanyoftheanalysesweresubsequently improvedandrefinedbythinkerslikeSartre,Heidegger,Levinas,and Derrida(cf.ZahaviandStjernfelt2002).ComparethistoMetzinger’ s claimthatthephenomenologicalmethodcannotprovideamethodfor generatinganygrowthofknowledge,sincethereisnowayonecanreach intersubjectiveconsensusonclaimslike ‘thisisthepurestblueanyone canperceive’ vs ‘noitisn’t,ithasaslightgreenhue’ (Metzinger2003: 591).Butsuchclaims orclaimsconcerning,say,thepreciseshapeof thevisualpatternsoneseeswithone’seyesclosed aresimplynotthe typeofclaimsthataretobefoundinworksbyphenomenological
philosophers;andtosuggestsoistorevealone’slackoffamiliaritywith thetraditioninquestion. 1
Phenomenologyisindeedinterestedinexperientialconsciousness,in the first-personaldimensionofconsciousness,butitsgoalhasneverbeen toofferdescriptionsofidiosyncraticexperiences—‘hereandnow,thisis justwhatIexperience’.Phenomenologyisnotconcernedwithfactual claimssuchas ‘Iamcurrentlyfeelingslightlynauseous’ or ‘whentasting Amarone,Iamalwaysremindedofmy firstvisittoVenice’.Phenomenologyisnotinterestedinqualiainthesenseofpurelyprivatedatathat areincorrigible,ineffable,andincomparable;itisnotinterestedinyour specificexperience,orinmyspecificexperience,butininvariantstructuresofexperienceandinprincipledquestionsconcerning,say,the presentationalcharacterofperception,thestructureoftemporality,or thedifferencebetweenempathyandsympathy.
Alikelyconclusiontodrawatthispointmightbethatthereisindeed moretophenomenologythansimplyacompilationofintrospective reports,sincetheaimofphenomenologyistocontributerefinedand sophisticatedanalysesoftheeideticandaprioristructuresofconsciousness:whatdoessentiallycharacterizeactsofperceiving,imagining, remembering,judging,etc.,andhowarethesedifferentactsrelatedto eachother?ThisisalsopointedoutbyBitbolandPetitmengin,whothen urgeusnottoforgetthatanyintersubjectiveagreementontheinvariant structureofexperiencehastoinvolveandrelyontheindividual’ saccess tohisorherownlivedexperience(BitbolandPetitmengin2011:36).
Tosuggestthatwenowhaveagraspofwhatisdistinctiveabout phenomenologyandofhowitdiffersfrompsychologywould,however, amounttoyetanothermisunderstanding.AsHusserlwrites,
1 ThomassonhasalsorejectedDennett’sclaimthatHusserl’sphenomenologicalmethod shouldemployintrospection,andthatphenomenologicalknowledgeisbasedonaninner observationofourmentalstates(2005:116).Herargumentproceedsdifferentlyfrommine, however.AlthoughThomassonrightlyhighlightstheimportanceofthephenomenological reductionandthecognitivetransformationiteffects,shealsoarguesthatHusserl’saccount ofphenomenologicalmethodhasmuchincommonwiththeaccountofself-knowledge developedbySellarsandDretske(Thomasson2005:116).Iamnotpersuadedbythislatter claim(foracriticismofDretske,seeZahavi2014:24–5),norbytheclaimthatHusserl’ s phenomenologicaldescriptionsaresimplytheresultofananalysisofvariouslogicaland conceptualentailments(Thomasson2005:133).Ineithercase,thedistinct first-personal characterofphenomenologyisoverlooked.
Theeideticanalysesofexperientialconsciousness,ofouterexperienceandof everykindofexperience,andincontinuationhereof,theeideticanalysesofevery kindofconsciousnessmightbecarriedasfaraspossible:Wewillstillremainat thelevelofpsychology.(Hua25/104)
Inotherwords,ifallphenomenologycoulddowastocontributerefined eideticanalysesofconsciousness,phenomenologywouldnotdifferfrom acertainkindofeideticpsychology.Butwherethenisthedifference betweenphenomenologyandpsychologylocated?
