Happy Ending: Holy Men in Sin City by Nicholas Tai

19/20

Happy Ending Holy Men in Sin City

Nicholas Tai HanVern

A/P Erik Lâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; Heureux Advisor

In tribute to Tai Tek Kong To all the life lessons that you have taught me Thank you KPL 30223

Escort

Escorts

Militants

Sex Tourist

Thai Army

Malay Muslim

Thai Muslim

Holy Men

Buddhist Monk

Malaysian Government

Holy Men

Sex Tourist

Thai Muslim

Malaysian Government

State Government

Indonesian Government Thai Government

Tropical Forest

Tropical Jungle

Monarchy

Police

Pimp

Police

Military Military

Mountain

Agriculture Agriculture

Mountain

cad-block

.com

Golok River

Tuk-tuk

Taxi

Motorcycle

Motorbikes

Sampan

Tuk-tuk

4WDVehicles

Sampan

Escort’s Transport

MilitaryVehicle

Immigration

Escort’s Transport

Immigration

Kampung House

Hotels Hotels

Golok Bridge Golok Bridge

ThaiThai Buddhist Temple Buddhist Temple

Mosque

FloodWall

Massage

Alcohol

Karaoke

Massage Parlor

Mosque

Kampung House

Flood Wall

Karaoke

Drugs

Halal

LocalBusinesses Businesses Local

Passports

Conservative Clothing

Conservative Clothings

Contents Abstract Post-Colonial Chaos In Southeast Asia

Colonialism In The Post-Colonial Period Looseness of Southeast Asia Borders

Islamization and Malay Power In Malaysia

The Growth Of Malay Power The Resurgence of Islam and PAS

Thaification In Thailand

Assimilation and Oppression Resentment and Reaction

Jihad In Borderlands

The Retaliation Against Oppression The Nationalist Movement

Bangkok-Kuala Lumpur Relations

Retaining The Malayâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Support Political Stance of Kuala Lumpur

Haram In Borderlands

Chaos In The Deep South Site: Sungai Golok

Architectural Proposition

Politics vs Religion

Visual Glossary/Reference Bibliography

Abstract

Post-Colonial Chaos In Southeast Asia Islamization and Malay Power In Malaysia Thaification In Thailand Jihad In Borderlands Bangkok-Kuala Lumpur Relations Haram In Borderlands Architectural Proposition Visual Glossary Bibliography

Interpretation of friction on site

Flood gate along the border of Thailand

Condition of illegal jetty at night

Malaysia Thailand

Thailand - Malaysia

Abstract Border, as shared between two separate nations, can exist in various forms depending on the geographical conditions in which it sits. The border is merely a demarcation set between two countries despite being an official demarcation which marks a nationâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s sovereignty. It is an agreed representation of land ownership by both the government and the mass. However, the border plays many roles where it controls geopolitical issues from not only a national scale but also internal problems at the regional level for those who live within borderlands; closely linked to matters of culture and history. This is especially relevant in the regions of Southeast Asia (SEA) that has undergone waves of colonisation and oppression for centuries. The borders of SEA are ones that share a common path. This thesis situates itself on the borderlands of Thailand-Malaysia, specifically between Rantau Panjang in Kelantan (Malaysia) and the infamous party town of Sungai Golok (Thailand). Unlike many well written and recorded borders in the world such as the US-Mexico border and the North-South Korean border that has strong traceable historical references between nations, borderlands in SEA are incidental and should be understood from a regional point beforehand as they share similar pasts of colonialism, civil wars, regional conflicts and etc. Many countries in SEA underwent further political turmoil during the post-colonial period, in the mid-20th century where various global geopolitical happenings were coinciding such as the Vietnam War and the Cold War, making SEA region a victim of its spillover effects. The effects are still visible at present in the many border regions in SEA, making it a hotspot for international and trans-border crimes such as smuggling and trafficking in the region if not global scale. With only a river separating between Rantau Panjang and Golok without any forms of physical barrier and active monitoring, the border is practically open to citizens from both sides who not only hold different citizenship and identity but were also brought up under opposite political and cultural backgrounds. Furthermore, with talks from both sides of the government in building a wall as an attempt to alleviate these issues, the impacts of this proposal would not only alter a local fabric that has been long established for centuries, but would also lead towards unknown future complications. Ultimately, this thesis challenges the roles and limitations of architecture within chaos, order, religion, culture, security and sovereignty in a familiar yet foreign context to the natives living within this borderland.

Abstract

Post-Colonial Chaos In Southeast Asia

Islamization and Malay Power In Malaysia Thaification In Thailand Jihad In Borderlands Bangkok-Kuala Lumpur Relations Haram In Borderlands Architectural Proposition Visual Glossary Bibliography

Post-Colonial Chaos In Southeast Asia Colonialism In The Post-Colonial Period The post-colonial period (1945-1957) in Southeast Asia (SEA) marks a significant shift in constitutional power from the West to the East with an utter chaos result due to the existence of new multi-ethnic and cultural societies in that period, especially in historically mono-cultured nations like Thailand and Malaysia. Such mixture is a result of various patterns of migration that was created to feed onto the colonial empire’s act of socio-economic exploitation, resulting in cultural segregation which further feeds on to the already segregated colonised society. The present situation in SEA retained many of its previous cultural fabric and characteristics, especially within borderlands where unlawful activities remain in both seen and unforeseen circumstances under the eyes of the government. Tightly controlled by the mafias and militias, they are the new colonizers of their own. Borderlands in SEA is once again exploited and abused with drugs and violence, a common trait found within this region (Winn, 2018). This phenomenon worsens considering that Asia constitutes more than half of the world’s population at 4.7 billion people (World Population Prospects, 2019), fulfilling all forms of global supplies and demands that stand at both sides of the legal system.

