The Asian Trends Monitoring Bulletin is a project sponsored by the Rockefeller Foundation, New York, the Centre for Strategic Futures, Singapore and the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore. The Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy gratefully acknowledges the financial assistance of the Rockefeller Foundation and the Centre for Strategic Futures, Singapore.
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Production Manager, Production & Research Dissemination Chris Koh
Editorial Team Principal Investigators Darryl S.L Jarvis Phua Kai Hong T S Gopi Rethinaraj Research associates Johannes Loh Nicola Pocock Taufik Indrakesuma
Image credits, with thanks Image on page 3 is copyrighted by j u s t i n . z* Image on page 4 is copyrighted by Amizyo* Image on page 9 is copyrighted by kodomut* Image on page 12 is copyrighted by andyteo99* Image on page 18 is copyrighted by Jun Acullador* Image on page 19 is copyrighted by duboff* *These images were obtained from www.flickr.com
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Contents 2
At a glance
3
Introduction
4
Trends & flows of migrants in Southeast Asia
7
Out of Bangkok: opportunities await in Mae Sot, a Thai–Burmese border town
8
The politics of migration: there is no “free� labour market
9
Welfare services for migrants in Singapore
11
Starting a new life in a legal grey zone: a Burmese refugee family
12
Migrants and population health: a politically sensitive topic
13
Helping Burmese migrants to access health services in Mae Sot
15
Migration and remittances
17
Enabling life choice via financial and business education: aidha
18
Financial products for low-income migrants in host countries: Philippines National Bank
19
Looking ahead
20
References
22
Editorial Team
2
The Cambodian government has intensified its efforts to eliminate the worst forms of child labour by 2016. An estimated 313,000 children are doing work considered hazardous to children less than 18 years of age (including selling souvenirs). Though there is no agreement on the best tactics for achieving the goal, the measures undertaken range from listing all children who work, talking with parents, non-formal learning centres, vocational training for older children, creating livelihood and microfinance opportunities for parents, vigilant community monitoring, and also “food scholarships” for poor families who send their children to school instead. A recent survey by an NGO affiliated with Peking University, revealed that nearly half of the nation's construction workers have suffered from deferred wages while more than 75% have no contract with their employers. Despite end-of-year efforts by local governments to crack down on particularly exploitative employers, an institutional framework which supports migrant workers rights is lacking. Their desperate situation has led migrant workers to engage in “wage begging”, protests and sometimes even suicide. Thousands of Burmese migrants have been fleeing from flood-affected provinces in Thailand after their factories were submerged by water in November 2011, often without receiving their outstanding wages. Local media estimates industrial losses would affect 891 factories and 460,000 workers and reach a total US$13 billion. Burmese migrants were dealt the biggest blow, not only due to material loss (e.g. loss of income), but also due to their struggle with authorities on both sides of the border, with frequent “extortion and abuses”. Migrants who leave the province they are registered in risk breaking the Thai law and face police fines and extortion. Their situation is further exacerbated by illicit brokers charging excessive rates for transportation to Myanmar. A worrying trend, which emphasises the need to provide overseas Filipino workers with better skills in financial management and planning, was revealed in a study conducted by the Social Enterprise Development Partnerships in the Philippines. It showed that one out of ten overseas Filipino workers end up broke even after years of working abroad. It also found that eight out of ten do not have savings and are unable to prepare for their retirement or return to the country.
Vietnam’s Ministry of Health and the World Bank kicked off a 6-year US$155 million hospital waste water treatment project to minimise environmental pollution. Currently, 56% of hospitals have no waste water treatment system at all, with more than 1,260 hospitals and over 1,000 medical clinics nationwide discharging around 350 tonnes of solid waste and 150,000 cubic metres of liquid waste per day. Better health costs as little as US$1.20 per person per year, according to the World Health Organisation, which also predicts that the global non-communicable disease epidemic will accelerate in the next two decades and by 2030, the number of deaths could reach 52 million a year worldwide. Movember Brunei, an online campaign that asks twitter users to put a moustache on their profile to raise awareness of men’s health issues, wrapped up its month-long initiative in early December with a series of organised activities coordinated by local bloggers in partnership with the National Cancer Centre and Health Promotion Centre. Activities included a fitness session and a “grow a moustache” pledge to raise funds and awareness. In Malaysia, end-stage kidney failure treatment requiring dialysis is costing taxpayers and patients more than RM700 million a year. “The prevalence of kidney disease is 15% and that means 4.1 million Malaysians are likely to have the disease… (with) the cost of kidney dialysis at RM33,000 per year per patient,” said Health director-general Datuk Seri Dr Hasan Abdul Rahman. Malaysia currently has the highest prevalence of biologic and behavioral risk factors for diabetes, such as obesity and rates of physical inactivity, in ASEAN. Indonesia’s health ministry is expected to increase the budget for childbirth care insurance for the poor from Rp 1.2 trillion to Rp 1.6 trillion (US$176 million) next year. Slamet Riyadi Yuwono, Director for nutrition education and mother and child health, said the decision was made after considering a 4-fold increase in visits by poor people to public and private hospitals, as well as community health centres, since the introduction of the Jampersal insurance programme in 2011, which provides full coverage for childbirth costs for poor women as well as pre- and post-natal treatment and family planning services. The scheme provides Rp 420,000 for each insurance package, but will raise the coverage to between Rp 470,000 and Rp 600,000 next year.
Biofuel producers in Vietnam are worried about society’s refusal to switch from fossil fuel petrol to the ethanol E5 blends currently on offer by the major petrol producers, Petrol Viet Nam Oil Corporation (PV Oil) and Petrolimex. It is reported that only two out of ten customers have switched to biofuels, despite PV Oil selling the ethanol blend at all of their fuel stations. Although the government initiated these biofuel projects as a way to improve energy security and reduce dependence on fossil fuels, the domestic market has yet to catch on. This domestic market condition has caused the petrol producers to export most of their products to China, which is counterproductive to the aims of domestic energy security. PV Oil has asked the government to consider making the purchase of biofuels mandatory. Laos, Thailand, Vietnam and Cambodia remain in conflict over Laos’ plan to build a hydropower dam on the Mekong River’s mainstream. While the other countries cannot legally stop Laos from building a dam in its own territory, they urged Laos to consider the potential negative impacts of the dam on the livelihoods of millions of poor people living along the Mekong River, downstream from the dam. Fish stocks are said to be particularly vulnerable. Laos though, has countered that the amount of energy generated will be a significant boost to the energy security of the entire region. The Malaysian government is taking a more “green” approach in their new housing projects for the poor. The new housing units will have environmental-friendly designs, including features that reduce energy consumption by maintaining cool indoor temperatures as well as a built-in rainwater collector to reduce water consumption from piped connections. Grassroots movements around the world are protesting against a Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) mechanism proposed as a way for heavilyforested developing countries to participate in climate change mitigation. The protest centres around the protection of the rights of indigenous people living in the forests, who have so far been excluded from the discussions. Global movements like NO REDD and local movements like Indonesia’s Indigenous Peoples Alliance of the Archipelago, have called for indigenous people to be included in REDD talks. REDD revenue is potentially very large in places such as Indonesia, and can be used for improving the livelihoods of indigenous communities.
3
introduction migrants, who provide much needed remittance income for families in source countries where employment opportunities are limited or lesser remunerated.
Migrant workers are a common sight in Singapore.