Itisundeniablethatphenomenologyhasaffinitieswithpsychology insofarasbothdisciplinesareinterestedinconsciousness.Butalthough thedistinctionbetweenaphenomenologicalandapsychologicalinvestigationofconsciousnesscanbedifficulttodraw,andmightat firsteven appeartobeanunnecessarilysubtledistinction,weare,asHusserl insists,intheendconfrontedwithacrucialnuancethatisfundamental totheverypossibilityofdoingphilosophy.Weshouldrealize thateveryhistoricallyavailablescientificdisciplineandevenpartofwhatnormally belongstophilosophy,includingformallogic,psychologyandethics,conduct theirresearchinanatural thoughinacertainwaynecessary naivety.Alltheir questionsrefertoaworldwhichisgiventous withanobviousnessbelongingto life priortoallscience,buttheyfailtonoticethatthispre-givennessconceals atrueinfinityofenigmaticproblems,whicharenotevennoticedfromwithin thenaturalperspective.Iamreferringtothetranscendentalproblems,andit isonlythetrulyscientifi cphilosophywhichhasmadetheirdisclosurepossible. (Hua32/7)
ForHusserl,themaindifferencebetweenphenomenologyandpsychologyisthatwhereasthelatteracceptsanumberofcommonsensical metaphysicalpresuppositions,theformerisengagedinatranscendental investigationofthoseverypresuppositions.
WhydoesHusserl’sphenomenologymeritthename ‘transcendental’?
Husserl’sstandardansweristhattheconcepts ‘transcendence’ and ‘transcendental’ arecorrelated,andthatphenomenologyistranscendentalbecauseitsaimistoclarifytheconstitutionoftranscendence(Hua 17/259,1/34,65).Positivesciencecannotbefaultedformakingthe metaphysicalassumptionsitdoes,forsimplypresupposingthemindindependentexistenceoftheobjectsitseekstoinvestigate.Butifphilosophyistodeserveitscredentialsasaformofradicalquestioning,ifit istoengagewiththefundamentalepistemologicalquestions,itcannot simplyprejudicetheanswerbeforehand.Ratherthansimplynaively
acceptingtheready-madecharacteroftheobjectiveworld,weneedto understandhowtheworldforuscomestoacquireitscharacteroftrue, valid,andobjective.Howisitthattheworldwhichweonlyhaveaccess toinvirtueofour first-personperspectivecanappeartousasbeing independentofthatperspective?Howcansomethingbegiveninexperienceastranscendingthatveryexperience?HusserlconcedesthattraditionalCartesianepistemologyhasalsobeenengagedwiththeproblem oftranscendence;butinitstraditionalform,theproblemhasbeenposed asthequestionofhowwecanevergetbeyondourstartingpoint,the innermentalrealm(Hua1/115–16).AsHusserlinsists,however,this framingoftheproblemiswrongheaded.Itpresentsuswithapseudoproblem,whichonlyarisesifweforgetthetruelessonofintentionality andconceiveofthemindasanisolated,world-detachedentity.
In Phénoménologiedelaperception,Merleau-Pontywouldechothis characterizationbydeclaringphenomenologytobedistinguishedinall itsfeaturesfromintrospectivepsychology,andbyarguingthatthe differenceinquestionisadifferenceinprinciple.Whereastheintrospectivepsychologistconsidersconsciousnessasameresectorofbeing, andtriestoinvestigatethissectorinthesamewaythephysicisttriesto investigatehis,thephenomenologistrealizesthataninvestigationof consciousnesscannottakeplaceaslongastheabsoluteexistenceofthe worldisleftunquestioned.Consciousnesscannotbeanalysedproperly withoutleadingusbeyondcommonsenseassumptionsandtowardsa transcendentalclarificationoftheconstitutionoftheworld(MerleauPonty2012:59–60).
Husserl’sandMerleau-Ponty’sremarkscallforfurtherclari fication. Thesimplestwaytounderstandbothofthemisbyacknowledgingthat phenomenology despiteallkindsofotherdifferences is firmlysituatedwithinacertainKantianorpost-Kantianframework.Onewayto interpretKant’srevolutionaryCopernicanturnisbyseeingitasamountingtotherealizationthatourcognitiveapprehensionofrealityismore thanameremirroringofapre-existingworld.Thus,withKanttheprecriticalsearchforthefundamentalbuildingblocksofrealitywastransformedintoatranscendentalphilosophicalreflectiononwhatconditions somethingmustsatisfyinordertocountasreal.Whatistheconditionof possibilityfortheappearanceofempiricalobjects?Whatdoesitmean fortheworldtocountasrealandobjective?Withvariousmodifications, thisideawaspickedupbyHusserlandsubsequentphenomenologists.
Phenomenologistssharetheconvictionthatthecriticalstanceproperto philosophynecessitatesamoveawayfromastraightforwardinvestigationofobjectstoaninvestigationoftheveryframeworkofmeaningand intelligibilitythatmakesanysuchstraightforwardinvestigationpossible inthe firstplace.Indeed,ratherthantakingtheobjectiveworldasthe pointofdeparture,phenomenologypreciselyaskshowsomethinglike objectivityispossibleinthe firstplace.Howisobjectivityconstituted? Howisitthattheworldcanbemanifestedorrevealedtousinthe firstplace?