Looseness of Southeast Asia Border The chaos in SEA concentrates at the border region, where lands are connected between two nations. Trans-border crimes and activities take place through networks of political immunity relations formed through corruption and an absence of multinational scale efforts in suppressing these crimes (Broadhurst, 2012). The Golden Triangle is a suitable example to illustrate such happenings in this region. Playing host to organized criminal activities, the Golden Triangle locates itself in the shared borders of Thailand, Laos and Myanmar within intersections between the Ruak and Mekong river. Since the 20th century, this region has played an active role in the global narcotics trade which was made possible due to its geographical conditions, lawless regional character and the never-ending civil conflict that has been happening since post World War II (Ywanghwe, 1993). As one of the primary supply sources to the global narcotics trade, the Golden Triangle has evolved from local opium and heroin to Amphetamine Type Stimulants (ATS), changing and adapting itself to its regional demands (Broadhurst, 2012). Subsequently, the global market opened when there are significant flows of locally produced drugs to the West, resulting in a new epidemic of narcotics production that is happening today (McKetin; Kozel; Douglas, 2008). This local-scale production has now ventured into the global market through China’s Guangdong and Yunnan provinces, which was then distributed in Hong Kong and Macau before reaching the US and European market (Huang, 2012). This sophisticated operation involves multiple criminal organizations across various borderlands and nations which replicates within other SEA borderlands; ranging from weapon smuggling to human trafficking. The happenings in this region is on a ‘stew’ that operate under glimpses of global attention. 05

Similarly, the Thailand-Malaysia border serves as an active pathway that feeds into the global crime network. Drugs and trafficking aside, this border is also home to multiple militant organizations that share the same goal of liberation and Islam, a widely practised religion within the region. Reaching over 640km in length, the border changes topographically through a series of separations by mountainous terrain while remain connected physically. Citizens from both sides cross the border daily through illegal and legal means for personal and economic reasons, showing that the border is fluid and volatile. Furthermore, the border is only partially guarded and barricaded, which facilitates illicit activities to occur while allowing this region to act as a transit point to serve the global illegal network. Both sides share a common history which transcends up till today, gathering issues of geopolitical and identity into this hot mess.

Malaysia Thailand

South China Sea

Perlis

Kedah

Malacca Strait

Kelantan

Perak

Ground condition at the border

Korea Japan

China

Myanmar

Laos

Phillipines Vietnam

Cambodia

Singapore Indonesia

Australia/New Zealand

Drug flow in SEA; data based on UN drug report (UNODC, 2019)

875km

1750km

2 6 25k m

3500km

4378km

5250km

Thailand Never Colonized Royal Thai Family Colonial Exports: Rice

1898

1945

Phillipines

Indonesia 17th August 1945 Netherlands Colonial Exports: Palm Oil, Cocoa, Rubber, Coffee,Tea, Rice, Spices

12th June 1898 Spanish Empire Colonial Exports: Cotton,Tropical Fruits

1945 Vietnam 2nd September 1945 France Colonial Exports: Rice and Coal

1953

1948

Laos

Myanmar

22nd October 1953 France Colonial Exports: Wood,Tin, Copper, Coffee, Gold

4th January 1948 British Empire Colonial Exports: Rice

1965

1957 1953 Cambodia 9th November 1953 France Colonial Exports: Rubber, Rice, Corn

1984

2002

Brunei

Malaysia 31st August 1957 British Empire

Singapore

Colonial Exports: Rubber, Rice,Tin,Tea, Coffee, Oil

9th August 1965 British Empire Colonial Exports: Nil

1st January 1984 British Empire Colonial Exports: Oil

Independence Timeline

East Timor 20th May 2002 Indonesia Colonial Exports: Nil

Independence time line of countries in SEA 08

k 10

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Topography Changes: Low to High 09

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Topography Changes: High 10

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Topography Changes: High to Low 11

Landscape Model - Low terrain

Landscape Model - Low-high terrain

Landscape Model - High terrain

Low terrain

Low-high terrain

High terrain

Abstract Post-Colonial Chaos In Southeast Asia

Islamization and Malay Power In Malaysia

Thaification In Thailand Jihad In Borderlands Bangkok-Kuala Lumpur Relations Haram In Borderlands Architectural Proposition Visual Glossary Bibliography

Islamization and Malay Power in Malaysia The Growth of Malay Power The border between Malaysia and Thailand once shared a single political and cultural identity back in the 14th century under the old Malay sultanate of Pattani (1390-1902). Under political influence of Siam (ancient Thailand), the former Pattani empire covers present Kelantan, Terengganu, Kedah and Perlis of Malaysia and Narathiwat, Pattani and Yala of Thailand. The Malay and Islamic identity shared was subsequently separated when British colonials signed the Anglo-Siam Treaty of 1909, which officially demarcated the current Thailand-Malaysia border. Since then, the southern states in Thailand continued practising their culture as its neighbours up till today as observed through language, religion and cultural aspects in both regions. It is crucial to be aware that to be Malay is to be Muslim but not vice versa (Omar, 2005). Islam thus plays a vital role in Malaysia, if not the most important. A majority Muslim nation and an official religion of the country, the position of Islam is both critical and sensitive within the multicultural and religious environment which Malaysia was built upon. The Chinese and Indian were brought into Malaya (pre-independence) by the British colonials to exploit local raw materials that were meant for export purposes to the West. Consequently, a multicultural environment was created but separated through the respective socio-economic roles that they play. This barrier was eventually broken down towards the independence period in 1957, forming a multicultural and multiracial Islamic country. However, a significant shift occurred after the racial riots in May 1969 as manifested in both culture and politics. Then on, influence and authority were glorified towards the Malays mainly by the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), the largest faction within the Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition which is the longest-ruling government since independence (1957-2018). Among the policies implemented is the New Economic Policy (NEP) of 1970, which served to help the Malays who were majority in the lower-income sector and to reduce income disparities with the non-Malays. This marked the beginning of segregation towards other races, a gradual process which was intensified by subsequent leaders of the country. The efforts used in reducing economic disparities between races eventually became a political tool used by political factions to gain votes and support during electoral periods. The factor of race is hence used as leverage for political victory, eventually positioning Islam and the Malay race as a front for further power and ruling.