Migrants cross the globe and traverse countries in search of employment or micro-business opportunities; in 2010, the estimated number of international migrants worldwide was 213 million, of whom 28% were located in Asia. The estimated numbers for internal migrants are even greater at 740 million worldwide in 2009. It is known that remittances sent home by international migrants are a bigger source of foreign income than Overseas Development Assistance, constituting US$325 billion in 2010 versus US$127 billion recorded for Overseas Development Assistance.1 Movement of people towards and within ASEAN is significant: there were an estimated 6.7 million international migrants in this region in 2010, not to mention millions of internal
In this issue, we attempt to provide a snapshot of where lowincome migrants from Southeast Asia come from, where they migrate to, and the challenges they face in host countries within ASEAN and beyond. We focus on labour migrants seeking work opportunities overseas or in a different part of their source country, as opposed to marriage migrants who are also predominant in this region. We draw attention to cutting-edge organisations that are helping low-income migrants to access health services and financial services, as well as legal advocacy organisations working to give a “voice� to this often disenfranchised group. This issue is based on primary interview material gathered during a fieldwork visit to Thailand in April 2011, as well as in Singapore in October 2011. We invite you to share the ATM Bulletin with colleagues interested in pro-poor issues in Southeast Asia. The Bulletin is also available for download at www.asiantrendsmonitoring.com/download, where you can subscribe to future issues. We encourage you to regularly visit our website for more updates and recent video uploads in our blog. Thank you again for supporting the ATM Bulletin, and as always, we gladly welcome your feedback. Nicola Pocock Johannes Loh Taufik Indrakesuma
4
Trends & flows of migrants in Southeast Asia also being major source countries for global migration, particularly to the Middle East).
A foreign worker having lunch alone.
Southeast Asia’s regional economy is highly dependent on legal and illegal labour migration. As might be expected, high to upper-middle income ASEAN countries experience greater immigrant inflows than the lower-middle to low income countries, with Malaysia holding the largest absolute number of migrant workers (2.35 million in 2010) – mostly Indonesians, as well as hundreds of thousands of Filipinos, Vietnamese, Burmese and South Asians. Thailand holds the largest number of refugees in the region (129,380 in 2010). Behind Qatar, UAE, Kuwait and Jordan, Singapore has the fifth highest share of international migrants in the country globally, at an estimated 40.7% of the total population in 2010.2 Southeast Asia’s main host countries are Singapore, Brunei, Thailand and Malaysia (the latter two also being significant sending countries regionally). The Philippines, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Indonesia and Vietnam are the main sending countries to ASEAN (with the Philippines and Indonesia
!
Net migration rate Net migration rate is the difference of immigrants and emigrants of an area in a period of time, divided per 1,000 inhabitants (considered on mid-term population). A positive value represents more people entering the country than leaving it, while a negative value mean more people leaving than entering it.
Fuelled by economic motivation, migration is often a household livelihood strategy. Increasingly, with the globalisation of production chains and downward pressures on wages, migrants fill jobs that locals in higher income host countries are no longer willing to do in plantations, agriculture, construction and some services industries – jobs that are known as “dirty, difficult and dangerous” (the 3Ds). As such, the construction industries in Singapore and Malaysia are almost entirely comprised of male migrants from India, Bangladesh, Thailand, China and Indonesia. Low skilled female migrant labour (both internal and international) also plays key role in the provision of domestic and care services across ASEAN countries. The ageing population and resulting “care crisis” in Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand has led to unprecedented demand for migrant labour from developing countries, most notably from the Philippines and in the case of Thailand, migrants from Myanmar. The feminisation of labour migration globally and regionally presents particular challenges for the legal protection of female migrant workers. Who are migrants? Internal, international, informal and female Low-income international migrants hail from lower-income countries, but not necessarily the poorest families, as some level of resources are required in order to migrate initially.3 A focus on international migration tends to obscure the importance of internal migration in Southeast Asia. Internal migration, mostly from rural to urban areas, has increased in recent decades as low-yield agriculture prompts movement towards urban employment opportunities in manufacturing and high yield agriculture. In addition, circular migration between villages and other destinations has been observed as the dominant pattern of movement of poorer groups.4 Migrant networks have sustained rural-urban ties and a review of studies indicates that temporary migrants are more likely to be older, male, have lower education levels, married, living in poorer conditions and remitting more of their income to support households in rural areas.5 Whilst migrant profiles differ by education and wealth, internal migrants are often young adults (late teens to early twenties) and increasingly are women. Demographic trends account for increased levels of migration observed regionally; the proportion
5
Trends in migrant stock, 2010
Net migration rate (per 1,000 population), 2005–2010
Estimated number of international migrants at midyear, 2010
Estimated number of refugees at midyear, 2010
International migrants as a percentage of the population, 2010
Refugees as a percentage of international migrants, 2010
Brunei
1.8
148,123
0
36.4
0
Cambodia
-3.7
335,829
139
2.2
0
Indonesia
-1.1
122,908
308
0.1
0.3
Laos
-2.5
18,916
0
0.3
0
Malaysia
0.6
235,7603
35,122
8.4
1.5
Myanmar
-2.1
88,695
0
0.2
0
Philippines
-2.8
435,423
103
0.5
0
Singapore
30.9
1,966,865
6
40.7
0
Thailand
1.5
1,157,263
129,380
1.7
11.2
Vietnam
-1
69,307
2,357
0.1
3.4
Sources: UN World Population Prospects, 2010 Revision http://esa.un.org/wpp/unpp/panel_indicators.htm and International Migrant Stock, 2008 Revision http://esa.un.org/migration/index.asp?panel=1
of young adults aged between 15–24 has remained consistent at 18% of the population in Southeast Asia between 1970 and 2010. Urban areas are becoming increasingly “young” in their demographic profiles.5 Internal migration is an under-reported phenomenon but a recent United Nations Development Programme working paper provides some estimates. For example, most internal movement in Indonesia takes place between municipalities (n=314), with a migration density of 3.98%. In Malaysia the migration density is highest between districts (8.1%, n=136) and in Vietnam most movement occurs between communes (6.5%, n=1,203).6 As a report by the Overseas Development Institute notes, internal migration holds more potential for poverty alleviation than international migration for four main reasons: 1. Internal migration stems from a broader base where smaller sums of money are evenly distributed to specific areas and poor families through internal remittances (rather than international remittances, which reach fewer people); 2. Internal migration will likely continue to increase at a faster rate than international migration;
3. Internal migration involves poorer people (relative to international migrants) from poorer regions and has a strong role to play in achieving the Millenium Development Goals; and 4. It is an important driver of growth in many sectors including agriculture, manufacturing, construction, coastal economies and services.4 The concentration of women as both internal and international migrants is striking; 87% of international migrants in the services sector (new hires) from the Philippines in 2010 were women (70% of whom were domestic workers)7; in Thailand, females dominate the trend of migration to urban areas (see table on next page). This trend is broadly attributable to expanded opportunities in industrial employment and the services sector, particularly linked to export-led development models pursued by Southeast Asian countries such as the Philippines and Vietnam, the concurrent establishment of Free Trade Zones and the concentration of female employees within them. In several Southeast Asian countries, over 80% of the labour force in Free Trade Zones are female.5
6
Migration streams by sex, Thailand, 2007 Destination
Urban areas
Source
Male
Female
Urban areas
190,956
192,782
Rural areas
140,955
144,224
Abroad
5,193
4341
Unknown
53
151
Total
337,157
341,498
Rural areas
322,943
300,238
Urban areas
434,496
323,892
Abroad
25,313
8,901
Total
782,752
633,031
Rural areas
Sources: Source: Thailand National Statistics Office, Migration Survey 2007, Table 12
Age profiles of 5-year internal migration intensity for ‘major regions’, selected countries in Asia
Sources: Bell M & Muhidin S (2009) “Cross National Comparisons of Internal Migration”, UNDP human development research paper 2009 / 30, p. 40 (ref. 7)
In all countries except Singapore, migrants are most often found in the informal sector. Estimates from the International Labour Organisation show that 42.3% of the workforce in Thailand and 68.2% in Vietnam were in the informal sector (excluding agriculture) in 2010 and 2009 respectively.8 According to the Thai Health Working Group, the informal sector in Thailand contributes approximately 70% of GDP and most informal sector workers
(often migrants from Mekong countries and Myanmar) are concentrated in agriculture and fisheries. These workers are 1.64 times more likely to incur occupational injuries than formal sector workers, most commonly via working with hazardous chemicals (59.6%) and heavy machinery (19.8%).9 Clearly, steps need to be taken to ensure safer working conditions for informal workers, the majority of whom are migrants.