Iwillinlaterchaptersreturninmoredetailtotheseissuesandalso discusstowhatextentHusserl’sprojectissimilartoanddifferentfrom Kant’s;butletusforthemomentcontinueourexplorationofHusserl’ s methodologybyconsideringhisuseofreflection,sincethiswillgiveusa bettergraspofthescopeofhisphenomenology.
1.2Thescopeofreflection
In IdeenI,Husserlstatesthatreflectionisthenameforanactthatallows ustoanalyseotherexperiences,andalsothenameforthemoregeneral methodemployedbyphenomenology(Hua3/162).Healsowritesthat oneofthedistincttasksofphenomenologyistoexplorethecontribution ofreflectioninamoresystematicfashion.Ithastoengageinakindof meta-reflection(Hua3/165–7).Butis ‘ reflection’ notsimplyanother termforintrospection,anddon’tHusserl’sassertionsconsequentlyprovidesupportfortheintrospectionistinterpretation?Doesn’tHusserl’ s systematicemploymentofreflectionshowthatthelatterreadingisafter allcorrectandthathismainobjectiveistoprovideaccurateandfaithful descriptionsofourinnermentalstates?Indeed,isn’thiscomplicated methodologypreciselyintroducedinordertoallowforasupposedly undistortedgraspofthepureexperience onethatinnowayistainted oralteredbyinterpretationandlanguage?Isn’tSpauldingexactlyright whensheclaimsthatphenomenologistshaveinsistedthattheattemptto ‘verballyexpressone’sphenomenologyistodefeatthepurposeofphenomenology?Toverbalizeone’sexperiencesistoimposealinguistic, culturalframeworkontheexperience,whichthwartsthegoalofstudying theexperienceitself ’ (Spaulding2015:1070).Tosettlethisquestion,and showwhySpauldinghappenstobequitewrong,letmeofferabrief comparisonofHusserl’sviewwiththatofBergson.
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Title: Deux années en Ukraine (1917-1919)
Author: Charles Dubreuil
Release date: July 18, 2022 [eBook #68560]
Language: French
Original publication: France: Henry Paulin, 1919
Credits: The Online Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images generously made available by The Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries)
*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK DEUX ANNÉES EN UKRAINE (1917-1919) ***
Au lecteur
Table des matières
MON SÉJOUR EN UKRAINE
Mon arrivée à Kiev
C’est le 6 janvier 1917 que je débarquai, pour la première fois, à Kiev. En toute autre circonstance, j’aurais admiré la capitale de l’Ukraine, avec ses rues larges et droites, ses hautes maisons aux toits rouges et verts, ses multiples églises aux dômes dorés, sa cathédrale Saint-André qui s’embrase sous les baisers du soleil, sa double croix de Saint-Vladimir qui s’illumine le soir, son vieux quartier qui s’étage en gradins, son fleuve majestueux qui roule, à la belle saison, ses eaux jaunes et profondes sur lesquelles se jouent, mouettes vivantes, une multitude de voiles blanches.
Mais, parti précipitamment de Bucarest, avec ma famille, cinquante jours auparavant, quelques heures à peine avant l’occupation de la capitale roumaine par les troupes austroallemandes, je venais d’accomplir un voyage, véritable odyssée, qui avait absorbé le plus clair de mes économies et j’arrivais dans une ville dont j’ignorais tout, surtout la langue et où je ne connaissais âme qui vive. Je n’avais guère l’esprit ouvert à l’admiration.
De Kiev, je ne vis donc tout d’abord qu’une gare, petite et sale, encombrée de soldats endormis sur le sol et de désœuvrés grignotant les graines de tournesol dont les Ukrainiens sont si
friands, des cochers enveloppés dans de vastes manteaux ouatés, chaussés de grosses bottes de feutre et assis sur les planchettes de traîneaux minuscules et fort bas; des maisons, encore des maisons et toujours des maisons, dont aucune porte ne semblait vouloir s’ouvrir pour me donner l’hospitalité.
Kiev avant la guerre, ne possédait que 600.000 habitants, mais depuis que Polonais, Lithuaniens, Serbes, Arméniens et Roumains, fuyant devant l’armée ennemie, étaient accourus en foule dans l’Ukraine hospitalière, la population kiévoise se chiffrait par plus d’un million et demi d’habitants. D’où superpopulation et crise de logements.
Dans la rue depuis huit heures du matin, par un froid de 22° et sans avoir eu le temps de ne rien me mettre sous la dent, je trouvai enfin, à neuf heures du soir, obligeamment aidé par la Directrice du Foyer Français, un gîte pour moi et les miens, dans un hôtel tenu par une famille belge, au centre de la ville.