Malaya Pattani Sultanate Siam Empire Current Kelantan Present Border

South China Sea

Malacca Strait

Coverage of Pattani Empire in the 14th century

Old Map of Malaysia, 1880-1920 21

The Resurgence of Islam and PAS The resurgence of Islam in Malaysia started in the 1970s during the Arab-Israeli War which subsequently triggered the Oil Crisis in 1973 (Abbott; Pippas, 2010). Together with the 1979 Iranian Revolution which saw the replacement of a pro-Western monarchy with an Islamic republic, the position of Islam became a limelight in that period. Together, these events served to highlight the adverse effects of Western-dominated Muslim societies as reflected through poor social conditions and more importantly triggered the idea of an ideal national ruling under an Islamic State (Zainah, 1987; Mutalib 1993). In Malaysia, the political competition between UMNO and Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS) has existed since the early 1980s (Abbott; Pippas, 2010). Both parties are controlled by the Malays with the difference being that UMNO functions within libertarian values while PAS revolves around Islamic ideas. The post-independence period marks a volatile phase for the new nation, especially post-1969. Malaysia not only has its internal issues and developments to work on but also needed to accommodate indirect effects from international conflicts like the Vietnam War and the Cold War. Furthermore, the political competition to win Malay votes between the two also marked the higher importance of Malays despite the country’s label as a multicultural nation. The political environment hence only revolved around ‘liberal’ urban Malays and ‘religious’ rural Malays. With global Islamic influence on the rise, PAS was politically dominating within many rural Malay areas which is seen as a threat towards UMNO and BN. Before the arrival of Mahathir, UMNO has done little in incorporating Islamic values into their ruling. This changed when the daughter of former prime minister Hussein Onn was spotted wearing a hijab while returning from her studies in England which showed the significant effects of preaching towards younger Malay generations. The arrival of Mahathir signified a substantial shift in Islam within the political system which were executed through state and UMNO led Islamization in the nation. With the help from Anwar Ibrahim who was a prominent figure in fighting for Malay rights and Islamic values, UMNO was able to incorporate new Islamic policies that received approvals from Muslim leaders and figures nationwide (Shome, 2006). Subsequently, Islamization was further intensified through introducing Islamic based banking systems, insurance and education which altogether alienated the non-Muslims, specifically, the non-Malays.

National Mosque, an influential Islamic landmark in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

Minaret (tower) Main Prayer Area Public Area (Circulation)

National Mosque, Kuala Lumpur Spatial, Program, Aesthetic

Spatial Analysis of National Mosque, Kuala Lumpur

National Mosque Interior

Abstract Post-Colonial Chaos In Southeast Asia Islamization and Malay Power In Malaysia

Thaification In Thailand

Jihad In Borderlands Bangkok-Kuala Lumpur Relations Haram In Borderlands Architectural Proposition Glossary Bibliography

Thaification in Thailand Assimilation and Oppression The official demarcation between northern Malaysia and southern Thailand in 1909 signified the split within the old Pattani sultanate, separating the Muslim dominated state of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat from Kelantan and Terengganu. The division sparked centuries of resistance from both sides who wanted reunification based on centuries of historical and cultural relationship. In the current context, the existence of Thai Malays holding dual-citizenship from both sides further marks a shared commonality as mentioned. As a result, residents living within this borderland are always in search of identity; Malay by ethnicity, Islam by religion and Thai by nationality while surrounded by daily political chaos. The chaotic environment eventually became a social norm as â&#x20AC;&#x153;borderland residents make sense of the tensions between cultural and political citizenship through tapping into locally produced idioms that reflect indigenous understandings of history and of the larger political processes impacting on their lives.â&#x20AC;? (Johnson, 2010). Southern Thailand underwent a series of assimilation program known as thaification, a plan orchestrated by the central Thai government in Bangkok as an effort to guide non-native Thai individuals in finding and forming their new identity within the Thai society; a moral virtue and loyalty towards the nation, religion and king (Nilsen, 2012). In simple terms, it is an attempt to direct non-native Thais to pledge allegiance towards the land which they live and towards the government which they serve while removing their original cultural identity. This radical process was executed throughout Thailand in particularly towards the northern region hill tribes and Malay Muslim community in the deep south. The idea of having a single national Thai identity started off after 1932, the year that marks the fall of the royal monarchy; a transition from absolute monarchy to constitutional monarchy which reduced the position of the king from a representative of central power to a figurative symbol of the nation. This gave initial hopes to Muslim leaders in the south on the possibility of reviving the old Malay Empire as Muslim representatives have now the opportunity to get involved in politics. However, the opportunity sank under the leadership of Phibunsongkhram whose administration is based strictly on military principles and promoted national-chauvinistic policies which saw the rise of military influence in Thailand, which eventually superseded the authority of Thai royalties (Nilsen, 2012).