Case study
Out of Bangkok: opportunities await in Mae Sot, a Thai–Burmese border town
Gestures bridge the language gap between the Thai hawker and Burmese customers.
During the field trip to Thailand, the research team met Mae-Noi and Lalana, mother and daughter, who jointly operate a mobile hawker business. At the time of the visit (April 2011), they had been in Mae Sot for only two months. Originally, they were farmers in Kamphaeng Phet province, but decided to start a new life in Bangkok. The hard life as a farmer and the low economic returns were not what they wanted to do for the rest of their lives. They tried to make a living with a food stall in the streets of the Thai capital. But living costs in the city are much higher than in the countryside and the sheer amount of small food businesses was tough competition. “We had to sell our food at low prices which left only very small profits for ourselves. Life in Bangkok is also very expensive” says Mae-Noi. Following the advice of her sister, Mae-Noi moved to the Thai– Burmese border town to run the food stall. The stall and the branding are part of a franchise called “Rich brother” (translation), which according to mother and daughter helps to attract customers. The cost of running a business in Mae Sot is only a fraction of
what they had to pay in Bangkok – the rent for the mobile stall, equipment and the cost of ingredients are significantly lower. Moreover, the hawkers face less competition and can rely on a continuous flow of income from the border population. Mae-Noi estimates that 60% of her customers are Burmese, consisting of migrant labourers, businessmen and women who commute daily to sell their produce on the Thai side of the border, as well as refugees. During the day time the area around the border crossing is bustling with activity. Every day, mother and daughter serve Burmese and Thai customers from 12pm to 10pm. They don’t complain. Mae-Noi sums up her new situation: “Here at the border, there are always hungry customers in transit. And we don’t have much competition. […] It was the right decision to move away from Bangkok”. While the temporary closing of the Thailand–Burma friendship bridge has slowed down business, there are still enough Burmese who cross the shallow river with floats 200 metres downstream. The Thai border patrols passively watch the stream of humans flowing in and out of Myawaddy, the town on the Burmese side.
8
The politics of migration: there is no “free” labour market Despite rhetoric of trade liberalisation particularly in the services, with ASEAN moving toward the “free movement of goods, people and services” under the auspice of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) by 2015, there is no free market in the movement of peoples. Globally, restrictions on immigrant inflows are political by nature (job protectionism for locals, who might otherwise be undercut by lower-cost migrant labour); Southeast Asian host countries are no exception to this trend. Whilst “3D” work that locals are unwilling to undertake is outsourced, entry to middle to high skill level work requiring formal educational qualifications is restricted for foreign migrants. In Singapore, guest worker schemes for low skilled migrants clearly differentiate the types of employment open to nationals from specific countries, e.g. work permits for foreign domestic workers from six specified countries only. Undoubtedly, this leads to stratification of the labour market along ethnic and national lines, which can pose its own set of problems for social cohesion. Employers in Singapore are incentivised not to employ excessive numbers of low skilled migrant workers by posting a security bond of S$5,000 (US$3,903) for non-Malaysian workers, as well as a monthly migrant worker levy ranging from S$50 (US$39) to S$470 (US$367). Employers of foreign domestic workers must also take out personal accident insurance of at least S$10,000 (US$7,807) for each worker.11
workers in Singapore for example are entitled to a mandatory day off, whereas domestic workers do not avail of this right. In Malaysia and Thailand, weak governance structures related to low-income migrants will likely lead to further tensions between host and source countries (Indonesia periodically issues bans on the movement of domestic workers to Malaysia following rights abuses, one of which was recently lifted). These tensions will not be resolved unless the governance architecture becomes well defined and implemented on the ground, via proper registration systems for migrants and decent working conditions.
Temporary guest worker programmes predominate in ASEAN, with several exclusionary features including restrictions to seeking employment in different occupations to the job presently held, mandatory health tests (such as HIV) and not being allowed to bring family members into the host country. In Malaysia, guest worker schemes have been less regulated than in Singapore. In Thailand, such schemes have been largely inconsistent in the last few decades.12 In Malaysia and Thailand, governments issue periodic calls for official worker registration of illegal migrants and also conduct random expulsions of selected illegal migrants and refugees – the subject of much controversy.
According to one researcher, in Indonesia alone there are around 500 licensed agencies that recruit and transport migrants to employers overseas. But, these agencies depend heavily on informal brokers or “field agents” who handle the actual recruitment of migrants in villages across Indonesia. In some cases, informal brokers are blamed for obscuring information from potential migrants and charging steep fees for their services. But in most cases, informal brokers are respected local figures, like school teachers, and the focus on the migrant-broker relationship may detract attention from the core issue; an inadequate migration governance architecture, such as bilateral agreements and legal protection of migrant workers.14
It is clear that government immigration policies in the three main host countries are better defined for high skilled workers than for low skilled workers, related to a preoccupation with ramping up the knowledge intense services sector as part of economic growth strategies. This is exemplified in the case of Singapore. Employment rights and access to social welfare for low skilled and low-income migrants is almost non-existent and again defined according to work function – construction
How do people move? Agencies and brokers – temporary debt bondage Thailand is the main destination for migrant flows from the Mekong countries, whilst the channels to Singapore and Malaysia are more mixed. But migrants do not make the journey alone. A thriving industry of private agencies has sprung up to meet demand from migrants to source work and from employers seeking low-cost labour. This growing industry dominates the organisation of migrant flows within and beyond Asia partly because receiving states are often unwilling to make bilateral temporary-worker arrangements with source countries.13
The agency (or informal brokers) migration network is pervasive in Asia, especially in cases where host and source countries are located further apart, such as the Philippines and the Middle East, whereas social networks play a greater role in the movement of Mekong nationals into Thailand.15 In all cases, migrants are charged exorbitant fees, especially new recruits. A 2006 report by Transient Workers Count 2 (TWC2), a migrant rights advocacy
Case study
Welfare services for migrants in Singapore
Migrant workers in Singapore take on jobs usually shunned by the locals.