Grâce à l’intervention de M. le Colonel P..., officier d’ordonnance du Général Berthelot, le Chef d’Etat-Major du Général Rousky m’avait accordé, à mon passage à la frontière roumano-russe, une recommandation très chaleureuse qui me permit, dès le lendemain de mon arrivée à Kiev, d’occuper, à l’Université féminine, la chaire d’histoire de la littérature française, vacante depuis le départ de M. Ch., mobilisé, et, au Gymnase Alexiev, celle de maître de langue française.
Assuré du pain quotidien pour moi et les miens, je pus ouvrir les yeux sur ce qui m’entourait.
Kiev avant la Révolution
Deux faits me frappent tout d’abord: la liberté extraordinairement grande accordée aux prisonniers de guerre et le respect presque exagéré que témoignent les soldats russes à leurs officiers.
Les prisonniers de guerre, presque tous allemands ou autrichiens, vont et viennent dans les rues de la ville sans aucune surveillance, du moins apparente. Très travailleurs et exerçant presque tous des professions, ils ont monté de petits commerces et de petits ateliers qui leur font réaliser de jolis bénéfices. «Cela est préférable à la guerre», me dit un moine-soldat qui veut bien me ressemeler une paire de souliers à un prix étonnant par sa modicité.
Les soldats russes, très nombreux à Kiev, puisque c’est de là que partent toutes les unités à destination du front roumano-gallicien, se montrent très profondément, trop profondément, à mon avis, respectueux pour leurs officiers. Dès que ceux-ci paraissent, les soldats s’arrêtent, se tournent face à l’endroit où l’officier va passer, frappent fortement le sol de leurs deux talons, portent une main largement tendue à leur shapka et dans un état de fixité et d’immobilité absolues, attendent que l’officier ait disparu dans le lointain.
Inutile de dire que la plupart du temps l’officier ne paraît pas s’apercevoir de ces marques de respect.
Dans les restaurants, les cafés ou les brasseries, un cadet, c’està-dire un élève officier, doit aller, la main dans le rang et en claquant les talons, demander à chaque officier présent, la permission de s’asseoir. Si un officier entre dans ces mêmes lieux, chaque officier se lève aussitôt et la salle résonne du timbre clair des éperons entrechoqués.
J’aurais été bien plus frappé si quelqu’un m’eût alors dit que deux mois plus tard ces mêmes soldats, non seulement ne salueraient
plus leurs officiers, mais porteraient la main sur eux et que ces officiers, si fiers et si hautains, obéiraient à leurs soldats et les craindraient.
Et cependant il en devait être ainsi.
La Révolution russe à Kiev
Les premiers bruits d’une révolution prochaine commencèrent à circuler à Kiev dans les premiers jours de février. Des personnes se disant et paraissant bien informées me conseillèrent même de ne pas sortir ce jour-là car «dans la rue il y aurait certainement des émeutes et le sang ne manquerait pas de couler».
La journée du 26 février arriva. Je sortis comme d’habitude et ne vis aucune émeute; pas même la plus petite manifestation. La Révolution annoncée n’avait pas lieu. Elle n’était que retardée.
Les journaux paraissant à Kiev le 13 mars, annoncèrent à la population que le tsarisme avait vécu et que Nicolas II ayant abdiqué, la Russie entrait dans une ère nouvelle. Ce fut comme un coup de foudre. S’arrachant les journaux, les passants dévoraient la nouvelle et se jetaient dans les bras les uns des autres; ils s’embrassaient, riant et pleurant tout à la fois.
A voir les rues de Kiev, ce jour-là, personne ne se serait douté que l’Empire Russe venait de subir la plus épouvantable catastrophe enregistrée par l’Histoire et que le colosse septentrional allait être réduit en quelques semaines à une sorte de néant.
Des rassemblements se forment, des cortèges se mettent à défiler aux accents de la Marseillaise dans la rue Krechtchatik. Toute la ville est en liesse. A toutes les fenêtres, sur tous les édifices, des drapeaux rouges apparaissent sortant on ne sait d’où; de place en place, en travers des rues, de larges banderoles sont tendues portant des inscriptions variées mais dont les plus fréquentes sont: Vive la Révolution, vive la Liberté.
Les établissements scolaires étant fermés, j’eus toute la journée pour jouir du spectacle qu’offrait la ville; j’en profitai largement et petit-fils de la Révolution de 1789, je restai à la fois, surpris et émerveillé de voir cette foule, hier soumise au plus avilissant des
jougs, passer tout d’un coup à la plus entière des libertés, sans un cri de haine, sans un acte vengeur.
Quatre jours après, la vie reprenait son cours, et il semblait que rien n’était changé. Les ouvriers se rendaient aux usines de guerre comme par le passé et les soldats partaient au front avec le même enthousiasme que la semaine précédente. A Petrograd, le prince Lvov, M. Milioukov et leurs amis mettaient sur pied le gouvernement libéral qui devait durer trois mois.