Resentment and Reaction The lifestyles and culture of Malay-Muslims in Southern Thailand underwent a series of radical changes under both Phibul and Sarit administration. The Malay language was replaced with Thai, specifically the central Thai dialect. Arabic words which was essential within Islamic teachings were banned and replaced with central Thai typeface. Other issues and incidents such as the banning of Arabic clothing, banning of Islamic based laws and customs, banning of Islamic education and the introduction of Thai Buddhism into the region were executed under the pretext of nationalism but was instead initiating hate towards the government. The 29

act of Buddhism conversion and introducing public education were considered the worst form of oppression and was also seen as a way to eradicate Islam and Malay entirely from the region (Nilsen, 2012). Resentment was hence building not only towards the government but also towards individuals who have relations to it such as government servants and Buddhist monks. However, there was a period of reconciliation between the South and the central government when the Pridi administration (1944-1948) came into power in 1944 which saw the enactment of Patronage of Islam Act in 1945 that helped alleviate some of the issues. Nonetheless, this was short-lived in the post-Pridiâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s administration when more repressive policies were passed to further oppress the Malay Muslims in hopes of creating a single identity nation.

Wanted individuals(suspected militants) in Golok

Early Phase

Incidents through years

2019

2018

2017

2016

2015

2014

2013

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

2001

1998

1997

1996

1995

1993

1977

1975

1968

1960

Dec

Nov

Oct

Sep

Aug

Jul

Jun

May

Apr

Mar

Feb

Jan

Year

Bombings

Shootings and beheadings

Time line of events that happened due to thaification and oppression

Situatuon Under Control

Government Control

9/11 Attacks

Formation of GMIP

Formation of New Pulo

Formation of PULO

Formation of BRN

Month

Abstract Post-Colonial Chaos In Southeast Asia Islamization and Malay Power In Malaysia Thaification In Thailand

Jihad In Borderlands

Bangkok-Kuala Lumpur Relations Haram In Borderlands Architectural Proposition Visual Glossary Bibliography

Jihad In Borderlands The Retaliation Against Oppression Although Thailand is a majority Buddhist state, the population of Thai Malay Muslims hold a higher concentration in the deep south. In contrary, non-Malay Muslims in Malaysia are scattered throughout the country, resulting in different intensity of minority influence on both sides. This also explains the influential role which Islamic militants play in the deep south. The continued oppression eventually led to a series of deadly jihad movements against the central Thai government, an outcome that was built up through a series of critical events that were considered insults to Islam. However, the jihad movement is only focused on the three southern Muslim states. It is deemed to be a fight towards a regional agenda unlike global terrorism network like the Al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) whose plan is to defeat and conquer the West. The issues at the border can hence be said to be a regional matter operating under indirect global influences. With thaification happening since the 1920s, retaliation towards central Thai government began in the early 1960s by several groups of Malay nationalist organizations. These organizations would eventually evolve and fight under different names while still sharing a common goal of upholding Islam. By the 1980s, these organizations were defeated by Thai government through series of steps that included strategic military planning, improved governance of all levels and most importantly, the cooperation with locals in the South and the Malaysian government. Malaysia has played a vital role in this borderland based on the aspect of religion. However, southern Thailand saw an exponential increase in violence at the beginning of 2004 right up till today, showing that the resentment is actually a slow build over time, the fight had never died down. As the internet starts maturing in the 2000s, exposure to online propaganda tools (e.g., beheading videos in the US-Iraq war and etc.) and information became a source of morale boost. The internet was also allowing the ease of weapons manufacturing such as Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) to help in the fight (Storey, 2007). Notably, localized education became an essential contributing factor to this sudden resurgence. Many Thai Muslims attended religious schools (pondok in Malay) that usually doubles up as propaganda tools. It is through these institutions where Pattani nationalism and local Islamic values and beliefs were passed on to younger generations. Subsequently, during the early periods of 2000s, a majority of these students were old enough to be involved in these fights. Together with local overseas religious school graduates who had more international Islamic influence exposure, the battle for Islam became not only a personal agenda but also for all Muslims in Thailand (Storey, 2007).

The Nationalist Movement Various nationalist groups were established since the 60s in the war against the Thai government. While sharing similar ideologies, many of these groups also share a close relationship with Malaya (the British Malaya government) through fights against communism in that period. Furthermore, many leaders and bases of these groups were based in Malaysia, showing Malaysiaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s indirect involvement before independence in 1957. Out of the many jihadist groups involved, only two groups stood out among the rest as they were involved in most fights. One of them is called the Barisan Revolusi Nasional - Koordinasi (BRN-C), the stronger armed group whose aspirations is to bring back the old Pattani Empire. The other is known as the Gerakan Mujahideen Islami Pattani (GMIP), which was reported to have military bases in Terengganu, Malaysia (Jalil, 2008). The sudden increase in violence was marked by a few critical incidents which turned many Thai Malays to rally behind their causes. It is hence significant to read that the unrest in southern Thailand is not only triggered by nationalist groups, but also through the support of locals who played a vital role in the reduction of violence during the 80s through government cooperation. One of the events which triggered the resurgence happened in January 2004 when Islamic militants were killed inside a local mosque after attacking a military and police outpost in Patani. The killings were condemned by many as it was done within sacred grounds of the mosque. The other incident happened in the same year of October, also widely known as the Tak Bai Massacre; where a local protest towards the unrightful arrest of six individuals turned violence, leading to the arrest of roughly 1300 protestors. While the detainees were transported to another site under inhumane conditions, 78 of them died due to suffocation and organ failure (HRW, 2014). Eventually, dissatisfaction towards the government not only included officials like the police and soldiers but also towards individuals who have ties to it, one being public school teachers. Public schools became significant targets as they were believed to assimilate Thai culture, unlike religious schools that instil Pattani nationalism. Over the years, violence in the south were manifested in the forms of bombings, shootings and beheadings, with the latest incident recorded in November 2019 (Beech; Ryn, 2019).