In response to the questionable state of regulations on migrant worker rights in several Southeast Asian countries, various advocacy groups have emerged as the last (and sometimes only) line of defense against migrant worker exploitation. Two such organisations highlighted below have contributed to migrant worker welfare in Singapore: Humanitarian Organisation for Migration Economics (HOME) and Transient Workers Count Too ( TWC2). HOME is an non-governmental organisation that specialises in empowering and protecting the welfare of low-income migrant workers in Singapore. It was formally registered as a society in September 2004 and has since provided their services to over 50,000 migrants in Singapore. Their activities fall into three broad categories: welfare, empowerment and advocacy. The welfare component of their activities is perhaps the most directly beneficial to migrants in the short-term. The services include shelter and food for those in need, free medical checkups, financial and employment assistance, as well as recreational and communal activities. HOME also provides a helpdesk and a phone helpline for paralegal counseling and conflict resolution. These services help to fill the various gaps in provision of public services for migrants. The empowerment component is comprised of various workshop and training programmes for migrants. The skills training
programmes include IT and financial literacy. The other workshops include HIV/AIDS education, human rights workshops and paralegal workshops. The advocacy component is comprised of influencing policies and societal paradigms in Singapore. HOME organises public education programmes on the problems that migrant workers face. In addition, HOME also has regular dialogues with authorities and policymakers on migrant worker rights issues. TWC2 is another non-governmental organisation that is quite similar in function to HOME. TWC2 provides services such as skills training, free meals, legal counseling as well as a helpdesk and helpline service. However, what differentiates TWC2 from HOME is its research wing. TWC2 realised that in order to be successful in their advocacy efforts, they would need to produce rigorous research to support it. The organisation’s past research undertakings include an in-depth study on problems surrounding foreign domestic workers in Singapore that was published in 2003, as well as a 2006 report entitled “Debt, Delays, Deductions: Wage Issues Faced by Foreign Domestic Workers in Singapore�. The main benefit of these research reports to the welfare of migrant workers is that their narratives are now reinforced by hard evidence, leading to a stronger case for improving their situation.
10
Human trafficking in Southeast Asia
Sources: US Department of State, Trafficking in Human Persons report, June 2011, p. 57
organisation in Singapore, found that agency fees for foreign domestic workers averaged S$1,700 for Filipina recruits, S$1,400 for Indonesians and S$498 for Sri Lankans. Women in their sample faced an average of six months of salary deductions, leaving them with an average of S$29 monthly pay during that period.16 A joint report with the Humanitarian Organisation for Home Economics found that average placement fee for Indian construction workers was S$6,000–S$7,000, S$8,000–S$10,000 for Bangladeshi workers and S$3,000–S$7,000 for Chinese workers, with an average of ten months potential salary being forfeited to repay these fees.17
into slave-like exploitation due to severe power imbalances between the lender and the borrower. The system persists due to poverty, absence of alternative credit sources, a lack of justice and rule of law”.18 His efforts to quantify human trafficking specifically are complicated by the fact that no global definition of the term exists, leaving brokers, agents and employers that practice effective debt bondage with migrant workers the prospect of “immense profit at little to no real risk”. Without a legal definition of human trafficking, debt bondage as the most common form of migrant exploitation will likely persist in the medium term in the region.
Human trafficking Those agencies that do exploit the lack of regulation regarding fees and information asymmetries between workers and employers are implicated in human trafficking across the Southeast Asia region. Human trafficking expert Siddarth Kara estimates that at the end of 2010 there were 30–36 million slaves worldwide, some trafficked within and across borders; the definition of slavery includes “those who enter into the condition due to absence of a reasonable alternative (i.e. out of economic desperation)”, often via debt bondage. This form of slavery “involves the exploitive interlinking of credit and labour agreements that devolve
The US Trafficking in Persons June 2011 report noted that no government in Southeast Asian fully complies with the Trafficking Victims Protection Act’s minimum standards, otherwise known as tier 1. Most countries do not comply with the Act’s minimum standards, but are making significant efforts to do so (tier 2), but worryingly half of ASEAN (Brunei, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam) are on the tier 2 watch list, where the absolute number of victims may be increasing or there is a failure to provide evidence of efforts to counter human trafficking. Burma does not comply with the minimum standards as it not making significant efforts to do so (tier 3) according to the report.19
Case study
Starting a new life in a legal grey zone: a Burmese refugee family
A poster in Burmese / Arabic. It is not uncommon to see notices in these languages in addition to Thai in Mae Sot.
20 years ago, Madame Khin* decided to run away from her home in Burma after she was randomly arrested and harassed by a Burmese police officer. She belongs to the Muslim ethnic minority of the Rohingya people settled in western Burma. She wanted to escape the forlorn life of poverty and made her way over the Thailand–Burma border to Mae Sot. Madame Khin is the head of a household of 11 members, all living in a former warehouse. The household is comprised of three small children, two teenagers, two working men, two women and two older women. However, only the children have Thai citizenship and are thus on secure legal ground. Madame Khin herself would be a considered an illegal immigrant under the law, but by staying out of trouble she has avoided the authorities for more than two decades. She is now taking care of her two grandchildren after her daughter and son-in-law passed away following an HIV infection. She hasn’t brought her grandchildren for HIV tests, in fear of what the results might be. The working adults barely earn enough money to cover the rent for the warehouse and the family tries to make ends meet by renting out storage space to Burmese merchants operating in Mae Sot. They also run an improvised coffee shop on the pavement in front of their house but it does not generate much returns. From time to time Khin’s sister helps out with a monthly contribution of her income as a tailor, typically she can spare between Thai Bt 1,000–2,000 (approximately US$32–64).
Hundreds of migrants cross the Thai–Burma border daily; some legally via this checkpoint, others not.
When asked whether she could imagine going back to Burma one day, Madame Khin shakes her head. “I have lived here for such a long time, Mae Sot is my home now, and I just wished it was possible for me to visit my relatives,” she says. According to figures from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Myanmar is the largest source of refugees in Southeast Asia, and globally it ranks 13th behind Iraq, Afghanistan and Somalia. Starting from 1984, refugees have fled to Myanmar’s neighbouring states; it is considered as one of the world’s most intractable refugee situations. (The Thailand Burma Border Consortium provides a brief history of the border situation at http://www.tbbc.org/camps/history.htm#6)20 Currently, there are just below 150,000 registered Burmese refugees in camps located along the Thailand Burma border, but the number of Burmese migrant workers, legal and illegal, is much larger.21 One of the issues is the confusion between refugees who fled from persecution and migrant workers seeking a better life. In consequence, “legitimate asylum seekers and refugees are instead treated as migrants in breach of immigration laws” says Kitty McKinsey, regional spokeswoman for UNHCR.22 The Thai media aggravates the negative public perception of refugees and migrants alike by portraying them as “unlawful”, “dangerous”, “disease carriers” and “drug traffickers.” *The name has been changed to protect her identity.
12
Migrants and population health: a politically sensitive topic Contrary to popular belief, young adult migrants, the largest migrant group in Southeast Asia, are generally healthier than non-migrants in host countries and those left behind, due to selectivity bias when migration is selective of those in higher socioeconomic groups.23 Importantly though, the health migrant bias may disappear when low-income migrants are concentrated in “3D” (dirty, difficult and dangerous) jobs. Poor living and working conditions can put them at higher risk of occupational injuries, psychosocial or physical health problems. For migrants beyond retirement age, poor health can prompt the decision to migrate, alluding to the retiree tourism trend seen amongst Japanese and Caucasian elderly to Thailand and the Philippines. Migration can also engender health impacts on those left behind, particularly children experiencing the departure of a parent. A study undertaken by the Child Health and Migrant Parents in Southeast Asia project found that children under 12 years old of migrant fathers in Indonesia and Thailand were more likely to have poor psychological well-being (experiencing emotional or conduct disorders during separation) compared to children in non-migrant households. But this was not the case in the Philippines or Vietnam. This stands in contrast to the popular conception that the children of migrant mothers are most at risk from negative impacts.24 Bar a handful of studies, little research has focused on “those left behind” and as migration accelerates in the region, it will become increasingly important for source countries to consider the forms of social support that families may need when a household member migrates. Migration in 3D jobs with poor living and working conditions can affect the spread of infectious diseases within migrant communities and host country populations. But contextual factors influence the degree to which migration is linked to the spread of infectious diseases. One study found that the type of migratory movement is correlated with HIV rates in Indonesia. Contract workers involved in rural – urban circulation e.g. transport, seafaring, as well as labour migrants in isolated worksites, like in mining, construction, are most at risk from HIV infection.25 Burma is the second largest opium and heroin producer and exporter in the world, and illicit drug use has been linked to HIV spread in Burma’s border regions with China, Bangladesh, India and Thailand. The increased incidence of malaria and tuberculosis in the Burmese–Thai border region has also been linked to large
Two foreign workers hanging out in Geylang, a red-light district in Singapore.
