The protracted Syrian refugee crisis started in 2011, while more recently a deepening economic, financial, and monetary crisis have been exacerbated by COVID-19 measures, political impasse, and ongoing civil protests. The effect on energy is manifesting in multiple ways. The influx of Syrian refugees to Lebanon led to a significant increase in electricity demand, with estimated 54.8 per cent increase in demand from 2010 to 2016 (CoR, 2020). Hyperinflation and drastic reduction in purchasing power has driven up prices for imported fuel and thus energy production while also limiting people’s ability to pay for energy. The same has increase illicit commerce in gasoline, where smugglers are purchasing subsidised gasoline in Lebanon and selling it on the black market in Syria. Some areas of the country used to have only 6 hours electricity a day while Beirut prior to the economic crisis had 21 hours of electricity a day. In July 2020 electricity went down to 4 hours due to fuel shortages, and with a further deterioration of the situation since electricity has been even more restricted. Moreover, the pandemic has contributed to a drop in electricity bill collections of around 20 per cent. Damages from the 4 August 2020 explosion affected Beirut’s transmission network and reduced supply at the time when the need for electricity to power health institutions, business, homes, and to support reconstruction efforts was of upmost importance. As a result, national production of electricity fell significantly in 2020. The compounded crises have also heightened the effect of chronically underperforming public services and historic and structural challenges.
Energy provision and systems Lebanon has a single, integrated utility company – Electricité du Liban” (EdL) – responsible for the
provision of electricity for the entire country. However, only 55-64 per cent of Lebanon’s electricity demand is provided by EdL. Electricity is commonly supplemented by neighbourhood suppliers, who are fully embedded in local wasta12 systems and in some neighbourhoods also referred to as the “generator mafia”, alluding to the little flexibility of residents to choose or navigate different options of energy suppliers. Estimates suggests that there are between 32,000 and 37,000 neighbourhood suppliers in Lebanon, concentrated in dense urban areas. While municipalities in theory regulates the rates charged by generator owners, this is a recent and an uncoordinated system that is often influenced by local sectarian politics. The legality of municipal provisions of energy remains in dispute. Currently, decentralised systems are not legal and cannot be connected to the grid (Zahle as an exception, see Box 8). Energy supplies in Lebanon rely almost entirely on fossil fuel (oil and diesel). Lebanon is in the exploration phase of oil and gas, which if found can provide Lebanon with energy for domestic use as well as exports. Currently however, Lebanon is importing all its fossil fuel needs, including for power generation. In addition, it is importing small quantities of coal, electricity, and solid biofuels. For example, Lebanon imported 533.803 GWh and 11.391 GWH electricity from Syria in 2017 and 2018, respectively. The GoL-subsidized fuel used in EDL’s power-generation plants has thus caused significant deficits in the government budgets. In comparison, revenues from energy provision is minimal. Electricity tariffs are based on consumer prices that have not changed since 1996 12
Term used on patronage/clientilism in the Arab world
Zouk Mikael hydroelectric plant located 20 km outside of Beirut. The fuel oil used for electricity generation produces toxic emissions contributing to high rates of lung cancer, cardiovascular and other diseases among local residents. Photo: Synne Bergby (2017)
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