Day-night scene 37

Borderland context in Kelantan, Malaysia

Roof scape in Sungai Golok,Thailand

Abstract Post-Colonial Chaos In Southeast Asia Islamization and Malay Power In Malaysia Thaification In Thailand Jihad In Borderlands

Bangkok-Kuala Lumpur Relations Haram In Borderlands Architectural Proposition Visual Glossary Bibliography

Bangkok-Kuala Lumpur Relations Retaining The Malayâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Support The historical relation between southern Thailand and northern Malaysia had indirectly caused friction between both sides of the government. The situation is somewhat complicated; whereby, on the one hand, Kuala Lumpur (KL) needs to safeguard the interest of the Malays at both sides of the border to retain political power. While on the other, would not want to be directly involved with the chaos in Thailand as this would be against its non-intervention policy. However, the indirect involvement is inevitable due to the already long-established relationship as mentioned; the issue is unfortunately inherited into the post-independence environment based on values of kinship which transitioned into a political tool for power and influence. Without interventions from KL, the risk of losing Malay support, especially from rural Malay majority areas to PAS was high. Akin to a sibling relationship, the relation between Thailand and Malaysia was never severely affected despite the frictions that occurred along the way.

Political Stance of Kuala Lumpur Malaysiaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s interventions were rather neutral and was mainly done through loose border policies. The border exerts a certain flexibility where despite being an official demarcation, people from both sides are free to move across without the need for an official travel document. This flexibility only applies to residents of the borderland who uses border pass to cross the border quickly and smoothly, which helped the movements of wanted individuals who use Kelantan as their safe haven (Chalk, 2001). Besides, refugee policy in Malaysia was not enforced when Thai Malay refugees escaped southern Thailand into Kelantan during escalating terrorist activities at the border in the early 2000s. The act was justified by the Malaysian government as a form of refuge seeking due to the absence of specific applicable refugee policy towards Thai Malays and hence the escape was not considered illegal (Nair, 1997). Extradition requests from Thailand on these refugees were also rejected on humanitarian grounds, with Malaysia insisting on providing refugees the freedom to decide their own future and movements (Jalil, 2008). While facing both domestic and foreign pressure, the Malaysian government has been playing middlemen role in various discussions and negotiations between leaders of nationalist groups and the Thai government. Among the many support shown by Malaysian Malays, Kelantan, a significant stronghold of PAS, has shown to be the loudest due to the long historical ties they shared. One of the earliest roles which PAS played was to call for the inclusion of southern Thailand into Malaya during the formation of Malaysia in 1960 (Yegar, 2002). PAS was also often regarded as spokesperson on behalf of the nationalist groups during negotiation periods, with many nationalist group leaders sharing familial roots with residents of Kelantan (Jalil, 2008). Though the violence in the south is an act of terror, the Malaysian government, especially Kelantan still somewhat shows indirect support in the name of ethnicity and religion. A similar support towards non-Malay citizens of the country would be paradoxical.

Abstract Post-Colonial Chaos In Southeast Asia Islamization and Malay Power In Malaysia Thaification In Thailand Jihad In Borderlands Bangkok-Kuala Lumpur Relations

Haram In Borderlands Architectural Proposition Visual Glossary Bibliography

Haram In Borderlands Chaos In The Deep South The fight against Thai oppression has been the main reason for the happenings in the deep south since the 60s. However, as Thailandâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s economy gained momentum, the fighters had another agenda in place, prostitution. The economic boom in Bangkok created a focused industrial economy in Thailand, which saw a profound fall in other sectors especially agriculture which was the primary source of income in many rural areas. The fall of agriculture sector triggered the beginning of the sex industry as demands increase in Bangkok due to the rise of the middle class in the city together with the increase of male workers from rural areas. These sex workers primarily originated from Phayao, the Northern region of Thailand that depended on agriculture (Nishizaki, 2011). The improvements of road infrastructures and increase in foreign investments together helped drive the sex industry in Bangkok. As the concentration of sex workers started to saturate, migration spread out onto other regions of Thailand, one being the borderlands of Sungai Golok. The movement to the south was also driven by small scale industrialization initiated by Bangkok central government as part of the efforts to control terrorism through economic satisfaction. As prostitution is considered haram in the eyes of Islam, the presence of vice within Islam territory ultimately triggered the attacks as part of the holy war.

Site: Sungai Golok Separated by an approximately 5 meters wide and knee-deep river, Sungai Golok is located opposite of Rantau Panjang, a small tax-free trade zone in the border region state of Kelantan, Malaysia. Besides acting as an official demarcation between Thailand and Malaysia, the river is also a mode of transportation for borderland residents on both sides. This movement is aided by the many illegal jetties and motorboats that are available along the river; they operate on a 24-hour basis which allow borderland residents to cross the border freely even after the official border closure at 9pm. Although illegal, these jetties operate in the open, next to official border checkpoints of both countries connected by a bridge. The looseness of the border is akin to the absence of it. It is as though as local residents and authorities are still living within the same land as they were back in the old Pattani empire. This looseness hence represents a constant change of an imaginary border that is determined by local contextual happenings daily; the position of the border is under continuous negotiation between both sides. Furthermore, the physical condition of the river changes according to tropical weather, physically separating and connecting both sides through dry and wet seasons. With the absence of physical barriers and active monitoring that act as tools of separation and protection, the official border merely exist in name. The actual border is free and organic. Upon crossing the border, one is awaited by the many motorcycles that serve as the primary mode of land transportation. The distance to the town centre from the border is about 800m; which sites the red light 47