scale migratory movement, in contrast to declining rates of these diseases observed elsewhere in Thailand.26 Migrant health is a politically sensitive topic. Governments generally discourage actions that could increase the labour cost of doing business for foreign investors, including compulsory health insurance and preventative health programmes. What may help better policies to be formulated to the benefit of both migrants and host country populations? • Specific research into the behavioural patterns of temporary workers to assess their HIV risk and the identification of “hotspot” areas, like in Indonesia, high concentrations of mobile workers are found in Batam. Hotspots and migrant occupations deemed “high risk” may be enable appropriate identification and targeting of prevention programmes; • In host countries, openness to the realities of health seeking beliefs and practices amongst migrant groups, including pre marital sex, the use of prostitutes and drugs27; and • Cost benefit analyses of infectious disease spread and migrant health interventions may increase the political appeal of investing in these interventions, if attention is drawn to the costly consequences of inaction.
Case study
Helping Burmese migrants to access health services in Mae Sot
Dr Cynthia Muang outside the clinic's library.
“More than 50% of our patients are from inside Burma – even the central provinces” explains Dr Cynthia Muang of the Mae Tao Clinic. These internally displaced persons (IDPs) often lack access to health services in Burma, with some travelling through dense jungle for up to seven days to receive treatment at the Mae Tao Clinic. Most Burmese migrants in Thailand come to escape the fighting between the Burmese government and minority groups, especially the Karen people, whilst others come to Thailand for greater employment opportunities in factories. The Mae Tao Clinic estimates that there are over 550,000 IDPs within Burma, with the largest concentration along the Thailand–Burma border, in addition to over two million Burmese migrant workers in Thailand (most of them illegal). Mae Tao Clinic treats most patients for free at the clinic as many cannot afford to pay for services, “they need at least 200–300 baht to come to the clinic” a great sum for IDPs. Knowing the challenges faced by migrants to reach the clinic, the Mae Tao Clinic works with other nongovernmental organisations like the Backpack Health Worker Team training Burmese mobile medics to provide preventive and maternal and child health services in the Karen villages bordering
Thailand, often dangerous work in the presence of landmines and daily fighting between the Karen fighters and the army. With a 120,000 caseload in 2010, the Mae Tao Clinic received between 800–1,000 referrals for caesarean sections at the clinic, with up to eight babies per day delivered onsite. Emergency obstetrics cases are referred to the nearby Mae Sot Hospital. Since the HIV/AIDs programme started, they receive 300–350 cases per year. Mae Sot has the highest infectious disease rate in Thailand with the most malaria cases in Tak province, due to mosquito breeding in the forests where refugee camps are located and lack of awareness of malaria prevention. “70% of our malaria cases are from within Burma, mostly severe cerebral malaria” says Dr Cynthia, “but the number of patients has decreased in the last eight months since the border closed” (at the time of interview in April 2011). According to Dr Ronnatrai Rueangweerayut, one of the Mae Sot Hospital’s directors, the border closed because the Burmese side was unhappy about the services being provided to the mostly Karen migrants / IDPs on the Thai side of the border, but now there is more illegal movement. Treatment at the
Case study
Mae Sot Hospital receives several landmine cases each week.
hospital for Burmese migrants takes a lot longer than for local patients “as they often come at a late stage”, with the majority coming due to landmine injuries, late stage malaria and tuberculosis – many of those patients experience a double blow of a drug resistant strain of tuberculosis and HIV / AIDS. The Mae Sot Hospital has hired 20 translators and several Burmese health promotion workers to conduct community health education with the factory worker population in Mae Sot, promising “as the Thai side works well with communicable disease prevention” according to Dr. Cynthia. There is an understanding that regardless of ability to pay, local health NGOs and the Thai health authorities work together to do what they can for the Burmese population. "Local Thai health workers are aware of the problems, they’re in the front line,” Dr Cynthia acknowledges. Challenges faced by Dr Cynthia include reluctance by some donors to donate to the Mae Tao Clinic as they are not a registered organisation, although they have received bilateral donations from large foundations such as the UK Department For International Development and USAID. A particular challenge involves streamlining funding into core programmes, as donors often prefer to fund specific programmes that they can “own”. “We are using standard protocols to report results to avoid funding overlaps, with about 60–65% success in doing this so far,” she
explains. But, there exists a funding shortage due to the growing volume of patients received by the clinic. Nearby Mae Sot Hospital faces a similar issue – there is no specific funding to provide services to the Burmese migrants, but the hospital treats everyone in need. Mae Sot is comprised of around 100,000 Thais and 140,000 Burmese workers, only 30,000 of whom are registered workers. Burmese and Karen migrants comprise up to 30% of inpatients and 18% of outpatients, but only Thai citizens are covered by the Universal Coverage health financing scheme. The migrants often have no health insurance or means to pay for services. At the time of writing (October 2011), it is not known how the recent closure of Medicins Sans Frontiers clinics along the border, which was servicing an estimated 50,000 in refugee camps, will affect the health situation of the Burmese IDPs / migrants nor the caseloads of Mae Tao Clinic and Mae Sot Hospital.28 But, it is clear that with the ongoing conflict, Burmese IDPs / migrants will continue to depend on this largely informal network of health services. For more information, please see: • Mae Tao Clinic: http://maetaoclinic.com • Mae Sot Hospital: http://www.maesot-hospital.com
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Migration and remittances The impact of migrant remittances (private money transfers) on developing countries in ASEAN in macroeconomic terms is significant. The remittances of Filipino migrant workers contributed 11.7% of GDP in 2009, followed by 7% in Vietnam and 3% in Cambodia that same year according to the World Bank. These figures however, do not capture the estimated value of remittances via informal channels. Remittances often cover trade deficits in developing countries, and broad remittance trends point to a positive impact during recessions, to the extent that migrants are altruistically motivated and send more money home. A study of Filipino remittances during the 1997–98 Asian financial crisis found that favourable exchange rate shocks for some currencies enabled remittance receiving families to receive more pesos per dollar (despite a dip in aggregate remittance inflows) with positive impacts on human capital accumulation and entrepreneurship, reduced child labour and increased educational expenditure in origin households. There was also
evidence found for more hours worked in self-employment and subsequent entry into relatively capital-intensive enterprises.29 But a dearth of empirical work on the macroeconomic impact of remittances does not enable a clear causal link between remittances and poverty alleviation to be made. Because remittances are private flows of money and not taxable in most countries, the extent to which they can be harnessed for large scale infrastructure building and development in origin countries is limited. Furthermore, there is mixed evidence on the microeconomic impact of remittances at the level of the individual migrant, family and community. Positive impacts have been cited by the majority of work in this area, including the increased ability of remittance receiving families to purchase land, durable assets, investments in education and consumption purchases that stimulate the local economy, including for non-migrant households.30,31 For example, when a remittance-receiving household decides to construct a house, the local construction business is engaged with positive effects on wages, prices and employment.
Remittances inflows (US$ million), 1995–2010, selected countries
Source: World Development Indicators, 2010.
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Remittances outflows (US$ million), 1995–2009, selected countries
Source: World Development Indicators, 2010.
Negative impacts include widening income inequality between migrant and non-migrant households (due to migrant selectivity – international migrants in particular tend to be from wealthier families), meaning that the direct beneficiaries of remittances are also not the poorest community members. Importantly, poorer groups migrate internally with lower income (remittance) gains than international migrants. A study of Chinese migrants found that internal migration increased a household’s per capita income by 8–13%, but that the impact on poverty was modest because the poorest people do not migrate, even internally.32 Who remits? Migrant selectivity partly explains why more educated migrants remit more – because they earn more.33 Disturbingly, advocacy behind many guest worker programmes (like those in Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore) is partly predicated on the “temporary migrant hypothesis” that temporary, single migrants remit more and thus guest worker programmes are actually beneficial to development in source countries – even though the profile of those whose who remit is heterogeneous. Migration expert Hein de Haas proposes a more dynamic model of remittances whereby integration indicators such as employment and income tend to have a positive
effect on migrant’s capability to remit.34 Prices of remittances also influence remittance activity. Recent work shows that the price of remitting is reduced when there are a) large numbers of migrants and more competition amongst remittance providers and/or b) lower barriers to access financial services and well regulated remittance service providers.35 In general, we can conclude that securitising remittance flows, increasing access to financial services and lowering the cost of remitting benefits migrants regardless of their demographic profile. Looking ahead Migrants face insecure / temporary and sometimes dangerous working conditions and a general lack of access to social security schemes in Southeast Asian host countries. One way out of the contract migration cycle is to save and invest to realise sustainable, enduring economic returns whilst they are working overseas and when they return to the Philippines.36 This is possible through encouraging the design of financial products in host countries catering to the migrant’s needs and investment in micro-enterprises run by themselves or families. This could permit migrants to take a proactive role in shaping their own futures, rather than as subject to structural constraints that provoke them to seek employment abroad in the first place.37
Case study
Enabling life choice via financial and business education: aidha
Attending classes at aidha.
“Without aidha, I would not have achieved the goals for my future” says Norma, at aidha’s 2011 graduation ceremony. “I have developed a confidence in myself and now I can speak in front of many people. In the compass (savings) club I’ve learned how to budget my expenses and monitor my remittances; now I can say a big “no” if they (family) ask for money for no reason”. Around 100 foreign domestic workers like Norma attend aidha, a microbusiness school for migrants located in Singapore, every Sunday to build the self confidence, financial literacy and business skills necessary to start their own business back home, expand their economic opportunities and end the cycle of contract migration. Over 1,200 students have enrolled in aidha’s programmes since its founding in 2006, hailing from the Philippines and Indonesia and increasingly India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and China. It is not uncommon for foreign domestic workers to have no savings after 10 or even 20 years of working in Singapore, as was the case for Susana, an aidha student. But, after nine months of the compass club and armed with budgeting techniques and her first bank account, she managed to save $960 that she is setting aside to establish a piggery business in the Philippines. The concrete impact of this programme is clear: on average, aidha students manage to save around $240 per month, just over half of the mean monthly salary. A recent survey with compass club alumni showed a 100% savings rate after completion of the programme. aidha’s curriculum is designed to leverage peer support with the assistance of mentor volunteers, with the first nine months comprising of computer workshops, a compass (savings) club and leadership clubs, modeled on the toastmasters format to
build confidence and public speaking skills. During the second 9-month component, students continue to attend leadership clubs, as well as advanced business IT skill workshops, like advanced powerpoint and business accounting. From October 2011 students will participate in venture clubs, a revised entrepreneurship programme organised around the analysis of real-world business cases, a learning approach employed in the world’s most prestigious business schools. Video case studies developed by aidha will be screened to provoke discussion on all aspects of business planning from strategy, marketing, operations and business finance, affording practical insight into business problems and solutions and skill and confidence in problem definition. Importantly, students will also be introduced to a powerful set of role models in the case protagonists. It is aidha’s vision that the venture clubs result in the creation of hundreds more businesses in the Philippines, Indonesia, Burma and India following the success of aidha’s prior entrepreneurship course. A recent alumni survey of 52 entrepreneurship graduates revealed that 66% had invested their savings in two or more income-generating assets (e.g. land for business purposes, livestock, transport). Over 60% had previously set up a business, with 79% of these businesses still running and generating an average of S$361 monthly profits, a substantial sum in the Philippines and Indonesia. For 9-in-10 business owners, this was sufficient to support the monthly expenses of their families either partially or fully. Looking ahead, aidha aims to scale up the delivery of the programme globally in areas where low-income migrants are concentrated, with the establishment of a branch in Abu Dhabi being the first step in this direction. aidha’s goal is to bring financial literacy and entrepreneurship training to 250,000 low income migrants worldwide by 2015 via a scalable learning programme that does not require subject matter experts (business school professors), but trained volunteer mentors that can help students to articulate and work towards self-defined goals. A major future challenge involves adapting to a rapidly evolving social enterprise funding landscape; alongside aidha’s first marathon fundraising campaign, the team is focusing its research efforts in quantifying the programme’s outcomes in anticipation that philanthropic donors and listings requirements for social stock exchanges will demand more and better performance metrics. For more information, please see: http://www.aidha.org/
Case study
Financial products for low-income migrants in host countries: PhilippineS National Bank
A growing stock of migrant workers inevitably leads to a growing amount of money and a growing demand for remittance services. This presents an opportunity for financial institutions that want to tap into the growing stock of money by offering attractive remittance services. One such example is the Philippines National Bank (PNB). As Singapore has a very large population of migrant workers from the Philippines, there is a large amount of profit that could potentially be made from providing remittance services. Thus, PNB has opened several branches in Singapore and has created a wide variety of remittance services that cater to all needs. The cheapest remittance service provided is the direct remittance from a PNB Singapore account to another PNB account in the Philippines. This is not only the cheapest service but also the one that offers the highest service quality: the money reaches the beneficiary account immediately, and there is an online banking option for remitters with internet access. The low service charge and high service quality act as incentives for both remitter and beneficiary to open PNB accounts. However, as not all remitters and beneficiaries have or wish to open PNB accounts, PNB provides other services in order to capture a higher market share. PNB now allows remittance payments to be made to accounts in other local banks in the Philippines.
PNB has also created the Global Filipino Card, a reloadable prepaid automated teller machine (ATM) card that beneficiaries can hold without opening a bank account. Remitters can transfer money directly to the ATM card. However, the most far-reaching of these remittance services are the over-the-counter and door-to-door services that allow beneficiaries to directly receive cash without opening bank accounts or needing to find an ATM. The over-the-counter service allows beneficiaries to claim the cash from a number of payout outlets in all major cities in the Philippines, while the door-to-door service allows direct delivery to the homes of the beneficiaries. These two services in particular are very useful for beneficiaries that are not technologically savvy or live in remote areas that don’t have access to bank branches and ATMs. These kinds of services are currently unique to PNB, and have not been replicated by other banks. Bank Negara Indonesia does not provide these extensive services for Indonesian remitters, despite also having branches in Singapore. Most banks in Singapore also provides very limited services for remittances, only handling inter-bank telegraphic transfers. However, as the number of international migrants continues to increase, other banks would do well to follow PNB’s lead and provide these cheap services, as they not only provide great value to unbanked remittance recipients, but also a great potential for profit.