district which is made up of a combination of massage parlours, go-go bars, karaoke bars, brothels and hotels. The town resonates an atmosphere of a rural township, dominated by small scale local businesses and paddy fields. In the day, the town is mundane and dull with slight traces of traffic and human flow besides peak hours during the noon and evenings which see a rise in traffic especially at border checkpoints and illegal jetties. Throughout the city, military and police presence dominates through day and night. Occasional passings of military tanks and Armoured Personnel Carriers (APC) can be observed as one goes around town while passing through the many checkpoints set up; guarded by heavily armed soldiers, barbed wires and sandbags. Temporary military camps were also seen at all road networks that connect to the main highway that leads to Bangkok. As the sun sets, activities, human and traffic start fading away; doors and businesses are shut tight, the street grows darker and silence takes over. The whole town is dead at night, possibly a precaution towards the continuous violence of bombings and shootings that usually happen at night. Nonetheless, the darkness and silence is quickly overshadowed by the red light district with a colourful glow of neon lights. The atmosphere is dominated rapidly by caustic smells of alcohol and cigarette smoke, loud badly remixed electronic music, out of tune sing-along karaoke and most notably, sweet, cheap and pungent perfume fragrance that radiates from groups of scantily dressed fair skin young girls who speak almost no English. As the red light district comes alive, military presence builds up in and around its periphery, looking out for possible targets who are in town for destruction. The crowd builds up at a slow pace. The later the night, the merrier it becomes, parallel to the frequency of boat trips across the border. The district sees a higher number of crowds during Thursday and Friday nights which marks the arrival of the weekends under the Islamic calendar. While the bars are filled with noise and smoke, a sense of familiarity sets in with a majority of the men communicating in Malay; Kelantanese Malay. Kelantanese Malays play a significant role in sustaining the red light district of Golok. Heavily controlled by the Islamic hudud law, Kelantan is the extreme end of Golok where consumption of alcohol and patronising prostitution are acts that are punishable with imprisonment and lashing. The actions of these Muslim men crossing the border to commit sins is a form of escapism while instilling a sense of irony; in search of freedom and excitement away from religious prohibitions. The open border facilitates the movements of these holy men in the search for vice, silent and discretely. The border hence plays different roles to different individuals; the roles of authority and freedom. The red light district is essentially a fortified sex fortress, protected from militants and Islamic laws while providing a platform for freedom.

THAILAND

Train Station

Marina Hotel

Thailand Immigration

Malaysia Immigration

M A L AY S I A

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Site dynamics 49

Drone view from Malaysia towards Thailand

Brothel/bar in the daytime 50

The sex fortress 51

The dull and mundane Golok atmosphere at daytime

Modernist buildings around Golok town 53

Abstract Post-Colonial Chaos In Southeast Asia Islamization and Malay Power In Malaysia Thaification In Thailand Jihad In Borderlands Bangkok-Kuala Lumpur Relations Haram In Borderlands

Architectural Proposition

Visual Glossary Bibliography

Architectural Proposition Politics vs Religion The existing condition on site reflects a built up resentment by the Thai Malays towards the central Thai government; triggered through years of cultural and religious oppressions. The existence of a red light district within holy grounds can be further read as an insult to both Islam and the local Thai Malays. The continuity of terrorism represents retaliation and expression by the oppressed locals who are politically weak, using violence as their last resort. The architecture hence seeks to mediate the situation on site by alleviating the political power of the Thai Malays through economical gain as power and money comes hand in hand. The architecture proposition hence reflects support behind the Thai Malays; a public market sited in Thailand meant for the locals especially the majority Thai Malays as a new economical zone. The architecture is located between the red light district and the border, acting as a gateway and landmark within this borderland. In response to the constant tension between the government and militants, a temple and mosque form part of the architecture, representing both Thai central government and the locals(Islam) under one common roof. The placement of two represented elements that are in constant tension seeks to cancel out possible threats and violence. The architecture hence acts as a neutral ground for all. While attempting to achieve a completely neutral state, a physical block acting as a government office separates both temple and mosque with the market acting as a tool of connection, binding all elements together as a single architecture. The block shall act as an agent of surveillance and governance, overlooking its surrounding to ensure that peace is maintained. Overall, the architecture plays an institutional role, consisting of a mosque, temple, market and government office; creating a safe and neutral zone for local economical and subsequent political gain. A happy ending for all.

Final Model 57

Architecture - Landmark in Thailand 58

Site Model 59

Early Study Models

Study Models

Massing and Detail 01

Massing and Detail 02

Massing and Detail 03

Massing and Detail 04

Massing and Detail 05

Massing and Detail 06

Final Model 68

Key Drawing

Key Drawing - Detail 01 70

Key Drawing - Detail 02 71

Key Drawing - Porous Inner Block 72

Key Drawing - Porous Inner Block 73

Key Drawing - Solid Outer Block 74

Key Drawing - Solid Outer Block 75

Market - Mosque - Block

Mosque - Market

Temple - Market - Mosque - Block

Market - Block -Temple

Temple Moment

Mosque Moment

Final Model - Elevations 83

Assembly Method 01 - 03 (top to bottom) 84

Assembly Method 04 - 06 (top to bottom) 85

Detail 01 - Mosque/Market/Block

Detail 02 - Mosque/Market Entry

Detail 03 - Temple/Block

Detail 04 - Temple/Facade Details

Detail 05 - Block/Facade Detail

Detail 06 - Temple/Block Detail

Detail 07 - Facade Detail

Detail 08 - Mosque/Market/Block Detail

StreetView 01

StreetView 02 94

StreetView 03

Street 04 95

Top DownView

Roof Detail 96

Facade Detail

TempleView 97

Abstract Post-Colonial Chaos In Southeast Asia Islamization and Malay Power In Malaysia Thaification In Thailand Jihad In Borderlands Bangkok-Kuala Lumpur Relations Haram In Borderlands Imaginary ‘Border’-Architectural Proposition