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Looking ahead of products and of the prevalence of trafficking, we anticipate concerned individuals and non-governmental organisations exerting continued pressure on governments to crack down on human traffickers themselves, with serious pecuniary punishment being a major deterrent for potential offenders.
Migrant workers on a day-off in Hong Kong.
International labour migration flows within ASEAN will likely intensify in the years up to and beyond 2020 (AEC and free movement of peoples) alongside growing volumes of internal migration. The cyclical, temporary nature of these flows will not change unless restrictions on settling in destination areas are removed, if migrants can avail of social welfare and if the importance of maintaining ties with the village becomes less important for migrants themselves. These shifts are predicated on a host country's political commitments to expanding welfare benefits for migrants with the anticipated subsequent effect of lessened village ties as generations move to urban areas. In effect this may exert pressure on urban structures to become sustainable and livable. Existing templates for migrant social security schemes in host countries, such as the KT system in Vietnam, could be replicated in Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore, countries with large numbers of migrants (see reference 4). As more of the poor seek migratory economic opportunities against a backdrop of neoliberal economic restructuring, globalised supply chains, falling value of wages in real terms and sparse social welfare systems, the risks of people entering into debt bondage due to “lack of a reasonable alternative” will likely increase, reflected in Siddarth Kara’s estimates on the rising prevalence of modern slavery (including economically desperate migrants who enter into the condition) globally. Human trafficking remains a core area of concern for the region – there is a need to demonstrate the economic case for prevention / prosecution in a context where the promise of profit for traffickers far outweighs the risks. As consumers become more aware of the origin
We foresee that migrant worker organisation and advocacy for better working conditions and employment rights will increase in intensity and scope, with such demands received more favourably by host country governments dependent on migrant labour. For example, a recent ruling in Hong Kong permits Foreign Domestic Workers who have been working there for seven years or longer qualify for residency status – an estimated 200,000 Foreign Domestic Workers could be eligible.38 Indonesian migrant workers in Malaysia are now entitled to a day off per week and have permission to retain their passports. The countries are now convening a joint taskforce to establish a standard placement fee.39 Clearly, the contract between host country and migrant is changing, but this has other implications. We could see more instances of rent-seeking between labour officials colluding with errant employers to keep migration streams illegal and wage costs down. Remittances will remain a significant source of revenue for migrant families and source countries in the future. But the extent to which they alleviate poverty may be limited because of the nature of the flows (micro-level, private) which are currently not channelled towards macro-investment in infrastructure and public services. Much like microcredit, remittances are not a panacea for poverty alleviation and it is important to not overstate their impact. We anticipate seeing more interventions that lower the price of remittances and a broader range of financial products catering to the needs of migrants and their families (potentially brought about by the use of information and communications technology). Fundamentally, migration and remittances cannot be a substitute for macroeconomic mismanagement and limited job creation in source countries. As highlighted in this issue, many policy deficiencies and regulatory gaps related to migrant worker’s welfare and access to vital services remain. Innovative non-governmental organisations are helping to bridge gaps, but ultimately the host and source country legislation related to migrants must offer a better deal. What are your thoughts on these issues? Please send us a feedback via email, twitter or our website, www.asiantrendsmonitoring.com
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References 1. World Development Indicators, Net official development assistance and official aid received (current US$) & Migration and Development brief 16, 23 May 2011, World Bank.
12. Kaur A (2010) “Labour migration in Southeast Asia: migration policies, labour exploitation and regulation”. Journal of Asia Pacific Economy, 15 (1): 6 – 19.
2. International migrant stock: the 2008 revision. http://esa.un.org/migration/index.asp?panel=1
13. Castles S and Miller M (July 2009), Migration in the Asian-Pacific region, Migration Information Source. http://www.migrationinformation.org/ Feature/display.cfm?ID=733
3. De Haas H (2007) “Remittances, migration and social development: a conceptual review of the literature”. UNRISD working paper. http://www. unrisd.org/80256B3C005BCCF9/(httpAuxPages) /8B7D005E37FFC77EC12573A600439846/$file/ deHaaspaper.pdf 4. Deshingkar P (March 2006) “Internal migration, poverty and development in Asia”, Asia 2015 conference. http://www.eldis.org/vfile/upload/1/ document/0708/DOC21176.pdf 5. Guest P (June 2003) “Bridging the gap: internal migration in Asia”. Population Council, Thailand, paper prepared for conference on African migration in comparative perspective, Johannesburg, South Africa, 4 – 7. http://pum.princeton.edu/ pumconference/papers/1-Guest.pdf
14. Lingquist J, “Understanding Indonesian migration via labour brokers”, Asia Pacific Memo, 3 May 2011. http://www.asiapacificmemo.ca/ understanding-indonesian-migration-via-labourbrokers 15. Martin P, “Merchants of labour: labour recruiters in Asia”. Presentation at conference on “Opening the Black Box of Migration: Brokers and the Organisation of Transnational Mobility”, Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore, 19-20 August 2010.
6. Ibid.
16. ‘Debt, Delays, Deductions: Wage Issues Faced by Foreign Domestic Workers in Singapore’, a research report by Transient Workers Count Too (TWC2), Sept 2006. http://www.twc2.org.sg/site/our-publications/ debts-delays-deductions.html
7. Bell M & Muhidin S (2009) “Cross National Comparisons of Internal Migration”, UNDP human development research paper 2009 / 30. http:// hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2009/papers/ HDRP_2009_30.pdf
17. TWC2, HOME, “Justice Delayed, Justice Denied: The Experience of Migrant Workers in Singapore”, 2010 report. http://home.org.sg/downloads/ Justice%20Delayed%20Justice%20Denied%20 Report%202010.pdf
8. Philippines Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), Overseas Foreign Worker (OFW) statistics, deployment per skill per sex, 2010. http://www.poea.gov.ph/stats/2010%20 Deployment%20by%20Major,%20Sub-Major%20 Occupation%20and%20Sex%202010%20-%20 New%20hires.pdf
18. Kara S, “A $110 loan then 20 years of debt bondage”, CNN Freedom Project. http:// thecnnfreedomproject.blogs.cnn.com/2011/06/02/ a-110-loan-then-20-years-of-debt-bondage/
9. International Labour Organisation, Statistical update on employment in the informal economy, June 2011. 10. Thailand National Statistics Office (2008), The 2008 informal employed survey, whole kingdom. 11. Yeoh B (June 2007), Singapore: hungry for foreign workers at all skill levels, Migration Information Source. http://www. migrationinformation.org/feature/display. cfm?ID=570
19. US Department of State, Trafficking in Human Persons report, June 2011. 20. Thailand Burma Border Consortium (2011). A brief history of the Thailand Burma border situation. Retrieved October 20, 2011 from http://www.tbbc. org/camps/history.htm#6. 21. Thailand Burma Border Consortium (2011). Burmese Border Displaced Persons: July 2011. Retrieved October 20, 2011 from http://www.tbbc. org/camps/2011-07-jul-map-tbbc-unhcr.pdf. 22. Thai Freedom House (2010). The living conditions of Burmese Refugees in Thailand. Retrieved October 20, 2011 from http://www.
thaifreedomhouse.org/blog/burma-news/theliving-conditions-of-burmese-refugees-in-thailand/ 23. Jatrana, S, Graham, E and Boyle, P “Introduction: understanding migration and health in Asia” in Jatrana, S, Toyota, M and Yeoh, B (2005) Migration and health in Asia, London: Routledge, p. 1 - 15 24. Graham E, Jordan, L (2011) “Migrant Parents and the Psychological Well-Being of Left-Behind Children in Southeast Asia”, Journal of Marriage and Family (73): 763 – 787. 25. Hugo, G “Population movement in Indonesia: implications for the potential spread of HIV / AIDS” in Jatrana, S, Toyota, M and Yeoh, B (2005) Migration and health in Asia, London: Routledge, p. 17 - 40 26. Beyrer, C, Suwanvanichkij, V, Mullany, L.C, Richards, A.K, Franck, N, Samuels, A and Lee, T (2006) “Responding to AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, and emerging infectious diseases in Burma: dilemmas of policy and practice”, PLOS Medicine 3 (10) p. 1733 – 1740 27. Jones, G “Some policy issues on migrant health” in Jatrana, S, Toyota, M and Yeoh, B (2005) Migration and health in Asia, London: Routledge, p. 242 - 253 28. Irrawaddy, “MSF Thailand Pullout Will Affect Health Care in Eastern Burma”, 7 October 2011. http://reliefweb.int/node/451485 29. Yang, D (2008) “International Migration, Remittances, and Household Investment: Evidence from Philippine Migrants’ Exchange Rate Shocks, The Economic Journal, Vol. 118, April 2008, pp. 591-630. 30. Carling, J (2004) “Policy options for increasing benefits of remittances”, COMPAS Oxford University, briefing paper. Available at: http://www.compas. ox.ac.uk/fileadmin/files/pdfs/WP0408.pdf 31. Ramirez, C, Dominguez, M.G and Morais, J.M (2005) “Crossing borders: remittances, gender and development”, INSTRAW working paper. Available at: http://www.un-instraw.org/en/publications/ gender-remittances-and-development/crossingborders-gender-remittances-and-development/ view.html 32. Du, Y, Park A and Wang S.G (2005) “Migration and rural poverty in China”, Journal of Comparative Economics, 33 (4), p. 688 – 709. 33. Bollard A, McKenzie D, Morten M and Rapoport
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References H (2011), “Remittances and the brain drain revisited: the microdata show that more educated migrants remit more”, The World Bank Economic Review, 25 (1), p.132 – 156. 34. De Haas, H (2007), “Remittances, migration and social development: a conceptual review of the literature”, UNRISD, Social Policy and Development Programme Paper number 34, October 2007. 35. Beck, T and Peria MSM (2011), “What explains the price of remittances? An examination across 119 country corridors. The World Bank Economic Review, 25 (1), p. 105 – 131. 36. Mavrinac, S (2008) “Migrant women, financial education, and the implication of savings for sustainable return”, aidha / IDRC working paper 1 37. Gibson-Graham, J.K (2005a) “Surplus possibilities: post development and community economies”, Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography, 26 (1) p. 4-26 38. Voice of America news, “Hong Kong court rules in favor of domestic worker residency rights”, 30 September 2011. http://www.voanews. com/english/news/asia/Hong-Kong-CourtRules-in-Favor-of-Domestic-Worker-ResidencyRights-130844413.html 39. Ridwan Max Sijabat, Jakarta Post, “RI, Malaysia end standoff on migrant worker’s rights”, 31 May 2011. http://www.thejakartapost.com/ news/2011/05/31/ri-malaysia-end-standoff-migrantworker-rights.html
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Principal investigators
research associates
Darryl Jarvis is an Associate Professor at the LKY School of Public Policy. He specialises in risk analysis and the study of political and economic risk in Asia, including investment, regulatory and institutional risk analysis. He is an author and editor of several books and has contributed articles to leading international journals. He has been a consultant to various government bodies and business organisations and for two years was a member of the investigating team and then chief researcher on the Building Institutional Capacity in Asia project commissioned by the Ministry of Finance, Japan.
Johannes Loh is working as a Research Associate at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy. He holds a Master’s degree in Public Policy from the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin. His previous research experience includes international student mobility, visual political communication, aid governance and public sector reform in developing countries. Recently, he completed a research project on Success Factors for Police Reform in Post-conflict Situations with the German Technical Cooperation.
His current research is a large cross-national study of risk causality in four of Asia’s most dynamic industry sectors. He teaches courses on risk analysis, markets and international governance and international political economy. His email is darryl.jarvis@nus.edu.sg
Phua Kai Hong is a tenured professor at the LKY School of Public Policy and formerly held a joint appointment as Associate Professor and Head, Health Services Research Unit in the Faculty of Medicine. He is frequently consulted by governments within the region and international organisations, including the Red Cross, UNESCAP, WHO and World Bank. He has lectured and published widely on policy issues of population aging, healthcare management and comparative health systems in the emerging economies of Asia. He is the current Chair of the Asia-Pacific Health Economics Network (APHEN), founder member of the Asian Health Systems Reform Network (DRAGONET), Editorial Advisory Board Member of Research in Healthcare Financial Management and an Associate Editor of the Singapore Economic Review. His email address is spppkh@nus.edu.sg
T S Gopi Rethinaraj joined the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy as Assistant Professor in July 2005. He received his PhD in nuclear engineering from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Before coming to Singapore, he was involved in research and teaching activities at the Programme in Arms Control, Disarmament and International Security, a multi-disciplinary teaching and research programme at Illinois devoted to military and non-military security policy issues. His doctoral dissertation, “Modeling Global and Regional Energy Futures,” explored the intersection between energy econometrics, climate policy and nuclear energy futures. He also worked as a science reporter for the Mumbai edition of The Indian Express from 1995 to 1999, and has written on science, technology, and security issues for various Indian and British publications. In 1999, he received a visiting fellowship from the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Chicago, for the investigative reporting on South Asian nuclear security. His current teaching and research interests include energy security, climate policy, energy technology assessment, nuclear fuel cycle policies and international security. He is completing a major research monograph "Historical Energy Statistics: Global, Regional, and National Trends since Industrialisation" to be published in Summer 2012. His email address is spptsgr@nus.edu.sg
Prior to joining the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy he has also worked for the United Nations Environment Programme in Geneva, Transparency International Nepal and the Centre on Asia and Globalisation in Singapore. His email is johannes.loh@nus.edu.sg and you can follow his updates on trends in pro-poor policies in the region on Twitter @AsianTrendsMon
Nicola Pocock is a research associate at the LKY School of Public Policy. She is also the research manager at aidha, a non profit financial education and entrepreneurship training school for migrant women, especially domestic workers, in Singapore. She holds a BA from Warwick University and an MSc from Kings College London. Prior to joining the LKY School of Public Policy, she interned as a Fast stream trainee in the UK civil service at the Home Office and as a research volunteer at Amnesty International. Nicola has also carried out social work in Marseille, France as a European Union sponsored youth volunteer. Her research interests span health and social policy, health systems financing, social impact assessment, gender, migration and financial behaviours. Her email is sppnp@nus.edu.sg and you can follow his updates on trends in pro-poor policies in the region on Twitter @AsianTrendsMon #health
Taufik Indrakesuma is a research associate at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy. He is a recent graduate of the Master in Public Policy programme at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy. He also holds a Bachelor in Economics degree from the University of Indonesia, specialising in environmental economics. Taufik has previously worked as a Programme Manager at the Association for Critical Thinking, an NGO dedicated to proliferating critical thinking and human rights awareness in the Indonesian education system. His research interests include behavioural economics, energy policy, climate change mitigation and adaptation as well as urban development policy. His email is spptri@nus.edu.sg
The Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy is an autonomous, professional graduate school of the National University of Singapore. Its mission is to help educate and train the next generation of Asian policymakers and leaders, with the objective of raising the standards of governance throughout the region, improving the lives of its people and, in so doing, contribute to the transformation of Asia. For more details on the LKY School, please visit www.lkyspp.nus.edu.sg