Visual Glossary

Bibliography

Thesis narrative reference

Thesis visual reference 101

Surprised by Henri Rousseau, 1891

102

Kota BharuVillage by Khalil Ibrahim, 2013

Sawah Padi Series by Khalil Ibrahim, 1957 103

Tools of documentation: Fujifilm X100F + DJI Osmo Pocket

Official border demarcation at the border bridge crossing 104

NorthWest direction from Malaysia

Surrounding border context 105

Flood wall construction in Thailand

Sungai Golok atmopshere 106

Direct train from Sungai Golok to Bangkok

Illegal jetties 107

Thai soldier guarding one of the many illegal jetties at night

108

Karaoke bar in the daytime

Context surrounding Golok 109

Film still_01

Film still_02 110

Film still_03

Film still_04 111

Film still_05

Film still_06 112

Film still_07

Film still_08 113

Official cross border checkpoint at Thailand

Sungai Golok demarcates the borderlands between Thailand and Malaysia 114

Low I n t en sity

High Intens ity

Filters throughout the site 115

Low I n t en sity

High Intens ity

Wormâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s eye view of red light district 116

110

220

330

Figure-Ground

117

440

Site Figure-Ground

Thesis Review 04 - 02 - 20 NUS SDE4 ER1 0900 - 1700

Atmosphere & Agency

The Equatorial City & The Architecture of Atmosphere Advisor A/P Erik L’Heureux

Guest A/P Ong Ker Shing

Happy Ending: Holy Men In Sin City Nicholas Tai Han Vern The Alun-Alun:The New Edge of Simpang Lima Siti Nur Farah Binte Sheikh Ismail Material Friction:The Concrete Symphony In Bangkok Lin Yin Kong The Golden Green: A Journey On The Land of The Deep-rooted Astrid Mayadinta Cartographic Architecture:The Architect’s Act on The Papar River As The Process of Representation Amando Mo Shun Yea

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118

Th es i s R e v i ew ( F i n a l s ) 04 - 05- 20, 0900AM O n l i n e v i a Zo o m

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Atmosphe re & A ge ncy

The Equatorial City & The Architecture of Atmosphere Students

Panel A/P Erik Lâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;Heureux (advisor)

Happy Ending: Holy Men In Sin City

NUS

Nicholas Tai Han Vern

A/P Ong Ker Shing

The Golden Green: A Journey On The Land of The Deep-rooted

NUS

Luh Astrid Mayadinta

Chatpong Chuenrudeemol Chat Architects, Thailand

Poetics of Emptiness: Redefining the 21st Century Alun-Alun in Semarang Siti Nur Farah Binte Sheikh Ismail

Joshua Comaroff Lekker Architects; A/P Yale - NUS, Singapore

Monolith & Fragment:The Concrete Symphony of Bangkok

Richard Hassell

Lin Yinkong

WOHA Architects, Singapore

Cartographic Architecture : Specific Interventions That Project The Rural Revenge of Indigenous Papar in 50 years Amando Mo Shun Yea

Grit Vltavsky Architect, New York City

zoom review by invitation only*

Review Posters

119

Bibliography

Bibliography Readings: 1. Abbott, Jason P., and Sophie Gregorios-Pippas. “Islamization in Malaysia: Processes and Dynamics.” Contemporary Politics 16, no. 2 (2010): 135–51. https://doi.org/10.1080/13569771003783851. 2. Abdullah, Sharifah Mahsinah. “Nearly Dried-up Sungai Golok Attracting Residents Baking in Heatwave.” NST Online, March 9, 2019. https://www.nst.com.my/news/nation/2019/03/467522/nearly-dried-sungai-golok-attracting-residents-baking-heatwave. 3. Anwar, Zainah. Islamic Revivalism in Malaysia “Dakwah” among the Students. Selangor Darul Ehsan: Pelanduk Publ., 1987. 4. Beech, Hannah, and Ryn Jirenuwat. “15 Killed in Southern Thailand in the Worst Violence in Years.” The New York Times. The New York Times, November 6, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/06/ world/asia/thailand-violence-insurgency.html. 5. Bernama. “Three Bomb Explosions Rock Sungai Golok; at Least Four Hurt.” NST Online, April 9, 2018. https://www.nst.com.my/news/crime-courts/2018/04/355319/three-bomb-explosions-rock-sungaigolok-least-four-hurt. 6. Broadhurst, Roderic, and Vy Kim Le. “Transnational Organized Crime in East and South East Asia.” SSRN Electronic Journal, 2012. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2121197. 7. Chalk, Peter. “Separatism and Southeast Asia: The Islamic Factor in Southern Thailand, Mindanao, and Aceh.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 24, no. 4 (2001): 241–69. https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100116748. 8. Dahari, Rafidah, Nor Azizan Idris, and Zarina Othman. “Influencing External Factors for Small Arms Light Weapon Smuggling at Malaysia-Thailand Border.” Asian Social Science 15, no. 3 (2019): 14. https://doi. org/10.5539/ass.v15n3p14. 9. Deutinger, Theo, and Brendan McGetrick. Handbook of Tyranny. Zürich: Lars Müller Publishers, 2018. 10. Franck, Anja K. “Corrupt(Ing) Borders: Navigating Urban Immigration Policing in Malaysia.” Geopolitics 24, no. 1 (2018): 251–69. https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2017.1422121.

11. Haryati, Hasan. “Malay Women and Prostitution in Kota Bharu, Kelantan, 1950s - 1970s.” Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society 78 (2005): 97–120. https://www.jstor.org/stable/41493539. 12. Huang, Kaicheng., Jianhong Liu, Ruohui Zhao and Paul C. Friday. 2012. Chinese Narcotics Drug Trafficking: A Preliminary Report. International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology 56(1): 134-152. 13. Human Rights Watch (HRW). “Thailand: No Justice 10 Years After Tak Bai Killings.” Human Rights Watch, October 25, 2014. https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/10/25/thailand-no-justice-10-years-aftertak-bai-killings. 14. Jafri, Abdul Jalil. “Malaysia’s Security Practice in Relation to Conflicts in Southern Thailand, Aceh and the Moro Region: The Ethnic Dimension”. PhD Thesis. The London School of Economics and Political Science, 2008. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/2965. 15.Johnson, Irving. “New Mosaics on Old Walls: Intimacy and Architecture along the Malaysian-Thai Frontier.” Anthropological Quarterly 83, no. 2 (2010): 239–77. https://doi.org/10.1353/anq.0.0122. 16. Kamali, Muhammad Hashim. “Punishment in Islamic Law: a Critique of The Hudud Bill of Kelantan, Malaysia.” Arab Law Quarterly13, no. 3 (1998): 203–34. https://doi.org/10.1163/026805598125826102. 17. Lai, Chee Kien. Building Merdeka Independence Architecture in Kuala Lumpur, 1957-1966. Kuala Lumpur: Petronas, 2007. 18. Lai, Chee Kien, and Chee Cheong Ang. The Merdeka Interviews: Architects, Engineers and Artists of Malaysia’s Independence. Kuala Lumpur: Pertubuhan Akitek Malaysia, 2018. 19. McKetin R., N. Kozel, J. Douglas, R. Ali, B. Vicknasingam, J. Lund and J.-H. Li (2008). “The rise of methamphetamine in Southeast and East Asia”. Drug and Alcohol Review. 27. pp. 220–228. 20. Mohamad, Isma Ae. Republik Sungai Golok. Bandar Baru Bangi, Selangor: Dubook, 2016.

21. 21. McKetin R., N. Kozel, J. Douglas, R. Ali, B. Vicknasingam, J. Lund and J.-H. Li (2008). “The rise of methamphetamine in Southeast and East Asia”. Drug and Alcohol Review. 27. pp. 220–228. 22. Nair, Shanti. Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy. London: Routledge, 2002.“Red Light Jihad: Islamic Insurgency in Thailand’s Strangest Party Town.” Public Radio International. Accessed November 10, 2019. https://www.pri.org/stories/2014-12-08/red-light-jihad-islamic-insurgency-thailand-s-strangest-party-town. 23. Nishizaki, Yoshinori. “Prostitution and Female Leadership in Rural Thailand: The Story of Phayao Province.” Modern Asian Studies 45, no. 6 (2011): 1535–97. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0026749x11000047. 24. Nilsen, Marte. Negotiating Thainess: Religious and National Identities in Thailand’s Southern Conflict. Lund, Sweden: Department of History of Religions, Lund University, 2012. 25. Omar Farouk Bajunid. Islam, Nationalizm and the Thai State. In Dynamic Diversity In Southern Thailand. Ed. Wattana Sugunnasil. Chiang Mai: Silkworm, 2005 26. Storey, Ian. “Ethnic Separatism in Southern Thailand: Kingdom Fraying at the Edge?,” January 2007. https://doi.org/10.21236/ada462929. 27. United Nations (UN). “World Population Prospects - Population Division.” United Nations. United Nations, 2019. Accessed November 14, 2019. https://population.un.org/wpp/. 28. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes (UNODC). “Transnational Organized Crime in Southeast Asia: Evolution, Growth and Impact. United Nations, 2019. Accessed November 1, 2019. https://www. unodc.org/documents/southeastasiaandpacific/Publications/2019/SEA_TOCTA_2019_web.pdf 29. Winn, Patrick. Hello, Shadowlands: Your Guide to Southeast Asia’s Meth Fiefdoms, Terrorized Party Towns, Guerilla. Hideouts and Other Places You’ll Probably Never Vi. Place of publication not identified: ICON Books LTD, 2018.

30. Yegar, Moshe. Between Integration and Secession: the Muslim Communities of the Southern Philippines, Southern Thailand, and Western Burma. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2002. 31. Yawnghwe, Chao-Tzang. “The political economy of the opium trade: Implications for Shan state”. Journal of Contemporary Asia, 1993 23(3). pp. 306 – 326

Artworks/ Images: 1. Rousseau, Henri. “Surprised!”. Oil Paint. 1891. London 2. Ibrahim, Khalil. “Sawah Padi Series”. Oil On Board. 1956. Kelantan. 3. Ibrahim, Khalil. “Kota Bharu Village”. Watercolour On Bamboo Paper. 2004. Kelantan. 4. Old Maps Online. Old Maps Online. Accessed November 14, 2019. https://www.oldmapsonline.org/ map/cuni/1013062.

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